

PEACE STUDIES  
JOURNAL

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# PEACE STUDIES JOURNAL

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Title: The Struggle for Resource Control and Its Implications on the Fragile Peace in the Horn of Africa

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## THE STRUGGLE FOR RESOURCE CONTROL AND ITS IMPLICATIONS ON THE FRAGILE PEACE IN THE HORN OF AFRICA

Jeffrey N. Umunna

### Abstract

The Horn of Africa is one of the most conflictive and uncertain locales in the world. Since the end of the colonial era, the locale has experienced inter-state wars, inter-state disputes, and a wide run of intra-state conflicts, as well as cross-border communal clashes and fear-mongering. Root causes and basic drivers of shakiness and flimsiness in the locale incorporate uncertain political settlements, savage radicalism, incapable security and governance structures, and deficient border boundaries and control. However, the conflict drivers are exacerbated by natural disasters, drought, and climate change. The Horn's 230 million inhabitants are exposed to the impacts of climate alteration such as dry seasons and surges. If not carefully handled, the changes and challenges may influence territorial peace and security. This calls for the intervention of extra-regional actors who aim for a more stable region to simultaneously address and evaluate the climate–conflict interrelationship that is affecting peace and security in the region. The paper draws to a close by offering thoughtful recommendations and policy guidelines to successfully tackle the change in

weather conditions and natural resource struggle challenges affecting peace and sustainable development in the regions.

## 1. Introduction

The Horn of Africa frequently faces the interaction and conversion of political, social, financial, and natural challenges. The Horn of Africa is a locale characterized by the European Union (EU) as the eight nations of the Inter-Governmental Authority on Development (IGAD): Djibouti, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Kenya, Somalia, South Sudan, Sudan, and Uganda. IGAD in Eastern Africa was established in 1996 to supersede the Inter-Governmental Authority on Drought and Development (IGADD) which was established in 1986 to relieve the impacts of the repeating extreme dry seasons and other natural catastrophes that give rise to broad starvation, environmental debasement, and financial hardship in the locale. The Horn of Africa contains one of Africa's largest countries (Sudan) and one of its smallest (Djibouti); the oldest (Ethiopia) and the newest (South Sudan) (Abshir, 2020).

This region covers 5.2 million square kilometers and a population of 230 million people with tremendous diversity in ethnicity, language, history, politics, and economic development; of which some 80 percent are economically dependent on agriculture – this region is also highly vulnerable to the impacts of climate change such as droughts and floods. These impacts compound many of the region's social, political, and economic challenges (IGAD, 2022).

Over the years, water and climate have been essential aspects of the enormous challenges encountered by the area. The Nile and Juba-Shabelle basins are of central significance for the Horn of Africa because of the interface and meeting of several political, social, economic, and environmental factors. The Nile River – with its two major tributaries, the Blue Nile and the White Nile is a primary source of water, vitality, and nourishment. The Blue Nile is of chief significance for Egypt, Ethiopia, and Sudan. As such the Nile has been a source of social and political pressures and low-intensity clashes for most of the 20th century (Krampe, De Goor, Barnhoorn, Smith & Smith, 2020).


While the Juba and Shabelle waterways are shared by Ethiopia and Somalia and to a negligible degree by Kenya, Ethiopia and Somalia have the clearest residential interface with the Juba-Shabelle Basin's water resources. The area around the basin, impacted by three decades of civil war and state collapse is reliant on the river for farming, drinking water, and hydropower. The region also links Asia and Europe through the Red Sea, the Suez Canal, and the Mediterranean Sea (Krampe, et al., 2020).

The Horn of Africa in any case remains one of the most volatile areas in the world. The locale has the generation-long struggle in Somalia that came out of a total state collapse in 1991 and is influenced by the armed clashes in Yemen and South Sudan. True causes and operational drivers of insecurity and volatility in the locale include indecisive political settlements, violent radicalism, feeble security and governance structures, and deficient border demarcation and control. Also, drivers of the conflict are worsened by natural disasters, drought, and climate change. In addition, natural resource exploitation leads to frictions over resource sharing exacerbated by considerable transnational organized crime. These factors all lead to continuous conflict cycles and numerous

displacements and migrations. The result is a region characterized by ungoverned spaces in which terrorism, piracy, irregular migration, and transnational organized crime flourish – all of which pose direct and indirect threats to security and welfare.

In Africa, climate change is contributing to observed changes in temperature, and rainfall activity, as well as the increase in frequency and intensity of both sudden- and slow-onset hazards such as droughts, floods, tropical storms, sea level rise, and heat waves across countries (Adaawen, 2024). Considering that the agricultural sector accounts for almost half (48%) of employment in Africa and more than 70 percent across some of the regions and countries, the devastating impact of climate change on the region has led to significant crop failures, livestock deaths, conflicts among the population, and in recent years exacerbated a migration crisis from the region (FAO, 2023). Oluoch (2023) declares that this mass development from the locale is driven by progressing frailty, clashes, unfavorable climate conditions, unemployment, political mistreatment, and financial downturns. Against this backdrop this paper examines the nexus and dynamics of climate change and the struggle for resource control in the Horn of Africa region, to highlight its security and welfare implications.

Figure 1: Map showing the Horn of Africa



Source: FOI Studies in African Security (Holmquist & Rock, 2023)

## 2. Conceptualizing Resource Control

The concept of resource control has been given numerous definitions by diverse researchers and analysts. There is no agreement on the meaning of the concept. Etymologically, asset control is the

method of controlling and designating a system's assets in a controlled design. Osaghae, Ikelegbe, Olarinmoye, and Okhomina (2008) see it as the "proprietaryship and control" of all assets which means the opportunity to eagerly arrange these assets, to transfer its estrangement or extraction without reference to a savage and or an undemocratic state.

According to Ojo (2010), resource control means the access of communities and state governments to natural resources deposited inside their boundaries and the flexibility to create and utilize these assets without impediment from external government. Put in an unexpected way, Ifedayo (2010), expressed that resource control does not just imply state admittance to assets inside a state's boundaries but moreover the utilization of these assets to their advancement without obstructions from other levels of government. Douglas (2005 cited in Okolo & Oziezi, 2021) states that resource control is the "actual control of assets by the individuals who live in communities with these assets for the bolster of life".

Daffione (2001) compares resource control to the exercise of genuine federalism and natural law in which the federating units express their right of proprietaryship to control the common assets inside their borders and make an agreed commitment toward the means, survival, and care of the common assets of the government at the center. Ofeimum (2005 cited in Dickson & Asua, 2016) looked at resource control from a different angle, he characterized resource control as an arrangement to guarantee the autonomy of the state maintaining these assets; while at the same time expressing that the control and administration of these assets ought to be a collaborative effort between the federal government and the states.

Simply put, resource control suggests that states or districts with natural resources are expected to work out continuous control over their assets, as intrinsically stipulated by the fundamentals of federalism. Henryik (2009) went further to delineate between who possesses and controls the assets and who builds up the laws for the administration and control of the assets. He opined that resource control involves that the assets mined from a specific locale or state belong to such locale or state, but function under government rules, especially ecological rules. He moreover expressed that an agreed rate ought to be paid to the federal government as a portion of the standards of federalism. The African landmass is well-gifted in terms of natural resources and substantial assets compared to world reserves. This avalanche of riches is a challenge for analysts since it has not driven the continent's rise, at least as an economic power. (Bassou, 2017).

Table 1: Percentage of natural (mineral) resources deposited in the continent of Africa

S/N	Natural resources mined	% of African reserves with world reserves
1.	Copper	97 %
2.	Coltan	80 %
3.	Cobalt	50 %
4.	Gold	57 %
5.	Iron	20 %
6.	Uranium and Phosphates	23 %
7.	Manganese	32 %
8.	Vanadium	41 %

9.	Platinum	49 %
10.	Diamonds	60 %
11.	Oil	14 %
12.	Arable land	65 %

Source: Bassou (2017)

Due to its wealthy store of natural resources, Africa up until today has been a focus of economic attention for Western powers and evolving nations like China. This competition and attention go beyond the struggle for her rich natural resources, it also targets her arable land, as a result of Africa's frailty and inability to develop this vast uncultivated areas itself. Nevertheless, despite its significance, the accessibility of wealth, in the frame of natural resources, tragically does not repeatedly produce growth and development in the African locale. Numerous nations in the continent of Africa are blessed with vast natural resources, still, they are among the world's poorest countries. For instance, Niger is among the top ten of the poorest nations in the world, even though it has a substantial amount of natural resources such as gold, iron, uranium, coal, and oil.

## 2.1 Resource Control Debate in the Horn of Africa

Water and wetlands are essential natural resources vital for socioeconomic development, especially in countries in the Horn of Africa region. Constituting national assets, these resources integrate terrestrial and aquatic environments including water, soil, and vegetation providing several critical ecosystem services that are indispensable to human beings and biodiversity's very survival, health, and welfare (Mishra, Kumar, Saraswat, Chakraborty, & Gautam, 2021).

The Juba and the Shabelle are rivers that generate fertile floodplains, sustain essential agriculture and crop production, and supply inhabitants in the region, especially Somalia with water. The region around the basin, marked by civil war and state collapse, is economically highly dependent on agriculture and needs to increase water usage for drinking water, as well as for the production of food and hydropower. While each country has its interests and needs, there has never been a bilateral agreement surrounding cooperation over the rivers' usage (Elmi, 2013). The potential of transboundary cooperation regarding the water resources of the Juba–Shabelle Basin has been, and continues to be shaped by domestic interests and interstate tensions, and by the consequences of over thirty years of civil war in Somalia. The possibility of interstate conflict due to these tensions is currently low because of Ethiopia's comparatively hegemonic military, economic and diplomatic influence, and upstream geographic position (Elmi, 2013).

The decisions of the riparian countries surrounding basin development and potential transboundary cooperation regarding the Juba–Shabelle Basin have been influenced by domestic interests and interstate tensions since the 1980s. On a transnational level, these country-level decisions have interacted with the policies of different government actors related to the construction of projects on international waterways. The multilateral actors with the most influence on these dynamics are notably financial institutions, specifically the World Bank. Early efforts by the World Bank to negotiate the use and development of the basin cited the 1968 African Convention on the Conservation of Nature and Natural Resources (Salman, 2011).

Somalia completed a master plan in 1989 for the development of the Juba Valley, which included the Baardheere Dam on the Juba River. This dam would control the movement of the river and was planned to help in advancing the generation of energy and guaranteeing food security (Elmi, 2013). After Somalia solicited for support from the World Bank for the dam in 1983, the bank stated that due to its policy on financed ventures for international waterways that may have detrimental impacts on other riparians, the nation state would have to notify Ethiopia and Kenya of its intents. As a result of strains with Ethiopia, Somalia entreated the bank to pass on its activities, which it did in 1986.

While Kenya did not respond, Ethiopia subsequently raised objections to the dam, citing a lack of consideration of Ethiopia's future use of the basin (Salman, 2011). These objections indicated concern that Somalia's development of the basin would increase its claim to the water resources in the event of future negotiations (Elmi, 2013).

Additionally, the Ethiopian Government proposed negotiations with Somalia concerning use of the Juba River. The Somali Government rejected the World Bank's subsequent proposal of negotiations with Ethiopia for several reasons, but most notably, because the Juba crosses the Ogaden region, which is the contested area on the border of the two countries that Somalia had claimed since its independence. Research suggests that as negotiations would recognize a border and give Ethiopia more opportunity in the dispute, Somalia was unwilling to negotiate (Elmi, 2013).

Due to the unwillingness of the two countries to negotiate, the World Bank commissioned independent experts to issue an external opinion to help resolve the issue. This opinion was meant to gauge the bank's assessment that the project would not cause harm to other riparian zones (Salman, 2011). The experts concluded that the development, and whatever rights it may establish for Somalia, were equitable and reasonable about Somalia's share of the river's resources, and would not harm future use for upstream Ethiopia. They cited the fact that both countries were party to the 1968 African Convention on the Conservation of Nature and Natural Resources. This convention required member states to coordinate, consult and cooperate on the development of water resource projects, and initiate interstate commissions to address problems due to joint use of resources. However, the security situation in Somalia stalled funding, and the 1991 civil war outbreak prevented the dam project from going ahead (Salman, 2011).

Ethiopia started arranging its own water resources expansion inside the Juba-Shabelle Basin in the early 2000s. Ethiopia's domestic interests and capacity to develop the basin to produce hydropower and for irrigation purposes affect Kenya's ability to develop water resources, as well as Somalia's resource development and overall economic well-being. Ethiopia has two dissimilar blueprint schemes for the Wabi Shabelle and Genale Dawa sub-basins inside the Juba-Shabelle Basin. These two sub-basins are the most water-scarce in Ethiopia and have the greatest levels of food insecurity; consequently, they have low levels of economic and social development. The plans for the Wabi Shabelle and Genale Dawa, respectively finalized in 2005 and 2007, identified different irrigation schemes and hydropower structures to be constructed (Elmi, 2013). The nine dams designed along the Genale Dawa ought to generate roughly 1300 megawatts of hydropower, which Ethiopia may well sell to bordering countries.

The dams and irrigation projects within these areas have the potential to use all available water resources, with consequences that will likely be hugely problematic for Somalia, and which will also affect Kenya's ability to access water resources in the basin (Elmi, 2013). The Genale Dawa III Dam, sponsored by the China Gezhouba Group of Company, commenced operation in 2020. The dam has a water supply volume of 2.57 billion cubic meters (Ethiopia News Agency, 2019). Of note is a difference between the Ethiopian and Somali reports on average river flows for the Juba and the Shabelle, with Ethiopian master plans estimating higher transboundary river flows than Somali measurements (Michalscheck, 2016).

Additionally, in the absence of an international agreement surrounding the water resources, Ethiopia argued that its ability and right to construct the projects should not be constrained (Elmi, 2013). Both countries need to access and develop the water of the Juba–Shabelle Basin to meet their own needs and demands, but the circumstances are challenging. Ethiopia's dams and their impact on river flows would likely force Somalia to rely completely on rain-fed agriculture instead of irrigation (Elmi, 2013). Rain-fed farming primarily works towards meeting the subsistence needs of individual rural households and is common in places where irrigated agriculture is unavailable. In addition to the upstream construction of dams, irrigated agriculture in Somalia, found primarily along the banks of the Juba and Shabelle rivers, already faces significant challenges. For example, irrigation and flood control infrastructure used before the Civil War fell into disrepair due to consistent insecurity. Two of the main crops – sesame and dry lemon – are exported. As of 2018 irrigated farming accounted for 10 percent of cultivable land, and supported approximately 4000 families. The World Bank approximates that Ethiopia's upstream dams may lessen the current of the Shabelle River by over 80 percent, putting irrigated agribusiness at risk (World Bank Group & FAO, 2018).

The Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO) has worked to assist Somalia in addressing the water scarcity it experienced after the civil war and the deterioration of its water resource infrastructure by establishing the Somalia Water and Land Information Management (SWALIM) project in 2001.

SWALIM aims to empower the people of Somalia and help them protect their natural resources while improving their lives and livelihoods. The plan of action recognized current insecurity, absent or incomplete information on water resource management in Somalia, a dearth of fiscal capitals, and inadequate information sharing on the river flow between Ethiopia and Somalia as impediments to developing the basin and reviving the agricultural sector. While Kenya has fewer significant interests than Ethiopia and Somalia in the basin due to its geographical position, it has demonstrated willingness in the past to work with Ethiopia and Somalia over shared water resources (Elmi, 2013).

## **2.2 Challenges confronting regional Peace and economic growth in the Horn of Africa**

The Horn of Africa is different because it is of intergovernmental as well as geo-strategic value to powers outside the African continent whose purposes are to take charge and exploit the region's resources. It connects Asia and Europe via the Red Sea, the Suez Canal, and the Mediterranean Sea. A region of huge potential in terms of natural resources and being of chief importance mainly to Western powers, the Horn of Africa has been distressed with several conflicts within each, and

across, the various member states (Citaristi, 2022). It hosts the African Union at Addis Ababa and IGAD at Djibouti, institutions that should promote regional peace and economic growth but the region enjoys neither peace nor substantive development mainly because of three interrelated factors (Munene, 2023):

First, there are intense rivalries, envies, and disconnect competitions that negate cooperation. With nations that have citizens who are highly critical of their governments, internal frictions become transnational, involving the neighboring states. People, particularly those at the borders fail to identify with the state in which they live and subsequently, loyalty to the given state disappears or it never existed. There are people at the border whose citizenship loyalty is not permanent and keeps shifting at points of political or socio-economic convenience. During periods of unrest, such people help to extend beyond national boundaries. The states in the Horn are yet to find an answer to the challenge of people having multiple loyalties and how to handle them.

Moreover, there happen to be overwhelming external systems, structures, and practices such as terrorism, global institutions, and technology that do not respect African states, undermining their sovereignty. The states of the Horn of Africa are consequently at the whim of these structures of Neo-colonialism that tend to have more resources and power than several small countries put together. Those structures have a tendency to be seated within and are protected by powerful nations in developed countries. Be that as it may, those organs lord over what small countries do. Few states, if any, have the capacity to defend themselves against, or resist such forces. Government in those little nations, hence, follow these forces without considering the dangers in doing so. Frequently, fact-finding does not mean anything to those who are in authority who many times wait to be directed by external powers. By disregarding facts on struggle over the control of resources in the region with an international and global dimension of projecting military power and directing diplomatic activity, states in the Horn have become susceptible to foreign exploiters and this is likely to continue since there is no predictable drive to change that undesirable principal attitude.

Also, the Horn of Africa region is over-reliant on powers outside the continent of Africa for many things which have a tendency to cripple her development. States continually fail to remit their levies to regional authorities either for the reason that they cannot or they do not put as much value on the regional authorities as they should. In some occurrences, those nation state that renege their commitments are characteristically not proper and look forward to other establishments to pay their levies even as their officials live largely. The regional bodies then end up begging for 'aid' from extra-continental donors or 'development partners' who then enjoy putting a lot of conditions on the said 'aid'. The 'aid' is a mechanism for exploiting the struggle over the control of spaces and place and turning states to act as agents on their behalf. Subsequently, the begging increases the amount of dependency that a country or region has which gives geopolitical leverage to master states to perpetuate and seemingly thrive in ensuring regional instability at the Horn. Turning states in the Horn into 'proxies' to advance extra-continental interests that might be detrimental to the region's long-term interests or the interests of individual states is likely to increase and that means trouble for the region (Munene, 2023).

### 2.3 Climate Change in the Horn of Africa

The Horn of Africa bears the brunt of the climate crisis with rising sea levels resulting in saltwater intrusion. The impact of climate change on the people in the region and nature is increasingly apparent. The Horn of Africa is largely inhabited by pastoralists and agro-pastoralists who heavily rely on the environment for sustainability. As the effects of climate change become increasingly apparent, vulnerable populations – including lower-income and other marginalized communities – have lower capacity to prepare for and cope with extreme weather and climate-related events and thus are expected to experience greater negative impact (Arrogo, 2023).

Society is undergoing climate change in varied forms. It has impacts on our wellbeing, capacity to grow food, shelter, security, and work. Several people, particularly those in the Horn of Africa are already more vulnerable to climate impact as are people living in other developing countries. Climatic conditions have advanced to the point where whole communities have had to relocate. Subsequently, the number of “climate refugees” is projected to rise (Arrogo, 2023).

Climate change continues to compel millions of people to leave their homes every year. As the global climate crisis worsens, an increasing number of people are being forced to flee their homes due to natural disasters such as droughts, hurricanes, tsunamis, floods, and other severe climatic events. The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) made known that an average of 21.5 million persons were against their will evacuated each year by sudden onset weather-related dangers between 2008 and 2016 (UNHCR, 2016), and thousands more from slow-onset dangers related to climate change effect. It is further projected that tens of millions of people are likely to be displaced over the next two to three decades due in large measure to climate change effect.

According to the UNHCR-led Protection and Return Monitoring Network, in Somalia, the number of people displaced internally primarily by drought in year 2022 alone is nearing 1 million, with another nearly 500,000 displaced due to conflict and insecurity (Reliefweb, 2022). Countless people who have already been compelled to escape violence have been forced to leave their homes, typically because of the worst drought in 40 years, caused as a result of four failed rainy seasons, with a fifth projected. Across the globe, such life-threatening climate conditions are increasing and becoming more recurrent due to change in environmental situations.

Nevertheless, the biggest single upsurge in involuntary migration in the Horn of Africa in recent times happened in Ethiopia. This advances the repercussions from the conflict in Tigray, which has also swept up the Amhara and Afar districts. As a result, approximately 1.7 million Ethiopians were displaced in the past year, contributing to the total of 4.7 million Ethiopians who have been forcibly displaced (Africa Center for Strategic Studies, 2022). This signifies a 56 percent upsurge from the preceding year. The upsurge in displacement in Ethiopia comprises 45 percent of the total increase in forced displacement recorded in Africa over the past year (Africa Center for Strategic Studies, 2022).

Similarly, with 4.6 million people forcibly displaced, South Sudan has the highest proportion of its population displaced (40 percent), compared to any African country. The 700,000 people forced to migrate against their will over the past year makes South Sudan the African country with the

second largest level of forced migration in Africa, accounting for approximately 20 percent of the increase on the continent. Flooding is common in the poverty-stricken nation. Khartoum, Blue Nile, and River Nile states are among the hardest hit by the floods (Africa Center for Strategic Studies, 2022).

#### **2.4 Relationship Between Climate Change and Conflict in the Horn of Africa**

East Africa is characterized by high sensitivity to climate conditions and limited adaptive capacity (Ide, Schilling, Link, Scheffran, Ngaruiya & Weinzierl, 2014). Heavy rainfall volatility presents a challenge to the most common source of revenue – farming and pastoralism (raising and herding livestock) in the region (Blackwell, 2011). Further recurrent famines have predominantly negative impacts on food security in Somalia, Ethiopia, South Sudan, and parts of Kenya and Uganda (Demeke, Keil, & Zeller, 2011).

Just like any other eco-system, humans also suffer the complexity of struggles for existence especially in developing countries as a result of climate change. In such circumstances, change in weather conditions can act as a huge threat, worsening current strains and adding to the burgeoning of conflicts. Due to the scarceness of resources, there is usually a scramble when it comes to the distribution of these natural resources (Arrogo, 2023).

The Population Reference Bureau (2017) anticipated that more people will be exposed to projected climate change, as the population of East Africa is expected to more than double from around 422 million in 2017 to 886 million in 2050. Ethiopia remains the most populated country (105 million), followed by Tanzania (57 million), which expects the strongest absolute growth (95 million) between 2017 and 2050. Burundi, Malawi, Mozambique, Somalia, Uganda, and South Sudan are projected to double their population by 2050.

Despite numerous studies, no scientific evidence exists that climatic changes had a major effect on large-scale conflicts in East Africa (Mobjörk, 2017; van Baalen & Mobjörk, 2018). Most studies on climate–conflict linkages in East Africa have focused on Kenya, with a particular focus on smaller-scale violent conflicts between pastoral groups (Scheffran, Link & Schilling, 2019). Most listed studies suggest a link between (drought-related) resource scarcity and conflict while others find that a higher level of violence is associated with more rainfall and hence increased resource availability: “Marauders oftentimes attack during rainy seasons for the reason that high grass, strong animals, dense bush to hide in and the availableness of surface water, which makes it stress-free to journey with the animals” (Witsenburg & Adano, 2009, p. 723). Eaton (2008) stresses that pastoralists are too occupied with keeping their livestock alive during drought and therefore have no capacity for attacks.

Mobjörk (2017) and van Baalen & Mobjörk (2018) provide further insights into mechanisms and links between climate and conflict variables in East Africa. An assessment on chronologies of conflicts among herdsmen and between herdsmen and farmers in East and West Africa finds that aridity potentially exacerbates conflict but warns against a “simple stimulus (resource shortage) – response (violence) relationship,” as a substitute pointing to “control over, use of, and access to resources” as a possible cause of conflict (Seter, Theisen & Schilling, 2018). To distinguish the areas that are most susceptible to climate security concerns in Africa, the Climate Change and

African Political Stability Project (CCAPS) utilized a multifaceted climate–security–vulnerability model based on more than a few groupings of indicators and related sub-indicators. These include physical exposure, population density, household and community resilience, governance, and political violence (Busby, Smith & Krishnan, 2014).




Figure 2. Map of Composite Climate Vulnerability in Africa, Combining Indicators of Physical Exposure, Population Density, Household and Community Resilience, Governance, and Political Violence. Source: Busby et al. (2014, p. 61)

#### 4.0 Concluding Remarks

Security of people in the Horn of Africa is in a life-threatening condition clamoring for suitable and immediate solutions. The region is typically marked by a history of common problems such as inter-alia, political exclusion, power struggle, ethnic and religious-based discrimination, piracy, terrorism, violation of human rights, the proliferation of small and light weapons (SALW), and poverty/famine, all of which are major threats to human security. Likewise, this geographical location is known in the international arena as a budding crisis zone. The struggle for scarce resources such as tensions surrounding transboundary water resources are at the origin of many of the conflicts, tensions, and manifestations of instability experienced by the region.

The study found that the ‘Horn of Africa’ is commonly characterized by underdevelopment, famine, and poverty; protracted inter-state and intra-state disputes over borders; civil war; violence; liberation and secessionist struggle; overthrow and insurgencies; ecological deterioration; and human rights abuses.

Thus, political actors of each State of the ‘Horn’ should attempt to solve their internal and external problems using a combination of multi-security strategies. Such strategies may include focusing on the empowerment of communities by empowering local elders, women’s group, pastoral associations to co-manage water points, grazing lands, fishing zones etc.

They can also strengthen local dispute resolution mechanisms by recognizing and integrating customary law institutions and training local peace committees to mediate seasonal migration conflicts. There is also need for the reduction of economic incentives for violent competition and the development of equitable resource revenue-sharing policies.

The introduction of more investments in marginalized regions is also very critical. Roads, water systems, electricity and other infrastructures should be considered in neglected areas in order to reduce militarization over resources.

Consequently, they have to create a strong commitment, mutual trust, and cooperation not only among and between elites of states of the ‘Horn’, but also with the whole continent as well as globally. In this regard, civil society organizations and regional organizations like the Inter-Governmental Authority on Development (IGAD) and the African Union (AU) could exert their maximum potential in the process of bringing peace to the region.

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