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**Guest Editor**:

**Meneka Thirukkumaran**

**Special Issue:**

**Historical and Contemporary Perspectives on the Discourse of Peace**

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**Introduction— Historical and Contemporary Perspectives on the Discourse of Peace**

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**INTRODUCTION—HISTORICAL AND CONTEMPORARY PERSPECTIVES ON THE DISCOURSE OF PEACE**

**Introduction: Weaving together the historical and the contemporary**

In the current U.S. American as well as international political climate, the threat of militarism and the growth of a globalized capitalistic world looms persistent. This special issue of *Peace Studies Journal* interrogates the importance of considering how historical understandings of people and events can be reconsidered through contemporary frameworks in an effort to bring about truly peaceful and just communities. Here, the contributing authors grapple with the ways in which dominant, multi-layered systems of power can be challenged. These writers utilize a variety of methodological approaches to engage in a dialogue about the ways that entrenched and complex conflicts can be approached and understood.

In the opening article, Luke Hynes-Bishop articulates how memory museums, particularly Peru’s national museum *The Place of Memory, Tolerance and Social Inclusion* can be read as a space that fosters common ground. For Hynes-Bishop, the notion of common ground functions not only to establish commonalities between conflicting parties, but more saliently as a means to allow meaningful dialogue, mutual understanding, thoughtfulness, and empathy. Hynes-Bishop’s work challenges the cliché of museums as repositories of antiquated ideas and objects by illuminating the role of museums as facilitators of post-conflict dialogues. By identifying and being accountable for past atrocities, communities can move forward towards peace and justice.

In the next essay, David Lempert examines how two key events, the 1963 assassination of President John F. Kennedy and the collapse of the World Trade Center Towers in 2001, expose militaristic components of the U.S. political and legal structure. Through a highly detailed anthropological analysis, Lempert delves into the theories and possible causes of these events, followed by an interpretation of what these reasons convey about the institutional power dynamics of U.S. American political and legal culture. As Lempert observes, the privileging of the U.S. military after both events suggests a lack of democratic control over national security and administrative policy. Lempert’s analysis reveals the parallels between U.S. policies and other industrial administrative states, demonstrating that the metanarrative of U.S. American “democracy” may be closer to myth than reality.

Felicia Stewart’s article continues the conversation between historical and contemporary reflections of peace and justice. While Lempert examines events, Stewart looks to persuasive public figures to inform a discussion about meaningful leadership. By engaging in a rhetorical analysis of speeches delivered by Barack Obama and Nelson Mandela during their Nobel Peace prize acceptances, Stewart uncovers the specific elements that may have contributed to each leader’s public success and symbolic associations with peace. Stewart’s exploration holistically discusses how each speaker’s life history, along with the oratory components used in their speeches contributes to a wide recognition of each leader as intimately connected to the idea of peace.

For Brion White, past and present understandings of activism converge through an examination of the social justice movement CODEPINK. White utilizes narrative inquiry to interrogate the relationships between U.S. American government (specifically the Obama administration), the perpetuation of drone strikes, and CODEPINK’s continued resistance and critiques of U.S. drone strike policy. White also discusses how CODEPINK’s history as a grassroots organization that employed traditional forms of activism has evolved and grown as a result of alternative media. By exploiting alternative media, White demonstrates, CODEPINK has developed an alternate discourse that challenges dominant mainstream narratives.

In the next essay, A. Karim Issifu investigates how Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) can move beyond its historical application as an administrative response to critique, and into contemporary modes of developing peaceful communities. Issifu uses individual and group interview research to study how corporations can use CSR to benefit communities, not only economically, but also culturally and socially. Further, Issifu argues that large corporations can promote conflict prevention by supporting human rights initiatives and legal stances on peace. Issifu recommends CSR policy frameworks backed by law as important components in maintaining peaceful communities.

Finally, Adediran Ikuomola confronts the historical tendency for studies of peace and security to discuss children and orphans within a monolithic and superficial narrative. Ikuomola’s deeply personal and intimate conversations with orphans reveal that there is much work to be done to help these children feel emotionally, financially, and socially supported. In addition to the problematic and rushed nature of matching orphans with surrogate families, Ikuomola’s participants were candid about their disturbing experiences with abuse and molestation. As internally displaced persons, the stories of these children contrast the tensions between personal resilience and systemic difficulties.

The issue closes with David Lempert’s book review of *War, peace, and human nature: The convergence of evolutionary and cultural views* (2013). Lempert points out that despite the abundance of literature in the field of historical non-fiction that examines the phenomenon of war, texts that examine predictive models of war and peace are generally absent. In his detailed review, Lempert interrogates whether *War, peace and human nature* can fill this gap.



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**Dialogue, Memorialization and Common ground in Post-Conflict Peru**

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**Keywords**: Common Ground; Memory; Post-Conflict Dialogue; Peru

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**Abstract**

The aim of this paper is to analyze the role that spaces of common ground play in developing post-conflict dialogue between former antagonists in the hope of addressing issues of accountability and transitional justice. This paper particularly focuses on the role of dialogical spaces, such as memory museums, which may help to foster common ground within post-conflict societies. Thus, this paper explores the example of Peru’s national memory museum *The Place of Memory, Tolerance and Social Inclusion* based in Peru’s capital Lima as a potential site of common ground. Identifying common ground, the space where shared interests, truths and concerns can be debated, presents opportunities for dialogue about Peru’s conflict, particularly around questions of memory, responsibility for atrocities, the causes and hopes for the future. It is argued within this paper that possibilities for post-conflict common ground from such memory museums are based upon both the shared concerns for truth and the development of empathy.

**Introduction**

The absence of sufficient dialogue in post-conflict situations often reinforces political polarisations and a de-humanisation of the *other* (Porter, 2007; Said, 1978). Hence, addressing dialogue between formerly opposing groups is central to strengthening peace, reconciling conflicting memories and building a more democratic society (Hamber, 2015). This paper explores the question: *under what circumstances can former opposing or antagonistic groups, usually with unequal power relations, engage in dialogue*? Following the trauma, suffering and sectarian violence that usually characterizes civil conflict, such as within the case study of Peru, discussions regarding the causes, consequences and responsibilities for the post-conflict society are often incomplete or absent (Porter, 2015; Ropers, 2004). Nevertheless, this paper argues that it is possible to recognize dialogical spaces, especially through certain transitional justice sites such as memory museums, which offer self-reflective, participatory and critical outlooks concerning the past conflict. These sites can sometimes offer openings for what this paper calls ‘common ground’. This concept of a post-conflict common ground refers to the space that may bring groups that are ideologically, politically, religiously and historically antagonistic together on their commonalities before or whilst debating their differences. Thus, it is argued that reaching such a shared space is central to improving Peru’s struggle in building a more just post-conflict society.

This paper first discusses the important role of post-conflict dialogue between antagonistic groups, while also highlighting the key obstacles to dialogue. The concept of a post-conflict common ground, the dialogical space whereby both similarities and differences can be recognized, is consequently presented here as a response to these obstacles. This paper then identifies role of the memory museum as a site where common ground is possible, and along with it, the opportunity for dialogue. Dialogue here, emerges through the mutual importance often surrounding truth and through the potential development of empathy across complex post-conflict differences. This use of empathy as a means for creating dialogue is underscored by Sylvester’s theory of Empathetic Cooperation (2002).

Peru is a nation in the process of overcoming the legacy of a 20 year internal conflict that officially ended in 2000 (Theidon, 2013). This paper argues that the 2015 opening of Peru’s national memory museum, *The Place of Memory, Tolerance and Social Inclusion*, has created a potential space where memories and truths around the past conflict can be [re]developed and contested – indeed, presenting a site of common ground. As a result, this paper addresses the question, to what extent does *The Place of Memory, Tolerance and Social Inclusion* help to improve Peru’s current attempts to address past injustices, particularly regarding memory, accountability and public acknowledgment of past crimes?

Discussion, argumentation, listening and non-compliance are all important forms of communication, resistance and negotiation that encompass the challenges for post-conflict dialogue between sectarian groups or groups with distinctly unequal power relations, such as within Peru. Nevertheless, Kerr and Mobekk (2007) insist, ‘the context, history and background to conflict and the actors involved are of crucial importance in determining not only what types of transitional justice processes are possible, but also how successful they will be’ (p. 11). Therefore, although achieving a channel of communication which recognizes commonality in the face of extreme sectarianism and inequality is not always possible and often highly contextual, this paper stresses that attempts should always be made to find shared spaces in the hope of achieving dialogue or simply presenting alternative voices that unsettle harmful prevailing hegemonies.

**Post-Conflict Dialogue**

This paper argues that post-conflict dialogue between antagonistic groups is essential to building a sustainable peace and improving social justice. The United Nations Development Program (UNDP, 2009) reinforces this importance arguing that ‘through dialogue war-torn societies can shed their distrust, build relationships, and bridge their differences’ (p. 2). Indeed dialogue, the UNDP states, ‘is an inclusive process’ whereby ‘people can develop a sense of joint ownership of the process’ of peace and social change (p. 2). This sense of joint ownership is vital in strengthening democracy and building social relationships and civic trust between divided populations (Borah et al, 2011). Through open dialogue, antagonists are often forced to reconsider the humanity of the opposing group who are frequently dehumanized within situations of silence. Dialogue can also instigate self-reflection and a re-evaluation of prior harmful political truths that can bring about the ‘recognition of differences as well as areas of common ground, and demonstrate a capacity for change’ (UNDP, 2009, p. 3). Likewise, dialogue can help to unsettle dominant and unquestioned truths, presenting opportunities for common ground. Consequently, ‘dialogue is primarily used as an instrument within the psychosocial conflict transformation paradigm’, influencing social change on a hegemonic level, which leads later to political, legal and economic change (Ropers, 2003, p. 2).

**Obstacles to Post-Conflict Dialogue**

Nevertheless, key obstacles exist to building dialogue between former antagonistic groups. Indeed, Porter argues that ‘the challenge of creating dialogue across differences can be enormous, particularly where deep discord and mistrust have complex historical roots’ (2007, p. 90). The difficulty of dialogue, due to mistrust, is reiterated by Hamber who notes that ‘at the social level, trust and a sense of connection between groups, normally a key part of well-being, are destroyed [by conflict], and the concept of the negative other emerges or hardens’ (2015, p. 3). This makes moves towards dialogue difficult. Another key obstacle to open dialogue relates to political power. Theidon reinforces the centrality of power regarding the types of dialogue possible between antagonistic groups in post-conflict situations by stating how ‘talk about dialogue, forgiving and reconciling is talk about power’, those who can frame the type of dialogue and those who cannot (2013, p. 250). Equally, sometimes following political upheavals and conflict, those with power can maintain what Porter calls an ‘indifference’ to dialogue and notes how it is a ‘common expression found among those whose lives have been relatively unaffected’ by the conflict’s aftermath (2003, p. 39-40). In these circumstances where power relations are unequal, creating dialogue can be a challenge as political and economic necessity usually does not dictate the start of negotiations and dialogue between the groups.

Alternatively, dialogue is often avoided due to fear of social reprisals and stigmatization.In the post-conflict milieu, although official violence may have ended, frequently hostility and fighting continues on a clandestine, unofficial level between rival factions, groups and individuals. As a result, the fear of violent reprisals following the official end of conflict is usually very real and thus open dialogue with the opposition can be very risky. Indeed this is especially true within local communities following civil conflict whereby Theidon explains that ‘the enemy is a son-in-law, a godfather, an old schoolmate, or the community that lies just across the valley’, and thus post-conflict, former enemies ‘widows, orphans, rape survivors, and army veterans [continue to] live side-by-side’ (2012, p. xiii). Ní Aoláin et al highlight the fear in the form of social stigmatization following dialogue, particularly concerning female victims of sexual violence who ‘fear social exclusion should their experiences become public knowledge’ (2011, p. 166). Issues around gender and open dialogue are especially difficult within patriarchal cultures where ‘high social premium is put on women’s purity’ and little space is afforded for talking about sexual crime (Ní Aoláin et al, 2011, p. 166). Nevertheless, without open dialogue, agreement about social justice and change for the long-term future, is greatly compromised.

**Common Ground**

The idea of post-conflict common ground refers to a space of shared understanding through which oppositional groups are able to engage, even if only in its most basic form, in dialogue. Although post-conflict resentments are greatly influenced by histories of violence, tragedy and extreme sectarianism, common ground may be possible based on mutual concerns such as: economic and security issues; the development of some empathetic understanding of the other; seeking alternatives to violence; and the desire for truth. It is recognized that such engagements are rarely linear and straightforward, but rather on-going, back-and-forth movements through which progress is often slow, untidy and imperfect. Nevertheless, it is argued that these borderland spaces created between extreme differences, offer moments for deliberation, potentially helping to progress reconciliation or simply create the climate for non-violent co-existence. Thus, common ground ‘occurs in the middle, messy spaces that negotiate between radical diversity and surprising commonality,’ creating in the process, ‘a shared basis from which to work’ (Porter, 2007, p. 85). Nevertheless, sometimes post-conflict power inequalities are so acute and the dominant hegemonies so entrenched that simply developing opposition, alternative standpoints, and moments that disturb this hegemony are important. These moments, which may simply be the recognition of some commonality, help to fracture the power of dominant truths and loosen up social inequalities so that if dialogical spaces emerge, neither group can assume a position of unquestionable truth, power and veracity.

This idea of common ground is very similar to James’ concept of ‘places of meeting’ as ‘designated places to meet face-to-face and negotiate over differences’ or ‘abstracted institutionalized spaces where communities and polities [likewise] negotiate over difference’ (2008, p. 121). Such ‘places of meeting’ are ‘careful not to pressure that differences will be resolved, or settled once and for all nor to presume an ultimate truth or transparency about the source of conflict’, but rather, suggest an ‘on-going place’ (James, 2008, p. 117). Indeed, Cockburn identifies such dialogical spaces in which former antagonistic groups ‘select agendas they can work on...setting aside issues they cannot’ (cited in Porter, 2003, p. 24). This concept of common ground does not call for the complete end of political or ideological opposition, which is often deep-rooted and complex, rather it proposes meaningfully dealing with the diverse views, contradictions and uncertainties inherent between radically opposed groups. The non-government organization (NGO) *Search for Common Ground* provides a similar explanation of the concept on their website, noting how ‘common ground is not a compromise’, at least not completely, but rather something ‘people can aspire to and are willing to work towards…through creating a new context in which people attack common problems, rather than each other’ (2016). Consequently, it is ‘through these hazy [common] spaces...that new possibilities arise, old views are revised or discarded, and visions of change emerge’ (Porter, 2000, p. 179). Locating these meeting places between formerly conflicting groups can be a form of developing communication through acknowledging common goals, necessities, values and beliefs, and seeking resolutions to conflict from within these spaces. Although such common views often refer to ideas around security, economic improvement, the need to end violence and creating a basic rule of law, in post-conflict situations of acute inequality these often do not provide a fulcrum for social change, especially within those groups that are unaffected. Consequently this paper looks for common ground particularly based around the desire for truth and shared empathy.

**Building Dialogue**

First, central in creating dialogue across difference is the shared concern for post-conflict knowledge and truth. Whether through desire to express truth, resist opposing truths or encounter and understand other truths, this joint interest can bring opposing groups into post-conflict communication where issues of truth are debated and [de]constructed. Boraine and Tutu (2008) categorize post-conflict truths, typically understood for the purpose of truth commissions, into objective or factual, personal narrative, dialogical and restorative forms of truth. The notion of objective truth applies to concrete evidence such as statistics, while personal narrative truth involves stories told at the commissions. Dialogical truth emerges through interaction and transparency, and restorative truth expresses the process following a form of healing (Boraine & Tutu, 2008). Each of these truths can present openings for dialogue between groups with prior antagonisms who may gain better insights regarding truths about shared fear, tragedy, pain and desire to move beyond conflict. Similarly, these truths can simply help to undermine and challenge harmful dominant truths that prevail post-conflict, offering alternative views and opinions.

Second, creating post-conflict shared spaces of discussion between historically disparate groups relies upon building a level of trust and understanding which, as Sylvester’s theory of empathetic cooperation (2002) demonstrates, often stems from empathy. Sylvester highlights how empathy can undermine sectarianism, particularly when ‘one listens seriously to the concerns, fears and agendas of those one is unaccustomed to heeding….Finding in the concerns of others [the] borderlands of one’s own concerns and fears’ (2002, p. 244). Indeed, she argues that empathy can lead to post-conflict cooperation (2002), eliciting spaces where the position of the other is reconsidered. Listening and observing are not seen in this paper as passive processes, but rather reflexive actions whereby subjects engage with both the differences and perhaps commonalities of the other. Likewise, Porter suggests how ‘often what begins a dialogue is a common language born of pain and grief and coalitions form when the empathetic mutual understanding grows’ (2007, p. 85). Similarly, Cockburn supports the value of empathy, noting how ‘creating working alliances across differences depends more than anything else on the capacity to step into another person’s shoes and see the world form her position’ (2004, p. 186-187). This approach stresses how the collective themes of suffering and grief can, under the right circumstances, help create commonalities, rather than further political divisions. Indeed, sometimes developing shared empathy can help to unsettle governing truths which are built upon binary views and marginalization.

Third, although post-conflict dialogue can occur informally or formally, this paper highlights memory museums, amongst other sites of memorialization, truth and public education - such as truth commissions, memorials and recovered sites of conflict - as spaces through which common ground is possible. Memorial museums are spaces dedicated both to educating the public about and commemorating a specific historic event, usually involving mass suffering. Like truth commissions, these museums emphasize the victims, not the perpetrators.

Similarly, James (2008) outlines ‘tribunals and commissions’ as prospective spaces for negotiating post-conflict differences through dialogue (p. 121). The spatial nature of these projects provides an opportunity for opposing groups to engage through these spaces, helping to bring former antagonists together. Likewise these projects can assist in undermining dominant power structures, memories and truths through a form of public education.

Memory museums and other attempts at publically memorializing the suffering caused by political turmoil are often highly controversial because they ‘make it possible to keep past events alive in the common memory through physical representation in public areas’ (Gurler & Ozer, 2012). Through their physical representation, these museums can sometimes allow the ‘opportunity to establish empathy with past events which the society...lived through’ – in so doing, they attempt to build common ground based on shared human experiences of suffering (Gerler & Ozer, 2012). Although Hamber warns, with regards to memory museums, that ‘expecting the full [agreed] truth about the past to emerge is overly optimistic’, these places offer hopeful possibilities for the acceptance of a common memory - providing ‘some framework of meaning at the collective level’ (2015, p. 11). While memory museums may not reach all opposing groups and individuals, and many continue to remain indifferent to these spaces, they do offer an opportunity for listening, self-reflection and the creating of empathy across difference, which together can sometimes initiate post-conflict dialogue in spite of extreme sectarianism. These issues and, hopefully, possibilities for dialogue across difference through the location of spaces of common ground will now be contextualized in the case of Peru and specifically the memory museum concerning the nation´s civil war: The Place of Memory, Tolerance and Social Inclusion.

**Peru’s Internal Conflict**

Peru’s internal conflict from 1980-2000 principally occurred in the poorest and most remote regions of the country. There, the Shining Path guerrilla movement, led by University Professor Abimael Guzman, attempted to exploit the indigenous population’s legacy of poverty, mistreatment and social neglect that dated back to Spanish colonialism to aid their insurgency against the Peruvian State (Theidon, 2013). However Shining Path’s mobilization was based on violence and indoctrination, killing thousands of so-called ‘counter-revolutionaries’ as they took control of the Andean highlands (Kruijt & Del Pilar Tello, 2002, p. 43). The Peruvian armed forces responded with what Theidon calls a ‘brutal counterinsurgency war in which “Andean peasant” became conflated with “terrorist”’ (2010, p. 93). This hostility resulted in massive indiscriminate violence against the ethnically-indigenous population as the army established martial law in the region. Additionally to Peru’s military and Shining Path, other smaller guerrilla forces emerged, while the Peruvian State armed indigenous self-defense communities, which, while helping to defend themselves against Shining Path, carried out further massacres and extrajudicial killings of suspects. In 1990, with Shining Path violence reaching Peru’s capital Lima, Alberto Fujimori became President of Peru, and shortly after dissolved Congress and opposition parties whilst assuming dictatorial powers – ‘justified’ in the name of national security. In the milieu of these draconian laws, Abimael Guzman and key Shining Path leaders were captured, effectively defeating Shining Path. Nevertheless Fujimori’s government remained in power until 2000, utilizing control of the media, death squads and fear of Shining Path terrorism to legitimate its power until collapsing under overwhelming allegations of bribery and fraud (Burt, 2013).

Accountability for the violence has been slow in Peru’s post-conflict era. The comprehensive state victory against the Maoist-inspired Shining Path insurgents and the subsequent democratization of Peru’s politics ended the 20 year conflict with a ’victor’s peace’, devoid of negotiations, greatly influencing the post-conflict society (Burt, 2013). From the nearly 70,000 casualties of the conflict, Peru’s Truth and Reconciliation Commission concluded that ‘79 percent...lived in rural areas and that 75 percent spoke Quechua or another indigenous language’, and inhabited the poorest regions of Peru (Martinez, 2013). Consequently, many urban Peruvians were uninterested or unaware of the conflict’s scale until it left these remote areas, an indifference that continues today. Correa emphasizes this unresponsiveness, noting how many well-off Peruvians ‘are reluctant to acknowledge their responsibility for historic marginalization, remaining indifferent to the violence that for years [only] affected indigenous communities in poor regions’ (2013). Thus, post-conflict Peru is characterized by a profound imbalance of power, principally separating the poorer Andean and Amazonian regions most devastated by the war, from the urban, globalized centers such as Lima (Rojas-Perez, 2013). The dominant post-conflict perspective of the violence, overwhelmingly generated by the urban elites, overlooks or justifies the military’s crimes in the fight against ‘terrorism’, and perpetuates the marginalization of the Andean and Amazonian communities within the idea of modern ‘Peru’ (Theidon, 2013). Consequently, Laplante and Phenicie state that many Peruvians ‘view the thousands of slain and disappeared victims- largely indigenous farmers- as terrorists deserving their punishment’ – as they considered them sufficiently dehumanized to warrant their suffering (2010, p. 273).

**The Place of Memory, Tolerance and Social Inclusion**

In this post-war environment, the Peruvian Truth and Reconciliation Commission (PTRC) was established and private and state-funded museums and monuments were constructed, while sites of horror were uncovered. All these have helped to resist dominant perspectives and truths, as well as to challenge indifference, and to present opportunities for shared understanding and dialogue. One of such public attempt to document the past conflict and tragedies, acknowledge prior injustices, uncover truths and create a space for dialogue is Peru’s recently opened national memory museum. Its official title, *The Place of Memory, Tolerance and Social Inclusion (Spanish: El Lugar de la Memoria, Tolerancia y Inclusión Social)*, suggests that this museum has a social mission beyond the normal concept of a museum that principally attempts to document historical fact. This social mission however, has drawn controversy from sectors of Peruvian society. Indeed, Peru's then-president, Alan Garcia, initially rejected a $2m donation from Germany, however reversed his decision following criticism, while Aguinaga, a member of Fujimori’s political party Popular Force, argued the museum was biased, claiming ‘Shining Path members had been exonerated’ (Collyns, 2014).

*The Place of Memory* does not just have a permanent exhibit documenting Peru’s internal conflict, but also features temporary exhibits – ranging from theme-based exhibitions, art, debates, cultural events, academic discussions, music performances and theatre – that both complement and interact with the permanent exhibit (McKinnon, 2014). These temporary exhibits are not solely about Peru’s conflict, but extend to other issues including: human rights; cultural incorporation of Peru’s minorities; and civil rights, each of which are connected with the war and its legacy. In this sense, *The Place of Memory* is an active museum attempting to educate about the past and engage with contemporary issues. In fact, during its inauguration in 2013, the museum brought together political authorities, victims and human-rights associations, artists and journalists to participate in a general discussion regarding the museum, post-conflict memory in Peru and other related issues of transitional justice (Soana, 2014). Hence, the dynamic, changing nature of *The Place of Memory* reflects the views of Goode who stated how ‘a finished museum is a dead museum, and a dead museum is a useless museum’, stressing the need for these sites to reflect their role as agents for social change, not simply static portrayals of history (cited in Meller, 1994, p. 76).

The museum’s location, in Lima’s upmarket Miraflores district, places it in contact with Peru’s middle-upper classes, many of whom represent or are affiliated with Peru’s leading national perspective; yet its free admission makes it accessible to all (Collyns, 2014). The museum´s location furthers the potential for *The Place of Memory* to act as a meeting ground for divergent groups to dialogue under the basic premises’ of communicative action – inclusive, open, reflexive and critical dialogue (Collyns, 2014). The museum’s director, Ledgard emphasized the museum’s themes of inclusivity, arguing that the museum ‘makes bridges for people so they can converge somewhere...to reflect…debate and discuss’ and starts ‘from the point that there is not one truth’ – important for recognizing Peru’s multitude of complex post-conflict truths (cited in Collyns, 2014). Thus the museum presents a space whereby Peru’s dominant national perspective can be disturbed by alternative views.

The *Place of Memory* strives to further the transitional justice goals of the PTRC, especially through increasing public awareness of the commission’s findings and its relevance within modern-day Peru (Saona, 2014). McKinnon highlights the necessity for such a space within Peru, noting how the initial debates concerning the museum ‘seem[ed] less about whether the project will achieve...national reconciliation...and more about the compromises with everyone’s disparate versions of “the truth”’, reinforcing the need for dialogue around Peru’s diverse and embedded post-conflict views (2014, p. 71). *The Place of Memory’s* website reinforces its potential in creating social change, explaining how it ‘originates out of the civil duty to symbolically redress the victims of political violence, to explain to the country the truth about the internal armed conflict...and to inculcate in younger generations the values of a democratic culture’ (cited in Saona, 2014, p. 96). This explanation of the museum’s goals affirms how it sees itself acting within Peruvian society, providing a space that would bring people together, educate, and draw attention to the need for accountability and improving transitional justice.

The building´s plain, sand coloured and concrete external design is architecturally similar to other spaces of memory such as Santiago´s *Museum of Memory and Human Rights* or Berlin´s *Topography of Terror* in its sombre and uniform construction. The museum’s three-floor internal design, built around panel texts, images, photos and short videos, reflects its transitional justice goals through their emphasis on truth, inclusivity, empathy and need for justice. McKinnon explains how the first floor addresses ‘memory and the multiple perspectives from Peruvian citizens who lived through the violence’, stressing the complexity and brutality of the conflict’s violence and its enduring impacts upon those who suffered and continue to do so (2014, p. 73). This helps visitors to connect the past violence with the post-conflict years through the lasting effects upon the victims, present openings for empathy and highlighting the conflict’s long-term impacts. The second floor is home to the *Yuyanapaq* exhibit, previously housed in Lima’s National Museum. McKinnon notes how the ‘updated exhibition [has] a database of victims and a significant number of personal biographies’ which further contributes to humanizing Peru’s victims and creating opportunities for common ground through the power of empathy (2014: 73). The third floor is dedicated to highlighting the diverse ‘local memorialization efforts throughout Peru, a space for reflection...a memorial to the victims of violence...as well as a recording studio for survivors and spaces for art and memorialization’ (McKinnon, 2014: 73). The third floor also features many of the temporary exhibits.

In documenting the local memorialization efforts through the country, *The Space of Memory* engages Peru’s local level, helping to build bridges between the national level and Peru’s under-funded and scattered local level memory work. Hence, through featuring the truths of the local actors, the museum offers ‘as a form of resistance’ which ‘unsettles [Peru’s] traditional categories’ of terrorist and passive depoliticized victim (Head, 2015, p. 105). The floor’s space for reflection opens possibilities for visitors to discuss the museum and its impact, embodying a dialogical space. Consequently, recognizing *The Place of Memory’s* possibility in helping to foster common ground between the local, national and alternative views within Peru is understandable considering its location, the goals of memory, inclusion and tolerance, and the incorporation of other local projects of transitional justice. Although the museum is controversial, this attention serves to highlight the challenge posited by this space to the country’s post-conflict hegemony. Furthermore, the museum’s use of the victim-based approach (Ashplant et al, 2000) for its setup, stressing themes of joint suffering, loss and hardship, helps to develop a post-conflict place of interaction across difference. Through emphasizing overall suffering and the victim’s oppression, the museum presents a shared space for memorializing the country’s history of tragedy and injustice, without alienating those who were not affected.

*The Place of Memory*, due to both its national level influence and recent inauguration, offers many possibilities for common ground. Indeed, *The Place of Memory* is largely at the forefront of Peru’s struggle over transitional justice, particularly concerning public acknowledgement, memory and truth – incorporating the PTRC’s findings, local level memorial work and other contemporary memory projects, whether art work, debates or temporary exhibits. In this way, *The Place of Memory* presents possibilities for a meeting space by drawing together many Peruvian memory and truth projects. Additionally, the museum disturbs Peru’s dominant national perspective which attempts to overlook or forget the past civil conflict and, likewise, those who suffered. The museum’s location in Peru’s capital Lima means that this site can attract visitors from around the country and internationally, such as occurred when Germany’s President Gauck visited the museum (*Peruvian Times*, 2015). Visits by foreign heads-of-state, help the museum gain prestigious influence within Peru, especially important in challenging the national post-conflict hegemony. *The Place of Memory* also receives many school and university visits in the form of organized excursions, helping to extend its national level influence and introduce themes of common ground in Peru’s emerging generation. The prospect for social change emerging from post-conflict memory and truth projects is highlighted by Knauer and Walkowitz who state that ‘memory work... [can] subtly subvert the government’s attempts to carry on with business as usual’ (2004, p. 8-9). This subversion of what Hattam et al call ‘common sense’- that which ‘dominates our views of the past...present and future’ - is an important aspect that each of these projects offer, helping to remind Peruvians of what took place and why it is relevant within contemporary society (2012, p. 5). Nevertheless, because *The Place of Memory* was very recently inaugurated, it is difficult to fully evaluate its influence. Nevertheless the museum will work against a Peruvian society in which the internal conflict and its legacy are no longer very relevant for many and the prevailing dominant views are deeply entrenched.

**Conclusion**

This paper has debated the question: ‘To what extent do sites of common ground exist and how can they help to improve Peru’s current attempts to address past injustices, particularly regarding memory, accountability and public acknowledgment?’ In particular, it has examined the possibilities for post-conflict dialogue between formerly antagonistic groups that are socially and politically unequal, and the potential for sites of common ground to help bring this about. An examination of *The Place of Memory* has illustrated that while this new space offers important opportunities for improving dialogue and transitional justice, there are obstacles to its success. Therefore such a space must be coupled with respective legal, economic and political changes in order to more fully address the legacy of past injustices. Nevertheless, despite the overall limitations within the Peruvian situation and the limitations directly related to these sites, has recognized such spaces do provide hopeful prospects for improving, even if only slightly, transitional justice within Peru. However, sometimes simply through unsettling Peru’s dominant hegemonies, these projects can assist in creating an alternative national conversation. Though simply identifying these projects is not enough to guarantee that they realize their potential as potential ‘democratic dialogue areas’ (Gurler & Ozer, 2012), it does help to underscore the direction in which Peru must continue if successful post-conflict dialogue is possible. The 2015 inauguration of The Place of Memory and the related controversy over its name, its content and its very existence has reinforced this point (Collyns, 2014). Similarly, Keiko Fujimori’s narrow loss in the 2016 Peruvian elections, following massive protests against her father’s party Popular Force, illustrates the continuing contentious and popular legacy her father has within Peru. Hence, many key issues, around memory, truth, democracy and moving forward are still very relevant within modern-day Peru – a nation still struggling to fully incorporate its rural indigenous citizens, their history and identity, and their truths about the national conflict that largely affected them.

This paper recognizes that the notion of common ground as a force for social change within greatly unequal post-conflict circumstance is optimistic and could be considered unworkable. Indeed, such is the demanding, fickle and unforgiving nature of entrenched post-conflict differences that simply suggesting a one-shot solution to overcome this could appear naïve. Nevertheless, I argue that despite the obvious challenges present within the struggles over transitional justice, it is important to present alternative approaches to overt political change, violence or legal battles as the means for social change in circumstances of extreme social inequality. Consequently, this article aims to open further debate around the concept of common ground between former antagonists, unequal power groups or indifferent citizenry to engage with the ‘other’. It has been argued that lack of contact and dialogue with the “other” is often decisive in maintaining indifference, prejudice and resentment, indeed in Peru’s case preserving the dominant national perspective. Therefore, despite the idealism present within the defense of common ground, this paper argues that it is important to recognize the potential framework of this concept as a means for, perhaps even slightly, resolving or unsettling this lack of engagement.

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**The “Deep Structure” of U.S. Political (and Legal) Culture: An Anthropological View of “Deep Politics” and Impediments to Peace**

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**Abstract**

This article reveals militarist aspects of the “deep structure” of U.S. political and legal culture suggested by an analysis of two key political-legal events in contemporary political history that remain controversial or “taboos”: the assassination of President John F. Kennedy in 1963 and the deaths in New York in 2001 following the collapse of the World Trade Center Towers. Given the time that has passed since these events, it is now possible to apply an anthropological analysis to consider the potential causes of the events and the reasons they are controversial as well as what they suggest about the underlying workings of U.S. political and legal culture. While this article does not “solve” or “resolve” these events, the clear beneficiary of both events has been the U.S. military, while the list of theories and beliefs of causes generally reveal a hierarchy of institutional political power in the U.S. more similar to that in empires like that of the former Soviet Union and contemporary China than of citizen based democracy. What Americans refer to as “bi-partisan consensus” in U.S. foreign policy suggests the absence of any real civilian control over the U.S. military, in contrast to descriptions of American “democracy”, and a political structure of a national security/ administrative state and empire that is increasingly similar to or “converging” with other industrial administrative states.

**Introduction**

One of the truisms of social science is that the closer one is to one’s subjects, the more difficult it is to study and to write about them due to the difficulty of freeing oneself from subconscious biases as well as conflicts of interest. The paradox of anthropology is that in our own culture, we are “participant observers” all the time, but often lack the distance from our subjects to effectively analyze the data we constantly acquire. At the same time, the advantage of anthropology in the study of our own culture is that the more we conduct studies of similar cultures to our own overseas, applying the methods of our field, the easier it then becomes to take the same tools and perspectives and apply them to our own culture. As the first U.S. anthropologist to study the political and legal culture of the Soviet Union, 25 years ago, and now following field work in several contemporary and collapsed empires, colonies, and nation states since then, it is easier to see what has been missing in analysis of U.S. political and legal culture and to attempt to use the approach of anthropological holism to create the missing picture and to offer comparisons with other political and legal cultures.

Several years ago, I was asked to teach a course titled “American Government and Politics” (with “Government” in the singular and without specifying a country), in which I first noticed the gaps between what anthropologists find as the structural reality of politics and the one generally presented. Finding a basic textbook and materials to present the reality of political power and implementation using approaches commonly applied elsewhere proved to be almost impossible. Almost all the available materials presented bureaucratic organizational charts and a mythical view that most of the U.S. public believe has little or nothing to do with the reality other than in a purely formalistic way.

At that time, I also searched for texts on the Native American political systems that were precursors to the imported European forms of government that individual migrant groups brought with them to North America (in their diverse settings that later become ethnically based “states” in areas of “New Amsterdam”, “New Sweden”, German “Pennsylvania”, “Louis-iana”, etc.) and that European governments imposed as colonies or areas of contractual concessions. The Iroquois system of federalism and the Native American “caucus” remain parts of the United States governmental structure today but this historical and cultural evolution of U.S political systems is also rarely presented in a systematic way (Lempert, 2000).

While I also looked for textbooks that started with the framework of international relations as well as international laws and treaties that would place the U.S. government within the context of competing empires and economic powers as well as the rules established for their interaction (written and unwritten, with the written framework of international law, rights, and trade relations supposedly binding obligations on member governments), there were none setting the U.S. government within this framework. By contrast, it is standard to analyze most other governments by starting with the economic and political power relations that constrain any real local autonomy and that pattern decision-making.

Social science models of political power in the U.S. that describe the underlying political system in the United States and compare it to the mythical, formal institutional system are also difficult to find. During the Cold War, scholars in the U.S. conducted this kind of analysis on the Soviet Union and China, looking beyond their formal constitutions and declarations to present their “deep structures” of ethnic or elite power, institutional power (military and economic institutions), urban and rural divides, and family and clan networks, as well as realities of power within communities and families. Those studies, whether political anthropological, political sociological or political science, also focus on informal institutions (such as organized crime and paramilitaries) and their mechanisms and interests (state terrorism and controlling processes or media manipulation) for foreign systems but not for the U.S.

There are, in fact, plenty of books that do focus on particular aspects of political reality and political power, but few present actual models of how it all works (the closest may be that of Rogers and Cohen, 1983 and Parenti, 1988, starting with the linkages between economic, corporate institutional power and political power and between economic class and political power). Individual classic works focus on elite networks (Mills, 1956), on money and institutional power (Domhoff, 1983; Beard, 1913), on multi-nationals and corporate economic power (Barnet and Muller, 1974), on military institutions (Melman, 1974) on local community power, caste and class (Dollard, 1949; Warner, 1947 and 1949) and on race. Some do focus on processes of control (Chomsky and Herman, 2002; Nader, 1990). There have certainly been studies of political influences of particular lobbies, of organized crime, of political clans and secret societies, as well as of vigilantism and of patriarchy in the U.S. political system, as well as of the U.S. as an empire but not in the holistic descriptive approach that one can find in political and legal ethnographies and in some other studies of foreign systems.

The standard comprehensive study of “U.S. Government” is still a formal legalistic framework of the “three branches of government”, “federalism” and “separation of powers”, with all supposedly under citizen control. Meanwhile, the standard political history of the U.S. still starts with European colonialism and a state that became transferred to new hands after a “revolution”. The standard political narrative claims to find increases in “democracy” as cultural differences and household production units were extinguished and the atomized individual worker (or state soldier), male or female, became the unit of labor. The history of cultural and political powers that have disappeared (ethnic federalism and representation of states in a split executive and Supreme court; citizen power through jury nullification, grand jury investigative and governmental oversight powers, private attorney generals, strict public chartering of organizations, and community militias) or that have eroded with industrialization (access to the press, ownership of means of production, privacy, low technology and high distribution of arms) disappears in these standard narratives.

Given how many courses today there are in universities that claim to focus on issues of “power”, “class”, “race”, “ethnicity”, and “gender” and given the number of journals that also claim to have such focus, one would think that this would be a good time to expect a comprehensive text mapping out the actual workings of “U.S. government” and its legacy of earlier governments through time. On the other hand, given how much of the anthropological literature today focuses on advocacy for specific groups and micro-studies or “narratives” without adhering to traditional anthropological holism offering explanatory and predictive social science models, perhaps the conditions still do not exist for the production and publication of such a work. This author’s approach, along with a model of how democratic oversight and ethnic federalism would actually work if they were legally protected today, in the “United States” (another name that seems to be a political anachronism), remains unpublished (Lempert, unpublished trilogy).

While presenting a deep structural model of the U.S. government is beyond the scope of this article, this is a good time to sketch out some of its features as well as to present and test some of the deep structural models of the U.S. government that have arisen in social science and popular literature during the past 50 years, largely outside of political anthropology.

This piece uses the methods of political anthropology to analyze, in hindsight, two significant events in U.S. and global history; the assassination of U.S. President John F. Kennedy in 1963 and the collapse of the towers of the World Trade Center in New York City in 2001, to generate some ideas on the cultural “deep structure” of U.S. political culture and of the political culture of industrial administrative states, or empires, in general. Given the time that has passed since these events, it is now possible to apply an anthropological analysis to consider the potential causes of the events and the reasons they are controversial as well as to consider how these events serve as a micro-cosm to reveal the larger workings of the society, following an approach that has long been used in anthropology in other societies (Geertz, 1972). While this article does not “solve” or “resolve” these two events, it shows how some very simple techniques that are used in legal analysis can quickly reveal underlying cultural forces that are part of the “deep structure” of the culture. In the U.S., the clear beneficiary of both events has been the U.S. military, while the list of public theories and public beliefs of causes, themselves provide a map of an underlying hierarchy of institutional political power in the U.S. that is more similar to that in empires like that of the former Soviet Union and contemporary China than of citizen based democracy. What U.S. citizens refer to as “bi-partisan consensus” in U.S. foreign policy suggests the absence of any real civilian control over the U.S. military, in contrast to the official descriptions of “American democracy”. The public views of these events and the analysis of beneficiaries quickly paints a picture of a political structure of a national security/ administrative state and empire that is increasingly similar to or “converging” with other industrial administrative states that U.S. ideology has always viewed as the opposite of “democracy”.

**Background**

The approach used in this article is actually one that has long been rooted in the discipline of anthropology, in advancing the basic founding goals of the discipline to predict the workings of human groups at the level of “cultures” and “societies”, but that has recently been abandoned and replaced with the study of “philosophy” and “narratives” rather than on social modeling, predictions and applications. Although the fundamental concepts are still taught, there is little effort to apply them. In turning away from studies of the overall structures of how cultures and complex societies (with multiple cultures), anthropologists have claimed that they lack tools and techniques to effectively reveal overall workings. They have also changed their focus away from cultures and from societies to small interactions or specific institutions, in ways that are no longer predictive or comparative and with few real applications. By contrast, this study shows how some simple techniques can return anthropology to its core principles and approaches, quickly modeling larger processes and interactions as a prelude to returning to large, complete ethnographies of the holistic workings of cultures and societies. Much of what anthropology sought to do in the modeling of “deep structure” is now being done outside of anthropology in studies of “deep politics” that can once again be reintegrated into the discipline to examine the key questions that originally drove anthropology, like those of war and peace.

Although it seems to have recently lost its meaning, the idea of “deep structure” is, itself, deeply rooted in the social sciences that focus on explaining human behaviors at the level of groups, in cultures and complex societies. Originally, scholars like Marx and Lenin sought to explain cultural differences and social change by looking for underlying “driving forces” (Marx, 1975 [1867]; Lenin, 1926). The problem with these explanations was that they sought a single term or variable to describe the workings of society or a behavior, such as “capital” or “profit” to describe trade relations or imperialism. Their approach was to look for deeper forces but the explanations only had modest predictive value. What anthropology added was the idea of looking at how the fulfillment of needs within certain environments, led to the creation of specific structures or repertoires of behaviors, sometimes in social institutions and sometimes just in rituals. Levi-Strauss’ models of cultures with these interlocking patterns of structures was referred to as “structuralism” (or in other models as “structural-functionalism”) with the role of the social scientist as modeling all of these linkages to reveal the “deep structure” of how they worked (Levi-Strauss, 1963). In the study of complex societies, the focus was on institutions and their relations, by sociologists like C. Wright Mills, in what were essentially deep structural models (Mills, 1956). Perhaps the use of this approach that is closes to that of anthropology today is that applied by the linguist, Noam Chomsky, who uses the idea of “deep structure” to explain underlying structures of human language, and also applies the term in his examinations of the workings of political systems and their military policies (Chomsky and Herman, 2002). While the original approach of anthropology was to find these linkages by modeling the entire society’s workings in all aspects and in relation to its geographic environment and neighbors, in the form of “holistic ethnographies”, anthropologists increasingly sought ways of studying micro-cosms to reveal the whole (Geertz, 1972). While these concepts are still taught, anthropology and sociology have themselves reverted back to the original shallow approaches of driving forces in looking for consciousness or gestalt explanations of society to replace the complex models (Foucault, 1985) as well as to resurrect Marx and explanations that are simplistic and political labeling, such as “corporate capitalism” or “globalization”. They have abandoned modeling, prediction and comparisons, driving them elsewhere.

Perhaps one of the reasons it is difficult to find a holistic ethnography of U.S. political culture is that anthropology itself has fragmented into different approaches to looking at the whole, often starting with standard sociological variables (race, ethnicity, gender or class). Rather than try to define political and legal power, to identify institutions that possess it by virtue of their technologies and their functions, and to model it in ways that link it to the overall dynamic of the U.S. as a “culture”, the discipline has moved towards narrower and narrower explanations to promote the “identity” of different groups and to offer short stories and philosophizing in the form of “narratives”. Meanwhile, with other disciplines and popular publications taking the lead, conclusions on American political “culture” and anthropological terms have entered other disciplines without review or comment by anthropologists and with little contextualization.

American political and legal culture have long been a focus of anthropological study, but much of the work has focused on telling stories about the evolution of human societies (by archaeologists) and more recently on issues of race, ethnicity, and social structure as well as ethnographies of specific political institutions and their workings (by social and cultural anthropologists). Many of these short ethnographies focus on workings of the courts and the nature of dispute resolution that dates back to the 1970s (Nader and Todd, 1978) and of the role of business and consumption in American culture (Harris, 1983) without placing them within the overall “structure” of the larger culture and its workings. With political anthropology recently focusing on specific institutions, symbols, or ideologies (including policing, the criminal justice system, and “terrorism”) there has been little attempt to look holistically at U.S. political culture, its changes, its overall workings or “deep structure” or to focus on the meaning and context of specific major political events (Duncan, 2014; Nader, 2012). Some of this may also be due to political influences on the choices of topics of anthropological study rather than on overall importance to the discipline (Price, 2003).

There is general recognition among anthropologists and several social sciences of several social changes that have occurred in U.S. political and legal culture over the past century with continuing processes of industrialization. The U.S. itself has become more homogeneous and there is much greater representation of ethnic, religious, and racial groups as well as genders in major political and legal institutions as cultural and regional differences disappear. Processes of globalization have resulted in political and economic integration and homogenization, with corporate institutional influences sometimes outside of the country. Technological and communications changes have changed personal and economic relationships as well as family structure, as have medical advances producing longer lifespans (Harris, 1983). Relations with the environment and in the workplace have also been transformed as a result of urbanization and technological production adaptations.

The impacts of recent technological and social changes on politics and law are disputed, but largely outside of anthropology and anthropological structural frameworks. Nevertheless, they raise the kinds of questions on larger issues of political power and war and peace that can and should be tested by anthropological approaches. Some see the homogenization of culture and the workforce as well as the revolution in communications and transportation technologies as evidence of greater political equality and democratization. Others point to advanced military and weapons technologies and the end of the citizen soldier as evidence of political centralization, reinforced by concentration of financial power, energy industries, and some high technology (Galbraith, 1967; Janowitz, 1960). These trends seem to be a confirmation of predictions of early sociologists that bureaucratization would ultimately reduce the kinds of direct public controls exerted by citizens (Weber, 1947; Durkheim, 1943) with the result in politics and law of reducing the active participatory role played by citizens in juries, political oversight, free speech and politics (Tocqueville, 1835-1840; Lempert, unpublished trilogy). Recent increases in income disparities and the decline of the “middle class” in the U.S. and other industrial countries seems to be a sign of (or the re-emergence of?) political oligarchy, though there are questions whether this is a long-term trend driven by technology or just cyclical political behavior.

Typically, one of the places that anthropologists look for windows into the workings of a culture’s political organization and of relationships between different political groups or interests is in the settlement of major disputes where large institutions are involved and/or where there is significant controversy. While legal systems usually act routinely to maintain order and apply rules, the inability or the avoidance of application of the usual approach generally signifies some kind of clash between rules and institutions that expose the underlying workings and that also reveals changing political power relationships (Nader and Todd, 1978). In U.S. legal and political history, among two of the most controversial and high profile such events, that could offer such a window into U.S. political and legal culture, are the assassination of President Kennedy, now more than 50 years ago in 1963, and the collapse of the World Trade Center (WTC) towers in New York in 2001, resulting in some 3000 deaths in one of the single deadliest unnatural events occurring in the U.S. The time that has elapsed and the increasing amount of information now revealed both on the actual events and the public beliefs on the meaning of these events, as well as the resulting changes and implications, now offers a two-generational period of data for examining current U.S. political and legal culture if appropriate methods would be applied to their study. That is also what this article seeks to do, by combining some techniques from legal studies and using them directly within the framework of anthropology.

Since there are still battles today over access to information about these events as well as over what happened and its meaning, these two events stand out as those in which to focus attention. Such controversies present very rich sources of anthropological data not only for understanding of political culture of the U.S. but also of administrative industrial states (or perhaps the better term is the “national security states” or “empires”) in general, as an independent case study but also as a comparative case study (for example with the Russian (Soviet) Empire). The historical public record of political and legal system changes in the U.S. also provides data and context in which to look at these events and what they might reveal about the deep structure of political power and its changes in the U.S. For example, the idea of public criminal due process for the suspects that the government quickly identified as the alleged perpetrators of both of these events now no longer exists in the U.S. for such crimes. The President and the U.S. military now have the power to assassinate suspects that they identify as the perpetrators of such events whether or not they are U.S. citizens, without ever bringing the suspects to trial or following what were Constitutional guarantees of due process. Further, individuals releasing documents on lawbreaking by the U.S. government (i.e., those actors whom researchers and the public suggested as suspects to also be investigated for these events) can now be subject to trials in special military courts without public justification defenses. These U.S. government activities can also be conducted without public review, in secret courts, with decisions unavailable to the public.

In the absence of an anthropological framework to examine the political and legal “deep structure” of the U.S. (assuming for the purposes of this article that the U.S. as a “nation state” and “empire” can be analyzed as a “culture”), the standard approach to understanding these two events has been to examine them in isolation, as simply historical events. Nevertheless, those looking for larger, contextual explanations and working outside of anthropology have applied what could be seen as quasi-anthropological approaches that put them in the framework of institutional actors and powers or the overall workings of the U.S. as an empire (imperial culture) and that can be incorporated into an anthropological framework. One of the starting points of such “structural” study, without using that term, has been the model established by political scientist Graham Allison in 1971 in seeking to explain another historic event that was linked to these two later historic events; the “Cuban Missile Crisis” during the Kennedy Administration (1971). Allison tried to explain significant events based on a variety of competing structural frameworks including institutional interests, and overall historical social forces. More recently, in applying these frameworks, scholars outside of anthropology have looked for “deep politics” or “parapolitics” explanations (Scott, 2010). Rather than establishing “deep structure” explanations for what these events mean in terms of the overall political structure of the U.S., as microcosms of how the system works and was changing and in ways that come out of anthropological holism, they have started by seeking to identify those hidden actors who need to be uncovered (Scott, 2010). Scott, for example, compares the actual history and the “parahistory” (what anthropologists would call the cultural mythology that works to cover up acknowledged truths). Once these actors are discovered, they could then be placed into an overall “deep structural” model, following the holistic approach of anthropology. The key difference between an anthropological approach and existing approaches is that anthropologists would identify the various institutional actors and show how they coordinate in a system of relationships that maintains the culture and that are not openly acknowledge (the “deep structure”) rather than viewing them as “dark” forces. The anthropological assumption, as opposed to other approaches, is that people do “know” the reality of their histories but that they agree to mythologize them in order to protect the system in which they find themselves, out of habit, agreement (and perhaps fear or social control) but not because they are being deluded or manipulated (that would imply a moral value to the workings of the system other than whether or not it was a sustainable cultural system, which is its real test).

The goal of this article is not to “solve” the two cases in the sense of reconstructing a crime and detailing the actions and criminal responsibilities of specific actors. That is the work of historians and legal analysts. It is also not to examine the relationships between facts and mythologies. Nor is it to question how cultural “facts” and “reality” are constructed and determined and shaped. The goal here, instead, is to use standard anthropological and recognized social science and scientific data on which there is almost universal agreement, to place that data in a standard analytical framework, and to show what it reveals about the “deep structure” of U.S. political and legal culture, and how such analysis works as a powerful tool.

The presentation of the events of the Kennedy assassination in this article adheres to the anthropological assumption that the events and the relationship of the various key actors in the (deep) structure of U.S. political and legal culture are mostly known to and have long been known to the U.S. public. Moreover, the facts behind these events and the relationships between key actors are clear and knowable to an anthropologist because they have long been known to objective professionals applying the meticulous procedures of legal and historical analysis that will be reviewed here. At the same time, there is a second cultural perspective that is a mythologized cultural version of the history that exists as an “official” government version. It also serves a function as part of the deep structure. It maintains the actual structure of power and assists the mass public in denying its responsibility (and, therefore, its sense of guilt) for the double standard it applies to the perpetrators of crimes whereby the same acts that are considered “crimes” by those of low political power and status are not considered “crimes” when they are perpetrated by individuals and institutions that are in high protected positions in the culture (Lempert, 2010). There is nothing unusual about this. This is a fundamental phenomenon common to all cultures. It is simply more difficult to examine when it happens in a culture in which we are members. Something similar may also be happening in the second case, of the World Trade Center (“WTC”) deaths, where there are also competing narratives. However, there are not enough available facts to absolutely confirm the official government version in all of its aspects. Possibly, today in the U.S., due to changes in the political culture, such kind of investigation and debate is no longer even possible. Nevertheless, the study of the WTC deaths is of anthropological importance because the different narratives reveal features of the workings of the political and legal culture today and also confirm certain deep structural cultural changes since the Kennedy Assassination.

What also makes the anthropological presentation of these events different from those of other social sciences is that anthropology as a social science, and this article, do not assign moral value or assign causality to events. Some social scientists say these two historic events are evidence of a turning point in political history, if not pre-meditated attacks on “democracy” and certain political interests. Others say that these are random events that are not significant in themselves in changing policy or power relations. The anthropological approach in this article is simply to look at these events for what the debates over them reveal about the overall deep structure of political power in U.S. political culture that is usually not directly examined. Whether these events changed the culture and whether the changes that occurred, either as a result of these events or as revealed by these events, have moral implications (in terms of the sustainability of U.S. political culture and of the global system, as well as whether it makes a difference that there is a wide disparity between claimed values and actual workings of the system), is a discussion that could follow this analysis but that should not influence it.

**Methodology**

This article applies the basic approach of political and legal anthropology for identifying the deep structures of politics and law: it starts with major political and legal decisions, identifies the visible (and potential actors), analyzes their actions and motives, and fits them into the overall dynamics of the culture. In the case of U.S. political and legal culture, not only are the Kennedy Assassination and World Trade Center deaths viewed as two defining political and legal events, but there has been so much written about them that it is easy to examine the actors, their activities, and different public views about them. Since the events are in the category of crimes, it is also easy to use the standard methodology for criminal investigations and to compare it to the actual approaches and presentation that governmental bodies used, in violation of the standard procedures, in investigating these crimes. Many legal anthropologists are attorneys, as is the author of this article, and are familiar with criminal laws and procedures as well as with the psychology of crime, so the value of this approach is that it can be easily applied elsewhere to other cases as part of a standard repertoire of legal and political anthropology in deep structure analysis. While the discipline of anthropology has recently become driven by specific methodologies to which it has become wedded in shaping the discipline’s boundaries and identity, the appropriate approach of intellectual disciplines is to continually invent and apply new and different methodologies in order to solve fundamental disciplinary questions, rather than to reshape the disciplinary questions (and the definition of the discipline) in order to fit a methodology.

In the U.S. criminal justice system, there are well established procedures for investigations of suspects, prosecution, and for trial before randomly selected public juries. Accused suspects (trial defendants) are allowed to offer legal defense and have the rights of access to government evidence as well as to present other theories of guilt that government prosecutors failed to sufficiently pursue. Replicating this process and comparing it to what actually happened offers evidence of the location of power in U.S. political culture. Asking questions about what happened and why other paths were not followed (essentially in the form of “thought experiments”) confirms an underlying system logic or “deep structure”.

For both of these events, part of what has contributed to controversy (skepticism about the government version of events that has created a wealth of information on alternate suspects, their motives and their ability to evade investigation or prosecution) is that few of the procedures that constitute the normal and routine processes of the U.S. criminal justice system were followed. In the case of the assassination of President Kennedy, there was no trial because there essentially was investigation of only one suspect (Lee Oswald), who was identified almost immediately, and who was quickly murdered while under police custody by someone suspected of having ties to the police and to organized crime (Jack Ruby (Rubenstein)). In the case of the World Trade Center towers, there was originally no trial because suspects, described as airplane hijackers and also identified almost immediately, were claimed as having died with the victims, and because the alleged organizer of the attacks (Osama Bin Laden) was killed rather than captured and brought to trial, following the orders and actions of the U.S. President (Obama), U.S. military, and State Department. Even now, the trial of five suspects, including Khalid Sheikh Mohammed, linked to those events more than 15 years before, seems yet to actually proceed. If and when they do, these trials are military, not civilian, trials, subject to military secrecy and military laws, with limited opportunities for defendants to investigate and present alternative theories. With no civilian trials, there has been no representative public jury. With no public investigations of other suspects for potential indictment, there was no public grant jury. These public procedures were replaced with government commissions selected by the U.S. President (or additionally by Congress) with direct conflicts of interest with potential suspects. Documentation that would otherwise be available to defense attorneys and placed before the public continues to be withheld (even despite Freedom of Information laws on some of the documents related to President Kennedy’s assassination that is more than 50 years old).

The standard used in criminal law to identify suspects and then to attribute responsibility is not universal, but that used in modern systems like the U.S. follows a standard logic dating back to the Romans. There are three basic elements: motive (“mens rea” in Latin), means or ability (weapon, strength, resources, etc.) and opportunity (appearing at the scene of the crime with the time and logistical ability to carry out the crime). For each case, it is possible to take the public record and anthropological insight and generate a list of actors as potential “suspects” to see how the evidence fits them for each of these three basic elements and several subcomponents. Admittedly, this approach is still subject to some interpretation and is not purely objective. Criminology is not an exact science though ballistics and autopsies can help. The more categories for an act, potentially better the analysis. But anthropology, itself, is not an exact science and also relies on some interpretation. What is possible is to apply approaches that are the state of the art and examine the results.

As with most anthropological presentations today, most of the field data and observations that are collected in this study are too extensive to place alongside the analysis of that data and are relegated to back-up notes. In following the established approach of the discipline, this article summarizes voluminous data in a way that highlights its meaning through the form of presentation of key observations and concepts. While this article references some key sources (sometimes directly in tables), full documentation is left for historical presentations and for follow-up discussions and are omitted here.

**The Data: The Two Historic Cases**

**Event 1: The Assassination of U.S. President John F. Kennedy in 1963**

While the specific timeline and suspected actors involved in the Kennedy Assassination remain to be presented in a thorough historical analysis (and should appear in any book length work to lend credibility to such works that claim to “solve” the case), an analysis of the suspects, their motives, means and opportunity now not only offers two or three clear narratives of what happened but also offers a direct window into the U.S. political power structure in 1963 (by revealing all those who benefitted from or did not challenge the official explanation). Analysis also provides an excellent map of public acknowledgment of the political deep structure and of public willingness to protect that power structure (either out of support for it or fear or it or both).

**Presenting an Analytical Table to Identify the Suspects**

Table 1 summarizes the key events of the Kennedy Assassination in the framework of prosecutorial analysis combined with a legal anthropological perspective. The columns consider the aspects of Motive, Means and Opportunity for each potential suspect that has been considered in social science, media and popular discussions (including films and the Internet) of the case. The chart also adds and analyses, by way of these columns, categories of suspects that have historically committed assassinations in U.S. history or that do so in similar countries but that have not appeared widely in published sources (jealous husbands and wives for example, or sectarian rival factions).

- In analyzing “Motive”, there is a column for personal gain (e.g., financial benefit or competitive rivalry) and also one for the cultural motivations (animosities) that are often overlooked in analyses by non-anthropologists.

- “Means” here considers the ability of different suspects to have placed themselves in the area of the assassination and to have fired the murder weapon from the place and at the rate that the minimum of three bullets from a suspected gun were allegedly fired. There is also a question as to whether the suspect has the “M.O.” (modus operandi) for such a crime (i.e., a history of carrying out such a crime in similar ways).

- The “Opportunity” section considers all of the speculative questions that are raised that challenge the official explanation of the crime (that it was committed by Lee Harvey Oswald, alone, with a single gun). If guilt were to be established for other suspects, there are a number of independent activities that would all need to be present in order to explain alternate versions of events and these key activities are listed across the columns. While there are several different possible scenarios for other assassins with other weapons, they also require one to believe that autopsy records and ballistic findings were distorted as well as to explain why Oswald was blamed for the crime and how and why he was “silenced” (killed in police custody by Jack Ruby (Rubenstein)) as well as to explain the murder of police officer J.D. Tippit (attributed to Oswald shortly after the time of the Kennedy Assassination). This author is unaware of any explanations that actually seek to present the logistics and opportunity for all of those events in order to create a convincing explanation for the potential guilt of different suspects. However, it is relatively easy to construct a table that does consider each suspect on the basis of such “Opportunity” and to reveal who they could have been either singly or in combination. Finally, there is a continuing historical question about information that is still held by government that would likely protect a suspect or would prevent particular questions being answered about certain institutions and suspects today. Since there are no direct motives today to protect suspects and avoid certain questions, this analysis can be used to help eliminate some suspects.

The table considers 16 potential suspects, with Lee Oswald considered twice; acting on his own initiative or acting in connection with the organizations for which he was affiliated (the U.S. military and/or Central Intelligence Agency). Many of these suspects can be eliminated easily for lack of motive (specific benefit). The involvement of others suspects is possible but the table reveals that most, if they were involved, could not have acted alone.

Note that before looking at the hypotheses that are constantly offered, there is much to be confirmed about U.S. political culture from the absence of certain explanations, shown in the list of “Discarded Suspects” at the bottom of the table. The can be reviewed quickly.

- Cultural antagonisms may underlie the assassination but there are no theories of sectarian violence against Irish Catholic Americans (as in Ireland) or of “Southern” plots against “the North” (as in the assassination of President Lincoln a century before). Nor are there theories of “class” struggle against the upper class Kennedy family, of commodity speculation.

- Other than speculation on organized crime (Italian “Mafia”) dealings with the Kennedy family in dealings for political power, there are no theories of clan or dynastic rivalries (such as Appalachian feuding) or of rival economic interests competing for territory (such as in Russian or Chinese contemporary politics or in organized crime feuds).

- While the government offered a theory of a “lone gunman”, there were no hypotheses of jealous husbands or jilted lovers seeking revenge against President Kennedy (though this theory is offered for Governor Huey Long’s assassination in the 1930s, in Warren, 1946, and for Prime Minister Olaf Palme’s murder in Sweden). (Some theories suggest that Officer Tippit’s murder may have been by police colleagues seeking revenge for an extramarital affair.)

- While vigilante killings were long a part of American political culture (such as lynchings by the Klu Klux Klan and “hate crimes” today) and the U.S. government has often used its authority to murder individuals from targeted ethnic groups for political reasons (such as the execution of Ethel Rosenberg, a Jewish woman, for “espionage” despite no evidence against her and the execution of Italians Sacco and Vanzetti shortly after World War I), with such targeting continuing after the Kennedy Assassination and until today, Irish Catholics have not been targets.

**What the Table of Suspects Reveals**

Given the evidence now available, the most likely suspect in all categories seems to be the U.S. military, the very suspect that President Kennedy himself most feared (leading to the subject of a popular book and film with actual figures fictionalized (Bailey and Knebel, 1962) and not the suspects that have more commonly been blamed. That in itself raises interesting anthropological questions. Note that the table does not rule out several possible suspects working in concert. Many political actors had motives and benefitted from the assassination and also would have benefitted from a cover up. The list itself reveals the depth of potential complicity among several powerful actors in the U.S. political system, in different ways. Even if none of these suspects was actually involved in the assassination, their interlocking motives and potential networks provides a map of the deep structure of the system and how it could easily thwart democratic pressures or attempts at “reforms” or transformation (to promote different interests, such as public oversight or peace).

As a “lone gunman”, the government’s suspect, Lee Oswald had no motive, nor were his actions those of someone committing a political murder who would certainly take credit and seek to publicize the reasons for such act. Well before additional investigations began to find information about Oswald’s government ties and flaws in the government theories, lawyers looking at the legal case against Oswald recognized that it would have been insufficient for a conviction had he lived (Buchanan, 1964; Lane, 1966). Only by combining his presence with recent evidence of his military and CIA connections (Douglass, 2008), are there potential motives, but then he is no longer a “lone gunman” but is either acting on behalf of or in concert with others. The logic is simple. As a “lone gunman”, Oswald has no motive and is an unlikely suspect, but as the operative of a larger group that does have a motive, he is an unlikely choice of a gunman with the alleged murder weapon. That strongly suggests that there was another or were more professional sniper(s) with better weapon(s) and that Oswald had some other role.

The table also reveals that most “conspiracy” explanations fail because their main focus is only on motive and likelihood of additional actors but not of actual means and opportunity to control the steps that would have been involved, nor the previous experience to show a pattern of activity. For many of these, there would also be no reason for the government not to now release full information that would implicate them.

The evidence from the table, that the U.S. military is the most likely suspect will surprise some but is not really a surprise. Recent disclosures of government documents, now easily accessible on the Internet, show that officials within the U.S. military were not averse to the idea of using “hijackings and bombings” within the U.S. to create a pretext for an invasion of Cuba and possibly a nuclear “first strike” against the Soviet Union. The “Operation Northwoods” proposal that General Lyman Lemnitzer presented to President Kennedy on March 13, 1962, and that would have been run by Edward Lansdale was refused by President Kennedy. It sought Presidential authorization for this kind of “false flag” attack against the U.S. that would be blamed on either Cuba or the Soviet Union, who were also among initial suspects offered as being behind the Kennedy Assassination. Lemnitzer, who had sought a “first strike” against the Soviet Union in 1961, was simply moved to Europe but was still in a position to coordinate the assassination. The lack of approval from President Kennedy for Operation Northwoods did not mean that the military did not have the means or opportunity to conduct such “false flag” operations and to use them to trigger war. It meant only that the President stood in the way of the goals of the military, something that was the subject at the time of a popular book and film that fictionalized the central characters (Bailey and Knebel, 1962).

**Which of the Suspects Benefitted: How the Deep Structure Works**

 Most of the suspects who appear to have a motive also appear to have benefitted from the assassination, which is likely why they continue to appear in the public mind as suspects. The military did not trigger war with Cuba or the Soviet Union, but it did increase its funding and its role, particularly in Southeast Asia. The CIA’s activities and budget also largely increased in the form of military operations and assassinations in Southeast Asia and elsewhere. Organized crime did not return to its operations in Cuba, but it did expand its activities in the 1960s. While there was some attempt to dismantle some organized crime families in the U.S. in the 1970s and to improve the workings of the Justice Department and the FBI after the death of Director J. Edgar Hoover, there was no real effort to increase public oversight of the military, of the CIA and other national security state organs or over concentrations of economic power. Nor were their efforts to democratize the legal and prosecutorial system. Overall, and in hindsight, even if it may have been in an institutional battle with the CIA, it appears that the military “won” the encounter. Its powers have increased with no more accountability or civilian control and probably less. The result was not greater democracy and oversight. It was “law and order” from top down.

Probably the easiest way to see the deep structure and to discredit the government’s explanation for the crime is to ask why the U.S. government did not take the steps to reduce the threat of “lone gunman” assassinations if it really believed it was the cause. Although President Johnson’s “Great Society” programs did increase attention to mental illness and to causes of violence in the U.S. (particularly poverty and racial inequalities) as well as to gun control, political assassinations continued throughout the 1960s. Since political assassins often seek to take credit for their acts, viewing them as patriotic, one might ask why no suspect has presented clear evidence to take credit for the assassination. Today, for example, the U.S. military’s extra legal force, the Joint Special Operations Command (JSOC) openly takes pride in activities that previously were kept secret and that were likely recognized as in violation of the U.S. constitution as well as international law (Scahill, 2013). Why, then, does it not admit (if some members were involved) or speak openly about what is now known about the Kennedy Assassination, claiming that it was an operation carried out in a patriotic belief of the best interests of the country, despite its illegality? Certainly, members of the U.S. military have done this before to escape or minimize accountability (such as the Iran Contra arms sales in the 1980s during the Reagan Administration). Indeed, there have been a number of books that have begun to suggest that President Kennedy’s early death was inevitable because he was already ill (due to Addison’s disease) or that the lifestyles of the Kennedy family members (sexual promiscuity and drug use, that were reflective of the cultural experimentation of the 1960s; reputed associations with organized crime, and financial improprieties and potential political corruption of President Kennedy’s father) created risks and dangers that required intervention. However, none of these has yet been used as justification linked with confessions by any government officials.

The best explanation may be that while the Kennedy Assassination may have further escalated militarization of U.S. foreign policy in the 1960s, the military did not get specifically what it allegedly sought and what it may have gained in military operations elsewehre is not viewed as a military success. If the goal was to provoke a “first strike” nuclear war against the Soviet Union/ Russian Empire or a full scale invasion of Cuba, both have *yet* to occur. (Some might claim they are still planned.) The increased attacks on Viet Nam, Laos and Cambodia and support for the military genocides in Indonesia, are generally considered today to be expensive American military failures in violation of international and U.S. law.

**A Possible Scenario that Opens Up the Deep Structure of U.S. Politics in 1963**

One possible scenario that fits with newly released evidence and with contemporary political realities is that the assassination may have been directed by elements of the U.S. military in a way that would give it greater power and trigger immediate military action in the Cold War through a “false flag” provocation, while also embarrassing the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and reducing its relative power in international military activities.

We now know much more about the alleged assassin, Lee Oswald, whom the government considered the only suspect; that he had a long history of connections to the U.S. military and to the CIA and that his activity in support of the Cuban government would be contradictory with those allegiances unless he were instructed to do so. In April 1963, he was apparently directed by a CIA contact to either kill or scare General Edwin Anderson Walker, perhaps as part of a false flag operation. Walker was an unsuccessful gubernatorial candidate in Texas, backed by Texas oil billionaire Howard L. Hunt. Like General Lemnitzer, Walker advocated for a nuclear first strike against the Soviet Union in which the U.S. could “win” after the death of tens of millions on both sides. Oswald’s alleged attack did not kill or wound Walker (other than let loose some wood chips from a single shot that hit a door frame near him) and did not provoke any other action, though President Kennedy’s brother, Attorney General Robert F. Kennedy, had him placed in a psychiatric hospital.

Prior to the Kennedy Assassination, the CIA had recruited and prepared a small invasion force of Cuban exiles ready to attack Cuba and claim that they were part of an indigenous uprising. The CIA’s goal was to land on the beaches of Cuba at the Bay of Pigs and to use the attack as a pretext for provoking President Kennedy into directing the military to join this “indigenous” attack and turn it into a war with Cuba and potentially against the Soviet Union. Fearing nuclear war, President Kennedy was clear that he had no intent to directly attack Cuba or the Soviet Union and was engaged in peace negotiations with Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev. When the CIA attacked the Bay of Pigs, the invasion was directly countered by the Cuban military. It is now believed that General Lemnitzer, knowing of the CIA’s plan to lead the U.S. into war, leaked the information to the Cubans to assure that the mission would fail and embarrass the CIA. Why would Lemnitzer do this if he, himself, sought such a war? He already knew that President Kennedy would oppose it, for one, and he likely felt that the CIA had been encroaching on the responsibilities of the military. Indeed, the result of the CIA’s failure in the Bay of Pigs was that President Kennedy replaced its director and sought to reduce its role.

If Lemnitzer’s objective was to trigger war (and possibly to get revenge for the hospitalization of General Walker), the way to do that was to remove President Kennedy in a way that immediately created a pretext for war; tying the assassination to the Cubans or to the Soviets. Such activities were not new to the CIA or to the U.S. military. Even U.S. baseball player Moe Berg committed assassinations against European scientists under U.S. military orders in World War II. Apparently, some of these assassinations were also conducted through the participation of organized crime syndicates like the Italian Mafia that also operated throughout the U.S. (Cottrell, 2012).

Most theories of the Kennedy Assassination seek to tie it to the CIA, with Oswald’s false ties to pro-Cuban activists used to try to link the assassination to Cuba, but the CIA alone apparently did not have the means for fully distorting the crime scene (particularly the autopsy). The CIA, the Mafia and others could have been involved, but the military had the clearest means and opportunity to oversee all parts of the crime. Many theories of the assassination also link the CIA to the cover up by the government, noting that the government commission that President Johnson created placed one of the suspects, Allen Dulles, the former CIA head whom President Kennedy fired. It is possible that Allen Dulles appeared on the Warren Commission not to cover up his own involvement but to help President Johnson regain some control over the military while balancing interests of the CIA and military. This could also explain why the Kennedy family recently gave its Profile in Courage Award for 2014 to President George H.W. Bush, a former head of the CIA and apparently involved with the CIA in the early 1960s. One could speculate that they viewed his role as trying to professionalize the CIA and also to establish some improved control over the military.

It does not seem likely that high level officials in the U.S. government would have a motive to protect former heads of the CIA or the Mafia or particular corporate interests for 50 years if they knew them to have directed the assassination. They could reveal such information and show how there were efforts to restore legality and oversight, even if the revelations were just for show and little had really changed. But, if the military had evaded civilian control (and continues to do so) and if the assassination were part of an intergovernmental rivalry and a coordination of actors that continue to be part of the current political deep structure, there would still be an interest today in keeping that information secret. Though specific details of the assassination will likely not become full public knowledge while the alleged suspects retain authority, one might assume that the collapse of the U.S. economy and empire would lead to some cultural change that would include a significant downscaling of the National Security State and its institutions and that release of such information would be instrumental in the restructuring process as in post-World War II Germany and in the Soviet Union (both in 1953 after the death of Stalin and in 1991 after the collapse of the Soviet Union).

**The Deep Structure of U.S. Political Culture and How it Matches and Deviates from Public Beliefs**

Over the past 50 years, polls have shown that U.S. public opinion has relatively consistently rejected the claim that Oswald was either the assassin or that he acted alone with 70 to 75%, including his nephew, law professor Robert F. Kennedy, Jr. (interviewed in 2013) placing the blame on other suspects (2003 Gallup and ABC News polls and a 2013 poll, reported in Wikipedia, 2014). Table 2 presents, side by side, the likely suspects from the analysis of Table 1 and the more common theories as presented by the public. The two columns roughly track each other with some exceptions. The public seems unwilling to directly blame the U.S. military, though it has less difficulty blaming the CIA. There also seems to be more willingness to blame political figures, such as President Johnson, and to see them as having more power than they really have. While the public preference for theories that blame the CIA and/or the Mafia suggest a racial element in the assassination (White Angle Saxon Protestants of the CIA and their Puritan tradition or Italian Mafiosos), the military would represent a larger cross section of the U.S. by ethnicity and class and perhaps would represent a “meritocratic” lower class bureaucracy opposing the permissive upper class Irish Catholic Kennedys.

**Table 1**. Standard Prosecutorial Legal Test of Guilt of Different Suspects in Assassination of President Kennedy

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | ***Motive*** | ***Means*** | ***Means and Opportunity for Cover Up*** ***(If Not Oswald Acting Alone)*** |
| ***Suspect*** | *Personal Gain* | *Political or Cultural Benefit* | *Motorcade Route and Position* | *Weapon and Firing Shots (Additional Gunmen if not Oswald)* | *Previous Modus Operandi* | *Distortion of Wounds and Autopsy* | *Influence of Actions of Jack Ruby and Officer Tippit (or “assassin”)* | *Manipulation of Crime Scene Evidence or Witnesses* | *Continuing Government Motive to Cover Up Information on this Suspect* |
| *Lee Oswald, alone (Bugliosi, 2007)* | None established | None established | By chance | Subject to debate among experts | Not of any successful killing | NA |
| *Lee Oswald under CIA (Douglass, 2008)*  | Doing his job (either to kill or frighten) | Pretext for war (first strike against the U.S.S.R., Cuba, or escalated “Cold War” proxy wars) | Arranged in advance | Possibly a decoy | Shots at General Edwin Walker  | Not clear, see below | Potential linkages | Not clear, see below | Yes, if it retains this power (e.g., killing Americans without trial) |
| *Cuba/ Castro* | None established | Revenge, but risky given likely retaliation | Unlikely | Unlikely | In Cuba | No | No | No | No, today it could be released if it were true |
| *USSR/ Khrushchev or Russian Military* | None established | High risk of retaliation and possible annihilation | Unlikely | Unlikely | Yes, but not in U.S. | No | No | No | No, today it could be released if it were true |
| *Howard Hunt/ Oil Interests or other regulated business (Trumbo, Freed and Lane, 1973)* | Economic | No | Possibly | Possible | Yes, killing of labor leaders | No | No | No | No, today it could be released if it were true |
| *Vice President Johnson (Zirbel, 2010)* | Presidential ambitions and fear of being pushed out in 1964 due to scandals | Lower class Southern white hatred of wealthy Irish Catholics and Kennedy permissive morality | Possible | Possible, given power in Texas | Speculation on killings in Texas to boost political career | No | No | No | No, today it could be released if it were true |
| *Richard Nixon* | Only revenge | Eliminate Kennedy family dynasty on political positions | Unlikely | Unlikely | No | No | No | No | No, today it could be released if it were true |
| *CIA (Stone, 1991; Douglass, 2008; Scott et. al, 1976))* | Revenge for Bay of Pigs failure and demotions | Upper class WASP hatred of wealthy Irish Catholics and Kennedy permissive morality; Provocation of war (see above) | Apparent access to Texas Book Depository and possible influence on motorcade through Cabell family connections with Dallas police | Possible given trained military for Cuba Bay of Pigs operation | Some similarities to assassinations of leaders of small countries in the 1950s. | More likely under military control. | Possibly through Mafia | Yes | Possibly, since they were investigated and “cleaned up” in the 1970s and lost some power to military intelligence. |
| *Dallas Police/ Cabell family (two brothers: police chief and fired CIA high level administrator) (Douglass, 2008)* | Revenge of Police Chief’s brother who lost CIA position. | No. | Yes | Possibly, though not clearly of Oswald. | Yes. | No. Higher levels took the case out of the city where it legally should have stayed. | Yes, possibly through local Mafia connections. | Yes. | No, today it could be released if it were true, to cleanup local police forces. |
| *U.S. Military (Scott, 2010; Cottrell, 2012)* | Possible attempt to push blame on CIA. Possible attempt to frame Oswald and gain revenge for attack on General Walker. | Lower middle class white hatred of wealthy Irish Catholics and permissive morality; Provocation of war and military, not CIA control of it. | Yes | Yes | Yes, in Europe in World War II. | Yes. | Yes, possibly through Mafia connections established in European World War II operations. | Yes, through linkages in the police. | Today they might boast, but the resulting 1960s militarization was costly. Inter-agency infighting would still be covered up. Continuation of such authority would be covered up. |
| *Mafia/ Organized Crime (Giancanas, 1992)* | Possible “Double Cross” of Mafia | End prosecutions of organized crime by Attorney General Robert Kennedy | Depends on infiltration of police and local businesses | Yes | Murder is their business | No | Yes | Possibly | No, today it could be released if it were true to demonstrate “clean up” of organized crime. |
| *FBI (Under J. Edgar Hoover)* | No. Johnson was more pro civil rights. | Hatred of rich Irish Catholics and Kennedy permissive morality. | Possibly. | Yes. | Possibly. | Possibly. | Possibly. | Yes. | Possibly. FBI and National Security State have grown rapidly, but Hoover’s abuses have been revealed. |
| ***Discarded Suspects*** |
| *Political Feuding Clans* | Possible (Republican Party business interests) | Corporate and middle American protestant hatred of rich Irish Catholics | Through other actors | Through other actors | No | No | No | No | No |
| *Regional (Texas/Southern) Militias* | Possible (e.g., Klu Klux Klan, Dallas Police) | No, because Johnson was a stronger civil rights advocate | Through other actors | Yes | Probably | No | No | No | No |
| *Sectarian Violence* | Not likely | Lower class white hatred of rich Irish Catholics | Not identified | Not identified | Not identified | No | No | No | No |
| *Economic Rival Interests* | Possible “Double Cross” of Mafia | End prosecutions of organized crime | Through other actors | If hired professionals | Not identified | No | No | No | Yes, if elections are still purchased and rigged by both parties |
| *Crime of Passion/ Betrayed Husband or Lover* | Possible | Possible moral issue with permissiveness | By chance | If hired professionals or a professional | Not identified | No | No | No | No |

**Table 2**: Hierarchy of Suspects in Assassination of President Kennedy: Prosecutorial Rules Compared to Public Views:

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
| **Potential Likelihood of Involvement from High to Low** | **Prosecutorial Analysis Based on Motive, Means and Opportunity** | **Appearance in Public Media and Discussion** |
| *High Likelihood* | U.S. Military and Intelligence | U.S. Central Intelligence Agency |
|  | U.S. Central Intelligence Agency (with or without Oswald) | Organized Crime |
|  | Dallas Police | Vice President Johnson |
|  | Organized Crime | Dallas Police |
| *Low Likelihood But Possible or Aiding and Abetting Crime or Cover-Up* | Vice President Johnson | “Lone Gunman” (Violent “Deranged”) (Oswald) |
|  | Oil interests or other regulated business | Foreign Power like Cuba or Russia/U.S.S.R. |
|  | Economic Rival interests | Oil interests or other regulated business |
|  | F.B.I. under J. Edgar Hoover | F.B.I. under J. Edgar Hoover |
|  | - | Richard Nixon or Other Political Clan |
|  | - | U.S. Military and Intelligence |
| *Unlikely* | “Lone Gunman” (Oswald) | Jealous Husband |
|  | Sectarian Violence | Sectarian Violence |
|  | Richard Nixon or Other Political Clan | Economic Rival Interests |
|  | Foreign Power like Cuba or Russia/U.S.S.R. | Regional Militias |
|  | Regional Militias | Accident of Secret Service or other idiosyncracy |
|  | Jealous Husband | - |

**Event 2: The Collapse of the World Trade Center Towers in 2001**

While the majority of the American public believes that many high level U.S. government officials lied to the public to present false or incomplete versions of the Kennedy assignation and that some may have been directly involved, the majority of the public does not question the (mostly Saudi Arabian Muslim) suspects whom the U.S. government identified as responsible for 3,000 American deaths on September 11, 2001. Nevertheless, significant numbers still believe that U.S. government officials may bear some criminal responsibility (a 2006 Scripps Howard poll found 36% believing that U.S. officials either participated in attacks or had prior knowledge and took no action to stop them; similar to the 49% of New York City residents and 41% of New York State residents in a 2004 Zogby International Poll) while half of Americans in various polls call for a re-investigation of the events and government involvement (Wikipedia, 2014).

As with the Kennedy Assassination, even if several government actors and, in this case, international actors (a sign of political cultural change, with foreign governments and the interests they represent now seen as U.S. political actors in the era of globalization) had no direct responsibility for the crimes, they are seen to have benefitted from them. Indeed, the U.S. political culture may now be co-dependent on attacks, with institutions reliant on them to justify their funds and authority. Even if this case does not reveal different perpetrators from the official government narrative, it does reveal the political deep structure.

In examining this case, that is still in recent memory and controversial, the speculations offered below on suspects are not offered as determinations of truth or falsehood of identified or potential suspects, nor to give credence or disrespect to arguments about the guilt or involvement of particular subjects. The goal is simply to offer an anthropological view of belief systems and to see what they reveal about U.S. political and legal culture.

**Presenting an Analytical Table of Potential Suspects (for Various Connected Actions) Appearing in the Media**

As in Table 1, Table 2 offers elements of criminal liability for potential suspects across the columns and a list of suspects identified in the media (some of them wildly speculative) in the rows. While the main element of this crime was the use of two passenger planes as “missiles” flown into two of the towers of the World Trade Center, there is a second theory that has emerged and that is examined in the table, that the destruction of the towers may have also required the planting of explosives.

Within hours of the planes hitting the towers and the two towers (and a third, not directly hit) collapsing, the Federal Bureau of Investigation identified 19 hijacker suspects (15 Saudi Arabian Muslims) and a leader, Osama Bin Laden. Along with these suspects are 7 others that have appeared in the media including the U.S. military, President George W. Bush and Vice President Dick Cheney, military companies, Wall Street financial companies whose offices were in the WTC towers and who may have sought to destroy records to evade a government investigation, oil companies with interests in the Middle East, and two countries (Israel and Saudi Arabia).

The main public suspicions that continue to surround this event are how a small group of Saudi Arabians could have had the organization and training to coordinate the events alone, on their previous contacts with the U.S. military in Afghanistan (training, weapons, and promises that were made and broken that could have triggered an attack), how governmental airline security systems could have been so easily breached in such a coordinated way, and how the U.S. government could so quickly identify and be certain of suspects but yet could claim to have no prior knowledge or security in place. There is also some suspicion as to how airplane attacks could completely destroy not just two buildings that were designed to withstand such shocks but how a third building that was not hit could collapse in a similar fashion, appearing to some to be more like a controlled demolition. While there were previous explosive attacks on buildings, including some a truck bomb attack also on the World Trade Center in New York, in 1993, the possible use of explosives in the towers seems to have been immediately discarded here, with the focus on the airplanes. Here, there are three separate areas to examine as elements of criminality, two of them involving the airplanes and explored in one column (the ability to gain control of four airplanes for complete destruction, the paradox of the U.S. government identifying and being sure of suspects but not having had any apparent warning or vigilance), and the possibility of some other involvement in planting explosives or weakening the structure of the Trade Center Towers.

**What the Table of Suspects Reveals**

While the analysis does not challenge the identification of “Al-Qaeda” as having means, motive and opportunity to carry out the attacks, it also does not rule out that the U.S. military also had means, motive and opportunity. Indeed, the interesting anthropological conclusion of this analysis is that the U.S. military and “Al-Qaeda” may be co-dependent on each other and are essentially coordinating together even if not intentionally. Historically, Al-Qaeda is a creation of the U.S. military, receiving weapons and funding from it to support attacks on Afghanistan in the late 1970s. In a sense, with its recruiting dependent on U.S. military attacks on civilians and support for repressive (oil) regimes, and with funding and weapons coming from oil sales to the U.S. and from floods of U.S. weapons to the Middle East, some see the two as inseparable (Moore, 2004).

**Which of the Suspects Benefitted: How the Deep Structure Works**

All of the suspects listed in the table benefitted from the attacks, suggesting that even though there may have only been one perpetrator, the interests of several organizations and institutions are linked in U.S. political culture. While the alleged Muslim planners and attackers of the attacks are mostly dead, if their goal was to provoke excessive military action and expense from the United States that ultimately weakens it, while promoting increasing violence and uprisings in the world, they have succeeded. Certainly, the U.S. military has been a major financial and political beneficiary as have oil companies, military companies and countries carrying out U.S. military policy and other self-interested objectives that might otherwise be subject to greater international scrutiny (such as Israeli government policies with regard to occupied Palestinian lands). Wall Street firms may also have benefitted indirectly from alignment with U.S. military interests. It is clear that the events of September 2001 in the U.S. did not change U.S. foreign policy in a way that would reduce hostilities towards the U.S. among peoples in repressive, undemocratic regimes, nor that would slow militarization, instability and “blowback” that were purported to be the cause of the rise and motivations of “Al-Qaeda” Muslims. Nor was there a greater emphasis on peace, global tolerance, or redress for past harms. Many initially described these as logical approaches to deal with the source of the attacks but none of these occurred, revealing the likely linkages of those actors who benefitted and whose interests appear to be linked and in opposition to de-militarization, dialogue, alternative and sustainable energy sources, democratization and peace.

**The Deep Structure of U.S. Political Culture and How it Matches and Deviates from Public Beliefs**

Table 4 compares the list of suspects/beneficiaries of the events with the beliefs of the public. As with the Kennedy Assassination, the public seems more likely to see particular politicians as having responsibility, even though they may be only indirect beneficiaries and lack the real means to carry out certain activities. Otherwise, there seems to be a relatively close correlation between the analysis of the deep structure and the public’s perception of it.

**Table 3**. Standard Prosecutorial Legal Test of Guilt of Different Suspects in the Collapse of the World Trade Center Towers in 2001

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | ***Motive*** | ***Means*** | ***Opportunity*** |
| ***Suspect*** | *Specific Gain* | *Cultural Reasons* | *Airplane (Suicide Pilot) Attacks (or Controlled Flight Paths) Destroy Towers* | *Previous Modus Operandi* | *Control of Airplanes (Established Element of the Crime)* | *Control of Explosives if Controlled Detonation (Speculative Element of Crime)* | *Continuing Government Motive to Cover Up Information on this Suspect* |
| *Osama Bin Laden and Followers* | Symbolic attack doing to U.S. what is done to others. | “Blowback” Revenge | Subject to debate among experts | Yes, suicide bombings. | Subject to debate among experts | Not Applicable |
| *Saudi Arabia* | False Flag to attack certain pro-democracy groups | Possibly clan rivalries among Arab families. | Possibly. | Not against U.S. | Same as for Bin Laden. | Not alone. | Yes |
| *Bush Family, Cheney Family* | False Flag to create the illusion of “leadership” and to create excuses for oil wars and vendettas. | Holy War of Christians versus Arabs. | No. (The argument is that they may have KNOWN of the attacks and allowed them to happen in order to benefit from them.) | No. | Not alone | Not alone. | No, today it could be released if it were true |
| *U.S. Oil Companies*  | False flag to boost oil prices and seek control of foreign oil. | Holy War of Christians versus Arabs. | Not alone. | Maybe with CIA and organized crime overseas. | Not alone | Not alone. | Yes. |
| *U.S. Military (Scott, 2010; Torelli and Frento, 2008)* | False flag to provoke war and boost in military funding after end of Cold War. | Holy War of Christians versus Arabs. | Possibly, if controlled flight paths. | Unknown in U.S. but considered as early as 1962 and false flag military attacks are an historical part of U.S. military history (e.g., 1898, 1964). | Possibly | Possibly. | Yes. |
| *U.S. Military Industries* | False flag to provoke boost in arms sales after end of Cold War. | Not evident. | Possibly controlled flight paths. | Unknown. | Possibly. | Not alone. | No. It could be prosecuted. |
| *Israel* | No. | Divert attention from similarity between Arabs and Jews to relieve Christian anti-Semitism against Jews. | Not likely if pilots die. | Terrorism of Irgun against British in 1940s and State terrorism against Palestinians. | No. | No. | Yes. |
| *Wall Street Companies destroying records* | Possibly, to destroy records of financial fraud and gain support for bailouts | Not evident. | Not alone. | Maybe with CIA and organized overseas. | Not applicable. | Possibly. | Yes. |

**Table 4**: Speculative Hierarchy of Suspects in World Trade Center Deaths in 2001, IF Evidence were not Sufficient to Implicate Bin Laden and Al-Qaeda: Prosecutorial Rules Compared to Public Critiques

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
| **Potential Likelihood of Involvement from High to Low** | **Prosecutorial Analysis Based on Motive, Means and Opportunity** | **Appearance in Public Media and Discussion** |
| *High Likelihood* | U.S. Military/ Security State | Bush Family, Cheney Family |
|  | - | U.S. Military Industries |
|  | - | U.S. Military/ Security State |
|  | Wall Street Companies Destroying Records | U.S. Oil Companies |
| *Low Likelihood But Possible or Aiding and Abetting Crime or Cover-Up* | Bush Family, Cheney Family | Wall Street Companies Destroying Records |
|  | U.S. Oil Companies | Israel |
|  | U.S. Military Industries | Saudi Arabia |
|  | Saudi Arabia | - |
| *Unlikely* | Israel | - |

**Discussion**

While all countries seek to describe their systems as unique and superior to those of outsiders, cultures follow similar principles. Even though the U.S. describes its political and legal systems as leading the world in “democracy” and accountability, the deep structure of political and legal culture that the two cases reveal are similar in many ways to that of other industrial empires, particularly the contemporary empires of the Russians (previously the Soviet Union and now the Russian Federation) and the Han Chinese. It may be that these cultures converge to a common form given the similar technologies of their military and industrial systems. Other aspects of U.S. political and legal culture show similarities to other cultures.

Table 5 presents a quick comparison of political deep structures of the U.S., as revealed in Tables 2 and 4, with the Russian Soviet Empire and the current Chinese Han empire, with information on Russia drawn from the author’s previous work (Lempert, 1993; 1995) and the rest from other sources (Granick, 1960; Meyer, 1965; Lane, 1988; Jowitt, 1992). Not only are the names of many of the political powers in the U.S. now seemingly parallel to those of the Soviet Union but so are some events. Although Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev, who sought to negotiate peaceful settlements with President Kennedy, lived out his natural life, he was removed by the Soviet military for not sufficiently supporting their militarist interests (Lempert, 1995). Note that none of the nominal political institutions in the three countries are shown on the table because their role is to coordinate the other loci of power that are shown: the President/Executive Branch and Congress in the U.S., the Communist Party (KPSS) and Politburo in the Soviet Union and the Communist Party Politburo and State Council in China essentially coordinate through political actors. One might view the avoidance of nuclear war in 1963, following the Kennedy assassination as a result of industrial interests seeking to restrain the military from less profitable or more destructive wars and to direct them instead to areas like Southeast Asia. While this map of deep structural power is similar to the analysis of the “power elite” (military, economic, and political interests) proposed by C. Wright Mills, (1956), it is also more detailed in that it identifies the range of institutions and economic interests found in industrial administrative states and includes organized crime as an economic elite.

Americans may fear the National Security State and may look in horror at its ability to prevent democracy and assassinate a President, or perhaps allow attacks on Americans (similarly, there may have been advanced warning of the 1941 Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, with some belief that the U.S. government allowed it to happen in order to trigger U.S. support for entering World War II) for potential scenarios that could destroy the world as we know it (through nuclear war). Nevertheless, they do not openly challenge or seek to control it (Lempert, 2010). Rather than move the U.S. towards addressing root causes of problems, democratization and peace, the choice has been invocation of “law” for “law and order”, control, and military solutions. Though the “Military Industrial Complex” is often blamed for unsettling events, the real deep structure in the U.S. and other industrial imperial states is much more complex and harder to identify because it is rooted throughout the culture. This “complex” has attachments to infrastructure industries (oil), organized crime, banking, and other institutions.

In addition to similarities of structure are similarities in methods. The use of assassination and “false flag” attacks in order to escalate animosities and/or to justify war is a universal phenomenon in foreign relations and can even be found prior to the founding of the U.S. under the country’s first President, George Washington, while he was in the British military (the “Jumanville Affair” of 1754 in which the British provoked an attack against the French and suborned the assassination of Joseph Coulon de Villiers de Jumanville). Two of the notable events of this phenomenon in U.S. history are the sinking of the U.S.S. Maine near Cuba in 1898, that the U.S. blamed on Spain as an apparent pretext for the Spanish American War, and the Gulf of Tonkin damage to U.S. ships near Vietnam in 1964, that was used as a pretext for unlimited military actions against the countries and people of Southeast Asia.

Nor is it unusual for justice systems, or the U.S. justice system, to blame crimes on innocent suspects in order to protect other deep structure interests. Blaming minorities to cover up crimes and convincing the public to support it is rooted in U.S. political culture and has been the theme of popular books and films (Lee, 1960). Not only in American culture but also in the other states, there is a tendency to create a dynamic between state control and individual freedom that works in the interests of the state. When freedom is needed for technological innovation, individualism is promoted, but it quickly becomes a means of targeting scapegoats when the State wishes to assert power and realign that power or make a greater demand for resources for an elite driven cause like war. The idea of individuals, even Presidents, being sacrificed for some national cause without remorse is also not something unusual to find in political cultures. What is interesting in viewing the Kennedy Assassination and the collapse of the World Trade Center Towers together is that they may represent the same phenomenon. If the alleged hijackers of the airplanes that hit the towers were on a suicide mission of a “Holy War”, so too do Americans seem to believe (though not state openly) that government officials involved in the Kennedy Assassination may also have been engaged in a different kind of crusade or Holy War (for business control over Cuba and the Second World) in which individuals like Oswald and Ruby may also have been expected to participate in suicide missions and/or sacrifices of American lives for the cause; dying for “country” and for “God”.

**Table 5**. Comparative Political Hierarchies of Modern Industrial Empires Based on Political Anthropological Analysis

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| ***Interpretive Ranked Institutional Power*** | ***United States*** | ***Former Soviet Russian Empire, late 20th Century*** | ***Chinese Han Empire, Peoples Republic of China, 21st Century*** |
| *High Institutional Power* | Military and Special Operations | Soviet Army | People’s Liberation Army |
|  | Central Intelligence Agency | KGB Unit 1 (PGU) | Ministry of State Security  |
|  | National Security Administration and “Homeland Security” | Committee for “State Security” (KGB) | Red Guards/ People’s Armed Police |
|  | Justice Department/ FBI | Ministry of Internal Affairs (NKVD) | Ministry of Public Security |
|  | Multi-National Resource Companies | State Plan and Industries (GosPlan) | National Development and Reform Commission/ State Planning; Major Resource Industries |
|  | Multi-National Finance Companies/Banks |  |  |
|  | Weapons Industries |  |  |
|  | Major Industries and Wealthy Families, Including Foreign | Industrial Leaders | Industrial Leaders |
|  | Organized Crime | Local Organized Crime | Local Powers and their Police Forces |
|  | Political Families |  |  |
|  | Local Police Forces |  |  |
|  | Paramilitary Vigilante Groups (Disappearing) |  |  |
| *Low Institutional Power* | Lone “Deranged” Gunman |  |  |

**Conclusion**

This analysis of the political and legal deep structure of U.S. culture confirms what is largely visible to outsiders looking at the U.S. since World War II and increasingly acknowledged within the U.S., itself. What the deep structure analysis suggests, is that the U.S. empire remains driven by, if not subservient to its military, with industrial interests now largely aligned with it rather than moderating it. There is little incentive in the system for peace and the level of militarism and violence appears to have ratcheted up continually following World War II, with the national security/military state co-dependent on those who oppose it.

The U.S. may have won World War II, but its political system is one of continuous war, with little incentive for sustainability or public involvement. As such, it has become quite similar to competing empires that have less pretense of being democracies. Little in this structure suggests that political movements in the U.S., even if supported by the President, could transition the culture towards peace, sustainability or democratization. The structure of control appears to be embedded, with even organized crime working to enforce it as one of a number of controlling processes at work (Nader, 1990, 2012).

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**Voices of Peace: The Rhetoric of Champions for Change**

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**Abstract**

President Barack Obama and former President Nelson Mandela are names that stand for leadership and change. They both accomplished enormous political feats as leaders of their respective countries at different times and in different spaces; yet there is one similarity that binds them even more directly-- they are recipients of the Nobel Peace Prize. Some may wonder what it is about their rhetoric that stirs the masses. What is it about their language that drives others to seek action once thought impossible and to participate in peaceful change? What is it in their oratory that was relevant to their winning such an acclaimed award? This paper analyzes the Nobel Peace Prize acceptance speeches of Barack Obama and Nelson Mandela, utilizing Lederach’s (2007) theory of peacebuilding to uncover the common rhetorical elements that may have led to their denotation as champions for peace.

**Introduction**

*Leaders are made, they are not born. They are made by hard effort, which is the price which all of us must pay to achieve any goal that is worthwhile.*

[Vince Lombardi](http://www.brainyquote.com/quotes/authors/v/vince_lombardi.html)

The epigraph above, by Vince Lombardi, addresses the constant sacrifice and hard work that propel people into leadership status, either purposefully or by default. Whether leaders are born can surely be left to debate. However, what is more certain are trait similarities found in those deemed to be great leaders. Those traits include analytical mental ability (Sternberg, 2007, Caruso et.al, 2013), certain personality characteristics (Bono & Judge, 2004), and emotional intelligence (Goleman, 2006; Caruso et al. 2013), to name a few. The leadership trait of emotional intelligence includes acceptance, emotional understanding, control and empathy (Baczynska & Rowinski, 2015). Other studies find that good leaders are inspirational, motivational, honest, innovative, and skilled at relationship building, problem-solving and effectively listening (Majid et. al, 2012; Baltodano, 2015; Skills You Need 2016).

Perhaps the trait that is most identifiable is that of a skilled communicator (Mumford et al, 2007; Beebe & Mottet, 2010; Wood, 2012; Lucas, 2015). Effective communication skills are essential to leading a group of people, a movement or a cause, regardless of context. Leaders can create shared understanding and use their words to motivate others. In fact, effective transformational leaders are deemed creative, interactive, empowering and passionate (Hackman & Johnson, 2013).

When thinking of current leaders who are great communicators, one figure who immediately comes to mind is President Barack Obama. President Obama is known for his charismatic speaking style, and his oratorical skills undoubtedly contributed to his historical achievement of becoming the first Black President of the United States. President Obama is not the only leader of a country whose communication ability helped him to achieve outstanding accomplishments. Nelson Mandela, the first democratically elected President of South Africa, and apartheid-ending hero was also skilled in his use of words to influence people. Mandela was a revolutionary leader, mesmerizing people with his speeches while fighting for human rights. The impactful nature of both Obama’s and Mandela’s communication styles raises questions about how they were able to use rhetoric to move nations to change. How did they use their voices to generate vision? What was it in their language that caused people to seek their leadership? What words did they choose that drove others to seek actions once thought impossible?

Both Obama and Mandela have been lauded as great visionaries who used empowering messages and passionate rhetoric in their quests for peace. While they have many things in common, there is one award for their stalwart efforts to achieve unity that binds them even more directly. They are both recipients of the Nobel Peace Prize. In examining Barack Obama and Nelson Mandela as Nobel Peace Prize recipients, it is essential to acknowledge their backgrounds, their experiences, their sufferings, and their calls to action, noting their differences, but certainly highlighting their similarities. Both were chosen by a people. Both were called to eradicate injustice. Both were men of African descent whose oratorical styles demonstrated power, emotion, and the ability to connect with others while rallying for justice. Both were leaders of countries that historically oppressed Black people. Both were leaders for peace. This study delves into the rhetoric of each of these leaders by examining their Nobel Peace Prize acceptance speeches. By conducting a rhetorical analysis, the researcher will uncover the concepts and language choices of these men that may foster a better understanding of the rhetoric of peace.

**Barack Obama**

In the most recent national political campaign season, the rhetoric of some candidates was anything but peaceful. In fact, at the time of this writing, the United States’ Republican Presidential nominee race had seen protests that included physical altercations and candidates’ support of name-calling and physical violence. The content of current political speech is a far cry from the inspirational rhetoric offered by President Barack Obama during his initial presidential campaign. Not long after his unprecedented election to the White House, President Obama was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize.

He was bestowed this honor for his “extraordinary efforts to strengthen international diplomacy and cooperation between peoples” (Nobel Prizes and Laureates, 2015, para. 1). The Norwegian Nobel Committee further stated the following about Obama’s award:

Dialogue and negotiations are preferred as instruments for resolving even the most difficult international conflicts. The vision of a world free from nuclear arms has powerfully stimulated disarmament and arms control negotiations. Thanks to Obama's initiative, the USA is now playing a more constructive role in meeting the great climatic challenges the world is confronting. Democracy and human rights are to be strengthened.

Only very rarely has a person to the same extent as Obama captured the world's attention and given its people hope for a better future. His diplomacy is founded in the concept that those who are to lead the world must do so on the basis of values and attitudes that are shared by the majority of the world's population. (2015, para. 2 & 3).

Hailed as eloquent and transforming, Obama “tends to emphasize rational persuasion as a means of motivating action” (Engbers & Fucilla, 2012, p. 1143). Examining his Nobel Peace Prize speech uncovers his intended rhetorical approach to peace and peace building.

**Nelson Mandela**

Nelson Mandela is widely known for his activism and leadership in South Africa. After spending 27 years in jail- the majority of that time on Robben Island, Mandela’s release sparked new efforts to change the climate of human rights in South Africa. On the day Mandela was freed from prison, he gave a remarkable speech that now reads like a preamble to his winning the Nobel Peace Prize. In it (Mandela, 2009) he reiterated his own words from his famous speech in 1964 where even then he was selflessly focused on leadership and change:

…The need to unite the people of our country is as important a task now as it has always been. No individual leader is able to take all this enormous task on his own. It is our task as leaders to place our views before our organization and to allow the democratic structures to decide the way forward.

…I have fought against white domination, and I have fought against black domination. I have cherished the ideal of a democratic and free society in which all persons live together in harmony and with equal opportunity. It is an ideal which I hope to live for and to achieve. But, if need be, it is an ideal for which I am prepared to die.

Just before his historical election, Mandela was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize, alongside President F.W. de Klerk. They were awarded the prize for “their work for the peaceful termination of the apartheid regime, and for laying the foundations for a new democratic South Africa” (Nobel Prizes and Laureates, 2016, para. 1).

**Peacebuilding**

The concept of peace to some is an idealized state of harmony. Peace is desirable, but can be difficult to achieve. This is evident through historical glances at wars and failed negotiations between varying countries, territories and cultures. The notion of peace is often even elusive in personal relationships. In response to this desire to live in harmony, there are those who actively seek peace and strategies to implement it. Over time, various scholars have studied and written about the rhetoric of peace and peacebuilding (Bostdorff & Ferris, 2014 Daley, 1999; Drinan, 1972; Felice, 2010; Galtung, 1988; Galtung, 2010; Keen, 1990; North, 2005; Reeves & May, 2013; Rhodes & Hlavacik, 2015; Terrill, 2011; Zeleny, 2009.) Leaders hypothesize about ways to destroy barriers and find common ground over which people can relate. Winners of the Nobel Peace Prize demonstrate that those who quest for peace on larger scales stem from different disciplines and different walks of life.

Men and women in various sectors have impacted the world’s views of peace. Martin Luther King, 1964 awardee and Desmond Tutu, 1984 awardee were both religious leaders. Political peace-makers such as Jimmy Carter (2002 recipient) and Yitzhak Rabin (1994 recipient) have been recognized for their efforts. Still others, who may be considered simple humanitarians with a sincere quest for a better world were awarded for advocating for a more peaceful existence and education for all. They include 2014 recipients Malala Yousafzai and Kailash Satyarthi, 2010 recipient Liu Xiaobo, 1980 recipient Adolfo Perez Esquivel, and 1931 awardee Jane Addams (Nobel Prizes and Laureates, 2016).

Others who advocate for peace may not have won the Nobel Peace Prize, but have still affected how others view co-existence by writing and sharing their theories (Galtung, 1988; Booth, 1990; Early, 1990; Bland, 2014; Shepherd, 2015; and Dutta et.al 2016). Included in this group of people who share their ideas on peace, is John Paul Lederach, Professor of International Peace Studies at Kroc Institute. A sociologist, Lederach has written numerous books on conflict, healing, and building peace. His publication co-authored by his daughter Angela, *When Bones and Blood Cry Out* (Lederach & Lederach, 2011), addresses “processes of healing and reconciliation in communities wrought by violence” (Hill, 2013, p. 270). Advocating the use of traditional methods of dialogue when striving for peace in different cultures, Lederach pushes for finding ways for those who have been involved in violent conflict to “engage more constructively” (Frykholm, 2009, p. 10).

Lederach, whose approach to peace is influenced by his spiritual formation in the Mennonite tradition (Frykholm, 2009) finds that listening is key to resolving conflicts. He bases the essence of peacebuilding on four criteria (Lederach, 2007): the capacity to imagine the web of relationships, the discipline to sustain curiosity, an eternal belief in the creative act (creativity and imagination), and the willingness to take a risk. According to Lederach, these four criteria are essential to peacebuilding. Together, these characteristics create what Lederach terms the moral imagination- defined as “the wellspring that is rooted in the challenges of the real world yet is capable of giving birth to that which does not yet exist” (2007, p.16). In examining these criteria, Lederach discusses how each principle works to defeat violence and how each offers new questions for the imagination that could lead to more artful realizations about achieving peace.

**Method**

Rhetorical analysis is a useful method for uncovering the goals and significance of a rhetorical act. It allows the investigator to find common themes, linguistic styles, symbol usage and other rhetorical choices made by rhetors. “Rhetorical analysis has the potential to address the problem of the elements and conditions of contemporary peace” (Cavin, 2006, p. 391). It is useful to find major themes in political rhetoric, and in this case, peace-creating rhetoric. Rhetorical analyses have been used to investigate both Obama’s speeches (Howard, 2011; Stewart, 2011) and Mandela’s rhetoric (Faflik, 2012; Dwivedi, 2015) in different contexts. Using this method to analyze Nobel Peace Prize acceptance speeches will help uncover whether language choices in these particular instances included the elements of peace as outlined by Lederach (2004), providing insight about the effectiveness of peace rhetoric.

Specifically, this study investigates Nelson Mandela’s Nobel Peace Prize Address on December 10, 1993 and Barack Obama’s Nobel Peace Prize Acceptance Speech on December 10, 2009. In doing so, this study will determine if the speeches, given exactly sixteen years apart, represent the following criteria of peacebuilding as asserted by Lederach (2007):

1. The capacity to imagine the web of relationships
2. The discipline to sustain curiosity
3. An eternal belief in the creative act (creativity and imagination)
4. The willingness to take a risk

Because speech acts “become effective means of violence prevention…” (Cavin, 2006, p. 390), the use of this method should answer questions about the goals of the selected speeches and highlight the unique rhetoric of Obama and Mandela as seekers of peace.

**Analysis**

**Relationships**

One of the first essential elements of peacebuilding is “the capacity to imagine the web of relationships…the capacity of the individuals and communities to imagine themselves in a web of relationship even with their enemies” (Lederach, 2007, p.16). The idea that relationships can create change emerges from this principle.

In Mandela’s address, the capacity to imagine relationships between those who were in conflict was evident as a goal and as something that was occurring as South Africa was on the brink of ending apartheid. Mandela speaks in inclusive terms, often using words like ‘our’ and ‘shared’ to indicate relationship with and between others. The following excerpt illustrates the focus on relationships:

The value of our shared reward will and must be measured by the joyful peace which will triumph, because the common humanity that bonds both black and white into one human race, will have said to each one of us that we shall all live like the children of paradise. (Mandela, 1993, para. 21)

Mandela’s language choice demonstrates a deliberate attempt to unite people. He indicates how the benefits of relationships can be mutual. He proposes the idea that when people work together they can live in harmony together. They can have joy and peace together.

Mandela often refers to people as one collective body, pointing out commonalities and the joyful peace that can exist. At times, he specifically references other groups, demonstrating the importance of relationship, even with those in opposition: “…we appeal to those who govern Burma that they release our fellow Nobel Peace Prize Laureate, Aung San Suu Kyi…” (Mandela, 1993, para. 25). Lastly, as it pertains to this element of peacebuilding, Mandela mentions then president of South Africa, F.W. de Klerk, with whom he shared the award, allowing the world to see how relationship development is important to peacebuilding.

Obama spends little time speaking of specific relationships as they pertain to peacebuilding. He does, however, directly mention his foreign policy work and refers to his work with then Russian President Dmitry Medvedev (Obama, 2009). Later in the speech, Obama makes the following statement which alludes to the idea of the importance of relationships with others: “Agreements among nations. Strong institutions. Support for human rights. Investments in development. All of these are ingredients in bringing about the evolution that President Kennedy spoke about.” (Obama, 2009, para. 46). Obama’s word support the importance of having good working relationships with others, indicating the significance in finding the commonalities amongst differences. Leaders from different countries or regions of the globe will differ in many things including tradition, socialization and religion; however, peace building requires discovering ways to nourish relationships even in the midst of differing philosophies.

As President Obama accepts an award rooted in peace, he must also justify his decisions about American involvement in foreign wars (Felice, 2010). This type of dichotomy influences perceptions about war and peace and alludes to the complex nature of relationships and diplomacy. According to Lederach (2007), the fundamental truth revealed here is that “who we have been, are and will be emerges and shapes itself in a context of relational interdependency” (p. 16).

**Curiosity**

The second criterion posited by Lederach (2007) requires the sustaining of curiosity:

…a kind of imagination that lives in the untamed and mostly unexplored geographies of human interaction that lies beyond forced dualisms and polarization. Curiosity suggests attentiveness and continuous inquiry about things and their meaning… (p. 17).

Building peace requires posing questions. Inquiry must be careful and focused. The language used to constructively unearth curiosity becomes important in finding understanding where it was previously unknown. The rhetoric in peace building involves the effective use of language by individuals whose motives may differ from those in authority (Drinan, 1972). Leaders seeking to build peace must embrace pointed curiosity that incites the imagination (Lederach, 2007) and seeks novel answers to difficult questions.

Mandela did not have much in his rhetoric that highlighted the necessity of curiosity, but he did speak with language that could be interpreted as a call for people to remain curious and have faith that curiosity will keep peacebuilding and harmonious co-existence moving forward. Mandela remarked, “It remains our hope that these, too, will be blessed with sufficient reason to realize that history will not be denied and that the new society cannot be created by reproducing the repugnant past.” (1993, para. 31). Mandela uses his words to urge people not to repeat past atrocities. Rather, he encourages them to explore the creation of new truths.

While Obama alludes to finding ways to continue on the quest for peace, even considering the current state of the world, he does not explicitly call for the sustaining of curiosity. Toward the end of the speech he does encourage listeners to “still reach for those ideals” (Obama, 2009, para. 51) that will make the world a better place. Indirectly, he is calling for people to continue to explore possibilities of peace, even if they do not live in a perfect world. Obama asks that people maintain hope and not relinquish their efforts to create a better community. He seeks to rally their spirits toward building peace and harmony.

**Creativity**

The third essential element of peacebuilding hinges on creativity and imagination. “Peacebuilding requires an eternal belief in the creative act, the building and coaxing of imagination itself” (Lederach, 2007, p. 18).

As for creativity and imagination, Mandela seems clear that new ideas are valued and changes are imminent. When speaking of his homeland, Mandela states “We live with the hope that as she battles to remake herself, South Africa will be like a microcosm of the new world that is striving to be born” (1993, para. 32). Lederach explains this element as the artist giving birth to something new. Mandela sees his impending new country with that same creative expectation:

The processes in which South Africa and Southern Africa as a whole are engaged, beckon and urge us all that we take this tide at the flood and make of this region a living example of what all people of conscience would like the world to be… (para. 34)

…Let it never be said by future generations that indifference, cynicism or selfishness made us fail to live up to the ideals of humanism which the Nobel Peace Prize encapsulates. (1993, para. 37)

Mandela seems to imply that ideas should be shared and that ideals should be given their proper attention. He tells his audience that they have a responsibility to move beyond doubt and passivity. Active imagination and a willingness to share new ideas are tools to help bring the world together.

When Obama lists his three ways to build a just and lasting peace, he does mention the moral imagination. Thus, this third element of peacebuilding is the most prevalent of the four that Lederach presents. Obama remarks that those who want peace must “develop alternatives to violence that are tough enough to change behavior…” (2009, para. 32). He furthers this idea by stating:

And yet, I do not believe that we will have the will, or the staying power, to complete this work without something more and that is the continued expansion of our moral imagination, an insistence that there is something irreducible that we all share. (Obama, 2009, para. 46).

Earlier in the speech, Obama speaks about meeting the challenges of war by “thinking in new ways about the notions of just war and the imperatives of a just peace” (Obama, 2009, para. 13). Here, he is calling on his audience to be creative and to expand their imaginations to think beyond what they already know. Obama is challenging listeners to participate in original thinking. In both speeches, both Obama and Mandela find themselves in situations that call for new attitudes and new actions. In order to move closer to the seemingly elusive concept of peace, people must be willing to change. Both orators invite their audiences to promote and participate in such change. They try to share their understanding that achieving peace requires innovation and creativity. Lederach (2007) notes that in the peacebuilding process, creativity requires “that we think about how we *know* the world, how we *are* in the world, and most importantly, what in the world is possible” (p. 18). It requires reaching beyond barriers to access new thoughts and plausible actions.

**Risk**

The fourth and final essential criterion for peacebuilding involves taking risks. “Risk is to step into the unknown without any guarantee of success or even safety” (Lederach, 2007, p. 18). Taking risks usually involves a certain amount of courage to explore the unknown. In the quest for peace, peace is often obscure, and therefore involves purposeful risk into unchartered territory. Peacebuilding requires a sacrifice of comfort and certainty.

Mandela refers to risk several times throughout his address. It rings out in the characterizations of those mentioned who fought against apartheid. Mandela references human beings that had “the nobility of spirit to stand in the path of tyranny and injustice, without seeking selfish gain” (1993, para. 8). He implies Lederach’s peacebuilding risks when he says an “invaluable gift is in the preparation, for those who suffered in the name of all humanity when they sacrificed everything -- for liberty, peace, human dignity and human fulfilment” (1993, para. 13).

When Mandela takes an opportunity to pay tribute to his fellow awardee, he mentions de Klerk’s risk-taking:

He had the courage to admit that a terrible wrong had been done to our country and people through the imposition of the system of apartheid.

He had the foresight to understand and accept that all the people of South Africa must, through negotiations and as equal participants in the process, together determine what they want to make of their future. (Mandela, 1993, para. 28 & 29)

Mandela’s words point to the notion that sometimes the risks of attaining peace involves venturing “into lands that are not controlled or chartered” (Lederach, 2007, p. 18).

In one portion of Obama’s address, he suggests that people have to move beyond their comfort zones to achieve peace. This interpretation can mean that achieving peace requires Lederach’s fourth criterion, the willingness to take a risk: “The belief that peace is desirable is rarely enough to achieve it. Peace requires responsibility. Peace entails sacrifice” (Obama, 2009, para. 28). Later, as he brings his speech to a close, Obama offers words of hope by giving examples of those who take risks:

Somewhere today, in the here and now, a soldier sees he’s outgunned but stands firm to keep the peace. Somewhere today, in this world, a young protestor awaits the brutality of her government, but has the courage to march on. Somewhere today, a mother facing punishing poverty still takes the time to teach her child, who believes that a cruel world still has a place for his dreams. (2009, para. 54).

Overall, Obama’s Nobel Peace Prize acceptance speech does not include a strong presence of the elements of peacebuilding as outlined by Lederach. Obama briefly incorporates the four criteria, but mostly on a superficial level without any specificity. Perhaps this is due, in part, to his position as Commander-in Chief of a country that was involved in conflict. It is conceivable that his lack of peacebuilding language reflected the fact that it was an acceptance speech as opposed to some sort of political rally. Whatever the reasons, Obama’s rhetoric differed from Mandela’s address.

The differences between the rhetoric of Obama and Mandela may stem from several factors. First, at the time Obama received his award, ironically, America was at war. Obama cannot overlook the inconsistency of the perceived requirements of a Nobel Peace Prize winner, as he, the leader of the United States Armed Forces, had admittedly sent American soldiers into battle:

But perhaps the most profound issue surrounding my receipt of this prize is the fact that I am the Commander-in-Chief of a nation in the midst of two wars….Still, we are at war, and I am responsible for the deployment of thousands of young Americans to battle in a distant land. Some will kill. Some will be killed. And so I come here with an acute sense of the cost of armed conflict filled with difficult questions about the relationship between war and peace, and our effort to replace one with the other. (2009, para. 4 & 5)

Second, Obama’s rhetoric stems from his position as the leader of arguably the most powerful nation in the world. At times, he almost seems to be moving away from the peacebuilding factors:

We must begin by acknowledging the hard truth that we will not eradicate violent conflict in our lifetimes…To say that force is sometimes necessary is not a call to cynicism, it is a recognition of history, the imperfections of man and the limits of reason. (2009, para. 14).

Obama acknowledges that war is a part of history and gives credence to the idea that sometimes change results from conflict and its aftermath. While he advocates peace as a goal, he also recognizes that, at times, conflict is needed to pursue ideals of freedom and justice. His message symbolizes the dichotomy of war and peace and differentiates between the goals of peace and the realities of life.

Much of Mandela’s address, on the other hand, carried a celebratory tone, not just for having been awarded the Nobel Peace Prize, but for what the prize represented in terms of the impending changes that South Africa was awaiting: “…we can, today, even set the dates when all humanity will join together to celebrate one of the outstanding human victories of our century. When that moment comes, we shall, together, rejoice in a common victory…” (Mandela, 1993, para. 9). The end of apartheid was in preparations and South Africa was enjoying a new hope and energy for a different existence.

**Other Characterizations**

A close look at Obama’s and Mandela’s acceptance speeches from a rhetorical standpoint, reveal other elements that explain the general popularity of their oratory. Stylistically, Obama makes use of repetition. Hailed as a great orator, Obama uses certain devices to make his speeches come alive. For example, in the passage mentioned earlier regarding risks, Obama repeats the beginning of three consecutive sentences (“Somewhere today...”), choosing to create a tempo that vitalizes the content. Additionally, he incorporates quotations by other noted great speakers such as John F. Kennedy.

Mandela’s speech is full of vivid imagery. His language choices allow the audience to visualize exactly what he references. The following passage demonstrates his powerful use of language:

The children must, at last, play in the open veld, no longer tortured by the pangs of hunger or ravaged by disease or threatened with the scourge of ignorance, molestation and abuse, and no longer required to engage in deeds whose gravity exceeds the demands of their tender years. (Mandela, 1993, para. 15)

Mandela also utilizes parallelism and rhythm when he states “We speak here of the challenge of the dichotomies of war and peace, violence and non-violence, racism and human dignity, oppression and repression and liberty and human rights…” (Mandela, 1993, para. 5). Again these stylistic choices invigorate their rhetoric and contribute to the success of their speeches. An interesting word comparison, Mandela used the word ‘peace’ sixteen times in his address. Obama spoke ‘peace’ exactly twice as much- 32 times, which is ironic based on the state of conflict in which Obama was engulfed at that time. Finally, in their acceptances speeches, Obama and Mandela, both specifically mentioning Martin Luther King Jr., honor and respect past Nobel laureates. King and his rhetoric became a national and international symbol of peace, particularly by using nonviolent means to seek human and civil rights. His actions and oratory undoubtedly influenced both Obama and Mandela and likely contributed to their ideas about peacebuilding.

**Conclusion**

Nelson Mandela and Barack Obama have been monumental advocates for peace and thus were both awarded the Nobel Peace Prize. Although their prizes were awarded in different decades, many similarities exist. They both confronted issues of freedom and justice. They both advocated for people—often for people born into a land where they sought to co-exist in harmony—to simply be treated like human beings. They both have led masses of people to seek change by means of peace.

Obama’s and Mandela’s acceptance speeches were noticeably different, but their views on peace encourage others to look beyond an elusive ideal. Their rhetoric urges people to take inventory of their own and others’ lives and strive to fully yield to the commonalities that can lead to harmonious existence. While Obama’s speech may not have contained Lederach’s four criteria of peacebuilding as readily as Mandela’s speech, Obama did address peace by utilizing a more practical and contemporary approach. Additionally, this analysis is limited to using the criteria as outlined by Lederach. His approach only considers four components to peace building, and other components not found in this analysis may exist. As a qualitative study, this analysis provides an application of Lederach’s theory and uncovers the peacebuilding strategies in the Nobel Peace Prize acceptance speeches of Barack Obama and Nelson Mandela.

Mandela presented his speech in a more positive and optimistic tone, leaning on the hope of a new South Africa; whereas Obama dealt more straightforwardly with the realistic and imminent issues of war. Although Obama received his prize amidst a time of war and strife, he managed to strike a chord with those that would honor peacebuilding. Mandela may not have uttered the actual word ‘peace’ as much in his acceptance speech as Obama, but he worked tirelessly toward it. Obama, too, used his position to foster peace building around the globe. Both Nobel Peace Laureates continue to be hailed and remembered as visionaries and champions for change.

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**The Resistance to Drone Strikes: CODEPINK’s Use of Alternative Media to Promote a Social Movement of Protest**

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**Keywords**: Drone Strikes; Social Movements; Alternative Media; Narrative

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**Abstract**

This paper examined drone strikes by the Obama administration and the counter narrative from the alternative media produced by the social movement CODEPINK. First, I examined different situations where CODEPINK made their voices heard against political power. Next, CODEPINK produced a counter narrative to U.S. foreign policy on the issue of drone strikes. After that, I established some information about drone strikes as a public policy issue. Then, I used definitions of alternative media from Atkinson (2005; 2010) and Atton (1999; 2002) to establish how CODEPINK uses alternative media to establish its public peace perspective. In the paper, I outlined my method for the study. I also laid out the results of my study. Finally, I added some implications for future research. This paper fused social movement theory with previous research about alternative media and applied this fusion to the contemporary political issue of drone strikes.

**Introduction**

On May 22, 2013, President Obama shared with the world, for the first time, some of the reasons for the drone strike campaign that has flourished during his presidency. Obama shared both his reasons and concerns for the policy choices, while leaving significant details out of the speech. This protocol did not sit well with one longtime activist. Medea Benjamin, co-founder and longtime activist member of peace and justice group CODEPINK, interrupted the president to question some of the policy choices he may have glossed over during the speech. Benjamin questioned the president on the GITMO hunger strike prisoners and his failure to address the death of 16-year-old Abdulrahman al-Awlaki (Queally, 2013). After this event occurred, a new lawsuit introduced by the family of Abdulrahman al-Awlaki, which the presiding judge over the case questions the role of the judicial system that has no power to reign in the executive branch decisions which involve drone strikes as targeted assassinations of American citizens (Doyle, 2013). During this brief outburst, Obama, while not agreeing with Benjamin, did acknowledge the importance of her voice to be heard (Queally, 2013). In a politically controlled environment during a speech by the President of the U.S., Benjamin had managed to bring up some key points about national security often time left out of the larger political discussion.

By performing this specific democratic action, Benjamin, and the group she represented, CODEPINK, jumped to the foreground of peace organizations in the U.S. that offered an alternative to the Obama administration’s narrative about the impact of the drone campaigns. Benjamin later wrote a (2012) book titled*Drone Warfare Killing by Remote Control,* one of the first books from a U.S. author that examined the political legitimacy and humanitarian impact that the drone strikes had on other regions of the world. Benjamin and CODEPINK also hosted a conference titled *Drone Summit: Killing and Spying by Remote Control,* a conference that brought together academics, journalists and peace activists to discuss not only the current drone strikes but also the future work for advocacy against the growth of this type of military operation (International Drone Summit, 2012). Through this type of work, Benjamin and CODEPINK made a specific name for themselves as one of the U.S. leading organizations against militarism during the Obama administration. The Obama administration wanted to conduct drone strikes throughout the world as a tactic of foreign policy to help contain the threat of terrorism. CODEPINK wanted more accountability from the Obama administration about this program, including the number of civilians killed and specific and timely threats posed by these people targeted by drone strikes.

In this article, I focused on the organization CODEPINK. I outlined my article by breaking down what CODEPINK is and what types of campaigns the organization has focused on in the past and continues to rally behind in the present. Next, I examined social movement theory and peace organizations. Then, I examined drone strikes and their importance in U.S. foreign policy. After that, I examined alternative media and detail how CODEPINK produces information and what that information states. When done, I outlined how I conducted the study and the importance of the methodology of narrative when understanding how CODEPINK shares its information with the public and how it constructs this narrative on a structural level. I detailed how CODEPINK used alternative media in relation to the issue of drone strikes and that reflected about the importance of narrative as a device to connect complex information in palatable way with the public. Finally, I concluded by engaging in a discussion of where to move research dealing with CODEPINK in the future.

**Literature Review**

**CODEPINK**

Previous research on CODEPINK has focused on how they intersect with other feminist groups and how they have addressed issues of militarism through their rhetoric and action. Kutz-Flamenbaum (2015) examined the feminist groups NOW and CODEPINK and their relationship to resistance of the burgeoning Iraq War in the early 2000s. CODEPINK acted in congress with NOW to help establish a connection to the larger issues of the war in Iraq. CODEPINK focused on action and the relationship of that action to the individual, distancing itself from NOW’s more rhetorical lens of rights specifically connected to women, specifically reproductive rights (Kutz-Flamenbaum, 2015). Managhan (2011) showed how CODEPINK supported Cindy Sheehan in her quest to end the Iraq War, a clear reflection of its mission. Simone (2010) advanced the importance of social movement groups to use new media technologies to both advocate for their position but also to connect with the public in new and creative ways. CODEPINK’s main unifying factor in connecting their diverse membership focused on their website to share information and send out new alerts to their membership, regardless of their physical location (Simone, 2010). For this and other reasons outlined in the alternative media section, I focused this study on the promulgation of information from the CODEPINK website.

CODEPINK emphasized a specific agenda that puts women at the center of society. CODEPINK, however, did let a specifically feminist approach completely define their entire organization. CODEPINK advocated against the banking industry, the Israeli Occupation in Pakistan, the use of U.S. defense dollars abroad and advocated for Occupy Wall Street. CODEPINK outlined its philosophy in 2015:

CODEPINK is a women-initiated grassroots peace and social justice movement working to end U.S. funded wars and occupations, to challenge militarism globally, and to redirect our resources into health care, education, green jobs and other life-affirming activities. CODEPINK is not exclusively women — we invite men to join us — -but we are particularly eager to see mothers, grandmothers, sisters, and daughters, female workers, students, teachers, healers, artists, writers, singers, poets and all outraged woman rise up and oppose the global militarism (What is CODEPINK, 2015, para 1-4).

Based on this information, CODEPINK outlined specifically who it is and why. The fact that the group emphasized the contributions of women does not mean it is ostracizing or distancing themselves from men. However, it was an important choice by the organization to detail specifically that women led activism spurs the growth of this organization. CODEPINK also places a great emphasis on anti-war and anti-militarism work. This rhetoric defined the group as much as its prioritization of women. While certain feminist groups may not emphasize a resistance to militarism, CODEPINK made it clear what tyranny they fight against and what social programs would benefit from a reimagination of government resources.

This approach to a radical interpretation of human rights differed from other human rights organizations. Amnesty International (AI) exists as a human rights organization that remains committed to human rights regardless of nation, wealth, and race or gender background. Amnesty has over 7 million people throughout the world committed to its ideals of human rights for all and does not endorse a political ideology or religion (Who We Are, 2015). When comparing these organizations, CODEPINK takes a definitive political ideology to challenging militarism directly while Amnesty International distances itself from these outward political statements. CODEPINK has an agenda to challenge dominant structures, while Amnesty International focused more on awareness of human rights violations.

In addition to its commitment to a woman first, anti-war philosophy, CODEPINK also detailed and privileged its origin story. A very specific event led to the formation and philosophy of CODEPINK as an organization.

Medea Benjamin, Jodie Evans, Diane Wilson, Starhawk and about 100 other women kicked off CODEPINK on November 17, 2002. We set up for a 4-month all-day vigil in front of the White House during the cold of winter. The vigil inspired people from all occupations, and from all over the country, to stand for peace. Many organizations joined us, including Global Exchange, Greenpeace, WILPF, WAND, and Public Citizen, NOW, Women for Women International and Neighbors for Peace and Justice. The vigil culminated on March 8, International Women's Day, when we celebrated women as global peacemakers with a week of activities, rallies and a march to encircle the White House in pink. Over 10,000 people participated, and police arrested a group of 25 women, including Alice Walker, Maxine Hong Kingston, Susan Griffin, Starhawk, Jodie Evans and Medea Benjamin for taking our peaceful protest right up to the White House gate. CODEPINK thus emerged out of a deep desire by a group of American women to stop the U.S. from invading Iraq. The name CODEPINK plays on the former Bush Administration's color-coded homeland security alerts — yellow, orange, red — that signaled terrorist threats. While Bush's color-coded alerts were based on fear and were used to justify violence, the CODEPINK alert is a feisty call for people to "wage peace". (What is CODEPINK, 2015, para 5-8)

While many organizations acknowledge the WTO meetings in Seattle in 1999, other organizations promulgated the beginning of the Iraq War as the pivotal point that galvanized a group of people to take action. For CODEPINK, the Iraq War clearly acted as the impetus for beginning a worldwide struggle for peace. From its conception, CODEPINK also understood that this particular organization would take its leadership from women, not only its philosophic approach. In other words, CODEPINK’s mission fused fiery anti-war rhetoric and nonviolent direct action.

The very first protests came from women and grew to other social justice groups based on the commitment of these women. The group also mocked the Bush Administration’s color-coded terrorist threats and took its name as a way to “color” their own resistance. With the Iraq War “ending” and the Obama administration’s drone strikes beginning, CODEPINK continued without wavering on its commitment to peace based on Benjamin’s public interruptions and continued travel to war torn areas such as Yemen. This change in focus showed that the group does not have a specifically partisan political aim toward a particular political party. The commitment to end U.S. militarism allowed CODEPINK to speak strongly against both parties who embrace militarism instead of social welfare.

**Social Movement Theory and Peace Movements**

One definition of social movements stated that social movements are “a set of opinions and beliefs in a population which represents preferences for changing some elements of the social structure and or reward distribution of a society” (Burstein, 1999, p.7). Many researchers defined social movements as reflecting the ideas of a specific social group. McClurg Mueller defined social movements by the process of mobilizing resources to produce a desired social effect (McClurg Mueller, 1992). This definition showed that some groups minimize the ideological concerns of the group to produce a logical or rational result. Tarrow (1998) limited social movements to “sequences of contentious politics that are based on underlying social networks and resonant collective action frames, and which develop the capacity to maintain sustained challenges against powerful opponents” (p.2). From this example, social movements acted as an alternative to the dominant narrative.

While grass roots democracy building helped specific social movements achieve their goals, other key factors played a role in determining the tactics that social movement groups used. Some social movements depended upon a specific historical event to create a significant impact on the culture and society they intended to change (Tarrow, 1998). Other social movement groups, such as The Catholic Worker, advocated a less direct cause and effect relationships between social movements and change. Some current social movements, such as Black Lives Matter, fight for an increase in public discourse about an issue, which can provide a “voice” in the debate on the public policy of an issue (Klandermans, 1992). Others, such as Occupy Wall Street, started social activism based on one issue and extended the social movement to other issues.

Using one historical example, some social movement actors who participated in the peace movement during the Vietnam War provided a platform for not only the new left of student movement activists but also other activists involved with the peace movement (Klandermans, 1992). While some organizations worked in traditional means of legislative action, most of the primary factors involved within this particular social movement worked on the perimeter of the power structure, attempting to provide a voice from outside the governmental structure (Lynd, 1997). This provided the chance for a social movement to branch out from working with traditional power structures to create an alternative social movement working from the perimeter of power to speak out for social change. The example of peace movement groups during the Vietnam War illustrated how some social movements broadened the discourse by focusing on diverse issues from outside the elite power structure.

**Drone Strikes**

The first drone strike took place in 2002 in Yemen (Thompson & Ghosh, 2009). Drones not only provided strikes but also video surveillance technology. When the military engaged in a strike, it did so after determining behavior from the thousands of hours of video surveillance that a drone provided. Drone strikes began under the presidency of George W. Bush, who used nine drone strikes in Pakistan from 2004 to 2007 and 33 drone strikes in Pakistan in 2008 (Bergman & Tiedman, 2010).

Drone strikes became a significant part of the war on Al-Qaeda utilized by the Obama presidency. In 2010, the Obama administration used 117 signature strikes in Pakistan in an effort to curb the Al-Qaeda presence (Miller, Nakashema & De Young, 2013). President Obama extended the policy to include Yemen and Somalia. For example, in November 2011, a Hellfire missile fired from a U.S. drone killed 16-year-old Tariq Aziz and his 12-year-old cousin Waheed Khan. Earlier in the same week, Aziz appeared at a public meeting condemning the drone strikes with several western reporters. While two U.S. lawyers at the meeting stated the U.S. does support the idea of a person being innocent until proven guilty, the officials did not levy any charges against Aziz when they had a chance, nor did they give any explanation after Aziz’s death (Chatterjee, 2011). One key reason that established the credibility of using drone strikes involved the precision of the instrument of war. While previous U.S. wars involved heavy amounts of bombing in both WWII and in Vietnam, the drone strikes minimized the impact of civilian casualties that accompanied previous U.S. bombing efforts throughout the world.

The *New York Times* and other U.S. media outlets adopted specific policy and linguistic choices established by the Obama administration without critical questioning or inquiry. These decisions by media outlets caused some critics to question the role of the media in covering this issue (Friedersdorf, 2008; Greenwald, 2008). The policy choices made by the Obama administration in relation to the drone strikes have largely been viewed as something that may not in fact be legal under international law and caused some members of the Obama administration to refer to the drone strike policy as a “cowboy mentality”, (Woods, 2008). These examples illustrated how the U.S. mainstream media has neglected to question the legality and political wisdom of a foreign policy decision by the Obama administration.

When I examined how media and power functioned on the reporting of drones by the mainstream media, a few key points stood out. First, large portions of the in depth reporting about the drone strikes came from media outlets outside of the U.S. From *The Guardian* in England, to the global website *The Global Post,* to the reports from the people of Pakistan and transmitted through the *Al-Jazeera* website, the global media, much more so than the U.S. media, stood at the forefront of the reporting on this issue. These media sources gave voice to U.S. critics including constitutional lawyer and journalist Glenn Greenwald and other U.S.

scholars (Greenwald, 2008).

**Alternative Media**

Scholars examined alternative media from a variety of perspectives. For the purposes of this article, I focused on different definition of alternative media studies in communication and attempted to understand how the theoretical framework provided a basis for CODEPINK as an organization. Atkinson (2005), defined alternative media as “any media that are produced by non-commercial sources and attempt to transform existing social roles and routines by critiquing and challenging power structures,” (p.78). Atkinson (2010) defined alternative media by having one of three characteristics: 1. Alternative content, 2. Interpretative Strategies of Audience and/or three. Alternative Production (p.22). Based on these definitions, people used alternative media to look at corporate power, how audiences discussed amongst themselves alternative content and content that comes from these other sources of media production (Atkinson, 2005; Atkinson, 2010). Alternative media functioned as a milieu to study the practices of those who engaged in the information from alternative media and how that engagement might change their perspective on dominant cultural and political issues.

Using Atkinson’s definition of alternative media, the content and the production of that information came from sources outside the mainstream or corporate dominated media. Downey and Fenton (2003) looked at alternative media and examined the aspects of social change could come from alternative media. Alternative media moved the discussion away from theory and instead embraced the work of social movement group actors (Downey & Fenton, 2003). Alternative media became a mouthpiece of communication that encouraged voices to emerge that traditionally existed outside the traditional communication process (Frey, 1998).

Kenix (2011) saw an opportunity for democracy with alternative media on both a local and national level. The location of information changed during the last generation, allowing new forms of technology to shape and change how people understood issues that alternative media promulgates to the public. “Alternative media describes a vehicle that cannot be labeled as traditional,” (Blakeman, 2011, p.4). Alternative media also had the freedom to explore a more creative relationship with its audience, which may explain the closer interpersonal reciprocity with the sender and receiver of alternative media content. This relationship encouraged a greater interactivity between audience and producer (Blakeman, 2011).

This connection showed activists a way to both use alternative media and help those same activists shape its content. Atkinson (2010) examined how groups who used alternative media as a lifeline for connection to other groups established ideological perspectives, and also investigated how these groups engaged with social issues based on those ideologies. Activists fit into four different categories: radical participatory, reformist participatory, reformist lay and radical lay (Atkinson, 2010). Radical participatory engaged in direct action risks arrest. Reformist participatory engaged in marches and protests without direct action that leads to arrest. Reformist lay used the existing political system to advocate for social change. Radical lay attempted to establish alternative political leaders and legal action to engage in social change. Activists engaged with the community in different ways and used different methods at least partially affected by how they engaged with alternative media (Atkinson, 2010).

Atton (2002) broke down alternative media by different standards. First, alternative media content had to have a radical aspect. Second, alternative media used innovative concepts of aesthetics. For this reason, alternative media needed not be a traditionally produced media source, but instead a unique collaboration of audio, video, poems and prose. Third, alternative media looked for advancements in technology and media innovations. Fourth, alternative media needed to embrace an imaginative distribution angle. For some types of alternative media, this could mean flyers handed out at a popular social landmark, or a twitter blast to one’s followers. Fifth, alternative media wanted to establish a less rigid hierarchy in the transmission of its media product. The media based social roles that differentiate editors and writers needs to be broken down. Finally, alternative media involved transforming the communicative process by establishing a less traditional power structure and emphasized networks that worked on the advancement of a people based society. These steps showed how alternative media had provided a variety of social movement groups with a method to connect to their audience in new and creative ways, challenging the dominant power structure in society. This creative approach laid the foundation for contemporary social movement groups, such as CODEPINK.

**Method**

**Narrative**

 I used a narrative framework to study the content from CODEPINK about drone strikes for this study. I established my narrative framework through a unit of analysis of entering the search terms “drone strikes” into the CODEPINK website. I found examples that included press releases, news stories and editorials from CODEPINK activists. I examined each press release, news story and editorial for this study in detail. I chose the entire time from January 2009 (to incorporate the first term of the Obama presidency) to December 2013 to include the first public words from President Obama about drone strikes. In the five-year period of this study, CODEPINK produced over 40 media production examples about drone strikes. I used five categories to determine the narrative from these textual examples: characters, setting, focus, tone and action. Through these five categories, I constructed a narrative about how CODEPINK used its platform as an alternative media source to produce a critique of the Obama administration’s drone strike policy.

Fisher (1984) saw narrative as another way to learn information from text. The difference, Fisher argued, came from the way to organize the text. Fisher advocated that stories allow the best way to share information with others. The best stories were the ones told not by experts, but by people, who act as educators and facilitators of knowledge through a humane channel. The best storytellers conveyed technical knowledge in a way that made it palatable to an audience, who then judged the merits of the story against other stories.

 Fisher (1984) saw context through the experience of storytelling. Narrative gave order to how people experienced situations in their lives, and that practice became part of a commonality that united people together. These social practices became a historical tradition that attempts to provide a connection to a larger human experience. Fisher used the idea of narrative but called it a “narrative paradigm” that helped construct a social and public meaning. This type of narrative approach allowed reasoning to evolve from all forms of symbolic action, including text. This symbolic action had meaning for those who interpret text.

McGee (1980) offered a heuristic shortcut that many narrative critics used to help understand text and context through the path of ideology and myth. McGee stated that ideographs develop from political language, a kind of vocabulary that established the understanding of public motives. This vocabulary functioned to control the concept of power and reality. The state used a discourse of control to help establish these power relations and help the ideograph to guide political decisions, such as a discourse of war. These ideographs functioned in discourse to establish a political consciousness on a social level. A social history developed from the ideograph, leaving little chance for a critical examination of how these ideographs function in contemporary society.

Narrative ideology allowed the social meaning to develop from any given context, and society influences that ideology by specific cultural standards. Others shared the common language and values espoused by socially credible actors to establish norms and produce social knowledge (Fisher, 1984). This production of knowledge provided an opportunity for scholars to find meaning in specific stories and produce new insights and ideas.

**Results**

In this section, I stated my results of researching the information produced by CODEPINK on its website on the issue of drone strikes through the unit of analysis of a narrative framework. I used this narrative framework to establish a narrative critique of the Obama Administration’s drone strike policy that CODEPINK intended to share with its audience. I concluded by explaining an overall summation of my findings.

On the issue of drone strikes, as illustrated in the introduction, CODEPINK had a contentious relationship with the Obama administration. CODEPINK, as the central character in this narrative, intended to shame the Obama Administration into explaining its action on the issue of drone strike. By offering up strong rhetoric against the Obama Administration’s policy on drone strikes, CODEPINK wanted to makes its position clear as an alternative media organization that disagrees with the Obama Administration. This tactic allowed for insight into how the Obama Administration has examined the drone strike policy that has proliferated under its time in leadership. This editorial column appeared on the CODEPINK website in the days following Obama’s speech about drone strikes to the world in May 2013.

As President Obama, hosts a press conference at the National Defense University CODEPINK and other activists will be vigiling outside. President Obama will be speaking at the National Defense University on the topic of two of the most egregious crimes committed by this Administration: drone strikes and Guantanamo Bay. CODEPINK and allies will rally outside the premises calling for an end to targeted assassinations and indefinite detention. Visuals include people in Guantanamo jumpsuits, life-sized Obama renditions, and a large model drone. “We are anxious to hear what President Obama has to say, and hope he will announce measures to close Guantanamo and stop the drones wars,” said CODEPINK co-founder Medea Benjamin. “But if President Obama continues to rely on killing by remote control and locking people up indefinitely, we will be constantly creating new enemies and jeopardizing our national security. Respecting human rights, international law and the guarantees provided in our Constitution is the best way to keep our nation secure.” (Obama Speaks On Drones & Gitmo: CODEPINK Speaks Back! 2013, para 2).

What this example articulated was the clear adversarial position of CODEPINK in relation to the Obama Administration on drone strikes: CODEPINK saw the Obama Administration having as failing the U.S. public on the issue of drone strikes. CODEPINK intended to rectify the situation by providing an alternative narrative through alternative media. This narrative contained specific critiques that challenged the Obama Administration on drone strikes: human rights law, lack of transparency and using the Obama Administration’s rhetoric against itself. In CODEPINK’S textual examples, the Obama Administration lost the right to control the discussion about drone strikes and social movements groups that used alternative media needed to provide another narrative that reflected the interests of the public.

CODEPINK depicted itself as an external government organization that challenged the dominant political norms of party and policy on the issue of drone strikes. CODEPINK illustrated its social movement philosophy through protests at events, and then reported on those events on its own alternative media website, its main media channel for the dissemination of information. CODEPINK not only reported the news but also became it. CODEPINK posted links to other media organizations, including the NYT, which reference the CODEPINK action. This example was from the Democratic National Convention in 2012:

CODEPINK activists are in the streets at the Democratic Convention calling for significant economic reform, an end to US wars, and money out of politics. CODEPINK has already managed to make waves in the news; from Tighe Barry of CODEPINK DC featured in a New York Magazine article, to Jodie Evans of CODEPINK LA being quoted in a piece by the Atlantic, and Politico dubbing our Make Out Not War stickers as "ubiquitous". CODEPINK created a splash at the RNC with its bold actions both inside and outside the Convention Center, and will do the same at the DNC. "Both the republicans and Democrats are war-addicted parties, continuing to pour money into the bloated Pentagon budget instead of addressing people's real needs," said co-director Medea Benjamin. "We'll be on the streets, loudly and boldly protesting the ongoing war in Afghanistan, killer drone strikes and a potential war on Iran.” (CODEPINK Actions at the DNC, 2012, para 3).

This example depicted CODEPINK’s intentions at these large political events. CODEPINK wanted to establish its location and social and political agenda at these events. CODEPINK was “in the streets”, meaning they were not part of the actual convention but in a different location to demonstrate their metaphorical distance from the established power structure. CODEPINK also referenced other media organizations that had recognized their efforts and impact at the event and pointed to that information as an opportunity to broaden the discussion about its own narrative on the issue of drone strikes.

 CODEPINK not only took the issue of drone strikes to the politicians: it also took the issue to the manufacturer of drones. CODEPINK wanted to challenge the war profiteers not only in a rhetorical manner that occasionally percolates mainstream media outlets but also to the communities where the drone manufacturers lived. This story appeared on its website in 2010:

In light of the failed New York Times Square bombing, increased U.S. predator drone attacks in the Pakistan-Afghanistan border region is stoking anti-American feelings and prompting violent acts of revenge. The drone attacks are killing innocent civilians. Peace activists from California and Nevada will mobilize outside the predator drone manufacturing company, General Atomics, and at the home of General Atomics CEO, James Neal Blue, to bring home the issue of the increased deadly drone strikes on innocent civilians. Contractors built a shrine for the children of predator drone strikes at Blue's home on Tuesday, followed by the community-wide protest at General Atomics HQ on Wednesday. As many U.S. domestic programs suffer, drones and other unmanned aerial systems have taken a prominent role in the U.S. occupations and defense budgets with billions continuing toward research and development. Even though General Atomics brought countless technical jobs into the community, San Diego along with many other cities has had their share of hardships. The civilian unemployment rate is at 10.1%; there are more than 160,000 San Diegans unemployed, and employers have lost roughly sixty thousand jobs. The school district is $87 million dollars in the red with threats of salary and program cuts. Over 7800 people live on the streets. According to Veterans Village of San Diego, 30-40% of San Diego County's homeless are veterans (San Diegans to Protest Predator Drone Makers General Atomics and CEO's Home, 2010, para 6).

CODEPINK presented its narrative in a dual nature in this example as well. CODEPINK depicted the action it intended to take against the drone manufacturer by giving some background information about the depth of the drone strike problem throughout the world. CODEPINK also encouraged others to participate in its action to face the actors who profited off the sale of drones to the U.S. government. This excerpt also extended the argument against drone strikes to include other social issues that plague the U.S. to show spending on other programs besides drones. CODEPINK confronted problem of drone strikes by involving drone strike manufacturers and used these war profiteers to promote its social justice message through its own production of alternative media content.

CODEPINK also understood the need for other social movement groups to connect in unison against the issue of drone strikes. While distancing itself from the government and drone manufacturers, CODEPINK wanted to establish its respect for other alternative media outlets by promoting their agenda on their website.

As the American Civil Liberties Union challenges the CIA's secret drone program in federal appeals court Thursday, CODEPINK will be outside the courthouse with a model drone and banners calling for an end to the CIA's covert drone program, and will stage a die-in to draw attention to the innocent people killed in these drone attacks. They will also stand in solidarity with the ACLU's challenge to the CIA's absurd denial of the existence of the government's targeted killing program and its refusal to respond to Freedom of Information Act requests about the program while officials continue to make public statements about it (Benjamin, 2012, para1).

CODEPINK saw the need to promote the legitimacy of the ACLU by joining forces with its fellow alternative media producer at a specified setting. While the ACLU took the legal route against the problem of drone strikes, CODEPINK saw itself in a more active role by encouraging a “die in” to represent the lost civilian lives of those people who died from drone strikes. In this example, CODEPINK again became a character in its own alternative media production but also recognized the importance of other alternative media organizations in fighting for greater transparency and accountability from the government on the issue of drone strikes.

As illustrated in this paper, CODEPINK not only had a specific position on drone strikes but also established a clear narrative based on its position. In the development of that narrative, different characters emerged. One of those characters was Jon Brennan, a former Obama administration advisor before taking on a role as head of the CIA. Much like the rest of the CODEPINK alternative media content, Brennan’s actions warranted not only a political focus but also a personal one. CODEPINK organized a vigil outside of his residence to raise awareness about his role in the use of drone strikes throughout the world before his nomination to head the CIA. In CODEPINK’S thinking, Brennan not only needed accountability in professional prose but also with direct action:

As President Obama is nominating John Brennan to head the CIA, CODEPINK will be outside the White House protesting his nomination. Some protesters will be in orange jumpsuits representing US policy of torturing prisoners and others will carry a large model drone. Both torture and drone strikes represent John Brennan's legacy. “It is tragic that the person who is responsible for the counterproductive, illegal drone strike strategy that has killed so many innocent people and unleashed such fierce anti-American sentiment around the world is being tapped to head the CIA,” said CODEPINK cofounder Medea Benjamin. “We condemn President Obama for making this nomination and call on the Senate to reject it” (Benjamin, 2013, para 1-2).

By performing both rhetorical strength and physical direct action, CODEPINK wanted the Obama Administration to understand that nominating John Brennan to a position like head of the CIA brings with it a responsibility to protect human life. The director of the CIA ultimately had the responsibility of issuing drone strikes that could lead to the loss of human life. Based on his employment background, Brennan did not share CODEPINK’s approach to the value of human life. CODEPINK saw Brennan as unfit for this leadership position. John Brennan acted as the focal point in the lack of accountability that comes from the Obama Administration on the issue of drone strikes and his new title will exacerbate the problem in the future. CODEPINK intended to challenge the policy of drone strikes through confronting Brennan as a social movement at the White House and making public that confrontation on its website.

In another example from its alternative media content, CODEPINK turned its attention to how the U.S. government acts against its own interests by illustrating the inconsistent approach that the U.S. uses when providing visas to foreign nationals. By demonizing people who are not terrorists, CODEPINK wanted the U.S. to reexamine who the “real” terrorists are in the world.

After months of pressure from human rights activists, the U.S. government has granted Pakistani lawyer Shahzad Akbar a visa to attend and speak at an International Drone Summit in Washington DC on April 28, 2012. “I am glad that better sense prevailed and the State Department is finally letting me into the country after 14 months of delay and tireless efforts by the Summit organizers,” Akbar said. “I will be speaking to American people about the loss of so many innocent Pakistani lives in their name. I believe the American people are good people and will want to do something to stop this unjust, counterproductive war that violates all norms of international law and human rights” (Kudaimi, 2012, para 1).

CODEPINK wanted an open and honest discussion about the issue of drone strikes in the U.S. and in other countries. By bringing in activists from other countries, CODEPINK hoped to bring the public a better understanding about drone strikes from people in those impacted areas, including Pakistan. However, the U.S. government controlled the access people have when traveling to the U.S. This gatekeeper power showed that the U.S. influenced Pakistan in continuing a drone strike policy along with a subjective visa policy. In addition, the U.S. influenced the media discourse of its own citizens by limiting the voices who spoke the truth about drone strike policy. From this example, CODEPINK wanted a more holistic discussion about drone strikes.

CODEPINK crystallized its approach to drone strikes by engaging in direct action against the drone strike policy of the Obama Administration. CODEPINK also produced a narrative through alternative media about drone strikes and promulgated that narrative on its website. The direct action tactics varied from protests, to marches, to fasts, to pilgrimages in the impacted settings. These tactics intended to confront the practice of drone strikes throughout Muslim majority countries.

These examples exemplified the lack of agreement that CODEPINK had with the Obama Administration about their policy on drone strikes. CODEPINK wanted to broaden the discussion about drone strikes in a number of ways. For example, the group showed its commitment to fighting drone strikes by focusing on Akbar’s presence at a drone strike conference. CODEPINK traveled to various locations, both established locations of power as well as unknown locations in the desert, to indicate its position on the policy of drone strikes. CODEPINK also wanted to confirm its connection to other peace advocacy groups affiliated with ending the drone strikes. CODEPINK saw the peace community as advocates for the campaign against drone strikes. The group wanted to establish that point in its tactical choices and again, promote those choices on its website.

CODEPINK also wanted to see the relationship between the legal community and its own use of activist anger against the continuation of drone strikes by the Obama Administration, instead of presenting legal critiques about the reasoning behind the drone strikes. One example involved CODEPINK’s travel to Yemen and the organization’s engagement with the local populace in that setting:

This week seven Americans announced their intention to travel to Yemen from June 11-18 on a peace delegation to meet with victims of US drone strikes and family members of Yemeni Guantanamo prisoners cleared for release. The delegation, organized by the U.S. group CODEPINK, will meet with government leaders, drone victim families, lawyers, academics, representatives of major Yemeni political parties and US officials. “It is long past time to stop the lethal drone strikes in Yemen,” said CODEPINK co-founder Medea Benjamin, author of Drone Warfare: Killing by Remote Control. “The drone strikes have killed countless civilians, are a recruiting tool for extremist and spread anti-American sentiment. We are traveling to Yemen as citizen diplomats to show the people there that not all Americans support these policies of terror and assassination, and we know that peace cannot be achieved by dropping Hellfire missiles from Predator drones.” (McCracken, 2013, para 1).

CODEPINK had zero interest in promoting an agenda that focused on the theoretical arguments about the legal reasoning about drone strikes. Instead, this social movement group through its direct action and alternative media posted to its website, attempted to engage with the public about the human cost of drone strikes and the need for this policy to stop and move toward a more humane engagement with international countries such as Yemen. This did not mean, however, that CODEPINK did not acknowledge the actors involved in the legal reasoning struggle from either inside or outside the governmental structure. CODEPINK wanted to use its social movement agenda and alternative media production to promote its own interests and stop drone strikes.

CODEPINK also provided its critique of the drone strike policy on a human level. By using people as the standard for evaluating the effectiveness of drone strikes, CODEPINK hoped its critique of this policy raised awareness of people from the international community. The example below appeared on its website regarding the issue of drone strikes:

Since the US does not assist innocent victims, we are collecting funds for their rehabilitation, including prosthetic legs. One of the people we will help is 16-year-old Sadaullah, from North Waziristan, who lost an eye and both legs in an attack on his home. “I had a dream of becoming a doctor, but now I can't even walk to school,” said Sadaullah. Whose story is related in Medea's book Drone Warfare? We are trying to raise $5,000 to help the victims, so please consider making a donation. We will also be taking petitions to the US Embassy in Islamabad, so make sure you have signed. We would like to deliver 5,000 signatures to the Ambassador, and right now we have just under 2,000 (Benjamin & Wright, 2012, para 3 & 4).

CODEPINK wanted from the world community an understanding about the people who lose their lives or the lives of loved ones from drone strikes. By using the example of teenagers who had lost limbs from the execution of drone strikes, CODEPINK was able to provide to their audience a visceral and highly critical challenge to drone strikes. CODEPINK also wanted the international community to contribute to the livelihood of the people impacted by drone strikes because the Obama Administration did not provide for these victims. CODEPINK not only provided a critique of drone strikes but also attempted to rectify the human fallout from this policy by raising money for these victims. Finally, CODEPINK performed these actions in a manner consistent with its prerogative as a social movement organization that promoted its own interests through the production of alternative media. CODEPINK used this platform as way to get its message to the public.

As this example indicated, CODEPINK provided a strong voice against the U.S. government, in direct action. In these direct actions, CODEPINK attempted to confront agents of the U.S. government or corporations that profited from drone strikes in an attempt to provide personal accountability instead of governmental or democratic accountability. Manias (2009) observes:

Activists with peace groups CODEPINK and Nevada Desert Experience will fast outside of Creech Air Force Base against U.S. drone strikes on Afghanistan and Pakistan over the Thanksgiving Holiday, November 26 through November 29. After learning about the brutal assaults on innocent bystanders in those countries, the activists decided to fast as a way to show to the global community and the U.S. government that we do not support the drone strikes. According to an October 2009, New Yorker article "The Predator War" written by Jane Mayer, the Predator drones strikes continue at a fast pace -- "a rate of approximately one bombing a week." The pilot program is housed at various military installations in the U.S. with Creech Air Force Base, just north of Las Vegas, as the headquarters of the Air Force's Predator and Reaper "hunter-killer" UAV squadron, the 432nd Flight Wing. Young Air Force pilots commute into the base every day to fly the unmanned aerial vehicles (UAV), referred to as drones, to scout over Pakistan and Afghanistan and launch Hellfire missiles onto the region as part of a controversial C.I.A. targeted international killing program; and at times missing their intended targets, resulting in the deaths of many innocent people including children. The non-violent peace activists call for a stop to U.S. drone strikes and call on our government to stop spending American tax dollars on C.I.A. classified covert drone programs (Manias, 2009, para 1).

CODEPINK emerged as a social movement where activists produced alternative media that not only critiqued U.S. policy. As well, CODEPINK functioned as a social movement that periodically caught the attention of mainstream media. These tactics showed how multifaceted and engaged CODEPINK was as both a social movement group and an alternative media producer. Overall, CODEPINK challenged the dominant government narrative but also created an alternative narrative by both demonstrating against the powers that enacted and benefited from drone strike policy and promoted its position through the production of alternative media. For these reasons, CODEPINK played a significant role as a creator of a narrative in alternative media production and content on the issue of drone strikes that analyzed the policy and promoted its own alternative media organization.

**Conclusions and Future Directions**

This article focused on CODEPINK. CODEPINK acted as not only a producer of alternative media content but also provided a critique of the dominant political thinking on drone strikes. In addition, CODEPINK had a clear formation of a narrative that also promoted its own interest as an alternative media entity that wanted respect by the public for its anti-establishment work. This study left some questions about how best to assess CODEPINK in relation to other groups that focused on peace to produce social change in the world. While CODEPINK popped up on particular days of media coverage around specific social protests, the group did not connect with traditional legislative politics to have a clearly defined agenda that worked directly for change through the existing governmental process. In addition, the group did not worked as extensively on women’s issues that were not directly related to peace, such as equal pay. By limiting its focus on the issues directly related to peace and eschewing religious communities committed to some of these same issues, CODEPINK existed as a group both inside and outside traditional social movement paradigms working for change.

Some future studies about CODEPINK and alternative media could focus on how right wing organizations view a group like CODEPINK. While the political ideologies would change, the groups would embrace similar mechanisms to engage in the public on particular issues. The right wing groups may also show a pronounced difference from an organization such as CODEPINK because of the fact that they may limit the agenda of their group to help focus their resources on political issues. Right wing groups may also show political leanings that can influence alternative media content and how that content may reflect the society.

Future research could also include how social movement groups that focus on other issues examine the impact of U.S. drone strikes throughout the world. This study mentioned Amnesty International as another social movement group that deals with human rights. This type of comparison could show how similar ideologies fit through the prism of human rights versus women’s rights, a U.S. social movement compared to worldwide social movement.

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**Corporate Social Responsibility: A Business Model for Conflict Prevention and Community Development in Ghana**

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**Keywords**: Corporate Social Responsibility; Newmont Ghana Gold Limited; Peace; Community Development; Ghana

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**Abstract**

Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) is not mandatory in Ghana; nevertheless, it is highly practiced by a number of multinational corporations. Newmont Ghana Gold Limited (NGGL) for instance, uses CSR as a business model for conflict prevention and community development. The objective of the study is to examine CSR as a business model for conflict prevention and community development. Qualitative research and a case study design were used in the study. Purposive sampling was used to select units for the study. In-depth interview, group discussion and observation were used to collect the data. The study revealed that NGGL’s continuous supports to the police, the community development foundation fund and the supplementary social development provided to mining affected communities are the models for conflict prevention and community development in the Ghana. It is recommended that stakeholders and government agencies should work to design a policy framework on CSR backed by law.

**Introduction**

Corporations are key actors in the socioeconomic, political and cultural development of all countries. Besides providing goods and services, they are a source of livelihood for many and they pay taxes regularly to the government to carry out social interventions. In North America, for instance, corporations, especially those in the extractive sector continue to play a leading role in economic growth and community development. In 1993, for example, the extractive industry’s contribution to the Peruvian economy was represented by $240 million paid in taxes to the government; $400 million spent on local purchases; $280 million in imported goods, and accounted for over 11% of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) (Acheampong, 2004).

In Africa, the multinational corporations have had a significant impact on economic growth and development. In South Africa, for instance, gold mining companies alone contribute 27.4% in mineral revenues to the government and are responsible for 56% of the country’s mine labor force (Mbendi Profile, 2005). Ghana, which is also Africa’s second most important producer of gold after South Africa has increased its contribution to gross foreign exchange earnings through the active role of the multinational mining corporations. For example, the mining companies registered under the Ghana Chamber of Mines (GCM) employ over 17, 500 people (Ghana Chamber of Mines, 2012). Moreover, the latest economic and financial data released by the Central Bank of Ghana indicated that gold mining companies earned the Ghanaian government a revenue of 3.5 billion dollars in 2015 alone (Myjoyonline, 2016).

Notwithstanding the economic contribution of the multinational corporations, specifically the mining companies, they are also bereft with challenges. According to the National Coalition of Civil Society Groups Against Mining, Ghana’s growing foreign investment and production by the mining companies has had a devastating effect on communities’ livelihoods, environment, and human rights (Jenkins & Obara, 2006). It is against this background that CSR has become a part of corporate policy in recent times to address the negative effects emanating corporate activities. Specifically, the Newmont Gold Mining Corporation (NGMC) has initiated a number of CSR programs in their areas of operation. In 2006, NGMC was cited as the only company among the ten largest corporations worldwide that had an over-arching CSR policy towards community development in their operational areas (Jenkins & Obara, 2006). This is why the NGMC mines in Peru and Oruro, Cajamarca and Bolivia areas have been applauded for the enormous CSR contributions in economic growth, potential mining conflict prevention and community development (Gutierrez & Jones, 2005).

The tremendous contribution of NGMC’s corporate social responsibility for mines in Peru and Oruro, Cajamarca, Bolivia, United States, Australia, Indonesia, New Zealand and Mexico has attracted a substantial number of researchers studying the impact of CSR in community-company relation, and peace and community development. For instance, studies by Loayza, Franco, Quezada and Alvarado (2001), and Whellams (2007) has shown that NGMC’s corporate social responsibility model has contributed to good company-community relations and has provided a peaceful and secured atmosphere for NGMC to maximize profit in their mining areas. This paper seeks to examine whether or not corporate social responsibility is a business model for conflict prevention and community development in Ghana. The paper begins with an introduction followed by the conceptual and theoretical framework, methodology, findings and discussions, and ends with conclusions and recommendations.

**Conceptual Framework of the Study**

This section of the paper reviews concepts relevant for achieving the objective the study. The concepts reviewed includes, corporate social responsibility; corporate social responsibility and community development; corporate social responsibility and conflict prevention.

**Corporate social responsibility**

The terms corporations, businesses, firms, enterprises and companies are used interchangeably in this paper. In the recent past, CSR has become an important concept in the study of business growth and social welfare by researchers, scholars and industrialists, yet CSR has no generally agreed definition. This raises the question as to what exactly can be considered a working definition of CSR (Crowther & Aras, 2009). Following this question, several scholars and agencies have attempted to define it in diverse ways. The first definition of CSR was by Bowen. He defined CSR as the social obligation of corporations (Bowen, 1953). Ismail (2009) also defines CSR as strategies corporations or firms put in place in conducting their business in a way that is ethical and socially friendly. Ismail reiterates that, these strategies involve a range of activities such as working in partnership with local communities, providing socially sensitive investments, developing relationships with employees, customers and their families as well as involvement in activities that promote environmental conservation and sustainable livelihood development (Ismail, 2009). In addition, Kotler and Lee defined “CSR as a commitment to improve community well-being through discretionary business and contributions of corporate resources” (Kotler & Lee, 2005, p. 3).

The World Business Council on Sustainable Development (WBCSD) in their effort has defined CSR as “The continuing commitment by business to behave ethically and contribute to economic development while improving the quality of life of the workforce and their families as well as of the local community and society at large” (WBCSD, 2000, p. 8). CSR is an evolving concept, which has continued to develop over time. This is why there is still no universally accepted definition for CSR (Hamann, 2003). For the purposes of this paper, I define CSR as the strategic effort by corporations to maximize profits through the integration of the sociopolitical, economic, environmental and cultural needs of all the stakeholders into their business objectives and policies. The underlying assumption in this working definition is that in an attempt to maximize profit in a serene environment devoid of conflict, the sociopolitical concerns of a corporate policy include conflict prevention measures, peacebuilding mechanisms, conflict resolution processes and community development initiatives.

**Corporate social responsibility and community development**

Community Development (CD) is an important mechanism for tackling social needs and hardships that people in urban slums and specifically people in rural communities face. More importantly, CD cannot be achieved without the active participation or involvement of the people concerned, taking into consideration their beliefs, norms and indigenous knowledge. In achieving CD, the beliefs and practices of the local people themselves play an important role in overcoming poverty (Bonye, Aasoglenang & Owusu-Sekyere, 2013). According to Camfens, CD is “Viewed as a means for mobilizing communities to join states or institutional initiatives that are aimed at alleviating poverty, solving social problems, strengthening families, fostering democracy and achieving modernization and socioeconomic development” (Camfens, 1997,p. 25). People living in poverty have basic needs that have to be met, and one important sector whose activities have come to promote CD includes multinational companies, particularly mining companies (Camfens, 1997).

The mining company’s contributions towards CD include promoting peace and community development initiatives, promoting capacity building and improving resource flows. For instance, a foundation set up by the Newmont Mining Company, provides community development projects in the towns surrounding the company’s mines in Peru and Bolivia (Gutierrez & Jones, 2005). In addition, Minera Yanacocha, a mining company in South America, jointly owned by Newmont has set up two departments to promote community development in their mining areas even though they have compensated the affected communities already. These departments have helped to execute the installation of potable water systems in eleven communities; installed sanitary latrines for 485 families, installed a sewer system in the community, constructed twenty-seven classrooms in fourteen schools, and provided electric energy supply service to over 800 families in South America (Yanacocha, 2004).

**Corporate social responsibility and conflict prevention**

In contemporary times, multinational corporations, including large-scale mining companies are increasingly playing diverse roles in conflict prevention. According to Banfield, Gündüz and Killick (2003), companies play a significant role in promoting peace and preventing conflicts through the implementation of CSR initiatives. Research conducted on corporations and conflict prevention revealed that a variety of factors exist to explain why in recent times companies engage communities in their CSR. Firstly, as a way of promoting conflict prevention through political channels, companies support the rule of law, human rights and transparency initiatives in societies recovering from war devastations (Rieth & Zimmer, 2004). For instance, Christian Aid (2004) has acknowledged that industries, organizations, trade unions, Non-governmental Organizations (NGOs) and multinational companies, including large-scale mining companies use, CSR as a focal point for supporting human rights and peace.

Secondly, companies contribute to conflict prevention in the dimension of socioeconomic development. According to Deitelhoff and Wolf (2010), companies work to prevent conflict through the transformation of the economies of war-shattered countries by fighting against poverty and social division through social interventions. Thirdly, firms contribute to conflict prevention in the socio-cultural area. Thus, companies address the socio-psychological grievances of affected parties or promote a culture of peace through independent media, reconciliation or peace education. Again, companies promote the culture of peace by sponsoring sensitization and awareness creation programs on peace and conflict prevention (Feil, 2012). It is also evident that companies have engaged communities in the peace making process in terms of sustainable peace policy dialogue and peace advocacies in countries emerging from war (International Alert, 2005).

More so, conflict prevention and resolution have been possible in some conflict prone areas, through the active participation in peace dialogue initiatives provided by companies across conflict divides (Banfield et al, 2003). For instance, in South Africa, multinational companies through CSR engaged warring parties in relationship-building programs, thereby providing technical, logistical and administrative support in the peace process, which helped to promote peace after the apartheid (International Alert, 2005). Besides, businesses contribute to meeting some of the main security challenges in conflict and post-conflict natural resource endowed countries by: seeking to provide jobs for former combatants, either as part of a national-level disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR) program (as in Afghanistan and Colombia) or on a more *ad hoc* basis (as in Democratic Republic of Congo and Somalia); providing finance and logistics for small arms and light weapons collection programs (in El Salvador); and strengthening post-apartheid official security structures in South Africa (International Alert, 2006). Doyle and Sambanis (2000) conclude that companies play significant roles in helping peacebuilding and conflict prevention in mining endowed countries in Africa, Asia and Latin America to succeed.

**Theoretical Framework Underlying the Study**

The study is anchored on the integrative theory of corporate social responsibility. According to Garriga & Melé (2004), the integrative theories are based on the idea that business is dependent on the social context around it for its acceptance, success and growth. The integrative theory is strongly consistent with the provision of employment opportunities, provision of public goods, voluntary commitment to a broader sense of social demands and environmental responsibilities as key to responding to the consequences of corporate actions, which without CSR could lead to poor company-community relations. The social demands and environmental responsibilities, including the provision of social amenities (schools, hospitals, roads, employment, water and electricity, livelihood diversification) are perceived as being the way used by companies to interact with society, which gives it some prestige and legitimacy relevant for corporate growth and a good company-community relation.

Carroll (1979) has been an early proponent of this integrative approach to CSR. He argued that CSR should be integrated into a corporate policy, aimed at fulfilling the social, cultural, economic and political needs of the larger society, in so doing, potential conflict can be prevented, and peace and community development would be achieved. In addition, the integrative theorists see the CSR practice as an opportunity for firms to increase corporate reputation and profits as well as an opportunity for them to enhance good community-corporate relationships, important for corporate growth and development. The theorists add that companies that engage communities with CSR activities tend to enhance business profits and project sustainability (Frynas, 2005).

In support of the previous assertions, Truscott, Bartlett and Tywoniak (2009) also argued that, CSR has become significant and used as a model for promoting community empowerment and corporate reputation. The theorists conclude that CSR practices have made companies respected and recognized as good corporate citizens. Frynas (2005) affirm that benefits for companies that practice CSR include the fact that CSR helps them to establish a good corporate governance and status, capable of contributing to corporate-public acceptance. In support of the integrative theory, in recent times, mining companies in Ghana are increasingly practicing CSR (Afrane & Adjei-Poku, 2013) in order to prevent conflict, promote community development and enhance corporate growth and profits.

**Methodology**

Data for the study were collected from both primary and secondary sources between December 2014 and April 2016. The study adopted a qualitative approach and a case study design. The qualitative approach was used in both the data gathering process and data analysis, where in-depth interviews, a focus group discussion (FGD) and field observations were applied. The case study design allowed a detailed and in-depth study of the topic. Respondents were purposively sampled from Kenyasi No. 1, Kenyasi No. 2 and Ntotroso communities and were interviewed face-to-face. The study had fifteen (15) respondents and key informants purposively sampled from Kenyasi No.1, twenty-five (25) from Kenyasi No. 2 and ten (10) from Ntotroso. In addition, there were nine (9) respondents from the Newmont Ahafo Development Foundation (NADeF) and NGGL, seven (7) from the Police service and private security, and four (4) from the District Assembly. There were also eight (8) chiefs, elders and sub-chiefs interviewed as well as twelve (12) opinion leaders and community members. Also, women’s, farmer’s and youth groups interviewed in the study were ten (10). In all, there were fifty (50) respondents interviewed. The purposive sampling technique used involved the identification and selection of individuals or groups of individuals that were proficient and knowledgeable about the issues of interests (Creswell & Plano Clark, 2011). Also, the various groups of respondents were purposively sampled to attract diverse opinions to gain a holistic picture of the main issues.

The FGD was used to give further explanations to issues raised in the interviews. There was FGD in Kenyasi No. 1, which constituted farmers’ groups and youth groups, making eight (8) discussants. In Kenyasi No. 2, the FGD comprised of women’s groups, youth groups and farmers’ groups, which constituted nine (9) discussants. There were two (2) sets of FGDs. The discussants were selected for the FGD based on the researcher’s judgment that they were more proficient and well informed about the issues because they are the highly affected people. The primary sources of information for the study were collected using an interview guide, FGD guide and an observation checklist from the respondents and the key informants.

In addition, some secondary literature was gathered from documents from NADeF, NGGL, and the Ghana Statistical Service in the District. Other secondary literature sources included documents and articles, scholarly books, journals, published and unpublished theses and the internet. The discourse analysis tool was used to analyze both verbal and written data obtained from the field. Discourse analysis is the study of social life, understood through analysis of language in its widest sense, including face-to-face talk, non-verbal interaction, images, symbols and documents (Potter & Wetherell, 1987). Also, it includes the analysis of written sources, such as documents and reports to give a rich source of data (Easterby-Smith, Thorpe, Jackson & Lowe, 2008). The tool was used to analyze data collected from or in written texts, in-depth interviews, FGD, field notes and transcripts, to make meaningful conclusions for the study.

**Findings and Discussions of the Study**

This section of the paper deals with the findings and discussions of the study. The findings and discussions are based on issues that helped to assess CSR a business model for conflict prevention and community development in Ghana. The issues discussed include, CSR as a model for peace and community development, and the potential conflict in the absence of CSR business model in mining areas.

**CSR, a business model for peace and community development**

During the interview, the respondents were of the view that CSR is a tool for pursuing peace and community development. They maintained that NGGL’s continuous support to the Ghanaian security services with protective and defensive logistics and equipment has enabled them to maintain peace, law and order, and enhance security in the mining areas. For example, in 2009, NGGL handed over 140,000-dollar transit housing to the District Police Command at Kenyasi No. 1 and provides 120 liters of fuel following the donation of a Toyota Hilux pick-up to the Kenyasi No. 1 police station. Additionally, NGGL provides 60 liters of fuel to the Duayaw Nkwanta police every. This effort, according to Boateng (2009) has helped to foster crime prevention, and enhanced peace in the District. The District Police Commander confirmed during an interview that:

*“NGGL via CSR provides the District Police with administrative and technical support to equip them to work assiduously in the District. Besides, NGGL provides the District Police with furniture, vehicle, and importantly fuel free of charge for patrolling to ensure law and order, and peace and security in the District” (Fieldwork, 2016).*

In addition, the chairperson for the ten youth groups in the mining affected areas adds that:

*“Peace and security are enhanced in the District because the police get some incentives and allowance from NGGL which motivate them to patrol the communities to ensure law and order” (Fieldwork, 2016).*

Boampong (2012) in his study, *Ghana’s golden opportunity: A district struggles with striking it rich* also found that police posts and other security infrastructures have been put up by the NGGL through the NADeF to help strengthen peace and development in the District. He adds that the supports have contributed to the peace and security currently seen in the District (Boampong, 2012). Similarly, a number of the mining companies in Ghana have embarked on various social interventions aimed at maintaining peace, enhancing security and promoting community development in their mining areas. For example, four mining companies in the Prestea Huni/Valley District, namely, the Golden Star Resources, AEL mining services, Rockshure International, Erdmac mining services, and Karibiana Pools in the Western region constructed a 40,000-Ghana-Cedi Police Check Point to the Ghana Police service, constituting a charge office, two rest rooms, washrooms, electricity and mechanized borehole at Tintimhwe. The facility has help the police curb the increasing robbery cases recorded in the Tarkwa-Bogoso mining areas (All Ghana News, 2014).

The community development approach of NGGL is based on a foundation fund. The fund is set up by the corporation to support various community development activities essential for peace and relationships building. The foundation fund includes the Women’s Consultative Committee (WCC), Newmont Ahafo Development Foundation, Resettlement Negotiation Committee (RNC) and the Agricultural Improvement and Land Access Program (AILAP). One of the key intents of the foundation fund is to focus on improving economic self-sufficiency of the host communities. An interview with one of the NGGL officials revealed that, since July 2006 to the end of June 2008, NGGL had paid a total of US$ 19, 396,729 in royalties to the Government of Ghana to support the host communities to develop in their economic activities. The study also indicated that NGGL’s Women Consultative Committee program had helped women’s groups in the host communities to get access to loans from the fund to support economic self-sufficiency activities and repay it with little interest. It was also observed that the Newmont Ahafo Development Foundation had helped to support local sustainable community development projects in the host communities, including Kenyasi No. 1, Kenyasi No. 2 and Ntotroso, and other communities in the District with schools, hospitals, clinics, durbar grounds, roads and scholarships among others. The study noted that the reason why there is no violent conflict or misunderstanding between the NGGL and the communities is the fact that NGGL through its foundation fund has created opportunities for community development initiatives in the District. For example, a member of the women’s group in Ntotroso admitted:

*“…The community development programs of the NGGL have provided employment opportunities which have help increase the income levels of women and enhance the wellbeing of the people. Especially, the soap making and production has empowered the community women economically” (Fieldwork, 2016).*

Although CSR is not mandatory in Ghana (Amponsah-Tawiah & Dartey-Baah, 2012; Anku-Tsede & Deffor, 2014) the foundation fund, according to the respondents, has contributed to the community development of the District, which has strengthened the peaceful relationships between the communities and the NGGL.

**Potential conflict in the absence of CSR business model**

According to Whellams (2007), Minera Yanacocha jointly owned by the Newmont in South Africa, after originally paying families the market price for their lands affected by the mine, many of the landowners later felt they had not been adequately compensated following the massive negative impact of the mine activities in their economic, health, social and environmental lives. Owing to that the community returned to the company demanding more compensation using unfriendly approaches such as violent and nonviolent demonstrations and physical attacks. As such, Minera Yanacocha began dealing with individual complaints from former landowner’s on an *ad hoc* basis, but eventually realized that a more formal social development plan was needed to ensure the equal treatment of all former landowners. Thus, Newmont via CSR initiative launched the Original Landowners Program (OLP) in 2001 to improve the quality of life of the original landowners and their families, which helped to prevent potential violent conflict (Whellams, 2007).

In Ghana, the impact of mining on the environment affects different aspects. The massive use of water by NGGL and the industrial waste discharged into water sources are among the leading causes of poisoning the water, of diseases, but also of the economic problems of the communities concerned which has the tendency to trigger violence. The experiences from Minera Yanacocha prompted NGGL to understand that their activities could cause conflict in the District, and as such embark on CSR, including the provisions of alternative water sources. A miner with the NGGL admitted:

*“Even though compensations for lands are provided, conflict would have erupted if NGGL had not provided the affected communities with the hygienic supplementary water sources, including the merchandize boreholes in the District” (Fieldwork, 2016).*

During the interviews other respondents cited that although initial cash compensations are paid to land affected communities, without CSR there would have been violent and nonviolent conflicts through a series of organized demonstrations, threats, roadblocks and physical attacks against NGGL in the District. As noted by a member of the farmer’s group:

*“…Because the mining land is ours and has been passed to us from our ancestors, alienating us with just a onetime cash payment as compensation for affected lands is not enough, so providing us with supplementary social services and projects is the best way of telling us not to cause violence” (Fieldwork 2016).*

This is why Richards (2002) has emphasized that giving out cash as compensation against mining effects is not a sustainable solution, therefore, modern mining operations should expend considerable resources in social infrastructural investment, including schools, hospitals, roads, water sources, electric power source, alternative livelihoods and most importantly, business and technical training to ensure that monies paid in compensation are not wasted, but in support of community development, relevant for preventing any potential conflict in the long run. The integrative theories of CSR have as their goals the sort of positive responses emerging in the above assertions of the study. The theory maintains that corporations depend on society for its continuity, growth and survival. Therefore, integrating the socioeconomic, cultural and environmental needs of communities around corporate institutions into a corporate policy is relevant for corporate growth. Utting (2005) concludes that integrating the social concerns and needs of the affected communities into the policies of businesses is essential for conflict prevention and community development. This is why the NGGL have as part of its corporate policies CSR to prevent conflict and promote community development in their mining areas.

**Conclusions and Recommendations**

The purpose of this study was to examine how NGGL through their CSR model is contributing to conflict prevention and community development in Ghana, particularly in the Asutifi North District of the Brong Ahafo Region. The paper demonstrates that the strategically developed CSR model transferred from Newmont mines in Minera Yanacocha in South Africa, Peru and Bolivia has positively contributed to peace and community development in the mining areas in Ghana. The study revealed that although CSR is not mandatory in Ghana, NGGL’s continuous support to the District police has helped to maintain peace, law and order, and enhanced security in the mining areas. Also, the study observed that the community development foundation fund set up by the NGGL has helped to improve the economic self-sufficiency of the host communities relevant for peace and development. Significantly, the supplementary social development packages provided to the mining affected communities’ aside the original compensations have prevented conflict and contributed to the peaceful relationship between the communities and NGGL in the District.

In view of the above, since there is no legal document guiding CSR in Ghana, is recommended that a collaborative effort among civil society groups and government agencies, including the Ghana Chamber of Mines; Minerals Commission; Ministry of Environment, Science, Technology and Innovation; and the Ministry of Lands and Natural Resources should geared towards working for a comprehensive CSR policy backed by law. This will serve as a tool for influencing all corporations to comply with CSR activities in their host communities. Hence, peace and community development would be imperative in most mining communities should there be a legal framework guiding CSR in Ghana. Last and not least, multinational corporations, including those in the manufacturing, telecommunication etc. can contribute to the conditions of peace if they emulate NGGL’s strategically developed CSR model in Ghana.

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**Life of Orphans in Internally Displaced Persons’ (IDPs) Camps in Northern Nigeria: Coping Strategies and Adjustments to Life in the Hands of Surrogate Families**

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**Keywords**: Orphans; Surrogate Parents; Economic Difficulties; Withdrawal Syndrome; Maladjustment.

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**Abstract**

Research on internally displaced persons (IDPs) often neglect orphans and lump the plights of children as a single homogenous issue in peace and security discourses. Using qualitative interviewing and observations among a cross section of 50 orphans, this study examines their coping strategies and adjustments to life in the hands of surrogate families**.** The data revealed that orphans are inadequately catered for, and were hurriedly and compulsorily attached to surrogate families without detailed background checks, a situation which widens the social and emotional distance between orphans and their surrogate parents. Accounts of insecurity and child molestations were noted as rampant in the camps. The study concludes that social economic difficulties in IDPs’ camps have greatly severed orphans living conditions and maladjustments in the hands of surrogates’ families.

**Introduction**

Nigeria has witnessed her own share of the global growth in internally displaced persons (IDPs), not only in terms of the population size involved but also the geographical spread of the areas being affected (McHugh, 2010). The situation has never been this bad since the Nigerian civil war of 1967-1970. IDPs in Nigeria constitute a significant quota of the 250million youths worldwide living amidst violence (UNICEF, 2016). Statistically the IDMC (2016) estimates that there are almost 2,152,000 internally displaced people (IDPs) in Nigeria as of 31 December 2015. According to the UNICEF report (2016), children constitute more than half of the estimated figures of displaced persons by Boko HaramIslamist militants**.** The Islamist militants have been described as insurgents whose name loosely translates in the Hausa language as “western education is forbidden”. Formally *Jama’atu Ahlis Sunna Lidda’awati wal-Jihad*, or People Committed to the Prophet’s Teachings for Propagation and Jihad. It has systematically sought to destabilise the Nigerian state and impose sharia in the north-east of the country since 2009 when the group first launched an insurgency aimed to create an Islamic state in the region. Between 2012 and 2014, they destroyed several villages, towns and schools; kidnapped 276 schoolgirls and killed 314 students and 196 teachers (Human Right Watch, 2015; IDMC, 2014).

Traditionally, internal displacements are caused by natural disaster, communal violence and internal armed conflict; however the dimension of religious extremism and intolerance accentuated by the Boko Haram sect has been a recurrent phenomenon in Northern Nigeria, characterized with higher endemic poverty, low levels of education and a huge and alienated youth population compared to the other parts of the country (IDMC, 2014; UNHCR, NHRC and FEMA 2015). The Boko Haram violence combined with ethnic and communal clashes have not only brought about IDPs within the country but also a number of orphans and child refugees fleeing over the years with many ending up in different camps and parts of Niger, Chad or Cameroon, cut off from their families. Thus a number of children are faced with various social and psychological traumatic experiences, such as being unable to access education, forced into child marriage, labour among others vices in society. The most recent displacement assessment survey (IDMC 2016) conducted from November to December 2015 by the Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre (IDMC) and the International Organization for Migration’s (IOM) with a displacement tracking matrix (DTM) in 207 Local Government Areas (LGA) covering 13 States of Northern Nigeria, estimated the numbers of IDPs as follows: Abuja (13,481); Adamawa (136,010); Bauchi (70,078); Benue (85,393); Borno (1,434,149); Gombe (25,332); Kaduna (36,976); Kano (9,331); Nasarawa (37,553); Plateau (77,317); Taraba (50,227); Yobe (131,203); and Zamfara (44,929). Of the total figure of IDPs, the assessment indicates that 12.6 per cent were displaced due to communal clashes, 2.4 per cent by natural disasters and 85 per cent as a result of insurgency attacks by BOKO Haram Islamists (IDMC, 2016; [NEMA](http://nigeria.iom.int/sites/default/files/dtm/01_IOM%20DTM%20Nigeria_Round%20VII%20Report_20151223.pdf)/IOM, 2016). The displacement assessments were conducted with key informants from LGAs, wards and IDPs sites (both in official camps and camp-like settings), as well as people in host communities. The assessments resulted in individual and household displacement estimates, including the identification of wards within the LGA with displaced populations and the type of displacement locations, reason for displacement, displacement history, livelihood and return intention and time of arrival of IDPs as well as their place of origin. Studies on IDPs in Nigeria often group IDPs as a monolithic entity (Oduwole and Fadeyi, 2013; IDMC, 2014; 2016; [NEMA](http://nigeria.iom.int/sites/default/files/dtm/01_IOM%20DTM%20Nigeria_Round%20VII%20Report_20151223.pdf)/IOM, 2016; SERAP, 2015). However, surprisingly little attention is directed to the life of orphans in IDPs’ camps, their coping strategies, and adjustments to life in the hands of surrogate families. This paper seeks to fill this gap.

Unlike other demographic phenomenon, such as migration, birth and death, IDPs as a concept go beyond the event of internal displacement, which the African Union Kampala Convention, (2009), defined as “the involuntary or forced movement, evacuation or relocation of persons or groups of persons within internationally recognized state borders” . For clarity of purpose According to Article 1 (k) of the African Union Convention for Protection and Assistance of Internally Displaced Persons in Africa (African Union, Kampala Convention, 2009), the term IDPs refers to:

“persons or groups of persons who have been forced or obliged to flee or to leave their homes or places of habitual residence, in particular as a result of or in order to avoid the effects of armed conflict, situations of generalized violence, violations of human rights or natural or human-made disasters, and who have not crossed an internationally recognized State border” [Article 1 (k)].

The reality however is that IDPs come in different faces and shapes, while homogeneity seems to be the norm when it comes to characterising IDPs. A common pattern characterising IDPs in several developing countries is that they lack the three basic necessities of life, food, shelter and clothing (IDMC, 2014; Socio-Economic Rights & Accountability Project (SERAP), 2015). In one of the suits against the Nigerian government, SERAP alleged that:

“The response by the Nigerian government to the conditions of IDPs is fragmented and inadequate, as illustrated by Defendants‟ closure of several displacement camps in Central and Northern areas of Nigeria. Those living in camps are often left without enough food, essential household items or health facilities.”(No ECW/CCJ/APP/15/15).

By implication, the provision of camps by government and non-governmental organisations is seen as capable of solving the problems of IDPS, however apart from the various socio-cultural, socio-demographic, health and psycho-sociological diversities in terms of needs and challenges of IDPs that exist, orphans placed in camps and in the hands of foster and surrogates families are undermined.

# **Methodology**

The research consists of an ethnographic study which involved in-depth interviews, focus group discussions, and observations among a cross section of 50 orphans, 15 surrogate families and 10 officials in three IDPs’ camps in Abuja (Kuje and Kunchingoro), Plateau (Bukuru and Riyom) and Kaduna States (Sabon Tashe and Kargago), all located in the North-Central Geo-Political Zone of Nigeria. In this study, all respondents’ were self identified as Nigerians. This study is qualitative in nature. Data were gathered over a four-month period of fieldwork among IDPs (surrogate parents and orphans) and officials in charge of the camps, between the months of November 2015 and February 2016. The choice of IDPs’ camps in Abuja, Plateau and Kaduna States is drawn from the fact that these are states in the North Central region that are relatively peaceful and have seen a tremendous influx of IDPs over the years from more prone states in the North East (Borno, Yobe and Adamawa States), the epicentre of the Boko Haram conflicts (UNHCR, NHRC and FEMA, 2015; IDMC, 2014). The respondents were contacted at their different camps with prior appointments through personal contact and a snowball approach was adopted to gain access to research participants. The snowball technique was useful in identifying (orphans and surrogate parents) and the social networks of participants required for this research. That is to say, participants that were interviewed helped in recommending other people that meet the criteria of the study and those recommended were contacted and interviewed. Respondents’ ages range between 6-17 years, and 30-68 years for surrogate parents and camp officials at the time of the research.

Of the 50 respondents, there were 21 boys and 29 girls (orphans), 32 were schooling prior to being displaced, while others (18) were engaged in farming and vocational activities with either their parents or guardians prior to their sojourn in the camps. Further breakdown revealed that about two-third of the children could not read or write. The majority of biological parents claimed to be poor peasants. Thus the socio-demographic and economic statuses of respondents and their biological parents varied. Field-notes were also used as a means of obtaining data. A semi-structured interview was conducted by the researcher in English and Pidgin, while a field assistant helped with the interpretation in Hausa language which aided clarity and robust responses from the subjects. Data collected were subjected to content analysis (after all recordings were transcribed and translated by the researcher and the field assistant), limited within the scope of life experiences of orphans as IDPs, in the hands of surrogate families. Issues emanating from respondent narratives revealed the nature of camp arrangements, the fusion of orphans to surrogate parents by camp officials and self decisions, social and emotional distance in living arrangements, and the coping strategies and adjustments in and off the camps. This informed the basis for which the discussion of findings below is presented. The principle of anonymity and confidentiality of respondents were maintained by the use of pseudo-names in the transcription, sorting, and analysis of responses.

**Emprirical findings and discussion**

Considering the intricacy of the situation of IDPs living in camps in general and orphans as a category of children internally displaced; and placed in the hands of surrogate parents in simialr conditions as IDPs in particular, this study examines the life of orphans in internally displaced persons’ (IDPs) camps in Northern Nigeria. The findings were discussed under the major subthemes of organisational arrangement of IDPs into camps and orphans’ resilience amidst inadequacies. These inadequacies were clearly spelt out in orphans’ narratives about their vulnerability and adjustment crisis with surrogate families. The concluding theme reveals orphans’ adaptability (coping strategies and adjustment) and powerlessness of surrogate families in IDPs’ camps.

**Organisational arrangement of IDPS into Camps in Northern Nigeria**

IDPs’ camps in Nigeria can be categorised into informal and formal camps. The latter is often set up, recognised and supported by legislation. In Nigeria, the agency that is officially saddled with the responsibility of IDPs is the National Emergency Management Agency (NEMA). It was established in March 1999 by ACT 12 1999 and as amended by Act 50 of 1999, to manage disasters in all its ramifications (Nigeria Emergency Management Agency, 2016).The agency is being assisted by its subsidiaries, at the state level by the State Emergency Management Agency (SEMA) and the Local Emergency Management Agency (LEMA) at the council level. While informal camps are communities, personalities, and voluntary organisations hosting IDPs. They are often made up of scattered tents in open fields, farm settlements and perceived places and facilities of safety farther from the displaced environments, such as religious institutions (churches and mosques), town halls, family houses, while others live in uncompleted and abandoned buildings. The activities of NEMA are often urban biased towards formal camps as evident in the relative better attention and media coverage enjoyed in camps situated in State capitals, while religious and voluntary organisations concentrate more in communities and informal scattered camps. Nevertheless the focal concern of any IDP Camp management is to ensure that IDPs are properly rehabilitated or assisted to enable them return to as close to a normal life as possible and to prevent the outbreak of diseases. In Nigeria this seems to be difficult to achieve. The realities in most of the camps are shocking as individuals including children are found loitering around (SERAP, 2015; UNHCR, NHRC and FEMA, 2015). The environment lacks inadequate security,, as there are little or no security personnel protecting people and space. Most camp coordinators agree that IDPs are often at the mercies of philanthropic Nigerians, NGOs and international agencies, who often have to step up to help due to the overwhelmingly deplorable conditions. Children and other vulnerable IDPs are key concerns to the camp authorities, but shortages of the basic necessities of life such as poor makeshift tents as shelter, inadequate food and medicals aids create more problems than solutions (Interview/Camp Coordinator/Kuchingoro Camp/Abuja/November 2015). Other views of camp leaders were captured by a respondent who stated:

We are asked to gather here in this abandoned primary school, with the hope that we will at least have a roof over our heads, but the classes are not in good shape, come rain, come shine we are exposed to harsh weather condition. At night the children cry for hunger while others for blankets to keep them warm. It is very difficult to meet all our needs. Food supplies are inadequate so also is medical aids. On few occasions we have lost some children and adults IDPs (Interview/Camp coordinator/Sabon-Tasha Camp/Kaduna State/ February 2016).

The domesticated national policy on IDPs, specifies that internally displaced children shall be entitled to the full enjoyment of their rights under the Nigerian Constitution, as domesticated from the International Human Rights and Humanitarian instruments (SERAP, 2015), which specifically state that children shall, in particular, enjoy their rights under the Child Rights Act, and similar laws enacted at the State and local government levels. This is based on the fact that some children may have lost their only living parent or both parents during conflicts and disasters. These statutes naturally envisaged the problem of children who are not able to establish their true identities. (National Policy on Internally Displaced Persons in Nigeria, 2012; UNHCR, NHRC and FEMA, 2015). While IDP camps are quite numerous, some are officially recognised; others are not known to be in existence and therefore are not funded by the State until they are discovered by media and voluntary organisations (UNHCR, NHRC and FEMA, 2015). It is not uncommon to see four to five families who have come to organise themselves into camps.. The social organisation of IDPs’ camp can be described as poor. Individuals are clustered either in a tent or in a classroom, with ten to -twenty persons in each classroom. .Tents may house fewer individuals depending on how long the camp has existed. For new camps it could be more, while as the camps mature, the numbers tend to reduce. In most men and women are separated, while women and children are clustered. Men are often paired for religious reasons but eventually, these arrangements change and bonding starts to take place, especially for children and people who get along.

According to a camp leader, arrangements in camps are not clearly defined:

The arrival of IDPs and the creation of camps are often sudden, and unplanned so their arrangement is often not clearly defined depending on the situation and maturity of the camps. We try to put women together separately from men because overwhelmingly majority are Muslims, especially when they are single. For family members and individuals that are related either by blood or common residency in a locality, they are separated with time. Children are also divided and placed with their parents or relatives if any. While those who have no relatives were given to families with at least a surviving mother, or an adult female survivor. Other times an elderly person is mandated irrespective of gender to cater for an orphan (Interview/Camp Coordinator/Bukuru Camp/Plateau State/ January 2016).

The division and separation of IDPs are done as they arrive. Most times IDPs come in groups, hand in hand with close and distant relatives. Sometimes it is easier to place them in their natural state, while most times splitting occurs because of space. Another official reaffirmed that often there are no single classroom that can contain a particular group from a particular place, or a complete family (large or small) at the onset, which families would naturally have preferred. Thus e issues of privacy cannot be emphasised. An official clearly stated that ‘IDPs’ camp is not for comfort rather it is a temporary place for safety’ (Interview, NEMA Official/Kargako Camp/Kaduna State/February 2016).

**Orphans resilience amidst inadequacies in IDPs’ camps**

Observations revealed that displacement renders internally displaced children, particularly orphans, more vulnerable. Their vulnerability is generally accentuated as the social organization of displaced communities are destroyed or damaged by the act of physical displacement which may take the form of family groups being separated or disorganized (Baines, 2004; IDMC, 2007) and the inadequacies in camps. Specifically, orphans experience profound psycho-social distress related to displacement and dislocation from biological parents, daily emotional stress with unfamiliar faces, of learning to adapt to the environment, not going to school and the attachment to a new families. For younger orphans, it was much easier to feel comfortable and adjust speedily. Amina, for instance, was very happy. She said: ‘The official told me to take them like my parents. I am happy living with them, they call me Aisha, but my real name is Amina’ (Amina/10years/Riyom Camp/Plateau State/January 2016). Unlike Amina, Simon was not happy being a surrogate child. ‘But I am not one of them. I am still hoping I will see someone from my real family someday, so as to get out of this arrangement (Simon/Male/15years/ Bukuru Camp/Plateau State/ January 2016). Wilson elaborates:

I was asked by the camp official from the National Emergency Management Agency, to stay with Mr and Mrs Jumbo, because they say we are all from Barom ethnic group, from the same area in Plateau state, that we all speak the general Hausa language but what the camp director does not know is that we have different dialect. The new family are not actually from the same community, but the same Local government Area. Communicating in Hausa fluently does not justify that they can fill in the gap. They give more attention to their only surviving daughter. I am often left alone (Male/14years/Bukuru Camp/Plateau State/January 2016).

Azeez noted:

It is a different place from home. My families are not here. I have been hoping and praying to see a relative someday for the past two years but I have not been lucky like some others. Living with a new family is quite tough. It is difficult to call them my family because I know I have relatives even though my parents were killed (Male/9years/Riyom Camp/Plateau State/January 2016).

Most of the respondents (camp coordinators) stated that there are some fragile and stubborn children, some in their teens and other younger ones who cannot cater for themselves independently. This informs the camps’ decision to allocate orphans as appendages to older adults (Interview/Official/Kargarko Camp/Kaduna State/February 2016). Another coordinator argues that it is necessary because ‘there are women who have lost their children, and even some without children in the camp. Women are very nice when it comes to handling cases of orphans in camp’ (Interview/Officials/ Bukuru Camp/Plateau State/January 2016). Similarly it was noted that surviving husband and wife or wives as the case might be for IDPS in polygamous union, also make requests for orphans to form a family for companionship. However interviewees revealed that these orphans were often not consulted before such an arrangement is done. The point was clearly made by Danladi who echoed ‘I was asked the name of my village, my religious affiliation and the language I speak very well, I guess that was the main reason for attaching me to a Muslim family (Male/17years/Orphan/Bukuru Camp/Plateau State/January 2016). For another she was asked to go round to see if she could identify anybody in the camp that she might know, probably from the same locality. ‘Without any luck I was attached to a family with their biological children to get along with’ (Female/12years/Orphan/Kuje Camp/Abuja/November 2015). In a similar manner, aged IDPs (most especially lone survivals) were also given orphans for companionships and as helpmates to assist with basic chores within the camps. These were echoed in the following narratives from different quarters:

Raphael (10years) has been of help to my husband and I take him as my child. We call him ‘Blessing’ in the camp:’ He has been more than a son to me, if not for him I wonder how I would be able to get water to wash, and queue to get food (Mrs. Idom/Surrogate parent/56years/Kuje Camp/Abuja/November 2015).

Initially I was very lonely in this camp. I have arthritis which prevents me from being very active. That was the reason Nufisat was attached to me to serve as my daughter. It has really improved my life in this place in the absence of family members. I have someone to talk to, care for and also to assist me (Mrs. Loita/Surrogate parent/49years/ Sabon-Tasha Camp/Kaduna State/December/2015).

These two children Doris (6years) and Daniel (13years) are all we now have after losing four of our own children in one night from the Fulani herdsmen attacks. They serve as a great consolation to us. They may not completely replace them because they are younger. They however reduce our stress of thinking a lot about our lost children (Mr Aduram/Surrogate parent/67years/Riyom Camp Plateau State//January 2016).

There were cases where orphans were also rejected or sent away to other families for inability to cope with surrogates parents. For Mrs Zainab, it is not as easy as the camp leaders often assumed: ‘They don’t know what it takes to look after somebody’s child or children; they cannot be a replacement to the lost ones, different children, different spirits and difficult coping problems’ (Interview/Surrogate parent/Sabon-Tasha Camp/KadunaState/February 2015). Mr. Kasu, noted that ‘not all of them can be strong to adjust to a new setup and family, for instance James was too lazy for me to cope with, at 14 years, he is always waiting for me to do everything for him in the camp. I became tired and send him off’ (Interview/Surrogate parent/Bukuru Camp/Plateau State/January 2016). Officials from the various camps seem to concur that ‘families who are willing and asked for orphans themselves were better off in handling them’ in terms of accommodation, concerns and their welfare’ (Camp Leader/Kargarko Camp/Kaduna State/February, 2016). The reality of the inadequacies of basic necessities shows that these orphans and other children are not well fed and monitored. As they go outside the boundaries of their camps to the city centres to beg for alms. This account for some of the reasons attributed to orphans absenteeism in camps. The survival in the street is often gendered with moments of intense competitive activity. The ingenuity of orphans (children) is evident among boys in the street scampering along pavements or running in the highways and markets, through and around the many other vehicles, traders and pedestrians, racing against one another to be the first to claim a load and to carry the load for a fee. These are similar to activities of street children in many West African countries, where boys make use of wheelbarrows or large sturdy trolleys constructed from planking and old vehicle axles, to transport heavier consignments like scrap metal, redundant electrical components, building materials, or piles of fruit or vegetables over longer distances (Ikuomola, 2014; Isamah, and Okunola, 1997; Mizen and Ofosu-Kusi 2010). Despite these survival strategies on the street, there are some orphans who have attached themselves to one skill acquisition centre or the other, alongside other children and youths mostly in official camps. For Halimat, going to the centre makes her happy: ‘Idleness makes me to think about my family, so I told my new parents to allow me learn a trade. It makes me happy having time to myself and keeping me away from them, Monday to Saturday’ (Female/11years/Orphan/Kuchingoro Camp/Abuja/November 2015). The daily routine of most female IDPs shows that they often share themselves into groups in the morning before noon, in a matrix comprising of an adult female and at least two or more younger ones walking along streets and commercial centres to attract alms and sympathy from passersby. The theatrics of both male and female IDPs reveals what Davis (2006), termed ‘bodily necessities of 'informal survivalism', where success depends upon being 'strong enough' where the older boys make more money because they can work more and lift bigger items. The bigger the more the money, they also arrive very early to the parks to scout for works (Idris,/Male/12years/ and Mattew/Male/15years/Riyom Camp/Plateau State/January 2016). Resilience, ingenuity and cooperation are all necessary for children to survival difficult conditions (Mizen and Ofosu-Kusi, 2010). Nevertheless, the work of orphans often doubles that of biological children. This can be adequately conceptualized as a response to their subordinate status and to their active marginalization in the care of surrogates who are also helpless in understanding their conditions as orphans who need special attention differently from other children. While the above narratives revealed that orphans attachment is of importance to older IDPs, who enjoy their companionship for the fact that they are resourceful and sometimes fill in the gap of a lost child or children, accounts of orphans show that nevertheless they are often stressed. Thus cases of orphans running away from camps and deaths were brought to the fore. This is clearly discussed in the following section on orphans’ vulnerability behavioural outcomes and familial fond.

**Surrogate families: Orphans’ vulnerability and adjustment crisis**

The vulnerability of orphans is often not spelt out in IDPs literatures. In most cases they are subsumed under the plights of women and children as the most vulnerable population in any conflict situation. For instance it is common to see statistics echoing the overwhelming majority of internally displaced persons (IDPs) as women and children who constitute about 80% of the displaced populations and are widely recognised as the most vulnerable (IDMC, 2009; McHugh, 2010; UN Women 2012). Psychological stress and trauma of orphans are often overlooked and not catered for by various governmental, non-governmental and faith base organisations. The absence of programmes to calm the minds of orphans stripped of the protection of immediate family members, their homes, and family structures make many of them more vulnerable amidst the exiting vulnerabilities in the camps and recent lukewarm attitude of the Nigeria government towards the maintenance of IDPs’ camps, resulting from the global shortfall of oil prices and corrupt practices. Allegations of officials of the state emergency management agency (SEMA) re-bagging rice meant for IDPs feeding, for onward sales in the market are common issues in the media (National News, 2015; Pulse, 2016). Thus most camps are at the mercies of international organisations, NGOs, faith based organisations (FBOs) and private individual donors. Though the efforts of these organisations have been commendable, it is however described as not regular by IDPs and camp officials. The irregularities expose a number of orphans to the street and issues of molestation and sexual violence arose from neighbours and neighbouring communities who lure children and youths from IDP camps with gifts and money.

Similarly, accounts of security personnel (the military and the joint task force) molesting IDPs (children and adults) emerged in the quest of safeguarding the communities hosting IDPs form the intrusion of Boko Haram insurgents. Hakeem noted that ‘Boys are often flogged with horsewhip, whenever they return late at night to the community, because they suspect anybody can be a member of Boko Haram’ (Male/17years/ Sabon-Tasha Camp/Kaduna). Baba too remarked that ‘even suspicious faces are interrogated and if one cannot mention the particular neighbourhood or head of his or her household one could also receive beating (Male 14years/Kargarko Camp/Kaduna State). As Simbiat elaborates:

Though we have been warned from time to time not to go or return late from the city to the camps because of the insecurity in the country, and also that military men do patrol at night to prevent Boko Haram members from infiltrating the villages around. The safety warning is to avoid them from mistaking us as members of Boko-Haram, since there are no identity documents distinguishing IDPs. So there are checkpoints everywhere, stop and search operations just as it is on the highways. But the boys will always be boys, they are often the ones that will fall victims to police molestation and brutality. On a particular day, a boy was almost shot, he ran into the bush all because he wanted to avoid being punished, he came home late but with bruises all over his body. He told us he ran into the bush on sighting a military man. Most ladies do not go out late and we return home earlier than the boys (Female/ 17years/Kargarko Camp/Kaduna State/February 2016).

These narratives inform us that there are security personnel in the environs where IDPs’ camps are located (both formals and informal camps), occasionally militarised to safeguard the communities and not specifically for the IDPs safety, nevertheless IDPs live perpetually in fear, not only of their next meal but also of routine violence of assaults and molestations. Instances of female IDPs (not necessarily orphans) being sexually assaulted by military personnel and some unscrupulous members of the communities were mentioned in communities hosting informal camps. This was however not the case in formal camps. A typical example is the Kuchigoro IDPs’ camp in Abuja where security measures and better attention are more evident. Rukiyat narrated how her friend (Amina) was sexually assaulted and the resultant stigmatisation from her pregnancy made her to run away from Kargarko to Bawa camp:

Amina was very close to this particular woman and members of her family in the community, she sometimes sleeps over her place because they were nice to her and other IDPs, they shower her with largesse. Not knowing that the husband of the woman has been lustfully looking at her. The man in question is a notable elder in the community. One day in the absence of his wife, He raped her. Amina reported the case to the community head, nobody believed her story, and instead she was scolded for always wearing seductive clothes. When she became pregnant, she moved to Bawa camp out of shame and the stigma she would suffer if she decides to remain in this camp and community (Female/17years/KargarkoCamp/Kaduna State/February 2016).

The expectation of judgement or stigma by Amina was borne out of the fear of teenage pregnancies without proper marital blessings from parents. In most societies, such situations, often foreclose the opportunity for teenage mothers to access appropriate support, prevent women from a full and free consideration of options following an unplanned pregnancy and perpetuates the social exclusion of young mothers (Macvarish, 2010; Briedis 1975 and Fessler, 2008; Ellis-Slohan, 2013). Just as some community members take advantage of young girls, so also do military men forcefully engage in sexual affairs with female IDPs. There were accounts of female IDPs being lured with power, money and items ranging from expensive goods such as clothes and beauty products (makeup accessories for women) to simple and cheap items, from food to sweets. Sexual assaults were described as also frequent between male and female IDPs, often late at night and outside the camps. Loveth noted that ‘some young boys have forgotten their sorrows so soon, and are in the habits of conniving with male friends within and outside the camp (non IDPs) in the neighbourhood to rape innocent girls (Female/16years/Kuchingoro Camp/Abuja/November 2016). Zaki emphasised that friendship is expected but how to go about it in the camp could be very difficult: ‘So the bigger boys in the camp sometimes make use of force in having affairs with younger girls in nearby farms’ and on their way from city hustling (Male/14years/Kuje Camp/Abuja/November 2016). Dogna elaborates further:

It is often through deceitful means. I was a victim, Musa asked me to walk him down the road to get some drinks and steak and on our way back to the camp he started fondling my body. I had to run for my dear life. In the formal camp, freedom is quite limited; molestations and assaults are not rampant (Female/16years/Kuje Camp/Abuja/November 2016).

Amidst the vulnerable conditions facing orphans in the camps, (in and outside the camps), orphans with poor adaptation and bonding to surrogate families are either left with two options of accepting their faith (often they become unnecessarily reserved and idle in the camps) and running away as alternative. According to Mr. Rasheed, a camp leader in Plateau State:

Orphans’ running away from camps is very common in informal camps but there is often nobody to take their statistics seriously. IDPs come and go, just as deaths of IDPs. But this camp has experienced three cases in the past two years. A girl and two boys have left the camp, the whereabouts of the boys is not known. In search of these children, the girl was said to have been impregnated and absconded with a military man who once worked in this location. The police report says she absconded with an unknown soldier (Interview/Camp Coordinator Bukuru Camp/Plateau State/January 2016).

Another account shows that even among IDPs sexual activities and teenage pregnancies was not limited to girls and boys outside the camps but also between IDPs. Narrating the case of Ruth (15 years), a surrogate mother revealed thus:

Ruth had a boy friend called James (17 years), he was well known in the camp. And he is the only person Ruth confides in because they both speak the same dialect. As time goes he was nowhere to be found. Ruth started vomiting weeks after. I became suspicious. Later she confessed that she was pregnant. This was the reason why James had to run away (Mr. Collins/Surrogate Parents/Kuje Camp/Abuja/February 2015).

Apart from being orphaned, female children are particularly vulnerable as soft targets for hoodlums. In camp and non-camp situations, females are often victims of sexual violence, rape, sexual assault, forced recruitment and other forms of sexual violence and forced labour. As in the case of female refugees, they face the rigors of long journeys seeking safety, official harassment and frequent sexual abuse even after reaching an apparent place of safety (Rehn and Sirleaf, 2002; USAID, 2006; Olsson, 2004). These events have led to some government officials and personalities calling for the closure of IDPs’ camp, if the Nigerian government cannot fully provide funding. This is well captured in a personnel response to deviant activities in IDPs’ camp:

The inability of government to fully finance IDPs’ programmes has led to several issues of child trafficking, drug addictions, gangsterism, early child marriage and prostitution to flourish in many IDPs’ camps and host communities. We are often ridiculed for not meeting IDPs needs. There are too many of them in communities that are not documented in Central and Northern areas of Nigeria. It is important that government regulate by closing camps that are scattered (Interview/Male/Official/Kuje Camp/Abuja/November 2015).

The above summations are very similar with the security risks facing women generally in post-conflict situations (USAID, 2006; Olsson, 2004). Accounts of female vulnerabilities in this study further buttressed the fact, that many have simply escaped from one form of violence, only to be confronted with another.

**Bonding: Surrogate families and orphans’ adaptability**

IDPs suffer emotional problems, which are characterized by memory of fearful events and nightmares, loss of livelihoods, frustrations, abuses, and threats of assaults and powerlessness (Durosaro and Ajiboye, 2011; Cagoco-Guiam, 2013). For orphans, the situation is further heightened as children are forced to take up adult roles in camps and as appendages to families or individuals facing similar conditions as IDPs. In the cases of improper placement of orphans in the hands of incapable surrogate parents, emotional problems emerged, associated with poverty, the inability of surrogate parents (adults) to provide for the family and children become breadwinners by going outside the camp to the city centres to get not only their daily bread but also that of their parents. In this situation orphans contribute to the rise of child breadwinners in Nigeria (Ikuomola, 2014; Isamah, and Okunola, 1997). Apart from going to the street in search of food, difficulties in camp settings and situations have also led to records of orphans and younger IDPs running away from camps in search of better living conditions in other camps, while others go about wondering, hoping they can one day locate a relative and lost members of their family. In the same vain, references were made about orphans running away from one family to a more favourable family to live with. This was common among orphans who felt lonely and very uncomfortable with their aged surrogate families. Mrs. Janet noted the case of Wudi (Male/12years/Orphan) who followed her son from the streets in Kuje area council, begging for alms to Kunchigoro camp and decided not to return. He blended well with my only surviving son. Ever since, he has come to see us as his family (Mrs. Janet/Kuchingoro Camp/Abuja/ November 2015).

Thus, attachment to ‘natural’ families creates a better bonding for orphans. For the fact that camp officials and leaders are often too busy with providing food and sanitation to IDPs, there is little or no time to embark on proper background checks or regular visitations to surrogate families to ascertain the adaptability of orphans. While the idea of having surrogate families in IDPs’ camps is welcomed, as it is meant to create adequate cover-up for lost families, and a safer homelike scenario, orphans could have been placed in the hands of psychopaths. Thus, many orphans fail to bond and adapt with their surrogate families. Orphans caught in situations of improper placement and the inadequacies of basic needs in camps are especially at risk of disappearing from institutions or being abandoned in them. In one of the interviews, young Kudus (13 years) emphasised the busy survival schedule of surrogate parents to make ends meet for themselves, with little attention for the children:

After morning meals in the camp we all dismiss, they don’t have my time. Everyone goes out to town because there is no assurance of food till night. Every day I go out to farm (cutting of weeds) in nearby communities for a fee. Sometimes l go to houses where I can be of help doing basic house chores, cleaning (washing of clothes and dishes), for a meal and return late at night just like them (Male/ Sabon-Tasha Camp/Kaduna State/February 2016).

Another noted:

I feel like running away sometimes, but I am handicapped. I don’t really know where to go. If things continue this way, I will one day leave just like my friends Ibrahim and Raymond. I feel abandoned here (Musiliu/Male/Orphan/11years/Riyom Camp/Plateau State/January/2016).

The narrative above is further clarified and elaborated by Musiliu and the families that once hosted Ibrahim and Raymond prior to their departure. Musiliu noted that Ibrahim and Raymond are also orphans, 16 and 14 years of age respectively who ran away from the camp: ‘for not getting the needed attention, care and love from their surrogate parents and the camp in generally’. According to their parents, ‘Ibrahim complains about everything in the camp and difficult to please. He wants to live in the city. Several times he has had the gut to confront us saying ‘’we are too old to be his parents’’ (Mr. and Mrs. Jubril/65years/Bukuru Camp/Plateau State/January 2016). For Raymond, he is a stubborn boy always moody, he fights a lot and very aggressive. Whenever he is calm he tells stories of his lost sisters and dead parents. He said he saw his mother being killed by Boko Haram insurgents, but he keeps saying he wants to search for his sisters, that they are still alive. I guess that was why he ran away (Mrs Kannesaju/Riyom Camp/58years/Plateau State/January 2016). These narratives shows that children will often seek alternatives with minimal or no support in transitioning to independent living outside the camp especially in situation where bonding fails to take place.

**Powerlessness of Surrogate families: Orphans’ coping strategies and adjustments to life**

The lack of adequate care and protection in camp institutions expose children to life-threatening dangers (UNICEF, 2015; UNHCR, NHRC and FEMA Conference Report, 2015). And since the IDPs’ camps are often ill-equipped and unhygienic at best, malaria, typhoid fever, cholera, measles, amongst other infectious diseases are said to be rampant. In Kuchingoro, Abuja, the best of all camps observed, on site was a motorized borehole, requiring IDPs to pay for their water, or fetch water from a small, nearby stagnant stream. Poor standard of sanitation facilities and waste evacuation throughout the site leave IDPs vulnerable to disease concerns.IDPs are in dire need for medical attention, access to doctors/clinics, pre-natal care and access to medicine. The general helplessness of IDPs in Nigeria is well captured in one of the community leaders’ assertions:

At night the children and women sleep inside the hall or class rooms, mostly on mats and in a few cases on mattresses, while the men among them spread their mats along the verandas for whatever their sleep is worth in the poorly kept surroundings. No tap water. Often they go to near and far wells to fetch water for drinking and washing. Though there are tanks, irregular supply of water is the case. The available makeshift toilet is meant to last for ninety days (three months), but they have been here of over two three years (Community Leader/Kuje Camp/Abuja/December 2015).

UNICEF’s (2015) report on missing childhood succinctly posited that ‘Nigerian children in the IDP camps showed an 18% threshold of malnutrition, higher than a global emergency threshold of 15%’ (p.10). Orphans irrespective of being attached to surrogates parents, and children with disabilities are especially at risk, in some cases they are often relegated to the most barren and filthy sections of the camp and left without activities. Instances of surrogate families abandoning orphans were revealed by IDPs. Similarly a wide range of features of orphans/children’s peer cultures was identified. Communal sharing: (orphans between the ages of 10-17 were seen gathering separately away from other children, also depending on their physical size) and control: (orphans making persistent attempt to gain control of their lives and they always attempt to share that control with each other). These are some of the secondary adjustment strategies orphans adopt in their daily routines within and outside IDPs’ camps. Of the 50 interviewed orphans, about two-third (32) were not happy with their families for reasons associated with lack of education, inadequate care and protection, not necessary from the camp but specifically from surrogate families. Orphans expectations were not often communicated to parents but to one another in play group settings. Orphans expectations revealed how constrained surrogate parents could be:

He said he will do his best to be my father, but I do not see him as a father, sometimes it looks as if I am his houseboy. Often it is.... ‘’James go get me cigarette, James go check if there are any government official around,...’James ‘do this’ ‘James do that’....’without James nothing is done’. It has been like this for two years doing all errands. I cannot recall what he has done for me as a father. I only obey him because of his age and frail health (Male/16years/ Sabon-Tasha Camp/Kaduna State/December 2015).

Sometimes you just want them to praise you for work done but nothing. They see it as normal, they see themselves as also helpless, and I know a helpless person cannot understand and give help. As an orphan I expect them to show me love, send me to school, and provide basic things for me. (Female/13years/Bukuru Camp/Plateau State/ January 2016).

It is difficult for me to tell them my needs. I once did, I was told to always ask the camp coordinators or NEMA officials for my needs. I wake up in the morning, greet them, I take my bath then move to the street alongside other children, especially when there is very little or nothing to eat in the camp. Thus we don’t really communicate. If not for other children, life would have been so boring. With the children, we mix and go out, sometimes to the farm to fetch firewood. Most times we go to the city centre to beg. In the same way we play games, share our problems and catch fun together (Male/12years/ Kuchingoro Camp/Abuja/February 2016).

The above narratives show clearly that many surrogates parents are powerless as aged IDPs and as individuals who are not employed nor have any form of regular income or stipend. In this situation orphans and children looking up to adults who do not have economic power and authority, end up find alternatives, and the space for both primary and secondary (mal) adjustments increases. It was not uncommon to see orphans mingling more with other children without supervisions. They spend great deal of time creating and protecting the shared play and peer routines that provide them with a sense of excitement and emotional security like children in a care facility (Corsaro, 2003). This also points to the fact that there are communication gaps between orphans and their surrogate parents in both host communities and official camps. A respondent noted that there is nothing to really share with them, 'they are not my parents and they just cannot be, and there is nothing they can do to help me, rather I am the one helping them’ (Jumia/Female/15years/Riyom Camp/ Plateau State/January/2016). Another said: ‘without my help they would have died’ (Salisu/Male/16years/Kuje Camp/Abuja/February 2016). Investigations reveal signs of schizophrenia or mania that is marked by delusions, hallucinations, incoherence, and distorted perceptions of reality among orphans and surrogate parents, especially among those who have experienced multiple displacements. Mariam (14 years) and Sulaiman (16years) are among some children observed to be exhibiting some possible signs of psychosis. Mariam’s situation was also affirmed by their parents. Mrs. Halimi (Surrogate parent/48years/) described Mariam as ‘always too silent and reserved’ and whenever she is alone ‘she talks aloud’ often saying ‘I will find my parents someday’. For Suilaman, his parents puts it thus ‘he is ‘unnecessarily stubborn and unpredictable’. Unlike Mariam, Sulaiman was described as very aggressive. Mr Mustapha elaborates:

‘He is always fighting with other children, he goes out late and sometimes you don’t see him for days, other times he is with other families, you cannot predict his behaviour. He makes friends with wrong and rough guys within and outside the camp. He has never for once been happy with us, and the camp (Surrogate Patent/61years/Sabon-Tasha Camp/Kaduna State/February/2015).

These behaviours were acknowledged as not only common to orphans but also occurred among young and older adults. About 22 of the 50 orphans (13 females and 9 males) could be observed to openly display some of these aggressions and reservations. More of the female orphans take to sleeping when they are not on the street. These are signs of (mal) adjustments to their families as well as the camp situation. Situations like these widens the gap between orphans and surrogates families’ in terms of communication on one hand, and on the other psychological vulnerabilities are heightened in the absence of regular activities and interactions with significant others. While interactions were relatively poor between orphans and their foster families, it was however cordial and strong with peers in similar conditions which is not a healthy situation for young and growing children. In all of the camps and communities covered there were no psychologists among members of NEMA to assist with proper counselling of IDPs to make them accept realities and gradually return them back to a state where they can pick up the remains and ruins of their lives to kick start and to flourish again.

**Conclusion**

This study has revealed a considerable overlap in the difficulties experienced by children orphaned by religious, ethnic and communal crisis in Northern Nigeria. It is quite evident that attachment of orphans to surrogate families though aimed at providing succour, familial access, most of all, psychological and emotional support, suffers a number of outstanding challenges. Inadequacies in camps arrangement and provisions of basic necessities for adult IDPs and families further made it impossible for orphans and children alike to be provided with much needed familial and economic care. Thus, the idea of surrogacy in IDPs’ camps is defeated. As orphans not only failed to properly bond with their new families, ironically, they also had to provide and assist the families in a range of domestic and economic engagements. Children are seen on the streets and city centres taking up adult roles to make ends meet. Amidst orphans’ personal attempts to restore balance and harmony within the domain of supposedly family life as conceptualised by their resilience, they are stressed, and are exposed to more vulnerabilities (molestations, exploitations, sexual violence, teenage pregnancies, drug abuse, and prostitution) and associated maladjustments signs such as withdrawal syndrome and aggressiveness with their surrogate parents and other children. In their daily life experiences they live in sheer poverty, pervasive hunger, and lack of adult supervision which impact adversely on their physical (externalised), psychological, mental as well as emotional (internalised) balance.

IDPs are among the most vulnerable set of people, especially orphans and children with special needs who are often classified as one whole category. The Nigerian government, non-governmental organisations (NGOs), faith based organisations (FBOs), civil society groups (CSGs) and other international humanitarian partners need to intensify their efforts in ensuring that orphans and children as IDPs and IDPs generally are well catered for beyond mere provisions of food, shelters, clothing, security, and medical aids which come in piecemeal to the inclusion of psychological treatments through experts (professional and academics) who can disaggregate IDPs peculiarities for proper adjustment in camps and afterwards for proper integration in society. Though the global shortfall of oil prices and corrupt practices presently have greatly hindered the Nigerian government’s capacity in the struggle to facilitate proper care for IDPs in their numbers and diverse locations, there is no doubt that more can be done in savaging the plights of orphans in the face of emerging violence, economic difficulties, adjustment crises and noticeable withdrawal syndrome suffered by orphans in IDPs' camps. Despite these challenges and limitations, this study cannot deny the fact that IDPs’ camps provide a relatively safe haven for children. It is important to note that a lot of gaps and gray areas in IDPs arrangements and financing needs to be considered by both governmental and non-governmental agencies in checkmating violence and adjustment problems. This study is not in any way exhaustive, further research should be embarked upon in the areas of sexual violence in IDP’s camps and corrupt practices in the management of resources meant for IDPs. Findings from such studies will further empower our drive as researchers to impact on policies that will bring about better living condition for IDPs in Nigeria.

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**Book Review: Douglas P. Fry, editor, *War, Peace, and Human Nature: The Convergence of Evolutionary and Cultural Views*, (New York: Oxford University Press, 2013) 562 pages, index. US$105.00 (hard cover); US $39.95 (paper). ISBN 978-0-19-985899-6**

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Although social scientists have been writing about war for decades (and increasingly now about peace), there does not yet appear to be a basic comprehensive social science text (or sourcebook) of war and peace that would meet the definition of social science and incorporate predictive models of war (and peace) and the applied technologies of applied social science for achieving peace, in a single volume. Fry’s, *War, Peace and Human Nature*, might qualify as a recent attempt to do so given its size and inclusion of a wide scope of subfields. Like some previous books, however, Fry’s book is more of a compendium of review essays and conference papers than a text. It is infused with polemics, taking an ideological, if not a religious stand (attempting to define “human nature”) on the human historic record as one of mostly peace rather than war. There is much in the book that is new and that could certainly serve as the backbone of a course or study in the social science of war and peace. However, there is also evidence here that social science has been distracted and diverted to what are really religious debates about “human nature,” which do not really help us to predict when wars will occur or offer technologies to limit or avert it..

This book is filled with chapters by some of the leading authors of the past 30 years in the wide subfields of anthropology of war (and peace) as well as some new contributors. The small print volume packs about half a million words into its pages. That is more than double the size of some previous collections that are what is currently available as texts, (Morton Fried and Marvin Harris’, *War: Anthropology of Armed Conflict*, 1967; Ferguson’s, *Warfare, Culture and Environment*, 1984; Turner’s, *Anthropology of War and Peace*, 1988; Haas’s, *Anthropology of War*, 1990; Reyne and Downs, *Studying War*, 1994; Ottterbein’s, *Anthropology of War*, 2009; and Waterston’s, *Anthropology of War*, 2009) among them. The book has 32 contributors, mostly from anthropology but also psychology, offering 26 chapters. Among the authors are Brian Ferguson and Jonathan Haas, authors/editors of two of the earlier texts.

The book’s main effort is to convince the reader that the human archaeological and evolutionary record is one more of peace rather than war. As Fry notes, “During most of our prehistory, we were nomadic hunter-gatherers, which today are not particularly known for warfare” (p. xii). His goal is to use this data to “put human nature in perspective” (p. xiv). The data presented in the book convinces this reader that were we to live in a society of hunter gatherers or among non-human primates, in a world where there were abundant resources for everyone, the only violence we would have to fear would be conflicts over mating. The problem, though, is that today we are no longer hunter gatherers living in abundance. Instead, we live in a world where we humans are putting increasing pressures on global resources and where our political systems seem to hunger for use of those resources in ways that co-exist with perpetual war and that authors in this book recognize as the cause of war (“homicide rates increase with population pressure”, Kelly, Chapter 9,p. 159).

Apart from the unconvincing political goal of the book and its lack of coherence as a social science text, one can still “mine” various chapters in an effort to track through some of the archaeological and anthropological literature in this subfield...The approach of the book is clearly a comprehensive one. In an era where social sciences have become fragmented and overspecialized and where anthropology, itself, as the study of human groups and their central phenomena (such as war and peace making) has been disintegrated in many (perhaps most) major universities and has lost its focus on such key behaviors of human groups, this book offers an holistic approach and partly goes beyond. It starts with a section on Ecology/Evolution/Genetics to examine the Sociobiology of war and peace, moves on to human prehistory (Archaeology), then to Social Anthropology/Ethnography (though mostly of pre-agricultural and pre-industrial societies), then Primatology (Physical Anthropology), to incorporate three of anthropology’s four holistic subfields (not including linguistics), though in an order that seems to defy logic (Primatology after Archaeology, since those chapters also partly deal with peacemaking strategies). It then focuses on Peace Making as a separate subject across human and primate history.

Part I of the book offers a detailed and comprehensive review of approaches in Sociobiology/Evolution/Genetics and many of the fundamentals of the discipline, though it is painstaking to read. It is more exciting to read the original theories of Axelrod (evolution of cooperation), E.O. Wilson (1978) and Konrad Lorenz (1982), and primatology including van der Waal (1982) on bonobos, Fossey (1983) on mountain gorillas, and films like “Project Nim” (2011) on a chimpanzee raised as a human and showing how our emotions and aggression work. Often, today, in social science, classic works are lost or forgotten, as they are here, and replaced with “current debates” that may disconnect from the building blocks of the discipline. Nevertheless, the chapters are valid introductions to the assumptions and methodological debates in these subfields, as well as to some of the recent studies and evidence.

In Part II, Ferguson’s Chapter 7, offered as a rebuttal to contemporary works of “warrification”, presents the core argument of the book while Robert Kelly’s Chapter 9 is an excellent social science presentation of occurrence of war, with references to key anthropological and archaeological works. Discussions here walk the reader through the science of the archaeological record and the assumptions and forms of proof and modeling in archaeology.

Part III offers some capsule case study ethnographies of peaceful cultures and their strategies (mostly for interpersonal violence, not war) without much general theory to tie them together. It is followed by an intriguing piece in Chapter 16 by Christopher Boehm, another leader in the field. Boehm seems to disagree with the book’s thesis and believes there is more evidence of war in the ancient human record. He offers an integrated continuum of looking at war, hierarchy, and other aspects of violence (like revenge killings/ feuds) and morality. Chapter 17, by Darcia Narvaez, comparing childrearing and its psychological implications in ancient human cultures (“Small Band Gatherer-Hunters”), when apparently humans were more like bonobos) with those in contemporary imperial cultures (where we are more like the chimpanzees of Ngogo (p. 376)), even though it may be out of place in this volume, is a refreshing look at assumptions of human development and human relations even though it does not deal with the realities of cultural change and its impact on the groups under study and their practices.

Part IV has some fascinating work. Robert Sapolsky’s long-term studies of baboon cultures and diffusion of “peace” behaviors in Chapter 21, followed by studies of behaviors in other primates and in human children, Chapter 22, by Maaike Kempes, Liesbeth Sterch, and Bram Orobio de Castro, helps broaden the investigation. Chapter 22 reinforces the assumptions held by most of the book’s authors that teaching children non-violence will have a transformative impact over the institutions and interests that currently promote war. The presentation, however, looks only at the psychology and ideology of individual behaviors and does not address the very different processes and realities of social and cultural change that occur at the level of culture and society.

Part V’s focus on peace making from the perspective of military applications of psychological theories seems a bit disconnected, in disciplines and theory, with the rest of the book. Nevertheless, the inclusion of Chapter 25 by two retired military, Hughbank and Grossman, is inspired because it shows how modern cultures use techniques of psychological control to override the “midbrain inhibition” to war and to program soldiers, police, and the mass public from childhood (essentially a strategy of “Nazification”) to become killing automatons without empathy, humanity, or independence. These psychological techniques play on innate human responses to authority and co-action, and include using “combat conditioning techniques in children” through desensitization to violence, in creation of an overall “warrior renaissance” integrated with our lethal technologies. It is easy to see features of modern society described in this chapter and to accept the vision of the authors that contemporary societies are indeed the violent nightmarish visions of Kubrick’s classic films (*Clockwork Orange* and *Dr. Strangelove*).

The failure of this book in offering a cohesive theory or model is that the central debate in the book over “human nature” as warlike or peace-making is essentially a religious debate over the Christian view of humans “born in sin” (presented here as the 17th century philosophy of Thomas Hobbes) or having a “fate” versus freedom of action to change society (presented here as the 18th century philosophy of Jean Jacques Rousseau). While social science can certainly provoke religious questions, the danger is that theological and ideological beliefs can erode the objectivity, veracity, applicability and/or legitimacy of the social science that can underlie the debate. The failure to create boundaries ends up distorting several of the chapters in the book. Brian Ferguson’s definition of war as “organized lethal violence” (p. 90) is an example of the problem. War cannot be “organized” until there is a society with division of labor and technology (to produce weapons). Therefore, the conclusion will always be that traditional small scale societies do not have “war”, simply because they do not have complex social organization of any functions, including deadly violence. The question about war in human nature thus becomes tautological because of the subjectivity of the definition.

The assumption of the book is that this question about human nature must be answered is itself questionable and is driven by an ideological belief of the author that ideologies are needed to combat ideologies and that it is ideologies that drive societies, including war. None of this is backed up by any social science models of where ideologies come from, how they change, or whether ideologies are even the cause of action or just the verbal justification for other factors that are the real causes. In presenting this underlying belief of the book’s authors, two of the authors, Jonathan Haas and Matthew Piscitelli argue that war in the U.S. today has become a “self-perpetuating ideology” that is driven by a belief of “the Pentagon and other public policy makers” that war is “innate” and that countries now need to be constantly prepared for war and ready to engage in it without any “fundamental reason to look for the immediate causes of war” and to consider peaceful alternatives (p. 169). They move immediately from this assertion to the belief that the way to change the Pentagon and other militaries and to promote peace is to present a fat academic volume arguing that war is not innate. This is not based on science or reason. It is simply “religious” faith. If we already live in a militarized world run by military technology and ideology, what is the reason to believe that an academic book would change this, or that the debate this book responds to isn’t one that has already been funded by military interests to divert attention from real technologies of change?

As an anthropologist, one thing that our profession does is to analyze the fundamental interests behind ideologies to see what may be going on. Very often, what is presented as “debate” or “change” is actually a form of co-dependency between both sides that assures that nothing really changes at all. This reviewer’s view, in reading through this book, is that many of the authors, working in a university structure that is parallel to military organizations, may in fact be co-dependent on diverting predictive social science modeling and tools of change into a religious debate that takes a lot of energy but, like religious debates, ultimately will make little or no difference because it avoids examining fundamental causes and solutions.

The “solution” that Fry offers in the conclusion of the book, in a discussion on how to promote peace (Chapter 27, “Cooperation for Survival: Creating a Global Peace System”) is to create another supra-national organization for peace. The view of this author, having worked for several years with the United Nations, the global development banks, agencies of the European Union, and with governments in some 30 countries is that this is academic naivete. We already have plenty of supra-national organizations that have legal missions of security, protection of minorities, protection of the environment and solving the fundamental causes of war and violence. The missions of almost all of them have been co-opted by agendas of trade and productivity that mostly undermine the potential for security and long-term peace. Fry’s model of something better is the European Union, which is arguably just a trade bloc, and one of the examples of failure. The European Union is not very protective of minority autonomy. It is essentially an aggregation of relatively equal “colonies” asserting themselves against other superpowers, acting to protect itself and to exploit the resources of former European colonies of Africa, Asia and the Middle East to promote resource and cash crop exports and investments, but not to further global peace. The EU’s seemingly draconian economic policy pressures on Greece, for example, to eliminate most of its social safety nets and public investments in order to balance its “payments” show that these practices now are exerted within the EU, itself, despite the repercussions on local populations and the implications for potential political violence.

Indeed, this reviewer finds some of the underlying views of “peace” that are presented in this book to be troubling, if not frightening. There are four chapters in the book that describe “peace” including Paul Roscoe’s Chapter 24, “Social Signaling, Conflict Management and the Construction of Peace”, which offers a short ethnography of the interaction between Yangoru peoples of Papua New Guinea. Their solution to avoid war is one of “peaceful” exchanges of pigs (the objects of greatest value to the Yangoru are their pigs, in the way that other agricultural people’s most valuable possessions are their oxen or cattle) to replace battle. What Roscoe is actually describing is a situation where a weaker group peacefully capitulates to the stronger and apparently loses its land. “Might makes right” may be achieved through peaceful means, but this seems to just be a justification for the imperially imposed peace of the “Pax Romana” and “Pax Americana” that denies the right of peoples to survive with their environments. Part of the avoidance of modern issues and moralities in this book leads to potential uncomfortable inferences that strategies of peace should also include the submission of weaker human groups (as occurs with other primates and historically) rather than focus on dismantling empires. It is interesting to study the full human record and to see which principles might apply across species of primates or across human cultures, independent of social organization, technology, and environmental relations. At the same time, where different variables change the models (in the same way that laws of physics are supplemented at different conditions like higher velocity), these need to be taken into account. We live today in a world of perpetual war and technologies that may themselves impel war with limited human action, of increasing pressures on (and hunger for) resources that societies do not wish to avert despite having the ability to do so, of weapons of annihilation that could wipe us out faster than this review is published, as well as of genocides and internal conflicts. Apart from one or two articles from psychologists looking at individual behaviors, but not from anthropologists who study the levels of culture and society, this book seems to avoid addressing that reality, without explanation. Anthropology can certainly be applied to predicting contemporary warfare and explaining whether or not (and how) technologies can and do create the conditions for peace (and not just through “trade”, where contemporary globalization is creating the very resource pressures that the authors note are a cause of war). The book’s authors critique the unsatisfactory psychological, political and ideological explanations promoting “warrification” (Ferguson’s term, that this reviewer interprets to mean “militarization” of peoples and ideology, p. 116) but they do not further the work of social science that could present alternatives. Nor do they discuss processes of changing the cultures of empires and the genocide of expansion (into what Ferguson calls war in the “Tribal Zone”), and examine whether it is inevitable or subject to change according to the laws of culture (p. 222). All of these authors leave a gaping hole in social science, leaving few who are able or willing to fill it.

While there is a great deal of interest here to different audiences along with a bit that is just downright strange (e.g., Chapter 26’s focus on singing competitions), there is a failure to pull it all together in a comprehensive way that would serve as a general textbook. The lack of attention to book production (e.g., limiting the index to a mere 4 pages for a work of this complexity and size) also makes it difficult for readers to try to pull it all together.

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**Author Biography**

David Lempert published one of the first neo-Malthusian models for explaining political violence using Mauritius as a case study. He extended this modeling to explaining the periods of purges and revolutions in the Soviet Union in his two volume work, Daily Life in a Crumbling Empire. His more recent work focuses on approaches to building democratic culture through democratic experiential education (his book, Escape from the Ivory Tower) and to new forms of democratic protection and oversight in model constitutions and in accountability tools of international organizations. He is a Ph.D. social anthropologist, attorney and international development consultant, currently running a heritage protection project in Southeast Asia.