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**Guest Editor**:

**Dr. Erik Juergensmeyer**

**Special Issue:**

**The Rhetoric of Agitation and Protest**

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**Introduction—Rhetoric and Activism: Opportunities for Influencing Public Thought and Action**

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**Keywords:** Rhetoric, Activism, Peace and Conflict Studies

**INTRODUCTION—RHETORIC AND ACTIVISM:** **OPPORTUNITIES FOR INFLUENCING PUBLIC THOUGHT AND ACTION**

Rhetoric has a rich history with advocacy and engagement in public discourse. Grounded in Aristotle’s *On Rhetoric: A Theory of Civic Discourse* (1991), rhetoric has evolved from the ‘ability to identify the available means of persuasion in any given situation’ to include a wide range of symbolic strategies for influencing public thought and action. This expansion has also occurred with rhetoric’s companion discipline of composition. As an offshoot of rhetoric, composition studies has experienced several “public turns,” solidifying its connection to public discourse (McComiskey, 2000; Mathieu, 2005; Welch, 2008; Scott, 2009). Combined, these fields of study put forth scholarship and work that forward rhetorics of activism (Ackerman & Coogan, 2010; Berlin, 1987; Cushman, 1996; Goldblatt, 2008; Grabill, 2011; Flower, 2008; Kahn & Lee, 2011, Moore & Goldberg, 2015; Rhetoricians for Peace, etc.).

Within peace and conflict studies, rhetoric is showing itself as a worthy participant in the conversations. Several excellent works explicitly demonstrate how rhetoric contributes to peace and conflict (Bowers, Ochs, Jensen, & Schulz, 2010; Hodges, 2015; Stewart, Smith, & Denton, 2012, etc.), and many more continue to implicitly establish this connection (see disciplinary conversations on argumentation, civic engagement, contact zones, critical pedagogy, democracy, human rights, literacy, public spheres, service-learning, etc.). Most often in these studies, rhetoric appears as a set of theoretical, analytical, and productive arts that demonstrate how symbolic interactions can motivate action and/or effect change.

Theoretically, rhetoric offers ways to understand the interplay between dialogue and dialectic as they relate to peace talks, humanitarian missions, conflict resolution, etc. Theories from Classical rhetoric to Enlightenment to the new rhetorics focus on rhetoric as knowledge-making activity that helps speakers develop ideas as well as communicate them. For example, social theories of rhetorical invention abet conflict resolvers as they seek mutual gains (e.g. Lloyd-Jones, 2003; Juergensmeyer, 2011). And, Classical theories of ethics provide grounding for contemporary sites of activist intervention (e.g. Weaver, 1953/1985; Hasbrook, 2011). Both of these applications seek to improve upon existing practices by providing foundations for effective public engagement.

Analytically, rhetoric provides frameworks for understanding persuasive appeals and discursive strategies in order to deconstruct a variety of peace-and-war-related artifacts and propaganda. For example, Kenneth Burke’s foundational work (1945/1969, 1950/1969) explaining how rhetors seek to identify with each other in order to resolve conflict continues to provide methods for understanding and improving communication. And, more focused discourse analyses can help peace and conflict practitioners construct narratives supporting positive peace in direct response to divisive, confrontational positions (e.g. Brown, 2009; Dunmire, 2013). Encompassing a broad application of rhetoric to public discourse, varying iterations of rhetorical criticism offer conflict resolvers and activists detailed insights on rhetorics of communication and conflict.

And, productively, rhetoric offers concrete strategies for producing effective communication. Often categorized under areas of the ‘rhetorical canon’ (invention, arrangement, style, memory, and delivery), numerous heuristics exist to guide rhetors through written, oral, and visual discourse. Further developing these applications are numerous approaches to crafting messages. For example, methods of utilizing intertextuality and adapting conventions of discourse communities empower rhetors with means for adopting effective communicative tools (e.g. Porter, 1986; Toulmin, 2003). And, genre awareness and framing strategies empower rhetors with concrete skills to adapt to varying genres (e.g. Del Gandio, 2008; Bawarshi & Reiff, 2010). For activists and the increasing amount of intergovernmental and nonprofit organizations that seek to enact change, the productive arts of rhetoric help contextualize and position greater narratives of peace studies, leading to increased agency and action.

Because of its theoretical-analytical-productive structure, rhetoric has much to contribute to peace and conflict studies. To better understand this relationship, let us examine how rhetoric can contribute to an issue integral to peace and conflict studies: human rights. In a world in which the means and reach of communication only continue to expand, the transformative effects of communication in a global world surface daily. From haunting images of refugee children face down in the sand to divisive methods of advanced interrogation to intimidating extremist social media campaigns, contemporary understandings of rights and justice are constantly being challenged and modified within the public sphere. Further complicating our understandings, traditional declarations of human rights have given way to public awareness campaigns where education rivals shaming of offenders and campaigns dedicated to increasing rights of protectors. Human rights, consequently, now exists not as static, fixed concept but as “an emerging consensus generated by situated communities that are open to internally and externally generated social criticism” (Hogan, 2015, p. 3). Simply put, we are in an age of multiple forms of persuasion that requires more diverse communication and the need for more dynamic discourse (Babbit & Lutz, 2009).

It is under such changing circumstances where participating in human rights discourse on a variety of levels becomes even more important. As Kate Nash (2009) argues, contemporary human rights discourse now occupies a variety of discursive fields (juridicial, governmental, activist, and public) making it more subject to the arts of rhetoric and persuasion (pp. 32-58). Of these fields, the latter sub-field of the ‘mediated public’ is especially relevant to contributing to understandings of human-rights. Having the potential to influence all other sub-fields and connecting to a variety of different voices, the media can be very effective to contemporary conversations:

News media – television, radio, newspapers, and increasingly the Internet – bring human rights issues into […] ‘mediated publicness’, the only kind of public life and public debate possible in complex societies […] In the mediated public, human rights are contested and definitions of what human rights are or should be are introduced and consolidated, or emerge and then disappear, or are quite simply rendered invisible and therefore irrelevant. (pp. 50-51).

Nash’s understanding invites rhetoricians and activists to contribute to mediated dialogues in order to challenge the “authoritative definitions of human rights” claimed by others (p. 56). Our analytical and persuasive strategies position us perfectly to contribute to a public that is “not democratic” (Nash, 2009, p. 51) and therefore needs participatory agenda and frame setting that rhetoricians and activists can offer.

This special issue contributes to public conversations of activism and peace studies, and the authors participate in a variety of ways: interdisciplinarity, educational advocacy, peace work, and by reframing ongoing conversations. By emphasizing the interdisciplinary nature of models for peace, Giorgio Gallo shows how peace activists utilize a variety of discourse. Michael Royster reminds us of the importance of activist rhetorics and civil rights discourse. Regarding education and identity, Mubarak Ahmad and Mahsood Shah demonstrate the importance of education to youth interested in creating change. For the classroom, Amy Pason provides concrete practices for teaching students interested in rhetoric, while Kathryn Johnson Gindlesparger provides concrete practices for teaching professionally-oriented undergraduate students. As rhetoric influences practices for on-the-ground peace work, Karim Issifu demonstrates the importance of local context in peace building. Analytically, Evan Hoffman identifies conflict resolution strategies in effective international peace talks. And, Anna Hutcheson demonstrates the importance of personal agency and discourse to peace and peace intervention. Seeking to change existing discourse, Mecke Nagel demonstrates how a rhetoric-centered approach to peace and conflict advocates for direct change in existing practices of incarceration.

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**Efficacy of the Indigenous Approach to Peacebuilding in Africa**

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**EFFICACY OF THE INDIGENOUS APPROACH TO PEACEBUILDING IN AFRICA**

**Abstract**

This article examines the efficacy of the indigenous approach to peacebuilding in Africa. Although Africa is blessed with natural mineral resources, including gold, diamond, manganese and bauxite, the continent is bedeviled with challenges, including rampant civil war, ethnic violence and frequent political uprisings. Thus, almost all the countries in Africa have experienced some form of unrest, partly caused by the colonial legacy of divide and rule, imperialism, genocide and racism among others, which has claimed numerous lives and destroyed many properties. In an effort to build a sustainable peace in Africa, the international community via the Euro-U.S. Centric Colonial White Dominate Approach (EUCCWDA) to peacebuilding is used in countries recovering from war-devastations. However, the review of secondary data, including journals, articles, books etc. revealed that, the EUCCWDA to peacebuilding has not achieved its purpose. Instead, the relegated indigenous peacebuilding approach has attained some level of peace in war-torn countries. It is recommended that, for a sustainable peace to be seen, leaders of African countries should establish a legal framework regarding indigenous peacebuilding.

 **Introduction**

The African continent is blessed with natural mineral resources, including gold, diamond, bauxite, tin, manganese, etc. Other economic resources found in Africa are timber, cocoa, coffee, cashew cotton and rubber among others making the continent enviable. Nevertheless, the continent is, thus faced with a myriad of developmental challenges, including malnutrition, violent conflict, hunger, poverty, slavery, child labor, environmental and animal destruction. In fact, almost all the countries in Africa, including South Africa, Nigeria, Mozambique, Angola, Liberia, DR Congo, [Algeria](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_conflicts_in_Africa#Algeria), Burundi, Somalia, Chad, Sierra Leone, Ivory Coast, Mali, Eritrea, etc., are thus, besets with countless gainsays such as protracted civil war, intractable ethnic conflict, political rivalry, tensions and upheavals (Issifu, 2015a). These backdrops, especially, the ethnic violence and civil wars have their roots from the colonial legacy of divide and rule, racism, genocide, oppression, domination, imperialism and dictatorship. The British colonial legacy, for instance, is accused of the rampant conflicts in Africa (Blanton, Mason, & Athow, 2001). There is no denying the fact that Africa is faced with the roughness of dreadful struggle in political, social, economic and religious spheres (Mbiti, 2010). The continent is ragged with cases of armed conflicts and struggles over territorial (land) claims, political posts, natural resources and other values (Bamidele, 2014), emanating from the effects of imperial power transitions. Consequently, the freedom from imperial powers was, and is still, not a smooth transition in Africa. Even as colonial administrators parted, they left behind supportive elites that, in effect, continued the siphoning of Africa’s wealth and leaving in arrears enormous problems among the African people (Shah, 2010). Specifically, the British colonial legacy is positively associated with the rampant ethnic conflicts in Africa (Blanton et al., 2001).

In congruence, Murithi (2006) observes that colonialism did not only destroy the basis upon which Africans could define themselves, but where it could, it also co-opted the indigenous structures and mechanisms of governance and dispute resolution to serve the interests of the colonial government. In addition, the indigenous traditions with regard to governing and resolving disputes in African societies were, therefore, corrupted by the centralizing power of colonialism (Murithi, 2006). In support of the above assertions, Obi (2012) has confirmed the legacies of colonial manipulations, authoritarianism and external forces as the major causes of violence in Africa. Due to these setbacks, the international community, including the United Nations (UN), European Union (EU) as well as other large donor countries such as the United States of America (US) among others suggest the Euro-US Centric Colonial White Dominate Approach (EUCCWDA), also known as the Western approach, as the only suitable springboard to ensure a lasting peace in the region. In a similar vein, other Euro-US Centric trained peace actors, countries and organizations, including the New Zealand and UN among others hold the view that, it is only the Euro-US Centric methods of peacebuilding: open market, political reforms, democratic elections, rule of law and others that could end the intractable violence in Africa (Reilly, 2008). In effect, the basis for peace in war-shattered zones in Africa are presumed to be market liberalism, democratic elections, and political reforms by the EUCCWDA (Paris, 1997).

Irrespective of the massive support of the EUCCWDA to peacebuilding in Africa, the role of traditional informal institutions such as chieftaincy and the extended family system among others, via mediation, reconciliation, pacification, culture, storytelling, joint problem solving, truth-telling etc., in peacebuilding cannot be over emphasized. This is because, according to Pkalya, Adan and Masinde (2004), traditional informal social entities such as chiefs, elders of the community, extended families, lineages, clans, tribes, religious goodwill, local institutions, and ethno-linguistic groups remain key in the peacebuilding process in Africa. It is also because, countries such as South Africa, Kenya, Rwanda, Malawi, Burundi, Uganda etc., have successfully used the indigenous conflict transformation tactics to promote and build peace in their countries (Olivier & Odendaal, 2008). Choundree (1999) adds that, citizens of war-devastated African states have employed indigenous mechanisms as part of their post-conflict peacebuilding processes to promote a lasting peace. In Chad and Niger, for instance, the indigenous methods of peacebuilding were successfully employed to address the low intensity conflicts that affected these countries (Murithi, 2006). This is why more recently, a number of literature in the field of peace and security, and the *Peace Studies Journal,* for instance, have added some specific references to the propositions that indigenous African culture does play a significant role in peacebuilding, conflict transformation and sometimes peacemaking (Pruitt, 2004).

In spite of the efforts of the traditional peacebuilding methods, that is flexible and has respect for basic human rights, the approach is still not giving the needed recognition. In some case, it is not even discussed during international peace and security discourse; others even see it as unethical, unlettered and ancient myth. Worse of all is that in the past, EU-US Centric minded historians declared that Africa had no history, hence a ‘dark continent’. This could be the reason why up to date some European philosophers see non-EUCCWDA to problem solving as backward and unworthy to invest resources (time, energy and funds) in research (Bamidele, 2014). As Bamidele (2014) rightly put it, many African indigenous systems to peacebuilding that have been modeled for many centuries around the African region remain largely ignored. Therefore, while the EUCCWDA to peacebuilding was thus, taught in modern African societies and institutions, the knowledge of indigenous systems of peace was excluded because it was perceived unworthy to be included in the African modern institutions’ societal curriculums (Bamidele, 2014). This suggests that the EUCCWDA to peacebuilding nullifies the philosophy of traditional approaches to a sustainable peace. Following the above assertions, this article intends to examine the efficacy of the indigenous system of peacebuilding in Africa. In line with the central objective set out to achieve, the rest of the paper is divided into four parts. Thus, the first part will conceptualize key issues; peacebuilding, and approaches to peacebuilding. The second part will focus on the efficacy of the African indigenous systems of peacebuilding. The third part will attempt to point out and discuss with relevant examples from some African states where the EUCCWDA to peacebuilding has failed. In addition, the fourth part will discuss lessons for the future, and end with a conclusion and recommendation.

**Definition of Terms**

The term ‘indigenous’ as opposed ‘contemporary’ does not mean that the former is either bad or inferior to the latter. In present times, people usually use the word ‘indigenous’ loosely to denote origin or original inhabitants of a given community, or an idea which is appropriate to a given people, it could be a way of making peace, nature of a song or mode of doing something such as farming, which has endured over the years (Arthur, Issifu, & Marfo, 2015). Therefore, the terms traditional and indigenous are used interchangeably in this article. In a broader sense, it refers to a range of African cultural practices and products, which are found outside the ‘modern world’. By modern world, I mean North America [US and Canada], Western Europe [France, Italy, Germany, and Britain] and the Southern Hemisphere [Australia and New Zealand]. Hence, indigenous peace is defined as African peacekeeping traditions, which have been developed from within African traditional societies (Bamidele, 2014). Essentially, in the context of this paper, I defined indigenous as African culturally related practices and belief systems, including norms, folklores, native worldview, etc. that have endured the test of time, and contemporarily relevant.

On the other hand, the Euro-US Centric Colonial White Dominate Approach, ‘West/Western’-Conventional and Liberal approaches as used in this article means the same. ‘The West’ is, hence not a geographic term, but is to be understood as comprising the economic, social and political order and the associated worldviews and practices of the ‘developed’ capitalist societies and states; basically those states which had formed the Western bloc during the Cold War. Therefore, EUCCWDA means anything such as ideas, laws, policies, structures, and the way of life among others, commonly to Europeans and the Americans, but coerced on Africans.

**Peacebuilding**

The central aim of peacebuilding is to provide countries emerging out of conﬂicts with the skills and resources they require not only to rebuild, but also to prevent the recurrence of violence. The term “Peacebuilding” first emerged in the 1970s through the work of Johan Galtung who called for the creation of peacebuilding structures to promote a sustainable peace by addressing the “root causes” of violent conflict, and supporting indigenous capacities for peace management and conflict resolution (Galtung, 1996). Since then, peacebuilding has covered a multidimensional exercise and tasks ranging from the disarming of warring factions to the rebuilding of political, economic, judicial, and civil society institutions. Peacebuilding became a familiar concept within the United Nations following the former Secretary-General, Boutros Boutros-Ghali’s 1992 report, *An Agenda for Peace,* defined peacebuilding as action to solidify peace and avoid relapse into conflict. Over time, scholars and institutions have intricate on the definition of peacebuilding provided by Boutros-Ghali and have attempted to explore further, coming out with diverse opinion on peacebuilding. Therefore, the concept of peacebuilding has different definitions by several departments, institutions, schools, agencies, and scholars (Issifu, 2015b).

For example, Call and Cousens (2007), have defined peacebuilding as those actions undertaken by international or national actors to institutionalize peace, understood as the absence of armed conflict (negative peace) and a modicum of participatory politics (as a component of positive peace) that can be sustained in the absence of an international peace operation. Similarly, Porter (2007) defined peacebuilding to involve all processes that build positive relationships, heal wounds, reconcile antagonistic differences, restore esteem, respect rights, meet basic needs, enhance equality, instill feelings of security, empower moral agency and are democratic, inclusive and just. As a follow up, peace psychologists have described peacebuilding in terms of prevention, being proactive, problem solving, meeting human needs, and ending oppression and inequality (Christie, 1997; Wessells, 1992; Abu-Saba, 1999). The term peacebuilding also means to preserve and to ensure enduring peace in the society, removing the root causes of the conflict and genuinely reconciling the conflicting parties (Nwolise, 2005). Additionally, Lederach (1997, 2005) defines peacebuilding as a term that involves a wide range of activities and functions that precede and follow formal peace accords. More so, Mazurana and McKay (1999) emphasized that, peacebuilding involves personal and group accountability and reconciliation processes which contribute to the reduction or prevention of violence.

It is against these diverse definitions that Smoljan (2003) has argued that, at present, there is no definitive definition of peacebuilding. This raises the question as to what exactly can be considered a definition for peacebuilding. However, I define peacebuilding as the process of building the capacities of both formal and informal institutions, agencies, organizations etc. after violence, and putting in place a holistic measure such as an active local participation, local empowerment, and joint-problem solving in dealing with the structural causes of the violence for a sustainable peace. This suggests that measures put in place in African countries recovering from war devastations by an oppressive aid of the UN and Bretton Woods institutions [International Monetary Fund (IMF)/ World Bank (WB)] should not be geared towards only negative peace, but essentially, on positive peace as well (Issifu, 2015a).

**Approaches to Peacebuilding**

Peacebuilding is grouped under two approaches: the top-down and bottom-top approaches. These broad approaches are further associated with the EUCCWDA and traditional peacebuilding respectively. The EUCCWDA to peacebuilding refer to the use of external bodies and foreign systems to transform countries recovering from civil war, violent conflict and natural disasters (Issifu, 2015b). It could also be defined as the use of a coercive formal and external bodies and structures in attempting to end a conflict (Bukari, 2013). Newman, Paris and Richmond (2009) observes that, the prevailing paradigm of EUCCWDA to peacebuilding; liberal peacebuilding and liberal internationalism refers to the transformation of war shattered states into market democratic states and the holding of immediate democratic elections. Paris (1997) adds that the liberal peacebuilding is based on the assumption that the foundation for peace, both within and between states is market democracy. The paradigm involves transplanting Euro-US Centric Colonial White Dominate Models of political, social and economic organization in war-shattered states in order to control civil conflict. The key principles of the EUCCWDA include, holding immediate democratic elections, promoting market liberalism, enhancing humanitarian assistance, encouraging litigation and promoting rule of law (Hoffmann, 1995). In addition, the EUCCWDA to peacebuilding, which is guided by external principles or bodies is very elitist, white male dominate, and oppressive in nature.AsBukari (2013) rightly mentioned, the EUCCWDA is the use of formal and external bodies and structures in seeking to end a conflict and achieving a negative peace.

On the contrary, the indigenous approach to peacebuilding refers to the process of identifying the structural causes of conflict and using elements such as negotiation, culture, and pacification among others from African origin to promote a sustainable peace (Issifu, 2015b). According to Udofia (2011), the indigenous or traditional peacebuilding approach centers primarily on negotiation, mediation, conciliation, pacification and appeasement. Supporting the same viewpoint, Okrah (2003) opines that, traditional societies resolved conflicts through cultural and internal social control mechanisms such as truth-saying, culture and belief systems. Indeed, the traditional approach to peacebuilding seek to promote a win-win or non-zero sum game approach to a sustainable peace (Issifu, 2015a).

In Africa, the indigenous approach to peacebuilding do not only focus on achieving a negative peace, but also seeks to ensure a positive peace through social solidarity. An essential part of the process of achieving a positive peace is the need to promote social solidarity, and such is the thinking of the indigenous approach to peace in Africa (Murithi, 2006). In an important sense, peace is not just the absence of violence, a philosophy of the ‘developed’ world, but also the presence of social solidarity. Zartman (2000) emphasizes that, the task of the indigenous approach to peacebuilding is to re-establish contact between individuals, families and communities with the goal to rebuild social harmony and social solidarity. Mabovula (2011) also adds that, social solidarity and social harmony promote human dignity and respect within the understanding that, an individual’s humanity interconnects with the dignity and humanity of others. Whereas in Africa, achieving social solidarity means that members of the society once again begin to recognize each other as fellow human beings and begin to share a concern in the common welfare and wellbeing of each other, the EUCCWDA on the other hand, is about individualism, fault finding, blame game, retribution and winner takes all syndrome. Arthur et al. (2015) conclude the indigenous approach to peacebuilding is that it sought to focus on restoration rather than retribution; on restitution of friendship rather than faultfinding, truth telling rather than fact-finding, on dialogue rather than blame, an apology and forgiveness rather than zero sum game; on accommodating rather than avoiding; and on cooperativeness rather than assertiveness.

**The Efficacy of the Traditional Peacebuilding in Africa**

Traditional peacebuilding programs are usually designed to include a clear understanding of the social, religious, cultural, philosophical, economic and political dynamics of indigenous communities. Understanding the local dynamics informs the planning of peacebuilding programs and, therefore, is a condition for their sustainability. Traditional peacebuilding interventions foster mutual self-help, relevance, and sustainability of peace (Mokua, 2013). According to Assefa (1993), the indigenous peacebuilding approaches saves time as it quickly responds to crisis. They contribute to the reduction of regular court caseloads, contribute to saving public money, and minimize the problem of a shortage of judges who work in the regular courts. More so, indigenous conflict mediators typically possess moral status, seniority, neutrality and respect of the community; they are acceptable to all parties and demonstrate leadership capacity whose resolutions, are generally accepted and respected by all concerned parties (USAID, 2005).

One feature of the traditional peacebuilding approach, which is ignored by the Euro-US Centric Colonial White Dominate peace actors, is the emphasis of social healing. The aspect of meeting the needs of those involved in war crimes seems to be ignored by actors who are trained in the context of Euro-US Centric Colonial White Dominate enlightenment. This is to say that peacebuilding processes are about not only negotiations, reconstruction, or political agreement, that we are made to believe by the Euro-US Centric Colonial White Dominate theories, but also it is about reconciliation, healing and purification. In this regard, the traditional approaches have a lot to offer; they do not only deal with the political and economic reconstruction, but tackles the feelings and trauma of victims. On this note, Jalong and Sugiono (2010) point out that the African peace reconciliation process has both social and cosmological dimensions relevant for communalism. Igreja and Dias-Lambranca (2008) further support this as they explain that, the traditional method of healing and purification carried out by customary leaders, priest and other spiritual authorities during peace process are of utmost importance for the mental and spiritual rehabilitation of victims and perpetrators. This means, the mental healing of those who were deeply traumatized by the experiences of violent conflict is an important aspect of material reconstruction.

For instance, South African’s traditional restorative *Ubuntu* peacebuilding technique,an expression that literally connotes humanness, caring and ‘we’ feeling, was used in the aftermath of the apartheid to promote peace. This is to say that, the African indigenous peace methods typically incorporate consensus building based on open discussions to exchange information and clarify issues important to end violence. An example can be traced in the communal *Gacaca* court system, where villagers and neighbors congregate in outside localities throughout Rwanda in order to hear cases brought against accused killers and criminals of the 1994 genocide. The introduction of the *Gacaca* courts yielded marvelous results, serving as a reconciliation technique based on trust. Essentially, it tried at least 178,741 cases at the level of appeal; representing nine percent of the 1,958,634 cases tried by all *Gacaca* courts. This indicates that without the intervention of the traditional *Gacaca* court, the huge number of the genocide crimes could have created congestion and slowed adjudication in the formal courts. Therefore, the rate at which criminals responded to the local *Gacaca* rulings suggests its superiority and acceptability (Corey & Joireman, 2004).

Furthermore, the traditional peacebuilding process among the Akwa Ibom people of Nigeria signifies the potentials of the indigenous approach. Thus, the *Ayei* (young palm frond) and *Mbiam* (juju) helped to bring out the truth and justice for victims and perpetrators after the violence in the oil area. According to Udofia (2011), the neglect of *Ayei* and *Mbiam* would have had serious effects not only in Akwa Ibom State, but also in the entire country. In addition, in the Democratic Republic of Congo, *Baraza* (a Swahili word meaning ‘gathering’) served as a **community-led justice courts that provided successful ends to conflicts through participatory processes of dialogue and reconciliation (Peace Direct, 2013)**. The primary purpose of the *Baraza* is to ensure accessible, fair and non-punitive restorative justice, and to prevent, solve and heal wounds after conflict to those living in rural villages, for which the Euro-US Centric Colonial White Dominate methods of legal and retributive justice systems could not work effectively in rural areas using punitive approach. Between 1998 and 2004, *Baraza* successfully facilitated an inter-ethnic dialogue in Northern Kivu, especially those over land before they escalate to violence (Tongereen, 2013). More so, the traditional *Amnesia* peace technique employed by the Mozambicans after the war to promote peace also indicates the strength of the indigenous system of peacebuilding (Issifu, 2015a). Again, the traditional *Wajir Peace Committee* set up in Kenya during the peak of its violent conflict in the 1990s helped to calm down the tension. For these reasons, the effectiveness of the process and sustainability of the outcomes of the traditional peacebuilding approaches cannot be overestimated. Hence, the relevance of Rwandan’s village *Gacaca* court (Villa-Vicencio, Nantulya & Savage, 2005), South African’s *Ubuntu* reconciliation, and Mozambican’s *Amnesia* traditional ceremonies of healing to forgo the past (Graybill, 2004: Issifu, 2015a) should now be receiving recognition by Euro-US Centric Colonial White Dominate diplomats, international development agencies and Western security analysts.

**Failures of the Euro-US Centric Colonial White Dominate Peacebuilding Approach in Africa**

According to Paris (1997), the liberal peacebuilding has not been an effective model for establishing sustainable peace, especially, in Africa. John Burton (1993), in his work entitled *Conflict Resolution as a Political System*, wrote a critique, arguing that Euro-US Centric Colonial White Dominate approach approaches to governance, including peacebuilding have been based on power rather than the consideration of human needs. Paradoxically, the very process of political and economic liberalizations used in some war-torn countries generated destabilizing side effects, hindering the consolidation of peace and in some cases, even sparking renewed violent conflicts (Issifu, 2015a). For instance, in Angola, the political liberalization contributed to the resurgence of violence. Moreover, in Mozambique, the effect of economic liberalization threatened to reignite the violence. These cases illustrate the potential dangers of the EUCCWDA to peacebuilding in war-shattered African states (Issifu, 2015a). Examining the case of Angola, the International negotiators i.e. using the EUCCWDA help secured a cease-fire in 1991 between the warring Angola political parties through an agreement to hold an immediate multi-party election in September 1992, after several years of political turmoil. The elections took place on schedule under the international supervision, and judged ‘free and fair’. Yet, in January 1993, there was a full-scale civil war, which has been described as a bloody scene since independence in November 11, 1975 (Issifu, 2015a). Thus, the Angolan elections did not serve as the basis for reconciliation championed by the external bodies, including the UN, who we are made to believe are ‘saviors’, but rather, their aid oppressive operations worked to rekindle the war.

Similarly, after the peace agreement in Mozambique between Frente de Libertacao de Mocambique (FRELIMO) and Resistencia National Mocambique (RENAMO) in October 1992, following seventeen years of intermitted warfare, a democratic election was held under the so called ‘White Savior’ UN supervision in 1994. However, as part of the economic restructuring process, economic liberalization policies appeared to have made life more difficult for ordinary citizens. For instance, the oppressive aid conditions underlying the implementation of the Bretton Woods institution’s policies such as the Structural Adjustment Program (SAP) crippled the Mozambique government’s abilities to rebuild schools, clinics, roads, and other social infrastructure (Issifu, 2015a). Again, absolute levels of poverty increased, sharpening inequalities between the rich and the poor. The worsened living conditions contributed to the spread of rural bandit, increased fears, frustration, anger and desperation, that could spark a new uprising (Issifu, 2015a). Consequently, in 1999, post electoral violence erupted between FRELIMO and RENAMO supporters (Graybill, 2004) even in the face of ‘White Savior’ UN-led democratic election in 1994. According to Newman et al. (2009), the prevailing paradigm of the Euro-US Centric Colonial White Dominate Approaches to peacebuilding; liberal peacebuilding, liberal internationalism or the assumption that the best way to consolidate peace is to transform war-shattered states into market democratic states and hold an immediate democratic election, has been more problematic than anticipated. Newman et al. (2009) reiterate that, political policies and economic liberalization seem to have generated unforeseen instabilities in most of these nation-states that underwent liberal peacebuilding changes. It is against these reasons that scholars have argued that indigenous approaches to peacebuilding and conflict transformation are more effective than the Euro-US Centric Colonial White Dominate Approaches, especially in Africa (Zartman, 2000; Bukari, 2013; Issifu, 2015a). Unlike the traditional peacebuilding methods, the Euro-US Centric Colonial White dominates approaches, are not credited with local legitimacy because they do not focus on psychosocial and spiritual dimension, and do not take into account the cultural milieu of Africans during conflict transformation (Kirby, 2006).

Instead, the Euro-US Centric Colonial White Dominate Approaches focus on holding immediate elections after peace agreements signed and introducing unfriendly economic restructuring policies without tackling the structural causes of the conflicts as well as appreciating the cultural needs of the vulnerable in society (Austin, Fischer, & Giessmann, 2011). Therefore, the failure to recognize the customs of the local people, and refusal to identify the structural causes of the violence, according to Kirby (2006), are the reasons why the Euro-US Centric Colonial White Dominate Approaches to peacebuilding have failed in Africa.

**Failures of the Euro-US Centric Colonial White Dominate Approach to Peacebuilding outside Africa**

Although the focus of this article centers in Africa, it is appropriate to extend the scope to other parts of the world. Essentially, this will provide a more comprehensive knowledge and empirical evidence to the fact that the Euro-US Centric Colonial White Dominate Approach to peacebuilding need to be incorporated into the local philosophies in areas it operate if sustainable peace is much desired. Apart from Africa, the Euro-US Centric Colonial White Dominate Approach has also failed in other jurisdictions. For example, in El Salvador (Central America) the economic liberalization policies fueled political instability and thereby leading to social and political unrest in the country. Reasons for the social unrest was because the new police administration in El Salvador used authoritarian methods to calm down hostilities following the signing of a UN mediated peace accord (Paris, 2004). The methods used by the police administration were simply alien to the people; hence, it did not gain cognition. Closely linked to the failure was also the issue of economic liberalization promoted by the Bretton Woods institutions, IMF/WB, which led to renewed fighting in the country.

Also, in Nicaragua (North America), the United Nations supervised and implemented a peace agreement between the two feuding parties; Sandinista Government and the “Contras,” an armed force group that fought the government throughout the 1980s. One could think of a stable peace after the United Nations and other International actors had supervised the implementation of the 1990 peace agreement, however, the country was hit by increased levels of crime and gang related violence making conditions unbearable for civilians as well as former combatants (Paris, 2004). Another example emanating from the flaws in the Euro-US Centric Colonial White Dominate model to peacebuilding is the case of Cambodia (Asia). It is evident that a stable peace remains a fallacy in that country rather than a reality, even in the face of the ‘White Savior’ supervised elections in 1993 (Paris, 2004). Nevertheless, the relevance of East Timor’s indigenous *Nahe Biti* community-based reconciliation process and the Afghanistan’s *Loya Jirga* local peace-making process has had a positive effect in promoting peace in the countries (Mac Ginty, 2008).

**Lessons for the Future**

There is no denying the fact that Africans worldview of sustainable peace are from within African settings such as culture and tradition, and has endured the test of time. Therefore, neglecting it entirely and embracing solely the Euro-US Centric Colonial White Dominate Systems of peacebuilding and conflict resolution will continue to worsen the plights of Africans, and will make sustainable peace a far-reaching aspiration in the continent. This is because Africans have respect for their local cultures and traditions, and will not compromise it for any alternative. As the former President of South Africa, Mr. Thabo Mbeki rightly put; the conflict situation in Africa and the failure to achieve sustainable peace is that, the contemporary peace systems are essentially Eurocentric in nature. Therefore, Africans should adopt new ways of revisiting traditional conflict transformations that will be more effective and efficient than what is currently imported from the west. Mr. Thabo Mbeki in his words stressed that:

The time has come for Africa to seek new ways of preventing conflicts, so as to enhance our growth and development, as well as remove the stigma placed on us, indicating that Africa is a continent of perennial conflicts and wars. The new conflict prevention process and techniques being elicited, are to make Africa a continent of peace in the new millennium. (Harunah, Nwolise, & Oluyemi-Kusa, 2003)

Harunah et al. (2003) re-examined the view of Mr. Thabo Mbeki and add that, the time has indeed come for us in Africa to seek new ways and means of conflict prevention, conflict management and conflict resolution from within homegrown. He emphasized that some of the systems inherited from the Euro-US Centric Colonial White Dominate Peace Agenda even exacerbate conflict situations and make the attainment of peace unrealistic. In his words:

In fact, some of the systems, especially those of the United Nations Organization (UNO) had in certain cases, precipitated fresh uprisings, leading to further violence, reckless killing, arson, generation and production of more refugees, instead of finding a lasting solution to the original conflicts, which they were evolved or adopted to tackle. (Harunah et al., 2003)

This is why Adedeji (1993) have argued that a society which neglects the instructive value of its past for its present and future, cannot be self-reliant; and will therefore lack internally generated dynamism and stability. Adding to the argument, the Cable Network News (CNN) in March 2001, through its advertisement programs, repeatedly beamed the assertion that, the future of Africa lies in her past (CNN cited in Harunah et al., 2003). Therefore, if tradition and local cultures are crucial in peacebuilding, why not legalize the positive aspects of these traditional tenets to make it more formidable with customary and legal backing capable of ensuring a sustainable negative and positive peace.

**Conclusion and Recommendations**

Generally, the indigenous African method of peacebuilding and conflict transformation stress the need of fostering a spirit of peace and mutual respect for both individuals and groups in times of peace and in times of conflicts. It is observed that unlike the Euro-US Centric Colonial White Dominate Peacebuilding principles of win-lose or winner takes all philosophy, retributive justice systems, litigations and unfriendly economic policies, the traditional peacebuilding mechanisms are inexpensive and flexible, participatory, and ensure that conflicting parties participate actively in deciding appropriate restorative justice measures. It is also seen that because the indigenous mechanisms of conflict are based on the very values and tenets of the local people, they maintain and protect the customs and traditions of the society. It will however be inappropriate if we ignore the potentials of the traditional peacebuilding approach entirely for the Euro-US Centric Colonial White Dominate Approach, rooted in white supremacy elitism oppression academia. And whose focus is on ‘imported models’ of peacebuilding, conflict transformation and conflict prevention, rather than on the root causes of the violence, and the local conflict prevention prescriptions (Hauge, Doucet, & Gilles, 2015).

Essentially, the traditional approach to peacebuilding need to be given a critical attention as it might give us more important insight for peacebuilding success in Africa. The non-EUCCWDA to peacebuilding alternatives, including those inspired by the traditional peacebuilding initiatives as observed in the cases of Nigerian’s *Ayei* and *Mbiam*, Kenyan’s *Wajir*, South African’s *Ubuntu*, and Rwanda’s *Gacaca* etc., deserves an excellent opportunity for rethinking the traditional peacebuilding. In that regard, scholars, including (Lewis, 2010; Okoro, 2010; Tsekpo, 2015) have stated categorically that the traditional peacebuilding is the most presently potent alternative to liberal peacebuilding. Therefore, it is recommended that, for sustainable peace to be seen in Africa, leaders of African countries should establish a legal framework regarding indigenous peacebuilding. In so doing, the approach will not only have a customary value, but also a legal framework capable of building and strengthening the capacities of formal and informal institutions in peace and security with the adequate skills to ensure sustainable peace and development. To support, Bamidele (2014) add that, relevant aspects of these traditional strategies when adopted and incorporated into modern legal frameworks and mechanisms will ensure a transformative and a holistic society based on community empowerment and social justice, and relevant for peaceful, orderly, lawful and harmonious society, which can support and catalyze overall development.

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## **Richardson Revisited: An Analysis of ‘Action-Reaction’ Conflict Models**

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**Keywords**: Lewis Fry Richardson, Action-reaction, Mathematics

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## **RICHARDSON REVISITED: AN ANALYSIS OF ‘ACTION-REACTION’ CONFLICT MODELS**

**Abstract**

The remarkable pioneering work of Lewis Fry Richardson has started the theoretical analysis of the action-reaction processes leading to the onset of violent conflicts. His work, developed between the two world wars, has started receiving recognition only with the birth of Peace and Conflict Studies in the aftermath of WWII. Here the main model proposed by Richardson will be presented and discussed, together with some of its extensions and derivations. Particular attention shall be dedicated to the epistemological analysis of these models.

##### Introduction

For Lewis Fry Richardson, a mathematician and physicist, WWI was a fundamental turning point, both from a personal and from a scientific point of view. A dedicated pacifist, as a conscientious objector, he did not serve in the army during the war, and, immediately after the end of the war, he started applying the mathematical tools he had developed for the study of meteorological phenomena to investigate the conditions that make likely the onset of violent conflicts, and also the conditions that make peace possible. With his work, he became a pioneer of the area of peace and conflict studies which were to become relevant as a scientific discipline only after the end of WWII. Talking of the theoretical analysis of the action-reaction processes leading to conflicts, Kenneth Boulding, one of the founders of peace studies, writes: “By far the most extensive theoretical treatment of these processes has been made by Richardson, whose remarkable pioneering work is only now receiving recognition. It would only be just to name these processes *Richardson processes* in his honor" (Boulding, 1962, p. 25).

In what is apparently his first scholarly paper on peace issues, Lewis Fry Richardson addresses the problem of finding a viable mathematical formula to determine the relative voting power to be granted to the participants in the congresses which most likely were to be convened after the end of the Great War’s hostilities. The idea was that in such meetings unanimity was not viable, giving a veto power also to minor States, but also that assigning one vote to each state was not reasonable considering the huge differences in strength among the States. It was quite clear to Richardson that mathematics was not intended to provide a “solution” to what was actually a political problem, but rather to be a decision-aiding tool: “The proper voting strength is, and must always remain, a matter of judgment, of opinion. But a well-chosen mathematical formula may help it to become a matter of considered and agreed opinion. In the choice of the formula we may be guided by a good old rule in applied mathematics, that of taking the simplest formula which makes sense” (Richardson, 1918, p. 195). The problem of voting strength in international assemblies has been addressed again in an unpublished report of 1953 with reference to the UN assembly (Richardson, 1993c).

One year later, in 1919, in an essay dedicated to his comrades of the motor ambulance convoy “S. S. Anglaise 13,” in which he had worked during the war, and published in the volume of his collected papers (Richardson, 1993a), Richardson analyzes at length all the different motivation which lay behind the willingness of a state to engage in a war against another state, and defines a set of differential equations which can help in studying the dynamics of the aggressiveness in the relations between two states or two coalitions of states. The dynamics of aggressiveness has been later further presented in a paper and in a letter to the editor published in *Nature* (Richardson, 1935a, 1935b), and are analyzed at length in a long essay published in 1939, on the eve of World War II (Richardson, 1939). In these writings it is clear that to Richardson mathematical models, more than describing reality, are decision aid tools. His insistence on Ockham’s Razor goes in the same direction: models should be characterized by the maximum simplicity compatible with their capacity to provide decision makers with the right information.

The use of mathematical models for decision aid is exactly the aim of Operations Research, which can be defined as “a discipline that deals with the application of advanced analytical methods to help make better decisions” (Informs, The American Operations Research Society). In this sense we can say that Richardson can be considered as an *ante-litteram* Operations Researcher.

Richardson not only had a clear understanding that, in systems of human activities, mathematical models are decision aid tools, but he also knew well that he was not modeling the behavior of single entities, be they states or individuals, but rather that he was modeling the interaction of such entities. Moreover such entities were themselves aggregates of other lower-level entities. He uses the example of gases: “Just as in meteorology it has been found necessary to endow the air with an eddy viscosity to compensate for the motion which we cannot study in detail, so in the social sciences it is to be expected that there will be a need to regard the social groups as endowed with properties, analogous to viscosity, arising from the lack of agreement in the purposes of the individuals which compose the group” (Richardson, 1939, p. 3). Later in the same book (p. 9) he talks of *social viscosity* with reference to the slow processes in a community that eventually lead to a decision. He was well aware of the systemic structure of the reality he was dealing with.

In the following section I present in some detail Richardson’s *action-reaction* linear conflict model, then, in sections 3, I discuss from an epistemological point of view its meaning, purposes and uses. Finally, in sections 4 and 5, I describe two different nonlinear models which can be derived from it. Some real life applications of these nonlinear models are discussed.

## **Richardson’s Model**

The main idea behind Richardson’s model is that, in a situation in which there are two parties who are potentially foes, each of them responds to the actions of the other by increasing or decreasing its level of aggressiveness or, as he says, “preparedness for war.” In Richardson’s view the two parties are either states or coalitions of states, but we may think also of social groups or armed organizations in contemporary intrastate conflicts. The behavior of the parties is the result of the complex pattern of interactions between the many different individuals constituting them, and that is why Richardson warns against applying his model to the interaction between single individuals.

Let’s call *X* and *Y* respectively the two parties, and *x* and *y* the respective levels of aggressiveness or of preparedness for war. Variables *x* and *y* are usually positive, but, at least in principle, they can be negative, representing solidarity or cooperation between the two countries instead of aggressiveness. I call the function which, for any given level *y* of action taken by *Y*, gives the value *x* of the action decided in response by *X*. Similarly, *Y* responds to *X* according to response function .

The dynamics of the aggressiveness between the two parties *X* and *Y* can be described by the following system of differential equations

 (1)

 (2)

where *D*(*z*,*w*) is the distance between *z* and *w* according to some criterion, and ** and ** are positive constants. The idea is that the rate of change in the aggressiveness is proportional to the distance between the optimal level, that is the one given by the response function, and the actual one. If is positive (), then *X* will try to reach the equilibrium increasing its aggressiveness. The opposite happens when the distance is negative. In the following, for the sake of simplicity, I will assume the distance functions given by:

The response functions chosen by Richardson for his model are linear:

Richardson calls *k* and *l* the *defence* coefficients, ** and ** the *fatigue-and-expense* coefficients, and *p* and *q* are measures of the past *grievances* between the two parties. In fact, the response increases in force with *k*, *l*, *p* and *q*, and decreases with ** and **.

Thus, the differential equations governing the conflict escalation in Richardson’s model are:

Richardson starts his analysis from these differential equations, and from them derives the response functions 3 and 4, which he calls *equilibrium lines*. Solving the linear equilibrium system

 *ky**x*+*p* = 0

 *lx**y*+*q* = 0

we get the equilibrium point such that and :

When the system reaches such equilibrium point, there is no further incentive for changes. The equilibrium point is stable when for small displacement from it the system returns to the equilibrium. It is possible to prove that an equilibrium point is stable if , that is when the product of the slopes of the two curves at is less than 1. In the linear case studied by Richardson, the stability condition becomes:

 **> *kl*. (9)

Since the product ** can be considered a measure of the overall cost/fatigue of the system and the product *kl* a measure of the overall defense/aggressiveness of the system, inequality 9 states that for the stability to be granted it is necessary that in the system the cost considerations bear a higher weight than those for defense.

From this analysis two important observations can be derived. The first concerns Richardson’s intuition that, in order to analyze the chances of the onset of a violent conflict, a systemic approach is needed. It is not sufficient to study the nature of the parties involved. It is also essential to analyze the dynamics of their interaction, which, possibly independently from their real intentions and objectives, may lead to a situation in which the outbreak of a violent conflict is unavoidable. The second concerns the interpretation of inequality 9. The cost/fatigue coefficient of a state cannot be considered independent of the internal characteristics of the state itself. An autocratic or dictatorial government may impose sacrifices to its citizens without any risk of losing legitimacy, at least up to a point. In contrast, a democratic government cannot lose the support of its constituency, lest it risks being overthrown at the next elections. In this sense inequality 9 is in accord with the well-known *Liberal Peace* theory, which states that democratic states very seldom fight wars against each other. The liberal peace theory is actually much more complex than this and also widely disputed (Doyle, 2005; Mearsheimer, 1990).

Although in most of his papers on the topic he treats the interactions between two nations, Richardson has also tried to extend the model to the case of three or more nations. In the case of three nations he has shown that: (*i*) “if each of the three pairs of nations be separately unstable then the triplet is necessarily unstable”, and (*ii*) “If each of the three pairs of nations be separately stable then remains the possibility that the triplet of nations may be unstable” (Richardson, 1939, pp. 54–55).

Richardson was well aware that his model was a quite rough approximation of the reality. But actually he was mainly interested in making a theory of stability and instability of peace. For that a linear approximation is much more useful than complex nonlinear models: “Because, if we had accurate non-linear equations, it is likely that the only possible formulae of solution would be attained by local linear approximations […]. So linear theory is a necessary preliminary” (Richardson, 1939, p. 48).

## **Models of Action-Reaction Processes: An Epistemological Perspective**

Richardson’s pair of differential equations is usually considered as an arms race model. This is how it has been referred to in the papers he wrote in the years before WWII (Richardson, 1938, 1939), and how, for instance, Anatol Rapoport (1957), noted peace and conflict studies scholar in the U.S. in the aftermath of the second world conflict, presented it. These equations have inspired many variants of the model. Meaning, purposes and usefulness of arms race models such as Richardson’s are reviewed by Anderton (1989), in whose view “Arms race models can be useful in three major ways. First, they can describe and summarize the complex reality of arms races. […] Second, arms race models can be a useful tool to help an analyst better understand and predict the complex reality of arms races. […] Third, arms race models can be useful if they can help prescribe a treatment that will achieve a desired end. It is here that the normative aspects of arms race modeling come into sharper focus” (p. 347).

Anderton discusses at length the many problems facing attempts to support arms race models with quantitative/econometric analyses. The first problem arises from the difficulty in choosing a measure of defense capability: “The majority of empirical arms race studies use military expenditures to measure defense capability” (p. 352). A second problem we face has to do with the reliability of the data. For instance, which is the best source for Soviet Union military expenditures: the official Soviet Government data, the CIA estimates, or the data provided by independent Research Institutions such as the SIPRI? The main point is that in arms races what is crucial, more than the actual military expenditures of a country, is the perception of such expenditures by the decision makers of the other Countries. In this view the CIA data are probably better than the much more reliable SIPRI figures. Finally, another relevant problem is that what really matters in an arms race is weapons capabilities rather than military expenditures. In fact we can represent weapons capabilities as a stock and military expenditures as a measure of the in-flow, while the replacements needed are the out-flow. If the flow of expenditures to weapons is greater than that needed for replacement, then the stock will be rising even if the flow has fallen from the previous year. The problem here is that weapons capabilities is a kind of multi-criterion variable: it is a set of different variables representing the different types of weapons, each of which can hardly be compared to the others.

These facts frustrate the attempts to estimate the arms race equations empirically, and, accordingly to Anderton, “lead to unreliable and sometimes nonsensical parameter estimates, numerous ad hoc re-specifications of models, and contradictory results” (p. 349). But, do we really need to make arms race models quantitative? Or are qualitative models rich enough in useful information? And furthermore, is it not limiting to see the models only as representation of an arms race?

Let us examine how Richardson saw his action-reaction model. In his 1939 essay “Generalized Foreign Policy: A study in group psychology,” Richardson talks explicitly of his differential equations as an ‘arms race model’, and also makes some attempt to support it with empirical data on military expenditures (see for instance sect. 2.10 at page 16 on “The European arms race of 1909-14”). But this essay, according to what he says in the preface, is based on an unpublished 1919 essay titled “Mathematical psychology of war” (Richardson, 1993a) in which the different actions and attitudes that may provoke escalation leading to wars are analyzed. In this earlier essay the main role is assigned to what he calls *Vigour-to-War* and *Warlike Activities*. Vigour-to-war can be interpreted as readiness for action, that is a *potential* for acting in a violent or threatening way, while warlike activities are such violent or threatening actions. In addition to these, many other factors are considered: freewill, beliefs, vengeance, rivalry, national prestige, business advantages, war as a source of income, security of rulers, fear, pain, fatigue, desire for change, prospect of military success, racial antipathy and cohesion, religion, justice. Interestingly, a role is given also to information and to what those who control the information want the man in the street to read and to believe. In this essay there is no mention of an arms race, at least not in terms of military expenditures. After having proposed many different equations that include most of these variables, he arrives at equations 5 and 6, where variables *x* and *y* represent the two parties’ warlike activities.

The differential equation models described in the two essays are identical from a syntactic point of view but there is a significant semantic difference. This difference may result from the difference in the political and historical context in which they were conceived. The first essay has been written in the aftermath of World War I, and, in fact, it is dedicated to his companions in the Quakers’ ambulance service. The second was written on the eve of World War II.

While the years preceding World War II saw Germany’s clandestine program of massive re-armament (disclosed by German pacifist Carl von Ossietzky in 1931), with the effect of triggering the re-armament policy in the United Kingdom, the outbreak of World War I cannot be considered as the deterministic result of the arms race between the Central Empires and the Entente Powers. That of course does not mean that there was not an arms race in Europe in the years preceding the war. In fact, for instance “In the years that followed the Bosnian crisis, the Russians launched a programme of military investment so substantial that it triggered a European arms race” (Clark, 2013, p. 87). The process that started Sunday 28 June 1914, when Archduke Franz Ferdinand and his wife Sophie Chotek arrived at the Sarajevo railway station, and which ended thirty-seven days later with the war’s onset, was the result of “rapid-fire interactions among heavily armed autonomous power-centres confronting different and swiftly changing threats and operating under conditions of high risk and low trust and transparency. Crucial to the complexity of the events of 1914 were rapid changes in the international system: the sudden emergence of an Albanian territorial state, the Turco-Russian naval arms race in the Black Sea, or the reorientation of Russian policy away from Sofia to Belgrade, to name just a few. These were not long-term historical transitions, but short-range realignments” (Clark, 2013, p. 557). Also relevant was the growing role of Serbia, which after the two Balkan wars (October 2012 - May 2013 and June - July 2013) had occupied large swaths of former Ottoman Territories nearly doubling its territorial extent (from 18,650 to 33,891 square miles). Serbia, which with the help of French loans had built a strong Army becoming a regional power, was waiting the collapse of the Austria-Hungary Empire to claim the vast lands of the empire that still awaited pan-Serbian redemption. From the analysis of the 1914 events emerges “a picture of great complexity in which lack of reliable information, misconceptions and corrosive distrust forced key actors into playing a kind of multidimensional chess while wearing blindfolds” (*The Economist*, 2014).

In the words of Christopher Clark (2013, p. 567) “the protagonists of 1914 were sleepwalkers, watchful but unseeing, haunted by dreams, yet blind to the reality of the horror they were about to bring into the world.” It is not impossible that the very process leading to the onset of the war, that Clark described with these words nearly three-quarters of a century later, had prompted Richardson to explain the meaning of his equations as follows: “The process described by the ensuing equations is not to be thought of as inevitable. It is what *would occur if instinct and tradition were allowed to act uncontrolled*. In this respect the equations have some analogy to a dream. For a dream often warns an individual of the antisocial acts that its instincts would lead him to commit, if he were not wakeful" (Richardson, 1939, p. 1). The role of instinct is stressed by Richardson when he decides to name one of the key variables of his model Vigour-to-War instead of Will-to-War. He wants to explicitly rule out Volition playing a fundamental role, “[b]ecause when, for example, somebody hits me violently on the nose, my tendency to personal combat with him is not a matter of volition at all, but simply of automatic instinct, which the Will has to struggle to resist” (Richardson, 1993b, p. 71).

The suggestive parallel with dreams might provide us with a clue on how best to use models like Richardson’s and on their epistemological meaning. First, they are very distinct from models intended to describe biological or economic systems. Take, for instance, Volterra’s Prey-Predator model (Volterra, 1926), which was developed a few years after Richardson’s first description of his model, and which bears some resemblance to it. In both cases, there are two differential equations in two variables, but the similarity ends when we look to them more closely. First, Volterra equations are nonlinear while Richardson’s are linear. Actually, Richardson, discussing the difference between his model and Volterra’s one, explains why he had chosen linear equations: “Because, if we had accurate non-linear equations, it is likely that the only possible formulae of solution would be attained by local linear approximations […]. So linear theory is a necessary preliminar” (Richardson, 1939, p. 48). Second, Volterra’s equations provide us with a rather faithful and objective, although simplified, description of the interplay of two populations sharing the same ecosystem, and allow us to make predictions on the dynamics of such populations. In fact, its variables are easily quantifiable and allow for empirical verification of the model. It is not then a surprise that the model constitutes the building block of many ecological and also economic models.

Richardson’s model, instead, appears to serve different purposes, and to pursue different goals. It is a typical model built mainly to gain insight into a problem. In these cases “the modeler only wants to identify the basic structures and processes. The result of this modeling process - the model - is a by-product; its application is not of prime importance. […] The concise structure of mathematics allows the modeler to produce a model which can be used as a communication tool - to transmit ideas to other people. Complex relations are best presented in compact mathematical form so that they can be quickly grasped by others” (Hürlimann, 1999, p. 71).

Unlike more traditional mathematical models which aim to provide quantitative predictions, Richardson’s, at least in its initial formulation, has a different, perhaps more ambitious goal. The main aim is to provide an interpretation and a meaning of the reality under analysis, to provide conceptual support for those who want to intervene in such a reality to change it. In the 1919 essay Richardson writes:

To have to translate one’s verbal statements into Mathematical formulae compels one carefully to scrutinize the ideas therein expressed. Next the possession of formulae makes it much easier to deduce consequences. In this way absurd implications, which might have passed unnoticed in a verbal statement, are brought clearly into view and stimulate one to amend the formula. An additional advantage of a mathematical mode of expression is its brevity, which greatly diminishes the labour of memorizing the idea expressed. If the statement of an individual becomes the subject of a controversy, this definiteness and brevity lead to a speeding up of discussions over disputable points, so that obscurities can be cleared away, errors refuted and truth found and expressed more quickly than they could have been, had more cumbrous method of discussion been pursued. Mathematical expressions have, however, their special tendencies to pervert thought: the definiteness may be spurious, existing in the equations but not in the phenomena to be described; and the brevity may be due to the omission of the more important things, simply because they cannot be mathematized. Against these faults we must constantly be on our guard. It will probably be impossible to avoid them entirely, and so they ought to be realized and admitted. (1993b, p. 67)

Rather than tools to describe and represent reality faithfully, although in a simplified way, Richardson’s models are tools that help us understand and interpret reality and ask the correct questions. In the following sections, the use of action-reaction models as conceptual tools will be illustrated making use of two different nonlinear response functions.

## S-shaped Response Functions

The underlying assumption in Richardson’s linear response functions 3 and 4 is that the response of an actor is directly proportional to the actions of the other with a constant proportionality coefficient. Thus the derivatives of the two response functions are constants:

That is the response of each of them to a unit increase in the other’s aggressiveness is the same, independent of its own level of aggressiveness. It seems more realistic instead that the response be sensitive to the level of aggressiveness already reached. In the following formulas we have inserted a self-reinforcing factor and an inhibiting one. The first has been chosen proportional to the variable value, so that if it were the only one it would imply an exponential growth. The second instead is decreasing as the value of the variable approaches what can be called a saturation value, that the maximum conceivable value for the response variable. The two factors are multiplied giving rise to the following differential equations:

The role here of *k* and *l* is similar to that of the constants with the same name in the original Richardson model. They provide a measure of the strength of the response: higher is their value higher is the response’s strength. Also ** and ** bear some similarities with the corresponding constants in the original linear model, although the relation goes in the opposite direction: the lower are ** and **, the lower is the saturation level and faster the response approaches the zero-growth condition.

It is easy to see that the solutions to equations 10 and 11 are:

where *C* and *D* are the constants of integration. If *C* and *D* are positive, then the response is an S-shaped logistic function of the type of that represented in Figure 1.



Figure 1. S-shaped response function

Response functions of this type have been studied, among others, by Pruitt (1969), Liebovitch, Naudot, Wallacher, Nowak, Bui-Wrzosinska, and Coleman (2008), and Pruitt and Nowak (2014), who, as a mathematical function, choose to use the hyperbolic tangent.

The S-shaped curves like the one described here represent a situation in which each actor, at least initially, is slow to respond to the other’s actions and is not prone to premature escalation, allowing time for the opponent to change his/her course of action. Only when the other actor keeps increasing the level of aggressiveness does he/she respond by increasing the pace of his/her own aggressiveness level growth. These curves can be interpreted also in terms of delays, which are always present in complex systems of human activities. Time is always needed before decision makers become aware of relevant changes in the situation they face and start taking decisions, and further time is needed to implement them. Similarly when the decision maker has decided to react in a strong way, the response to a reduction of the other party’s level of aggressiveness comes with some delay and at a slow pace. Moreover, there is also a saturation effect, which makes that the level of response cannot exceed a given threshold which depends on the actor’s resources and attitudes. We talk in this case of *saturation level*.

Remember that response functions should be considered mainly as conceptual tools to discuss and analyze theoretically possible behaviors of actors in a conflict or, better, the different possible dynamics of a conflict. The idea of finding an empirical a priori response function representing with a reasonable accuracy the actual behavior of the actors of a conflict appears meaningless, except, perhaps, in the case of micro-conflicts in which the parties are individuals, and even there freewill and irrationality may make unpredictable the individuals’ behavior. In more complex conflicts there is a significant degree of complexity in each of the actors. This is for instance the case when the actors are states: typically within each state there are multiple decision makers and stakeholders, each with his/her own interests and objectives. In many cases the actors are not states but rather coalitions of states, and that increases the complexity as the number of decision makers and stakeholders grows. Even more complex are often the intrastate conflicts, where there might be many different parties in the conflict (most often more than two), taking decisions independently one from one another and possibly forging alliances that change over time.



Figure 2. S-shaped response functions: equilibrium points

In Figure 2, the two response curves have been plotted together. The curve labeled Y is the response function of Y, while the other is the response function for X. In this latter case the abscissa is the y axis. Depending on the values of *k* and *l* there may be either one or three equilibrium points. In the figure we have presented the case in which the equilibrium points are three, namely a lower equilibrium point, *A*, a middle one, *B* and an upper one, *C*. Both the lower and the upper equilibrium points, are stable, the first corresponding to a peaceful situation and the second to a situation of endemic conflict, possibly, but not necessarily, violent. A typical case of equilibrium points of type *C* are those of so called ‘failed states’, where the rupture of an equilibrium characterized by limited or no violence as led to a situation of generalized war involving different groups, each fighting against the others (see for instance the case of Syria). The middle one, *B***,** instead is an unstable equilibrium point representing a transition point either in an escalation process or in a de-escalation one. If the point (*x*,*y*) is in *A*, it stays there unless some external or internal force induces a large displacement that brings the point into a region in which the attractor is *C*. This is the case when the displacement is such that the system goes in the region which is North-East of point *B*. In this case we have an escalation which brings the system to a conflict situation, represented by the attractor *C*, from which only a force strong enough to make the system to move toward a region in which the attractor is *A* can make the conflict to de-escalate. It is easy to see that both, in *A* and *C*, the product of the derivatives (the slopes) of the curves is smaller than 1, while in *B* the opposite holds true.



Figure 3. Cases of a single equilibrium point

For very low values of the defence coefficients, *k* and *l*, there is only one equilibrium, in the lower area of the *x**y* plane, corresponding to a peaceful stable situation (see Figure 3(*a*)), while for very high values of these coefficients we have again a single equilibrium point, but in the upper area of the *x**y* plane, corresponding to a stable situation of conflict and possibly of violence (see Figure 3 (*b*)).



Figure 4. Two different systems: resilient (a); prone to violent escalations (b)

The behavior of the system strongly depends on the relative position of the two curves. Consider for instance the difference between the two systems depicted in Figure 4, (*a*) and (*b*) (Pruitt & Nowak, 2014). In the first case the system is quite resilient. If the system is in a state of peaceful equilibrium (*A*), a rather strong displacement from the equilibrium is needed for it to start a violent escalation, and conversely, if it is in a state of harsh, possibly violent, confrontation a not too strong pressure may make the point to move to position in which the attractor is *A*. In the second case instead, if the system is in *A*, an escalation is much more likely to happen, while when the system is in point *C*, a de-escalation is much more unlikely to happen.

What happens when one actor has reached his/her saturation level and the other keeps increasing his/her aggressiveness? It appears reasonable to think that he/she will be obliged to accept the fact that the other’s strength cannot be matched and will be forced into a submissive attitude. Richardson in his 1939 essay talks of *submissiveness*, and in this case the response function he uses is a nonlinear one. In Figure 5 a S-shaped response function modified to take into account this possibility is given.



Figure 5. A response function which takes into account the submissiveness

The use of a response function like the one of Figure 5 helps to understand the dynamics of a conflict when the two parts are strongly unbalanced in terms of strength. This is the case when the saturation level of one of the actors is much higher than the saturation level of the other. A situation of this type is depicted by the two solid lines in Figure 6. Here the most likely outcome for the system is equilibrium point *C*, that is a situation in which *Y* is subject to *X*. It is true that also *A* is stable, but relatively small displacements might easily bring the system in the region in which the attractor is *C*.



Figure 6. Equilibrium points in the case of submissiveness of *Y*

As an example take what happened with the Libya crisis of 2011. In mid-February 2011 an uprising started in Libya against the Qaddafi regime, as a mix of peaceful and violent protests. It was part of the Arab revolts which in a few months changed the political landscape in Tunisia and Egypt. But, while in those countries some form of civil society existed and it was possible for the uprising to move in the direction of relatively nonviolent political change, the reality on the ground was completely different in Libya due to “the tribal and regional cleavages that have beset the country for decades” (Anderson, 2011). Libyan society was fractured and divided along tribal and regional lines, which resulted in sustained fighting more similar to a civil war than to a popular uprising. (For the role of tribes in the formation of the Libyan state see Anderson (1990).) The regime responded to the uprising with harsh military repression, but refrained from indiscriminate violence to reduce civilian casualties. From the beginning of the uprising to mid-March 2011, when NATO intervened, about 1,000 Libyans had died, mostly government soldiers and rebels. By that time, “government forces were poised to recapture the last rebel stronghold of Benghazi, thereby ending the one-month conflict at a total cost of just over 1,000 lives” (Kuperman, 2015). A likely outcome would have been an equilibrium point such as point *C* of Figure 6, where the solid line labeled *X* and *Y* represents the government’s and the rebel’s response functions respectively. Point *C* corresponds to the substantial defeat of the rebels with possibly limited and sporadic violence.

NATO intervention, triggered also by fabricated reports which strongly exaggerated the casualties of the Libyan regime repression (Roberts, 2011, 2012), has further fed the conflict, “increased the violent death toll more than tenfold” (Kuperman, 2015), leading to a situation of uncontrolled violence, a situation from which no viable way out appears at the time of this writing. In fact, the effect of NATO bombings has been a reduction of the saturation level in the government’s response function, represented in the figure by the dotted line. The new equilibrium point, *C'*, corresponds to a situation characterized by sustained and protracted violence. For the sake of the simplicity the different rebel forces have been contracted in one single actor *Y*. In reality they are several and diverse, and now that the Qaddafi has been killed and his forces dispersed, as result of the complex pattern of rivalries among the Libyan tribes and of the international context, with its different Islamic groups and movements, they are fighting one against the other.

“In retrospect, Obama’s intervention in Libya was an abject failure, judged even by its own standards. Libya has not only failed to evolve into a democracy; it has devolved into a failed state. Violent deaths and other human rights abuses have increased several fold. Rather than helping the United States combat terrorism, as Qaddafi did during his last decade in power, Libya now serves as a safe haven for militias affiliated with both al Qaeda and the Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS)” (Kuperman, 2015, p. 67). It must be made clear that in what we have written here there is neither justification nor condonation of the Qaddafi regime. Still we cannot deny that the situation prior to the NATO intervention was better than the actual one. That, together with what happened in all the Middle East since the 9/11 attack, is a further confirmation that, in regions characterized by a high level of systemic complexity, peace can hardly be brought by military interventions.

## **Reverse S-shaped Response Functions**

## Let now consider the following response function:

Such response function, whose behavior is the one depicted in Figure 7, is in some sense the opposite of the one studied in the preceding section. Here we have a first phase in which the response is quite strong with a steep increase in aggressiveness, followed by a second phase in which the response is much slower. One possible interpretation of this change in the pace of the aggressiveness growth is that when one feels secure enough he/she can afford to maintain almost unchanged the level of aggressiveness in presence of relatively small increases of aggressiveness of the other, so avoiding the risk of an unwanted escalation. We call the region of the variable *x* in which the response is almost constant the *security region*. Of course, when the aggressiveness’ level of the other is perceived as too high, then each actor steeps up the response starting a new escalation phase. The length of the security region depends on the positive constant ** which is called the *delay* coefficient. In this model the constant ** plays a role similar to the one of the defence coefficients *k* and *l* in the original Richardson’s model. The higher is ** the steepest is the increase in aggressiveness. The role of the constant ** instead bears some similarities with that of the cost/fatigue coefficient **. In fact the higher is ** the slower and more delayed is the increase in aggressiveness once the security region has been reached. In Figure 7 two functions of this type are displayed, one (*a*) with a smaller delay coefficient than the other (*b*).



Figure 7. Reverse S response functions

Let us see what happens in the interaction of two actors characterized by this type of response function. In Figure 8 the response functions of the two actors, *X* and *Y* are shown (remember that the axis *x* is the abscissa for the response function of *Y* while the abscissa for *X*’s response function is the *y* axis). Again, there are 3 equilibrium points, *A*, *B*, and *C*, but here only *B* is an attractor, that is a stable equilibrium point. As for *A*, small increases in aggressiveness of the actors make the system to start an escalation phase leading to *B*. Instead, if the system is in *C*, small displacements make the system either to de-escalate moving toward *B*, or to escalate without any limit.



Figure 8. Reverse S response functions: equilibrium points

In the following two interpretations of the type of behavior we have just described are provided, which make reference to real conflict situations.

##### Aggressive Containment without War

This is the case in which a state, facing a real or perceived threat, starts a quick and robust military buildup until a point in which the state feels secure enough. A similar process happens for the other state. That leads to a phase of reciprocal containment in which the conflict takes a form which is different from that of a violent confrontation between them. During this phase the increase in defense capabilities, if any, is quite slow, at least until one of the two feels that the level of the adversary military activities is becoming too high. At this point it starts again to increase its military capabilities at a fast pace. In terms of the graph of Figure 8, there is first a movement from the peaceful but unstable equilibrium point *A* to the stable equilibrium point *B*. The system is now stable and limited displacements do not necessarily lead to irreversible changes. Being *B* an attractor, the system tends to return to it, unless the displacement is such to bring the system to point *C* or further. At this point the most likely outcome is a violent, hardly reversible, escalation which will end with the destruction of one or, possibly, both the states.

There is a quite interesting interpretation of a situation in which the two (or possibly more) actors may decide to follow an “aggressive containment without war” strategy. Assume that they are foe and would like to see the other part destroyed. But they are realist enough to know that to try to achieve that would be very dangerous, highly costly and the final result would be rather uncertain. On the other hand, a situation of relative high reciprocal aggressiveness might have significant advantages in terms of control of the population and of the natural resources in the respective areas of influence. This is the type of situation that has been imagined by George Orwell in his novel “1984.”

This is what, at least in part, happened during the so called Cold War, a term which “in the 1950s came to signal an American concept of warfare against the Soviet Union: aggressive containment without a state of war” (Westad, 2005, p. 2). Peculiar of this state of war without actual fighting was the Mutually Assured Destruction (MAD) strategy. As observed by Mearsheimer (1990), “MAD bolsters peace by clarifying the relative power of states and coalitions. States can still miscalculate each other will, but miscalculations of relative capability are less likely, since nuclear capabilities are not elastic to the specific size and characteristics of forces; once an assured destruction capability is achieved, further increments of nuclear power have little strategic importance. Hence errors in assessing these specific characteristic have little effect” (p. 20).

MAD “was a way to extract advantages from nuclear weapons without actually using them” (Gaddis, 2010, p. 11). One of such advantages is well described by the words of the first NATO Secretary General, Lord Ismay, who is credited with having said that the purpose of the alliance was “to keep the Russians out, the Americans in, and the Germans down” That is, behind the official motivation of the post war US military buildup, which officially was to counter the soviet menace, there was a hidden one, that of keeping western Europe firmly within the western camp. Something similar can be said of Soviet Union with regard to eastern European states. Joffe (1984) claims that “In this view, the United States and the Soviet Union have embroiled the Europeans in conflicts not their own” and adds that “If one superpower were to relinquish the grip on its vassals, perhaps the other would too, and thus the “true strength and interests of the intermediate ... peoples” would help build an order more just and natural than domination *à deux*” (p. 65). This peculiar kind of conflict had effects also outside Europe, providing a way “to delegitimize domestic Third World revolutions or radical movements on the grounds that they were Soviet-inspired or Soviet-sponsored. [...] Without the Cold War, Africa, Asia, and possibly also Latin America would have been very different regions today” (Westad, 2005, p. 3). In the same line is the statement of Orwell (1945), credited to be the inventor of the term “Cold War,” that the effect of the atomic bomb would be of “robbing the exploited classes and peoples of all power to revolt, and at the same time putting the possessors of the bomb on a basis of military equality. Unable to conquer one another, they are likely to continue ruling the world between them.”

Typical cases in which the Cold War provided political and ideological justifications to interventions aimed at maintaining the control of areas of great strategic importance are the 1953 coup organized by the US administration, with a little help from Britain, against the Mossadeq government in Iran, and the 1954 coup against Guatemala’s president Jacobo Arbenz.

In Iran, “[t]he origins of the coup go back to the Anglo-Iranian oil crisis of 1951-53, which, in turn, goes back to the abortive petroleum negotiations at the end of World War II”  (Abrahamian, 2001, p. 184). What was at stake in that crisis is explained by Abrahamian:

While the British realized Iran wanted control, it was adamant this control should not be relinquished - at least not to Iran. […] [U]nder no circumstances was it willing to give Iran final say over how much oil to produce, when to produce it, and where to sell it. If Iran had this power, it could influence world prices and even choose to keep oil underground for future generations, selling only what was needed to buy essential goods. A Foreign Office memo stated bluntly: ‘Whatever new arrangements we arrive at, they should be such that we keep effective control of the assets. […] We can be flexible in profits, administration, or partnership, but not in the issue of control’. (p. 188)

The Iranian parliament choice for prime minister of Mohammad Mossadeq, a nationalist leader who had in his program the nationalization of the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company, brought the crisis to a no-return point. “The conclusion the British drew was that the crisis could end only with the removal of Mossadeq from the scene” (Abrahamian, 2001, p. 189).

A quite aggressive lobbying was carried on by the British in the U.S., that found a good and self-interested reception among the oil companies. American oil companies were particularly worried of the repercussions in their areas (Latin America, Indonesia) of a nationalization of oil assets in Iran. At the same time a massive propaganda campaign was launched to weaken the Mossadeq government, whom, among other allegations, was portrayed as favoring the communists and threatening Islam. Publications such as Newsweek raised the hue claiming that the country was on the edge of falling into the communist abyss (August 10, 1953).

While the Truman administration had attempted to mediate in the dispute between the British and the Iranian governments, the new republican administration of Eisenhower, who won the 1952 presidential elections, was more inclined to see Mossadeq as playing into the hands of the Communists. The fear of losing the control of the Iranian oil production and reserves, and the fear of them falling within the Russian influence area, were decisive in the decision to overthrow the democratic Iranian government in 1953. By August, Mossadeq was under arrest and the Shah Reza Pahlavi was firmly in control of the government.

The Iranian coup was the first one organized by the U.S. in a Third World country since the start of the Cold War. The Guatemala coup to overthrow the President Jacobo Arbenz, elected in 1951, was the second, a year later. In a country in which 91 percent of arable land was controlled by big landlords or by foreign companies (at the time, the US United Fruit Company, with its huge investments in banana plantations, railroads, ports and shipping, dominated Guatemala’s economy), land reform programs were at the top of Arbenz priorities. That, together his increasing cooperation with the Guatemalan Communist Party, was sounding alarm bells in Washington. Pushed also by United Fruit, President Eisenhower in 1954 gave the green light to the CIA, and on June 27 of that year, President Arbenz was deposed.

While the Iran coup is a departure from the more traditional policy of the US in Middle East and Africa, until that time quite critical of the European colonialism and more sympathetic toward to the native nationalist movements, the US domination of Latin America is the effect of a process which began well before 1945 (see for instance LaFeber, 1984). “[T]he Cold War gave shape and direction to attempts at the systematic subordination of the states on the southern half of the continent to the will of the United States”  (Westad, 2005, p. 143).

##### New Wars

The original Richardson model had been conceived in a world in which international relations were characterized by what is sometimes called the Westphalian order. In such context the main international actors were the States and relatively little attention was put on the dynamics internal to them. Today, according to several authors, we are faced with a decline of the Westphalian system and of the States themselves. Williams (2008), to define this new situation, talks of “New Middle Ages.”

In this new reality, conflicts are most often intrastate rather than interstate, although they often cross the State boundaries. States are no longer single actors. On the one side, their control of their territory and population is weakened, and on the other there are external forces which hinder the capacity of the governments to take and implement decisions. The actors are movements and groups of different types, often divided along ethnic/religious lines, or based on loyalties to contrasting fiefdom chieftains/warlords.

In these cases a frequent pattern is: (1) a Country/Region starts to become unstable due to outside forces or to either internal or external (or both) economic problems (point *A* in Figure 8); (2) different groups inside the Region start to fight for the control of some resources or of the political power; (3) these fights are reframed within an ideological or, more easily, a religious context; (4) the conflict reaches a level of relatively violent stability (point *B* in Figure 8).

In these wars, the main interest of the belligerents is the continuation of the war rather than the quest for a decisive and final battle. Actually, while real battles involve armed people on both sides and are thus quite dangerous, robbery, plunder and violence against civilians are much less risky and much more rewarding: “[I]n the new wars, force is mainly directed not against the enemy’s armed force but against the civilian population […] War becomes a way of life: its players make a living out of it, and not infrequently amass considerable fortunes.” (Münkler, 2005, p. 14). Actually the web of interests one can find in such wars appears to be directed not to ending the war with a clear victory but rather to its theoretically endless continuation. This is very far from what happens in civil wars, which are also intra-state conflict, but in which each party seeks to capture the political power in order to assert its own political and ideological interests and objectives. It is not a case that these new wars most often “have neither a identifiable beginning nor a clearly definable end. Only rarely is it possible to set a date on the cessation of violence […, and] peace agreement ending the war are replaced by peace processes in which the warring parties have to be sworn to mutual consumption of the peace dividends”  (Münkler, 2005, p. 13).

Examples of this new type of war, each of them with its own peculiarities, can be found in many regions, from East Europe to Africa, from the Middle East to Latin America. In most cases the ideologization of violence, often based on religious arguments, is used to justify the actors’ behavior and to attract and motivate new recruits. One may say that these new wars are, in fact, not so new: the Thirty Years War that devastated Central Europe between 1618 and 1648 displayed many similarities.

## **Conclusions**

In this paper I have revisited Richardson’s action-reaction model, his most relevant contribution to the area of peace and conflict studies, discussing its meaning, purpose and use, together with some of its most relevant extensions.

Lewis F. Richardson is certainly not the only one, in the first half of the last century, who tried to apply mathematics and especially mathematical modeling outside of the world of physics, to biology and to the social and economic sciences. I referred to the contemporary model of population dynamics of Volterra, but I could also have mentioned the applications of mathematics to economics developed by Leon Walras and Wilfredo Pareto (Ingrao & Israel, 1990).

I claim that the contribution of Richardson has particular characteristics that make it unique and original. While the mathematical models of Volterra, Walras, and Pareto arise from a mechanistic and deterministic view of reality and constitute attempts to transpose the methods of mechanical science to not physical sciences, the models of Richardson appear as attempts to derive “mathematical metaphors” that allow us to represent and discuss conceptually those aspects of the reality in which we are interested. Another point that seems particularly significant is that the model, for Richardson, is not only a cognitive tool, but also a tool to intervene in the real world, an aid to decision makers. In this sense, I have highlighted the similarity between his way of thinking about the mathematical models and the way they are conceived and used within Operation Research.

In the last sections of the paper, through extensions of the original model of action-reaction and their application to concrete cases, I have illustrated some ways in which the ideas of Richardson can still make a contribution to the understanding of real conflict and of their dynamics.

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**Engaging Youth in Peace: A Study of the Ahmadiyya Muslim Community**

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**ENGAGING YOUTH IN PEACE: A STUDY OF THE AHMADIYYA MUSLIM COMMUNITY**

**Abstract**

The last decade has witnessed increased instability and political unrest among nations, religious groups, and communities, impacting international relationships, diplomacy, loss of lives, and lack of trust among citizens, governments, and international organizations. A number of political, economic, and social factors are calling the need for world-wide peace. In recent years, another key factor that has emerged includes “Islamophobia” where individuals and communities express hatred towards Islam due to the actions of few and lack of knowledge of true Islamic teachings and the Holy Quran. It in turn has resulted in civic unrest of Muslim youths and exclusion and disenfranchisement with religion. According to a recent research report by United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (Long & Crisp, 2011), it is estimated that almost 15.4 million refugees are moved from their region due to lack of human security and peaceful solution. This paper presents a religious perspective on the need for world peace as a pathway to prosperity. The paper is based on the work done by the Ahmadiyya Muslim Community (AMC) in promoting the need for peace across the world. The paper is based on a study undertaken with 80 youths in Australia on the extent to which religious organizations could play a key role in peace building, their views about key causes of conflict, and ways in which religious groups could lead peace among youths. The study found that religious organizations could play a very critical role in achieving world peace. The study also found that youths could play an important role in achieving peace efforts if religious leaders are genuinely committed to peace and educating youth about peace.

**Introduction**

Efforts to establish peace by governments and international organizations have been in place for many decades. Despite significant efforts with resourcing and finances, establishing peace has not proven successful. Key organizations such as governments and international organizations have failed to achieve peace efforts. More focus so far has been to destabilize countries which pose threats to established economies rather than working collaboratively to secure human life and natural resources. Media headlines, international reports, and various researches have shown ongoing peace efforts with limited success. The efforts to establish peace has come to a point where individuals in the society lack trust in organizations and individuals who are engaged in establishing peace. One of the factors contributing to the lack of success in achieving peace efforts is the political influence of countries. Individuals providing leadership in establishing peace are often driven by political imperatives (Jehangir, 2012). Peace advocates who recognize social justice and humanity and are passionate about peace work are often unable to achieve desired outcomes due to political pressures. The United Nations, for example, has been working for many decades on peace efforts with thousands of human beings involved in peace-keeping duties. Likewise, international organizations such as United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF) and United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) for many years have attempted to establish peace. The conflict between countries and religious groups continue in many part of the world. The rising loss of lives due to conflict and the movement of people from homeland to new location is a testament that peace efforts are failing and new strategies are required to genuinely address the global problem.

There is clear evidence on the engagement of youths in conflict and civic unrest in some countries. While youths could play a key role in establishing long-lasting peace, efforts to develop a platform to engage them is yet to be developed. World peace and international harmony between governments and citizens is a solution to many social, economic, and health and wellbeing challenges. If the current trend in conflict continues, more youths will most likely be engaged in such activities with massive loss of lives and increased conflict between nations and religious groups.

This paper is based on a study undertaken with 80 youths from the Ahmadiyya Muslim Community (AMC) across Australia. In Australia the community has almost 8000 members. The Ahmadiyya sect is a minority Muslim group that has experienced persecution in many parts of the world including Pakistan, Indonesia, and other Muslim countries. Most members from the community in Australia come from refugee backgrounds that have experienced persecution, civic unrest, and discrimination in their countries of origin. The AMC is making significant efforts to spread the message of world-wide peace. These efforts are led by the world-wide leader of the AMC and his vision to spread the message of peace in many parts of the world including Australia. The study is aimed to find out the following: *1) the role religious organizations could play in peace, 2) leadership capacity for peace amongst youths within the community; 3) and the causes of current conflict based on the views of AMC youths.* The study is significant for the AMC and other religious communities. AMC has made significant efforts in many parts of the world to establish peace. Most of the work around peace is undertaken by members between the ages 15-40. The community has effective structure in place where members between the ages of 15-40 belong to *‘Majlis Khuddamul Ahmadiyya’*, a group that is the future of the community whose members could be at risk if they are not trained and educated about true teachings of Islam. Therefore, significant effort is made by the community world-wide to train youths in preaching, spreading the message of peace, and other charitable work.

The study is significant to AMC given its effort to establish peace. While the world-wide leader, Mirza Masroor Ahmad campions peace efforts at global level, AMC youths in many parts of the world are actively engaged in peace education. Therefore, this study is timely in reviewing peace efforts of the community and engaging youth in ways to improving peace initiatives.

**Youth Engagement in Peace**

Youths could play an active role in building peace. National and international strategies to engage youths in peace could be sustained with increased ownership in building peace amongst communities. So far, most efforts made to establish peace are through political and humanitarian solutions. Limited attempts are made to identify youth leaders in building leadership capacity in peace building. Educating and empowering youths in peace leadership could strengthen relationship between youths from different backgrounds. Peace education involves talking on values, attitudes, and behaviors that allow a person to be in harmony with self, others, and their environment (Morrison, Austad, & Cota, 2011). Youth engagement in peace could create and sustain a socially responsible environment for the development of active, critically reflective, and socially aware young people that are both interested in their (local) communities as well as taking action to build more inclusive and just communities (Bužinkić, Ćulum, Horvat, & Kovačić, 2015). Studies have shown positive effects when youths are working with peers in the development of young people as well as its contribution to creating an active and sustainable society (Bowie, 2004; Devlin & Gunning, 2009; Forde, Kiely, & Meade, 2009). Research has shown that youth engagement in social policies is considered to be one of the pivotal features of contemporary youth policy (Coussee, 2008; Verschelden, Coussée, Van deWalle, & Williamson, 2009) and it is widely supported in youth development discussions (Davey, 2009; European Commission, 2009). There is a widespread view that young people are the leaders of tomorrow who are changing the world today. Mahmood (1938) states that, ‘Nations cannot be reformed unless the reformation of the youth.’ This view is one of the principles of the Non-Government Organization in Mexico which engages youths in peace building (Kopeliovich & Kuriansky, 2009). Kopeliovich and Kuriansky found the youth engagement in peace encourages and facilitate young people to embody a peaceful conscience, awareness about the conditions for peace, and peaceful behavior in themselves and others (p. 75). Ensor (2013) argues that when youths are given the tools and skills to resolve conflicts, they can be empowered to support their communities’ peacebuilding processes.

Reports by United Nations suggest that building peace takes time. They further suggest success in building peace is dependent on national leadership, in government and society, and requires real ownership over the process (United Nations Peace Building Support Office, 2013). Previous study has suggested that young people are both victims of and active agents in conflict and post conflict settings, and playing a multiplicity of roles (Başer & Çelik, 2014). Lack of dialogue with youths on national issues is the causes of marginalization and conflict. Research in Sierra Leone found that youths felt marginalized and not given a proper platform to influence decision making that affects their lives (McIntyre & Thusi, 2003). A United Nations report found that sports can be used in promoting peace among youths and nations. The report suggests that there is tremendous enthusiasm among sport for development and peace proponents to fully harness the development power of sport (Right to Play, 2008). A Commonwealth Secretariat report authored by Kay and Dudfield (2013) found that in countries directly affected by conflict within their borders, many civil society institutions stop functioning, critical health and education systems break down, physical infrastructure is destroyed, agricultural activity is interrupted, food supplies become scarce, commerce and trade shrink, poverty increases, populations are uprooted and made homeless, disease epidemics spread unchecked, discrimination against vulnerable populations increases, and violence and criminality become widespread (p. 203).

According to Fobear (2014), peace education has been a buzzword for many activists and politicians as a method for social healing and conflict resolution. In 1945, the United Nations has declared peace education an integral tool for the building and maintenance of peace (Page, 2008). The objective of the peace education was to study the causes of war and prevention (Ardizonne, 2001). According to Fobear (2014), in the 1970s peace education became more conscientious by linking education to liberation from social oppression and human rights; in 1980s peace education turned its focus from the individual peace process to a broader scope of human coexistence and harmony; and in 1990s peace education returned to a more “humanist” approach of prioritizing civil, domestic, cultural, and ethnic forms of violence and its prevention, along with the notion of social justice (p. 99).

**Religion and Peace**

Rosen (2009) questions why in many contexts of conflict in our world religion appears to be more part of the problem than the solution. According to Saiya (2015), religious freedom contributes to peace in four ways: religious believers being able to practice their faith as they see fit free from governmental restrictions and social hostilities; religious freedom frees people of faith and faith-based organizations to provide social services that reduce the personal grievances that people have; free exercise of religion works against tendencies towards authoritarianism and tyranny; and religious freedom promotes a diversity of views within and between religions by allowing each faith tradition to believe in private and practice in public as it wishes free from interference (p. 377). Religion could also serve as a basis for bringing people together (Abu-Nimer, 2001). Religious actors have a potentially important part to play as peacebuilders (Clark, 2010). Research by Morrison and Harris (2003) found that religious organizations have been successful in educating about peace in schools and informal settings. Abu-Nimer observes that many studies focus on the destructive role of religion, but he points out that in recent years there has been a rising interest in how religion can be used in conflict resolution and the peacebuilding process (2001).

Religion plays a meaningful role in the life of individuals and in both national and international issues such as human rights, education, medicine (e.g., organ donation and contraception) marriage and divorce, law, immigration, and many other social issues and political structures (Silberman, 2005a, b). Johnson and Sampson (1994) have suggested that religion-based programs are more effective in reaching individuals and leaders than programs based on social or political agendas. Whilst Islam and Judaism view peace as part of the religion, (Cox et al., 1994; Fox, 2001) argue that such religious messages have been overlooked. Research by Yablon (2010) with 255 students concluded that religion can serve as a base for intergroup dialogue and that religious reasoning may serve as an effective strategy for enhancing positive intergroup relations. Religious individuals, often as representatives of faith-based organizations, have for decades carried out mediation, striving to help resolve conflicts (Haynes, 2009). As Shore and Kline (2006, p. 309) underscore, ‘Historically, international conflict resolution theories have largely excluded religion as a source of peacemaking’. Clark (2011) argues that religious organizations command considerable trust and respect, thus making them very influential actors in peace building. She further suggests that one reason why the churches are so influential is that they offer stability, safety, and support. Studies have shown that religious organizations encourage trust between and within races; and trust, in turn, is an important element of reconciliation (Staub, 2000; Govier & Verwoerd, 2002; Huyse, 2003).

Studies have also shown that religion could also create and enhance intergroup conflict (Fox, 1999; Haynes, 2009; Huntington, 2003). Research has shown that religious beliefs and practices alone do not account for armed conflict. It is the processes through which religious organizations are formed and become involved in politics that results in conflict (Bamidele, 2014). According to Toft (2004), religion does not need to be the central factor in a conflict for that conflict to be called religious. Few quantitative studies address the issue of whether religion motivates a conflict. Most that do deal with this issue found that religious motivations influence conflict but other factors are also important (Fox, 2012, p. 142). Several studies found that religious discrimination was a significant factor in ethnic conflict but other factors including separatism, international intervention, regime, and non-religious forms of discrimination were also important influences (Fox, 2012). Religion can contribute to the escalation of conflicts when it is part of such common interpretations: fragmented groups can be integrated on the basis of common religious myths, beliefs, and rituals (Juan, 2015). Studies by Svensson (in Brown, 1997) found that the probability of peaceful conflict resolution is lower if one of the conflict parties has explicit religious aims. Religious elites play a central role in many violent conflicts. They can interpret them in religious terms and disseminate radical religious interpretations among the believers (Juan, 2015, p. 775).

**Minority Muslims and their Effort in Peace**

The AMC has strongly advocated about the need for peace as a mechanism to address world crisis. The 5th leader of the AMC has championed peace and his work has been highly recognized by British Parliament, US Capitol Hill, and European Parliament in Brussels (Ahmad, 2012). The AMC was founded in 1889 in Qadian, a small village in Punjab, India. Members of the sect believe that the founder, Hadhrat Mirza Ghulam Ahmad, was born in fulfilment of a prophecy by the Prophet Muhammad and that he was the promised Messiah (Adamson, 1989,pp. 1-2). Hazrat Mirza Ghulam Ahmad sought to reform the teachings of Islam in accordance with their peaceful and tolerant origins (Ahmad, 2007; Ali, 1996; Faruqui, 1983).

Various scholars have written about AMC. Balzani (2010) writes that Ahmadi Muslims remain the least known of all Muslim communities and in many Islamic countries they have been defined as heretics and subjected to persecution. According to Kilonzo (2011), the AMC is noted for its active engagement in social welfare and in meeting the educational and medical needs of host communities. Rahman (2014) finds that governments in countries such as Pakistan and Indonesia have adopted anti-Ahmadi policy which directly discriminate AMC. Turner (1998) outlines the history of AMC in the U.S.A. and the role early missionaries played in preaching Islam. Valentine (2008) endorses the doctrine of the founder of AMC in relation to jihad and physical force as understood by the Muslim divines “is utterly incorrect [and] totally contrary to the Qur’anic injunctions” (p. 197). In his view jihad of the pen has replaced to jihad with sword. Thus from the very beginning, AMC was established on peace. Studies in Ghana suggest that AMC retains a major role in educating and preparing young Muslims for modern life and has been recognized by the government for its significant efforts (Skinner, 2013). It could be argued that minority Muslims and other people who have been disadvantaged in past due to their religious belief play an important role in peace education and building peaceful communities. Their experience in peace processes and previous persecution could empower them to be advocates of peace.

**Methodology**

The study was undertaken at the AMC annual national youth conference in April 2015. The paper-based survey was distributed to 160 members on the first day of the conference. In total 80 (50%) completed the survey. The conference was attended by more than 300 youths; however, the survey was randomly distributed to 160 youths. The survey questionnaire was designed after extensive review of literature on youths and peace (refer to appendix 1). The survey enabled respondents to provide quantitative and qualitative responses. The study used both methods to triangulate quantitative and qualitative data and identify common findings. Most of the respondents (92%) were between the ages of 15-40. The AMC has established various auxiliary organizations. The youths are part of *‘Majlis Khuddamul Ahmadiyya’*, which consists of males between the ages of 15-40.

**Findings**

The paper-based survey has a series of quantitative questions divided into three sections. The three sections included participant’s perception of how religious organizations could promote peace; assessing global initiative of AMC in peace leadership; and assessing participant’s views on the causes of peace conflict. Participants completed the quantitative items using five point Likert scale where 1= strongly disagree, 2=disagree, 3=neutral, 4= agree, and = strongly agree. After each section of the survey, participants were invited to write comments to support their quantitative response. The survey asked participants to outline their education attainment. 72% of participants completed tertiary education at postgraduate or undergraduate level. 21% of participants were completing high school education.

The first section of the survey asked participants about ways religious organizations could actively engage in promoting peace. Table 1 below outlines the result on each item. The findings suggest that AMC’s motto of *‘Love for All Hatred for None’* could play an important role in promoting peace with 96.1% participant agreement. This finding aligned with the recent participation of AMC youths in a rally aimed to promote peace after the Sydney siege incident. AMC youths participated in the rally with *‘Love for all Hatred for None – Muslims for Peace’* printed on the shirt to promote peace. The participation of AMC youths with the motto on shirt was highly praised by non-Muslims. Participants in the survey also agreed that conferences and seminars about peace could also play a key role in promoting peace effort. 92.2% participants agreed about conferences and seminars as a way to promote peace. It is worth to note that AMC has been hosting peace symposiums in many countries which engages diverse stakeholders such as: governments at all levels, academics, students, religious leaders, and communities. Participants in the survey rated two areas as equally important in religious organizations role in promoting peace. They include using religious centres such as mosques as a source for peace (90.9%), and hosting public lectures at religious centres on peace (90.9%). Participants also agreed (89. 6%) that religious organizations could actively participate in disasters and unrests with message of peace. Other areas participants thought as areas where religious organization could promote peace includes: community open day at religious centres with focus on peace (88.3%); engaging in discussions and debate about Islamic views on peace (87.0%); and engaging with government at all levels to raise awareness of peace (85.7%). The findings also suggest that the three least areas of impact on promoting peace by religious organizations include: encouraging youths to undertake tertiary studies in peace (62.3%); training of youths to be researchers and academics with focus on peace (70.1%); and actively participating in public rallies with the aim to build peaceful communities (70.1%). *T-test* was undertaken to assess the significance between youths below the age of 20 and those above. The result showed significance (p < 0.05 and p < 0.01) in one item only. Participants above 20 years old thought that religious centres such as mosques could be a source of peace (mean 4.71) compared to youths below the age of 20 (4.33). Significance of 0.30 was found between the two age groups.

**Table 1: Ways Religious Organizations can play an important role in Promoting Peace**

| **Participant perception on how religious organizations can promote peace** | **Mean** | **% marking 4 and 5** |
| --- | --- | --- |
| Religious centres such as mosques could be a source of peace | 4.33 | 90.9 |
| Conferences and seminars about peace | 4.43 | 92.2 |
| Undertaking research on peace and sharing findings | 4.08 | 75.4 |
| Public lectures at religious centres on peace | 4.33 | 90.9 |
| Public lectures at universities on peace | 4.26 | 84.4 |
| Community open day at religious centres with focus on peace | 4.33 | 88.3 |
| Engaging in discussions and debate about Islamic views on peace | 4.08 | 87.0 |
| Publishing articles in local and national newspapers about peace | 4.25 | 74.0 |
| Encouraging youths to undertake tertiary studies in peace | 3.96 | 62.3 |
| Training of youths to be researchers and academics with focus on peace | 3.75 | 70.1 |
| Engaging with government at all levels to raise awareness of peace | 4.33 | 85.7 |
| Actively engaging with international organizations (e.g. UN) to promote peace | 4.52 | 83.1 |
| Actively participating in public rallies with the aim to build peaceful communities | 3.96 | 70.1 |
| Actively participating in disasters and unrests with message of peace | 4.46 | 89.6 |
| Promoting the motto “love for all hatred for none” | 4.63 | 96.1 |

The survey encouraged respondents to suggest other ways by which AMC could actively promote peace which may have positive impact at national level. 54 respondents took the opportunity to identify ideas or suggestions. Some of recurring themes outlined by 54 respondents could be grouped into two areas. They include increased use of media in promoting peace; and engaging with schools and communities at local and national level. In terms of media participants suggested strategies such as the use of social media, local newspapers, and question and answer sessions. The AMC has its own international television channel called Muslim Television Ahmadiyya (MTA) and respondents thought that it could have a segment on peace. One respondents suggested *‘Use of social media and Q&A type of session - it is a need of time to utilise the modern communication e.g. social media’.* Many respondents suggested ideas related to community engagement as a mean to promote peace. Some ideas included *‘advocacy and exemplary life and role model – lead by example’; ‘engaging high school students in peace process by having discussion sessions about peace’; ‘personal contact and engaging local communities’; building personal relationships with friends and neighbours’; ‘the community should be more open to other communities so as to win their trust’; more interfaith dialogue is required with the involvement of the whole community’ ; ‘public lectures in collaboration with universities and holding conferences on peace, and broadcasting it at national level’.* The suggestion on use of media and engaging with communities could be further areas of improvement by AMC. It is clear that youths within AMC recognize the need to engage and collaborate with various communities or stakeholders to peace efforts. The AMC is already making efforts to work with local and regional communities and with government agencies. Further work is needed to engage students in schools and tertiary education institutions to educate youths about the need to establish peace.

Respondents were asked to outline ways the AMC youths are leading peace in the community. Respondents outlined that AMC is actively involved in community work such as Clean up Australia day, Red Cross Door Knock Appeal, Blood Donations, National Tree Day as part of Planet Ark environmental foundation, and other charitable work to help communities in Australia and overseas. One respondent outlined *‘they are leading peace through their behaviour and representation of themselves as peaceful people. I think youths should have more opportunities to be trained so they can present themselves as peaceful individuals’.* Another respondent stated that the youths are actively *‘promoting love for all hatred for none motto of the community’*. Another youth suggested that AMC is promoting peace by *‘being good productive citizens of the country’*. Being a role model in the community was one of the recurring messages by the respondents. One youth stated that *‘youths are promoting peace through being kind and respectful to the general community- by doing this the community has recognised the effort of AMC’.*

The worldwide leader of the AMC is a champion of peace. His peace effort is recognized by various government and non-government organizations. The second section of the survey was aimed find out the extent to which his message of peace is widely communicated within AMC youths in Australia and how his leadership is building capability to develop youths to lead peace. Table 2 outlines the results. The findings suggest that youths in AMC are inspired by the effort of the world-wide leader in promoting peace (88.3%). Youths below the age of 20 and participants above 20 years of age had strong view that the world-wide leader has inspired youths to engage in peace efforts. Youths also agreed that a global peace effort of AMC is developing future youth leaders in peace with 88.3% agreement. 72.2% participants agreed that the priority for world peace set by the leader is widely communicated and understood amongst youths. *T-test* between the two groups did not show any major significance. The AMC has members in 206 countries with membership exceeding tens and millions. The leadership provided by the global leader based in the United Kingdom is proving to have significant impact on youths in countries such as Australia. The development of leadership capability is key to success in communicating and advocating peace in various communities. Each year the AMC distributes millions of brochures and pamphlets to various communities which communicate the message of peace. AMC youths in Australia and other countries have actively participated in national events in the cause of humanity. The youths within the community have played an active role in religious preaching with book stalls, exhibitions, and distribution of literature in tertiary education institutions. Most of these efforts are based on the leadership and directions from the world-wide leader of the AMC.

**Table 2: Building Leadership Capability amongst youths in Peace**

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
| **Participant perception of AMC Leadership in Peace efforts** | **Mean** | **% marking 4 and 5** |
| Global peace efforts by the leader of the Ahmadiyya Muslim Community is encouraging youths to engage in peace efforts | 4.35 | 85.7 |
| The global peace effort of AMC is developing future youth leaders in peace | 4.13 | 88.3 |
| The priority for world peace set by the leader is widely communicated and understood amongst the youths | 4.00 | 76.6 |
| Youths within AMC are actively involved in peace related work | 3.91 | 72.2 |
| Youths of AMC are inspired by the effort of the world-wide leader in promoting peace | 4.35 | 88.3 |

The survey asked respondents to identify ways AMC could develop youth capability to lead peace efforts. The first recurring theme identified by youths includes training and education of youths. One youth suggested ‘*AMC develop youth capability to lead peace efforts by training them as they grow and become peace ambassadors - so that they can be a better future to society and the community’*. The second theme relates to engaging with organizations such as schools, universities, and other organizations that are actively engaged in establishing peace and resolving conflicts. One respondent suggested *‘working with different organizations which help people affected with conflict and voice against unnecessary wars’.* One respondent suggested that AMC youths *‘could be trained to lead research on peace’*. Many youths suggested that *‘promoting and educating peace in collaboration with schools and universities could be effective’*. One respondent suggested holding *‘lectures/presentations to encourage youths to promote peace at local and national levels and organising peace promoting activities and visits in which the youths of AMC can participate’.* Another respondent suggested to *‘conduct awareness programs by showing the youths that self-character is the biggest promoter of peace’.* Respondents also spoke about *‘strengthening the education of moral values in the current context with conflict and civic unrest in many countries’.*

The survey provided opportunity for respondents to outline ways AMC could better engage with the national and international community in its peace efforts. Respondents provided useful suggestions such as engaging with governments at all levels; inviting key political parties in peace programs/events; taking an active part in national and international rallies which are aimed to establish and sustain world peace; encouraging AMC youths in political and journalism careers; presentations by AMC in national and international peace conferences; and building partnership with media to propagate the message of peace. One respondent suggested that *‘social harmony and mutual respect as the key factor in developing long term peace’.* Another respondent stated *‘to eliminate causes that disrupt peace, be an example for others, and assimilate with non-Muslim societies in a positive manner’*.

The final section of the survey asked participants to outline their views on the causes of conflict which has hindered peace efforts. The results suggest that 84.4% participants think that the cause of conflict is due to the hatred against certain religious groups. 77.9% participants think that most of the global conflict is due to the economic power or some nations. 76.6% participants agreed that nations have a moral responsibility on people and 75.3% think that cause of conflict is due to the lack of leadership on peace efforts by key political leaders. Based on the response, the least causes of conflict based on participants is disengagement of people with religion (53.2%); and failure of international organizations. *T-test* showed significance of .008 between youths below the age of 20 and those above 20 years of age on the item “The cause of conflict is due to the failure of international organizations (e.g. UN).” Respondents above the age of 20 think that international organizations have failed to establish peace efforts. Table 3 outlines the result.

**Table 3: Causes of Peace Conflict**

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
| **Participant perception on the causes of conflict** | **Mean** | **% marking 4 and 5** |
| Most of the global conflict is due to the economic power or some nations | 3.91 | 77.9 |
| The cause the conflict is due to the actions of some religious groups | 3.83 | 71.4 |
| The cause of conflict is due to hatred against certain religious groups | 4.39 | 84.4 |
| The cause of conflict is due to lack of leadership on peace efforts by key political leaders | 3.92 | 75.3 |
| The cause of conflict is due to the failure of international organizations (e.g. UN) | 3.54 | 66.2 |
| The cause of conflict is due to the disengagement of people with religion | 3.75 | 53.2 |
| In my view nations have lost moral responsibilities on people | 3.92 | 76.6 |

The final part of the survey asked respondents to outline their views about factors contributing to conflict and building peace efforts. Some of the recurring factors outlined by respondents included: lack of tolerance in modern culture; lack of leadership and unity amongst nations; division between religions; and greed for power and ignorance. Participants also expressed strong views about the role of media in instigating conflict. One respondent expressed concern that *‘right now in the world almost more than 50% of the wars are because of religion- we need to remind ourselves we are all humans’.* Another respondent suggested that ‘*religious organizations play a very important role in tolerance towards others. Perhaps this is not promoted much. The life of materialism or economic power is also having major impact on people morals, hence impacts peace building efforts’*. One respondent spoke about ‘*hypocrisy at an individual level, and lack of tolerance and the greed for power and money’.*

**Conclusion**

The study has shown that youths in religious organizations could play an important role in peace. The findings clearly suggest that efforts to establish and sustain peace can only be achieved if such initiatives are led by a leader who is a champion of global peace efforts. The AMC has played an important role in peace efforts in Australia and other parts of the world. The results of the survey are a testament that youths are aware of the AMC priorities and global peace efforts is inspiring youths to be role models in peace development. The study also reaffirms the findings of previous studies on how youths could lead peace efforts if they are led, trained, and developed to promote and lead peace. This study confirms that the work undertaken by AMC is engaging youths, and religious education and engagement are developing youths to be leaders with skills in peace, humanity, religious values, and building harmonious communities. These skills are key in the current context in which youths are exposed to drugs, alcohol, civic unrests, and conflict between nations and religious groups. The study suggests that youths could be a powerful source of developing and sustaining peace efforts if they are educated by leaders who are genuinely committed to peace.

So far most studies on peace are undertaken by researchers and international organizations. This study was a collaborative project between AMC and an Australian University. The collaboration has enabled both institutions to work closely with youths. Undertaking such project in religious setting has strengths and limitations. It engages youths and empowers them to voice their concerns when studies are undertaken at the religious organization. In terms of barriers, views of other religious groups through inter-faith dialogue are also helpful in understanding the perceptions of youths from other religious groups.

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**Appendix 1: Survey Instrument**

**Leadership in Peace**

**A Study with Muslim Youths in Australia**

**Purpose**

The Ahmadiyya Muslim Community (AMC) has played an important role in promoting the need for peace across the world. The world-wide leader of the AMC is a champion for peace. A number of critical factors are contributing to world-wide need for peace. They include: political, economic, and social factors. In recent years, another key factor that has emerged includes *“Islamophobia”* where individuals and communities are expressing hatred towards Islam due to the actions of few. It in turn has resulted in civic unrest of Muslim youths and exclusion and disenfranchisement with religion.

**Aim of the survey**

The aim of the survey is to find out the extent to which the message of peace which is championed by the world-wide leader of the AMC is effectively advocated and led by youths from the same community. The survey also aims to find out ways in which religious organizations and youths could play an active role in building peaceful communities.

**How to complete the survey?**

The survey has various questions which allows respondents to rate their response on a five point scale where 1=strongly disagree; 2=disagree; 3= neutral; 4=agree; and 5=strongly agree. Throughout the survey, opportunity is also available for participants to write open ended comments.

**Contacts about the survey**

Further information about the survey can be obtained from Mubarak Ahmed (Naib Sadr, Majlis Khuddamul Ahmadiyya, Australia at mabamussy@yahoo.com.au

**Section 1: Personal Details**

Please tick your response in the shaded area.

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| **Your education attainment** | **Tick** |
| In high school |  |
| Certificate/Diploma |  |
| Undergraduate degree |  |
| Postgraduate |  |
| None of the above |  |

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| **Your age group** | **Tick** |
| Below 20 |  |
| 21-30 |  |
| 31-40 |  |
| 41 and above |  |

**Section 2: Religious Organizations and Peace**

This section of the survey aims to find out how religious organizations can play an important role in promoting peace within communities. Please select your response using a tick or circle using 5 point scale where 1=strongly disagree; 2=disagree; 3= neutral; 4=agree; and 5=strongly agree.

| **In what way can religious organizations actively engage in promoting peace?** | 1= Strongly disagree | 2= Disagree | 3=Neutral | 4= Agree  | 5= Strongly agree |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Religious centres such as mosques could be a source of peace | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 |
| Conferences and seminars about peace  | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 |
| Undertaking research on peace and sharing findings | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 |
| Public lectures at religious centres on peace | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 |
| Public lectures at universities on peace | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 |
| Community open day at religious centres with focus on peace | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 |
| Engaging in discussions and debate about Islamic views on peace | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 |
| Publishing articles in local and national newspapers about peace | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 |
| Encouraging youths to undertake tertiary studies in peace | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 |
| Training of youths to be researchers and academics with focus on peace | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 |
| Engaging with government at all levels to raise awareness of peace | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 |
| Actively engaging with international organizations (e.g. UN) to promote peace | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 |
| Actively participating in public rallies with the aim to build peaceful communities | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 |
| Actively participating in disasters and unrests with message of peace | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 |
| Promoting the motto *“love for all hatred for none”* | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 |

**Please suggest other ways our community could actively promote peace which may have positive impact at national level**

**In what way the youths of Ahmadiyya Muslim Community are leading peace in the community?**

**Section 3: Championing Global Peace**

The leader of the Ahmadiyya Muslim Community is a champion of peace. His peace effort is recognised by various government and non-government organizations. This section of the survey aims to find out the extent to which his message is widely communicated within Ahmadiyya Muslim youths in Australia and how his leadership is building capability to develop youths to lead peace. Please select your response using a tick or circle using 5 point scale where 1=strongly disagree; 2=disagree; 3= neutral; 4=agree; and 5=strongly agree.

| **Building leadership capability amongst youths in peace** | 1= Strongly disagree | 2= Disagree | 3=Neutral | 4= Agree  | 5= Strongly agree |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Global peace efforts by the leader of the Ahmadiyya Muslim Community is encouraging youths to engage in peace efforts | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 |
| The global peace effort of AMC is developing future youth leaders in peace | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 |
| The priority for world peace set by the leader is widely communicated and understood amongst the youths | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 |
| Youths within AMC are actively involved in peace related work | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 |
| Youths of AMC are inspired by the effort of the world-wide leader in promoting peace | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 |

**In what way could AMC develop youth capability to lead peace efforts?**

**Thinking about global challenges in peace building, what ways could AMC better engage with the national and international community in its peace efforts?**

**Section 4: Peace and Conflict – Your Views**

Globally, many social and economic factors are contributing to conflict amongst communities and nations. This section of the survey aims to find out your views on key factors contributing to such conflict and ways of resolving them. Please select your response using a tick or circle using 5 point scale where 1=strongly disagree; 2=disagree; 3= neutral; 4=agree; and 5=strongly agree.

| **Your views about peace and conflict** | 1= Strongly disagree | 2= Disagree | 3=Neutral | 4= Agree  | 5= Strongly agree |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Most of the global conflict is due to the economic power or some nations | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 |
| The cause the conflict is due to the actions of some religious groups | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 |
| The cause of conflict is due to hatred against certain religious groups | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 |
| The cause of conflict is due to lack of leadership on peace efforts by key political leaders | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 |
| The cause of conflict is due to the failure of international organizations (e.g UN) | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 |
| The cause of conflict is due to the disengagement of people with religion | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 |
| In my view nations have lost moral responsibilities on people | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 |

**In your view what are other factors contributing to conflict and building peace efforts?**

***Thank you for participating in the survey***

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**An Analysis of the Egyptian-Israeli Peace Process**

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**Keywords**: Mediation, Peace Talks, Egypt and Israel

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**AN ANALYSIS OF THE EGYPTIAN-ISRAELI PEACE PROCESS**

**Abstract**

This paper explores the Egyptian-Israeli peace process after the October 1973 war and it aims to identify which key factors from the mediation may help explain the durable peace that resulted between these two countries. An original framework is used to analyze U.S. President Jimmy Carter’s mediation efforts before, during, and after the Camp David talks. The analysis found that the post-war struggle for power was channeled into nonviolent mechanisms and processes, a directive mediation strategy was employed, a highly-experienced mediator led the process and potential spoilers were managed. A number of other important insights regarding this case are also generated from this analysis.

##### Introduction

The Middle East is one region which has been consistently unstable and rife with violent conflicts which persist to the present day. The war between Egypt and Israel in 1973 (also termed ‘the October War’) can therefore be viewed as one violent conflict in the long and dramatic history of this part of the world.

The October War of 1973 and the events surrounding it were also dramatic: during the war there were Soviet threats of intervention, a resulting world-wide American military alert, an oil embargo, and a resupplying of arms by both of the super-powers (Quandt, 1977a). This meant that this war, and its outcome, had great importance because of the possible global ramifications.

What follows is an examination of this war between Israel and its neighbor Egypt, and the successful efforts of US President Jimmy Carter to bring a lasting resolution to this armed conflict. First, the features of the case will be presented. Then, the case will be analyzed using a set of questions developed for this study.

**Features of the Case**

In 1967 Egypt suffered a crippling defeat by Israeli forces: nearly every Egyptian plane on the ground was destroyed and their ground forces were ineffective at preventing Israeli advances (Brooks, 2006). Then, in October of 1973 Egypt and Syria launched a surprise attack against Israel which allowed the Egyptian forces to quickly cross the Suez Canal into Israeli-occupied territories (Brooks, 2006). This surprise attack marked the beginning of the 1973 war which was concluded with the signing of a peace treaty in March of 1979 (Quandt, 1986a).

The main parties in this war were Egypt and Israel. However, there were numerous neighbors and other outside actors who were involved both directly and indirectly in waging this war. For example, Syria was Egypt’s ally and had cooperated directly in the war effort (Brooks, 2006). Additionally, at one point in the war, Iraqi forces came to the aid of the Syrian forces on the Syrian front (Quandt, 1977b). Moreover, the Israeli forces were receiving support from the US, and the Arab forces received support from the Russians (Quandt, 1977a; 1977b).

Numerous impacts were created by this war. Aside from the large loss of life on both sides, it created a near showdown between Russia and the USA (Carter, 1986) thus threatening global security (Kamel, 1986). One estimate places the total number of battle deaths (both civilians and combatants killed in the course of combat) at 6,450 people (Lacina & Gleditsch, 2005). Moreover, this war threatened the global economy because of the implications it created for the control and movement of oil from the region (Kamel, 1986).

Several earlier efforts were made to terminate the war. Perhaps the most prominent of these was Henry Kissinger’s shuttle diplomacy process which resulted in the brokering of three Arab-Israeli peace agreements during the period of 1974 to 1975 (Quandt, 1986a). President Carter’s mediation process, however, could be considered to start when he held a first meeting with Israeli Prime Minister Begin on 19 July 1977 (Princen, 1991), and the process concluded with the signing of the peace treaty in March of 1979 (the actual talks held at Camp David only lasted thirteen days, and they should properly be viewed as only one segment of the entire ‘peace process’ since they produced the initial framework for peace which would later be developed into the full peace treaty).

A state of durable peace has endured between Egypt and Israel from the date of signing the peace agreement to the present. Therefore, durable peace has endured for well over 30 years. This remarkable achievement will be analyzed in the following section of this chapter.

**Analytical Framework**

In order to understand the outcome in this case, it is necessary to examine a number of factors and how they contributed to the creation of a durable peace. In any given mediation process, there are at least 6 key factors to explore in this regard:

1. Past and Current Relationships between the Parties
2. Distribution of Power between the Parties
3. Mediation Timing
4. Mediation Strategy
5. Spoiler Management
6. Mediator’s Experience

The analytical framework, which follows, is presented as a set of questions to be asked of the case study that aim to further illustrate and explore the role of these 6 factors in this case:

* Did the parties have a previously friendly relationship and, if yes, how did that affect the creation of new friendly relationships in the post-agreement stage?
* Did the mediator balance the power between the parties in order to help create a balanced agreement?
* Was the struggle for power channeled into nonviolent mechanisms and processes?
* Did the timing of the mediation mean that the parties were less entrenched in their positions and were therefore able to produce a good agreement?
* What type of mediator strategy was employed and what affect did that strategy have?
* Were there spoilers present in this case and, if yes, did the mediator address the spoilers?
* Did the mediator’s experience affect their ability to manage the key aspects of the mediation process?

 **Analysis**

The efforts of US President Jimmy Carter to end the war between Egypt and Israel are analyzed in this part of the paper. The analysis is structured around the questions from the analytical framework.

**Relationship between the Parties**

The following section of this analysis examines the previous relationship between the parties prior to the war and its affect on the parties’ post-agreement relationship.

*Did the parties have a previously friendly relationship and, if yes, how did that affect the creation of new friendly relationships in the post-agreement stage?*

Egypt and Israel had a previous relationship that was marked by several armed conflicts. For example, the UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict Dataset (Version 4-2007) lists three armed conflicts between these parties; including two separate wars in 1967 and 1973, and a minor conflict in 1969-70. Furthermore, at the individual level, the leaders did not have friendly relationships as Carter (1995) noted that during his first meeting with Egyptian President Sadat, he probed him concerning a diplomatic recognition of Israel, to which Sadat would not agree to because of the generations of hatred and vivid memories of recent wars.

Not surprisingly, the relationship between the parties during the Camp David talks was also not friendly, and Carter stated that, “it was clear that we had a long way to go before a mutual feeling of trust and respect could be established between the two men. Over the next eleven days, I was to spend much of time defending each of the leaders to the other” (Carter, 1995, p. 347).

Moreover, the relationship between Egypt and Israel did not quickly become friendly after the signing of the Egyptian-Israeli peace agreement (Quandt, 1986). Instead, several events occurred after the signing of the agreement that continued to strain Arab-Israeli relationships. This includes Israeli Prime Minister Begin:

…annexing East Jerusalem, bombing Beirut in July, and running for reelection on a platform that claimed Israeli sovereignty over the West Bank, Gaza, and the Golan Heights. (Mahmood, 1985, p. 81)

Carter, however, recognized that normal friendly relations would not be quickly and easily created in this case. For example, the text of Carter’s signing statement notes that, “obviously time and understanding will be necessary for people, hitherto enemies, to become neighbors in the best sense of the word. Just because a paper is signed, all the problems will not automatically go away” (President Jimmy Carter: Draft Signing Statement, 1979, p. 3).

It should also be noted, however, that by 1980 even though Israel had fulfilled the first part of its obligations regarding the withdrawal of Israeli troops from 60 percent of the Sinai peninsula and the establishment of diplomatic relations, it had not met its other obligations regarding reaching an agreement on the question of Palestinian self-rule in the West Bank and Gaza Strip (Associated Press, 1980a). These outstanding issues continued to strain the relationship between the parties, and Egypt’s Foreign Ministry stated at the time that if no agreement could be reached by the deadline, then the quality of the relations between the two states would be affected (Associated Press, 1980a). So, there is a lot of evidence that suggests new friendly relationships were not quickly and easily established. Furthermore, the Camp David Accords actually placed new strains on the relationship between Egypt and other Arab countries, as described in the next section of this analysis.

**Distribution of Power between the Parties**

The next section of this analysis examines the distribution of power between the parties. First, the power differences between the parties will be discussed. Then, the analysis examines what, if anything, Carter did to balance the power between the parties, and lastly the analysis explores the affects of the power dynamics in this case.

*Did the mediator balance the power between the parties in order to help create a balanced agreement?*

Israel could be considered to be the more powerful party for four main reasons. First, at the time of the negotiations Israel was in control of the disputed territories (Mahmood, 1985). Second, Israeli Prime Minister Begin had the full backing of his government going into the negotiations (Mahmood, 1985). Third, Israeli Prime Minster Begin was not pressured by the same time constraints and resulting sense of urgency concerning the negotiations that Carter and Sadat were facing (Quandt, 1986b; 2001). Fourth, Begin was considered to be a more astute negotiator (Quandt, 1986b).

In contrast, Egypt was already somewhat isolated from other Arab nations at the time of the negotiations, and shortly after signing the Camp David Accord it became further isolated and was suspended from the Arab League (Mahmood, 1985). Moreover, militarily, Egypt had less power than Israel (Brooks, 2006). More specifically, Brooks (2006) states that the “Egyptian [military] capabilities were still inferior to the Israelis, especially in air power and offensive maneuver…” Sadat was also in a weaker position than Begin because the breakdown of talks would mean that Israel would continue to occupy the Sinai, Sadat would have nothing to show for his historic initiative to bring peace to the region, and his hope for American economic, military and technological assistance would not be realized if he were to be responsible for the breakdown of the talks (in other words, he ‘needed’ a new peace agreement) (Quandt, 2001). In sum, Israel could be considered to have more power than Egypt.

There is evidence that Carter was aware of the power differences between the parties, could not substantially alter them, and may have even exploited them to reach an agreement. In fact, some analysts criticize Carter for not putting more pressure on Israel to help balance the power.One member of the Egyptian negotiating team observed that the US held 90% of the cards in the Camp David process since Israel was completely dependent on it for bread or for missiles and, as such, this should give the US power to influence or pressure Israel (Kamel, 1986). However, because of domestic forces (e.g. the American Jewish community) Carter was unable to influence Begin into changing his positions (Kamel, 1986). Kamel (1986) claims that Carter admitted this fact to the Egyptian delegation when they were considering breaking off talks and that he needed them to continue with the talks as only together could they both exert enough pressure on Israel.

In order to further strengthen the Egyptian negotiating position, Carter nearly assumed a position of negotiating with Israel on behalf of Sadat. Sadat had given Carter a free hand to negotiate on most of the issues and, as such, Carter would “…draft a proposal [which he] considered reasonable, take it to Sadat for quick approval or slight modification, and then spend hours or days working on the same point with the Israeli delegation” (Carter, 1995, p. 364). Carter was thus astute at recognizing and exploiting the parties’ negotiating behaviors in order to shift them towards an agreement. In another example, Carter knew that it was a good negotiation tactic for one party or the other to first reach an agreement with him, and then to jointly approach the third (Carter, 1995, p. 375). Carter admits that he capitalized on this behavior with both parties and that it greatly magnified his own influence (Carter, 1995, p. 375). We can therefore conclude that Carter was aware of these power differences and even used them to his advantage for securing an agreement.

Another way in which Carter balanced the power between the parties, however, was to be the principle architect of the final agreement – one which intentionally, by his design, equally balanced the power between the two parties. For example, on the sixth day of the Camp David talks, Carter presented an American proposal to the Israeli delegation. The American proposal attempted to bridge the positions of the two parties, and Carter assured the Israelis delegation that it was a balanced proposal (Carter, 1995, p. 381). It required that both parties make difficult concessions, and therefore the initial Israeli response to the document was not a favorable one (Carter, 1995, p. 381).

In sum, there was a power difference between the parties and that despite some efforts on Carter’s behalf to alleviate these, an equal distribution of power could not be created at the time the parties were entering into the formal mediation process. A balanced agreement was still reached in this case.

*Was the struggle for power channeled into nonviolent mechanisms and processes?*

Despite the fact that Israel had more power than Egypt during the talks, a balanced agreement was reached that also channeled the parties’ struggle for power into nonviolent processes. Interestingly, the Assistant for National Security Affairs sent a memo to Carter after the Israeli government had accepted the text of the treaty, which stated that one of the talking points for the meeting with Prime Minister Begin was that, “the [Egyptian-Israeli] treaty represents a fair and balanced agreement” (Brzezinski, 1978).

In this sense, the Israeli-Egyptian peace agreement is remarkable for many reasons. First, it involved the extensive withdrawal of Israeli forces from the disputed territories. In fact, Fortna’s study of 48 ceasefire agreements and 15 major follow-up peace agreements in cases of interstate wars found that the most extensive withdrawal of forces took place in the Sinai after the Israeli-Egyptian peace agreement (Fortna, 2004, p. 50). Second, it provided third-party guarantees of peace. Third-party guarantees of peace are rare; only four cases in one dataset of agreements in interstate wars contained provisions for this, and the Israeli-Egyptian peace agreement was one of these four (Fortna, 2004, p. 51). Third, it contained Confidence-Building Measures (CBMs) which, by one definition (Fortna, 2004), aim to provide information about or regulate those military activities which are likely to cause tension between the parties. CBMs are also relatively rare in peace agreements between warring states, and only four agreements in one dataset had provisions for on-site inspections or aerial photography; the Israeli-Egyptian peace agreement was one of these four (Fortna, 2004, p. 51). Fourth, it contained plans for the control and distribution of oil, which were evidently satisfactory to both parties (in other words, they must have considered them to be ‘fair’). Fifth, it contained clauses aimed at normalizing relations between the two states so that they could use diplomatic channels instead of military means to resolve any possible future conflicts. Sixth, it specified that both parties would request a UN mission to, “…provide forces and observers to supervise the implementation of this Annex [concerning Israeli withdrawal and security arrangements] and employ their best efforts to prevent any violations of its terms” (Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 1979). Taken together, this means that the Israeli-Egyptian peace agreement channeled the parties’ struggle for power into nonviolent processes.

In conclusion, there was a clear power asymmetry in this case towards one of the parties and the mediator was unable to balance it. A balanced agreement that also channels the parties’ struggle for power into nonviolent processes, however, was still reached. Indeed, the type and extent of the specific provisions of this peace agreement are unique and this peace agreement should be considered a benchmark for other peace agreements.

**Mediation Timing**

The next section of this analysis determines whether Carter’s efforts to resolve the war between Egypt and Israel could be considered to be early mediation, and it also considers the effects of the mediation timing on the parties’ positions and the production of a good agreement.

This is an important question to explore because it could be reasoned that the case will be easier to resolve if mediation occurs early on in the war before the parties have become deeply entrenched in their positions.

*Did the timing of the mediation mean that the parties were less entrenched in their positions and were therefore able to produce a good agreement?*

The war between Egypt and Israel began in October of 1973, and President Carter’s mediation began when he held his first meeting with Israeli Prime Minister Menachem Begin on 19 July 1977 (Princen, 1991). Therefore, the mediation process was initiated 45 months into the conflict. As such, this would not be considered an early mediation.

Some analysts argue that there was evidence that the parties were moving towards peace prior to Carter’s mediation. Carter himself, for example, notes that there were several positive signs that the region was moving towards peace, including the unprecedented visit of the Egyptian President to Israel, but that soon after the visit it was clear that the parties were unlikely to make any further progress (Carter, 1986). Quandt (1986a) aptly describes the situation by saying that peace was possible, but not inevitable. These early indications that the parties were moving towards peace were not, however, reflected in the flexibility of their positions during the Camp David talks or later during the related treaty negotiations.

On the first day of the Camp David talks, the Israelis presented their opening positions to Carter and they were as equally entrenched in their initial positions as they had ever been in the past. Carter notes that “…the [Israeli] Prime Minister simply repeated almost verbatim the old Israeli negotiating positions. There were few indications of flexibility…” (Carter, 1995, p. 345). Sadat, on the other hand, when presented with Begin’s positions, “… promised to go to extremes in being flexible, in order to uncover the full meaning of Begin’s positions, and he stated that if the efforts at Camp David should be unsuccessful, then when the equitable Egyptian proposal were made known, they would bring the condemnation of the world on the Israeli leader” (Carter, 1995, p. 346).

Later in the talks when an American proposal was presented, the Israeli delegation still refused to shift from their positions: they adopted a hard-line position on nearly every issue, and in some cases they reversed themselves from previous positions and the related commitments they had made earlier (Carter, 1995, p. 386).

Even after the talks at Camp David had successfully concluded with the production of a framework agreement, however, the Israelis continued to show reluctance to easily shift from their positions as the exact text of the new peace treaty was being negotiated. One of the last hitches that the treaty faced was how, if at all, the Egyptian-Israeli accord would be linked to negotiations on the future of the West Bank and Gaza Strip (“Gaza schedule delays accord,” 1978). On December 13, 1978, Carter called the Egyptians “very generous” because they had accepted the text of the treaty (including all of the ancillary documents) without any exceptions (Carter calls Cairo ‘very generous’, 1978, para. 5). The same article quotes Carter as saying that his understanding of the situation was that, “…the Israelis have some problems in accepting those ancillary documents…” (Carter calls Cairo ‘very generous’, 1978, para. 9). Not surprisingly, the article concludes with a quote of Carter remarking that he was, “…very frustrated at this point” (Carter calls Cairo ‘very generous’, 1978, para. 10). Four days later the deadline previously set at Camp David for concluding the treaty negotiations had been passed and agreement with Israel still had not been reached (Mideast deadline comes and goes, 1978). Rather, the Israeli negotiators said the proposals were unacceptable and the Israeli Cabinet later made the rejection official (Mideast deadline comes and goes, 1978). Thus, the earlier pattern of greater Egyptian negotiating flexibility and less on the Israeli side continued for some time.

Despite this ongoing difficulty with negotiating the Camp David Accords and then the subsequent peace treaty, a good agreement was still reached in this case because it has most of the features of good agreements. First, the agreement was crafted by the parties and not simply imposed upon them by some outside body (although as previously noted, Carter was active in working with the parties to design the agreement. So, to be more precise, we might consider that the agreement was crafted by the parties but with the active advice, input, and assistance of the mediator). Second, as discussed in the previous section, the agreement addressed security, political, and economic matters. Moreover, several aspects of the agreement helped to institutionalize these changes. For example, the treaty contains provisions for the establishment of a Joint Commission to help facilitate the implementation of the treaty, and when the Joint Commission dissolves a new liaison system to, “provide an effective method to assess progress in the implementation of obligations under the present Annex and to resolve any problem that may arise in the course of implementation, and refer other unresolved matters to the higher military authorities of the two countries respectively for consideration,” will be established (Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 1979, para. 1). Additionally, the commencement of diplomatic and consular relations and the exchange of ambassadors, as called for in the agreement, is another way to institutionalize the political changes that the agreement creates. Third, the agreement has provisions for third-party mediation and renegotiation during the implementation phase. For example, Article VII of the treaty states that, “disputes arising out of the application or interpretation of this Treaty shall be resolved by negotiations” (Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 1979, para. 1). Moreover, the same article has another fallback measure that specifies, “any such disputes which cannot be settled by negotiations shall be resolved by conciliation or submitted to arbitration” (Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 1979, para. 2). Fourth, the peace agreement is formal and detailed, calls for the establishment of a UN peacekeeping mission, and specifies that confidence building measures will be established.

In conclusion, this case would not be considered to be an example of early mediation, and the Israelis were not showing flexibility in their positions. This meant that reaching an agreement was very difficult. Despite these difficulties, a good agreement was still reached.

**Mediation Strategy**

The following section of this analysis examines Carter’s mediation strategy. First it will be determined what kind of mediation strategy he utilized. Then it will be determined how this type of mediation strategy affected the outcome in this case.

*What type of mediator strategy was employed and what affect did that strategy have?*

Carter’s mediation strategy could be considered to be a directive one because he employed several tactics that are associated with directive mediation strategies. For example, “Carter offered both sides billions of dollars in aid and threatened dire consequences for not agreeing” (Princen, 1991, p. 67). Moreover, both parties reportedly wanted to build a relationship with the Americans, and at one point in the Camp David process Carter threatened that if Sadat left, it would mean an end to the relationship between Egypt and the USA (Telhami, 1992-1993). Likewise, on the eleventh day of the talks, a critical juncture was reached when Carter thought that an impasse had been reached and that the talks could not progress any further. Shortly thereafter, news came that the Egyptian delegation was unilaterally breaking off the talks, and Carter responded by meeting directly with Sadat to outline all of the negative consequences of doing so (Carter, 1995). Carter was eventually able to persuade the Egyptians to remain at the talks provided he made a statement that if any nation rejected any part of the agreement, none of the proposals would stay in effect (Carter, 1995). In sum, it can be concluded that Carter utilized a directive mediation strategy.

In fact one researcher argues that because of Carter’s position he had no choice but to employ a directive mediation strategy. Princen (1991) argues that Carter was bound by his role as President:

Jimmy Carter as President of the US had strong interests in mediating this dispute and he had substantial resources to bring to bear. He could make agreement very painful or very profitable. These were the facts that all concerned were well aware of. He could try to distance himself, try to establish a moral or personal or technical overlay on the dispute. But the fact was that Begin and Sadat were there to bargain, not just between themselves, but with the USA as well. In fact, for both Israel and Egypt, the most important bargain was indeed with the USA, not each other. Carter carried the entire baggage of the USA, not just his predecessors' tactics, but also the undeniable carrots and sticks all US presidents have. (p. 66)

Disputed Issues and Related Behavior

This study argues that directive mediators are more likely to create durable peace because they address both the disputed issues and related behavior. As such, the next section of this analysis identifies both the disputed issues and the related behaviors. Then, it assesses whether and how the mediator addressed both of these items.

Two disputed issues central to the Israeli-Egyptian war were the control of the Sinai (and, consequently, the oil reserves there) plus the normalization of relations between the two states. Telhami (1992-1993) describes the positions of the two parties with respect to these issues as follows:

First, in the context of long-term regional strategy, Israel needed at least a peace treaty with Egypt and sought to normalize relations to the maximum. Egypt sought to minimize

normalization so as to retain a degree of leverage over other issues. Second, Israel sought maximal demilitarization of the Sinai so as to make the Egyptian military option more remote. Egypt sought minimal demilitarization, so as to retain the military option. (p. 631)

Carter’s directive mediation strategy was vital for reaching an agreement and it is through this agreement that both of these issues are addressed. As one analyst notes, “very few interstate wars end with a settlement of the political issues over which they were fought, and, the Israeli-Egyptian peace agreement is exceptional in that it was a truly negotiated settlement [of the main issues in the conflict]” (Fortna, 2004, p. 52).

Even with the use of a directive mediation strategy, Carter could not change some of the Israeli behavior prior, during, and after the mediation process. Perhaps the most revealing incident concerns the sudden expansion of Israeli settlements in the disputed territories at various critical times, to which Carter issued stern warnings or statements of disapproval without much effect (Quandt, 2001). Likewise, Carter was unable to convince the Israelis to refrain from making public statements and issuing press releases which would be potentially damaging to the mediation process (Quandt, 2001). In sum, despite Carter’s attempts to control certain damaging Israeli behavior with some directive tactics, it appears that even more intrusive and/or intensive tactics may have been required to effectively change their behavior.

Altering the Costs of the Conflict

Carter was able to change the costs of the conflict, and for doing this a directive mediation strategy was vital. Carter made peace a more attractive option for the Israelis through the offer of various incentives such as helping to ensure that the Israelis would continue to receive oil (Quandt, 2001), providing a grant for some of the costs involved with withdrawing from the Sinai (Quandt, 2001), and making a commitment to have the US build substitute airfields in Israel (Bar-Siman-Tov, 1994; Quandt, 2001). The United States gave a total of $3 billion to Israel to construct new airfields, $800 million of which was in the form of grants (Quandt, 2001). Only a mediator employing a directive strategy could offer these incentives for reaching a peace agreement. The value of these potential peace payoffs made the cost of continuing the conflict high, and the notion of signing an agreement more attractive.

Altering the Future Costs of Reneging on the Agreement

This study argues that directive mediators are better able to create durable peace because they change the implementation environment by making it costly for the parties to abandon the peace agreement.

Some tactics associated with Carter’s directive mediation strategy meant that continuing to implement the terms of the agreement would be beneficial to the parties. For example, by giving up the Sinai, Israel was in a position of having less certainty about oil supplies. To overcome this uncertainty, Carter assured the Israelis that they would continue to receive Sinai oil, and if for some reason should delivery be interrupted, the US would guarantee an adequate supply to Israel at prevailing world prices (Carter, 1995). Should Israel renege on its commitments made under the peace agreement, this US support might be lost, and therefore, Carter made it costly for them to abandon their commitments.

Carter, however, was not in a position to personally oversee the implementation of the peace agreement, and, as such, he was unable to do much for the peace process after the agreement had been signed (Quandt, 1986). Carter tried, however, to ensure that there would be future American support of the implementation of the Camp David peace commitments by stressing to incoming President Reagan that America will have to continue to play an aggressive role in carrying out the commitments made because without their strong leadership, progress would be slow (Carter, 1995).

Influencing Regional Actors or Outside Great Powers

Carter was active in shifting the regional forces in support of peace. For example, shortly after Sadat’s famous visit to Israel, Carter held his first meeting with the Shah of Iran, and during that meeting Carter urged him to support Sadat (Carter, 1995). Furthermore, Carter held similar meetings with the Soviets where he urged them to support Sadat’s visit, minimize criticism of Sadat, and cooperate on reaching a Middle East settlement (Carter, 1995). In neither instance, however, were there any signs that the tactics associated with a directive mediation strategy were used by Carter to influence these other actors. In sum, Carter did influence regional actors, although his influence did not depend on utilizing a directive mediation strategy.

Fostering Ripeness

Carter’s directive mediation strategy was not used to foster ripeness. One moment for fostering ripeness, in particular, stands out in this case: the period following Sadat’s visit to Israel. After Sadat’s visit to Israel, Carter could have capitalized on that moment and the momentum created by it, by pushing the parties even closer to peace using directive tactics, but he did not. Instead the momentum created by the moment was lost. In fact, it should be noted that the talks were not initiated when they were because the moment was perceived to be right, rather they were initiated as Carter puts it, “as an act of political desperation” (Carter, 1986, p. 167). We cannot, therefore, conclude that a directive mediation strategy was important for creating ripeness in this case.

**Spoiler Management**

Managing spoilers – those actors that intentionally or unintentionally try to block the creation of peace – is vital for ensuring an outcome of durable peace results from mediation. Carter’s efforts to manage spoilers are discussed in this section of the analysis.

*Were there spoilers present in this case and, if yes, did the mediator address the spoilers?*

There were multiple spoilers in this case- those who did not want a peace between Egypt and Israel to last, because it threatened their own interests- and Carter was active in managing these groups. Some of these spoilers were active long before the idea of holding peace talks at Camp David was even conceived: Syria’s President Assad sabotaged the earlier Geneva peace talks by refusing to attend and would later do everything possible to prevent the Camp David accords from being fulfilled (Carter, 1995). Additionally, in December of 1973 the Libyan leader, Colonel Muammar el-Qaddafi, was quoted as saying that every possible means should be used, including revolution, to stop Egypt from concluding a separate peace agreement with Israel (Libyan said to prefer revolution over an Egyptian-Israeli peace, 1973). Libya also tried but failed to persuade Egypt to boycott the Geneva talks (Libyan said to prefer revolution over an Egyptian-Israeli peace, 1973).

Moreover, there were both internal and external spoilers present during and after the Camp David talks. For example, there were certain factions within both of the conflicting parties that did not want the peace treaty to succeed, and a*s* Carter himself notes, he was trying to protect the Israeli-Egyptian peace agreement, “against attacks from outside and from within the two countries” (Carter, 1995, p. 500). Clearly there were some factions within Egypt did not want peace to last. For example, Egypt’s former chief of staff founded a new opposition party in 1980 which vowed to overthrow President Sadat by democratic methods or revolutionary violence and to abrogate the Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty should it assume power (Associated Press, 1980b). The Egyptian President was eventually assassinated by Egyptian radicals because of the peace agreement that he had negotiated with Israel.

Begin, Sadat, and Carter had considered the long term implications of the agreement, the possibility that it might fail, and ways to ensure its durability. Carter (1995) states that, ‘Begin was concerned about the permanence of any peace accord, even if he and Sadat could come to a complete understanding. I reminded him that any agreement would last as long as it appeared to be advantageous to the people as well as the leaders involved” (p. 342). Moreover, Carter (1995) goes on to state, “in this case, I was convinced that the benefits of peace would be so obvious that the commitments would be honored. The direct interest and influence of the United States would help ensure it, no matter who might lead our nations in future years. I pointed out that our three nations and we three leaders were strong enough to prevail, even if other more radical leaders disagreed with certain aspects of our settlement and tried to disrupt what we had done” (pp. 342-343) Indeed, Begin had to ‘sell’ the benefits of the treaty to the Israeli Knesset in order to gain their approval, his main argument being that a separate peace with Egypt diminished the chances of war on all fronts (Smith, 1978). For example, the *New York Times* quoted Begin as saying that, “if Egypt signs [the treaty] Syria cannot attack us because Syria knows it would be suicide” (Smith, 1978, para. 4).

In essence, the above discussion illustrates that Carter took what could be considered a ‘multi-pronged’ approach to spoiler management. First, Carter recognized that a good peace agreement (e.g. one which was advantageous to the people concerned) would have more chances of gaining popular support, and less chances of being undermined. The first prong of the approach was to therefore focus on designing a good agreement. Second, Carter recognized that the successful implementation of the agreement and the durability of the resulting peace would depend on the direct and continued support of the United States. In other words, Carter recognized that creating a durable peace in this case would require an external guarantor, and that the US would play this role over the long-term because of their direct interest in creating this outcome. Third, Carter recognized that the process had strong leadership; leadership which was strong enough to overcome any obstructionist forces which may arise. Carter’s multi-pronged approach, therefore, involved the design of a good agreement, the continued influence of an external guarantor, and strong leadership.

In conclusion, there were both internal and external spoilers present in this case who were active prior, during, and after the mediation process. Moreover, Carter was aware of these spoilers and their possible role in derailing the prospects for durable peace. Carter, therefore, took a multi-pronged approach to spoiler management. Consequently, the efforts of the spoilers were held in check to a high enough degree that their actions didn’t undermine the fragile peace. This suggests that there might be thresholds at which spoiler efforts will reach a point that peace is undermined and further research on this important topic is certainly warranted. This analysis also revealed that it is unrealistic to think that there will be no spoiler efforts after a peace agreement is signed. It is more realistic to consider that some spoilers will likely try to undermine peace and a well-prepared mediator would be ready for this likelihood well in advance by having a spoiler management strategy already prepared.

**Mediator’s Experience**

In this section of the analysis, the question of whether Carter’s previous experience affected his ability to manage some key aspects of the mediation process will be addressed.The assumption would be that a highly-experienced mediator would be able to achieve a durable peace whereas as an inexperienced mediator would struggle with their efforts to guide the mediation process towards a durable peace.

*Did the mediator’s experience affect their ability to manage the key aspects of the mediation process?*

Orchestrating the Camp David process was Carter’s first major mediation effort between warring leaders. Carter, however, had extensive negotiation experience at the highest political levels; as President of the United States of America he had negotiated with the Soviet Union during the ‘Strategic Arms Limitation Talks’ (SALT), with the Chinese regarding the normalization of relationships between the two countries, and with Panamanian officials regarding control of the Panama Canal (Carter, 1995).

The first aspect of the mediation process to consider is the management of the power dynamics. As noted earlier in this analysis, Carter did recognize and attempt to alter the power imbalance between the Egyptian and Israeli delegations but with little success. It was also noted earlier that the balance of power between the parties at the time of mediation was not levelled, yet a balanced agreement was reached. This peculiar fact can be explained by Carter’s past experience as an engineer:

Thus, Carter consistent with his training as an engineer, viewed the primary task of

the facilitating mediator to be to find a formula, to devise a blueprint for a solution.

Indeed, as a mediator, Carter's first step was to master the facts and then present his solution. In his first meeting with then Prime Minister Rabin, he led off with his conception of the principles necessary for a solution. If he saw this as 'mediating' it was not in the sense of eliciting underlying interests and helping each side explore options. Rather, he appeared to feel that. presented with a reasonable formula, reasonable men could not help but agree; from there, only the details need be worked out and peace would be achieved. (Princen, 1991, p. 59)

In this sense, Carter’s past experience outside of the conflict resolution field was perhaps more important to the design of a balanced peace agreement than his previous experience as a mediator or negotiator. This finding has important implications for current mediators and the type of training and background they should have in order to be skilled at crafting good peace agreements.

Another key aspect of the mediation process to consider is the application of leverage at opportune moments. There were several critical moments throughout the Camp David talks where the use of leverage was vital for ensuring that the talks did not collapse. For example, at one critical juncture, both parties were prepared to break off the talks. Carter, out of desperation, quickly outlined the areas of agreement and the consequences to both parties should the talks fail at this stage (Carter, 1995). Then, as the two leaders began moving towards the door, Carter got in front of them to partially block the way, and he, “…urged them not to break off their talks, to give me another chance to use my influence and analysis, to have confidence in me” (Carter, 1995, p. 367). Both leaders eventually reluctantly agreed.

It is not clear how the use of leverage during this and other similar critical moments in the talks was clearly based on Carter’s previous experience, and for the purpose of this study it might be concluded that Carter’s quick analysis of the situation and rapid responses are largely based on his ability to be responsive to the changing needs of the moment, and not necessarily on his past experience. This would suggest that good mediators must have a sense of immediacy and be ready to react quickly to the parties’ behaviors.

The final factor to consider is the management of outside actors. More precisely, the question of whether the mediator’s previous experience affected their ability to understand and influence outside actors is of concern. Carter’s experience as a politician gave him an unprecedented advantage concerning how to understand and influence outside actors. Carter was aware of political restraints on his and other political actors’ behavior. More specifically, he understood that the negotiating behavior of political leaders and the positions they adopt can often be driven by their domestic political affairs. Likewise, Carter recognized that political support can quickly be lost, and that therefore, there is sometimes a need to act with a sense of urgency to galvanize this support. For example, Carter recognized that he had to move rapidly with the finalization of Israeli-Egyptian peace treaty while outside actors, such as the Saudis, were still supportive of the peace process (Carter, 1995). A more inexperienced mediator may not have been so aware of these timing issues. In sum, Carter’s ability to successfully understand and influence outside actors was based on his experience as a politician.

**Summary and Conclusions**

This paper applied an original analytical framework to the case of US President Jimmy Carter’s efforts to mediate a peace agreement between Egypt and Israel. President Carter’s efforts were successful in that a peace agreement was reached and there has been a durable peace between Egypt and Israel since the signing of the agreement.

The analysis found that the post-war struggle for power was channeled into nonviolent mechanisms and processes, a directive mediation strategy was employed, a highly-experienced mediator led the process and potential spoilers were managed. In other words, this finding would suggest that mediators should pay particular attention to these four key factors that might determine their success. The linkages between these factors and durable peace can be depicted as per the below diagram.



Several additional important points were raised by this case. First, mediation affects not only the relationship between the warring parties, but it can also affect the parties’ relationships with other external actors. Second, balanced agreements can still be reached even if the balance of power between the parties is unequal during the mediation. Third, spoilers can emerge from within or externally to the parties. Fourth, agreements which are equally divided between the parties’ positions can be considered to be balanced.

In this sense, we must view mediation as a political intervention that actively shapes the post-war political landscape and can dramatically alter the power dynamics in the country. Based on the findings from the analysis of this case, a struggle for power is at the core of all wars. During peacetime the struggle for power is managed non-violently. War, however, represents the parties’ violent struggle for power. Viewed in this manner, mediation re-shapes the struggle for power through the peace agreement and the provisions it contains. This leads to the next implication: all mediation interventions are therefore political.

Because war can be considered a continuation of politics by other means, and mediation is an intervention into a war, all mediation needs to be viewed as being a form of political intervention. In other words, international mediation of armed conflicts should not be framed primarily as some type of psycho-social enterprise and it might be more accurately framed as a process which affects the political aspects of the armed conflict like the size of the military; the functioning of the judicial institutions; the structure and operation of the electoral processes; and lastly the form, shape, and composition of the government. Moreover, mediation and the agreements it produces can shape and alter the structure of the state itself.

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**Beyond *The New Jim Crow***

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**Keywords**: Prison Industrial Complex, Excarceration, Race

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**BEYOND *THE NEW JIM CROW***

**Abstract**

This article challenges contemporary critiques of the U.S. prison system and argues instead that we are experiencing a penal system that most resembles the dehumanizing conditions of nineteenth-century slavery. Through revisionist histories and examinations of international trends in penal management, it argues against simplistic reform and instead advocates for excarceration.

**Introduction**

*Dedicated to Tiyo Attallah Salah-El, penal abolitionist*

*There are prisons, and there are prisons. They may look different, but they’re all the same. They’re all confining. They all limit your freedom. They all lock you away, grind you down and take a terrible toll on your self esteem. There are prisons made of brick, steel and mortar. And then there are prisons without visible walls, prisons of poverty, illiteracy and racism. All too often, the people condemned to these metaphorical prisons--poverty, racism and illiteracy--end up doing double time. That is, they wind up in the physical prisons, as well. Our task, as reasonable, healthy, intelligent human beings, is to recognize the interconnectedness and the sameness of all these prisons, and then do something about them.*

*--Rubin Hurricane Carter, 1994*

Michelle Alexander’s (2010) bestseller *The New Jim Crow: Mass Incarceration in the Age of Colorblindness* has sparked a social movement and moral outrage across the United States. It is noteworthy that Black law professor Alexander’s *liberal* analysis of the legal, historical landscape resonates with a heterogeneous public such as Black anti-prison activists and white conservative politicians who are rethinking the War on Drugs. This essay intends to clarify the ideological differences between those who critique the prison industrial complex and those who question mass incarceration. I argue that instead of witnessing the creation of a new, racist criminal justice system, we see a continuation of neo-slave penal conditions from Lincoln’s emancipation decree of select groups of Black people in 1863 until today. So, instead of a “*New* Jim Crow,” we clearly see a legal justification of permanent servitude and civil death reserved for a people in the U.S. legal apparatus beginning with the dehumanizing codification of an enslaved human counting as “three fifth of a person” (sic).

Alexander’s liberal, reformist argument is in line with those who demand a decriminalization and *decarceration* policy change at the federal, state and local levels. It is a reformist tactic which avoids tackling systemic inequalities faced by poor and racialized communities across the United States. Abolitionists demand that nothing short of *excarceration* (and reparations owed to Black people) can overcome the horrific and enduring legacy of chattel slavery.

I argue that Black prisoners and Black feminist critiques of the prison industrial complex and of the 13th Amendment to the U.S. Constitution, which codifies state-sanctioned slavery, have paved the way for a protest movement against the carceral state. I suggest that Angela Y. Davis and Mumia Abu-Jamal (2014), drawing on W.E.B. DuBois’s concept of *abolition democracy*, give a richer, more nuanced context of the persistent criminalization of Black men and women within a capitalist system than Alexander’s critique of the reemergence of a racialized caste system in the context of mass incarceration. In order to understand the endurance of enslavement and the paradox of existence-in-Black, one needs to address the overlapping realities of slavery and prisons and go beyond labeling the prison crisis as a new Jim Crow. Penal abolitionist Angela Y. Davis gives us an important corrective to Alexander’s liberal paradigm with the pertinent phrase “From the prison of slavery to the slavery of prisons” (Davis, 1998).

In the following, I present a revisionist criminal (in)justice history that not only focuses on the violence of state institutions and state actors but also includes Black insurrectionist actors, who have been left out of Alexander’s non-abolitionist narrative. Hers, by contrast, stays safely within the ideological framework of reforming the racist system, tinkering at its unjust edges, namely over-incarcerating non-violent drug users, who make up about 25% of the prison population. Problematically, she has very little to offer in terms of decarcerating measures that would strike at the core of the carceral state. Her book does not give us a blue print for a sound justice (re)investment for those who have been effected the most by the oppressive systems of colonialism, genocide, slavery, white supremacy, capitalism, militarism, and public hetero-patriarchy. By contrast, abolitionist critics of the prison industrial complex seek to understand how (total) institutions interlock and how we mobilize effective resistance to repressive laws and agents.

**State-Sanctioned Slavery: From Slave Codes, to Black Codes to COINTELPRO**

Whereas prison abolitionist Angela Davis notes the seamless “transformation” of chattel slavery into penal slavery, Alexander’s argument is based on a three-stage theory of repressive systems: slavery – Jim Crow – war on drugs, each brings a little more freedom or less total control by the state (p. 22). I will borrow her three stages to develop a dialectics, a dance of emancipation and repression, a spiral movement of life and death, highlighting three epochs, a variation on a theme:

1. the end of slavery brings the Emancipation Proclamation (1863) along with the 13th Amendment to the Constitution (1865);

(2) the end of Black Reconstruction ushers in the repressive era of Jim Crow;

(3) the end of Jim Crow culminates in the Civil Rights Voting Act (1965), along with the illegal Counter Intelligence Program (COINTELPRO) of the FBI and the war on drugs.

Instead of joining Alexander’s appealing progressive narrative, i.e. that each period ushers in a little more freedom for Black Americans, I argue the opposite is the case, making the case for abolition and reparations even more urgent.

(1) The meaning of emancipation in times of slavery:

Lincoln’s Emancipation Proclamation mirrors the elites’ love-hate relationship with the oppositional couple of liberty-slavery. A benign reading may suggest a moral and legal paternalistic commitment that liberty is to be enjoyed in its full range only by some, even where its appeal is universal: “All men are created equal…” and thus enjoy full access to “life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness.” Of course, the same constitutional text also enshrines the right of slave-holding states to count “others” as three fifth of a person, even when those “persons” are otherwise labeled as chattel, objects, not citizens. This contradiction, liberty and equality (for some, not for all), of course fuels the abolitionist imagination, creating a mass movement across the North (and Great Britain) to topple this torturous regime once and for all, just as the Haitian brothers achieved in their revolution against the French colonialists and slave masters. (In fact, Haiti is the only nation-state that defeated both slavery and colonialism and had to pay dearly for its victory.) At the height of abolitionist fervor, the Underground Railroad, repressive legislation with the Fugitive Slave Act (1850) is passed to engulf the entire union in the legal reality of chattel slavery (in apprehending “fugitives from service or labor”), and it finds judicial support with the equally infamous *Dred Scott* (1857) landmark decision: Black people (deemed free or unfree) are not entitled to citizenship or even personhood on American soil. Lincoln came up with the brilliant strategy to free only those Black men and women, who were enslaved in states hostile to the Union at the onset of the Civil War. Slave states who supported Lincoln and the Union were allowed to keep their Black populace enslaved. At one point, he also favored deportation of Black persons to Liberia. Thus the stage of such fractured commitment to total freedom was set for the convoluted logic of the 13th amendment to the U.S. Constitution. Titled “Abolition Amendment,” it sets slaves and indentured serfs free at the same time as it not only restricts freedom to those under legal penal control but effectively codifies state-sponsored enslavement of human beings. Furthermore, the radical demands of Frederick Douglass and other abolitionists, namely, access to land for a landless freed people, were not granted, nor any other substantive measures that would go beyond guaranteeing mere survival (if that).

(2) The meaning of Black Reconstruction and Jim Crow:

In his magisterial work *Black Reconstruction*, W.E.B. DuBois (1935/1976) argues that by 1876, Black people were arrested for trumped up, frivolous charges and his analysis of the brutality of the convict lease system leaves no doubt that “they were compelled to work … as if they were slaves or indentured servants again” (p. 698). In the immediate aftermath of the Civil War, the Civil Rights Amendments (14th and 15th) along with the Union soldiers’ presence in the defeated south ensured that freed men (not women) were enfranchised, served on juries, and were elected to public office. Black people proved their moral standing as worthy citizens in a white supremacist polity that on the other hand wanted to show that Black people were savages and needed to be controlled by brute force, hence the birth of the Clan, as a paramilitary, terrorist organization that ruled the south and parts of the north with orchestrated acts of intense violence, including murder.

Angela Y. Davis (2005) notes that the death penalty, found to be objectionable in discussions over instituting the modern prison system, was kept within the American slave codes. White people were “merely” executed for the offense of murder of other whites, whereas enslaved Black people were treated to seventy death-qualified offenses in some Southern states (Davis, 2005, p. 37). Well into the twentieth century, Black men were regularly executed for the offense of rape where the victim was a white woman, even after systematic lynch terror was disrupted. Ida B. Wells-Burnett produced substantial evidence that consorting with white women was often the reason for lynching (Davis, 1982).

Convict leasing became a boon for Southern rebuilding effort after the Civil War and the sudden release of millions of Black people from bondage. Private white citizens petitioned the sheriff’s office to open the jail and “send me a slave” (cf. Oshinsky, 1995)—the petitioners did not have white prisoners in mind. Oshinsky’s book *Worse than Slavery* (1996) makes clear that the mortality rate for Black convicts on the chain-gang was much higher than of enslaved people prior to 1865. As Abu-Jamal and Davis’s recent article (2014) notes, arguably, the Black Codes following “Emancipation” did not present a state of freedom. In fact, economic, social, and political disenfranchisement post 1865 seemed to look a lot like chattel slavery. It manifested itself economically, by white men throwing freed men and women into debt peonage, defrauding them of their homestead, private property. Legal, political, and social disenfranchisement occurred by enforcing Black Codes and thus criminalizing Black people as a group and condemning them to the murderous convict lease system. Another way of looking at enslavement is living “beyond the pale” (Nagel, 2014), i.e. a state of exception designed for a surplus people that deserve no protection from the state. If a slave master or lynch mob metes out “justice” against an enslaved person, there’s no mechanism of appealing to the law to stop the violence or to incriminate the perpetrators. Other people of color have also been affected through denaturalization, violence, and (cultural) imperialist processes which Andrea Smith (2010) calls the three pillars of white supremacy: slavery, genocide, and orientalism.

(3) The meaning of the Civil Rights Movement and COINTELPRO:

World War II served as a catalyst for reigning in legal segregation. First, President Truman averted an embarrassing march on Washington, D. C. by Black activists desegregating the armed forces. And secondly, Black soldiers returning from the liberation of Dachau and Buchenwald concentration camps found it impossible to readjust to a subjugated status in the Jim Crow south. The landmark decision *Brown v Board of Education* (1954) overturned the hated *Plessy v Ferguson* (1896) decision that installed a “separate, but equal” doctrine; yet, *Brown* again built in a provision that slowed down integration “with deliberate speed,” an echo of the Emancipation Proclamation and the 13th Amendment. The message to Black Americans can be summarized thus: “Do not hasten your progress, because whites are not ready for you claiming equal standing.” This time, Black people again didn’t listen by delivering the second wave of abolitionism building a non-violent mass movement, also called the Borning Struggle, for engendering other civil rights movements such as women’s rights, just as the abolitionists did a century earlier. Its imminent success resulted in broad civil rights legislation, including an Affirmative Action Executive Order by President Kennedy, which was meant as a gesture of reparation to undo centuries of unequal opportunity. The Civil Rights Movement’s non-violent struggle for recognition was disrupted through the massive secret FBI operation COINTELPRO, which began in 1956 to destroy individual leaders’ reputation (e.g., Martin Luther King, Jr.) or outright assassinate them, as well as bomb offices such as Black Panther headquarters with the expressed goal of undermining the creation of a Black Messiah. The War on Drugs began much later in the Nixon years, which Alexander pinpoints as the beginning of the New Jim Crow.

Interestingly, Alexander’s book starts out with a sobering account of the paternal family genealogy of Jarvious Cotton that crystallizes the enduring violence faced by people of African descent and a white supremacist disregard for Black people as citizens from the founding fathers to today’s criminal justice system. Cotton’s great-great-grandfather was a slave and couldn’t vote; his great-grandfather was beaten to death by KKK for trying to vote; his grandfather, intimidated by KKK, and thus prevented from voting; his father, barred due to poll taxes and literacy tests; and Jarvious himself can’t vote because he is a felon, on parole in Mississippi. I ask: Isn’t it the case that we see through the centuries different faces of slavery? In what ways is Jarvious “freer” than his ancestors? Why then does Alexander label mass incarceration as a “New Jim Crow,” when we are ensconced in the legacy of hundreds of years of enslavement? Her famous words “We have not ended racial caste in America; we have merely redesigned it” (p. 2) also fit within the context of neoslavery. The term caste suggests the softer analysis of second-class citizenship but elides the more radical penal abolition demand of ending slavery in all of its forms. The following section outlines the U.S.’s exceptional standing as penal democracy.

**Understanding the Global Legal Context: Revisiting the U.S. Slavery Statute**

*De jure*, prisoners are indeed slaves and considered civilly dead. The Thirteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution (1865) guarantees that chattel slavery continues as publically administered servitude. Slavery or indentured servitude is prohibited, but in an exception clause it is determined that as long as a person is duly convicted of a crime, that person is considered a slave of the state. *Ruffin v Commonwealth of Virginia* (1871) made this reading abundantly clear. Thus the racially coded *Dred Scott* decision during chattel slavery found a new life, as now state actors and others find it appropriate to refuse to give Black people equal dignity status. Under *Ruffin* Black men still had “no rights which the white man was bound to respect" (*Dred Scott,* 1857), but in a post-Civil War era, *Ruffin* could no longer appeal to a racially explicit justification: convict status now serves as a placeholder for Blacks’ qualified standing in the white polity. Spielberg’s epic film *Lincoln* (2012) passes over the exception clause in silence while the congressional fight over the passage of the 13th Amendment plays a central role in defining Lincoln’s anti-racist pedigree.

The League of Nations passed the first global anti-slavery convention in 1926, which propelled the U.S.’s legitimation of the “peculiar institution” onto the international stage, since its government signed onto it with reservations, citing verbatim the language of the exception clause:

United States of America

(March 21st, 1929 a)

Subject to the reservation that the Government of the United States, adhering to its policy of opposition to forced or compulsory labour *except as punishment for crime of which the person concerned has been duly convicted,* adheres to the Convention except as to the first subdivision of the second paragraph of Article 5, which reads as follows:

"(I) Subject to the transitional provisions laid down in paragraph (2) below, compulsory or forced labour may only be exacted for public purposes." [emphasis added]

With this reservation language, the United States has the dubious distinction for being the only nation-state defending slavery. If I understand correctly the double exception language embedded here, the U.S. delegation also expressly condoned the notorious convict-lease system; however, convict-*corvée* underwent “reform” by abolishing private actors profiteering from prisoners’ labor. As Abu-Jamal and Davis (2014) point out convincingly, “[t]he Union’s victory over the Confederacy in the Civil War and the ratification of the 13th, 14th, and 15th Amendments to the Constitution during Reconstruction spelled slavery’s doom. Within a few years, however, the system thought buried by war was exhumed and given new life under the program of leasing convicts as labor. It was slavery in every sense but its name. Indeed, as it was public instead of private ‘slavery,’ it was in some ways worse.” Thus, earning formal, abstract rights and colorblind legal instruments did little to ensure that the lives or civil rights of freed men and women were

**Neo-Slavery Meets the New Jim Crow**

1. A New Racial Caste system?

Alexander provocatively writes that racial caste status has not been relinquished, it has only been redesigned in the age of colorblindness (p. 2). It is a powerful statement that has been cited extensively. Yet, I fear that with this bold thesis the book actually is at its weakest because it devolves into a performative contradiction. Is it a new racist segregated system or does mass incarceration have the hallmarks of chattel slavery of yesteryears? Alexander seems to want to argue both sides. The contemporary War on Drugs confirms the New Jim Crow status of Black men qua convicts (not Black women—are they also considered a “collateral” as whites are described to be ensnared in this war?). She argues that they can never evade their felon label and that in fact the system depends on the prison label, not prison time (p. 136). Taking her cue from *Dred Scott* (1857), she writes:

Today a criminal freed from prison has scarcely more rights, and arguably less respect, than a freed slave or a black person living “free” in Mississippi at the height of Jim Crow. Those released from prison on parole can be stopped and searched by the police for any reason—or no reason at all—and returned to prison for the most minor of infractions, such as failing to attend a meeting with a parole officer. Police supervision, monitoring, and harassment are facts of life not only for all those labeled criminals, but for all those who “look like” criminals. Lynch mobs may be long gone, but the threat of police violence is ever present. (p. 138)

Here Alexander clearly articulates that a) any Black person can be a target of arbitrary state power and b) vestiges of slavery live on in today’s Black America.

Yet, Alexander contradicts herself by clearly stating that today’s “mass incarceration” is not similar to the prior systems: “Just as Jim Crow, as a system of racial control, was dramatically different from slavery, mass incarceration is different from its predecessor” (p. 195). She finds that virulent racism is gone, and Black children may dream of ascending to the presidency (p. 197). Yet, she also acknowledges that the “penal system may be as brutal in many respects as Jim Crow (or slavery)” (p. 197).

I argue that the ontological status of Blackness attaches to the existential condition of “unfreedom” and at best “second-class citizenship.” Whites possess freedom, while Black people do not. Natal alienation, as Orlando Patterson (1982) notes, refers to the lack of belonging:

I prefer the term “natal alienation,” because it goes directly to the heart of what is critical in the slave’s forced alienation, the loss of ties of birth in both ascending and descending generations. It also has the important nuance of a loss of native status, of deracination. It was this alienation of the slave from all formal, legally enforceable ties of “blood,” and from any attachment to groups or localities other than those chosen for him by the master, that gave the relation of slavery its peculiar value to the master. The slave was the ultimate human tool, as imprintable and as disposable as the master wished. And this is true, at least in theory, of all slaves, no matter how elevated. (p. 7)

Given the 13th Amendment, we can clearly see the continuation of slavery behind prison walls, and as Alexander shows, as “released” felon. Patterson also notes that existential status of slaves as “social death” (p. 5). Micro-aggressions amounting to social death occur daily in prisons. Tiyo Salah-El shed his slave name while imprisoned and legally changed his name. When I visit him, I have to give his “committed name,” since the white guards do not recognize his right to his new name and identity. Yet, “community policing” is another side of the penal democracy, which favors selective targeting, expressed in the protest response of “driving while Black” or even “breathing while Black.” Since 2014, the social movement of Black Lives Matter has blown apart the notion that Black lives are “only” endangered while incarcerated. But many imprisoned intellectuals have written about the white supremacist state’s seamless surveillance, including the school-to-prison pipeline. It has just evaded Alexander’s vision.

Pace Alexander, I argue that the war on drugs did not jumpstart “the New Jim Crow.” Even during the height of the Civil Rights Movement, Black people were policed, harassed, murdered by the state due to the FBI’s controlling COINTELPRO (i.e., counterintelligence program). This repressive policy focused on the Black Panther, in addition to Martin Luther King among thousands of others, in part to root out “any Black Messiah” and to do anything to destroy and decimate the reach of the Panthers into Black America. This included state-sanctioned murder, as the killings of Chicago activists Fred Hampton and Mark Clark made abundantly clear. These insurrectionist Black freedom fighters disappear from Alexander’s liberal historical lens. As marooned freedom fighter Assata Shakur (1987) put it, as a Black woman “I don’t have the faintest idea how it feels to be free” (1987, p. 60). So while it is true that the expansion of the prison industrial complex has engulfed millions of Black Americans like never before since the end of the Civil War (1865), it is not the case that repressive policing has not always been a permanent reality in the past. It may have been the psychic reality of a “minimum security” prison, i.e. “the streets,” rather than life behind bars, i.e. “maximum security” prison (Shakur, ibid.), but it has been the experience of penal slavery all along. The social, economic, political costs endured and debt “owed” to white people (through debt peonage, unscrupulous lending agents, landlords, bosses) continue the existence of slavery in a colorblind polity (Coates, 2014b).

Alexander’s focus on the War on Drugs as propelling the New Jim Crow makes other repressive policy changes less significant. However, youth of color, especially Black youth, have been severely impacted by “Zero Tolerance” policies in schools, creating a veritable “school-to-prison” pipeline. Drug use or sales is eclipsed by citations and punishment for “talking back,” for wearing the wrong type of clothing, for carrying cell phones to the classroom, and other petty “offenses.” White kids do not get criminalized on the scale of Black kids—witness six-year old child Salecia Johnson being arrested and handcuffed in kindergarten for having a temper tantrum—and the police standing by their decision to handcuff and press charges against the child! (Campbell, 2012). It is so engrained in a Black child’s psyche that a) they will be confronted with whites’ compassion deficit, and that therefore b) to them prison is part of becoming adult, a normalized rite of passage. A six-year old boy when asked what he plans to do when he’s grown up, answered pensively “well, first, I’ll go to prison to put that behind me, then I will go to college” (Nagel, 2008).

2. Cyclical evolution or more of the same neo-slave penal regime?

Alexander relies on Loïc Wacquant’s stage theory of the cyclical nature of racial caste in the U.S. (p. 207). In support of his theory, she proposes that “we have witnessed an evolution … from a racial caste system based entirely on exploitation (slavery), to one based largely on subordination (Jim Crow), to one defined by marginalization (mass incarceration)” (ibid). This elegant stage theory, which takes us from ante bellum times to today’s war on drugs as the major culprit for locking up Black men, has its merits, yet it leaves out major existential and material aspects in each phases – the categorization of slavery merely as a problem of capitalist exploitation. Alexander is silent on the well-established concept of natal alienation noted above and of the gendered violence of chattel slavery, the systematic rape of Black women and girls whose children “followed the condition of the mother” (see Constitution of Virginia, 1669). Her stage two brings about Jim Crow, which is reduced to the issue of “subordination,” or in legal terms “second class citizenship.” Is this true?

In the following, I show parallels between the Jim Crow period and slavery. Extreme and arbitrary forms of violence prevail; Black entrepreneurs who were competing successfully with white business owners face threat and certain ruin; white supremacist riots swept the South terrorizing Black people that they have no legal rights and by extension, lacking moral standing. Thousands faced the dire choice between potential lynching, extra-legal execution, or flight. Ida B. Wells-Barnett, who chronicled the lynchings chose the latter. A dignitarian ethics has never been extended to Black people, as Kant, dignity scholar par excellence, makes clear in his racist ruminations (Kant, 2004). Instead, under the merely formal aspects of freedom after 1865, people of African descent continued to experience a special kind of violence: a compassion deficit, which emanated from all institutions which controlled their lives, and continues to this day.

Under the brutal convict lease system, Black convicts paved the streets of Atlanta, toiled in mining industries in Birmingham and were thus coerced to industrialize the post-Civil War South: they served as unpaid laborers creating the racial state (Lichtenstein, 1996, cited in Davis, 2003, pp. 34-5). Their living quarters were so appalling and diseases were rampant; securitization was achieved by riveting a metal spur to their feet and they were overcome by “shackle poisoning” from wearing the iron leg shackles on the chain gang (Oshinsky, 1996, cited in Davis, ibid., p. 32). So much for death from natural causes! Nowhere are penal plantations described as death camps, fitting descriptions for the Parchman Farm or Angola (“The Farm”). Furthermore, rounding up men and women selectively under Black Codes eerily resembles modern day sweeps (stop-and-frisk) in American cities. During the Jim Crow era, the Clan used extra-legal terror to lynch Black people, while the sheriffs (by day) also enforced the Black Codes, i.e. offenses that no white citizen was charged for such as walking after sunset or walking in groups. Angela Y. Davis (2003) writes:

We have learned how to recognize the role of slave labor, as well as the racism it embodied. But black convict labor remains a hidden dimension of our history. It is extremely unsettling to think of modern, industrialized urban areas as having been originally produced under the racist labor conditions of penal servitude that are often described by historians as worse than slavery. (p. 35)

Chattel slavery was abolished, only to reemerge through legal maneuvering as penal slavery (James, 2005, xxix).

To be sure, Alexander also comments on the cruelty of Jim Crow’s convict lease system by citing Douglas Blackmon’s study *Slavery by Another Name* (2008) and Oshinsky’s study of the Parchman Farm (1996). She even mentions briefly the exception clause of the Abolition Amendment and the *Ruffin* case noting that “the court put to rest any notion that convicts were legally distinguishable from slaves” (Alexander, 2010, p. 31). I argue that her own acknowledgement of these conditions of neo-slavery under Jim Crow also puts to rest any notion that “mere subordination” was at work in creating a new caste system, measurably different from chattel slavery. Alexander is silent about the fact that the Southern prisons were filled with a vast majority of white people in the ante bellum period. Post 1865, all of the sudden, whites were no longer fit to serve much (if any) prison time, whereas freed Black men and women were condemned to hard labor and the chain gang during the establishment of the Black Codes (Davis, 2003, p. 29).

The third element of Alexander’s stage theory suggests that mass incarceration leads to marginalization. As many critical race theorists have pointed out, today’s second-class citizen, the racialized subject qua felon, lacks our collective sympathy, since the system and the state are officially post-racial, i.e. colorblind. On the other hand, it is also problematic because for instance, as Mary Ann Curtin points out (2000), of the parallels between convict-leasing and the contemporary private prison experiment (cited in Davis, ibid., pp. 36-7). Various prison corporations benefit from owning prisons and advertise with catchy slogans “if we build it, they will come,” profiting directly from human misery. In addition, prison industries such as TWA, Microsoft, Victoria’s Secret contract prisoners who get paid a fraction of minimum wage (Nagel, 2002). And tell prisoners who toil on the plantation of Angola State Penitentiary (a slave plantation, converted into a prison post-1865) that they are not exploited for forfeiting a living wage, a pension plan, and meaningful health care. They are forced to see medical staff who often lost their licenses and are barred from working outside prisons. Prisoners are not allowed to unionize, as the courts recently confirmed, due to the exception clause in the 13th Amendment. Several states still condemn prisoners to hard labor without pay (Schwartzapfel, 2014).

Black Panther Assata Shakur’s brush with “the law” while awaiting trial is telling. Told in no uncertain terms by the guard to sweep the floor (i.e. condemned to unpaid labor), she defies the guard declaring: “you can’t make me work!” The guard doesn’t miss a beat and cites the Thirteenth Amendment—prisoners are after all mere slaves. It gets Shakur thinking and writing the following before the onset of “mass incarceration”:

That explained why jails and prisons all over the country are filled to the brim with Black and third world people, why so many Black people can’t find a job on the streets … Once you’re in prison, there are plenty of jobs, and, if you don’t want to work, they beat you up and throw you in the hole. … Prisons are part of this government’s genocidal war against Black and third world people. (Shakur, 1987, pp. 64-65)

Nevertheless, the guard wasn’t exactly correct in her legal interpretation of the Constitution due to Shakur’s remand status. But in the U.S., remand prisoners are barely treated as persons presumed innocent. They do not live in separate quarters and even have to wear prison orange jumpsuits adorned with stomach and leg shackles to court.

Alexander misses the larger context of the prison industrial complex and how this massive web is tied to the control and surveillance of a people that cannot be trusted with being left alone, i.e. enjoying negative freedom. And contrary to Wacquant’s prediction, each system is not less total—in fact, the registration system starts prenatally!

At the very least, we are seeing the endurance of the slavery legacy, of the ruthless demonization of a people where white elites “impute crime to color” (Douglass, 1883, cited in Davis, p. 30). Slave Codes morph into Black Codes and these have enduring legacy in the neo-slavery “post-racial” carceral setting. The Baldus Study so poignantly shows that it is practically impossible for a white man to receive the death penalty for the offense of killing a Black girl; by contrast, it is highly likely for a Black man to be executed for being implicated in the death of a white person (Baldus et al., 1990, p. 315). Alexander tellingly mentions the racist continuation from ante Bellum *Dred Scott* *v Sanford* that declared that a Black man had no rights that a white man needed to respect, to *Plessy v Ferguson*, cementing Jim Crow law with a “separate, but equal” fiction, to *McCleskey*, who brought the Baldus study to the Supreme Court’s attention. Yet, the justices “feared too much racial justice” (in the words of the dissenting judge) and erred on behalf of a spiteful endorsement of penal slavery; and thus ordered death for McCleskey who was convicted of killing a white man (Alexander, 2010, p. 189). Clearly, Alexander is very well capable of seeing the continuation of civil death from the prison of slavery to the slavery of the prison industrial complex, but she ignores this analysis in her optimistic liberal narrative.

In summary, Alexander’s oscillation between two competing paradigms can be summarized with this Zizekian formula (“I know …, but nevertheless, I believe …”). She commits herself to this fetishistic disavowal: “I *know* very well that the current penal system is ‘worse than slavery,’ but I *believe* that it is an echo of Jim Crow and the second-class citizenship has to be dismantled by ending the war on drugs, so that Blacks can rise up unencumbered by racialized policing.”

Why might she be involved in performative contradictions or disavowals? I suggest it has to do with a professional audience Alexander has in mind: the civil rights community of which she is a part. ACLU or NAACP lawyers have a passion for reforming the status quo, but as she says, many folks in the civil rights community have been rather silent about mass incarceration and the epidemic reach of the dragnet ensnaring Black boys and men during the escalation of the war on drugs. Alexander has been singularly effective in reaching this group by shedding light that this calamity is not about criminal justice, rather it is about racial justice and indeed a civil rights issue of crisis dimension (p. 9). Lest they be accused of activist lawyering, attorneys do not use inflammatory rhetoric such as labeling criminal justice apparatus as “prison industrial complex” or prisoners and felons as “slaves.” So, Alexander treads carefully between liberal rhetoric of the abstract rights bearing individual and procedural democracy and a plethora of U.S. Supreme Court cases where it is clear that the law simply is not just, especially for Black people. She chronicles egregious cases, where the high court has condoned torture by state actors (i.e., police chokeholds, arbitrary arrests, racial profiling) and the wholesale abandonment of the Bill of Rights (passim).

**Whose Narratives?**

Alexander boldly claims that her book “is not written for everyone.” In fact, I would argue that Alexander’s book is written for specific (mainstream) reform-minded audiences in mind, and not for penal abolitionists. It is remarkable that this is a book that has landed on the *New York Times* bestseller list and is read widely in book clubs around the United States. Politicians have started to change their tune on “harsh justice” and some of us (criminal justice activists) have been able to impress on our local prosecutors to have courage to rethink punishment when long prison sentences are proven to be abysmal failures. In fact, we have over 90 million Americans with a criminal record, often preventing them from pursuing choice housing, jobs, and much needed education (EIO coalition, 2014). Nowhere is the crisis more acute than in Black America, when one in three Black men will face incarceration or some kind of judicial supervision in his lifetime. It goes without saying that surveillance does not stop at innocence, as we know from the “stop-and-frisk” policy of Bloomberg’s New York. Nationwide, a Black man has a fifty percent chance to find himself arrested by the time he is 23 years old (Brame et al., 2014). Mass incarceration has focused on the Black man as a species, in terms of Russell-Brown’s (2009) “criminalblackman” which refracts Foucault’s (1976/1990) famous comment about the homophobic invention of “the homosexual as a species.” As Angela Y. Davis (2003) and others have noted, such sober statistics disguises another alarming development, namely, that Black women are the fastest rising group given all incarceration. American Indians, as well as transgender and gender nonconforming people of color are also disproportionately targeted, but since they are marginalized persons, they are disappeared from most policy discussions.

Thus, her second audience—of white politicians, civil rights attorneys, prosecutors and judges—might resonate better with the term of “mass incarceration” than with the more politically controversial concept of “criminal injustice” (Rosenblatt, 1999) or the “prison industrial complex” used by prisoners of war, political prisoners and other penal critics (Shoatz, 2013; Davis, 2003; James, 2005):

A phrase like "mass incarceration" obviates the fact that "mass incarceration" is mostly localized in black neighborhoods. In Chicago during the '90s, there was no overlap between the incarceration rates of black and white neighborhoods. The most incarcerated white neighborhoods in Chicago are still better off than the least incarcerated black neighborhoods. The most incarcerated black neighborhood in Chicago is 40 times worse than the most incarcerated white neighborhood (Coates, 2014a).

We may ask: *What happened to prisoners’ protest movements and insurrectionist prisoners’ narratives?*

Alexander’s third audience is that of prisoners, a few of them having encouraged her to write the book. As somebody who has focused on writing about prisoners’ life and learned a great deal about prisoners from my students and friends who are locked up (Nagel, 2008), I certainly appreciate that she acknowledges their voices rather than writing them out of existence, as it so often happens in criminological treatises. Thus, I am bewildered that prisoners’ protests including the famous 1971 Attica, NY uprising, where men demanded a modicum of civility concerning sanitary items, lawbooks, and be treated as men, not as animals, disappear in her broad historical analysis. The Attica prisoners organized their prison takeover in response to the state’s killing of California’s most famous politicized prisoner, George Jackson. Alexander doesn’t mention victories such as a prisoners’ Bill of Rights in California, conjugal visits in New York, thanks to Attica, and the abolition of the hated trustee system in the South, which condoned prisoners’ shootings of other convicts (Parenti, 1999, pp. 164-5). It is as if one writes about the ills of American chattel slavery without mentioning David Walker, Frederic Douglass, Harriet Tubman, John Brown, Nat Turner, and Sojourner Truth, and the radical maroon communities in the struggles to abolish slavery (cf. Shoatz, 2013). Alexander does mention the reformist reentry organization “All of Us or None” which receives state funding, but she avoids naming the abolitionist group Critical Resistance, whose co-founder is Angela Davis.

One prominent prisoner not mentioned in her book is Mumia Abu-Jamal (1995) who signified on Douglass’s stirring speech “What, to an American Slave, is the 4th of July?” (1852) with his own “What, to a Prisoner, is the 4th of July?” Douglass’s searing critique of the hypocrisy of the state’s celebration of the freedom of its citizens, when millions of men, children, and women were subjected to shackles and violence, is echoed in Abu-Jamal’s soliloquy on the meaning of Mandela and De Clerk getting a Liberty Metal in Philadelphia. Despite celebrating the end of apartheid, he notes that the “African majority, even after the awards, still isn’t free” (p. 138). Abu-Jamal does not clarify the meaning of freedom, yet, clearly, he means that abolition democracy is not made overnight: reparations, land return and redistribution of wealth are all part of demands to fully enfranchise a landless majority that has been oppressed for over three hundred years by white minority rule. Furthermore, it is important to note that Abu-Jamal’s bestseller brought trouble to him as his “privileges” on death row were revoked for the offense of “engaging in the business or profession of journalism” which earned him thirty days in solitary confinement (1996, p. xxi).

As Northrup’s abolitionist narrative *Twelve Years a Slave* makes abundantly clear, enslaved persons forfeit the right to literacy, and death or other severe punishment were a natural consequence to keep the captive population terrorized. It is no coincidence that the vast majority of U.S. prisoners are barely functionally literate beyond 5th grade education, and special sanctions are handed out to those who dare to write legal briefs challenging the terms of the incarceration. They are dubbed jailhouse lawyers, and given what they endure thanks to arbitrary punishment by wardens, the modern-day plantation masters, these unsung marooned heroes produce neo-slave resistance narratives in the contemporary penal colony (cf. Abu-Jamal, 2010; Shoatz, 2013). It seems that insurrectionist prisoners, whether as jailhouse lawyers or doctors, determined to take care of their own health, are particularly policed by the state, as they question the right of the state to hold them and others captive and boldly imagine a different kind of democracy (cf. James, 2005, xxxii; Abu-Jamal, 2010, passim).

Thus, the concerns of the prison audience are overshadowed by the primarily targeted audience, especially the white middle-class and elite, who have so far been comfortably ignorant about the prison industrial complex. In fact, prosecutors, sheriffs and the like would arguably hold that violent crime is down precisely because policing has been increased and more people are being locked up (albeit for non-violent crimes or for offenses that wouldn’t be criminalized elsewhere, e.g., Portugal, Denmark, or the Netherlands). They want to believe religiously in the old philosophical adage that violent crime is stopped only through overzealous prosecution in order to *deter* others (if not the *predicate* offender). Alas, what is noticeable in this justification of punishment (deterrence) is a penchant for retribution. Revenge tends to trump all other reasoned approaches to penality along a fetishistic disavowal formula: “I *know* very well that retribution is another word for revenge, but I *believe* that it really works and represents a measured dessert-based punishment that approximates proportionality of the offense.” An eye for an eye ideology is thus disguised in the language of abstract rights bearing individual deemed innocent before acquitted or punished in a court of law.

Of course, Alexander and I agree on the ruse of such blame game given the racist implications of the war on drugs. She acknowledges with refreshing honesty a turn in her political commitment, moving away from a belief in the post-racial, democratic system which duped her: “Never did I seriously consider the possibility that a new racial caste system was operating in this country. The new system had been developed and implemented swiftly, and it was largely invisible, even to people, like me, who spent most of their waking hours fighting for justice” (p. 3). Despite her vague understanding of the oppressive “legacy of slavery and Jim Crow” (ibid.), the seductive ideological force of the procedural, colorblind, well-ordered aspects of criminal justice is unrelenting. To underscore how easy it is to be ensnared in colorblind ideology, I want to mention again the journalist Abu-Jamal, who after all was a Black Panther at the tender age of 15, something haunting him in the closing statements of the prosecution in the death penalty phase of his trial over a decade later. In *Live from Death Row* (1996), he writes that he still naively believed in getting justice and relief from the hanging judge Sabo presiding over his case when he turned to the appeals process to seek his freedom (p. xvi). It is easy enough to believe that one poor judgment by a mean spirited judge (and prosecutor, hiding exculpatory evidence and promulgating coerced confessions). Thus, Americans of all political persuasions, including political prisoners, are caught up in believing that the criminal justice system is in fact just. However, many political prisoners and prisoners of war and their allies in the streets have chronicled amply the obverse being true. Philosopher Angela Y. Davis’s 1972 acquittal of murder, kidnapping and criminal conspiracy charges by an all-white jury did not prove that the system “works;” instead it showed that a vibrant world-wide movement organizing on her behalf for 22 months made all the difference.

**Choosing Excarceration over Decarceration**

Both reform and more radical opponents of mass incarceration agree that *decarceration* is an urgent strategy to employ. Alexander argues fervently for the decriminalization of drug use, which, astonishingly, has resonated with white mainstream politicians and the U.S. Justice Department. It is a curious coincidence that the publication of her book coincided with the national launching of an ultra-conservative think tank devoted to the motto “Right on Crime,” suggesting that the drug war has utterly failed and that therapeutic approaches to an addiction problem are urgently needed. The conservative ideology of fiscal responsibility may have finally been put to good use. At 80 billion dollars in direct costs associated with incarcerating prisoners (NYT ed., May 25, 2014), policy wonks like Newt Gingrich admit that the drug war is a failure and strains state’s budgets.

Penal abolitionists caution that some aspects of decarceration, presented as alternatives to incarceration, may lead to increasing the dragnet of the carceral state, e.g., drug court, which has a low success rate. Furthermore, if the person ordered to years of drug court attendance once fails to supply clean urine tests, she may be sent back to jail. Electronic monitoring also has been used as an added punitive measure, rather than as a decarceration tool (Kilgore, 2015). Prison abolitionists go further by demanding an *excarceration* strategy, which implies the application of transformative justice. Transformative justice means that all institutions, not just the penal system, have to be dismantled and rebuilt differently.

The behemoth of the criminal justice system can accommodate all kinds of alterations or reforms, collectively called alternatives to incarceration (ATI). ATI tend not to be excarceration practices, given that the judicial focus is still on the carceral: if one violates sanctions such as the mobility terms of the electronic bracelet, of drug court, etc., the person usually gets returned to jail or prison. The digital age has ensured a perplexity that confirms Foucault’s notion of regulatory power at work, namely, that the carceral panopticon is truly everywhere, especially in one’s living room. Hence I disagree with Alexander following Wacquant who argues that “[w]ith each reincarnation of racial caste, the new system …’is less total, less capable of encompassing and controlling the entire race’” (cited in Alexander, p. 22). Exactly the opposite is the case. Alexander emphasizes herself that nowadays more Black men are under “correctional” control than were enslaved in 1850 (p. 175). That does not even account for those who are on parole or probation and mandated to diversion programs (ATI). It’s difficult to even label ATI as part of the decarceration strategy; it is part of the Probation Office in many jurisdictions.

The threat of being “violated,” i.e., found guilty of technical violation of parole or probation conditions, looms large. The court, social workers, parole officers, probation office, make it clear to defendants that they still have to pay a debt to society through submitting to drug court sanctions, and mental health evaluations. In addition, they are literally indebted with a proliferation of fees—ensuring that the person of interest will never walk “free” from state supervision. Alexander helpfully gives a catalogue of such privatized services, whose fees often are also encumbered by prisoners: public defender application, bail investigation, per diem (during pre-trial detention), supervision by parole or probation, child support, etc. (pp. 150-51). At least to me, it is clear that the slavery image looms large here; what is new is that this “life-on-the-installment plan” (Salah-El, personal communication, 2003) in the “slave-ship that doesn’t move” (N'Zinga, 2000) is publicly executed enslavement of millions of people, instead of being privately administered, as chattel slavery was till 1865.

In comparison to whites, Black citizens possess fewer driver’s licenses and other identification cards, which are now requirements for voting (akin to a poll tax) in some states, but there is a tacit understanding that they are supposed to be “registered” in the system. An anecdotal illustration: a friend and neighbor has been racially profiled over the years on different occasions—on her porch or in her car in a town in upstate New York, which is predominately white. Every time, the police runs her license, they exclaim in disbelief to her “why don’t we have you in the system? When did you move here?” And they are shocked to find out she’s been living in town for ten years without having a criminal record. We can only speak of successful practices of decarceration when a) the rate of criminal ensnarement drops to the level of whites; b) the sentencing practices (i.e. anti-Black harsh justice) drop to the level of whites; c) the “criminalblackman” is a stereotype of the past and that all Black people are truly considered innocent before proven guilty; d) there’s an expectation that Black children finish high school and go on to college. At that point, we could begin to see that the system is indeed less ensnaring the “usual suspects” (sic).

How does the conceptual contrast of decarceration and excarceration compare to anti-slavery narratives? During the 1820s, vigorous discussions took place between those who demanded a *gradual* abolition of slavery and those like David Walker and Frederick Douglass, who demanded *radical* and immediate abolition. At the same time, they both had different perceptions of the racial nature of the constitution: Douglass denied that there was a racial contract (cf. Mills, 1999; Sundstrom, 2012) and Walker would probably have had difficulties with Douglass’s pragmatist political style, namely, working with groups that were overtly racist. Douglass also had a procapitalist bias and critiqued labor unions (Davis, 1998).

In summary, today’s reformists, who wish to address the excesses of mass incarceration and converting capital punishment into calls for life imprisonment without parole, are somewhat similar to white abolitionists, who favored a gradual anti-slavery approach along with repatriating Blacks to Africa (Liberia), appeasing white supremacists fears of an emancipated people. Those who now favor penal abolition, contesting all aspects of penality, not just (mass)incarceration, compare to radical abolitionists of chattel slavery. Their dogged determination to bring about abolition democracy compares to current freedom fighters, as James’s anthology of prisoners’ voices makes clear: *The New Abolitionists: (Neo)Slave Narratives and Prisoners’ Writings* (2005). In fact, one of the contributors, Tiyo Attallah Salah-El, could not receive a copy of that book in the Pennsylvania prison where he has been locked up for over three decades for an offense he didn’t commit (personal communication), since the book contained two problematic terms: “abolition” and “slave.” Using the word “slave” is a fighting word in a U.S. prison: One of my Black students received the treatment of the “box,” i.e., solitary confinement for three months, for complaining to be treated like a slave within earshot of a guard. In a training session, a program administrator explained to me that the use of terms like “slave” when it refers to prisoners will be punished; the analogy given was “it’s like crying fire in a crowded theater.” In fact, what the overseers, i.e. correctional personnel, wish to avoid is another slave insurrection such as the Attica rebellion of 1971. However, it is ironic that prisoners are punished for articulating exactly what they are in the eyes of the state: enslaved people.

**Conclusion: Beyond Emancipation towards Liberation and Abolition Democracy**

Alexander’s argument can be summarized this way: She argues that mass incarceration engendered the New Jim Crow. The pretext for indiscriminate arrests and selective punishment of Black men is the government’s policy war on drugs. She convincingly shows that the badge of felon status renders one permanently into social exile and social death (p. 158). Thus the New Jim Crow can only be dismantled if the drug war were eradicated, the majority of prisoners, especially Black males, were released and felons destigmatized. It is as if she waved a magic wand and made racism qua penal servitude disappear in the context of a capitalist democracy.

I am, of course, all for pursuing sensible measures of decarceration. My key concerns with her approach remain that Alexander short-circuits an in-depth analysis of the mechanisms of the prison industrial complex, and she doesn’t sufficiently take seriously the racialized nature of the prison itself, in fact of replicating the slave-like conditions of torture and dependence, from its birth in Philadelphia and then ideologically buttressed through the exception clause of the Thirteenth Amendment. Legally reducing people to slaves makes it easier to institute a death row and justify state-sanctioned executions; thus the United States is one of very few nations that still murders its citizens and others. Therefore, not only mass incarceration needs to be destroyed, but the modern Benthamian project, as it was first executed on American territory, needs to be declared inhumane and untenable with contemporary concerns for human rights. And the wholesale criminalization of Black people did not start with the advent of the drug war, but it started with the Slave Codes, so that the stigma that crime is singularly foisted upon a Black male and increasingly Black female, giving white people literally a carte blanche to commit crimes with impunity because we possess the color of innocence. To be sure, white people also get arrested, but it is as if an affirmative action policy were in place: to lock up just so many whites that it does not look too blatantly like the fact that only one group of people is capable of committing criminal acts.

So, following other penal abolitionists, I maintain that excarceration is the only way to rid ourselves of racialized penal servitude, and the state’s step towards true manumission or emancipation would result in the abolition of the exception clause in the so-called Abolition Amendment. Joy James correctly presents this conundrum of the Amendment: “[it] ensnares as it emancipates” (2005, p. xxii). She explains that emancipation is a state-governed, legally binding agreement, imposed by the dominant party upon its subjects.

In his *Narrative* (1845), Douglass spells out what it means to seek not manumission (from above) but liberation (from below) in his battle with a slave-breaker, Mr. Covey:

The battle with Mr. Covey was the turning-point in my career as a slave. It rekindled the few expiring embers of freedom, and revived within me a sense of my own manhood. It recalled the departed self-confidence, and inspired me again with a determination to be free. The gratification afforded by the triumph was a full compensation for whatever else might follow, even death itself. He only can understand the deep satisfaction which I experienced, who has himself repelled by force the bloody arm of slavery. I felt as I never felt before. It was a glorious resurrection, from the tomb of slavery, to the heaven of freedom. My long-crushed spirit rose, cowardice departed, bold defiance took its place; and I now resolved that, however long I might remain as slave in form, the day had passed forever when I could be a slave in fact. I did not hesitate to let it be known of me, that the white man who expected to succeed in whipping, must also succeed in killing me. (Douglass, 1845/1994, p. 65, cited in Sundstrom, 2012)

Today, prisoners write courageously under the watchful eye of the censors from the tomb of solitary confinement or death row, and some of them even miraculously maintain their dignity refusing to be a slave of the system or forfeit their beliefs. Political prisoner Herman Wallace was never meant to leave alive Angola penitentiary, formerly a slave plantation, after forty-two years of solitary confinement, because its long-time warden determined that lifers die inside and get buried in the cemetery. A Black Panther, Wallace was railroaded through a trial accused of murdering a guard, and sentenced to the tomb, longer than any prisoner in the world (Bhalla, 2012). He left prison in 2013 holding up his fist and dying a mere two days later.

What would abolition democracy look like to a political prisoner like Wallace? As DuBois suggests, it would mean to dismantle *in toto* all institutions that bear the vestiges of bondage. Angela Davis adds that the reparations movement should start advocating for the end of the death penalty (2005, p. 35). Tiyo Salah-El (2007) favors turning abandoned prison sites into healing and caring centers, and retrain former guards to become social workers. From the Quakers to mainstream criminologists, it is clearly established that white-collar crime (i.e. multinational corporations, finance capita, etc.) cause more criminality than street crime, yet there’s hardly a conviction that follows their wreckage on communities and lives lost due to corporate crime. In addition, legal drugs (pharmaceuticals, alcohol, tobacco) cause much more harm, death, and destruction than all of the illegal, criminalized drugs combined (Drucker, 2011). A vision of abolition democracy would return to many of the tenets of the 10-point program of the Black Panther Party, the organization that brought American children the breakfast school program, Head Start. Eliminating capitalist exploitation, the penal system, including policing, as well as the military industrial complex would be part of an overhaul program and charting life-affirming institutions and a type of communalism cherished by Tanzania in its decolonial phase.

What needs to be done to discontinue the horrifying trend that one in three Black men today will be incarcerated in his lifetime? This statistic doesn’t even account for the hundreds of thousands who will find themselves frisked and arrested and released without being charged. Or, those who are simply shot in the back by rogue police, a haunting reminder that extra-legal lynchings are not violent acts of the past. Once formally freed from chattel bondage, Black people were not given reparative means to get free education, vocational training, jobs, homestead farming—the rallying cry of “forty acres and a mule”: Land reform was indeed executed in the Carolina islands by General Sherman who consulted with freed citizens, but it was swiftly annulled (Gates, 2013). Black homesteading was also crushed through dubious mechanisms that resulted in a freed family being shackled by share cropping till the Great Migration brought an end to it (see Coates, 2014b).

The promise of yesteryear’s reparations rings hollow in the bowls of the slaveship that doesn’t move (N’Zinga, 2000). Dismantling capitalism which buttresses the prison industrial complex will be an important step in getting towards abolition democracy, but it is not something law professor Alexander is prepared to advocate for. And another great migration of freed Black men and women from the diasporic penal colonies of rural white America to the cities and other areas that offer jobs, housing, healthcare, education, culture, sports paid for by reparation dividends will provide more peace, wellbeing, and security than any paramilitary police force, national guard, judicial system ever could pretend to accomplish.

Abolition democracy is a call to reclaim the common, to end U.S. imperialism and endless warfaring and its concomitant domestic pacification strategy through the prison industrial complex. Alexander calls for an end to mass incarceration, but not an end to incarceration. Critics such as Marie Gottschalk (2015) argue that a complete end of punitive drug policies will still leave prisons and jails at massive levels because only the low hanging fruit gets attended to in reform discussions: the non-serious, non-violent, and the non-sex offenses. Ending life imprisonment, death sentences, mandatory minimum sentences for violent offenses would slowly reverse the incarceration rate that has turned the U.S. into the world’s biggest jailor.

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**Teaching the Rhetoric of Protest and Dissent**

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**TEACHING THE RHETORIC OF PROTEST AND DISSENT**

**Abstract**

This article presents the framework for an upper-division college level course on the rhetoric of social movements. The course is within the discipline of communication studies/rhetoric, but presents a model of social movement literacy that can be adapted to other disciplines. Included are student learning outcomes, sample schedule, and suggested readings for teaching the rhetoric of social movements and protests for both historic and contemporary movements. Examples presented include how the course has been adapted to study the current Black Lives Matter movement. The author notes challenges of teaching social movement rhetoric to university students.

**Introduction**

Course descriptions can both be constraining or frightfully vague and open for possibilities. COM [Communication Studies] 441: Rhetoric of Dissent at the University of Nevada simply states: *Description and analysis of public discourse by agitators and those opposed to agitation.  Focus on significant movements for change in recent American history.* This description itself is a reflection of Bowers and Och’s (1971) germinal theory related to social movement rhetoric (see Bowers, Ochs, Jensen, & Schulz, 2010) where agitators confront the decision-making establishment who responds with its own forms of counterpersuaison and control. However, more recent study of social movement and counterpublic rhetoric recognizes a more nuanced and complex nature of advocating for social change (see review by Cox & Foust, 2009), where “agitators” direct appeals internally to their own members, outwards to get on the “public screen” of mainstream media (Deluca & Peeples, 2002), and/or towards a variety of audiences and other publics. Thus, teaching the public discourse of “agitators” and the various responses becomes itself a complex challenge because there is not a clear dichotomy of two opposing sides or easy answers of which side is “just” or right. In this piece, I describe my own framework for designing the course; as an instructor I think both like a community organizer and a rhetorical critic in building the capacity for my students to engage with and analyze contemporary struggles connected to historical movements. In this, I tailor the course to address and think through a current movement, and in this piece I will describe how the framework addresses Black Lives Matter (BLM) for Spring 2016.

The design of the course follows a model to develop “social movement literacy” (see Del Gandio & Nocella, 2014), which combines theoretical knowledge of movements and rhetorical criticism skills for analyzing the social conditions and tactics used by movements. In learning about the tactics and communication skills employed by activists, students experience and practice those skills through in-class workshops and discussion. This approach balances what others scholars have identified as educating *about* and educating *for* peace (see Thomas, 2012). Students read both the history and theory produced by scholars to learn *about* movements, but also engage in dialogue and participatory activities to enable advocacy *for* issues in the future. My particular course serves both majors and non-majors (coming from history, political science, or gender programs), and this approach can be adapted to other disciplines. I proceed by giving the course’s overall framework and learning objectives to outlining how I address those objectives through readings and content.

**Course Development and Framework**

*Rhetoric of Dissent* fits within my department’s emphasis on Public Advocacy and Civic Engagement courses. The course focuses on the ways communication affects public and political processes as well as how agents advocate or exert influence through communication in various forms of speech. Within this emphasis, we have courses that focus more on practical skill building (e.g., public speaking, facilitation) as well as courses that focus on theory and research related to advocacy contexts (e.g., leadership, political communication, persuasion). For *Dissent*, I include both theory and skill development; both analysis and critique of movement practices as well as appreciation and employment of those practices. This approach fits with the tradition of rhetorical criticism in which analyzing speech strategies enables one to become a better speaker by adapting successful strategies to new contexts. Similarly, *Dissent* focuses on tactics and speech types employed by movements to understand how those tactics were chosen, and how tactics are chosen because of (and affected by) the particular socio-political contexts in which a given movement speaks.

The combined skills/theory approach is reflected in the student learning outcomes:

* Identify social movement theory and concepts specific to communication studies.
* Describe and evaluate rhetorical dissent strategies used by activists including the ethics and effectiveness of those strategies.
* Compare rhetorical strategies used by various movement groups for different issues within particular socio-political-historical contexts.
* Research and analyze elements of social movements to articulate how they emerge and fulfill rhetorical movement functions.
* Apply dissent concepts and theory to contemporary social movements or activists.

In developing the strategies to address these outcomes, my approach has been to think both like an organizer and a rhetorical critic.

*Thinking Like an Organizer*

My own identification as a scholar-activist meant that I could not divorce this course from the practices of better-world making that I advocate for in my research and activism. To learn about how movements develop agency, identity, and find their voice, the classroom should also be a space where students have agency, voice, and recognize their own passions and abilities for advocacy. Thus, I think like an organizer in building the capacity of my students to understand the issues affecting their communities and how others have worked to address them. In turn, the goal is for students to also starting thinking like an organizer to develop the curiosity, sensitivity to one’s surroundings, power analysis, and communication skills needed for advocating change (Alinsky, 1971). Reading practical guides such as Del Gandio’s (2008) *Rhetoric for Radicals* breaks down some of the initial barriers students might have in engaging with activist rhetoric when they realize “radicals” use similar persuasive strategies that they have encountered in other courses (albeit for different purposes). At the same time, reading about advocacy from the perspective of “radicals” also shows students that language does have the power to shape our realities, constructs inequities, and that to address those structures, one needs more than outrageous acts or a big heart (Del Gandio, 2008, pp. 24-27). Like any organization, students recognize the importance of effective communication to work towards strategic goals (see also Bobo, Kendall, & Max, 2002 for communication skills needed by organizers).

Within the classroom, I follow Alinsky’s (1971) rule of being a “political schizoid”: having the ability to understand a situation from multiple perspectives, but strategically present issues in (potentially) polarizing terms (p. 78). This may seem counter to building an inclusive classroom space for discussion, but does work to have students engage in debate to critically analyze the movement cases we work through. As the movements I tend to focus the course around are for more progressive/liberal causes, being a “schizoid” allows even conservative students to have a space and to be understood by other students as having reasonable views as we engage in discussion together. For me, the classroom should not become an echo-chamber or space for students to learn to agree with a given movement wholesale (as there is necessary critique for any given tactic), so much like debate, the political schizoid method works to present the best case possible for any side. For example, in talking through BLM demonstrations at the Mall of America, I facilitate discussion to present how the demonstration is ethical and effective from the perspective of protesters in raising awareness or creating an image event for media, but also how the demonstration goes against First Amendment law. Importantly, presenting opposing arguments demonstrates to students that different perspectives are valuable and gives them the agency to choose their own position for essay assignments (where they apply course readings and argue a position) without fear of grade retribution. At the same time, this method creates a condition for students to empathize or see the necessity of dissent by understanding the rules and laws that might necessarily need to be broken or how movements work within and against those rules with their tactics.

“Schizoid” classroom discussions allow students to develop their own ability to think like an organizer, and they demonstrate this through writing assignments related to a given prompt specific to BLM events or discourse. For example, one student recognized how saying #AllLivesMatter was not a “popular” position in relation to BLM, but was able to support a position on how that might also be rhetorically effective given course readings and movement theory. Even though taking a position opposed to BLM, this student first respectfully presented the perspective of activists, then use theoretical approaches to show limits to #BlackLivesMatter by applying “functionalist” theories (foundational to communication studies) that outline the purposes and effects of activist discourse (see Stewart, 1980). In classroom discussion and writing assignments, the goal is to take generalized concepts of “transforming perceptions of history” or “legitimizing” movement goals to outside audiences and bring them to live through learning about the history or socio-political contexts of the time and having students place themselves in the position of those activists. For example, students reading the Black Panther’s (1966) Ten Point Platform with its inflammatory language recognize how the Platform was both a tool for organizers to build a collective of Black members as well as a declaration to the general public instead of immediately rejecting the demands as if reading it from the perspective of the Establishment. Students then can work through how they might employ rhetorical strategies adapted to different audiences working both through the practical and theoretical approaches to communicative action.

*Thinking Like a Rhetorical Critic*

Rhetorical criticism is a method of analysis that incorporates historical and contextual analysis of where speech acts occur along with theories of communication to understand the textual strategies of a particular rhetoric act. In developing the course, I work from the perspective of a critic to take the exigency of a current movement (in this case BLM), and build a “text” with readings for the course that combine history, current event accounts, and theory of movements in conjunction with particular BLM actions. Following McGee (1990), the role of a critic is largely in text construction, while speakers and audiences do interpretive work of evaluating and making sense of the “text.” Translated to the classroom, the choices of readings and discussion topics each week become the “text” or particular narrative of the movement I, as a critic, would like to tell. As speaker (instructor) along with my students (audience), we work each week to interpret and make sense of BLM by thinking about what historical movements influenced or are reflected in current activism, what contemporary context fostered BLM, what social movement theory is related to this rhetorical strategy, and what rhetorical principles help unpack the function and effects of #BlackLivesMatter. As example, given #BLM constitutes a collective identity for the movement, one week of the course is devoted to discussing the ego-function of rhetoric (Gregg, 1971), *and* the history of Black Power rhetoric from the Civil Rights Movement as we (in class discussion) think through why we have/need #BLM now. By structuring course readings this way, students experience and are also constituted as critics themselves, and start to approach current movement events with a new perspective. As I show in the themes below, the topics each week are designed to present what strategies define BLM and incorporate rhetorical/social movement theory texts along with history and current events for us to build our understanding of the movement each week.

Rhetorical criticism, as pedagogical practice, works both to instill critical analysis skills but also instill the ability and inclination for students to *produce* their own rhetorical responses to public discourse(Terrill, 2014). Focusing the course on an in-progress movement is risky business as students might have either emotive reactions or barely a passing understanding of the movement (from what they see on the news)—neither point on the spectrum having much ability to “see” the movement strategies as a product of contemporary and historical constructs. However, by having students experience the movement through our class discussions and in-class analysis of events related to each week’s topic, students then become part of a conversation about that movement—moving beyond their own reactions formulating their own discourse about those events in class discussion and writing assignments. For example, to learn about activists blocking the Bay Bridge in San Francisco over the Martin Luther King Jr. holiday weekend, we read about direct action strategies such as a blockade (Dutta, 2011), accounts of the blockade, and connect it to histories of Black Power actions or media spectacles (such as with the Black Panthers). In this, students go beyond evaluating whether the blockade had an immediate policy effect, to seeing how meaning making and collective building are part of the tactic and fit within a longer history, and present their own positions on the effects and nature of this recent event.

The approach of applying theory and history to contemporary events is not just an academic tool to reflect on events, but also as a means to inform the production of rhetorical strategies for new contexts. Another component of the course is for students to practice or experience dissent rhetorics through participating in consciousness-raising discussions, interacting with activist trainers, or in watching documentaries or speeches to see direct action. Theory and practice combined are part of the “education of an organizer” incorporated in the course.

Coincidentally, more activist groups are employing rhetorical criticism of their own in building movement-created theory. For example, the Center for Story-Based Strategy (CSS, previously, SmartMeme), utilizes narrative analysis to understand issues and build strategies to “change the story” through addressing points of intervention (see Boyd, 2012). Narrative or frame analysis on public discourse about a given issue allows activists to target a “point of assumption,” which in turn informs how they can use memes or counter-discourse to reframe issues or highlight hypocrisy. For example, CSS organizers were part of Billionaires for Bush actions. *Billionaires* took a comment made by then President Bush about “elites” to then protest while wearing formal attire with signs proclaiming, “Corporations are people to!” By breaking the “assumption” that the group was in favor of Bush’s policies, the group was able to expose “how the Republican Party serves the interests of the super-rich” (Boyd, 2012, p. 296). In-class, I have been able to have trainers from CSS work with students through frame analysis as we think about how activists can work to change the story.

Whether a student “agrees” with movement tactics, the process of learning about movements and related issues through a rhetorical criticism frame constitutes students as a type of political participant, enabling them to view the world anew or to act if they choose. Pedagogy that incorporates both critical interpretation as well as rhetorical practice also allows students to recognize a “movement” is a product of the meaning making and the changing of social consciousness related to the issues we encounter as a “public” (McGee, 1980). Tracing the history of movement organizations as well as the history of language tropes and meanings becomes another thread in understanding contemporary issues. Organizers also underscore the importance of history: Thompson (2007) notes history does not provide easy answers or formulas for success, but does show what is possible, demonstrates personal and social transformations, and redefines “the context of our own actions” (p. 143). In this class, I do not provide easy answers, but rather allow students to work through contemporary problems through a rhetorical lens.

**Course Organization and Semester Schedule**

I organize the course thematically, building students’ knowledge and awareness of socio-political contexts with the disciplinary frameworks that enable them to analyze and understand the movement under study for a given semester. Roughly, the themes are designed to move students through more familiar and general topics, to prepare them to engage with more complex and specific discussions on movements.

*Theme 1: We Have A Right to Dissent*

The first couple of weeks I establish the larger societal context in which dissent occurs, and move students beyond assumptions that protest is “wrong” to establish where dissent is needed. As the course focuses on U.S. American movements, it is helpful for students to get a sense of the “legitimate” pathways to participate in democracy to understand how movements work through “uninstitutionalized” means or have to work to legitimate their actions. I usually provide some First Amendment contexts, showing what “rules” there are for dissent and speech. Wolf’s (2008) *Give Me Liberty* is a good conversation starter for these issues as she outlines the ways she wants to legitimately participate (such as running for office), but encounters barriers and rules and regulations meant to limit participation.

*Theme 2: Communication Studies Approaches to Movements*

Next, I bring in theoretical frameworks and approaches to understanding movement rhetoric both from within the discipline and activist voices. This is where Alinsky (1971), Del Gandio (2008), and Fox Piven (2011), combine with the foundational communication studies works of Bowers et al. (2010) or Stewart, Smith, and Denton (2001). Readings in this section are more “textbook” or “handbook” oriented, allowing students to see “radical” rhetoric as accessible. As noted above, these theories become a familiar or neutral ground to begin to analyze movement texts, allowing students to evaluate the texts from the perspective of activists, those in power, or the public. Students work to identify the different functions and effects of a given text from these various perspectives. Certainly, other disciplines can adapt this by including texts outlining major paradigms or concepts pertinent to studies in their own fields as a base.

*Theme 3: Tactics and Strategies of Specific Movements*

Given the breadth of tactics and theories related to movements, using a particular movement as a starting point helps to narrow and focus topics each week while allowing students to think through what they are reading, seeing on the news, and their own social change preferences. For example, BLM has taken advantage of particular *places* for demonstrations (e.g. Bay Bridge, Presidential campaign rallies) as well as erupting in the particular places where police violence occurs, so we read and discuss the significance of places (see Endres & Senda-Cook, 2011) and the importance of decision-makers being able to “see” the people their decisions affect (see Pezzullo, 2001). As there was controversy over University of Missouri students not allowing media access to their planning meetings and events, we discuss that particular issue by reviewing the history of how movements have been framed by media (Gitlin, 2003). Given that BLM was initiated in response to police violence with BLM demonstrations being confronted with militant policing, I am working with a criminal justice professor who has led community meetings about policing to talk to students about the protocols of police and protesters. Social media (by activists or participated in by “slacktivists”) is another place students have experience and that is part of BLM (such as with the Dream Defenders’ social media blackout), so we also address the debate of “clicktivism” and the uses of social media as its own tactic and in combination with direct action (see Penney & Dadas, 2014). The concluding project for the course is for students to pick their own movement action to describe the tactic, how/why activists chose it, and evaluate the function/effect of the tactic using what they have learned over the semester.

**Conclusions and Challenges**

Other scholars have demonstrated how they balance their work as activists and scholars both in the classroom and their lives outside of the academy (see Kahn & Lee, 2011), and I noted above where thinking like an organizer or rhetorical critic helps me navigate these with students from a variety of backgrounds and viewpoints. Class discussions will also be challenging in dealing with issues of race, class, and gender that students might not be accustomed to engaging with in other courses. It is a challenge, then, for both me and my students to check our biases, evaluate facts, and make our own assessments of the cases we analyze (see Verma, 2014 for more on engaging in pro-justice dialogues in the classroom). At times, this means we work from more abstract problematics (e.g., what are the interests of university administrations in general) before tackling more specific cases (e.g., so why did the President of the University of Missouri system not talk with students until after the football team threatened to not play?). Other times, it means for me to admit to my own privileges or misgivings to allow students to feel comfortable in expressing what might not be “popular” opinions. Not every class will be a “success” in terms of student discussion or engagement (or for students to appreciate movements in the same way I do), but I find these challenges productive in evaluating my strategies and working with students to find their potential in engaging with movements and their own advocacy. In this way, I learn as much from the interaction with my students as I hope they gain from the course as a whole.

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**Introduction to Activism: Rhetoric, Social Justice, and Professionally-Oriented Students**

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**Keywords**: Rhetoric, Social Justice, Activism

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**INTRODUCTION TO ACTIVISM: RHETORIC, SOCIAL JUSTICE, AND PROFESSIONALLY-ORIENTED STUDENTS**

**Abstract**

This article describes a general education social justice course taught at a professional university and suggests that combining student experience with a rhetorical framework makes the course attractive to students who may not initially self-identify as “activists.” At an institution where only 1% of students have “undeclared” majors (Philadelphia University Census Report, 2015), a professional orientation often supersedes the interdisciplinary work of activism: for many students, this course is a first-exposure to the interdisciplinary work of social justice. To address the importance of a professional orientation, students interact with a nonprofit of their choice that has relevance within their discipline. To build upon the rhetorically-grounded general education writing curriculum, students examine their experiences in their chosen nonprofits through the concepts of genre, discourse communities and intertextuality. Students also reflect on their learning via a general education e-portfolio system.

**Introduction**

Philadelphia University is a professionally-oriented university where, based on the latest Cooperative Institutional Research Program data, 88% of first-year students come to the institution to get training for a specific career and 79% report coming to PhilaU because "this college's graduates get good jobs" (Philadelphia University Census Report, 2015). Despite these jobs-focused numbers, general education faculty at our institution often anecdotally report that students are interested in issues of social justice, but may perceive volunteer commitment or campus activism as a distraction from their professional training. American Diversity 200: American Social Justice intends to help students connect social justice work to professional education.

American Social Justice expands offerings in the University’s new general education program. When faculty at Philadelphia University began the process of revising the general education curriculum in 2011, one of the challenges was to bridge the perceived divide between the majors and general education; faculty proposed teaching general education outcomes in both the majors and the core. To create the outcomes, faculty from across the University formed a subcommittee of the university education committee and began holding group brainstorming sessions designed to identify gaps in the current curriculum and identify opportunities for moving forward. In these sessions, faculty sketched, listed and debated what a professionally-oriented general education curriculum should look like; the results were eight outcomes that all programs across campus are now committed to teaching. The outcomes are confidence, collaboration, empathy, curiosity, initiative, contextual understanding, ethical reflection, and global perspectives (“Hallmarks Goal Descriptions”).

To engage students in their own learning and to help with transfer, students keep an electronic portfolio of their own work that identifies where and how they have met these outcomes. The American Social Justice course detailed here is mapped to the “confidence” outcome, which asks students to consider how to “challenge concepts, practices and experts with reasoning and evidence.” One way students in this course do that is by challenging their own, their peers’ and community (commonplace) assumptions about social justice and volunteering. One assumption tackled in the first iteration of this course was, “I am not an activist.” However, course readings’ (particularly *Grassroots*), analyses of professional organization websites, and discussion of university events helped students redefine activism. Building upon this new knowledge, one tacit goal of the course became to show students that social justice activism exists across the disciplines and that such activism provides meaningful ways for students to interact with and learn more about their future professions.

Course assignments progressively unpack the rhetorical context of students’ chosen nonprofits and ask students to consider how they fit into those contexts. It should be noted that students come to the course with some familiarity with the concept of discourse communities, as the general education writing sequence uses the popular textbook *Writing about Writing* to introduce writing in the professions. One advantage of naming Writing 101 as a prerequisite is that students are familiar with threshold concepts in writing, like “writing mediates activity” and “writing requires knowledge-making” (Wardle & Downs, 2014, vii). This familiarity allows students to do genre and discourse analysis of their nonprofits and then ultimately connect their findings to our social justice readings.

For example, the first essay asks students to define their activist identity: literally, “who are you as an activist”? In this essay, and at this point in the course readings, students are able to draw on Alinsky’s emerging assertion that activists must work within existing institutional frameworks in order to create change. They are also able to use John Swales’ concept of discourse communities to place themselves within the membership (or not) of the larger discourse community to which their nonprofit contributes. One particularly successful student essay, for example, argues that activists interested in joining discourse communities devoted to ending stigma surrounding mental illness must use their own testimony about mental health to gain membership to the group. The assignments for the second essay, including an annotated map for services, ask students to create a rhetorical analysis using one artifact from their organization’s communication. Another particularly successful student essay for this assignment analyzes signage at a no-kill animal shelter that asks volunteers to refrain from a long list of activities: entering without washing hands, touching the animals without warning, administering medication without asking the on-call veterinarian, etc. The signage contributes to an unsaid message of the organization, that “volunteers are helpful, but also a liability.” That finding provided fodder for the student to consider the rhetorical context of the organization: why are volunteers potentially a liability at a no-kill animal shelter? What does this tacit message say about the needs and demands of local no-kill shelters? These larger questions about the rhetorical context are the foundation for the third assignment, an essay that asks students to create an argument about why their organization exists.

The threshold concept in writing that “writing mediates activity” is a pathway into addressing the role of activism in students’ future professions. Exploring the rhetorical strategies of the nonprofit is one way for students to experience angles of their future professions that they may not have had the opportunity to consider before. The student working on signage in the no-kill animal shelter, for example, is an industrial design student with an interest in healthcare. Thinking about how communication mediates shelter activity allowed her to start thinking creatively about how designers can address the needs of those in distress.

**Logistics**

Because of the professional orientation of the institution, I wanted students to have an applied experience with the course content. Creating an applied experience developed in several ways:

* **Engagement requirement:** I required that students identify a nonprofit with which they would like to work, and complete a volunteer contract with the organization. Organizations did not have to be external to the institution; in fact, some of the most successful student projects centered on campus-based initiatives like the PhilaU Global Medical Brigades chapter and the Gender Resources Committee.

Having worked at a variety of nonprofits, I realize the need for consistent volunteers and the challenges brought on from requiring college students to fulfill a course requirement, often discontinuing their service after the course concludes. It is unfair to the nonprofits to ask students to contribute time and energy—especially if vulnerable clients are involved—only to leave abruptly at the end of the semester. Nonprofits do not operate on semester timetable. To accommodate for the potential disruption to the nonprofit, students were required to fill out a volunteer contract (10% of their final grade) with the nonprofit supervisor or volunteer coordinator; this contract was loosely structured around the requirements many nonprofits already have in place as a part of the volunteer orientation process. The contract asks for a start and end date to ensure transparency. While this process is imperfect, it at least forces a conversation about the students’ expectations so that both the student and the nonprofit can plan around any potential disruption to programming that the semester might inflict.

* **Reading requirement:** I wanted two perspectives on social justice that could highlight controversies over defining an activist. Saul Alinsky’s *Rules for Radicals* and Jennifer Baumgardner and Amy Richard’s *Grassroots: A Field Guide for Feminist Activism* accomplished these goals*.* Whereas the Alinsky book is familiar to many of us (it was a favourite of my parents, both educators), it has its problems: namely, it is written primarily for a white, male, middle-class audience. It also assumes that readers know what they want to change, that they have a “target” in mind. For an audience of students not convinced they could be activists, it was an aspirational choice. To compensate, I levelled Alinsky with *Grassroots: A Field Guide for Feminist Activism*. Baumgardner and Richards are accessible and argue, using their own personal experience and interviews with friends, that anyone can be an activist; the key to becoming an activist is recognizing and using the resources you already have. One critique of these choices is that both books are written from positions of privilege. Alinsky assumes the white privilege of his male audience, while Baumgardner and Richards often refer to resources that may be inaccessible to students who do not share their largely heteronormative, conventionally female orientation.

 **Observations and Reflections**

Two unexpected findings inform future iterations of this course:

* **Choice of nonprofits.** Students who are successful in the course have a meaningful experience with their nonprofit. Students who do not do well in the course tend to struggle finding a nonprofit, do not put in the effort to find one, or start the search process so late in the semester that they are not able to accommodate the organization’s timeline. For example, several students from the healthcare professions initially opted to volunteer at disease-specific organizations like the local chapter of the ALS Association. When they contacted the organization, they found that they did not fit the organization’s volunteer profile (certified medical professionals; volunteers over a certain age; volunteers with cars, etc.). This realization was an important one, and allowed the students to reconsider their own resources, a recommendation of *Grassroots*. Moving forward, I will require an earlier due date for the volunteer contract to help students plan more fully.

I am also struck by how less-meaningful volunteer activities negatively affect student participation in the course. Some students find professionally-relevant and meaningful volunteer opportunities that are impressive—for example, one student is still volunteering helping an ALS patient type up her memoirs—but others run out of time and, feeling pressed to volunteer to do *anything*, end up handing out juice boxes at the Red Cross blood drive on campus. While there is nothing inherently inappropriate about this activity, some students reported that this half-day experience did not hold the same weight as memoir transcription or commuting weekly to the animal shelter in Old City to care for abandoned animals. I fear that students who do not find meaningful opportunities leave the course affirmed in the belief that “being an activist is not for me.”

* **Unfamiliarity with campus units.** Students in this course are unfamiliar with the structure of the University and do not know who to ask for help should they want to make a change on campus. One day our class discussion veered toward the University of Missouri football team’s request for the University president to resign; during our conversation, I asked the students: “Why the president?” They responded, “He’s in charge.” I countered, “Of what?” “Of the whole university”—which spawned a discussion of what offices and positions are responsible for student life, academic affairs, student healthcare, university finances, etc. The lack of information about campus structure hinders students from taking action on issues that are important to them personally and professionally. To address this issue, future iterations of the course will include introductory reading from the literature on higher education about the structure of universities and an organizational chart of our own institution.

 **Conclusion**

As neoliberal education reform continues to push against the humanities and demands more skills-based education, faculty teaching in general education programs must create new ways of linking liberal education and professional training. In its recent survey of employers, the American Association of Colleges and Universities found that “employers place the greatest degree of importance” on ethics, as defined by “ethical judgment and integrity” and “intercultural skills,” as defined by “comfort working with colleagues, customers, and/or clients from diverse cultural backgrounds” (Hart, 2013, “Key Finding 4” para. 3). Introducing professionally-minded students to social justice concepts is one way of training students for the innovation and intercultural skills they will need to be successful.

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**Appendix: Course Documents**

American Diversity 200: American Social Justice

Syllabus

Welcome to American Social Justice! This course will introduce you to the volunteering and nonprofit world: what nonprofits are, how they work, what you can do to get involved in a nonprofit of your choice, and, most importantly, what the social and cultural structures are that necessitate philanthropy. While this course is not a writing course, it is informed by the theories of language and power that investigate why inequity happens and what we can do about it.

**Course Description:**

This course examines pervasive issues of difference and inequality in the U.S. through the lens of social service and nonprofit organizations. Students will learn about major American social movements as well as what cultural values cause these movements and seek to remedy them (and how), and research a social justice cause of their choosing. Students will apply course concepts by volunteering at a social justice nonprofit; students should expect to contribute out-of-class time to developing a relationship with this organization. Transportation is not necessary.

**Learning Outcomes:**

* Identify major movements and theories in American social justice and critique these movements using theoretical perspectives from class readings and first-hand experience from the service requirement.
* Develop claims about the role service and volunteering play in pervasive social justice issues in American culture.
* Identify the sociocultural and political dynamics of the U.S. that push social justice organizations into existence and identify the role(s) race, class, and religion play in the formation of social justice organizations.
* Articulate and reflect on the cultural and power dynamics inherent in social justice service.
* Apply research and information literacy skills to understand the context of a social justice organization and its impact on the community.

**Assignments and Grading**

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
| Assignment | Points | Percentage |
| Essay 1/ “Portrait of an Activist”: Who am I as an activist? Why do I want to make a difference? What issue(s) are important to me and why? | 100 points | 10% |
| Annotated map of potential volunteer sites  | 50 points | 5% |
| Essay 2: Profile of your organization  | 150 points |  15% |
| Volunteer contract* Made in consultation with the volunteer coordinator at corresponding organization
* Must have volunteer coordinator signature
 | 100 points | 10% |
| Essay 3/ Contextual Essay 3: Analysis of your organization: what cultural, economic factors have contributed to the organization’s formation? | 200 points | 20% |
| Hallmarks reflection | 100 points | 10% |
| Participation | 100 points | 10% |
| Informal Writing Projects | 200 points | 20% |
| **Total** | **1,000 points** | **100%** |

**Required texts:**

Baumgardner, Jennifer and Amy Richards. *Grassroots: A Field Guide to Feminist Activism*. New

York: FSG Books, 2005. Print.

Alinsky, Saul. *Rules for Radicals*: *A Pragmatic Primer for Realistic Radicals.* 2nd ed. New York:

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*Writing about Writing: A College Reader*. 2nd ed. Eds. Elizabeth Wardle and Doug Downs. Boston: Bedford/St. Martin’s, 2014. Print.

**Class Schedule**

**Unit 1: Who Does Activism?**

*Do you consider yourself an activist? Who gets to be an activist, and why?*

Week 1

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
| *Date* | *Class topic* | *Items Due* |
|  | What do you know about social justice? Why are you interested in this class? What do you hope to take away from this class? Develop a working definition of “social justice.” |  |
|  | Introduction to rhetoric and social movement rhetoric; syllabus quiz; introduction to Essay 1 | Prologue + Introduction, *Grassroots*; Prologue from *Rules for Radicals.*  |

Week 2

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
| *Date* | *Class topic* | *Items Due* |
|  | Alinsky discussion; start work on Essay 1 | “The Purpose,” *Rules for Radicals*. Post at least 3 potential volunteer sites to BlackBoard, along with a justification for why you are interested in them.  |
|  | How do social movements gain speed | John Swales, “The Idea of a Discourse Community” (WAW) |

Week 3

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
| *Date* | *Class topic* | *Items Due* |
|   | Who gets to be an activist? Workshop of Essay 1 (focusing on what the “systems” are in your area of choice) | “Rebels with Causes” and “The Real World,” from *Grassroots*; **post draft of Essay 1** |
|  | What is a nonprofit and how does it work?  | “Key Facts on U.S. Foundations,” The Foundation Center (foundationcenter.org) |

Week 4

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
| *Date* | *Class topic* | *Items Due* |
|  | Special Topic Example: Youth Development/ Mentoring. Class visit from Executive Director of Gearing Up: Moving in the Right Direction  | Read Gearing Up materials: *Braking Cycles* trailer:<https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=7pP1VMhOLUo>andGearing Up 2014 Community Report <http://www.gearing-up.org/images/346_Gearing-Up_Brochure_WebPDF_OPT.pdf> |
|  | Writing Workshop | **Draft 2 of Essay 1 due to Bb** |

Week 5

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
| *Date* | *Class topic* | *Items Due* |
|  | Special Topic: Access to Food | “This is what happened when I drove my Mercedes to pick up food stamps”:<https://www.washingtonpost.com/posteverything/wp/2014/07/08/this-is-what-happened-when-i-drove-my-mercedes-to-pick-up-food-stamps/> |
|  | Special Topic: open forum/ based on class interest |  |

**Unit Two: Profile of an Organization**

*In this unit, you will make contact with a social justice organization of your choice and become a registered volunteer.*

Week 6

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
| *Date* | *Class topic* | *Items Due* |
|  | Introduction to Essay 2; library session on local resources.  | **Essay 1 due** |
|  | Framing difference and inequality | Alinsky, “Of Means and Ends” |

Week 7

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
| *Date* | *Class topic* | *Items Due* |
|  | Theorizing the role of the outsider, Part I | **Annotated map of service sites due** |
|  | Theorizing the role of the outsider, Part II | James Porter, “Intertextuality and the Discourse Community” (WAW) |

Week 8

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
| *Date* | *Class topic* | *Items Due* |
|  | Responsibilities of the Volunteer | “The Activist at Work,” from *Grassroots* |
|  | Managing and Using Volunteers: Challenges and Opportunities | “Philanthropy Chat: Aaron Hurst on Corporate Pro Bono Services.” Podcast via The Foundation Center |

Week 9

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
| *Date* | *Class topic* | *Items Due*  |
|  | Debrief of service work | You must have visited your service site by this date. **Volunteer contract due.** |
|  | Writing Workshop | “A Word About Words,” *Rules for Radicals* |

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
| *Date* | *Class topic* | *Items Due* |
|  | Workshop |  “The Education of An Organizer,” **draft of Essay 2 due** |
|  | Continue review of key concepts from readings |  “Communication” and “In the Beginning,” *Rules for Radicals***Essay 2 due** |

**Unit Three: Situating Your Organization**

*What key differences and inequalities have prompted the creation of your organization?*

Week 10

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
| *Date* | *Class topic* | *Items Due* |
|  | Introduction to Essay 3; The idea of sponsorship | Brandt, “Sponsors of Literacy” (WAW) |
|  | Who has agency to make change? |  “Tactics,” *Rules for Radicals* |

Week 11

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
| *Date* | *Class topic* | *Items Due* |
|  | Applying Alinsky’s rules from “Tactics,” continued | Choose one social movement from class discussion and argue if it has been successful or not, using Alinsky’s rules from “Tactics.” This short essay should be about 500 words (you may not address all of his rules or all aspects of the campaign).  |
|  | Who has the power to speak? | Villanueva, from *Bootstraps* (WAW) |

Week 12

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
| *Date* | *Class topic* | *Items Due* |
|  | New directions for research in social movements/ writing workshop | Kain and Wardle, “Activity Theory” (WAW) |
|  | Identifying moments of fundamentalist rhetoric/ writing workshop | From Sharon Crowley,*Toward A Civil Discourse: Rhetoric and Fundamentalism* |

Week 13

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
| *Date* | *Class topic* | *Items Due* |
|  | Writing workshop | **Post draft of Essay 3 to Bb** |

**Unit 4: Reflection**

Week 14

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
| *Date* | *Class topic* | *Items Due* |
|  | Introduction to Hallmarks reflection | **Essay 3 due** and “The Way Ahead,” Alinsky  |
|  | Preparation for Hallmarks reflection | “Epilogue” from *Grassroots* |

Hallmarks reflection due during the final exam period.

Essay 1: Portrait of an Activist

In the Introduction to *Grassroots: A Field Guide for Feminist Activists*, Winona LaDuke argues that “our most personal lives—even the intimacy of death—are actually embroidered in the reality of public policy, foreign policy, military aid, and economics” (xv). In *Rules for Radicals*, Saul Alinsky argues that [I]t is necessary to begin where the world is if we are going to change it to what we think it should be. That means working in the system” (xix).

In this essay, please answer the question, “who am I as an activist?” by identifying the area(s) of interest you are most committed to and why, as well as the systems in which you participate to fulfill your commitment. You may also choose to address whether or not Alinsky’s idea of working “within the system” is helpful for your particular area of interest.

To make your argument, you will need to draw on roughly 3-4 sources, most of which are provided in this course:

* Your own experience
* *Rules for Radicals* and/or *Grassroots* and/or a source from *Writing About Writing*
* 1-2 credible sources from your area of interest (e.g. webtext from a nonprofit of your choice) or about your area of interest (e.g. access to healthcare, arts education, mental health awareness, etc.)

Essay 2: Profile of an Organization

For this assignment, you will use our readings and the rhetorical framework from class to create an original argument about your chosen organization’s purpose, audience and context. To make your argument, you will need to cite as evidence:

* Your Annotated Map of Service Sites (or information gleaned from this process)
* A text from your nonprofit (a pamphlet, volunteer instruction sheet, mission statement, “about us” webpage, etc.): this artifact should be short so you can analyze the entire piece of communication.
* Your own lived experience with your organization: this may be your own volunteering experience, your experience at the volunteer orientation, or any other interaction with your site.

OPTIONAL (only if it advances your argument):

* 1-2 course texts (*Grassroots, Rules for Radicals,* and/or anything from *Writing about Writing)*

Do not let the short citation list fool you: this essay is an original argument about the rhetorical appeals used by your organization. Your own analysis takes center stage. As such, you will want to address the:

* message of your organization (as evidenced by a text/artifact)
* author of the message/text
* purpose of the text/message
* audience for the message
* setting for the message

You will synthesize all of these “clues” to create your argument.

Essay 3: Context of an Organization

In “Sponsors of Literacy,” Deborah Brandt argues that literacy is delivered by agents (institutions, ideologies, actors) who “enable” and also “withhold” literate practices (46). In this essay, you will argue how the rhetorical context surrounding your organization has contributed to your organization’s current state. Another way to think of this is, what cultural or economic factors have contributed to the organization’s formation? Basically, why does your organization exist?

For this essay, you will need to use the following sources:

* A theoretical framework from class (any text from *Writing about Writing, Rules for Radicals, Grassroots)*
* At least one artifact from your organization
* Your own lived experience from inside the organization
* At least one professional or scholarly source that addresses the rhetorical context of your organization
	+ (e.g. journal article from *Journal of Counseling and Development* arguing that college campuses don’t offer enough on-site mental health services 🡪 provides reason for the proliferation of ad-hoc, informal mental health awareness organizations like Active Minds)

You may think of this argument as an evolved, extended, or matured version of your Essay 2, where you profiled your organization through rhetorical analysis. While Essay 2 asked you to identify and argue for your organization’s message, Essay 3 asks you to identify why that message exists.

**Example:** In Essay 2, Robert argues that PUMP UP volunteers experiment with innovative teaching methods in underserved elementary schools. Essay 3 would explore WHY innovative teaching methods are needed in underserved schools and/or why innovative teaching methods are not already present in underserved schools.

Annotated Map of Service Sites

By now, you have either chosen or are deep in the process of choosing a nonprofit with which to be affiliated. Learning about the landscape that surrounds your nonprofit—geographic, rhetorical, financial—can help you understand more about how and why your nonprofit functions as it does.

For this assignment, you will create a Google Map that identifies competing, cooperating, and/or similar organizations to your own chosen nonprofit. Each pin will be annotated and you will write a brief report that details your findings.

The annotations should (1) summarize the organization (with your own interests in mind), (2) assess its strengths and weaknesses, and (3) reflect on its relationship to “your” nonprofit, you, or your greater cause. The report should tell the class what you learned from the mapping process. As is the case with all academic writing, the report should have an argument/thesis of its own.

You may choose to define “similar organizations” as organizations that share the same/similar client populations (i.e. incarcerated women), organizations that have similar structures (programs that only offer drop-in programs), and/or nonprofits that share a major funding source (i.e. The City of Philadelphia). Though to be transparent—most of you will likely choose the first option, here: organizations that share the same/similar client populations.

**Sample Process**

1. Go to “My Google Maps” and place a pin for the nonprofit you’ll be working with.
2. Identify how you want to categorize your nonprofit. When I used Gearing Up as an example, I searched for “sports” volunteer opportunities. This yielded a very different map than if I would have chosen “addiction” or “criminal justice.”
3. Use volunteermatch.com and basic Google searching to identify other services that are similar to your own organization; pin them. Write annotations as you go and keep notes for the report at the end.
4. Write up the report: one thing I learned from searching around about Gearing Up, for example, is that adult women are nearly invisible as clients in sports service category (let alone incarcerated women, or women who struggle with addictions).

Volunteer Contract

This contract is a document that explains the basic details of your volunteer experience with your chosen organization. Each contract may vary in form, as many organizations use a volunteer release form, volunteer intake form, or volunteer interest form as an entry point for all volunteers.

At the very least, your volunteer contract should include:

* The name, location, and contact information (phone number, webpage, and email) of your organization and/or one representative of your organization
* The duties of volunteers at this organization and/or the duties you assign to yourself as a part of this organization; the “scope of work”
* A time frame and location for volunteer duties to be performed

If creating a volunteer contract is inappropriate for your organization or volunteering situation, you can also forward me a screen shot of an email or other communication that relays the above information. Please discuss this option with me if you think it applies to you.

This contract is worth 10% of your course grade. While the contract itself is not onerous to complete, the ability for you to complete it signals that you are indeed engaging in meaningful contact with a nonprofit organization of your choice.

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**Book Review: Autesserre, S. (2014). *Peaceland: Conflict resolution and the everyday***

***politics of international intervention*. New York, NY: Cambridge University Press.**

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**BOOK REVIEW: AUTESSERRE, S. (2014). *PEACELAND: CONFLICT RESOLUTION***

***AND THE EVERYDAY POLITICS OF INTERNATIONAL INTERVENTION*. NEW**

**YORK, NY: CAMBRIDGE UNIVERSITY PRESS.**

**Abstract**

This book review examines the arguments made by peace practitioner and scholar Séverine Autesserre in her 2014 book *Peaceland: Conflict Resolution and the Everyday Politics of International Intervention*. Utilizing an ethnographic approach based on her vast experience in the field and academic research in political science and international affairs, Autesserre points out that what conflict resolution needs is a change in the way interveners function on a daily basis. She argues that the failure of peacebuilding efforts is neither theoretical nor abstract, but comes down to the “everyday” practices, habits, and narratives of the peacebuilders themselves. In light of the author’s well-researched critique and legible presentation of her arguments, this book is a valuable contribution to the field of peace research.

**Introduction**

Séverine Autesserre paints an excellent picture of the current state of international interventions in conflict situations in her 2014 book *Peaceland: Conflict Resolution and the Everyday Politics of International Intervention*. Utilizing an ethnographic approach based on her vast experience in the field and academic research in political science and international affairs, she points out that what conflict resolution needs is a change in the way interveners function on a daily basis. Rather than the all-too-common scathing critique of the liberal peace model, Autesserre argues that the failure of peacebuilding efforts is neither theoretical nor abstract. Instead, it comes down to the “everyday” practices, habits, and narratives of the peacebuilders themselves that get in the way of sustainable peace. The author provides several feasible recommendations in the conclusion that help readers envision a way that peacebuilding operations can be reformed from the ground up, in order to increase the effectiveness of operations and sustainability of the subsequent peace.

Autesserre uses an ethnographic approach to provide support for her argument that “mundane elements – such as the expatriates’ social habits, standard security procedures, and habitual approaches to collecting information on violence – strongly impact the effectiveness of intervention efforts” (Autesserre, 2014, p. 9). She draws upon experience and connections made as an employee of various development and humanitarian aid agencies, as well as her time as an academic researcher in places such as Afghanistan, Kosovo, and especially, the Democratic Republic of Congo. As a political scientist, she specializes in international relations and African studies, although she includes peacebuilding and peacekeeping in her repertoire as well. This is important, as it shows she has had access to many other scholars in the discipline of conflict resolution, in addition to drawing upon her own experiences in conflict zones and the experiences of those she has met. This is shown in the vast spread of interviews cited in the book, from fellow interveners, representatives from major organizations such as the United Nations, and those most affected by conflicts -- the locals. This ethnographic method is well-suited for the research, which is directed towards examining the day-to-day operations and inner workings of peace operations conducted by external interveners. It allows her to obtain a nuanced view of a culture, in this case the culture of “Peaceland,” as one who is also part of that culture. Autesserre has done this with a great deal of reflexivity as a researcher, attempting to be as objective as possible despite her close proximity to the subjects of the study.

Autesserre argues that the ineffectiveness of peacebuilding operations is explained by the counterproductive “practices, habits, and narratives that shape international efforts on the ground” (Autesserre, 2014, p. 3). These things are not always deliberate actions undertaken by peacebuilders and are not the result of peacebuilders’ wishes to undermine the peace process. Rather, they are ingrained and standard modes of operation, shaped by the culture of the intervention community Autesserre calls “Peaceland.” It is “Peaceland’s” separation from the reality of peacebuilding that enable such counterproductive practices to continue, despite their detrimental effect on peace. For example, Autesserre discusses the “politics of knowledge” and how the debate over which types of knowledge are most important has negative consequences for a peace operation (Autesserre, 2014, p. 69). The first type is what Autesserre calls “local knowledge,” which is specific knowledge about the country or village in which the conflict is taking place, as well as an in-depth understanding of the historical and political context. This understanding of the conflict environment is typically relegated to a lower status, relative to the second type of knowledge she refers to as “thematic knowledge.” This latter type is the technical expertise centered on understanding the mechanisms of intervention, including conflict resolution, provision of humanitarian aid, as well as other things that may be relevant in a conflict situation, such as project management (Autesserre, 2014, p. 69).

The result of the premium placed on technical knowledge is that interveners are not properly equipped to assess a situation or understand the underlying dynamics of a conflict, which inhibits them in designing and implementing a conflict strategy that will be effective (Autesserre, 2014, p. 80). Further, viewing the conflict as “a set of technical problems to be solved by experts” often leads interveners to adopt templates that have been used in other conflict situations, despite the lack of similarities in the contexts between the two conflicts. Worse yet, Autesserre states that many of her contacts resented the emphasis placed on technical knowledge, as it led peacebuilders to ignore local input from those who had valuable context-specific knowledge to offer to the program. This local resentment is detrimental to the success of peacebuilding because it can lead to “evasion, contestation, and resistance” of the peace efforts (Autesserre, 2014, p. 95). In addition, it makes the collection of data a somewhat futile exercise, as interveners are altogether looking in the wrong places for the wrong information.

Autesserre calls attention to another interesting aspect of the daily workings of peacebuilders that is harmful to peace outcomes, which is the adherence to “dominant narratives” of peacebuilding generally, as well as that of the particular conflict situation. The first refers to the “‘here to help’ narrative” which paints a picture of the interveners as the altruistic saviors of the local people who lack the capacity to save themselves (Autesserre, 2014, p. 197). The author does acknowledge that “most of them [interveners] genuinely try to end violence and work hard to improve local situations [and] are usually well-meaning individuals who have devoted their lives to combating injustice, violence, and poverty” (Autesserre, 2014, p. 5). However, this dedication loses much of its value when interveners unwittingly hold themselves above the locals and do not respect the latter’s ideas or wishes. This discrepancy even exists, the author finds, between international peacebuilders and their local counterparts, which is the second component of the dominant narrative—that locals are unable to help themselves. While foreign expatriates tout their own altruism and the sacrifices they make for the conflict-afflicted, they ascribe ambivalent or even nefarious motives to the members of local peace agencies (Autesserre, 2014, p. 97). Further, the locals are seen as *incapable* of helping themselves, as international interveners do not respect the type of knowledge or systems that the locals possess that could contribute to the peace process. Again, this is harmful because it creates a feeling, and subsequent behavior, of superiority amongst the international intervention community that separates it from those they are trying to help. They are also reliant upon narratives to explain the conflict situation, as we have already determined they often lack the country-specific knowledge needed to understand the context in which they are working. As Autesserre and many other scholars, such as John Paul Lederach and Roger MacGinty, in conflict studies note, local ownership is a crucial component for the success of sustainability. This dominant narrative of “here to help” and its failure to acknowledge the value of locals’ capacity to help themselves precludes any opportunity for local ownership and thus, for sustainable peace. The interviews with interveners, both local and international, as well as laymen, provide compelling evidence of this in the field.

Autesserre discusses other aspects of the everyday behavior and actions of peacebuilders that inhibit the creation of sustainably peaceful societies in former conflict zones. The boundaries created between “Peaceland” and the locals, whether created intentionally or otherwise, do exist and serve to marginalize the locals and inhibit relationship-building between the two groups. This is especially true for highly-securitized conflict zones, in which interveners are forced to endure “bunkerization” in order to protect themselves. Autesserre posits that this actually makes peacebuilders more likely to be harmed, as they do not forge meaningful relationships with the locals who could have relevant information to keep them safe (Autesserre, 2014, pp.185, 218, 230). All of these, as well as the informal habits that interveners have of only associating with each other and working only with state actors or agencies further decreases the effectiveness of their efforts by depriving them of more thorough and nuanced information and creating local resentment.

As important as all of these critiques made by Autesserre are, the most significant contribution made by her 2014 book comes in the conclusion. Here Autesserre offers her concrete suggestions that help the reader to see that changes are not, in fact, impossible and that the current structural problems with intervention can be remedied. She states that there are already those peacebuilders who challenge the standard modes of operation and attempt to have stronger ties with the locals, to increase the efficacy of data collection and respect for local knowledge and country-specific expertise, and to eliminate actions that can come across as arrogant and to elevate the locals as their equals in the peace process (Autesserre, 2014, p. 251). Autesserre stresses that other peacebuilders should emulate these “challengers” rather than perpetuate the status quo. She argues for the need to do away with donor-driven or top-down peace strategies, as studies have proven that they are less effective than grassroots approaches. Top-down changes are also needed, however, in the realm of rules and policies that are handed down from international organizations to the peacebuilders in the field. Additionally, changes are needed in the ways recruitment and promotion favor technical expertise over local knowledge and place the most emphasis on the foreign expatriates, relegating the locals to a lesser role (Autesserre, 2014, p. 262). In short, Autesserre recommends a complete overhaul of the way international interveners go about doing their work in the field. Her solution of more local inclusion and ownership is not a new suggestion. Her stress upon the importance of forging local relationships, rather than staying neutral or impartial, is rather novel, however, and deserves more attention in the discipline.

Not only does Autesserre offer useful and practical ideas for reform in conflict intervention, but her text also provides a valuable contribution to the available peacebuilding literature. Rather than criticizing broad theories of intervention, she engages some of the issues in praxis that do not face enough scrutiny in the scholarship. This is useful for scholars, as well as practitioners, because it presents a new lens with which to view the field and a novel way of conceptualizing important aspects of peacebuilding. This practical approach provides a welcome relief from the often-abstract discussions of peacebuilding in the existing literature. It is an exemplary addition to critical scholarship that does not merely focus on critiques of the liberal peace.

In conclusion, Autesserre’s 2014 book *Peaceland* provides an ethnographic study and critique of the current state of peacebuilding. The argument is based on the notion that the everyday and seemingly mundane actually matter a great deal on the ground in conflict situations. The standard practices, habits, and narratives that are dominant in the international intervention community, known as “Peaceland,” are the factors that prevent the achievement of sustainable peace. The evidence is derived from extensive interviews conducted by the author, as well as her own personal experience as a researcher and practitioner of international intervention and peacebuilding. The method provides a unique and nuanced understanding of the topic at hand. Further, it is presented by the author in a way that is both interesting and legible for all readers, including those that are not from the conflict studies discipline or are new to the field.

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**Book Review: Miller, K. D. (2012). *Martin Luther King’s Biblical Epic: His Final, Great Speech*. Jackson, MS: University of Mississippi Press.**

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**Keywords**: Civil Rights, Speech, Martin Luther King, Jr.

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**BOOK REVIEW: MILLER, K. D. (2012). *MARTIN LUTHER KING’S BIBLICAL EPIC: HIS FINAL, GREAT SPEECH*. JACKSON, MS: UNIVERSITY OF MISSISSIPPI PRESS.**

**Abstract**

This book review examines the rhetorical moves made by the author as he details the context and significance of one of Martin Luther King’s most famous speeches. It moves beyond the content of the speech to identify the biographical and spiritual/philosophical factors contributing to the speech’s effectiveness as well as the book’s contribution to Biblical hermeneutics and studies in rhetoric.

**Introduction**

In *Martin Luther King’s* *Biblical Epic: His Final Great Speech*, Keith D. Miller captures the essence of the national mood of the U.S., the local civic temperament of Memphis, the ominous threat of the weather, and the speech itself entitled “I’ve Been to the Mountaintop” (1968). In eight concise chapters, the author demonstrates the careful craftiness of the speech itself, along with the irony in its location of the historic Mason Temple Church of God in Christ which occurred at the eve of his death. Miller addresses the fact that the construction of Mason Temple itself made the historic speech possible, because it was the only “black owned and operated” facility in Memphis that could host an event for an audience of roughly three thousand while indoors. A greater irony of the host church rests in the idea that Pentecostalism as a whole has an “other-worldly” focus as the building construction occurred during the Great Depression, which required great economic sacrifices from an impoverished community. Nevertheless, the construction of the church including its elaborate design symbolizes the reality of impoverishment that individuals have in isolation. However, the church functions as a public display of African Americans’ collective strength. Fifty years later the same church served a more “this-worldly” purpose as a means of institutional support for the sanitation worker’s strike, economic justice as a base for the Poor People’s Campaign, and a reception of King whose public support had drastically diminished within the last five years of his life.

In the beginning of the text, Miller reorients the reader to the rhetorical context of the speech as during the aftermath of persistence in delayed economic justice among large sectors of society, the demise of the Civil Rights Movement, the emerging prominence of black militancy, the organizational stage of The Poor People’s Campaign, the aftermath of a series of urban riots, the Vietnam War, organized labor including exploited sanitation workers, and the pervasive infiltration of intruders in peaceful nonviolent demonstrations. Rather than providing an explicit statement regarding the book’s theme, the author references major current events and a description of King’s escalated anxiety in order to imply the theme that “hope is difficult to achieve, but once it is achieved indeed it becomes easy to shatter.”

This book also functions as a partial biographical account of King. Although the book’s main focus centers on an overall analysis of his final speech, the author portrays King as radical, ideologically further to the left than the typical self-proclaimed progressive of the day. For several decades following King’s death, the “radical” part of King has been truncated from his national narrative.

The book does not intend to function as a commentary or verse-by-verse analysis of King’s final speech. Instead, Miller provides a narrative of how the speech and its context occurred at a pivotal crossroad in the greater American story. Beyond mere polarizations between the progressive left and the ultraconservative right, the aftermath of multiple urban riots, the midst of various other social movements such as women’s rights, anti-war protests, the Black Panthers, cold war politics, the middle of the primary season of the first election since the Voting Rights Act of 1965, King embodied the tension of the multi-polarization of America during his final moments. The narration demonstrates how King utilized a distinct type of prophetic voice known as the “African American Jeremiad” (term coined by David Howard-Pitney). The basic elements of such a tradition includes the declaration of promise, failure, and fulfillment and it traces its roots back to abolitionist Frederick Douglass with respect to his commitment to “American civil religion” through his verbal rebuke of America for its sin of slavery. Both King and Douglass make frequent appeals to Biblical scripture as authoritative and sacred documents of “American civil religion” such as the U.S. Constitution (1787).

Because the Civil Rights Movement began and ended with the shed of blood, Miller emphasized that King’s final speech transcended agitation but occurred within the context of sacrifice. Although King’s assassination functions as an official ending of the Civil Rights Movement era, the movement began with Mamie Till-Mobley’s murdered son Emmett. The Civil Rights Movement’s earlier years occurred during the post-World War II era in which the proliferation of Max Weber’s concept of the “iron cage” of rationalization became deeply embedded into the fabric of American culture.

A significant feature of *Martin Luther King’s Biblical Epic* rests in its ability to expose the source of the passion behind “Mountaintop Speech” ranging from the tumultuous weather, the shortcomings of the Civil Rights Movement, backlash from the political right and left, in addition to federal orders prohibiting King from holding demonstrations. Furthermore, Miller acknowledged that King’s final speech was without notes and at the spur of the moment--King had no intention to speak that evening, but rather to delegate the platform to Ralph Abernathy.

At the heart of the speech, “not only does King connect African anti-colonialism to American civil rights, he also aligns these popular struggles with the Exodus, Reformation, and Emancipation Proclamation” (p. 77). In the same tradition as his prior speeches and sermons, King uses the rhetoric of American civil religion in order to diagnose the nation as immersed in domestic and global sickness, call for national repentance from its transgressions, and a proclamation that the choice entails an urgent response or face the consequence of doom:

The conclusion of King’s final speech thus, in part, fulfills the climax of the ‘I Have a Dream’ refrain in “I Have a Dream.’ In 1968, King witnesses that he has finally seen what in ‘I Have a Dream,’ he proclaimed that all people would see in the future. Thus, what was distant in 1963 is now closer and, King testifies, has partly arrived. (pp. 156-157)

Part of the mystique in the final statements of his final speech lies in the idea that as a preacher in the “black church” the expectation among the congregation entails the creation of a moment of celebration with the “Good News.” One of the requisites for such a climax consists of providing the sobering harsh reality of the present condition because the masses need to know that their suffering does not exist in isolation, but rather is shared by many. Furthermore, the proclamation of the unfavorable aspects of the human condition provides the backdrop for “good news” but also the means to better appreciate that which can be regarded as good. Ultimately, the goal of the celebratory moment consists of the following: provide hope, assurance, and a reason to act with perseverance. As Miller explains, “One could argue that the purpose of many African American sermons is to transport church goers beyond their ordinary consciousness” (p. 106). Miller draws directly from the “I’ve Been to the Mountaintop” speech to address the idea that despite the sense of collective disappointment from rising expectations, King reassures the audience that although the racial and economic justice in America had not been realized in its fullest sense, America has made significant progress such that the fulfillment of “the Dream” has become conceivably real and at the horizon.

Nevertheless, King “says nothing at all about what the promised land looks like. He simply states that God allowed him to behold it” (p. 135). King leaves the metaphor “promised land” open for interpretation which allows inclusivity rather than dissent. The target audience contains persons with diverse ideological beliefs and understandings of the final ideal state of existence.

The conclusion of the text focuses on the relationship between Biblical hermeneutics, which entails interpretation in light of linguistic, literary, and redaction criticism, racial protests, and eschatological themes. Oppression and empathy for the oppressed provokes protest, yet protest frequently accompanies harsh consequences ranging from shaming, incarceration, physical harm, and death. Although, racial protest to some extent has been mythologized by revisionists, the harsh reality of mental and physical endurance required of racial protesters tends to become lost. Nevertheless, such experiences shape perspectives and provide a unique reference point for understanding Biblical narratives.

*Martin Luther King’s Biblical Epic* would interest scholars within the disciplines of African American studies, the Bible as literature, and contemporary rhetoric. With respect to African American studies, the book integrates Black grassroots politics, a critical point in African American history, with drama. In terms of literature, the text functions as an interdisciplinary book on African American Biblical Hermeneutics, because it demonstrates how biblical accounts provide function as testaments to the collective African Diasporic experience in America; almost along the tradition of scholars such as Randall Bailey, Stephen Breck Reid, and Cain Hope Felder, except Miller’s academic training was in English literature and rhetoric rather than religious studies. The book’s greatest strength rests in the author’s presentation of King’s thorough integration of the five major cannons of rhetorical theory which include invention, arrangement, style, memory, and delivery within the context of constructing the narrative of how the final speech served as a national benediction to the close the Civil Rights Movement Era. Miller captures how King uses the art of persuasion to instill optimism among those who on the brink of hopelessness. Relative to the book’s genre, the book contains no weakness in terms of content, structure, and rhetorical analysis.

Readers must approach the book as one focused primarily on King’s way with words at a singular and moment of heightened tension. Historians would find the book fascinating because 1968 functions as a climatic year not only in the U.S. but the world. April 3 and 4 of 1968 signified the close of an old era, and the ushering in of an era in which a glimpse of King’s vision from the “mountaintop” in metaphorical terms becomes increasingly possible though not realized. During the same year, the U.S. experienced urban uprisings and riots, the assassination of Robert Kennedy, and a collective paradigm shift from modernity to post-modernity. Ultimately, the text exemplifies the complexities of rhetoric, communication theory and the role that social and political context plays in the construction of the meaning of any public speech--“In King’s argument, until the final curtain drops, all human experience is contained within the arc of the biblical narrative” (p. 171).