PEACE STUDIES JOURNAL

Volume 12, Issue 2
August 2019

PEACE STUDIES JOURNAL

Guest Editor:

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THE BIAFRA CRISIS AND MULTI-TRACK DIPLOMACY: TOWARDS A PEACEFUL DEVELOPMENT

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Abstract

This paper opines *ab-initio* that there is a nexus between the first agitation for secession by the Biafrans which led to a 'political jihad' and/or civil war that lasted for more than thirty months, the Movement for the Actualization of the Sovereign State of Biafra (MASSOB), and the recent movement by a group known as the Indigenous People of Biafra (IPOB). The root cause on one hand is the forced marriage of people of different cultural and historical pasts while the immediate causes on the other hand are bad governance, perceived inequality in the sharing formula of available resources, and poor or bad leadership styles demonstrated at the national level. However, this increases the degree at which the region wishes to divorce itself from the unmeritorious marriage that has little or nothing to offer it apart from regression and stagnation. The perceived polarization within the leadership of these groups shows that the movement for secession within the region is riddled with cacophonous voices. The government escalates the crisis by employing the carrot-and-stick approach with the apprehension of some of the ringleaders and the denial of their constitutional rights in the court. This paper *inter-alia* argues that there is need for both conflicting parties to make a *volte-face* in their approach toward the crisis; it then examines the use of preventive diplomacy to de-escalate the current crisis and avoid escalation of such in the nearest future. It also suggests the use of Multi-Track Diplomacy as a tool in resolving the conflict.

I. Introduction

In 1979, J. J. Rawlings—an astute and provocative Ghanaian Flight Lieutenant—successfully hijacked the government as a result of the recklessness and inept attitude of the politicians. He then decimated by firing squad eight topnotch officers out of which were three former heads of state, set up an extemporaneous People's Courts to deal with dozens of military officers found guilty as well as business tycoons said to be mortified of corruption and mismanagement of public fund, and then returned the system to the political figures (Martin, 2005). This, in Ghana's history, is commonly known as the House Cleaning Exercise and for the time being orderliness was at the center of Ghana's politics. Similarly, prior to this period, it can be argued that Nigeria also had undergone its own House Cleaning Exercise. This is because by 1966 young Nigerian soldiers made effort to cleanse the nation of those considered a threat to its development and this led to the successful execution of the first Prime Minister along with the Premiers of both Northern and Western regions alongside some senior military officers (Martin, 2005). The failure of the masterminds of the coup to tamper with the Eastern and Mid-Western Igbo leaders was, however, the beginning of the end for the coup and aided the element of doubt of the Northern leaders that the aim of the young soldiers was mainly for the Igbo to gain power (Martin, 2005). The *Araba*, or the threat to secede by the north, later fomented the counter coup of July, which, however, wrested power from the Eastern region (Martin, 2005).

The counter coup ran amok. Lieutenant Colonel Chukwuemeka Odumegwu Ojukwu—the military governor of the Eastern region—refused to succumb to the supreme power of Gowon as the Commander of the Armed Forces and Head of State and hence announced secession of the Eastern region. This was due to three reasons, first, Ojukwu saw the mounting power of Gowon as a political mistake. In the order of hierarchy, there were still five military personnel of higher ranks than Gowon and three of these soldiers were from the Eastern region. Second, the seat of the Head of State and Supreme Commander was yet to be vacant, as Ironsi's death had not been made official. Third, Ojukwu only consented to the secession of the Northern region when Gowon was the leader of the rebel group against Ironsi government (Ademoyega, 1981). He was humiliated by Gowon's position at the helm of affairs and was left with no other choice than to secede. This decision culminated and metamorphosed into civil war by 1967 and lasted for 30 months (Martins, 2005). Unlike in Ghana, where the House Cleaning Exercise was a success, the similar efforts in Nigeria failed mainly because of egoism, tribalism, chauvinism, failure to forge an ethnic *parapoism* (unionism), and nepotism.

The consequence of the failed House Cleaning Exercise in Nigeria was a series of military takeovers amidst successive civilian administrations until the dawn of the 20th century when democracy was installed in the country. Between then and now, it is obvious that what the nation is experiencing under the current dispensation is much worse and more terrible than what it encountered under some if not all of the military regimes of the last century. Supporting this claim, a Nigerian was quoted as thus,

> When we were in the military regime, we didn't get anything from the government but we had peace. Now we are in a democracy, we don't get anything from the government and we do not get peace (United Nations Development Programmes [UNDP], 2002)
> .

While the foregoing is not the partially true, its accuracy can be confirmed by the persistent occurrence of Boko-Haram insurgency in the north, the Niger-Delta Avengers, and the reemergence of groups such as the MASSOB and IPOB in the east. While in the west, confirmation of such a statement can be found in the recurrent cases of robbery, killing, kidnapping and the reemergence of groups such as Hausa and Yoruba as they clash in Mile 12 of Lagos. Finally, to crown it all, there is the Hausa/Fulani-Herdsmen imbroglio that started as a local crisis but suddenly degenerated to a national threat. One then begins to wonder if truly democracy is the government of the people, by the people, and for the people as noted by the founding fathers. This is because, failure to enjoy dividends of democracy by the people is the major cause of the crisis ravaging different regions of the country. Hence, while it has been a form of government where the grassroots had been catered for, the reverse is the reality for democracy in Nigeria. What we are experiencing under the so-called democracy since its inception is corruption, election malpractice, redundancy, public killings in the name of power tussles, and many other injustices.

This development has raised several questions yet to be answered and has equally attracted scholars' attention. It is against this backdrop that this paper attempts to provide answers to questions such as: what are the triggers responsible for the continuous or renew agitation by the IPOB? And, what are the coping strategy adopted by the federal government of Nigeria? To do this, the paper at hand first discusses the theoretical issues surrounding secession, the Nigerian civil war, and Multi-Track Diplomacy. It examines the nexus between the first and the ongoing IPOB movement while also clarifying motivations for political independence and national independence. In furtherance of that, this paper suggests the use of Multi-Track Diplomacy as a tool to bring the nation back to peaceful coexistence.

II. Secession, the Nigerian Civil War and Multi-Track Diplomacy: Theoretical Issues

The process through which a group seeks to dissociate itself from a state to which it belongs in order to form another one within the existing geographical location of the former is what is meant by secession (Crawford, 1997). Self-determination and dissolution are used interchangeably most times to mean secession (Mavric, 2012). Truthfully, there is a nexus between the two terms, but their paths differ. However, according to Osaghae, secession of a group of individuals in a given country occurs as a result of three imminent factors or theories: their indigenous status, their extraneousness due to globalization, and, their marginalization (Osaghae, 1999). The first emanates from strong social affinity of norms and culture shared by people against an imposed culture. The second, hinges on influence by external forces—most especially in Africa—as a result of the colonial experience. The third can be premised on an individual's or group of individual's experience of being weakened, oppressed, depressed, deprived, alienated, discriminated against, and otherwise unable to influence the state's action (Osaghae, 1999). These factors describe those whose power relation within the state is at disequilibrium. The perceived marginalization of the group politically, economically, and socially turns them to secession as a tool by which they are able to command recognition; but this is not the actual aim of the Biafra agitators.

However, the Biafra secessionist movement can be located within the marginalization theory as the sole reason for their grievances. Suffice to say, as Akale reaffirmed that the resurgence of the Biafra in the post-civil war era emanates from identity crisis, economic and political marginalization in spite of the 'no victor no vanquished' position of the federal government of

Nigeria. This then forms the basis of the purported Igbo factor. A reflection of this factor are the witch-hunts of the people and limits placed upon them in obtaining employment, and occupying federal offices, in spite of the enshrined federal character in the constitution. Also, the dearth of public infrastructures within the region and the further break down of the region into disparate states immediately after the civil war, which of course dissociate the people of Igbo ancestral from their families (Akale, 2009). In response to this reflection and discrimination, the people are ready to breakaway and create a unique entity where they can wear their national identity as a badge of honor (Akale, 2009).

The civil war has also been theorized from the angle of ethnic cleansing than national tragedy. This argument relies in part on the tempo at which the civil war commenced in 1967 from the northern part of the country, on the fact that the decimation was of mostly people of Igbo origin, on its subsequent escalation across the country as being primarily within the Igbo region, and on the massacre by deliberately starvation affecting mainly Igbo people, all of which were supported by the federal government (Akali, n.d.). Substantiating this position, and relating it to the deliberate genocidal intent by the federal government, it should be noted that the action leading to the depopulation of the region during the war tally with Article II of the UN Convention on Genocide (Lawrence, 1988). Coupled with this is that despite the war having officially ended in January 1970, the decimation of the Igbo through killing and maiming in the six month of post-conflict era equaled the number killed during the war (Akali, n.d). The politicization of the war by the international community and their inability to act swiftly against the Nigerian government's acts of genocide opened the front door for the subsequent dreadful and yet avoidable attacks on humanity across Africa, most notably in Burundi, Ethiopia, Sudan, Somalia, and Rwanda (Akali, n.d). And eventually coming full circle, this all led to the resurgence of the Biafra crisis.

According to Diamond and McDonald, Multi-Track Diplomacy is a systems approach to peacebuilding (1996). This systems approach seeks to understand the root cause of a conflict, to facilitate the transformation of deep-rooted social conflicts in the post conflict era. Furthermore, the theory of Multi-Track Diplomacy is unlike other theses and as a systems approach to peacebuilding engages many actors and stakeholders in resolving violent conflicts rather than perceiving it as solely the government's responsibility. Muggah and White (2013) effortlessly make use of Multi-Track Diplomacy from the angle of conflict prevention when they observe that,

> Conflict prevention comprises indices such as the strengthening of human rights oversight mechanisms and a fruitful attempt at addressing the root causes of conflict. This attempt includes but is not limited to improvements in governance, social and economic well-being, equality, and the management of common resources (p. 5).

In essence, the theories of Multi-Track Diplomacy are all-encompassing and compartmentalized peacebuilding.

III. The Civil War, the MASSOB and the IPOB: Reimagining the Nexus

Several studies are available on the on the subject of the Nigerian civil war (Ademoyega, 1981; Osaghea, 1999; Martin, 2005; Ukiwo, 2009; Akale, 2009; Achebe, 2012). The quest for unity or nation building, authority or state building, distribution of available resources, identity

nomenclature, and many other factors are deduced as the *raison d'être* that led to the civil war. Though there is also a misconstrued idea on the nature of conflict itself, it is more often believed that the existence of conflict in any society is a bad omen, and hence the Nigerian civil war must have resulted from the waywardness and nonchalant attitude of the nation's leaders coupled with the 1914 amalgamation. Such a conclusion or belief is specious. While it should be noted that conflict is inevitable in any given society, Coser further lends credence to this when he observes that,

> Conflict is a struggle over value or claim to status, power and scarce resources in which the aims of the groups or individual involved are not only to obtain the desired value but to neutralize, injure or eliminate rivals. (Coser, 1967, as cited in Bernard and Ashimi 2014, p.119).

On the contrary, Burton likens conflict with sex and submits that,

> Conflict like sex is an essential creative element in human relation. It is the means to change, the means by which our social values of welfare, security, justice and opportunities for personal development can be achieved (Burton, 1972, as cited in Salolomo and Don-Solomon 2016, p. 44).

The foregoing buttresses the theory that conflict can be either constructive or destructive: it depends on individual's perspective. A conflict is destructive in a situation where the outcome is on win-lose resolution. The reason is that one party to the conflict adopts blackmail, military might, and intimidation to challenge the opponent, whereby the only option available to the other party is avoidance. This form of conflict handling style increases tensions and snowballs into more violent conflict. The Nigerian civil war of 1967-70 comes to mind. On the other hand, a constructive conflict opens the channels for those parties involved to use all available options such as joint problem solving or through the help of the third party to reach a compromise and settle the conflict amicably for a win-win outcome.

Any student of history, however, must be well informed that the national question of secession is not a post-independence nomenclature, the Northern region was the first to use the dictum during the constitutional conference of 1953 when the Western region moved the motion for the independence of the country. As a quick move against this, the Northern leaders retorted that the country was not ripe for self-government and further threatened to secede should the region fail to change the tenet to one determined to be as 'practicable as possible' (Martin, 2005). However, the conflict handling style adopted during the civil war by the federal government and the perceived bruise on the region's ego made secession a desired option. It can then be said that the Biafra secession movement is a means to an end, and not an end per se.

It becomes imperative to locate the cause that gave rise to the seeds of discords and political anarchy in the polity that later metamorphosed into conflict between the federal government and the belligerent group that was bent on secession. That said, the conflict was a war of need, interest, fear, and position. The inability of one party to allay the fear of another gave rise to the conflict. The fear of the belligerent group, emanated from political anxiety and non-recognition (Eleigwu, 2005) in the scheme of affairs of the country. Speaking further on political anxiety, Ake observes:

'Political anxiety' refers to a 'fear of the consequences of not being in control of government associated with a profound distrust of political opponents',[sic] leading to antagonistic and increasingly violent relations between the state and oppositional political and social groups. This has transformed the state's 'legitimate monopoly of violence' from a mechanism for maintaining order into a form of oppression that undermines legitimacy and national cohesion (Ake, as cited in Ukiwo 2009, p.11).

The position that later snowballed into the civil war as a result of mismanagement can be traced to the counter coup that ran amok and brought in Yakubu Gowon as the head of state, a subordinate to the Eastern Region governor who was vaster in experience than him (Ukiwo, 2009). To Ojukwu, the move was an insult to his personality and he would not succumb to such insubordinate leadership but rather preferred to lead a countermove and thereby left the country that had no emotional respect for his position. (This is well explained in P.1, par. 2 of this paper).

Earlier in this paper, a Nigerian was quoted as claiming that periods of military rule were largely times of peace, at least in comparison to periods of democracy. Of course, a peace scholar should be quick to interrogate the form of peace inferred. You will agree with me that if there is any form of peace during the period under review, then it was nothing less than a *negative* peace as a result of the event that characterized the polity at the time. We will return to that matter in a moment, but first let me clarify what is meant by *negative* and *positive* peace. The former is the absence of mortal combat while the latter is the absence of structural and psychological violence (Albert & Oloyede, 2010). It is thus pertinent to note that the cause of the conflict at hand was characterized by elements of negative peace. Albert and Oloyede further explain that the engagement of military, paramilitary, and the courts of law in conflict situations only yields an atmosphere of physical violence. The level of destruction of both lives and properties speak volumes as a result of the involvement of the armed forces in combating with belligerent group and this in turn did not de-escalate the conflict but instead reached a stalemate. The two further note that in a situation where positive peace is desired, the non-adversarial method must be adopted and applied (Albert & Oloyede, 2010). The non-adversarial approach permits the conflicting parties to negotiate and navigate their way out of conflict by discussing their interests, positions, needs, and fear to reach a substantial agreement; in some cases this is accomplished through a facilitated negotiation (mediation) which calls for a third party to serve in the negotiation process. Although the non-adversarial process has been adopted in resolving both religious and ethnic inspired conflicts with outcomes of positive peace, the nature of the Biafra crisis precludes the application of the non-adversarial processes. Earlier negotiations facilitated by the president of Ghana and popularly referred to as "Aburi Accord" ended in deadlock the moment both conflicting parties returned to the country and realized the implication of their actions (Eleigwu, 2005). To this end, Albert and Oloyede (2010) are justified in their argument that parties must be willing to participate, to agree on some issues and interests, to have the settlement tendency, and to have the authority to decide on issues at hand. The failure of both actors to put their egos aside and approach the conflict head-on led to the fallout that later culminated in the machinations of adversarial method and allowed the war to simmer. Meanwhile, federal government apologists observed that the failure of 'peace talks' and the responsibility of maintaining the unity of the country bestowed on Gowon accounted for the declaration of war on the secessionists that portends a challenge to the unity of the nation (Eleigwu, 2005).

Nonetheless, we must note as Ojukwu opined before he was forced into exile and led to the abrupt end of the movement that "whilst I live, Biafra lives" (Martin, 2005). Such assertion gives the impression that the war was a personality clash than national adventure to salvage the Biafra Republic. It is not a hidden secret that though Ojukwu is no more, the Biafra movement is still an intractable melee. This is an indication that the factors that necessitate the agitation for the sovereign state of Biafra Republic is of general concern than individual. While it was believed in some quarters that the civil war and its post-21st century agitation emanated from an identity crisis, such a stand is partially true and it should be set straight that state violence played a prominent role in the reemergence of the crisis. This state violence connotes any unlawful and unconstitutional acts of a state (in situation of multiethnic society like ours) towards a particular ethnic group or general public without any active step taken by the government in charge of securing of lives and properties. For instance, the 1966-1967 pogrom that led to the death of thousands of citizens of eastern origin residing in the northern part of the country and also the anarchy unleashed by the subsequent governments on one ethnic or another fueled the state violence (Ukiwo, 2009).

In spite of this, three events reshaped the animosity enraged the political terrain of the country after the civil war: First, there was an oil boom exploration and centralization of revenue for redistributive politics; second, three regions broke up to smaller states, and; third, the state's exertion of domination without the use of coercion. These are the main reasons that accounted for the sustainability of peaceful environment immediately after the civil war. The first reason orchestrated centripetal tendencies in the social formation of the state, the second curbed the centrifugal forces, and the last fostered a harmonious environment for all and sundry. This spirit of reintegration was vital in taming the post war period and harnessing the unity of the nation with the tendencies of state building.

But then, this euphoric moment of peaceful coexistence was as short-lived as a honeymoon, for the nation sooner than expected left from the frying pan to the fire and returned back into its garment of state violence characterized by military machinations and machinery that used weapons of the state to subjugate the very citizens that it should have been protecting. The period from 1976-1999 was a whirlwind era for the country with a series of bloody coups that started with the unsuccessful attempt to oust Murtala Mohammed and continued through the period democracy was installed. This criminal act of different heads of state in execution of citizens considered to be rebellious toward their regimes, and most especially of eastern and western extractions increased the tempo of dissent groups within the regions. The sabotage acts of these dissent groups hence resuscitated the agitation for secession (Ukiwo, 2009). (The central idea here is not the assassination of Murtala Muhammed, but the series of political scheming against the citizens by the government—most especially against those of eastern and western origin—that took place between 1976 and 1999.)

The final limit and partial cause of the resurgence of the agitation for the creation of the Biafra Republic can be traced to the following six occurrences. The return of Ojukwu, the erstwhile warrior in 1982 after being granted presidential pardon and his involvement in the 1983 Senatorial election under the umbrella of the National Party of Nigeria (NPN) but lost. Also, in 2003, the warlord contested as the presidential candidate of the All Progressive People's Alliance (APGA). The inability of the Eze Ndi Igbo Gburu Gburu, that is, king of the entire Igbo nation (as he was

popularly called) to win the party's ticket paved way for the unavoidable anarchy that was fast approaching. It must be stated that what actually midwifed the re-radicalization of Biafra with Ojukwu as the leader was the Kano riot of 1991. At the invitation of the Igbo communal association in the north, Ojukwu was being taken on a tour, he was perplexed at the extent the Igbo people in the region were maimed. In his response to this grievous act towards his people made him to conclude that "if the sacrifice needed for the building of the Nigerian nation is the constant shedding of Igbo blood then let us not be a nation" (Ukiwo, 2009). More importantly, the removal of Commodore Ebitu Ukiwe as the second in command to the General Babangida's military regime (first of such position to be attained by individual of Igbo extraction) as a result of his opposition to the Organization of Islamic Conference speaks volume and signaled to the Igbo the level of hatred channeled towards them. Furthermore, political marginalization of the Igbo that turned a majority tribe to a minority in the affairs of the country as the region was not considered fit for Federal executives and Supreme Military Councils. Coupled with this was the question of their equal share of the "national cake" a euphemism for dividends of democracy. This is because the region had five states while other regions were left with six and seven states respectively (Ukiwo, 2009). Though it was combination of all these factors that made Ojukwu to signal the renaissance of the Biafra Republic in 1999/2000 under new nomenclature known as the Movement for the Actualization of the Sovereign State of the Biafra (MASSOB). But it was not until 2003 before Chief Ralph Uwazuruike, the founder and president of the Movement could actualize the dream.

That said, the actualization of the sovereign states of the Biafra Republic, which was believed will lead to the emancipation of the 'Biafran' people was conceived by the agitators as a case of no retreat, no surrender. This conclusion was inferred because of the steps taken by the group. I will cite some of these steps to strengthen the argument. May 30, the day the Nigerian Civil War begun was declared as the 'Biafra Day', whereby the agitators instructed its members to boycott all activities. In addition, embassies were registered with the United States of America and some other countries. Unrecognized Biafran International Passport was issued in 2009 (Vanguard, 2009); as well as a functioning and active radio station was operated; the Biafra currency was reproduced; and the flag of the Republic was hoisted in some parts of the country among many other drastic steps taken by the Movement. In fact, national army was the only important element the Movement did not put in place in its bid for sovereignty (Ukiwo, 2003b). In responding to these acts of insurrection by the MASSOB, the Nigerian government, used the state apparatus to clampdown on the leaders of the Movement. To later add salt to the fester wound of the group was the support provided the federal government by the state governments within the region who had believed that the action of the Movement was politically inclined and the handiwork of their opponents. This support given to the federal government by the state governments of course led to the arrest of Uwazuruike and some of his subordinates in 2005 and charged for treason. It was not until 2007 before the leader regained his independence after the death of his mother at a time when other militia leaders from the west and south-south arrested together were released and walked as free men. The reason for this however, could be traced to the seed of discord and mutual suspicion among leaders within the region.

Nonetheless, the cause of disagreement of this paper is that the aim of the region ab-initio had never been to secede from Nigeria, but because of the political anxiety that turned the people to second-class citizens in their country. The politics of division that characterized the formation of MASSOB in 2003 as reflected in their inability to field a candidate for the presidential election

and the subsequent elections confirmed this. Similar to this is the birth of splinter groups that are pro-active in their agitation toward the independence of the region and believed that the existing groups have failed woefully in leading them to the "promise land." While the political kabuki of 2003 in the region set the track for factions, the squandering of money generated from members both within and in diaspora led to the division and emergence of different groups. Famous among these groups are the Biafra Zionist Movement (BZM), the Indigenous People of Biafra (IPOB) at the offshore of the country in 2012 with its professed leader currently at large for his radicalization pedals, which led to the proscribing of the group by the Nigerian government. In addition, in 2015, the erstwhile leader of the MASSOB regrouped and formed the Biafra Independence Movement (WANEP, 2016). Also, Bilie Human Right Initiatives, Igbo Youth Cultural Association, United Eastern Congress, Lower Niger Congress, Niger Delta Self Determination (Okodili, 2015) and the recent breakaway of the Rebranded Indigenous People of Biafra (TRIPOD) (Agbodo, 2016) from IPOB among numerous other splinter groups indeed calls for clarity of interest and raise serious concern for the sincerity of independence as their blueprint of action.

Unlike MASSOB that kicked start within the country, IPOB was founded in London in 2012 by individuals of South/South and South East origin that has lost hope in the action of the former group(s) with Nnamdi Kanu a dual citizen of Nigeria and Britain as its temporal and spiritual leader. Like MASSOB, IPOB also adopts propaganda as instrument to gain public support towards the emancipation of its members. To do this, a satellite based television known as Biafra Television and Biafra 24 Radio was launched in 2015 to compete with Radio Biafra created by MASSOB; the Biafra Herald newspaper platform was also launched as well as Facebook pages and twitter handles to disseminate vital information not only to its members but to the general public; solicitation of weapons for Biafra from Igbo in diaspora during the Igbo Conference in the US in September 2015 (BBC, 2015); the adoption of the referendum template of lower Niger congress for the restoration of the nation of Biafra.

However, Radio Biafra has been portrayed as an unlicensed station with violent struggle to achieve independence for Biafrans through broadcast of highly provocative messages imbedded with misinformation, hate speech, and anti-Nigeria derision. On its part, the Nigerian government described the station as a seditious pirate radio station with unsavory hate messages. Unsuccessful efforts were made at different time to halt the activities of the station by the Broadcasting Organization of Nigerian (BON), and Nigerian Communications Commission (NCC) the leading broadcasting regulatory bodies in Nigeria. What follows was the clampdown and arrest of the Director of Radio Biafra and founder of the group on October 17, 2015. However, between October and December he was charged for treason, criminal conspiracy, managing and belonging to an unlawful society and intimidation (Amnesty International, 2016). Unlike the parochial ethnicity that characterized the detention of the MASSOB leader, immediately after the detention of the IPOB leader, it would have been expected that agitation would subdue, rather the detention of the leader was a vigor to the members and exacerbated peaceful protests amidst violence protest that led to the death of both security officials and protesters not only in the comfort zone of the group but also in Abuja-the capital territory of the country.

Meanwhile the Nigerian government at a point was caught pant down to have supported and described the protest as a complete legitimate struggle for self-determination. Contrary to this position, and the subsequent employment of state apparatus to silence the group when its leader

was released on bail on health grounds and under stringent conditions which include but are not limited to: not holding rallies; not to grant interviews; not be in a crowd of more than 10 people, and; submission of both his Nigerian and British passports (Premium Times, 2017). It bears repeating to note that Kanu did not only breached the court order but alleged that elections would not hold in South East States until the government conduct referendum to determine whether Biafra should secede or not. Apart from that the IPOB leader also flouted court order and addressed crowd exceeding 10 and incited members to indulge in civil disobedience and hate speeches (Vanguard, 2017). It was on this note that the Nigerian government sent a clear message to the leader of the group through one of its broadcasts noting that, "the unity of Nigeria is settled and nonnegotiable." To show its frankness, the military and paramilitary agencies were sent after the group, and series of human abuse raids were conducted out of which is the Operation Crocodile Smile at the backyard of the leader. In addition to that, the Nigerian government also obtained a *pro tem* injunction from a Federal High Court in Abuja on September 20, 2017, which proscribed the activities of the group and turned its leader to a fugitive.

From the above analysis, it's crystal clear that the link between the Nigerian Civil War of 1967-70, the emergent of MASSOB in 2003 and the birth of splinter groups most especially IPOB in 2012 was as a result of perceived marginalization from the affairs of the country. It is on this note the next section is analyzing if it is the agitated national independence that is the keen issue within the region or political and/or national development?

IV. National Independence or Political Development: a(n) Interrogation

One of the utmost ideas of this paper is that development, and not sovereignty is the fundamental issue confronting the region. But it can also be argued that if national independence is achievable within the region, another problem to be confronted is that of elite fragmentation (see Albert, 2016). Two instances are apposite to convince us that history as it happened in South Sudan and Libya during their struggle for self-determination and political freedom is bound to repeat itself in the region. The expulsion of Uwuzurike as the leader of the MASSOB for squandered public fund and his subsequent regroup of the Biafra Independence Movement. And the failure of the region to foster a national group that represent their interests, rather the creation of numerous lopsided splinter groups are indications that there will be case of sponsoring of terror and metamorphosis of the splinter groups to either militias or insurgents which of course will make the region ungovernable after achieving the agitated independence. With this in mind, it is necessary we consider the argument in support of socio-political marginalization as the indices for the secessionist movement.

The presentation of President Buhari at the United Institute of Peace during its first term in office and his response to an enquiry by Dr. Paulina Baker about the security of the Niger Delta it must be noted gave birth to the recent seed of cacophony sown among the people. This is because the president explained in his response that each region would be dealt with according to the percentage of votes garnered from their constituents. The president's response is worth reiterating, I hope you have the copy of the election results. The constituents, for example, gave me 97% (of the vote) cannot in all honesty be treated on some issues with constituencies that gave me 5%.' (Sahara Reporter, 2015). The nexus between that statement and the subsequent body language of the government reflected in its policies and appointments towards and across the region. For

instance, the Buhari led administration managed the appointments of key positions in a way that is characterized to be lopsided and hence flamed the embers of hatred of the region toward the ongoing administration. On the other hand, what should one make from an appointment that gave 75% to the northern while 25% to the whole of the southern region? A further scrutiny of the appointment reveals that the northwest had the highest percentage of 43% while the southeast had 0% (Abdulraman, 2015). This underrepresentation of the region, in spite of the enshrined federal character policy in the country's constitution triggered the resurgence of the Biafra movement.

Apart from that, development of the country at large to say the least has been politicized. This then explains why the social infrastructure of the southeast has become a campaign manifesto strategy for politicians since the inception of democratic rule in the country. The most glaring of these are the dredging of the River Niger, which would have served as an inter-link between the region and the other parts of the country and the agitation for the second Niger Bridge. Though the construction of the bridge started during the second term in office of the Obasanjo administration, it must be noted that failure to embark on the project was tagged to the non-availability of fund and lack of legal backing (Dailytrust, 2015). The Jonathan administration also flagged off the project, and made available 25% commitment of the fund budgeted, with the plan for the project to spread through four consecutive years. There was however a retraction of the commitment by the President Buhari led administration believing the contraction of the project ab-initio at the total sum of One Hundred and Seventeen Billion Naira was baseless (Dailytrust, 2015). The foregoing, in addition with youth unemployment and the hardship suffered by the youth and most especially during the ongoing administration are the chief factors that rekindled and motivated the movement for self-government from the region.

With this in mind, what then is the way out from this political quagmire in which the nation is enmeshed? All the approaches (carrot and stick, divide and rule, confrontational and avoidance) used thus are not productive in de-escalating the crisis but in heightening it. This paper posits there is need for the parties to volte-face their approach toward the conflict. In essence, the focus of the remaining part of the paper is to discuss the application of Multi-Track diplomacy as panacea to the crisis.

IV. What Role for Multi-Track Diplomacy?

Preventive diplomacy is a dimension of Multi-track diplomacy with major attributes of dousing tension and/or violent conflict from escalating or simply put, pre and conflict peacebuilding measure. Its inability to function beyond this stage explains why it is popularly tagged as short-term strategy. On the other hand, Multi-Track Diplomacy is multifaceted and centered majorly on post conflict peacebuilding. Hence, a long-term approach to post-conflict peacebuilding. That said, defining preventive diplomacy, the United Nations observed that it is an action to prevent disputes from arising between parties, to prevent existing disputes from escalating into conflicts and to limit the spread of the latter when it occur (Boutros, 1992). In order to prevent or manage escalation of conflict, preventive diplomacy adopts certain measures. The major components of these measures include but are not limited to early warning, fact findings, confidence building, and preventive deployment. The creation of an effective early warning system helps in collecting signs of conflict such as continuous violation of human rights, internal population displacement, refugee flow (Wadlow, n.d.) and any other tensions that might result to the escalation of the perceived abuse by

a crisis team monitoring the sequence of events. This is followed by an on-ground analysis and fact-finding mission which is done locally or by requesting the help of international organizations. The extent at which mutual trust are built among the parties determine the de-escalation of the conflict and the needs for preventive deployment measures.

It should be noted that Nigerian government has been taken certain preventive measures toward the crisis. These measures include but are not limited to its national conferences at different time in the history of the country. But it needs to be asked that how genuine such conferences are, if not often time for political gains which then made it difficult to implement its findings and recommendations. Also, the acquiescence of the proposed Biafra state back to the Nigeria nation initially should have inter-alia brought the agitation to an end. The failure to achieve that and the continued agitation further reinforces the point that exchanging truce for peace is not a means to an end per se (Notter & Diamond, 1996), but is rather a short-term preventive measure. The inability of Nigerian government to put in place (or to follow to the latter where such exists) political, structural and social peacebuilding in spite of its launched 3Rs program (Rehabilitation, Reconstruction and Reintegration) and the National Youth Service Corps accounted for the continuity of the crisis. Political peacebuilding has been likened to agreement, to have deeper knowledge of the causes or the indices of the conflict, to allay the fear and attend to the needs and position of conflicting parties by make available infrastructures. The creation and execution of structures or institutions such as economic development programs, strengthening democracy and governance however aided peace culture and foster structural peacebuilding. On the other hand, social peacebuilding is concerned with the maintenance of the created peace culture by respecting the views and shared culture of other groups (Notter & Diamond, 1996). Little wonder it is the grass-roots portion of the peacebuilding procedure.

Meanwhile, it has been argued that the historical dimension of ethnic conflict limits the usage of preventive diplomacy (Kikawa, 2003) most especially in ethnic inspired conflict that seeks for self-determination like the case at hand. In fashioning a befitting argument for the concept in the ethnic inspired conflict, preventive diplomacy as earlier observed is of short-term and long-term measures. The short-term preventive diplomacy makes effort to curtail a crisis from escalating into full-fledged armed conflict by sending diplomatic mission and deploying preventive military forces to address the immediate triggers of the conflict. Whereas the long-term measure is post conflict peacebuilding strategy which attempts to address the root cause of a conflict and monitor the violation of human rights, put in place civil society and the entrenchment of the rule of laws (Kikawa, 2003). To say the least, steps taken since the outbreak of the civil war by the government and the international community towards the crisis are short term measures. In explaining the long-term measure, it is exponential to take into consideration Multi-Track Diplomacy as a tool applicable for post-conflict peacebuilding.

By Multi-Track Diplomacy, we mean 'a systems approach to peacebuilding that cut across various organizations and employs interdisciplinary approaches for the prevention of violent conflict and conflict resolution around the globe' (Diamond, n.d.). The approach is a buildup to the track one (governmental/official actions) and track two (non-governmental/unofficial actions) to defuse conflict by further dividing the activities of track two into four that is, conflict resolution professionals, business, private citizen and the media and finally into nine with additional four tracks to include religion; activism; research, training and education; and funding or philanthropist

community, (Notter & Diamond, 1996) hence Multi-Track Diplomacy with a departure from the superiority of Track One creates a parity of all tracks and paved way for synergies between the nine tracks in order to foster sustainable peace.

Track One Diplomacy: Government

No doubt diplomacy is one of the key instruments of foreign policy along with military, political and economic might of a nation. It is the official diplomacy and the primary peacemaking tool of any given country foreign policy. This track uses diplomats, high-ranking government officials, agencies, and heads of states in its formal engagement and in time of a political crisis with the aim of influencing the structure of political powers. Ability to influence the directions and outcome of negotiation through the use of military might; access to material and resources that give leverage and flexibility in negotiation, and; access to in-depth knowledge about the conflicting parties through the use of advanced intelligence sources among others, are the strength of track one diplomacy. The implication is that most times conflict transformation approaches adopt by government are corrupted by power and that officials of the track are not expected to speak against their country in a facilitated negotiation. This of course delay and only facilitated transitory, instead of durable peace and thereby undermines the sustainability of a peace agreement (Ziegler, 1984, Sanders, 1991, Diamond and MacDonald, 1996, Stein and Lewis, 1996, Bercovitch and Houston, 2000,).

Though developed to improve interactions among states, it has been actively used by the federal government of Nigerian to clamp down on the agitators of the emancipation for the Biafra nation. For instance, the transitory peace currently enjoyed in the region was as a result of the military might of the Nigerian government through its numerous military expeditions to silent the region among which are Operations 'Crocodile Smile,' 'Egwu Eke Dance,' and 'Python Dance' between 2017 and 2018; additionally, there has been the outright dislocation of the leaders of the group and perhaps regrouping or most likely strategizing on staging a comeback. Government should be reminded that peacebuilding activities are no more the sole responsibility of track one diplomacy. The earlier the government agrees with this 21st century reality, the better for the nonnegotiable unity of the country paraded by different leaders at different time and space. In its bid to end the crisis, government should not only erect structures of social peacebuilding, it should also involve other tracks in the healing process of the region.

Track Two Diplomacy: Non-Governmental Organizations

Realizing the weakness and failure of Track One or traditional diplomacy to accomplish humanity's needs on the diplomatic missions, Montville, (1991) coined Track Two diplomacy as unofficial, informal engagement between conflicting parties with intention of designing a plan of action to influence public opinion, organize human and material resources in ways that might help resolve their conflict. Though it needs reiterating that like other tracks, track two diplomacy is not a substitution of track one but to complement the effort of the former track (Nan, 2005). They are skilled professionals and humanitarian by nature and intent, they use their large body of knowledge and humanistic perspective to resolve and transform conflict situation. Unlike track one diplomacy that cannot approach a crisis head-on for the fear of losing its constituency, track two diplomacy is opposite to this and therefore express their perception and perspective on issues openly. This

then makes the track to be effective as conflict transformation and/or preventive tool at the pre-conflict stage and post-conflict peacebuilding. But, it must be observed that access to fund, delay in decision making or lack of political will to influence decision and mostly in an authoritarian regimes (Mapedenre, n.d.) and improper coordination as a result of inexperience are some of the pitfalls of track two diplomacy.

Nevertheless, Track Two remains an effective and viable tool that is applicable to the ongoing crisis between the Nigerian government and the agitators for the Biafra Republic. It is expected of the local and international NGOs to embark on conflict resolution workshops and peace advocacy work within the region. International organization should be ready to guide and at the same time see personnel of the local organizations through the purview of forging strong alliances in order to engage both conflicting parties in a scientific negotiation while both parties signed memorandum of understanding prior and after such negotiation. Also, NGOs like International Alert and Amnesty International among others should not relent in chronicling cases of abuse of human right and make such available to the public. The levels of success achieved also help foster infrastructural peacebuilding.

Track Three Diplomacy: Business

Most business ventures do not see themselves as viable instrument for peace (Diamond & McDonald, 1996), forgetting that engagements, interactions, and negotiations that involve money, resources, and labor require diplomacy. Few among the international businesses that understand this have made efforts to establish new ventures for effective diplomatic relations. This is because they realized that business interaction is de facto for peace negotiations. To say the least, track three is an agent of transformation prior to and in the moment of violent conflict and can help to build peaceful post-conflict environment. For instance, enactment of joint trade agreement by various business ventures or opening of more manufacturing plants in the region would help in transforming an impoverish region like the southeast Nigeria and open it up for development. Also, standard of living can be improved upon by setting new industries which open channels for new opportunities. However, all these are achievable in a situation whereby businesses are less concern with the act of profit and profiteering. In a situation whereby the major aim of setting the business is for profit making only, little or no social advancement can be recorded, and hence, left populations impoverished.

Recently, the country was declared to have been faced with economic recession. One of the chief causes responsible for this is the various devious attacks of Boko-Haram insurgency, herdsmen, and the militias groups which indeed has devastated the northern region and in effect affects the socio-economic strength of the country. With this reality, businesses such as Multinational Oil Companies in the categories of the joint venture; production sharing contracts and service contracts, Vehicle Manufacturing Companies, various communication limited, Dangote Groups of company and the likes within the region and across the country should be aware of their responsibilities in curbing and halting the social violence in the region. More so, business only excel in a secured and peaceful environment, track three should not see the ongoing crisis as government constitutional right alone and hence they should also contribute their quotas to the peace-making exercise of the region. To do this, they should be ready to render economic, commercial, and empowerment assistance in the region.

Track Four Diplomacy: Private Citizens

The most interesting thing about Track Four is that it devours protocol, formality, and government sanctions to be involved in peacebuilding activities. This is because it can be instigated by any interested individual, or group of individuals, and can be on any topic or issue affecting the society or the country at large. In addition to that, Track Four is less concerned about guiding principles, formal organizations or common cause, and source of fund (Randall, 2005). Even at that, the activities conducted by this Track have profound effect on human conditions, part of the reason it is referred to as the grassroots of all the tracks. Like the NGO, we also have some individuals within the region and the country at large that their presence alone can foster peace and bring to an end the crisis in the region. Such private citizens should also make effort to work as intervenor between the government and the group(s). They can do this by encouraging and advising both parties to consider changing their confrontational and avoidance approach for scientific negotiation. They should also not hesitate to advice the government in making friendly policies toward the region. The knob of their responsibility is toward political peacebuilding. Meanwhile, it bears repetition to note that track four might also escalate conflict in a situation where the Track and Track One are not tailoring the same line of agreement or approach.

Track Five Diplomacy: Research, Training and Education

Track Five component of the diplomacy is more potential in making a globe saving transformation when compare with others and its peacemaking through learning. This must have made Randall, (2005) to describe the track as the most unique of all tracks. Supporting this view, Diamond and McDonald subsume that track five is of two subsystems, that is, the think tanks and the students' subsystems. The former is made up of professional scholars whose efforts are to embark on researches to solve and prognosis on the discovered problems. These researches are always issue based and scholarship oriented. Apart from that, the think tank groups also sponsor international conferences and seminars in the bid of solving an urgent outbreak or resurgence of an outbreak like the Ebola Virus Disease (EVD) and always available as consultants to the governments on any outbreak. On the other hand, the students' subsystem includes but is not limited to the university students alone as it is the community whereby intellectual ferment and creativity flourish and whereby students apply for diverse programs that introduce them to conflict resolution theories and its application. To crown it all, it is this subsystem gives rooms for all types of learning process (Diamond & McDonald, 1996).

Given this analysis, it is imperative of peace scholars and practitioners not to relent in their rigorous research into both remote and immediate causes of conflict within the region and across the country. A cursory glance across the world will show that religious and ethnic inspired conflict is at the increase because of the inability of political leaders across the continents to make available political peacebuilding, among others. Peace scholars and practitioners, however, have a dual responsibility of informing the citizens and the government of the early warning system/sign that can jeopardize peaceful coexistence, and, also endeavor to put in place suggestions that can avert such conflict. Government and private stakeholders on the other hands, should give the findings of such research a topmost consideration and where necessary it should be adopted as a policy. Addition to this also is that, public should be educated and well informed on the findings of such

research. Apart from that, the extent at which students at secondary and tertiary institutions embark on issue-based research is also a determinant factor in solving the conflict. There is also need for Nigerian scholars to intensify their exchange programs with international institutions such as Institute for Multi-Track Diplomacy, WANEP, and others. More so, courses on conflict studies should become core subject in our universities across the country while efforts are made to institute Centre for Peace and Strategic/Conflict Studies in the universities. Individuals scholars should not relent on their issue-based research. Scholarship and sponsorship on the part of the government and private organizations is also an added advantage that this track brings to the table in handling the many facet challenges associated with the conflict.

Track Six Diplomacy: Activism

Peacemaking through advocacy is the most delicate aspect of diplomacy. This is because in recent times, it has become an instrument in the hand of terrorists and other belligerent groups to cause havoc, destroy properties and lives, and canvass for public support in the bid of agitating for their constitutional rights and most especially in a democratic settings where the rule of law prevails. Nonetheless and if apply constructively, its capable of de-escalating and transforming conflict by making government to volte-face its approach in a conflict situation and ends in a win-win situation. This form of activism is what Diamond and McDonald explicitly expunged when they posit that the primary task of the activist community is to transform institutions, attitudes, and policies through political actions. Suffice it to add that peacemaking via advocacy/activism has a voice in arresting the ongoing conflict in the face of the region through their sincere, undiluted and unbiased criticism of the government and the group whenever actions and steps taken by either of them is not constitutional and negate civic rule. Without trepidation, their position should be made known in a non-violent way. Their involvement, in laying off the unrest should not incite more conflict or hardship on the citizens, rather, should bring the conflicting parties to the negotiating table where both need placing their cards, examine their tactics, policies, and reach a compromise. Activists like, late Ken Sarowiwa, Gani Fewehinmi, and Fela Anikulapo Kuti among others comes to mind and are indeed needed in the ongoing trying period of the nation. In transforming the conflict, it should be said that the efforts transcend advocacy at individual levels, rather advocacy groups also should make their voices heard and engage the various parties involved simultaneously.

Track Seven Diplomacy: Religion

As a total departure from the truckloads of havoc religion has caused the human history, the primary purpose of this track is to embark on reorientation through information dissemination across the globe that the place of religious organizations transcend violence and war, rather, and if well managed is supposed to be the bedrock of peace, love, and harmonious relations. Though it is assumed no religious organization preaches hatred and violence, yet almost all the world religions have the antecedent of one crisis or another. Even at that, the world religions have missionary and humanitarian groups across the world and use religion to canvass for—and settle—socio-economic and religio-political conflicts. Beyond this, and in some instances, terrorists, dissent, or self-emancipated groups prefer a negotiation that have in attendance their favorite religious leaders. Being in the knowhow of the indelible marks religion has left in the heart of people across the globe makes track seven to be concerned with peacemaking via "faith in action"

or religion. This played out in the northern part of Nigeria during the hurting stalemate of the Boko-Haram insurgency during President Jonathan's administration, the group mentioned General Muhammadu Buhari now President Muhammadu Buhari as one of the key stakeholders that must be in attendance before it would honored the alleged scientific negotiation the federal government pushed for. It is from this same perspective that the study believes so far, the large population of the southeast are Christians; these religious bodies should engage and endeavor to work toward peacemaking through their sermons, preaching, and humanitarian services. They should not be seen as taking sides or dishing out hate speeches. Apart from that, religious bodies in the contemporary Nigeria have become formidable stakeholders of sort and hence can also mediate in the conflict, as belligerent groups often times listening to religious leaders because of the spiritual and temporal respects accorded them.

Track Eight Diplomacy: Communications and the Media

The role of the media in the peaceful coexistence of Nigeria as a nation cannot be overemphasized through dissemination of genuine information. Hence, track eight or peacemaking via information as Diamond and McDonald further opines that the main thrust of the media is to use all at her disposal to engage the public on issues of peace, conflict transformation, and international relations. This further explains why the sustainability of peace of any given society of recent has been traced to the part taken by the media. This is because the Media serves as the gauge of public opinion. If our media houses (social media inclusive) can do away with sensational news and embark on professional reportage of events, durable peace will be imminent in the region. It is, however, not surprising anymore that the headlines of our media outlets do not correlate with the body of the essays, and in such instances, readers only read or act on the headlines without reading to the end. So, instead of promoting or be a part to the disintegration of the country media houses should be more professional in their field and be versatile in promoting peace in the region through their reportage. Meanwhile the expansiveness of the internet, couples with the multiplication of cheap internet support phones left us with a caveat in the country. This is because access to mobile phones and internet facilities has turned the populace to a street journalist. The implication is that the future of diplomacy through media looks bleak. The extent at which the region understudy used both internet and radio station at its disposal to dispense information and secured public attention speaks volume and negate the position that the birth of internet comes with a bright future for diplomacy (Randall, 2005).

Track Nine Diplomacy: Funding

The level of success to be achieved by all the components discussed is determined by the quantum of fund at their disposal to execute such projects. However, there are private individuals, foundations, organizations, and agencies into philanthropist activities around the world that perfectly made up the bulk of track nine component or peacemaking through providing resources. Among others, World Bank, International Monetary Fund, the US Agency for International Development, the Bill Gates Foundation, The Foundation for International Community Assistance (FINCA) and the Tony Elemelu Foundation are some of these agencies and private individuals that are committed to the course. Interestingly enough, these foundations and agencies are not limited to a cause as their philanthropist assistance cut across economic, political, health, and social programs and not limited to a particular region rather with tentacles that spread across the globe.

For instance, Bill Gate has contributed and still contributing deeply to the course of development through philanthropist activities in Africa at large and Nigeria in particular, even at that there is still need for other components of the Multi-Track Diplomacy to, through their convincing proposals bring Gates and others to their side.

But there is a caveat here, supporting a course with fund does not necessarily guarantee a successful outcome of such crisis. To be added is that often time organizations relaxed and return to their shells immediately they got the grants requested for; such moves made philanthropists to give granting aids a second thought and even where they do, their commitment is somehow shallow. Any Track requesting for aids should have in place a blueprint of action containing their budgets, plan, scope, and space through which the project would be achieved. Their concern should at every point in time be tailored toward turning a conflict habituated region to a peaceful habituated environment where both party's needs, interest, wants and fears that escalate the conflict ab-initio are discussed, addressed and attended to and put in place structures of peacebuilding not only to douse the tension but to de-escalate and transform the conflict.

V. Conclusion

The reoccurrence of the Biafra crisis stemmed from the trauma created by the event of the civil war and the conflict handling styles of the past and present governments. Coupled with this is the perceived marginalization of the region politically, socially, and economically immediately after the war. In fostering its grievances, MASSOB emerged as the arrowhead of the region and at the forefront threatened to secede from the country. Meanwhile, internal politics, mistrust and mismanagement of fund brought the group to a sudden end and opened the gate for formation of numerous splinter groups. It was during this period that IPOB was created and become radical through its activities. The paper then submits and shows that disintegration of the region will not solve the intractable melee confronting the region. This conclusion is reached as a result of elite' fragmentation surfacing within the groups agitating for self-emancipation. Whereas, to clamp down on the group, Nigerian government choice of approach is confrontational in nature rather than being collaborating or compromising. On its part, the group adopted avoidance or hit and run approaches. This then explained the reason the outcome is always on a win-lose basis and the hence, the escalation of the conflict. To transform the conflict and acquiesce the region back to the country, there is need for both parties to alter their approaches. The paper concluded by espousing the flexibility and multidimensionality of Multi-Track Diplomacy as a useful mechanism to de-escalate the conflict and put in place structures of political, infrastructure and social peacebuilding.

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RESTORATION OF INDEPENDENCE FOR HAWAI'I

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Abstract

The Kingdom of Hawaiʻi was deposed in 1893 by a coup supported by soldiers of the United States although not accepted by the president of the United States as a violation of international law. In 1898, Congress voted to annex Hawaiʻi and American control has continued to the present. Today, there is some desire to restore Hawaiʻi as an independent country. This paper analyzes eight reasons supporting independence and the feasibility of such a transfer of sovereignty.

Some now believe that the Hawaiian Islands deserve to become an independent country again. Is that pursuit justifiable or even feasible? In this paper, I attempt the first comprehensive analysis of a policy question that is destined to shock the United States and the world.

Should Hawaiʻi Be Independent?

1. The Kingdom of Hawaiʻi, Independent Up to 1893, Was a Progressive Country in Many Ways

In 1839, Kamehameha III issued a Declaration of Rights and the Edict of Toleration. The Rights protected for "all people of all lands" were identified as "life, limb, liberty, freedom from oppression; the earnings of his hands and the productions of his minds." The chiefs were explicitly informed that they would lose their noble status if they mistreated commoners. Religious liberty has been observed ever since.

In 1840, on behalf of the "Hawaiian Islands," Kamehameha III and Queen Kekāuluohi promulgated a British-style government. The body of chiefs that formerly met at the pleasure of the king became an appointive 16-member House of Nobles, including the king as a member, along with a "representative body," initially chosen by the king from letters of nomination; those with the most nominations were appointed by the king (Kuykendall 1938:228). Also that year, he nationalized all forests to prevent despoliation.

Any laws required majority support in the two legislative bodies, chosen biennially, as well as approval by the premier and the monarch. All adults in the Kingdom were given the power to vote in elections for the representative body. Hawaiʻi, thus, was the first country to grant women the franchise and the third country (after France and Greece) to grant universal manhood suffrage.

The king also formalized the position of governor for the four main island groups, similar to the present counties. The nobles on each island were empowered to appoint the governors, who would collect taxes on behalf of the king, appoint judges, and have control over military installations in their islands. Judges were to preside in each gubernatorial jurisdiction. There was a right of appeal to the Supreme Court, with the king at the head. Thus, the Kingdom of Hawaiʻi established rule of law, which provided security to commercial transactions in a manner that even today cannot be assured in many parts of the world.

Both the Declaration and the Edict were incorporated into the constitution. The right to a fair trial was also included, evidently modeled on the wording of the Sixth Amendment to the American constitution. The constitution also provided that the next monarch, should the king die without an immediate heir, would be decided by a vote of the chiefs or the legislature.

The constitution would not be considered adopted until the provisions were explained to the people, and the persons who were to serve in the government also had to agree to uphold the provisions. Amendments were to be discussed first with the public and then adopted by a majority vote of both legislative chambers.

According to the 1840 constitution, all land was owned by the monarchy on behalf of the chiefs and the people "in common," with the monarch as the protector of the land arrangement, though he could designate crown lands as his own property. But, the major piece of legislation during the 1840s, the so-called Great Māhele of 1848, established the concept of private property.

Soon after the Hawaiian language became a written language due to the efforts of Protestant missionaries from the 1820s, public schools were established. In 1841, Hawaiʻi was the first country to offer primary education for all whose parents could pay modest tuition. English was accepted, not imposed, as the medium of instruction soon afterward. Two-thirds of Native Hawaiians were literate by the 1890s (Daws 1968:284).

In addition, several "gathering rights" were recognized by the Kuleana Act of 1850: Those on ancestral agricultural lands to which they claimed title were granted a right of access, even over private land, to gather aho cord, drinking water, firewood, house timbers, running water, thatch, and ti plants (Eagar 1997). Also during 1850, the legislature designed a criminal code, and secret ballots were adopted.

In 1851, the legislature proposed a three-person commission, with one member appointed by the king and each of the two legislative chambers, to make recommendations to the king for a revised constitution. In 1852, based on the work of the commission, Kamehameha III adopted a more detailed constitution: Taxpaying citizens at least twenty years old were enfranchised, whether they owned property or not, though women lost the right to vote. The first articles expanded civil liberties to include all those enumerated in the American Bill of Rights. Slavery, which never existed in the Islands, was prohibited, joining the earlier abolition by France and Scandinavian countries. The king and House of Nobles were given the power to designate a successor to the throne; but if they failed to do so, that power would be exercised jointly by the two legislative bodies.

The Reciprocity Treaty of 1876 brought so much prosperity to the sugar interests that they no longer needed loans in advance of annual harvests. The Kingdom of Hawaiʻi, thus, because the first Third World country to achieve First World status. However, the result was that the sugar interests were economically dominant in the Islands and would remain so until a few years after World War II.

In 1878, Honolulu resident Charles Dickey bought two telephones while on the continental United States so that he could talk between his home and his office. Hawaiian Telephone Company was established five years later to provide service. Soon, cables were established to link the islands.

The Islands also became a testing ground for electricity. In 1879, Thomas Edison invented the first cost-effective incandescent lamp. Word of the invention spread to King Kalākaua, who had a "technical and scientific bent" (Hawaiian Electric 2013). In 1881, the king arranged a meeting with Edison, as he was eager to import the new invention to the Islands. After London and New York began to electrify in 1882, Charles Otto Berger brought Edison's lamps to Honolulu for a demonstration at ʻIolani Palace in 1886. One night, after placing the lamps throughout the palace, they were lit all at once. A crowd gathered, and the Royal Hawaiian Band quickly assembled to celebrate the event. Soon after the world's first steam turbine had been developed in 1884, a steam engine was installed to generate electricity on a regular basis for the lamps at the palace. It should be noted that ʻIolani Palace was lighted by electricity before the White House in Washington, DC. In 1888, plans for the illumination of downtown Honolulu, then a city of some 23,000 residents, came to fruition. A power plant was built in Nuʻuanu Valley, with turbines driven by a hydropower. By 1890, electric power had been extended to nearly 800 businesses and homes.

Power plants with generators, some operated by hydropower, were soon built around the Islands, including the plantations, and were consolidated into grids on each island by corporations, such as Hawaiian Electric on Oʻahu.

In 1876, the legislature adopted the Act for the Protection and Preservation of Woods and Forests, one component of which was to protect the watershed. To the present, Native Hawaiians consider all land sacred and protest efforts to convert pristine land into commercial developments.

2. The Overthrow of the Kingdom of Hawaiʻi was and Remains Illegal Under International Law

Britain and France signed a noncolonization agreement in 1843, recognizing the Kingdom of Hawaiʻi as a sovereign state (Kuykendall 1938:206-21). Next, two envoys from the king went to Washington to make the agreement trilateral. One suggested that otherwise the king might cede sovereignty to Britain. In response, President John Tyler agreed in 1843 to join the two European powers, implicitly extending the Monroe Doctrine to Hawaiʻi (Stevens 1945:18-20; Daws 1968:118; Geschwender 1982:195).

However, a secret Annexation Club was formed in 1892, when elections produced a situation in which no political party had a majority. Soon, the club morphed into a secret Committee of Safety, composed of thirteen Caucasians, including five Americans, six White citizens of Hawaiʻi, a Brit, and a German. Twelve of the thirteen had been members of an Annexation Club. Most were missionary descendants (Fuchs 1961:33). They solicited and gained support from American Consul John Stevens and the captain of the USS *Boston* for a coup but actually never asked them to land; they first wanted to draw up documents for a provisional government.

On January 16, 1893, Stevens unilaterally ordered 162 troops to disembark from the USS *Boston*, seize the government building, place the queen under house arrest, and demand that she abrogate. One palace guard was wounded in the leg of the otherwise peaceful takeover. The monarchs lacked a militia to put down the insurrection.

Instead of conceding power to the conspirators, however, the queen relinquished power to the United States (Liliʻuokalani 1898:ch40-47), expecting yet a disavowal. But none came, and the American flag went up in Honolulu on February 1, when a declaration of a Provisional Government and martial law was announced. President Benjamin Harrison forwarded a treaty of cession to the Senate, which was not then in session. The queen's son, Prince Jonah Kūhiō Kalanianaʻole Piʻikoi, was soon arrested for advocating her restoration to the throne.

After Grover Cleveland was sworn in as president the following month, he withdrew the treaty from the U.S. Senate and sent an envoy, James Blount, to Honolulu for an investigation. Based on the resulting report (Blount 1893), which found that most Island residents opposed the coup, Cleveland ordered the flag lowered, the return of American soldiers to their ships, and the withdrawal of the USS *Boston*.

Cleveland characterized the coup as unconstitutional and a violation of international law (Dudley and Agard 1990:25-46): The landing of American troops for the coup violated the Reciprocity Treaty (Dougherty 1992:169), an offense that was an international crime established by the

Congress of Vienna in 1815. His Secretary of State, Walter Gresham, even urged him to send American troops to overthrow the upstart regime and to restore the monarchy, but Cleveland instead asked the Provisional Government to restore the monarchy (Morgan 2011; Daws 1968:278-79). Under his administration the McKinley Tariff of 1890, which placed restrictions on Island sugar contrary to the Reciprocity Treaty, was repealed in 1894.

But that did not stop those who wanted annexation, which occurred in 1898 soon after William McKinley was elected president. In 1900, the Islands became the Territory of Hawai'i.

One century later, in November 1993, Congress adopted a resolution stating "that the overthrow of the Kingdom of Hawai'i occurred with the active participation of agents and citizens of the United States" and further acknowledged "that the Native Hawaiian people never directly relinquished their inherent sovereignty as a people over their national lands." President Bill Clinton then signed what is known as the Apology Resolution—a resolution, not an enforceable law.

A major decision by the Hawai'i Supreme Court in 2008 clarified the confusion between sale of public lands and claims of Native Hawaiians to those lands. The justices ruled unanimously that Congress's Apology Resolution and various state laws assigned state government with the responsibility of holding public lands in trust until Native Hawaiian claims could be resolved. In effect, public lands could no longer be leased casually. In the following year, the U.S. Supreme Court in *Hawai'i v OHA* (556US163) ruled that the Apology Resolution was advisory, not a basis for constitutional change of the status of the State of Hawai'i.

3. The Culture of Hawai'i is Entirely Different from American Culture

There is a wide consensus that Hawai`i's relatively exemplary race relations can best be explained in terms of shared values (Adams 1926,1934; Grant and Ogawa 1993; Kirkpatrick 1987; Lind 1969; Park 1938; Wittermans-Pino 1964). Some refer to a "Hawaiian ethos" (Chong 1975) or "local values" (Cayetano 2009:427). Although principles of the Aloha Spirit were encoded into law during 1986 as a guide to appropriate behavior by governmental officials (Haas 2011:Appendix), after statehood the Aloha Spirit was gradually enriched by the best values from other cultures, especially the Japanese. One reason for the merger of the Aloha Spirit with Japanese Buddhist values may be that Polynesians originally came from the Malay Archipelago and Taiwan (Kayser et al. 2006) before sailing toward the middle of the Pacific. Sociologist Lawrence Fuchs (1961:449) attributed the "Hawaiian Aloha" and the "promise of Hawai`i" to

> [P]olynesian attitudes, missionary conscience, and the patience and good will of immigrants from the Far East . . . [and] also the result of such democratic values of free public education and universal suffrage—values promoted by the Congress of the United States and educators the the mainland. Hawai'i illustrates the nation's revolutionary message of equal of opportunity for all, regardless of background, color, or religion.

Anyone moving to the Islands will soon learn that the norms prevailing in Hawai'i are often the antithesis of what is acceptable in the continental United States and elsewhere. Isolated geographically, a special culture has developed that is highly valued by residents.

Many Caucasians moved to the Islands during the 1960s, experiencing "culture shock"—that is, encountered experiences where previous forms of behavior were viewed by longtime Hawaiʻi residents as unacceptable. Barack Obama (1995:57) describes some of the difficulties that his in-laws experienced while living with them, though they adjusted reasonably well. But the culture of Aloha is radically different from that prevailing in the continental United States, where there is a bias toward assimilation to a "mainstream." To give an example of cultural misperception of someone from the Aloha State, on a television program during May 2014 moderator Gwen Ifill criticized Hawaiʻi-born Eric Shinseki, then Secretary of Veterans Affairs, for testifying before Congress without displaying emotion while saying that he was "mad as hell" over reports that veterans were being denied timely medical attention at veterans' hospitals.

For someone on the East Coast, failure to show emotion is interpreted as "not caring." For someone of Japanese ancestry, however, showing emotion is a sign of immaturity and weakness and thus strongly condemned (cf. Cayetano 2009:141), though evident when someone is under extraordinary personal stress. The influence of Japanese culture is so strong in Hawaiʻi that another person who acquired those traits as a boy is frequently criticized for the same tendency to show little emotion: His name is Barack Obama. Indeed, in April 2015, while interviewing a biographer of Obama's spouse Michelle, Ifill suggested that Barack's cool demeanor was a flaw in his personality. She had obviously not read either *Barack Obama, The Aloha Zen President* (2011) or *Mr. Calm and Effective: Evaluating the Presidency of Barack Obama* (2012).

Sometime during the 1970s, it became clear that Japanese values were being increasingly accepted as norms in the Islands. The revelation came through participant observation—my contacts with humble graduates of public schools but also in the political arena (cf. (Jordan and Tharp 1974; Horton 1975; Junasa 1982). With Japanese Americans also dominating the civil service and politics, they repeatedly insisted that others should respect their "cultural heritage," referring to Japanese values but not contesting the concept of Aloha. What happened after statehood was the development of a set of principles, known as the multicultural ethos, that brought about a peaceful modus vivendi in which members of all cultures now enjoy learning from and respecting one another.

Whites with humble Midwestern values are more resonant with the Aloha Spirit than those with East Coast and West Coast aggressiveness (cf. Kuroda 2011). Many Caucasian colleagues at the University of Hawaiʻi's Mānoa campus have had more difficulty because their social lives are centered around their profession. Those who made friends of many ethnic and racial groups off campus learn more quickly (cf. Haas 2011:v). The worse "culture shock" of all is for a longtime resident of the Islands to move to the continental United States, where not a day will pass when something will happen that could never have occurred back home in Hawaiʻi.

4. The People of Hawai`i Have Adopted Innovations far Beyond the Other 49 States

Even before statehood, Hawaiʻi has adopted progressive reforms before almost anywhere else in the world. They have done so because of their humanistic culture that is critical of the individualist norms of unbridled capitalism. The most famous, though unacknowledged, is the practice of racial integration, which was observed in the 1920s by the Chicago School of Sociology (Park

1928,1938), leading to a campaign for desegregation that resulted in *Brown v Board of Education* (1954).

Rather than discussing the reforms in depth, here is a list of some reforms first adopted by the Kingdom of Hawaiʻi were later adopted throughout the world:

- first use of the quarantine (kapu) to protect public health (traditional)
- first country to abolish the death penalty (1830)
- first country granting the right of women to vote (1840)
- first country to offer universal primary education (1841)
- country with a department of health (1851)
- country to establish forest reserves (1876).

When Hawaiʻi was forcibly incorporated into the United States in 1898 and became a Territory of the United States in 1900, the impact of innovations was mainly on the other states and the federal government, as the Islands lost their international identity. Nevertheless, changes first emerged from the Aloha of the people before being written into American federal and state law:

- first part of the United States with racially integrated schools (1900)
- first multiracial union (1906)
- first progressive income tax in the United States (1909)
- first desegregated YMCA (1917)
- first multiethnic trade union (1921)
- first part of the USA to ban billboards (1927)
- only part of the USA requiring equal expenditures at all public schools (1933)
- first agricultural trade union to gain the right of collective bargaining (1937)
- first female head of a police commission (1951)
- first part of the USA to adopt an equal pay act (1957).

After 1959, when Hawaiʻi became the fiftieth state, the people of the Islands, especially non-Whites, advanced ideas that had been desired but suppressed until the White establishment lost power:

- highest levels of employee benefits, unemployment insurance, workers' compensation, and temporary disability insurance (1960s)
- first statewide Land Use Commission (1961)
- first state with Family Courts (1965)
- first state Ombudsman (1967)
- first law requiring sale of leased land in fee simple when leases expire (1967)
- first state to require art decoration in all newly built public buildings (1967)
- first state with an Ethics Commission to monitor executive conflicts of interest (1968)
- first wide boundary between beachfront property and public beach (1968)—at high-tide debris
- first recognition of the right of landowner access to one's plot through another's plot (1968)

- first state to form a Media Council to monitor media relations with the public (1969)
- first state to allow unrestricted abortions (1970)
- first state to classify Caucasians as a "minority" in affirmative action (1971)
- first state to ratify the Equal Rights constitutional amendment for sex equality (1972)
- first system of neighborhood boards in a city (1972)
- first declaration that water is a public resource that cannot be owned privately (1973)
- first state to mandate universal health insurance coverage by employers (1974)
- state to declare strip searches of female prisoners unconstitutional (1974)
- first ban on aerial advertising (1978)
- first officially bilingual state (1978)—English and Hawaiian
- first constitutional mandate to refund taxpayers in years of budget surplus (1978)
- first constitutional declaration of the right to a clean and healthy environment (1978)
- first constitutionally declared right to privacy, with restrictions on wiretapping and electronic eavesdropping (1978)
- first establishment of an independent counsel for grand juries (1978)
- first state economic and environmental plan (1978)
- first state to use heat pumps (1980)
- first Jaycee club to admit women (1984)
- first Center for Alternative Dispute Resolution (1985)
- first native forest birds preserve (1985)
- Aloha Spirit Law (1986)
- first funding of an indigenous healing program (1988)
- first Green Party candidate elected to office (1992)
- first successful challenge to denial of marriage license to gays and lesbians (1993)
- first advanced indigenous language degree programs in the USA (1997).

During the present century, most innovations have responded to economic difficulties. But the form of the changes has involved human rights concerns more than economic gimmicks:

- first state to authorize bulk purchases of prescription drugs by insurance companies (2002)
- first state to regulate the cost of gasoline (2002)
- first work furlough program for prisoners (2005)
- first successful challenge to discrimination against LGBT prisoners (2006)
- first law protecting journalists from revealing their sources (2008)
- only law requiring all new houses to have solar panels for water heaters (2008)
- only state Islam Day (2009)
- only state to ban employment discrimination based on credit history (2009)
- only state to require mediation before foreclosure (2011)
- only state with an Interagency Council on Homelessness (2011)
- only state to ban employment discrimination of victims of domestic and sexual violence (2012)
- only state to ban discrimination based on breastfeeding (2013)
- state with the largest percentage of female state legislators (2013)
- first state to ban plastic bags (2014)

- only state to ban smoking until age 21 (2015)
- only state to set the goal of 100 percent renewable energy by 2045 (2015).

Other states and countries have pioneered various forms of progress, too. But what is perhaps unique about Hawaiʻi reforms is how improving life for people comes before principles of economic growth in resolving conflicts.

5. The Reason for Incorporation into the Territory of Hawaiʻi No Longer Exists

The United States annexed the Hawaiian Islands in 1898 because the magnates of plantation agriculture wanted to ensure that they could sell pineapple and sugarcane within the American market rather than having international tariffs imposed. But the days of plantation agriculture are over, and even the heads of those agricultural businesses have refocused their attention elsewhere in the world.

6. The Reason for Incorporation as the Fiftieth State Has Been Betrayed

Hawaiʻi was accepted as the Fiftieth State by Washington for a reason. For Harry Truman (1950), the aim was to demonstrate the superiority of the United States during the Cold War as a model of race relations, arguing that admission proved that the United States "judges people by their deed, and not by their racial or national origins . . . [and] that this country is till truly dedicated to the proposition that all men are created equal." President Dwight Eisenhower agreed, asserting that in the Islands "every creed and color . . . live[s] together in neighborly friendliness and mutual trust" (AP 1959).

In a way, Washington designed a sort of experiment: Admission as a self-governing state would provide a test market for the other states to learn on an equal basis from a place in the world where racial harmony exists. But for more than fifty years, the rest of the United States has copied the innovations of Hawaiʻi without acknowledging them. That legal abortion and many other reforms began in the Islands is uncelebrated today. And, among reforms not yet adopted, the rest of the country has not passed a law requiring mediation before foreclosure. Lacking acknowledgment of the Aloha State as a test market for American democratic reforms and harmonious race relations, one might question whether the experiment is really working. Perhaps the time has come to conclude that the experiment has failed to transform America, particularly in regard to race relations, and move on, giving the people of the Islands the right to regain their independence.

7. Hawaiʻi is a Colony Within the United States

Courts have ruled that federal authority preempts the people of the Islands from regulating GMO production, which benefits some corporations but definitely harms the environment and the people who live adjacent to the GMO farms. Other examples of preemption may reverse many reforms adopted in Hawaiʻi in the area of consumer protection (Lazarus 2015).

At the same time, the U.S. military occupies land in the Islands without paying the true market value of the land in the form of rent. As a result, areas of land traditionally used for agriculture

have been destructively used for firing practice. Raising the rent will help sustain the economy of the new country.

A third grievance is the Jones Act of 1920, which requires foreign trading ships to the Islands to first unload their merchandise in West Coast ports, after which American ships transport the goods to Hawaiʻi. Thus, under independence, the cost of foreign imports—one reason for the higher cost of living in the Islands—would decrease. A thorough analysis of the economic impact of independence would appear to be favorable.

Those who travel to Hawaiʻi will recall that their luggage undergoes agricultural inspect when they leave. But there is no such inspection upon arrival. Hawaiʻiʻs environment is imperiled because the Islands are the world's capital of endangered species. species (Cabin 2013:xx). According to a letter sent by the American Bird Conservancy dated May 16, 2014, "Habitat loss and degradation, invasive nonnative plants and predators, grazing animals, and diseases are transforming Hawaiʻi from a natural paradise into a wasteland for Hawaiʻi's extraordinary native birds, plants, and wildlife."

Similarly, an independent country can control immigration and international transactions. The Islands have limited resources of water and have run out of food, but under current circumstances the population could increase to millions beyond the capacity of the country for self-sustainment. The currently homeless crisis in Honolulu is due to the onrush of homeless from the continental United States seeking warmer weather under their tents (Khalsa 2014). Moreover, one reason for the high cost of housing is that real estate in Hawaiʻi is up for auction on the international market, and much is owned by outsiders who have caused the price of real estate and rent to soar beyond affordability (Brown and Cohen 1975).

Many states similarly argue for "state's rights." But the situation for Hawaiʻi is the most unequal.

8. The World would definitely pay attention and benefit from the voice of Hawaiʻi

Hawaiʻi's voice would be more likely to be heard in the General Assembly of the United Nations— or as a UN Secretary-General—than the present situation. The Islands are submerged within a country that ignores its long history of leadership at the very time when such wisdom is badly needed.

Hawaiʻi Might Become Independent

1. Washington Does Not Care

Because politicians and pundits in the nation's capital are for the most part unwilling to acknowledge the lessons of Hawaiʻi, they might not miss or bother to notice the removal of the fiftieth star from the flag.

For example, Vice Presidential candidate Dan Quayle rejected Michael Dukakis's proposal to make the Hawaiʻi universal health care law the basis for a national health care plan. His stated reason in 1988 was that Hawaiʻi was just a bunch of islands.

In 2008, journalist Cokie Roberts criticized Barack Obama for visiting members of his family and old friends by taking a vacation in Honolulu. She described the Aloha State as a "foreign, exotic place" (Schweber-Koren 2008; cf. Millican 2008) and instead suggested Myrtle Beach, a traditional vacation spot for upscale African Americans. Similarly, there is not a single entry for "Hawaii" (let alone "Hawai'i") in the index to the book of a well-respected Obama campaign biographer (Wolffe 2009). Two other famous journalists incredibly say that Obama spent "much of his youth outside the United States" (Balz and Johnson 2009:381). His three years in Indonesia, in other words, were more significant to them than his fifteen years in the city of Honolulu.

There is an even stronger rejection of the notion that Hawai'i could serve as a model for race relations. When the Ford Foundation was once approached for funding of research on race relations in Hawai'i in 1991, African American officials were not interested.

For many, the Fiftieth State cannot be a model of race relations because there are so few Blacks in the Islands. But problems of race relations in the United States are not "Black problems." The problem is with Whites, who have learned how to behave in Hawai'i but not in the continental United States. In one recent racial incident after another, nobody thinks of consulting the Honolulu Police Department to determine how best to handle the situation.

2. Plebiscite

Native Hawaiians took special note as Slovakia seceded from Czechoslovakia in 1993. The vote for Scottish independence in 2014 suggested that even a conservative British government would listen to the call for self-determination by allowing a plebiscite in the twenty-first century.

No plebiscite has ever been held in Hawai'i to determine the wishes of the present population. When citizens of Hawai'i voted for statehood in 1959, the option of independence was not on the ballot. Such a vote now might eventually gain a majority, especially from those who want to return to the days of the monarchy. A campaign to pass such a plebiscite, in my opinion, will pass when is a coherent argument is presented. The vote may increase year after year to the point that the will of the people may become so overwhelming that Washington will have to grant independence.

3. Prosecution Under International Law

Independence seems warranted under international law, though the idea has not yet gained traction in an international tribunal. The impropriety of the overthrow of the monarchy in 1893 has been acknowledged by the Apology Resolution adopted by Congress and signed by President Bill Clinton in 1993. President Grover Cleveland and members of Congress then believed that annexation was contrary to international law.

Attorney Hayden Burgess was perhaps the first to advocate immediate sovereignty (secession from the United States) based on his analysis of the violation of treaties between the United States and the Kingdom dated 1826, 1849, 1875, and 1883, which specified that there was to be a friendly relationship between the two governments but were violated by the overthrow in 1893 when U.S. marines went ashore. In 1978, Burgess decided to defend an accused criminal in *Hawai'i v Palawa*

(58Haw377) by moving to dismiss the case on the grounds that the court had no jurisdiction, since he should be tried in a Hawaiian court under Hawaiian law rather than a court under "American occupation." In 1979, after his plea was rejected, he stopped paying taxes to any government, and he formed the Institute for the Advancement of Hawaiian Affairs in 1982. successor to his earlier Hawaiian Sovereignty Committee.

In 1974, ʿOhana O Hawaiʿi was founded with the intention of suing the United States in the International Court of Justice to recover sovereignty. During 1998, attorney David Keanu Sai went to the Permanent Court of Arbitration at The Hague to seek acceptance of Ka Lāhui Hawaiʿi (the Hawaiian Kingdom) as a possible international litigant, and the court agreed in 2001.

At Sai's suggestion, Lance Paul Larsen then decided to sue, claiming that his rights as a subject of the Hawaiian Kingdom, were not being protected. The aim, to have the international court declare the 1893 overthrow as illegal, was frustrated when the arbitral judges ruled that they could not decide the case because the United States did not agree to be a party to the dispute and thus would not file an opposing brief on the matter. In 2001, Sai filed a complaint with the UN Security Council in his role of Interior Minister of the Hawaiian Kingdom, submitting an article written for a law journal as the legal basis for such a claim (Chock 1995). The UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples was issued in 2007 gave further encouragement.

Sai (2014) has also filed a memorandum with the Office of Hawaiian Affairs restating his position at length, citing many precedents of military occupation, even Texas (cf. Fernandez 2015). Among the violations of the Fourth Geneva Convention he listed the most serious as the de-nationalization of residents of the Islands. He also charged that collecting taxes from the people that serve purposes other than paying for the occupation itself is a war crime and quoted Governor Waiheʿe as agreeing that the annexation was occupation.

UH Professor Williamson Chang demanded in 2014 that Attorney General Eric Holder investigate the charge that the war crime of pillaging was committed when the United States militarily occupied the Islands without a treaty basis in 1893, exterminating the sovereignty of the kingdom (Radio Australia 2014). The force of such arguments has persuaded Professor Haunani-Kay Trask to conclude that her earlier efforts to work toward sovereignty within the scope of the United States have been superseded (Calizar 2003).

The international route would seek to re-establish the independent Kingdom of Hawaiʿi by secession of the Islands from the United States. Those seeking restoration of independence differ in regard to what sort of legal framework would be established.

4. Constitutional change for Native Hawaiians

In 1987, several Native Hawaiian groups met together in the Constitutional Convention for a Hawaiian Nation. Although there was no consensus on which path to take in order to recover lost sovereignty, a constitution was drafted, and those present agreed on a declaration of sovereignty for a new organization, Ka Lāhui Hawaiʿi (the Nation of Hawaiʿi). Subsequently, an election was organized for those of at least 50 percent Native Hawaiian ancestry (Osorio 2010:17). Mililani Trask was then voted as kiaʿāina (governor). The organization favors a nation-within-a-nation

concept, similar to the reservations of the Native American peoples who are considered sovereign nations inside the United States. Native Hawaiians would continue to live as citizens of the United States but would elect a legislature to manage Native Hawaiian lands carved out of the State of Hawaiʻi and pass laws operative on those lands. Ka Lāhui Hawaiʻi insists that the lands to be controlled by a Hawaiian Nation, similar to the Native American reservations, would consist of the 200,000 acres of Hawaiian Homestead lands, half of the 1.4 million acres of crown lands transferred from the monarchs to the Territory to the State of Hawaiʻi, and additional lands in restitution for the overthrow (Trask 1992:255), a very tall order indeed.

Later in 1987, the convention inspired the establishment of the Sovereign Council of Hawaiian Homestead Assembly as an association of twenty-eight Hawaiian homestead associations, similar to homeowners' associations in condominiums or residential communities. Representing about 30,000 homesteaders (Kamauʻu and Keppeler 1993:299), the Council proposed to serve as the administrative body for the homesteads outside a state government department. In other words, they wanted to serve as a nation-within-a-nation if granted a sovereign status similar to tribal governments of Native American reservations.

Ever since several organizations have sought consensus on how Native Hawaiians might regain control of lands that were reserved to the crown. In 1992, the Office of Hawaiian Affairs, a Cabinet-level body in state government offered itself as the governing body of a Native Hawaiian government, being the lawful recipient of ceded lands. Ka Lāhui Hawaiʻi did not agree, preferring the sovereign entity and land to be independent of state government. In May 1993, the legislature created a Hawaiian Sovereignty Advisory Commission to draw up a bill for Congress and advise the legislature on issues relating to sovereignty. But the body was opposed by several Native Hawaiian organizations for usurping their roles as independent advocates. The body, later renamed the Native Hawaiian Elections Council, proposed a plebiscite on whether to restore the Hawaiian Nation.

In 2000, Senator Daniel Akaka introduced the Native Hawaiian Recognition Bill in Congress seeking authorization to form the organization "Kingdom of Hawaiʻi" as an entity similar to various Native American tribal governments. The entity would control all land managed by OHA and DHHL. One aim was to enable a collective negotiation of grievances between that entity and the federal government by recognizing Native Hawaiians as on a par with Native Americans. In an amended form, the bill passed the House of Representatives in 2010 but not the Senate. Although amended and renamed in committee deliberations over the years, the bill has never been debated on the floor of Congress because of Republican Party opposition. The law, supported by OHA, would set aside land for Native Hawaiians to govern and live, similar to tribal arrangements for the indigenous peoples of North America. According to Akaka, passage of the bill would be a first step toward sovereignty. But those seeking restoration of Hawaiʻi as an independent country have strongly objected that passage of the vaguely worded bill might result in transfer of the management of the lands to the Bureau of Indian Affairs within the Interior Department (Kauanui 2014). In 2015, the Interior Department decided to let Native Hawaiians reorganize on their own outside governmental channels (Nakaso 2015).

If Native Hawaiians are to have a say in their own future, there must be a vote. Accordingly, in 2011 a Native Hawaiian Roll Commission was established by the First Nation Government Bill.

OHA thus had to determine by May 1, 2014, a roster of eligible persons who could vote to establish a Native Hawaiian government within the State of Hawai'i. The bill passed the state legislature when the Akaka bill seemed dead due to Congressional opposition, but the Supreme Court stopped the vote count in 2015 on the grounds that only one race was voting.

Establishing a separate entity for Native Hawaiians, however, will not solve the other problems identified above that result from continued colonization within the United States. They may even exacerbate enmities. Within an independent state, however, they could be more easily worked out, as the United States government would not be able to intrude.

Efforts of Native Hawaiians have resulted in divisions within the indigenous community as well as suspicions on the part of other groups. They would vanish if Hawai'i were granted independence, as all groups could work together.

5. Free Association

In 1995, Ka Lāhui Hawai'i sponsored a symposium on sovereignty. Michael Hansen proposed free association. Similar to the Commonwealth of the Northern Marianas and various countries in Micronesia, Hawai'i could allow Americans dual citizenship within a sovereign Hawai'i state that would allow the United States to handle the new state's defense and foreign affairs. The dollar would remain the currency, trade could flow without tariffs, and other arrangements could ease the transition. Such an arrangement would have to be written into a treaty that has yet to be drafted. But there are precedents on which to rely.

Conclusion

There are many reasons why Hawai'i might claim the right to self-determination. Overcoming resistance from the United States might not be as difficult as conventional wisdom assumes. A world would then derive the benefit of a new voice for racial harmony.

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PEACE STUDIES

JOURNAL

On the Violence of Housing Capitalism and its Policy Complex: Outline of a Nonviolent Alternative

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Keywords: Urban Studies, Housing Policy, Urban Development

Abstract

The social sciences conceptualize housing capitalism and its policy complex as violent in a variety of ways. However, social science concepts commonly locate violence on the 'exceptional' edges of housing capitalism. Moreover, a commitment to conflict ontology means that social sciences have no conception of nonviolent housing. This is problematic because social sciences are currently the master academic disciplines of 'housing studies'. Yet, we urgently require an understanding of nonviolent housing in order to build alternatives to the violence of housing capitalism. This paper draws on the nonviolence literature, as well as insights from phenomenological philosophy and theology, to address these problems. This enables me to, first, conceptualize violence as fully integral to housing capitalism, before second, allowing me to build the ontological foundations of a nonviolent housing alternative. I also outline what this alternative looks like in housing practice.

Introduction

This paper considers what Engels (1975[1872]) referred to as 'the Housing Question' from a nonviolent perspective. Why? In the midst of a housing crisis, and austerity, social scientists are increasingly regarding housing capitalism and its effects as 'violent' (e.g. Cooper and Whyte 2017). Yet, there has been no equivalent attention to what a nonviolent alternative to housing capitalism might look like. That is the concern of this paper which is presented in the following 3 parts.

Part I of the paper discusses social scientific understandings of the violence of housing capitalism and policy, especially in the social scientific field of 'Housing Studies' which is currently the main arena for the academic discussion of housing. I suggest that violence constitutes a strange absence in 'mainstream' (i.e. government sponsored, policy oriented) Housing Studies which regard it as exceptional. The same is not true in 'critical' (i.e. Marxist, academic left) Housing Studies where violence looms large. Literally but misleadingly. This is because most 'critical' social scientists conceptualize violence as a dramatic and 'out of the ordinary' event, e.g. violent clearances of urban homeless camps. Although some critical social scientists have sought to develop 'normalized' conceptions of housing violence (e.g. the everyday routine nature of 'bureaucratic violence'), they remain attached to an eventualized epistemology in which violence is dramatized, e.g. bureaucratic violence is located within the political drama of austerity. This is ironic because it places 'critical' social science in the same territory as its 'mainstream' opponent with whom it shares an 'exceptionalist' view of violence. However, this exceptionalism is only one of the problems with social science conceptualizations of violence.

Part II of the paper discusses how the ontological commitment of Critical Housing Studies to a conflict metanarrative has resulted in its conceptualization of housing violence as an inevitable reality within capitalism. Two consequences follow. First, since critical social sciences define housing capitalism as violent, they task themselves with 'fighting' capitalism as the source of housing violence. Second, they have no conception of nonviolent housing change. If we are to build peaceful alternatives to the violence of housing capitalism, these problems need addressing urgently. That is the task of part III of the paper.

Part III of the paper draws on nonviolence and related literatures to outline what nonviolent housing might look like. After making the case for an ontology of optimism, in place of the conflict ontology that roots social science in pessimism, I outline three routes towards nonviolent housing. First, I problematize the social scientific idea that we need to address ourselves to housing capitalism (the capitalist state, economy, bureaucracy *etc.*) as the source of violence. I instead emphasize our participatory subordination to housing capitalism as the source of violence, and the reflective capacity of silent spaces to 'break' this subordination. Second, I problematize the idea that social sciences, wedded to a conflict metanarrative, can be the primary or legitimate authors of a truly alternative, nonviolent, housing reality. Since nonviolence only emerges through *mutual understanding between people <u>involved</u> in housing,* nonviolent responses to the housing question can only properly emerge from a vernacular hermeneutics of nonviolence. The implications of this are radical because it decenters the social sciences as the legitimate authors of housing change. Third, if the first two steps involve 'breaking' our subordination to housing capitalism, as well as the grip of social sciences on authoring the alternative, the final step outlines the principles of

nonviolent housing. I do so using Ward's (1976) idea of 'dweller control', which is a prefigurative approach to change that is consistent with a Gandhian nonviolent emphasis on 'being change' rather than 'seeking change'. I conclude that a nonviolent approach does not call us to create a new Utopia. To make such a call would make the task too big. Rather, it emphasizes the building of housing alternatives that already exist, within institutional frameworks that already exist. Nonviolent housing is not a dream, then. It is already here so we need to recognize and build on it.

Part I: Social Scientific Understandings of the Violence of Housing Capitalism and Policy in 'Housing Studies'

In contrast to the theoretical desert of the 1980s which followed the flourishing of Marxist theorizing on housing capitalism in the 1960s and 1970s (Kemeny 1992), there has been a wealth of theoretical work on housing capitalism since the early 1990s such that it has been theorized from almost every viewpoint imaginable in contemporary social science. However, there is a lacuna in this rich theoretical literature: Housing capitalism has either not been theorized within the epistemic context of violence and nonviolence studies ('Mainstream' Housing Policy Studies) or has been theorized in epistemically limiting ways ('Critical' Housing Studies). I want to argue that this is a significant problem in both cases.

<u>The Aberration of Violence in 'Mainstream' Housing Policy Studies</u>

In his book *The Nation State and Violence,* Giddens (1985) suggests that mainstream social sciences tend towards a Hegelian view of the world which presumes the state to represent a 'universal' that actualizes civil society as a pacified space in which violence is an aberration. Mainstream Housing Policy Studies conforms to this view because it places the democratic policy process at the center of its narrative: Housing policy resolves housing problems and conflicts by responding to needs (Malpass and Murie 1993) in a way that serves the 'public interest' (Allen and Marne 2010) thereby maintaining social cohesion and order. As such, violence only ever appears as a *historical exception* or *behavioral* aberration.

In the former case, we are transported to historical periods when 'outbreaks' of violence were a consequence of a less than democratic policy process. Thus mainstream accounts of housing policy make reference to historical cases of 'social unrest' such as the 'outbreak' of rent strikes in 1915 (Short 1982), but treat these as aberrant and, in any event, tend towards the ambivalent terminology of unrest rather than violence. Accordingly, the word 'violence' does not appear in the index of mainstream housing policy books whereas there is a complete absence of papers on the violence of housing policy in peer-reviewed journals in the Housing Studies field. In the latter case, violence has featured as a *behavioral aberration* (e.g. domestic violence) which is resolved by housing policy intervention (see Baker et al 2003; Menard 2001). There is little sense that housing policy itself might be violent or, therefore, that violence might constitute a legitimate issue for social scientific consideration beyond its aberrant historical and behavioral appearances.

The Dramatic Violences of Housing Capitalism in 'Critical' Housing Studies

If Mainstream Housing Policy Studies possesses an epistemic blindness to violence, the same is not true of Critical Housing Studies. However, the 'critical' literature deals with violence in highly specific ways that might be limiting. Three points are pertinent.

> (i) Critical Housing Studies mainly focuses on the 'dull compulsion' of housing capitalism rather than its violence
> (ii) where 'Critical' Housing Studies focuses on violence it conceptualizes it as a dramatic occurrence and therefore exceptional. Ironically, this places it in the same epistemic territory as Mainstream Housing Policy Studies
> (iii) Although some recent studies have sought to treat violence as a 'normalized' aspect of housing capitalism they fall into the trap of epistemic exceptionalism by locating it in dramatic historical periods

I will now develop these three points in turn.

The Absence of Violence from the Dull Compulsion of Housing Capitalism

Following Marx, the theoretical focus of Critical Housing Studies has been on 'the silent compulsion' of capitalist housing development processes in which violence only appears in exceptional cases. A classic example of this can be found in Harloe (1977, 1981) and Harloe *et al* (1992), whose Marxist theorizations of housing focus on "basic economic processes, such as the declining rate of profit and the changing organic composition of capital in relation to urban structure" (Kemeny 1982: 419). The consequence of this is relegation of violence to the edges of housing capitalism where it becomes an exceptional drama to *empirically document* rather than an essential and regular feature of housing capitalism to be *theorized.* The following example makes the point:

> In 1984 a 22 person gang was indicted and jailed for having organized a 'routine of terror' (as the Manhattan District Attorney called it) aimed at emptying 21 apartment buildings. Hired by a group of landlords for $100,000 the gang 'installed drug addicts, prostitutes, thieves ... to commit burglaries and assaults against tenants' up to and including death threats .... In a more gruesome case Bruce Bailey, an aggressive tenant activist in Upper Mantahhan's Columbia Tenants' Union, went missing on June 14th 1989. The next day his dismembered body was discovered in trash bags in the Bronx (Harloe *et al* 1992: 196).

Although the violence that Harloe *et al* (1992) describe above is shocking, perhaps that is the point. However, the unfortunate consequence of their over-empirical attention to the shocking exceptionalism of violence 'in the name of housing capitalism' is distraction from generating understandings of violence as an integral feature of housing capitalism that merits theoretical attention in its own right. Ironically, this makes 'critical' understandings of violence remarkably similar to mainstream understandings of it; violence sometimes 'breaks out' but is not essential to the story of housing capitalism.

Dramatic Waves of Violence in Housing Capitalism

A second strand of work in Critical Housing Studies has attempted to break away from this 'exceptionalist' consensus between mainstream and critical housing researchers on violence. Harvey's (2004) work on 'the new imperialism' is key here. Harvey's argument is that critical (especially Marxist) social sciences have theoretically reduced "violence to an 'original stage' [of primitive capitalism] that is considered no longer relevant" such that it is regarded as "somehow 'outside of' the [contemporary] capitalist system" (Harvey 2004: 74). This has encouraged a contemporary focus on the political economy of capitalism in which realities of "violence and open expropriation [have] recede[d] into the background" (Glassman 2006: 611; see also Tyner and Inwood 2014). Harvey (2004: 76) suggests that critical social sciences have been mistaken in this approach because violence has played a historically continuous role in capital accumulation and that, as such, we should continue to focus on "capitalism [as] internalis[ing] cannibalistic as well as predatory and fraudulent practices" (2004: 75).

Key to understanding this, in a housing violence context, is his suggestion that there are two circuits of capital accumulation. These are the 'primary' circuit of industrial capital and the 'secondary' circuit of housing capital (Harvey 1978 1985; Lefebvre 1991). When accumulation crises occur in the 'industrial' circuit (i.e. when profits secured through wage repression result in an excessive accumulation of capital followed by under-consumption of manufactured goods: Gorz 1999), the increasingly bloated owners of capital 'switch' investment into the 'secondary' circuit of housing where new opportunities for accumulation exist. Housing now becomes an 'active moment' in capital accumulation as, indeed, we have recently seen in cities such as London and New York where an increasingly bloated global wealth elite have invested in large numbers over the last decade or so (Fernandez et al 2016; Kei Ho and Atkinson 2017; Atkinson et al 2017a,b).

The switching of capital into the secondary circuit of housing is violent in two key ways. First, the 'speculative housing bubble' that circuit switching creates produces the "structured violence of poverty, inequality and marginalisation by which certain groups are pushed to, or over the edge of, society" (Gee 2011: 37) by a lack of affordable housing. Second, circuit switching is neither a-spatial or mono-violent, i.e. merely structural. Industrial-come-housing capital is predatory because it targets 'rent gaps' (Smith 1996) which emerge where housing can be purchased at a low capital value, and then sold on at a higher capital value after redevelopment (Watt 2009; Hodkinson 2011). The problem is that 'rent gaps' tend to be occupied by low-value housing and low-income people who need to be forcibly removed so that the potential capital value of housing can be realised. Harvey (2004) calls this 'accumulation by dispossession'. More specifically, Smith (1996: 211) refers to it as 'revanchism' because it involves a "vicious reaction" against the "minorities, the working class, homeless people, the unemployed … [and] immigrants" that are targeted for removal from rent gaps. Symbolic and legal violence are integral to revanchism and dispossession.

Building on Lefebvre's (1991) work on 'representations of space', which emphasises how symbolic and linguistic devices are mobilised to devalue urban spaces targeted for redevelopment, Smith shows how revanchism is *initially* waged through 'obsessive portrayals' of the occupants of rent gaps as "degenerate" and "fatally flawed" and therefore in need of removal from urban space

(Smith 1996: 211-212; see also Wacquant 2008 on 'territorial stigmatisation' which has been applied in the UK by Kallin and Slater, 2014, in their discussion of the 'blemishing of place'). These stigmatising discourses constitute a form of violence in-themselves because, as Zizek (2009: 61) and Salmi (2004: 56) point out, they 'dismember' and destroy the psychological, emotional, cultural and human integrity of people by 'reducing them to a single negative feature'.

Yet stigmatising discourses are more than violence in-themselves. They are one *initial* element of the architecture of violence that revanchism visits on occupants of rent gaps. This is because they also act as facilitating devices; justifying and legitimising the use of other violences that, in the name of 'regeneration', promise to 'fix' problem housing by upgrading its physical and demographic attributes (Kallin and Slater 2014). Stigmatising discourses legitimise the use of physical violence (see Smith 1996: 3, for a graphic description of police violence against homeless encampments in Tompkins Square Park in New York) and legal violence (see Glassman 2006; Crookes 2011 and Hodkinson and Essen 2015 on the use of legal instruments such as Compulsory Purchase Orders in the UK and Eminent Domain in the USA) to forcibly dispossess low-income people of homes that sit on rent gaps. Legal instruments such as CPO are viewed as particularly violent because they are used as 'threats' and thus 'constitute a form of bullying' (Crookes 2011: 247) that perpetuates relations of power, exclusion and oppression (Imrie and Thomas 1997: 1403) in the pursuit of the "planned, deliberate destruction of someone's home, causing suffering to the dweller" (Porteous 1998). They are so violent, in fact, that Porteous and Smith (2003) refer to their consequences as 'domicide'. In 'critical' analyses of housing capitalism, then, multiple "violence is not aberrant, but central …. It is not exceptional, but quotidian" (Blomley 2003: 130; cited in Crookes 2011: 246). Or is it?

Although Marxist Housing Studies have brought violence back into the equation of housing capitalism, I would like to suggest that they do so in theoretically specific and limiting ways. So, although Harvey laments Critical Housing Studies for conceptualising violence as extrinsic to the dull compulsion of housing capitalism, ironically, he falls into the same conceptual trap. Herein lies his problem: Harvey's theoretical argument is that the dull compulsion of accumulation has not super ceded accumulation by violence because they are "organically linked" and have historically sat side-by-side (Harvey 2009: 73). Yet, in his historical analysis (Harvey 2004), the violence of accumulation by dispossession is extraneous to the dull compulsions of housing capitalism because violence is an episodic drama that occurs during accumulation crises (those of the 1880s, 1940s and 1970s are specifically mentioned) in the form of territorial 'raids', 'pillaging', 'imperialism', 'colonialism' and so on. As such, Harvey primarily sees violence occurring in episodic 'waves' of accumulation by dispossession (Harvey 2004: 80), for instance, in rent gaps (Smith 1996), which means that he does not conceptualise the dull compulsion of housing capitalism as violent at all. This consigns him to the exceptionalist conceptual territory he seeks to vacate.

The Normal Violences of Housing Capitalism: Silent, Mundane and Corporeal

Several attempts have been made to develop a social scientific conception of violence that shifts away from the eventalized idea that it occurs in 'big' or 'significant' historical moments such as accumulation crises (Harvey 2004) or 'big' policy decisions (Cooper and Whyte 2017) and,

instead, locates it within the 'normal' everyday routines of housing capitalism. The following, which are not mutually exclusive, are notable:

> (i) 'slow' and 'silent' conceptions in which violence is latent yet always present;
> (ii) routine and mundane conceptions in which violence is normalised and therefore indecipherable; and
> (iii) phenomenological conceptions where violence is inscribed upon, and carried by, the human body in everyday life.

The idea of a 'slow' violence (O'Lear 2016) emphasises to how the violent consequences of chains of decisions and non-decisions, made in the service of capital accumulation, are most often delayed (see Cooper and Whyte 2018 on the Grenfell Tower fire). Since these delays render the gradual unfolding of violence latent and invisible (Nixon 2011; Jackson et al 2017), Watts (2013[1983]) also refers to it as 'silent' violence. A good example of this is provided by Crookes' (2011) discussion of 'regeneration by attrition' which emphasises how institutional acts of neglect (e.g. 'not doing' repairs and maintenance) facilitate a slow process of neighbourhood decline and subsequent need for 'redevelopment-by-dispossession'. In this instance, a chain of decisions to 'do nothing' results in a truncated form of slow and silent violence (Galtung 1969) because they gradually increase the distance between *what is* (neighbourhood failure and home loss) and *what could have been* (liveable neighbourhoods) where *what could have been* is harder to decipher because institutional neglect has rendered it empirically invisible.

So far, so good. However, there is a problem. Insofar as 'silent' and 'slow' conceptions of violence have found their way into Critical Housing Studies, their 'discovery' has, paradoxically, been facilitated by their eventual tendency to loudly announce themselves, for instance, in the form of compulsory evictions from failed neighbourhoods (Crookes 2011). Insofar as slow and silent violence remain connected to their eventual tendency to suddenly increase in volume, then, we are only able to identify violence when its sudden loudness draws our attention. In other words, we otherwise remain ignorant of the presence of violence, which means that, most of the time, we misunderstand capitalism to be non-violent outside of its episodic tendencies to explode into violence. The result is an epistemological neglect of the violence inherent in the dull compulsions of housing capitalism. This has certainly been the case with the Grenfell Tower fire which social scientists are currently conceptualising as a paradigmatic case of a 'longer-term, slow, process of institutional violence' (Cooper and Whyte 2018: 6) and 'social murder' (Tombs 2016). Yet, during the long absence of loud violence at Grenfell, the 'dull' and routine decision-making that led to the Grenfell fire escaped social scientific discussions of violence.

This brings us to the second approach to the violent nature of 'everyday' housing capitalism which is exemplified by Cooper and Whyte (2017) whose edited book '*The Violence of Austerity'* guides us to the idea that violence is an 'ordinary', 'mundane' and 'routine' presence that is *visible* in the housing system *and can therefore be identified as such*. For instance, they identify 'bureaucratic violence' as a 'life shattering violence' that is routinely "delivered by smartly dressed people sitting behind desks" (Cooper and Whyte 2017: 23). Their book provides case studies of bureaucratic violence occurring in routine decision making about welfare entitlements that lead to evictions of people from their homes, which are increasingly accomplished through the use of

physical violence (Paton and Cooper 2016) and can result in further violent consequences such as devastation and suicide (Paton and Cooper 2017). Their argument is compelling.

However, there is a problem. Although Cooper and Whyte (2017) emphasise the mundane and everyday nature of violence, they conceptualise violence in temporal and dramatic terms, as historically situated within a specific housing policy complex (i.e. the violent time - space of 'austerity'), rather than integral to housing capitalism. As such, they leave us ontologically trapped by the notion that violence is an extraneous drama to housing capitalism *and therefore* without a conceptual understanding of violence as integral to the everyday routines of housing capitalism and its policy complex.

The third approach, which draws on existential phenomenology, promises to close this gap by focusing on the body as an *everyday carrier* of the violence of housing capitalism. This is most obviously the case in studies of 'home loss' and 'displacement' which provide phenomenological insights into how enactments of political, economic and legal violence attack the integrity of being in a way that "den[ies] a person the right to psychological, emotional, cultural or intellectual integrity"[1] (Salmi *et al*, 2004: 59-60). For instance, Chester Hartman (1984) in his classic work *The Right to Stay Put* argues that the structural violence of "involuntary residential changes … produce a considerable amount of psychosocial stress, which has been found analogous to the clinical description of grief" (Hartman, 1984: 305-6; see also Crookes', 2011, studies of home loss which contain graphic empirical detail of 'the cost in human terms' of state-sponsored gentrification (Crookes 2011: 324). Likewise, Tombs (2017) has spoken about the 'social harms' (physical, emotional, psychological etc) that "continue to be produced" as a result of the home loss endured by the victims of the Grenfell fire as well as the experience of the fire itself. In the slightly different context of mortgage possession, Ford *et al* (2001: 163-4), similarly describe people losing their home "express[ing], somatically, the conditions of their existence" such that the 'unpleasant emotionality' of mortgage possession became lodged in their 'mode of being'; the experience of home loss left many "people with an emotional legacy of enduring insecurity". In all of these cases, then, home loss became phenomenologically embedded in being such that people became "afflicted *daily* by anxiety, apprehension and dread" (Salmi 2004: 60).

However, despite taking violence into the realm of everyday, these phenomenology's are (like normalisation approaches to violence) problematically embedded within an eventalised epistemology which emphasises drama. So although these social scientists conceptualise the body as an everyday carrier of the violence of housing capitalism their conceptualisation of the enactment of violence remains scripted within the temporally played out drama of home loss. This is problematic for three reasons. First, it suggests that we would not need to talk about the violence of housing capitalism if these events had not happened to these people. Second, it implies that only some people are victims of the violence of housing capitalism some of the time. Third, it implies that interventions at the structural level (e.g. measures that prevent home loss) are sufficient to eliminate the violence of housing capitalism. In the next section, I want to suggest that these three

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[1] Salmi (2004) refers to loss of identity through assimilation and the maintenance of people in fear as examples of alienating violence.

assumptions are problematic *and* that social scientific housing studies is ontologically incapable of escaping from these problems.

Part II – For a Nonviolent Approach to the Housing Question

Similar to Vinthagen (2015a), I want to suggest that we now proceed without the assistance of social sciences, which, as we have seen in Housing Studies, have relegated violence to the exceptional edges of capitalism where its dramas only visit some people, sometimes. This is too limiting. However, this limitation does not, alone, disqualify social sciences from resolving the problem of housing violence. The fundamental issue that disqualifies social sciences from resolving the problem of violence is their commitment to an ontology of conflict and violence, that is, a metanarrative of the world in which conflict and violence are considered to be a default (albeit eventalized) reality. This is because it renders social sciences ontologically incapable of moving beyond housing violence.

To move beyond housing violence we need to turn to the disciplines and traditions that pursue "theoretical and conceptual development to capture various dimensions of nonviolence" (Vinthagen 2015a: 52) that we can then apply to housing. This takes us into radical territory because it compels us to dispense with social sciences as the master disciplines of Housing Studies (the current state of affairs) and, instead, embrace alternative ontologies and epistemologies from the various disciplines and traditions (philosophy, theologies *etc.*) that make up peace and nonviolence studies. These disciplines and traditions have shown themselves capable of understanding both violence and nonviolence as omnipresent which, when applied to housing, results in radical shifts in thinking as I will show.

The Metanarrative of Violence in Social Scientific Studies of Housing

According to Kemeny (2002) the conflict metanarrative of the social sciences can be traced to the philosophical axis established by Hobbes and Locke which instituted an antithesis between state and society. This has found expression in the historical and political creation of heroes (e.g. welfare state, good) and villains (e.g. capitalist society, bad) which have, in turn, naturalised the Hobbes-Locke antithesis. Kemeny argues that this is particularly true of Critical Housing Studies where "it is difficult to find any work that does *not* deal with this polarised relationship [between state and capitalist society] as a central dimension of analysis" (Kemeny 2002: 190) and in which:

> For Marxist ['critical' housing researchers] and Fabian liberals ['mainstream' housing researchers] the state is the heroic white knight of the narrative, riding to the rescue of the poor who are exploited and trodden under for the benefit of a few capitalists greedy for profits. The state intervenes in the market, sometimes abolishing it, sometimes regulating it, sometimes propping it up with subsidies (Kemeny 2002: 190)

Since this conflict metanarrative has provided the ontological foundation for the social scientific study of housing capitalism as a struggle between good and evil, conflict is seen as an inevitable reality as, indeed, Marx claimed in the *Communist Manifesto*: "the history of all hitherto existing

society is the history of class struggle". This has necessitated the formation of a framework of social scientific concepts suited to this conflict reality which, it follows, consists of theories of the state, power, domination, oppression, class, inequality and so on. The consequences have been two-fold. First, in a world in which conflict is a default reality, the logical question for social scientists to ask themselves is 'which side are you on?' (Becker 1967) where the only feasible option is to wage epistemic war on the powerful in the pursuit of epistemic and social justice (McConkey 2004). Second, since this implies a commitment to epistemic conflict, critical social scientists have shown 'no interest' in developing nonviolent alternatives to violence or in ideas of nonviolence (Vinthagen, 2015a). Instead, they regard their task to contribute to 'struggles' in which conflict and violence are inevitable rather than something to be overcome in the building of the new society (Milbank 2006). As such, social scientific responses to the violence of housing capitalism tend to take the form of appeals to 'fight' and 'battle' the violent injustices that housing capitalism and policy visits on people (for instance, see Smith, 1996, on 'retaking' the urban frontier and Paton and Cooper, 2016, on 'battling' the frontier of gentrification). Alternatively, they invoke exceptional phases of (e.g. welfare) capitalism and 'call' for the state (good) to attack the rich (bad) in order to stand up for the poor, for instance, by:

> restoring our system of social protection and restoring the spending power of local authorities …. Taxing the rich, not punishing the poor …. The best way to prevent the worsening violence of austerity and to rebuild the economy is to reinvest in public sector jobs. (Cooper and Whyte 2017)

This crystallizes the nature of the problem. For all the social scientific ink that has been devoted to the violence of housing capitalism and policy, barely any has been used to develop an understanding of nonviolent housing. It is not an accident that social scientists working in the field of Housing Studies have made no contributions to peace and nonviolence studies or that there have been no discussions of nonviolence in the housing studies literature. We need such a contribution urgently if we are to rethink the housing question in a way that promotes nonviolence.

From an Ontology of Violence to an Ontology of Peace: Rethinking the Violence of Housing Capitalism

Although social sciences have produced numerous conceptualisations of violence (structural, cultural, legal, institutional, bureaucratic *etc.*) I am suggesting that they actually possess a mono-conceptual view of violence, i.e. as an extra-routine drama periodically announcing itself on the landscape of housing capitalism. Yet, outside of the social sciences, violence is understood to be an uninterrupted omnipresence that flows under the surface of capitalist societies where it continuously works its effects in non-dramatic conditions of 'peace' (Fahey 2005; Gee 2011; Hiranandani 2014). This turns things on their head because it renders violence a phenomenological *absence of truly peaceful daily existence* (Gee 2011; Hiranandani 2014)*,* and therefore phenomenally integral to the routine functioning of housing capitalism, rather than a dramatic occurrence.

We get a sense of this in Allen's (2008) phenomenology of housing capitalism which uses Bourdieu's (2000) concept of symbolic violence to show how everyday language omnipresently works its effects *within* human 'being'. So where Critical Housing Studies' understand symbolic

violence as a temporal phenomenon that discontinuously works its effects *against* people living in 'rent gaps', a phenomenological understanding of symbolic violence regards it as an omnipresence that continuously works *within* the 'being' of its human subject. Allen suggests that housing market language, such as 'housing ladder', wreaks symbolic violence because it is *so omnipresent* in *everyday discourse* of housing (see Sprigings *et al* 2006 on the everyday prevalence of TV programmes on housing as a commodity) that it encouraged his working class subjects to take an active interest in the local housing market ("I can't help myself"). The phenomenal nature of the symbolic violence occurring here was not simply a consequence of how working class people lived everyday life (watching TV programmes on housing, keeping up with house prices *etc.*) but because it affected how they came to *feel about* and *define* themselves, daily. Since working class people consented to symbolic language such as 'housing ladder', through their active participation in it as a "natural" language for describing the market for houses, they felt "regret" about their own housing situations. They "wished" they had climbed up the 'housing ladder', even though it had been financially impractical for them to do so. Moreover, they felt "failures". As such, they not only lacked value in the eyes of others. The phenomenal symbolic violence wreaked by the everyday language of housing capitalism left its teeth marks in the 'being' of working class people who were silently reduced to 'living inferiority' (Charlesworth *et al*, 2004) because they lacked value in their own eyes.

Yet that is not all. Allen's (2008) phenomenology also reveals the violence of housing capitalism to be economic as well as symbolic. This is evident when we return to the existential consequences of housing indebtedness, which are not reducible to dramatic events such as home loss. Specifically, neoliberal housing systems have enticed working class people to assume increasing amounts of debt to 'invest' in home ownership, even though this "violate[s] the working class being-toward housing, which grasps houses in terms of their basic essentials" (Allen 2008: 198), i.e. as dwelling spaces rather than financial investments. Allen discusses how the consequences of this violation are "evident in the terror that … mortgage debt … the assumption of which is necessary to obtain a position in the brave new market for houses, strikes into working class people" thereby inducing an existential fear of everyday life (Allen 2008: 198). He concludes that housing capitalism is "tyrannical" because, even in apparent conditions of 'peace', it is an insidious omnipresence that violates human 'being' by desecrating who we truly are and who we could be - if only we were free from its shackles (see Gorz 1994).

Peace Ontology and Nonviolent Approaches to the Housing Question: New Responses to the Violence of Housing Capitalism

The idea that violence is a phenomenal omnipresence within housing capitalism has huge implications for our understanding of nonviolence. This is because it highlights how our active participation in the destructive competitiveness of housing capitalism renders violence and conflict human creations rather than structural inevitabilities. It follows that the capacity for nonviolence resides within human beings, who Gee (2011) now asks to participate in the world as a space of wholeness and fellowship rather than a capitalist space that reduces us to mere competitors:

> I commit to peace not first because violence is shocking, … but because I am moved by the simple wonder of being alive on a planet with breathable air and 30 million species of life …. Commitment to peace assumes the wholeness and fullness of this shared and given

life, in which <u>every</u> person, community, people and the ecosystem has inalienable value as part of the whole. (Gee 2011: 87-8; emphasis added)

In reframing our existential condition in this way, Gee creates a conceptual space for an ontology of optimism from which we can map a route to nonviolent housing. To help me undertake this mapping exercise, I now turn to Vinthagen (2015a,b) who provides the following three approaches to nonviolence that we can use to re-think housing:

> (i) Power breaking and refusal of violence: listening and finding nonviolent housing in silent spaces
> (ii) Dialogue and mutual truth seeking: listening and finding nonviolent housing in dialogic spaces
> (iii) Prefiguration and peace-building: construction of nonviolent housing alternatives in physical spaces

Part III – Outline of a Nonviolent Approach to the Housing Question

<u>Power breaking and Refusing the Violence of Housing Policy</u>

Our fundamental problem has been this: 'Critical' social science assigns a structural location to power and violence, that is, within housing capitalism and its policy complex. This defines the nature of the challenge that social scientists set themselves which is to wage struggle on behalf of the victims of state and market violence with the aim of capturing housing policy (the fulcrum of state power). However, this only creates a huge amount of discursive noise that leads to an intensification of ideological conflict (Webb 2010 2012) whilst leaving the problem of 'what happens when political power is lost' unresolved.

If the 'critical' social sciences locate violence within housing capitalism and its policy complex, a nonviolence perspective takes an opposite approach which understands the 'participatory subordination' of human beings to housing capitalism and its policy complex as the key source of violence (see De Ligt 1989; Dommen 2014; Vinthagen 2006 2015a; Hirandani 2014; Yoder 2003). So, whereas sociological approaches suggest that housing capitalism wreaks 'symbolic violence' by 'coercing' people into conformity with the market (see Allen 2008 on the 'housing ladder'), a nonviolent approach suggests that our 'participatory subordination' to the linguistic and economic demands of the housing market (e.g. the acquiescence of "I can't help myself") is the ultimate source of violence

> The social phenomenon of power is characterised by one actor who subordinates him-herself, partly or entirely, by relinquishing the practical responsibility or intention of their own behaviour …. What characterises the phenomenon of power is an abandoning of the initiative: the displacement of practical responsibility for one's own behavior. (Vinthagen 2015a: 179 & 186)

This suggestion, that the ultimate source of housing violence is within ourselves, brings us to the crux of what is different about a nonviolent approach to housing. Since 'critical' social sciences take a structural approach to power and violence (which prioritises 'state', 'society' and 'market' as the ultimate arbiters of human life) it regards ontological moves into the inner life of individuals as reductionist and nonsensical. Yet, their suggestion that power is 'achieved' through struggles to 'take' power is deeply problematic because it reduces our subjective lives and 'being' to the play of political and market power when, as Vinthagen (2006 2015a) suggests above, they are *already* and *always* a source of power in themselves (see also Holloway 2010; Clark 2012). To understand this point more fully, we need to turn to the disciplines and traditions that are contributory to nonviolence studies and that point to the 'power breaking' capacity of spaces of silence and contemplation. For example, in contradistinction to sociological approaches that regards capitalist society as inescapably 'tyrannical' and 'coercive' (see Allen 2008), the Christian theologian Jim Wallis points to the recalcitrant capacity of silent spaces of prayer to 'break' the tyranny and coercion of capitalism within us because they,

> place us outside the realm of the powers and principalities. A prayer declares our true identity, it destroys our false identities [as housing consumers]. In prayer we act upon who we really are and thus prayer has the effect of diminishing the illusions that have controlled us. It is therefore an act of revealing the truth and unmasking the lie …. *Prayer may be the only action powerful enough to free us from our spiritual bondage to property, money, power, ideas, and causes, which have made us willing to destroy everything in the desperate and futile effort to protect them ….* Thus *prayer and the results of prayer are the most revolutionary of acts*. The powers and the principalities of this world are aware of this; that is why they consider those who pray to be a threat. (Wallis 1973: 95-6; *emphasis added*)

Although Wallis (1973; see also Knowles 2014) is specifically concerned with the 'power breaking' capacity of Christian prayer, here, he sits within a broader philosophical and theological mode of thinking that emphasises the 'power breaking' capacity of silence. The philosophical work of Edmund Husserl and theological insights of Buddhism are especially relevant here. The former points towards the 'philosophical life' as 'power breaking', thereby opening us up to our 'true' selves, whereas the latter provide us with the philosophical tools for unlocking a nonviolent way of being.

In *Crisis of the European Sciences,* Edmund Husserl (1970) suggested that the key to achieving social change was through "complete personal transformation", and that this was only attainable by living a 'philosophical life' of radical self-questioning that re-appropriated the domain of subjectivity as the source of all meaning and being. Like Wallis, Husserl was attracted to 'transcendental' spaces of meditative silence because he thought they would enable people to 'bracket out' the social world in order to reach this this new radical self-understanding (Pellauer 1983). Crucially, Husserl felt that 'bracketing out' society, in order to put its imperatives (e.g. property, money, power: Wallis 1973) 'out of action', would enable us to reach into inner-experience and thereby lead us to the essence of our true human intuitions (Schmitt 1959). For Husserl, this revealed "love in addition to reason [as] the fundamental ethical motive. Love, which wells up from the depth of the person and the absolute obligation that it generates" from the depth of our being (Melle 2007: 3).

If Wallis and Husserl put the world 'out of action' to reveal the ethical subject, then Eastern religions and philosophies have provided the philosophical foundations on which this ethical subject can sit. Specifically, Buddhist concepts such as 'emptiness' and 'impermanence' *keep* the world 'out of action' by rendering 'attachment' to the 'social' (property, money, power *etc.*) nonsensical. And, in revealing the emptiness of the societal foundations (property, money, power *etc.*) on which capitalist notions of 'self' are built, Buddhism philosophically reveals the existential subject to be a 'not-self', i.e. no longer ontologically separate from other 'selves' but inter-connected with all human and non-human life (Gyatso 1997 2014; Hanh 2010; Hiranandani 2014; Sadhguru 2016; Sivaraska 2009; Stone 2008). Such a non-self refuses participatory subordination to the 'empty' and 'selfish' illusions of housing capitalism and transports us towards a nonviolence perspective of inter-being that the social sciences, with their ontological separations (class, gender and so on), are simply unable to conceive (see Daniels 2005; Punthassen 2007; Ash 2007).

These ontological moves into the inner life of the ethical subject have been especially significant in countries such as the UK. The UK has recently experienced the emergence of a 'new spirituality' (Bruce 2002; Heelas and Woodhead 2005; Cloke and Beaumont 2012) including a rapid growth in spaces of meditative silence (Kim 2018) and organisations promoting post-materialist ideas derived from Buddhism (Welsh 2018; Orsi 2011). Examples of the former include meditation centres whereas the latter includes Schumacher College, New Economics Foundation and Post-Growth Institute which all promote post-materialist ideas in relation to housing.

Sopher (2008) explains these 'new spiritual' developments as a consequence of disaffection with the excesses of neoliberal capitalism (Sopher 2008) which has fuelled a parallel growth of interest in the political economy of 'happiness' and well-being (Woodin and Lucas 2004; Montgomery 2015; Dommen 2013). In this context, increasing numbers of people are now questioning materialist values (Cartner-Morley 2018) and opening up to non-acquisitive economic practices such as those in the sharing economy (Ormerod 2016) which, in a housing context, is producing new forms of cooperation and inter-being rather than conflict. Whereas Clapham and Kintrea, writing in 1992, discussed cooperative housing as a historically marginal element of UK housing, then, it has since grown significantly as an alternative to housing capitalism (Nelson 2018) that is not simply about lower housing costs, which only "tell part of the story. But so does a desire for a simpler, more unplugged lifestyle" (Trapasso 2016; see also Hebden 2014; Nelson 2018; Sivaraska 2009) as, indeed, Hebden (2014: 125) articulates in his own study of housing co-operators.

> Values articulated ... include peace of mind, union with nature, joy, living in the moment, wonder, wholeness, ... while their satisfaction was high in respect of family life, housing, relations with neighbours, self-reliance .... *Their motivations [are] modest.* (Heben 2014: 125; *emphasis added*)

A further point is that these housing alternatives are not simply nonviolent in their conception (e.g. cooperative) but have been created by new institutions working within existing legal frameworks and therefore without recourse to conflict and struggle over the capture of housing capitalism and its policy complex (Allen 2018; Nelson 2018). For instance, the last few decades has witnessed increasing levels of small scale cooperation between individuals that have 'unplugged' from housing capitalism (see Chatterton 2014 on the development of the Low Impact Living Affordable

Community in Leeds) morph into the development of new institutions (such as Leeds Community Homes established in 2017) to promote cooperative housing more widely. The result has been an emergence of a 'young and rapidly growing movement' for cooperative housing based on new coordinating organisations such as Radical Routes (established 1992), the UK CoHousing Network (established 2007) and the National Community Land Trust Network (established 2010) alongside new lending institutions promoting cooperative housing (for instance, Ecology Building Society and Triodos Bank established in the UK in 1980 and 1995 respectively).

New Understandings: Dialogue and Truth Seeking and the Role of Housing Research

Building a nonviolent approach to housing change is not simply a matter of reaching into the inner life of experience. It also requires us to reach into, and listen to, the inner experience of others. This is a hermeneutic task requiring an epistemic humility that is ontologically absent in critical social sciences which task themselves with authoring (on behalf of society) housing as a field of conflict between forces of 'good' and 'evil' (Kemeny 2002) in order to raise the consciousness of the oppressed (Harloe 1981) and thereby 'win' arguments (Graeber 2009; Allen 2017) that will secure a redistribution of housing wealth (Cooper and Whyte 2017).

The problem is this: Critical social sciences are ontologically committed to the primacy of their scientific authorship of housing change in which they see themselves 'speaking for' some people and against others. However, they speak using a conceptual armoury (power, class, *etc.*) that 'hermeneutically flattens' (Gadamer 1975) the inner historicity of human experience and therefore the people it purportedly 'speaks for'. As such, the social sciences lack the hermeneutic capacity for dialogue and listening to others that is central to a nonviolent approach to housing. I now want to suggest two hermeneutic tasks that can overcome these problems:

- Developing the humility to 'give up' the critical social scientific monological authorship of housing struggles to a hermeneutics of dialogue and listening.
- Enduring hardship through civil disobedience rather than reproducing conflict and violence through 'fighting'.

Humility, Hermeneutics and Nonviolent Communication: Following his critique of the hermeneutically flattening effects of social science, Gadamer's (1975) suggested a conception of 'method' that 'emerged' in the context of everyday life where the hermeneutical task was to return to oneself through the horizon of the 'other', thereby leading to mutual 'understanding' (hermeneutics) rather than 'knowledge' (science). This requires us to replace social scientific approaches based on "skilful presentation of one's own arguments" (Vinthagen 2015a: 146) with the 'art of listening' (Black 2007) to 'oneself as another' (Ricoeur 1995) where participation in the other takes the form of an ongoing 'journey' on 'uncommon ground' (Chatterton 2006) towards:

> mutual reason that arises through dialogue. It stands in opposition to the antagonism of the concept of the [social scientist] or the rational subject being alone in their own room and coming to realise what is true or correct. (Vinthagen 2015a: 136)

This hermeneutic 'art of listening' aims to bring the housing experiences of others 'to life' in all of their human complexity (Chatterton et al, 2008) but in a way that enables us to gently progress towards mutual understanding and transformation rather than conflict (see also Rosenberg, 2003, on 'nonviolent communication'). To understand what this might mean in a nonviolent housing context, we can visit the Tent Cities of USA where listening to the inner historicity of homeless experience revealed that redistributive 'battles' over housing wealth were not necessary. The art of listening to homeless people revealed housing needs that were materially 'simple' (their valorisation of the Tent), whilst also emphasising housing needs (for autonomy) that housing capitalism violates by forcing people into debt (see Hebden 2014). As such, listening led to new understandings (of the value of the tent) and, as we will see below, new housing outcomes, i.e. acceptance of the tent.

The Civil Disobedience of Suffering as Nonviolent Communication: If a hermeneutics of humility has facilitated the emergence of nonviolent housing alternatives, such as Tent Cities, then we should also note that these alternatives have been met with extreme state violence involving the destruction of tent cities. Although the critical social scientific response to this would be to highlight state violence, and to sociologically 'fight' the architects of the violence, such responses reproduce conflict and are therefore unhelpful to our concerns here. For a nonviolent response we need to turn to Gandhian methods which are based on an ontology of optimism about our capacity to 'become human', especially in response to the suffering of others (Vinthagen 2015a: 244; see also Holloway 2010: 31).

Gandhi responded to state violence with the dignified 'suffering' of civil disobedience rather than by 'fighting back', e.g. by willingly enduring imprisonment in the nonviolent cause of seeking justice. He argued that the voluntary human suffering of victims of state violence (i.e. without hatred) would weaken the 'enemy images' mobilised against them (uncivilised, inferior *etc.*) whilst also 'moving the hearts' of opponents to reveal an existential commonality (a shared human dignity and vulnerability *etc.*). This would lead to nonviolent transformation by inducing 'loyalty shifts' within opponents and the wider population (Chenweth and Stephan 2011) as Vinthagen (2015a: see also Holloway 2010: 31-2) suggests:

> Nonviolence breaks up solid identities, destabilises them and offers new non-essential hybrid and flexible identities, thus undermining the conflict's polarisation of opposing parties. (Vinthagen 2015a: 239)

What we are now saying, then, is that voluntary suffering is constitutive of a hermeneutic of nonviolence that 'breaks' the social conditions that produce violence by reconstituting our understanding of each other as human (Vinthagen 2015a,b). We can see this in a housing context if we return to Tent Cities in the USA. Heben (2014) describes how the voluntary suffering and civil disobedience of homeless people in the face of state violence (i.e. their dignified and continuous rebuilding of tent cities destroyed by police) resulted in a 'human' response from a coalition of churches that used their own land as sanctuary to enable homeless people to rebuild their tent cities in safety. The churches then worked with homeless people to transform tent cities into Tiny House Villages that provided the security, community and autonomy that was so axiomatic to their felt housing needs.

All that said, two vital implications can be drawn out of the above analysis. First, critical social sciences become decentred from the picture. Instead, homeless people themselves, and a listening church, were authoring the creation of nonviolent housing (Barrett 2018; Kurlansky 2007). Second, in contrast to 'critical' social science approaches, which tend to exclude the ideologically 'non-critical' and thereby inhibit movement building (Chatterton 2006), the re-humanising of housing poverty through dignified suffering *widens the web of participation* beyond the 'critical' (Vinthagen 2015a: 222) as in the church example above. As Chenoweth and Stephan (2011) point out, human (rather than 'political') participation also produces *increasing levels of interpersonal commitment* that, as we saw in the tent cities, results in the building of an effective nonviolent housing movement. That is to say, a 'personalist' approach is potentially more inclusive because it entices *all human beings* to offer themselves to the suffering other (Zwick and Zwick 2005; Gneuhs 1988); for instance, by shedding privilege (e.g. sole occupation of one's land or home) and sharing housing experience (e.g. re-building of tent cities). Significantly, Chenoweth and Stephan's (2011) study of 323 Nonviolent and Violent Campaigns and Outcomes between 1900 and 2006 shows that nonviolent campaigns, like the tent cities, are twice as likely as to succeed as conflict approaches - even when waged in the face of extreme violence.

Prefiguration: Peace-building a New World Inside the Shell of the Old

Power breaking and nonviolent hermeneutics are not sufficient, in themselves, to constitute a nonviolent approach to housing because they are based on peacemaking which Sivaraska (2009: 21-22) defines as:

> settling conflicts [as in tent cities]. The most important part of peacemaking is dialogue. What we call dialogue is often just monologues. Genuine dialogue requires active listening. We need to abandon our idea of a particular outcome and remain quiet within …. Reconciliation is key.

However, peacemaking is circumscribed because it constitutes a response to housing conflict. It does not involve the strategic pursuit of housing change. For this reason, Sivaraska (2009: 22) argues that we also need to 'prefigure' the idea of peacebuilding through a "never ending effort to create a peaceful society", i.e. by 'being' the change we want to see in our own lives. This raises the question of what the principles of a prefigurative approach to peacebuilding should be in the sphere of nonviolent housing. Three are suggested here:

- Personalism: rejecting the strategic capacity of the policy making state and, instead, taking personal responsibility for housing strategy through the principle of 'dweller control'
- A life-giving ethic: housing practices that give (rather than deny) life by conforming to human over economic values
- Simplicity: Although simplicity can refer to the straightforward nature of our housing needs, as above, it refers here to a human and democratic approach to housing that uses naturally available and ecologically sustainable technologies rather than the alienating industrial technologies of housing capitalism.

State orchestrated 'policy' is problematic for two key reasons. First, the state is defined by its monopoly of the legitimate use of violence (Weber 1946) and therefore cannot be a legitimate vehicle for delivering nonviolent housing. Second, the state is an abstract entity that is incapable of lovingly relating to people, and moreover, empties relationships of their meaningful content by colonising the spaces in which loving relationships would otherwise flourish (Gneuhs 1988), e.g. societal dependence on state housing negates inter-personal commitments, i.e. by undermining cooperative housing (Allen 2017). Put simply, the state makes us less than we truly are (see Power 1987) and thus has no place in a nonviolent housing approach which must realise, rather than deny, human being.

Since the 'power breaking' capacity of silence shows love to be the essence of human being and relationships (Melle 2007; see more generally also Kropotkin 2006[1902]; Zwick and Zwick 2005; Sivaraska 2009; Hiranandani 2014), a **personalist** rather than a policy approach is axiomatic to nonviolent housing. This implies a number of things. First, it implies that the answer to the violence of housing capitalism does not lie in attempts to re-shape social structure (Dommen 2014; Sivaraska 2009) which, in this case, would mean re-shaping the political economy of housing and its policy complex. The converse is the case for personalists who,

> act through what we are as much as we will act through what we do and say .... the quality of personalist action will not resemble the frenetically externalized activism of fascist or communist ideologies. (Zwick and Zwick 2005: 109)

This brings us to the import of Ward's (1976) concept of 'dweller control' which involves people 'acting through what we are' to build autonomous housing. The concept of dweller control has two elements. First, it locates the existence of the housing problem with ourselves rather than the 'system', i.e. a result of our participatory subordination to housing capitalism and thus neglect to participate in collaborative housing. Ward (1976) therefore impels us to use (rather than conquer) housing policy where its provisions facilitate collaborative housing. He suggests this eminently possible by pointing to examples of prefigurative housing approaches that have used existing legislative provisions to self-build co-operative and co-housing rather than 'taking the law into their own hands'. Second, 'dweller control' is also a **life-giving** approach because it results in our affirmation, as human beings, in place (Ward 1976). So whereas the commodified spaces of housing capitalism and bureaucratic spaces of state housing desecrate the lives of those that live in them (e.g. the phenomenal violences of indebtedness and administrative convenience), 'dweller control' returns housing to people by allowing them to self-produce their home environment in a way that conforms to human rather than economic or bureaucratic values. It also facilitates cooperation, rather than individualisation, in the production of the home environment (Benson 2015). So, the social and physical construction of home can become a focus of self-discovery, personal transformation and growth; a way of finding out who we 'truly' are and what we can be (see Chakrabarti 1941 on the Gandhian philosophy of 'spinning' for a similar insight on self-provision).

Yet, 'dweller control' be cannot solely defined in anthropocentric terms. We also need an answer to the eco-violence of brick technology that has enabled housing capitalism to colonise the production of home at great environmental cost (Dunleavey 1981; Nelson 2018; Allen 2018). Nonviolent housing production should be based on **simple** resource alternatives to industrial brick

technology that are (i) natural and (ii) democratic in terms of their availability and usability. The first principle refers us to a bioregional approach, which emphasises the use of locally available materials in such a way that contributes to the sustenance of the local natural environment (Purchase, 1997; Barnhill 2010; Hunt, 2014). The second principle refers to natural materials that transform into homes using low-level technologies which, in contrast to industrial technologies that "stultify the human person", are:

> conducive to decentralisation, compatible with the laws of ecology, gentle in [their] use of scarce resources, and designed to serve the human person instead of making him (sic) the servant of machines. (Schumacher 1973: 128)

As such, nonviolent housing based on the principle of 'dweller control' now means more than just cooperative housing. It becomes inseparable from 'self-build' housing which, despite being marginal in the UK (Chatterton 2014; Grahame and Wikhu 2017), has elsewhere moved into the mainstream in less than conducive conditions (see Harris 1999 on post-war Europe & Coyula and Hamberg nd on Castro's Cuba) to constitute over half of the world's housing (Turner 1976; Ward 1976).

Conclusions

In this paper, I have suggested that social sciences have conceptualised housing capitalism and its policy complex as violent but that these conceptualisations are limiting. The ontological inseparability between society and self (manifest in categorisations such as class) is a fundamental problem for the social sciences for two reasons. First, it creates social scientific separatisms based on class *etc.* that make conflict and violence an ontological necessity. Second, it results in the social scientific location of violence in social structure (class conflict *etc.*) which leaves no conceptual room to pursue nonviolence. The other key problem with the social sciences is their exceptionalist view of violence, which makes violence extraneous to the 'dull compulsions' of housing capitalism which it thereby lets off the hook. A nonviolence perspective derived from the insights of philosophy and theology, on the other hand, does not. Their ontological separation of society and the self, whose capacity to refuse participation in housing capitalism and thereby authorise its own housing life, is emphasised. This leads to a number of observations and implications.

Whereas the ontological default position of social sciences is to 'fight' for housing justice, a nonviolent approach emphasises a return to our essential 'being'. As Vinthagen (2015a: 257) would advise, this involves everybody, all of the time, simultaneously *resisting* the violence of housing capitalism (e.g. through power breaking and dialogue) whilst also *constructing* nonviolent housing (e.g. through prefigurative housing action). As I have noted, the implications of this are huge. The legitimate authorship of nonviolent housing must now pass from social sciences to ordinary people themselves. However, if this happens, we need to be cognisant of the following points. First, although the state is a non-sequitur for a nonviolent housing movement, we must not throw the baby out with the bath water. The state cannot produce nonviolent housing. However, it can facilitate it by creating autonomous spaces in which people can act cooperatively in relation to housing (see Harris 1999). The current debate about Universal Basic Income (Gorz 1994) is

relevant here. Second, the same lessons apply to social scientists teaching 'housing studies', who are equally not redundant. We must create autonomous spaces of pedagogical silence in which students can ontologically reach into their nonviolent 'being' towards housing, rather than simply 'teach' about the violence of housing capitalism and struggles to conquer it (see Heyman 2001 for a similar point). We also need to draw housing studies into peace studies where it has a lot to learn and contribute. This paper is merely an initial attempt at this.

The political 'enemy' of the above approach is the impatience for change that too often leads us to grab for the levers of power (Holloway 2010). Three responses to this are necessary. First, unlike revolutionary approaches to housing change, which require the seizure of power, a nonviolent approach emphasises the potential that exists now in the form of cooperative and self-build forms of housing. To adopt a nonviolent approach is to work with what is already happening rather than construct a new Utopia. Second, the relative absence of nonviolent housing does not constitute a failure of nonviolence but of participation. This is easy to rectify and we can all play a part – even social scientists, such as myself, in the silent spaces of the classroom. Finally, it is worth noting that nonviolent paths to change "by building a new order, not smashing the old" (Yoder 1971: 29) are more enduring than change achieved through conflict and seizure of power, which are twice as likely to be reversed or quickly lead to new conflicts (Chenoweth and Stephan 2011).

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