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Special Issue:

Courageous Peace:
Exploring Innovative, Diverse, and Inclusive Efforts in Peace, Social Justice and Conflict Studies

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INTRODUCTION

As we worked to compile this special edition, we saw the U.S and some of its allies send troops to Syria to “degrade and dismantle the violent incursion of the ‘Islamic State...” (Statement by the President..., 2014, para. 1), brought upon on an America already invasion-weary from Iraq and Afghanistan. Obama presides over an increasingly militarized society. The authorization of drone attacks on Pakistan and other countries in the Middle East makes the Nobel Peace Prize winner surpass his predecessor George W. Bush in terms of the number of countries he has bombed. In addition, almost 20,000 minors crossed into the U.S. alone, mostly fleeing violence in their home countries. Domestically, we saw police continue to abuse their authority, with an officer shooting an unarmed black man, Michael Brown, in Ferguson, Missouri, prompting strong reactions that brought police violence in the U.S. to the forefront of global discourse. As well, police have killed unarmed Kejieme Powell in St. Louis, Eric Garner and Akai Gurley in New York, John Crawford and Tamir Rice in Ohio, Rekia Boyd in Chicago, Ill, Duanna Johnson in Memphis (beaten to death in police custody), seven year old Aiyana Stanley-Jones in Detroit, Michigan, and the list continues to grow. Also in Detroit, the city bankruptcy, water shutoffs by the city, and land and housing grab fueled by a colonialist settler mentality has disenfranchised residents who already have very little
human security. The National Football League (NFL) maintained weeks of media attention about its failure to contain player violence against women and children. The state of Oklahoma, using a new three-drug cocktail, botched the execution of an inmate yet other death penalty states continued executions regardless. We learned that at least 60 colleges and universities are being investigated by the U.S. Department of Education for their inadequate responses to campus sexual violence. These and many other holistically linked incidents and issues clearly warrant the serious attention of peacemakers.

As active members and representatives of the Board of Directors of the Peace and Justice Studies Association (PJSA) we are so pleased to have been given the opportunity to edit this special issue of the Peace Studies Journal. Given the many forms of violence that people across the globe continue to endure on a daily basis, it can be easy to forget that there are also many amazing individuals and organizations steadfastly working to create peace. This issue is intended to delve into the structural issues, while celebrating and encouraging those courageous, dedicated, and necessary and innovative efforts.

Just as curtailing violence and building peace requires a multi-faceted, collaborative approach, this special edition features manuscripts and reviews from scholars from a number of disciplinary areas and activists with diverse backgrounds. Similarly, just as peacemaking and peacebuilding require both personal and collective commitments, this edition highlights the work of courageous individuals and of institutions that are doing innovative work.

Danielle Davis’ review of Black Women in Leadership notes the important contribution of black females. Often minimized or presumed to be simple accompaniment to black male leaderships, Davis shows how the book highlights the many unique historical and current contributions of black females in terms of civil rights, human rights, and peacemaking. Davis, and the book she reviews, calls on peacemakers and peace educators to think beyond Rosa Parks and to study these amazing women as well as the social, political, familial and other factors that gave rise to their courageous actions. This review acknowledges the importance of resituating the struggle of People of Color and Black women in particular, firmly at the urgent attention of peace studies. Regis Tremblay, a documentary filmmaker, focuses on the strength and solidarity of farmers and fisherman who have used nonviolent tactics to counter the environmental damage being done by a massive naval base. Ghosts of Jejú reveals the adversity and resilience faced by ordinary people who challenge the right of corporations and governments to impinge on their environmental security.

J. David Berggren, Christopher Hrynkw, and Ruth Tallman all shine a light on innovative individualspeacemakers as well. Berggren focuses on former president Jimmy Carter’s human rights and peacemaking initiatives, documenting how Carter’s work as president and his ongoing efforts are the result of his deep spiritual beliefs. He suggests that subsequent presidents can learn from the ways that Carter actualized his convictions. Hrynkw focuses on Pope Francis, documenting his potential as a proponent of green peace, a form of positive peace that emphasizes sustainability, social justice, respect for diversity, ecological wisdom, participatory democracy and a commitment to nonviolence. Hrynkw notes that Pope Francis has already exhibited the “moral courage associated with his namesake,” Francis of Assisi. Tallman, a philosopher, helps us see that individuals in the public eye, even comedians, have tremendous power to be advocates for peace and social justice. Through her examination of the comedy sketches of Todd Glass, Tallman
discusses how peacemakers can use humor to address derogatory and divisive language to reach the many people, known as “the 90 percenters,” whose position on social issues can be moved.

Other contributions in this special edition focus on institutions---their potential for harm, as well as their potential for good. The article by Betsy Konefal and Silvia Tandeciarz shows how archival research can help peacemakers better understand the scope, issues, and dynamics of torture, thereby allowing for more effective responses and prevention initiatives. Randy Janzen documents how unarmed civilian peacekeeping (UCP) is a more humane method of containing violence. He provides readers with a description of UCP groups, showing how they have built on Gandhi’s vision of a peace army, or “shanti sena.” Julie Ethan’s work documents the important role that the Catholic Church has and can continue to play in negotiating peace in Mexico. As an institution with deep community roots and a commitment to nonviolence and social justice, Catholic organizations have potential to help broker peace in some of the areas most devastated by drug cartels.

The remaining contributors to this special edition emphasize the importance of building peace through creative strategies and through purposeful and strategic inclusivity. Richard Matthews provides a review of Understanding Peace: A Comprehensive Introduction by Michael Allen Fox. Matthews’ review notes the importance of this examination of how war is ineffective and peace is realistic. The book debunks the myths that permeate our “militarized consciousness,” such as that it is human nature to be violent and that wars are waged because of “shared ideals.” Matthews asserts that this comprehensive book focuses largely on a secular understanding of peace but allows space for the inclusion of faith-based understandings. Katherine Fobear highlights the need for peace educators to address gender-based violence. She notes that without critically analyzing gender, sexuality, sexism and homophobia, peace education can never result in education for peace. Glenn Bowen shares the Deliberative Dialogue model, highlighting how his institution is using it as method of teaching peace and social justice and to bring together diverse constituencies, from students to community.

We believe the articles and reviews included in this special edition truly reflect some of the most courageous peacemaking initiatives occurring today. From the local to the global, the individuals and institutions discussed in this edition give us hope for a better world and for the promise of building and sustaining what Dr. Martin Luther King Jr. called “the beloved community.”

References
“In Keeping with the Teaching of Scripture”: Jimmy Carter, Religious Faith, and the Search for Peace in the Middle East

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Abstract
President Jimmy Carter’s role as facilitator, partner, and mediator in the 1978-1979 Camp David peace process between Israel and Egypt was based upon his own ideas about what might be done. And these ideas were largely rooted his profound personal religious convictions. To illustrate the utility of religious faith for the purpose of peacemaking, this essay examines Carter’s use of and appeal to religious faith in three major ways. First, Carter’s motivation for peace in the Middle East is explored. Like most other evangelicals, President Carter saw the region through a religious lens. Second, Carter believed that politicians of sincere Christian faith are under a Biblical command to pursue peace. Third, to accomplish the task of peace, it is argued that Carter’s faith and reading of the Bible provided him with an appreciation for “the Other,” namely the diversity within the Western faith traditions of Judaism, Christianity, and Islam.

Introduction

“I will do everything in power to make our nation an agent of peace in the Middle East; a just and lasting peace that will be in keeping with the teaching of Scripture.”
It is often said that Jimmy Carter’s greatest accomplishment as president was his mediation of the 1978-1979 Camp David peace accords between two old enemies, Israel and Egypt (Chaundy, 2002; “President, peacemaker, peanut farmer,” 2002; Hutcheson, 1988, p. 127; Clymer, 1985). It was characterized at the time as the first such peace agreement between these two old nations in “some 3,000 years” (Lionaes, 1978). The agreement reached at Camp David, as Jack Germond and Jules Witcover (1985) explained, was a rare case of where presidential “words and good intentions” became a reality in “a remarkable achievement for peace.” “Camp David,” wrote Burton Kaufman (1993, 117), “was hailed throughout the world as a monumental diplomatic accomplishment,” a “personal triumph” for Carter and it was “his administration’s crowning achievement.”

Democratic and Republican presidents, too, have acknowledged and praised Carter’s Middle East diplomatic success. In the coming years, after Carter’s single term in office, President Ronald Reagan (1990, p. 407) said he “hoped to build on the peace process in the Middle East that had been started by Jimmy Carter at Camp David.” While he praised George H.W. Bush for merely starting talks in the Middle East in the early 1990s and generically acknowledged Gerald Ford’s steady and “wise leadership” in the mid-1970s, President Bill Clinton (1993; 1994; 1995; 1996; 1999) described Carter’s Middle East peace efforts as having made a tangible contribution. In fact, despite the personal animus between them, Clinton called Carter’s work a “miracle,” and claimed that it was the foundation for the 1994 Israeli-Jordanian peace treaty. Richard Nixon (1989, p. 276-277) described the 1978-1979 Israeli-Egyptian peace agreements as “one of the greatest American diplomatic achievements of the postwar [World War II] period,” and he strongly recommended that future presidents follow Carter’s example. Even foreign observers noted the importance of Carter’s Middle East work. An advisor to British Prime Minister James Callaghan said the Camp David Accords represented “a great effort of personal diplomacy on the part of Jimmy Carter and one which will, I think, be seen as the high point of his Presidency” (McNally, 1983, p. 468).

But what was the Carter example? What was Carter’s peacemaking model that Nixon believed could perhaps be emulated by an incumbent president and future presidents? To begin answering these questions, the following illustration may help.

In reflecting upon the Middle East in his memoirs, Reagan (1990, p. 407-408) observed that religion was a source of violence. In contrast, his predecessor was convinced that religion was a vital source of peacemaking and peacebuilding. Reagan said he often feared that events in the region could spiral out of control at any moment and lead to the fateful day of Armageddon foretold in the Bible. Carter, however, saw a region with a potential for peace, a place not so much where the next world war would break out, but a place where swords could finally be converted into plowshares and the children of Abraham, Jews and Arabs, Jews and Muslims, could live peaceably side-by-side. Confounding the conventional wisdom of these two presidencies, here was an instance where the usually optimistic Reagan was perhaps more fatalistic, resigned to the inevitability of Middle East war and ongoing faith-inspired conflict and it was Carter rather than
Reagan who was the optimist, the visionary, and the president who was convinced that Middle East peace was the ultimate future foretold in the Bible.

Carter was a different kind of president (Berggren, 2005; Berggren & Rae, 2006; Berggren, 2013a; 2013b). Breaking with the secular model of separating religion and politics, the former Georgia governor aimed to reintegrate them. In the aftermath of the Vietnam War and the Watergate scandal that brought down a presidency, Carter campaigned for president in 1976 to restore faith in government and faith in America. He (1975b) promised to reestablish a government “as good and honest, decent, truthful, and competent and compassionate and filled with love as are the American people.” He pledged he would never tell a lie or mislead the country. He was comfortable talking about God and his rededicated life to Christ. This distinguished him from his Democratic rivals for the party nomination and from the Republican nominee, President Gerald Ford. His appeal to the South, African Americans, and to religious voters, especially evangelicals, were crucial to his narrow election victory over the incumbent (Pomper, 1977, p. 60-65; Menendez, 1996).

Unlike his presidential contemporaries, Carter possessed a religious-style of leadership and he exhibited it in his search for Middle East peace. It is argued here that Carter’s role as facilitator, partner, and mediator in the Camp David peace process was largely driven by profound religious convictions. This was an instance where the faith of religious-styled president “moved mountains.” While security and strategic concerns certainly were important and his position as president of the United States did set parameters for action, Carter (1998; 2003d) was motivated by a “deep religious interest” and a deeply held religious belief that it was his moral and biblical obligation to pursue not just peace, but peace in the Holy Land: “That is my prayer.”

It is additionally argued here that Carter’s religious faith and inclusive reading of the Bible provided him with an appreciation for “the Other” and a means of “crossing boundaries” to include Jews, Christians, and Muslims in his vision of Middle East peace. Though he shared with Christian Zionists the belief that the Jewish people are a chosen people and blessed by God and that the modern state of Israel fulfills in some way Bible prophecy, Carter also viewed Muslims as co-religionists, joint heirs of God’s promises, and also blessed by God. For the time, this was an unusual degree of religious inclusion for a president with Judaism, Christianity, and Islam being presented as equal faiths, kindred faiths, with Israeli-held lands and Arab-Muslim-held lands in the region being identified as “holy”. Such a reading of Scripture aided Carter in his quest for peace and forging interfaith dialogue, especially with Egyptian President Anwar Sadat. In this issue area and in the constructive use of religious faith, current and future presidents could learn from Carter’s example and imitate his approach.

“I Had My Own Ideas” for Middle East Peace

I’ve moved into areas that have been avoided for a long time in the past. I’m not criticizing my predecessors. But the Egyptians and the Israelis have been at war for 30 years. They’ve been filled with hatred for centuries. And to see now Sadat and Begin sitting down, working out a peace agreement between them, because of action that we took in this country, is gratifying, indeed.
One of the enduring criticisms of Carter’s leadership style is that he lacked political vision. In a piece written not long after he resigned his position, Carter’s chief speechwriter James Fallows (1979) asserted that his former boss failed to “project a vision larger than the problem he is tackling at the moment.” He believed in “fifty things, but no one thing.” He preferred to make lists of things that needed to be addressed, but he provided no overarching theme that connected them. This view of a “passionless” Carter has been a lasting one (Roberts, 1981; Greenstein, 2000). However, Carter was not unusually short on political vision. He had a vision of peace for Israel, Egypt, and the Middle East. The success at Camp David proved to Carter (1994, p. vii) that the application of religious principles “can be significant for peacemaking.”

Carter (1976b, p. 202; 1977e, p. 1516) was under no illusion that peace in the Middle East would be easy. He recognized that no instant solution was available. As president, in May 1977, he (1977b, p. 862) said, “I don’t want to mislead anyone. The chances for Middle Eastern peace are still very much in doubt. We have a long way to go.” In August 1977, he (1977d, p. 1469) said that when it came to the search for peace in the Middle East, “no one can expect miracles.” Later in October, he (1977f, p. 1800) said, “This is one of the most complicated international questions which has ever been addressed, I guess, in the history of human beings.” Three years later, during his reelection campaign in 1980, Carter (1980d, p. 1555) said, “In the real world we know that we cannot expect miracles on the Middle East peace negotiations. The issues are too emotional. The difficulties are too great. The obstacles sometimes appear to be insurmountable.” Carter, nevertheless, believed that peace must still be deliberately and decisively pursued.

Carter was optimistic and hopeful about the prospects for success. On the campaign trail in 1976, he (1976c, p. 221) asserted, “Peace in the Middle East is not an impossible dream.” The following year, he (1977d, p. 1469) argued, “We may or may not be successful, but we’re going to continue to try in a very determined and tenacious way.” In spite of the daunting task, the political risks, and the seemingly interminable nature of the conflict, Carter (1977e, p. 1515) said, “We’re not going to slacken our effort.” In fact, he boldly stated, “I intend not to fail” (Brzezinski, 1983, p. 254, 258).

Stubbornly, President Carter ignored, wrote Fred Greenstein (2000, p. 137), “the near-unanimous advice of his aides not to put his prestige on the line for such a high risk cause.”

[T]old by almost every adviser to stay out of the Middle East situation, it seemed that all the proposed solutions had already been tried and failed. However, I could see growing threats to the United States and the Middle East, and was willing to make another try—perhaps overly confident that I could now find answers that had eluded so many others (Carter 1982, 286; 1979f, p. 1751; 1980e, p. 2135-2136).

Given the risks to a president’s domestic and international reputation and to the prospects of reelection if he failed or if he was perceived to be biased to one side or the other in his approach, Carter (1982, p. 282) understood why “Presidents Eisenhower, Kennedy, Johnson, and Ford had apparently tried to avoid any active involvement in Middle East disputes” and showed “restraint.” However, with caution, but with his usual confident determination and audacity to touch what he
politically probably should not, his often disregard for sound calls for pragmatism, and his repeated claim that he could prophetically foresee what others could not, Carter (1982, p. 282) wanted to try his hand at brokering Middle East peace. “I had my own ideas about what might be done.”

**Peacemaking as a Presidential Responsibility**

“The path to peace in the Middle East has always been difficult, but never impossible.”

---Jimmy Carter (2012b)

Carter (1979f, p. 1751) believed that working for peace in the Middle East was practical and served the interests of the United States. It was “a good investment for our security.” However, for him, it was more importantly a sacred activity. Working for peace between Israel and its Arab neighbors, Carter (2008, p. 3; 2003e; 2004a; 2004b; 2004c; 2005c; 2006a; 2006c; 2006d; 2006h; 2007c) said, was rooted in “a religious commitment,” rooted in the basic fact that he worshipped “the Prince of Peace, not war.”

Though he did not fully explore Carter’s motivation to pursue this daring, high-risk adventure that had bedeviled previous administrations, Greenstein (2000, p. 137) rightly noted that Carter was “spurred by the knowledge that it was the Holy Land in which he was seeking peace.” Others (Hutcheson, 1988, p. 125; Goldberg, 1996, p. 209; Fowler, Hertzke, & Olson, 1999, p. 118) have identified Carter’s faith as a fundamental source of his motivation as well.

Those that knew Carter best or worked closely with him affirmed this. For instance, one Carter assistant, Peter Bourne, said that Carter had long had an abiding interest in the Middle East region. According to Bourne (1997, p. 382), the source of this “passionate affinity” was “Carter’s religious beliefs and especially his deep knowledge of the Bible made the Middle East a region of unique consequence and interest to him.” He (1997, p. 31) added that Carter was baptized by Royall Callaway, a minister who “held more fundamentalist views than his predecessors” at Plains Baptist Church and who “was a pre-millennialist who preached that the Jews would soon reclaim Palestine and that Christ’s return to earth was imminent.” He (1997, p. 32) also claimed that Carter’s high religiosity likely influenced his preoccupation with the Middle East:

> Through his study of the Bible and his regular attendance at Sunday school, Jimmy acquired a broad familiarity with the Holy Land. By the time he was ten years old, he had a greater knowledge about Palestine than he did the rest of America. It seemed a fascinating, exotic place associated with an aura of deep religious reverence.

Jim Wright (1996, p. 307), the Democratic House Majority Leader at the time, agreed with Bourne’s assessment. Wright said Carter enthusiastically engaged the issue of Middle East peace because he had a “lifelong interest in the region, stemming from his study of the Bible.”

Within his first 100 days in office, Carter (1977a, p. 385) stated that in matters of foreign policy he wanted his country to establish and follow “a standard of morality.” He believed, “If we insist that the golden rule be applied in all public matters,” at home and abroad, “then potential inequities
can be prevented, and wrongs can be righted.” For Carter (1976a, p. 157), establishing and maintaining “such a government is the proper purpose of public service.”

Pursuing “peace is everyone’s job” and responsibility, Carter (1995) asserted. For his part, as president of the United States, he (1980b, p. 579; 1976d) “pledged to work tirelessly for peace.” He (1980f, p. 2340; 1980h, p. 2663; 1980i, p. 2675) said that the pursuit of peace was his “passion”. He (1980g, p. 2640) even described it as a “crusade,” “a crusade to keep this Nation on the road to peace.” “Peace,” he (1980c, p. 871) said, “is what we want. Peace is what we have maintained. Peace is a prerequisite for progress. Peace is a policy of our country.” To be successful, he (2003f) argued, peacemaking requires bold, hands-on presidential leadership. “Real moves toward peace demand bold actions by leaders.” Carter sought to bring such passion and boldness to the Middle East. As president, he (2003b; 2003c) aimed to pursue Middle East peace “aggressively” and “put his prestige on the line,” “put his influence on the line.” Carter (2007d) pledged he would “never let the fear of failure be an excuse for not trying.” Whatever the difficulties, the quest for peace is “never hopeless” (Carter 2003c).

Beyond Christian Zionism: Carter’s Inclusive Vision for Jews, Christians, and Muslims

If I had one constant prayer… it would be to bring peace to Israel…I know about the Holy Land, I’ve taught lessons about the Holy Land all my life…

---Jimmy Carter (2012a)

In his presidential memoirs, Keeping Faith, Carter (1982, p. 438) explained that he came to “realize that I spent more of my time working for possible solutions to the riddle of Middle East peace than on any other international problem.” He (1982, p. 280) said bringing peace to Israel was a constant “on my agenda, and on my mind.”

Carter (1982, p. 280) insisted that promoting peace in the Middle East was an old objective. It was a biblical command. Peace for Israel mattered to him because he had been reading from the Bible about Israel and the Jewish people since his youth (Carter 1976c, p. 216). Peace in the biblical lands, he (2007a; 2007b, p. 115) believed, was a fulfillment of “the finest ideals based on the Hebrew Scriptures.” Peace for Israel mattered because it is the holy land and the land had been given to the Jewish people by God (Carter 1976c, p. 220). In an interview with Al Jazeera, he (2006j) said, like many Americans, “Ever since I was 3 years old, I’ve always looked upon Israel as a people that was blessed by God through his covenant by Abraham.” Because of this, it is a requirement for Christians and Christian leaders “to honor and protect God’s chosen people from among whom came our own Christian savior, Jesus Christ” (Carter 2007a; 2007e). Furthermore, as a Christian, he (1980a, p. 181) said, advancing peace in the region embodied “the ideal of Christ: peace on earth.” Carter affirmed and repeated these views as governor of Georgia, as a presidential candidate, as president, and as a past president.

Carter first visited Israel in 1973 when he was governor of Georgia. The visit was one part politics and one part religion. When describing his first visit (or pilgrimage) to Israel, he (1985, p. 21-22; 2006i, p. 22-24) said he was torn about how best to spend his limited time there: “I was torn between the pleasure of visiting the Christian holy places I had longed to see since I was a child....
and the knowledge that I should be preparing for a future career” and learning about the politics and political personalities of the country. Ultimately, during his ten-day visit, Carter traveled to many holy sites. He went to Jerusalem, Bethlehem, Hebron, Jericho, Nazareth, the Mount of Olives, the Garden Tomb, Cana, Mount Carmel, the Sea of Galilee, the Mount of Beatitudes, Capernaum, Bethsaida, and the Jordan River. After leaving Israel, Carter (2006i, p. 34) said, “I was excited and optimistic about the apparent commitment of the Israelis to establish a nation that would be a homeland for the Jews, dedicated to the Judeo-Christian principles of peace and justice, and determined to live in harmony with all their neighbors.”

In *The Blood of Abraham*, an obviously religious title for his first book on the Middle East, Carter (1985, p. 29) stated, “For me there is no way to approach or enter Israel without thinking first about the Bible and the history of the land and its people. The names and images have long been an integral part of my life as a Christian.” In *Living Faith*, he (1996, p. 37) wrote, “The power of faith is a unifying bond between Christian and Jew and between the heroes of ancient Israel and those of New Testament times.” Though such statements make him theological kin with many evangelical Christians who view the Jewish people as a chosen people and view their ties to the land of Israel God-given, it would be inaccurate to characterize Carter as a typical Christian Zionist. Unlike many pro-Israel evangelicals in the United States whose Zionism precludes virtually any positive divine recognition of the Arab-Muslim people and lands, Carter (2006j) promoted the view that the Arab people and the Muslim world have also been blessed by God. They, too, along with Jews and Christians, are heirs to the promise through Abraham and his firstborn son Ishmael, “a founder of the Arab nations in general.” Therefore, by Carter’s reckoning, Egypt, the largest and most powerful Arab country at the time of his presidency, deserved peace and deserved to be at the center of the peace process. Such views delighted Sadat.

Carter’s vision of the Middle East was more inclusive than Christian Zionism. For Carter, the Holy Land, the land of the Bible, encompassed more than the boundaries of modern Israel and the lands it captured in the 1967 Six-Day War. The Holy Land included areas held by Arabs and Muslims. This wider vision was critical to his diplomatic approach as president and as a former president. It enabled him to be more of a balanced, fair mediator and facilitator for peace in the Mideast region. In his dealings with the Israelis and the Egyptians, Carter revealed and discussed his scriptural insights. As a Christian, he talked about his reliance on Jesus and his desire to follow Christ’s example of love and fellowship.

In the Bible, Carter (1985, p. 149) explained, Egypt was often a site of “biblical drama.” In his chapter on Egypt in *The Blood of Abraham*, the first thing Carter (1985, p. 143) noted was that Egypt is home to Mount Sinai, “where Moses received the Ten Commandments from God” and where Sadat hoped to build a shrine as a “symbol of peace” for the three great religions of Abraham: Judaism, Christianity, and Islam.

Of particular interest to Carter was the biblical role Egypt played as a refuge to the heroes of the Bible. He (1985, p. 149) observed that the Patriarch Abraham took refuge there, as did his grandson Jacob, later renamed Israel. Even “the family of Jesus,” Carter (1985, 149-150) observed, “was forced to seek refuge from the vassal King Herod the Great, who had ordered all male babies around Bethlehem to be killed.” The holy family “escaped into Egypt and stayed there until the death of Herod.” Carter (1985, p. 143, 148) also noted Egypt’s ties to historic
Christianity. Specifically, he mentioned that St. Catherine’s monastery, “the oldest continuously occupied Christian monastery on earth,” is located on the Sinai and that the patron of the old Coptic Church in Egypt is “Saint Mark.”

In his 2002 Nobel lecture in Oslo, Norway, Carter (2003a, p. 16-17) acknowledged the inspiring source of his Middle East policy and why he sought peace and why he sought to include Arab Muslims as equal partners in the process. For Carter, Christ was his inspirational model, because he “taught us to cross religious boundaries” and “repeatedly reached out” to others.

The unchanging principles of life predate modern times. I worship Jesus Christ, whom we Christians consider to be the Prince of Peace. As a Jew, he taught us to cross religious boundaries, in service and in love. He repeatedly reached out… I am convinced that Christians, Muslims, Buddhists, Hindus, Jews, and others can embrace each other in a common effort to alleviate human suffering and to espouse peace.

Following the spirit of Christ’s example, Carter aimed to be a Christian mediator and partner; he aimed to bring Jews and Muslims together.

Carter invoked authorities in the Jewish tradition as well. At the welcome ceremony before his first meeting with Israeli Prime Minister Menachem Begin in July 1977, Carter (1977c, p. 1282) cited the words of the Hebrew prophet Isaiah, “And the work of righteousness shall be peace, and the effects of righteousness, quietness and assurance forever.”

In November 1977, before the World Jewish Congress, Carter said, “The Old Testament offers a vision” of what peace in the region might entail. Quoting the Prophet Micah at length (1:1-5), Carter (1977g, p. 1957) said,

But in the last days it shall come to pass, that the mountain of the house of the Lord shall be established in the top of the mountains, and it shall be exalted above the hills; and people shall flow into it.

And many nations shall come, and say, Come, and let us go up to the mountain of the Lord, and to the house of the God of Jacob; and he will teach us of his ways, and we will walk in his paths: and the law shall go forth from Zion, and the word of the Lord from Jerusalem.

And he shall judge among many people, and rebuke strong nations afar off; and they shall beat their swords into plowshares, and their spears into pruninghooks: nation shall not lift up a sword against nation, neither shall they learn war any more.

But they shall sit every man under his vine and under his fig tree; and none shall make them afraid: for the mouth of the Lord of hosts hath spoken it.

For all people will walk every one in the name of his god, but we will walk in
the name of the Lord our God for ever and ever.

This vision, Carter concluded, would be his guide and ought to be that of all, Christian, Jew, and Muslim, who wish to see peace in the Middle East. In fact, he said, “it is our duty to walk together toward the fulfillment of this majestic prophecy.”

Later that month, in an exchange with reporters as he left the First Baptist Church in Washington, where he had offered a prayer for regional peace from the pulpit at the very time President Sadat made his historic visit to Israel to address the Knesset, Carter (1977h, p. 2042) explained that his prayer echoed the will and hope of the world for peace, that Jewish and Muslim peoples in the region were exhausted from war and violence, and that “Christ, our Savior, is the Prince of Peace.” He (1977h, p. 2043) further pointed out that on this same day Prime Minister Begin, “a very deeply religious man,” had “worshipped God in a Jewish temple,” and President Sadat had “worshipped the same God in a Moslem mosque” (the Al Aqsa mosque) and then “worshipped the same God in a Christian holy place where Christ was buried” (the Church of the Holy Sepulchre).

One reporter asked Carter, “You see the hand of God moving in all this, don’t you?” Carter (1977h, p. 2042) evidently thought so. This shared faith in God, a faith that Christians, Jews, and Muslims all share, Carter characterized as “an avenue of communication and common purpose” among the disputing parties. He additionally mentioned to members of the press on this occasion that he had similar discussions with Saudi Crown Prince Fahd. (In 1982, Prince Fahd became the King of Saudi Arabia.) In Middle East discussions, Carter reasoned, a “common religious bond” existed among the three religions and it “provides a possible avenue for peace.”

During his visit with President Sadat in February 1978, Carter (1978a, p. 274) called his involvement in the Middle East peace process a “sacred mission for peace.” He (1978b, p. 290) said that he and the Egyptian President shared the same vision for the region. “This is the vision that we share.” Describing the search for regional peace a “calling,” citing the Bible’s authority and the Biblical honor of being a “son of God,” Carter proclaimed,

There is no nobler calling on this Earth than the seeking for peace. For it is that reason which caused the Bible to say that peacemakers shall be called the sons of God.

At the annual National Prayer Breakfast, in January 1979, looking back over the events of the previous year, Carter (1979a, p. 59) cited that several of “most interesting news events of the year…had some religious connotation.” Among the events the President cited was the signing of the Camp David Accords. Though the modern world is conventionally considered to be “highly secular,” Carter explained that events like Camp David showed that people were still interested in and motivated by faith. To begin their 13-day summit in September 1978, which had been intended to last three days but no more than seven, Carter said that he, Begin, and Sadat prayed for peace and called upon the world to join in their “common prayer for peace.” Secretary of State Cyrus Vance (1983, p. 220) explained that Carter was determined “at the outset to put the summit on a high plane, reflecting the deep religious faith and humane purposes of the three leaders.”

In his memoirs, Carter (1982, p. 329) reported that when he left for Camp David, “on Monday, September 4…I went…with all my maps, briefing books, notes, summaries of past negotiations,
and my annotated Bible, which I predicted—accurately, as it turned out—would be needed in my discussions with Prime Minister Begin.” After Camp David, Zbigniew Brzezinski (1983, p. 274-275), Carter’s National Security Advisor, noted that Carter even envisioned that a final peace accord could be signed at “the Monastery of St. Catherine in the middle of the Sinai,” the place traditionally believed to be where Moses received the Ten Commandments from God.

“In the Name of God”: Carter Comes Before the Arab, Muslim World

We who are engaged in this great work, the work of peace, are of varied religious faiths. Some of us are Moslems; some are Jews; some are Christians. The forms of our faith are different. We worship the same God. And the message of Providence has always been the same.

---Jimmy Carter (1979c, p. 414)

Carter was determined to establish strong ties with the Arab-Muslim world. To accomplish this, he believed that reaching out to Egypt, the largest Arab-Muslim country, was crucial. During his presidency, Carter made three separate visits to Egypt, once in 1978 and twice in 1979. It was the most times an American president traveled to the country since World War II until Bill Clinton went four times in his eight-year presidency (U.S. Department of State, 2014).

In early 1979, President Carter traveled to the Middle East to conclude the agreement reached between Sadat and Begin at Camp David in 1978. Upon his arrival in Cairo, Egypt, on March 8, 1979, he (1979b, p. 407) told Sadat that he was “determined to persevere” in securing the Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty because “our common dedication, our common determination is rooted in the soil of common religious truth.” The President pointed to their shared belief in the one, true God and in truth. Though the particular components of their faith traditions may vary, Carter claimed, the “underlying message is the same—it’s a message of love, of faith, and of peace.” He asked his Egyptian partner to pray with him “in the words of the Christian gospel,” for God “to guide our feet into the way of peace.”

Two days later on March 10, in his address before the People’s Assembly of Egypt, Carter (1979c, p. 412, 414) began with the words, “I…come before you in the name of God” and “as a partner” and “friend” of the Egyptian President. In this address, Carter invoked the sacred texts of Muslims, Jews, and Christians, to remind all of their obligations to God and each other to pursue the age-old hope for peace in the region. From the Quran, Surah 8:61, he used words to encourage Egyptians to reach out to their old adversary Israel: “If thine adversary incline towards peace, do thou also incline towards peace and trust in God, for he is the one that heareth and knoweth all things.” From the Hebrew Scriptures, the Book of Psalms, he cited the words, “Depart from evil and do good; seek peace, and pursue it.” He then invoked the famous words of Jesus from his Sermon on the Mount as recorded in the Gospel of Matthew, “Blessed are the peacemakers, for they shall be called the children of God.”

Two weeks later (March 25), Carter, Begin, and Sadat issued a joint statement that grounded the occasion in unmistakable religious terms. The ecumenical statement (Carter, Sadat, & Begin, 1979, p. 490-491) read:
At the convening of the Camp David summit meeting we issued a communication which stated in part—‘Conscious of the grave issues that face us, we place our trust in the God of our fathers from whom we seek wisdom and guidance. We request people of all faiths to pray with us that peace and justice will result from these deliberations.’

Our trust in God was well-placed. On Monday, a treaty of peace will be signed between Egypt and Israel within the framework of a comprehensive peace settlement in the area. We are grateful to the people around the world who joined us in prayer. We now ask people of all faiths to join again in a day of prayer and thanksgiving for what has been accomplished, and then ask God to guide our nations in the days ahead as we continue to work for a comprehensive, just and lasting peace. With God’s help, we and generations to come will know peace between our peoples. To this end, we ask that Monday, March 26, be a day of prayer around the world.

At the signing ceremony the following day, Carter (1979d, p. 518) ended his remarks by presenting his repeated vision for the region. Quoting the Prophet Isaiah in full, Carter spoke the ancient words: “Nations shall beat their swords into plowshares and their spears into pruninghooks: nation shall not lift up sword against nation, neither shall they learn war any more.” He then said, as the prophet foretold, “So let us now lay aside war.” Carter finished his remarks looking ahead to the wider political vision for the region.

Let us now reward all the children of Abraham who hunger for a comprehensive peace in the Middle East. Let us now enjoy the adventure of becoming fully human, fully neighbors, even brothers and sisters. We pray God, we pray God together, that these dreams will come true. I believe they will.

That night, at a dinner honoring Sadat and Begin, Carter (1979e, p. 522) expressed the biblical vision of regional peace and expressed his hope that indeed that vision was coming to pass. “The peace that was born today has a meaning that comes down to us through many years or generations, even centuries.” This vision, for Carter, had its origins in Genesis, the Bible’s first book.

In ancient days, God promised Abraham that from his seed would come many nations. And as you know, that promise has been fulfilled. Yet for much too long, the people of Israel and the people of Egypt—two of the nations of the children of Abraham, trusting in the same God, hoping for the same peace—knew only enmity between them.

Hopeful that another promise of the Bible was in the process of being fulfilled during his presidency, Carter said, “That time, thank God, is now at an end.”

Continuing, Carter (1979e, p. 523) referenced “the vision of the psalmist.” He said, “Behold, how good and how pleasant it is for brethren to dwell together in unity.” “We share a vision of a time when all the people of the Middle East may turn their energies back to the works of life,” building
families, watching their children grow, and living to old age, sustained by “the depth of our common faith in a just and merciful God.”

Next, quoting the book of Ecclesiastes, a book traditionally attributed to King Solomon, son of David and ancient Israel’s third king, Carter (1979e, p. 523) said, “For everything there is a season, and a time to every purpose under the heaven.” And for Carter, the signing of the peace treaty marked “a season of renewal” for the peoples of Egypt and Israel who have had to endure too many centuries of persecution and dominance at the hands of foreign powers.

Together, in the words of Solomon, the peoples of Egypt and Israel experienced “a time to die,” of the planted being plucked up, “a time to kill, a time of breaking down, a time to mourn, a time of weeping, a time to lose, a time to hate, and a time for war.” For both countries, “we pray that the season of weeping is past” and that they were entering “a time to heal, a time to plant, a time to build up, a time to laugh, a time to dance, a time to embrace, a time to love.” “We pray to God,” Carter (1979e, p. 524) said, “that at last the children of Abraham have come to a time of peace.”

**Religion, Carter’s Motivation for Peacemaking and Hope for Peace**

My prayer was one that recognized this whole world wants peace; that Christ, our Savior, is the Prince of Peace…

---Jimmy Carter (1977h, p. 2042)

Carter may have prayed for it, but a comprehensive regional peace did not come. The peace between Israel and Egypt did not spread across the Middle East. The Palestinian question was left unresolved. Diplomatic relations between Israel and the vast Islamic world did not ensue in subsequent decades. Carter lost re-election in a landslide defeat in 1980 to Reagan. Sadat was assassinated in 1981. After his wife’s death in 1982, Begin became distraught and depressed. He resigned from office in 1983. With the principal actors gone from the scene, the momentum of Camp David stalled and then stopped.

President Nixon said other presidents should emulate Carter’s approach to the Arab-Israeli conflict. Carter anticipated this as well. However, Carter’s successors did not make peace in the region a central foreign policy objective of their administrations. For instance, Reagan was preoccupied with communism and the challenge posed by the Soviet Union. He was also concerned about the threat the Islamic Republic of Iran presented to the Persian Gulf. George H.W. Bush did not give serious attention to the Middle East until 1990 when Iraq invaded Kuwait. Subsequently, he labored to rally international opinion against the invasion and he forged a Western-Arab coalition to expel Iraqi forces in 1991. But peace for the Israelis, the Palestinians, and their neighbors was not an urgent matter. It bothered Carter that his successors did not typically express a personal interest in the region or become personally involved in the issue. If and when they did, the president’s effort was half-hearted and short-lived. Carter (2014) said, “I know from experience that the best way to have the United States be a mediator is for the President himself to be deeply involved.”

It also troubled Carter that subsequent Democratic and Republican presidents often were decidedly and uncritically pro-Israel. This prevented the issues of the Palestinians from being properly and
fairly addressed. To be successful, he (2000) asserted, “the mediator,” the United States, the U.S. president, must “maintain at least the semblance of neutrality.” The mediator must have the “mutual confidence” of both parties.

With nearly every eruption of violence, he (1985, p. 5; 1993, p. 5) lamented the ongoing strife among “the People of the Book” in the Holy Land and that the Scriptures remain “a source of more difference than agreement, inspiring more hatred than love, more war than peace.” He (2005a, p. 113-114) expressed strong dismay that his former denomination, the Southern Baptist Convention, had been led since 1979 by intransigent Christian Zionist ministers, who merely see Israel and the region through the lens of their “eschatological, or final days, theology” and for their failure to support solid diplomatic initiatives that would provide a real peace between Israel, Palestine, and the other countries in the region.

Nevertheless, Carter mediated a historic peace between Israel and Egypt in 1978-1979, something that eluded other presidents. None of his successors were able to have a Camp David-like moment. (Clinton, however, came close.). Though the Camp David Accords between Israel and Egypt led to more of a “cold peace” than a true peace based on collective, consistent trust and friendship (which Carter conceded), a dangerous front in the ongoing Arab-Israeli conflict was closed (Dickey & Krieger, 2006). Moreover, without Egypt as an ally, Syria and Jordan shied from war with Israel in the years ahead. Though it was not the total peace arrangement desired, Carter (1998; 2001; 2002; 2005b; 2006b; 2006c; 2006e; 2006f; 2006g) proudly and repeatedly remarked through the years that after more than a quarter-century “not a word of that treaty [between Israel and Egypt] has been violated.”

While other considerations mattered, including U.S. security concerns, Carter fundamentally believed that working for peace in the Middle East was not about good politics. Rather, it was about doing good, doing what was pleasing to God, doing what was in accordance with biblical principles, and doing what Christ had taught. Given the importance of the Middle East, especially the Israeli-Arab dimension, this region would be important for any American president. The risk of a region-wide war that could draw in the two superpowers, the threat of greater Soviet influence, and Western dependence on Mideast oil were all weighty matters for American presidents since Harry Truman (Carter, 1977a, p. 387). “Peace in the Middle East is of vital interest to us all,” Carter (1975a) said. However, that is not the whole story. For Carter, there was something more at stake than merely protecting U.S. interests in the region.

Politically, Carter understood the stakes. He understood the high political risks involved, and he ultimately paid a heavy price personally and politically (Miller 1992, p. 3). “The Middle East dispute,” he (1982, p. 421) said, was “the heaviest political burden” on his watch. “It was very time-consuming” and involvement was commonly “frustrating and thankless.” He knew that failure could further erode his prestige at home and abroad; he knew that it could hinder his other foreign policy goals and weaken his standing among world leaders. He knew it would be personally taxing, exhausting, and deeply emotional work. He knew he risked alienating or offending important Democratic Party constituencies that were important for his re-election bid. Given all this, one should not be surprised why future presidents after Carter did not always make Middle East peace a priority. They understood, as Carter’s press secretary Jody Powell put it, “that making peace in the Middle East was a political loser” (Baxter 2007).
Despite the personal and political risks and costs, Carter pursued Middle East peace anyway. As shown here, what sustained Carter in this pursuit of peace, what contributed to his emotional endurance, what provided him a vision of the improbable, what gave him a dogged sense of mission, was his religious faith. He was motivated by a belief that as a Christian the pursuit of Middle East peace was obligatory for him, that it was “in keeping with the teaching of Scripture.”

Not all observers appreciated Carter’s “faith-based” approach to politics. Some have largely ignored the role of religion in his politics, while others have doubted its importance (Ribuffo, 1989, p. 152; Princen, 1991, p. 65-68). There have also been observers of his presidency who contend that it actually worked against him. It contributed to a perception that he was a political amateur, too inexperienced to be an effective president (Neustadt, 1990). It has been advanced that his religious style of leadership came across at times to other political actors as arrogance, self-righteousness (Schlesinger, 1979; Jones, 1984; 1988). Sometimes when he spoke, he sermonized, developing a “preacher problem” (Barber, 1992, p. 445). It could even make him appear rigid, dogmatic in his thinking (Greenstein, 2000).

But what may have inhibited Carter in some ways during his presidency enabled him to succeed in others. Religion, Carter demonstrated, can be a constructive force for good in the world. It can build trust where only suspicion was known; it can give hope to peoples that have known despair and destruction. Without religion, Carter said, the Camp David accords would have been unthinkable; it was a crucial dimension of his statecraft. If President Nixon was right that future presidents should emulate Carter, a crucial part of his example appears to be that American presidents should prioritize pursuing Middle East peace, be personally engaged in it, and would be advised to examine and explore the peacemaking, peacebuilding potential found within their own personal religious faith traditions and the collective Abrahamic traditions of Judaism, Christianity, and Islam as President Carter had done.

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Transforming Cultures, Growing Substantive Peace: Francis of Assisi, Pope Francis and a Green Peace

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TRANSFORMING CULTURES, GROWING SUBSTANTIVE PEACE: FRANCIS OF ASSISI, POPE FRANCIS AND A GREEN PEACE

Abstract

Since the conclave that elected him concluded in March 2013, Pope Francis’ approach to his new office has garnered much interest. Notably, in Francis’ short time as the new bishop of Rome, he has been the subject of not only extensive coverage in the Catholic media, but also earned a Time magazine person of the year title and been featured in a Rolling Stone cover story. This article brings select symbolic actions and teachings of Pope Francis into conversation with both events from the life of St. Francis of Assisi and six principles that can be understood to inform a green understanding of peace. It is ends with a cautious note of hope that Pope Francis may now be displaying the moral courage associated with his namesake, as he moves to green the culture of the Roman Catholic Church to the benefit of fostering the incarnation substantive peace in this world.
Introduction

Praised be You, my Lord, through Brother Fire, through whom you light the night and he is beautiful and playful and robust and strong.
Praised be You, my Lord, through Sister Mother Earth, who sustains us and governs us and who produces varied fruits with colored flowers and herbs.

- Francis of Assisi (1996), Canticle of the Sun

Today, dear brothers and sisters, I wish to make add my voice to the cry which rises up with increasing anguish from every part of the world, from every people, from the heart of each person, from the one great family which is humanity: it is the cry for peace! It is a cry which declares with force: we want a peaceful world, we want to be men and women of peace, and we want in our society, torn apart by divisions and conflict, that peace break out! War never again! Never again war! Peace is a precious gift, which must be promoted and protected.


This article will relate the figures of St. Francis and Pope Francis to a green understanding of peace. Green peace will be defined as a positive peace (cf. Galtung, 1967). That is, peace as constituting more than the mere absence of war, incarnated through six green principles: Ecological Wisdom, Social Justice, Participatory Democracy, Nonviolence, Sustainability and Respect for Diversity. I begin this tripartite conversation with a discussion focused on “the poor man of Assisi” who lived during the medieval period and was declared a saint shortly after his death.

St. Francis, Ecology and Peacemaking

Francis of Assisi’s (1181-1226) reputation as a saintly follower of Jesus is such that he is sometimes called the “last” or “only” Christian (Cook, 2008). In a point I will return to in the conclusion, he was originally named Giovanni (John). However, his father, Pietro, started calling him Francesco, invoking his family’s French connection through trade and marriage. As a youth, Francis enjoyed popular Provencal music and fine clothes. He also aspired to be a famous knight. This ambition led to Francis being captured during a conflict with a neighboring city state. His father was a shrewd businessman, and Francis was somewhat troublesome and costly to keep in his lifestyle. As a result and much to the frustration of his son’s captors, Pietro drew out the negotiation of the ransom for over a year. Like so many great figures in the history of cultures of peace, being in prison gave Francis time to think. His thought process at this time was to precipitate a profound moral conversion, which as Bernard Lonergan apply notes “changes the criterion of one’s decisions and choices from satisfactions to values” (2003: 240).

After being ransomed, Francis started to live out an alternative set of solidarity-centric values. For example, he famously began to associate with lepers (not just those persons living with Hanson’s disease but also with elephantiasis and other disfiguring conditions). Underpinning these efforts,
he took inspiration for his emerging ethic of deep solidarity from the biblical description of the suffering servant (see Isaiah 53). One day while he attended mass, he heard the Gospel imperative to be perfect and, after going back to the priest for a second reading to make sure he had understood things properly, he relinquished his wealth to live on divine providence. Subsequently, Pietro sued his son to halt Francis’ sale of the family’s possessions. During the trial in Bishop Guido of Assisi’s court, the young man returned all the remaining goods to his father, an act which left Francis nude. According to legend, the bishop then covered Francis with his cape to preserve modesty (symbolizing adoption by the church).

Francis then took on the simple dress of the Umbrian peasantry and was granted the right to preach by being made a deacon. He preached in line with the decrees of the Fourth Lateran Council, affirming a path to salvation in communion with the pope in Rome, emphasizing the goodness of Earth community (understood as God’s creation) and upholding the value of penance, reform, and caritas (charity infused with love). Taking further inspiration from the example of the poor Christ, Francis sustained himself by working as a day laborer and begging. Further, he began to recommend that the brothers who were now gathering around him do the same.

Francis received only a basic formal education mostly focused on foundational skills in Umbrian and Latin (Cook, 2008). He was somewhat suspicious of overly academic theology as prideful but was supportive of one of the first generation of Franciscan friars’, St. Anthony of Padua’s, academic learning. Moreover, he made significant contributions to what today might be termed practical, applied or pastoral theology both through his lived example and contributions to a Christian spirituality of social justice and substantive peace. Famously, Francis heard a divine call to rebuild a crumbling church. At first he thought of this to be a particular call referring to San Damiano (a church, then in disrepair, near Assisi). Subsequently both he and Pope Innocent III understood the experience as a call to rebuild the institutional church. This rebuilding was undertaken through a distinctive Franciscan spiritually based on sharing the Gospel message through social action and lived example rather than on merely preaching with words (cf. Cunningham, 2004). As a result of this orientation, according to his first biographer, Thomas of Celano (1963), Francis was said to have made a tongue of his body. This characterization likely spawned the apocryphal summative dictum of Francis approach to Christian faith, “Preach the Gospel, use words if necessary,” which connects discipleship dedicated to Jesus with service and caritas for the social and larger communities.

It is important to emphasize that the early Franciscan movement was not solely a male endeavor. From the period, there is the prime example of St. Clare of Assisi (Nothwehr, 2012a), who, herself, experienced a profound moral conversion. She came from a wealthy Umbrian family known for their philanthropy. Clare was mentored by Francis. She shaved her head, which made her undesirable for marriage, as part of the act of leaving her family to devote herself to following Jesus in the style of the new movement. Clare went to live at San Damiano and made her own distinctive contributions to Franciscan spirituality and liturgy, writing the rule for the “Poor Clares.” Clare outlived Francis by thirty years and recruited many women including her sister and mother to Franciscan life.

Both Clare and Francis provide inspiration for those working towards peace and upholding the integrity of the ecological world today (cf. Delio, 2012). For example, the Brazilian theologian
Leonardo Boff (2006) characterized Francis as a model for human liberation. In his lifetime, Francis’ moral conversion meant he came to reject militarism. Further, he tried to broker peace on a number of occasions, including between Western Christians and the Sultan of Egypt during his time in the Middle East. Francis’ model of simple living and practicing hospitality, co-living, respect, tolerance, and communality is considered peaceful by many (cf. Boff, 2011). These virtues can be seen in Boff’s favored definition of peace taken from the cross-culturally and collaboratively drafted, Earth Charter: “[P]eace is the wholeness created by right relationships with oneself, other persons, other cultures, other life, Earth, and the larger whole of which all are a part” (Earth Charter Commission, 2000: 3). Similarly, as Dawn Nothwehr (2012b) highlights, the inviolable nature of human dignity is at the heart of Franciscan views of personhood. Thus, many within the Franciscan tradition hold that structures or actions that do not simultaneously enhance relationships with creation and respect human dignity, will not foster substantive peace and justice (cf. Delio, 2009).

Applied to the ecological world, this orientation illustrates that the story of Francis preaching to the birds is more than an analogy. In the “Canticle of the Sun,” Francis of Assisi (1996) extended sisterhood and brotherhood to other members of the Earth community. He considered both humans and the rest of the Earth community to be children of God, fostering an ethic supportive of integral peace (cf. Boff, 2001). Flowing from this worldview, his above-mentioned contemporary biographer, Thomas of Celano (1963) reported that Francis walked respectfully over stones (because Christ had been called a stone), collected worms from the ground to prevent their deaths and provided bees with sweetened water in the winter. Citing such compassionate acts, Boff surmises that Francis found another way of relating to the rest of the Earth community: “not living over and above these entities, not dominating these entities” (2011: 155).

Pope Francis: Transforming Cultures Towards Embracing Substantive Peace

Pope Francis’ episcopal motto, miserando atque eligendo (lowly but chosen), reflects a similar challenge to the ethics of domination as the one set by his medieval namesake. Although the February 2014 Rolling Stone cover story on the new pontiff is subtitled “the times they are a-changin’” (Binelli, 2014), Francis has yet to revise or otherwise change Roman Catholic doctrine. Nonetheless, he might be understood as fostering a remarkable cultural transformation in his church.

At the beginning of March 2013, Jorge Mario Cardinal Bergoglio, Archbishop of Buenos Aires, was 76 years old and his mandatory post-75 resignation letter was on file in the Vatican. Had that letter been accepted Bergoglio would have been even more unlikely to become Bishop of Rome. Indeed, despite his status as an active Cardinal in early March 2013 he was given long odds on becoming pope. Nonetheless, he is now the 266th pontiff listed by the Roman Catholic Church. Though South American by birth, he has substantial ties to the country that surrounds the headquarters of his church. Pope Francis’ father emigrated from Italy and worked for a railway in Argentina as an accountant. His mother, a homemaker for five children, was a second generation Italian-Argentinean (L’Osservatore Romano Staff, 2013). In an unusual move, Bergoglio chose a wholly new regal name. Indeed, his paper is marked by some significant firsts. He is the first non-European to hold the papal office in over a millennium. Francis is the first pope from the “New World” and the first from the Southern Hemisphere. He is also the first member of the Society of
Jesus (the religious order commonly known as the Jesuits) to take the papal office. As a younger priest, Bergoglio was Jesuit Provincial in Argentina, where he had to balance conservative politics and the interests of liberation theologians. After leaving his leadership role in the wake of the controversy over his handling of Jesuit liberationists’ imprisonment by the military regime, Bergoglio reinvented himself and became known for his humble nature and solidarity with those living in poverty. When serving as archbishop, he took public transit in Buenos Aires, even to visit the barrios, and helped care for differently-abled Jesuits whom he lived with in community. One Latin American Jesuit shared with the author that one of his fellow Jesuits was sent on business to the cathedral in Buenos Aires, he mistook Bergoglio for the doorman because the archbishop was so helpful and welcoming.

Other remarkable pastoral traits and orientations are evident in the early days of Francis’ papacy. The new pope has placed more emphasis on the local church, repeatedly favoring identifying his office as that of bishop to Rome as opposed to universal pontiff. This pattern started with Francis’ (2013a) initial words as a pope: an apostolic blessing to the city and the world, broadcast live around the world, which set the tone for a papacy where the post-holder purposely acknowledges his dependence on other Catholics and people of good will in the wider world. He has taught, through both word and action, solidarity with people (inclusive of children and those on the margins of society) and displayed a concomitant concern for those living in poverty.

He has also advocated for a greater, if gendered, role for women in Roman Catholic life, recommending tapping into what he names as the “incisive contribution of women’s genius” for building peace and harmony in families and with all of humanity (Francis, 2014a). However, this praise for peacebuilding has not transferred into changing the doctrine about priestly ordination being reserved for men. Francis has also initiated a process to reform the Curia (the Vatican civil service), away from a centralization of the administrative power of the Catholic Church in Rome. He asks priests and bishops to be pastors “who take on ‘the smell of the sheep’” (Francis, 2013e, para. 24). His appointment of a council of like-minded cardinals may be taken as indication that the papal office is exploring avenues for deeper consultation. Additionally, Francis is personifying a less scripted papacy. For example, he frequently drops in with the minimum required notice in order to share meals and conversation with religious communities and workers. These orientations have been further marked by a series of key symbolic actions.

Francis has been moving towards a simpler papacy. He literally refused to dawn the cape of power immediately after being elected. Moreover, he asserted that the papal apartments were too big and moved to an alternative location (a priests’ residence) at the edge of the Vatican, which allows him better access to lay people. Previously, the layout of the papal apartments had required visitors to pass through a buffer of Curial officials and offices in order to meet with the pope. Francis also repeatedly urges people to pray with and for him. This was a feature of his ministry before the papal election and one invoked in his first public appearance in the balcony in St. Peter’s Square after the last conclave (Francis, 2013a).

Moreover, Francis has asked Catholics and instructed all clergy to see things through the eyes of the poor in a global perspective. In line with this imperative, he has directed papal diplomats to report on potential candidates for bishoprics in their home countries based on criteria including an inward spirit of poverty, pastoral skills and external simplicity. Similarly, he has refused to travel
in a papal limousine and is generally moving the papacy away from opulent symbols of power including red slippers and ermine stoles. This is part of a general orientation of the Catholic Church out into the world, as evidenced by his instruction to the newly appointed Vatican almoner to sell the office’s desk and actively seek out those in need. Francis’ efforts to change the culture of Vatican from consumption to solidarity with those living in poverty is reflected in luxury restaurants around the Vatican experiencing a marked decline in their bottom lines as a result of the loss of business from Curial officials.

His choice of regal name is arguably the most telling symbolic action from the new papacy. Dispelling then current mumblings that his choice of regal name might not be invoking the poor man of Assisi, Pope Francis tells the story of his selection with reference to a conversation with the Brazilian Cardinal, Claudio Hummes. During a time in the conclave when it seemed “a bit dangerous” he might win the papal election, Francis recalls Hummes: “hugged me. He kissed me. He said don’t forget about the poor...and that’s how in my heart came the name Francis of Assisi...the man of the poor, the man of peace. The man who loved and cared for creation, and we don’t have a very good relationship with creation, do we?... The man who gives us this spirit of peace, the poor man who wanted a poor church.....Oh, how I would like a poor Church, and for the poor” (Francis, 2013b). In these simple statements, we have the links we need for the three parts of the title of this article to come together. To understand fully this claim, however, we need to first unfold the meaning of “green.”

**A Green Method for Mapping the Nourishing Content of Substantive Peace**

Essentially, I am proposing a green lens with which to view St. Francis’ and Pope Francis’ contributions to substantive peace. The lens is green because it employs as its organizational framework the six principles names in the *Global Greens Charter*: Ecological Wisdom, Social Justice, Participatory Democracy, Nonviolence, Sustainability and Respect for Diversity (Global Greens, 2001/2012). These principles were discerned through a cross-cultural process and affirmed at Global Greens conferences in Canberra (2001) and Dakar (2012). Remaining cognizant of these six principles helps to prevent an all too common slippage in use and misappropriation of the term “green.”

Particularly virulent in this regard are the instances when “green” is misappropriated to serve segmented interests, such as those of large profit-driven corporations which are damaging to socio-ecological flourishing. As an illustrative point here, consider how a number of persons concerned with planetary health have used the term “greenwashing” to describe, in rough parallel with the more common use of “whitewashing,” a certain phenomenon of misdirection becoming increasingly evident in today’s mass societies. The collaboratively edited activist website, Sourcewatch, defines greenwashing as “the unjustified appropriation of environmental virtue by a company, an industry, a government, a politician or even a non-government organization to create a pro-environmental image, sell a product or a policy, or to try and rehabilitate their standing with the public and decision makers after being embroiled in controversy” (Center for Media and Democracy, 2013).

In simple terms, to avoid such a phenomenon of greenwashing, a foundational contention of this article is that “it should not be that easy using green.” As a remedy, the principles taken together
and, in this case, further informed by a Peace and Conflict Transformation Studies orientation, offer an integrated vision of the nourishing content of “green.” As such, green peace is understood as a form of substantive peace that encompasses positive incarnations of each of the principles, which fosters diverse and mutuality-enhancing expressions of cultures of peace. In this light, I will now move to briefly explore how Pope Francis and the Franciscan tradition can be understood to inform and incarnate these principles.

**The Green Principles, Pope Francis and the Franciscan Tradition**

*Ecological Wisdom*

Simple living and care for the natural world are important features of ecological wisdom. Realizing the connections amongst all members of the Earth community is paramount to such wisdom. Both the Franciscan tradition and Pope Francis have recognized these connections and that they can serve as important models for people making efforts to live within ecological limits. In Christian terms, ecological wisdom can then be understood as peace with God, peace with human neighbors and peace with all creation. Furthermore, in some ways, Pope Francis’ approach to change within the Roman Catholic Church displays elements of the precautionary approach, so important to ecological wisdom: moving forward slowly with love when considering change. There is also strong evidence that Francis’ first social encyclical (a widely addressed papal letter, with a high degree of moral authority for Catholics) will deal with ecology (see Pongratz-Lippitt, 2014), expanding access to and deepening the available understanding of his views on human-Earth relationships. However, it is crucial to emphasize that green peace is about more than narrowly defined environmental issues. Many ecotheologians, peace and conflict studies practitioners and ecojustice advocates, the author of this article included, hope that the papal office will move under Pope Francis towards a deeper embrace of recognizing deep interdependence as a moral category.

*Social Justice*

Regarding social justice, peace theorists have long recognized that a society characterized by injustice and organized in a manner that perpetuates unjust forms of violence reduces the chances for the majority of people to flourish. The Franciscan tradition has long favored social justice, something that is sometimes lost when St. Francis is commoditized to point of being reduced to a mere garden ornament (Nothwehr 2012a). In this light, it is telling that Pope Francis is advocating a Church for the poor within a global perspective. Moreover, this orientation is connected to his understanding of positive peace:

> Peace in society cannot be understood as pacification or the mere absence of violence resulting from the domination of one part of society over others. Nor does true peace act as a pretext for justifying a social structure which silences or appeases the poor, so that the more affluent can placidly support their lifestyle while others have to make do as they can. Demands involving the distribution of wealth, concern for the poor and human rights cannot be suppressed under the guise of creating a consensus on paper or a transient peace for a contented minority. The dignity of the human person and the common good rank higher than the comfort of those who refuse to renounce their
privileges. When these values are threatened, a prophetic voice must be raised (Francis, 2013e: para. 218).

Here, a prophetic voice for social justice and the common good is not solely about justice within a given society, but also touches on a form of equality within the community of nations that will ultimately benefit the whole Earth community. In this light, Francis is moving towards making the culture of the institutions of Catholicism reflect the poor and, by extension, more fully incarnate principles of integral social justice.

**Participatory Democracy**

Positive peace and wide participation are intimately linked for peace theorists (cf. Galtung, 1967). St. Francis encouraged a great emancipation of the Christian community by bringing the gospel to the marginalized and preaching to non-human animals. Leonardo Boff (2011) reads this approach as setting a foundation for a socio-cosmic democracy, which includes participation and voice for all members of the Earth community. Green political theorists are also proposing ways to allow all people to participate in decision-making, accountability and transparency of governance when they invoke participatory democracy (cf. Eckersley, 2004). These outcomes are supported by a deeply egalitarian society, which values the dignity of all participants so that power does not corrupt the process. In contrast, it is often noted that the Catholic Church is not a democracy. However, the possibilities for a 1.2 billion person member organization (BBC Staff, 2013) with a presence in diverse contexts around the world scintillating for its potential to integrate participatory insights. More than a glimmer of this potential is recognizable in the collegiality of Vatican II (cf. De Roo, 2012), which Francis has affirmed he supports. Moreover, Pope Francis’ current imperative for meaningful consultation may represent a significant move in this regard as may his advocacy for cultures of encounter and dialogue.

**Nonviolence**

Nonviolent solutions require creativity, solidarity, participation and a commitment to fostering cultures of peace (cf. Boulding, 2000). As I will explore in greater depth below, both St. Francis and Pope Francis can be considered models in this regard. For example, in the run up to the “Day of Prayer and Fasting for Peace in Syria” (September 2013), Francis said the event was undertaken: “in in a spirit of penitence, to ask from God this great gift [of peace] for the beloved Syrian nation and for all the situations of conflict and violence in the world” (Francis, 2013d). He continued in the same vein when during his 2014 Easter message, which was broadcast around the world, when he extolled the need for peace in Ukraine, Syria, Venezuela, South Sudan and the Central African Republic (Francis, 2014c).

Francis further upheld the importance of substantive peace in relation to the situation of religious minorities in Northern Iraq, condemning the oppression and “intolerable suffering of those who only wish to live in peace, harmony and freedom in the land of their forefathers” (Francis, 2014f). At the same time (August 2014), Pope Francis’ first visit to Asia was explicitly themed around peace and reconciliation on the Korean Peninsula. Noteworthy is that Pope Francis has a full conception of not only peace, which includes both positive and negative dimensions, but he also is cognizant of the reach of violence as indicated in these comments from an address given during
his visit to the Grand Mufti of Jerusalem as part of his May 2014 pilgrimage to the Holy Land:
“May we respect and love one another as brothers and sisters! May we learn to understand the
sufferings of others! May no one abuse the name of God through violence!” (Francis 2014d).

*Sustainability*

For peace to be sustainable it requires a long term view that fosters positive relationships. St.
Francis’ renunciation of the culture of consumption and militarism fosters a method for simple
living that represents a deeply sustainable way to go about being faithful in the world. In the same
spirit, Pope Francis (2014b) has condemned a “throwaway culture” that wastes life and food,
damaging people and the ecological world. In the same address, Francis concludes with his “wish
to mention another threat to peace, which arises from the greedy exploitation of environmental
resources….Here too what is crucial is responsibility on the part of all in pursuing, in a spirit of
fraternity, policies respectful of this earth which is our common home” (2014b). He also offers a
recipe for sustainable and resilient communities in advocating for bringing those persons on the
margins of society into relationship with everyone. Participation in such a shift helps to remove
alienation from any violent revolutionary mix and thus is a form of peacebuilding in and of itself.

*Respect for Diversity*

In theological peace ecology terms, respect for diversity is often centered on respect for the dignity
of the human person and the integrity of creation (cf. Delio 2009, Boff 2011). St. Francis’ close
association with animals, people of different classes, cultures and religions has been brought
forward as personifying an embrace of diversity. Though without changing church doctrine on
same sex relationships, Pope Francis has been personally modeling respect for diversity, perhaps
most famously stating: “If someone is gay and he searches for the Lord and has go
d good will, who
am I to judge? …The tendency [to homosexuality] is not the problem….They’re our brothers”
(Francis, 2013c). It was these unscripted remarks, whose origins lie in an admittedly gendered
response to a reporter’s question during an impromptu press conference on the plane ride back
from his trip to Brazil for World Youth Day (July 2013) that tipped the balance in favor of Francis
earning *Time* magazine’s person of the year for 2013. The subtitle of the *Time* cover story named
him as the “people’s pope” (Chua-Eoan and Dias, 2013). Adding layers to such a description and
invoking the symbolism of Jesus’ model of servant leadership, Pope Francis has also washed the
feet of young prisoners, including those of a Muslim girl, and, in 2001, of persons living with Aids
in both Italy and Argentina. Ultimately, respect for diversity is at the heart of the pastoral charm
for both St. Francis and Pope Francis.

In another noteworthy and unscripted moment in November, 2013, Pope Francis spontaneously
embraced Vinicio Riva, who is a person living with neurofibromatosis, during a general audience
in St. Peter’s Square. This and other episodes in the new papacy demonstrate an emancipatory
approach to diversity. Further, they recall the story of St. Francis’ courage in embracing lepers
(cf. Nothwehr 2012a). Citing a foundation in this regard, Pope Francis (2013d) has written that
peace is an “opus solidaritatis” growing from our status as relational beings. Ultimately, it is this
vision of solidarity permeating integral relationships, though not without its flaws in either case,
which underlies the premise that both the Franciscan tradition and Pope Francis offer resources for
fostering substantive peace in our time.
St. Francis, Pope Francis and Green Peacemaking

One of the most well-known stories from the life of St. Francis points to his remarkable aptitude for peacemaking. It tells of him transforming a situation where the people of the village of Gubbio were caught in an apparently intractable conflict with a wolf, who seemed to want to eat all the villagers. At the same time, the villagers wished to kill the wolf. Despite the extreme hostility, Francis was able to craft a mutually enhancing peace deal between the wolf and the people of Gubbio. This was a forgiveness-based solution that saw the wolf live out the rest of his days in the community. Whether apocryphal or not, in light of the categories explored above, the power of this story, Francis helping to break a spiral of violence, along with the subsequent peace transforming the villagers orientation towards its most feared enemy and welcoming the wolf to live amongst them, demonstrates how the medieval saint’s legacy can provide inspiration green peacemaking.

Pope Francis has also displayed the aptitude of a peacemaker who addresses the green principles. In terms of geo-politics, we can support this assertion by referencing his peacebuilding discussions with Vladimir Putin over Syria and publicly offering “his house” at the Vatican to Palestinian and Israeli leaders as a place of mutual prayer for peace during his May 2014 visit to the Holy Land. This invitation was virtually impossible to decline and subsequently brought the images of Presidents of Palestine and Israel, Mahmoud Abbas and Shimon Peres, embracing in the Vatican gardens with Pope Francis looking on (June 2014). That occasion also included participation of the (Eastern Orthodox) Ecumenical Patriarch Barthomew I, and other Christian, Jewish, and Muslim leaders who joined together in multi-linguistic prayers representing their faith traditions intentions for “peace in the Holy Land, in the Middle East and in the entire world accompanied by the prayers of countless people of different cultures, nations, languages and religions” (Francis, 2014e). On that remarkable day, Francis spoke of peace in a way that resonates well with the Peace and Conflict Transformation Studies literature (cf. Boulding, 2000; Lederach, 2005):

> Peacemaking calls for courage, much more so than warfare. It calls for the courage to say yes to encounter and no to conflict: yes to dialogue and no to violence; yes to negotiations and no to hostilities; yes to respect for agreements and no to acts of provocation; yes to sincerity and no to duplicity. All of this takes courage, it takes strength and tenacity (Francis 2014e).

On a more micro-level, Francis’ success in undertaking the hard work of being a peacemaker is perhaps more effective, as evidenced poignantly by the fact that many who previously disagreed on a whole host of issues remain highly supportive of the direction taken by the present papacy. One factor operative here is that Francis has thus far been able to avoid entrenching himself in left and right wing ideologies which have caused division within and between local Roman Catholic churches. Perhaps he, like Green politics, is offering an alternative to dominant ideologies.

In any case, Francis is operating out of the papal office in a manner that revitalizes its function as a symbol of unity. Lasting and substantive witness for peace transforms a culture by moving relationships from fear and destruction towards love and mutuality (cf. Lederach 1997, 2001, 2005). With the advantage of time, it is simple to discern how Francis of Assisi came to represent
such a peace witness. If Pope Francis can tactfully reorient the Roman Catholic Church to the point that it incarnates green principles, we will undoubtedly be able to not only see a transformation in that church but also in the wider world.

More simply put, Pope Francis employing his office to foster green peace or even a greener peace would be a substantive witness for which is needed in our time, when consequences of challenges like global climate change on the world’s most vulnerable make it increasingly untenable to separate social, political and ecological qualities of positive peace (see Hrynkow and O’Hara, 2014). It is in this light, that I truly hope, and indeed pray, that Francis is laying the proper foundations that will allow for the nurturing of a church for the poor with a global perspective. Any movement towards such a green transformation has the potential to make a tangible global impact. Moreover, any prospect for realizing the potential of Catholics and all people of good will in this regard recalls both the fondest hopes and concrete suggestions of another namesake of St. Francis (who, remember, was christened Giovanni), Pope St. John XXIII (1963), for peace on Earth. Grounding and building upon John XXIII’s legacy, this transformation would, to adapt Thomas of Celano’s description, be representative of the Roman Catholic Church making “a tongue” out of both its structure and example, helping to foster the incarnation of diverse expressions of cultures of peace in this world.

References


Target the 90 Percenters: Comedian Todd Glass’s Social Justice Crusade

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TARGET THE 90 PERCENTERS: COMEDIAN TODD GLASS’S SOCIAL JUSTICE CRUSADE

Abstract

This paper draws attention to comedian Todd Glass’s social justice efforts, which focus not on individuals who are on the extreme ends of any given social justice issue, but rather on the people Glass terms “90 percenters” – people who are 90 percent on board, but who need to go a bit farther in terms of compassion, awareness, or action. Glass points out that small wrongs can “hurt like paper cuts,” and that helping generally good-hearted individuals realize the pain they are inadvertently causing can go a long way in making people’s lives better. The purpose of this paper is to highlight Glass’s innovative methods of promoting social justice, and to explore the ways in which Glass’s methods can be put to use by ordinary citizens in their day to day encounters with 90 percenters.

Introduction

In 2012, after 45 years in the closet, comedian Todd Glass went on the podcast WTF with Marc Maron and came out publically as homosexual. Glass cited the large number of suicides by gay teens and adults as his motivation for coming out, reasoning that if his action were to help even one gay teen feel less alone, it was the right thing to do. Coming out wasn’t enough, however. While Glass has always been socially conscious, since 2012, he has become a vocal social justice spokesman, using his comedic voice not only to promote equality and inclusiveness not only for
homosexuals, but for all manner of contemporary social justice issues, such as global climate change, capital punishment, and animal rights. This paper will explain Glass’s particular approach to advocating for social justice, and will demonstrate that his chosen method is especially useful to ordinary people who care about promoting social justice in their daily lives.

The 90 Percenters

On any given issue, one’s support can range from outright opposition to full on support. Often when considering controversial subjects, the people in between these extremes are overlooked. This leads to thinking about how best to make social progress through dialogue and communication from the perspective of convincing those with whom we disagree completely. Person A thinks homosexuality is morally abhorrent and person B thinks there is nothing wrong with it. A and B both have reasons for their views and they imagine the world a better place if those with the opposing perspective came around to their view in light of those reasons. This rarely happens, however. In reality, A and B start from such radically different places in their beliefs that it is hard for either of them to find common ground in their reasoning. This results in talking in circles, talking past one another, or outright yelling. Time and energy are wasted and, more damaging to those trying to bring about social change, there is a sense of defeat and impotency for those trying to have the dialogue.

Todd Glass is a smart guy, and he’s given a lot of thought to the question of how he can be the most helpful in promoting social justice causes. An answer he came to early on is his belief that it is fruitless to target the extremes. He knows that most of the people who hear him are not outright bigots or homophobes – those people wouldn’t come to one of his shows or listen to his podcast. Recognizing the built-in nature of his audience, along with a pragmatic desire to focus his attention on the people he thinks he’s most likely to convince, Glass has chosen to focus his social justice efforts on the group he terms the “90 percenters,” people who are 90 percent on board regarding a social justice issue but who still retain a nagging 10 percent of close-mindedness, bigotry, etc. (Glass 2012).

90 percenters are the individuals who, for example, say they are “fine with people being gay,” but feel they should not “have” to witness same sex public displays of affection. They’re the ones who don’t see why gay marriage is so important, arguing that civil unions would do just as well. They drop little comments about “illegals,” perpetuate racial stereotypes with slight, throw away off-hand comments. They intellectually accept the reality of global climate change yet take no action to reduce their own carbon footprint. They crack the occasional inappropriate joke about women. Yet, 90 percenters do not appear to harbor actual hate. They would never be deliberately cruel to a member of a marginalized group. They’re simply not quite there yet – and Glass has made it his mission to help them go these extra few steps. An important hallmark of this group is their ignorance. They lack the imagination to see that “separate but equal” is not equal at all; that a small comment they don’t even remember can have a huge impact on someone else’s self-perception, that true belief must be supported by corresponding action (Glass & Grotstein 2014).

Glass’s decision to focus on the 90 percenters is both pragmatic and innovative. As regular people with no immediate power to change law, there’s not a lot of practical work we can do with regard to the full-on bigots. This is not to say that work doesn’t need to be done, but that it is better left
to professionals – lawmakers who can legislate behavior, and professionals who might actually be able to change hearts. For lay people wanting to make a difference, focusing on those who just need a little more of a push to become 100 percenters is a really smart idea, one that Glass deserves kudos for promoting. But how, exactly, does Glass believe 90 percenters can be turned into 100 percenters? Since Glass argues that much of the residual 10 percent bigotry or lack of commitment to taking the actions necessary to bring about change is due to ignorance, the best way to tackle it is through education. As a comic, Glass chooses to educate not by throwing out a lot of statistics or step-by-step rational arguments, but through humor. Each step of his method will be examined in the following sections.

**Assume Good Will**

When dealing with 90 percenters, the best approach is to assume that thoughtless comments, questionable jokes, and problematic language are not intended to be harmful, but are rather the result of ignorance. Approaching individuals and attempting correction will be more effective if everyone feels like they’re on the same team. If the social justice advocate can make the 90 percenters feel grateful for the education, rather than defensive, the corrective measure will be far more effective. This necessitates approaching individuals with an attitude of care and camaraderie, rather than hostility or preachyness. An attitude of “hey, I bet you never thought of it this way,” as opposed to, “hey, you’re doing something wrong,” can go a long way towards promoting a productive conversation, rather than shutting your interlocutor down. Since 90 percenters already share the majority of the core beliefs of 100 percenters, getting into a place of like-minded dialogue shouldn’t be too difficult (Glass & Grotstein 2014).

The most consistent way in which Glass works to convert 90 percenters into 100 percenters is by *talking with them*. This may seem like a no-brainer, but Glass spends a considerable amount of time engaging in public dialogues (on radio and television shows, on podcasts, and in live venues) with people of differing viewpoints. Part of Glass’s technique is to allow his audience to witness his own progression of ideas. He listens to alternative viewpoints, and demonstrates a willingness to change his mind in light of new information. He is willing to admit he was wrong, and to graciously, even thankfully accept new information that disproves something he previously believed. For instance, Glass himself used the word “tranny” on his podcast, not realizing the word is understood as offensive within the transgender community. Upon correction, Glass apologized for his mistake and thanks those who pointed it out to him (Glass 2014, March 7). Glass does this deliberately, as a way of modeling for his audience that it is not shameful, that it does not mean you “lose,” if it turns out you held a view that you have now come to believe is wrong. Glass works to show that changing one’s view should be celebrated, as it marks a progression closer to truth (Lobell 2014).

**Address the Language**

Perhaps Glass’s most influential contributions to the promotion of social justice are his arguments concerning language. According to Glass, we need to be mindful not just to avoid speaking with malice, but to avoid using language that has unintended negative affects on those with whom we are speaking. As philosopher Stephanie Ross points out, words can harm through the metaphorical effect they have on one’s sense of identity. For instance, terms that might seem endearing, such as
calling a woman “doll,” or “baby,” can cause a woman to see herself as helpless, lacking autonomy, and something to be controlled. This can be deliberate, but often is not. Regardless, Ross argues that the psychological effect it can have on the subject of the term, as well as on others who hear it, can be significant (Ross 1981).

Glass’s own experience attests to Ross’s claim that words that are not aimed at harm can still do so. His most powerful example is the use of the word “gay” as a pejorative, even when the speaker is not targeting a homosexual person. Glass explains the insidious effect of hearing the word, and other similar words, as he was growing up and struggling to come to terms with his sexual identity:

I buried whatever thoughts and feelings I was experiencing as fast as I could. When I look back and wonder why I felt like I had to hide from everyone, one reason stands out above all the others: From a very young age I heard the word “gay” used as a pejorative term. The word…was almost always used to express dislike or distaste, a substitute for “different,” “weird,” “or “out of the ordinary.”

“That car is so gay.”

“What are you, a homo?”

“Don’t be such a faggot.”

…Every time someone said those words, it felt like a paper cut. The little wounds kept building and building until all I could hear was: “Gaygayfaggotsissygayhomogayfairypants gaygay…” (Glass & Grotstein 2014).

Philosopher Charles Lawrence points out that such language can be paralyzingly difficult to respond to, because for a homosexual to deny that he is a ‘faggot,’ or an African American to deny that she is a ‘nigger,’ “it is not sufficient to deny the truth of the word’s application, to say, ‘I am not a faggot.’ One must deny the truth of the word’s meaning, a meaning shouted from the rooftops by the rest of the world a million times a day” (Lawrence 1990). Such words are so hurtful because they pinpoint a truth of one’s identity (such as race or sexual orientation), but package it into a negatively value-laden term so that the target is dared to deny the truth (that one is a person of color, or a homosexual, for instance) as the only means of denying the negativity that has been bundled with it. Deny your identity, or accept the negativity – there’s no way to win, which is just what the verbal attacker was going for.

While these words can and are used as a deliberate means of hurting and silencing people, Glass goes on to explain that in many cases he does not think the people using those words intended harm, in fact many of them would have been horrified if they realized the silent pain they were causing him. This is characteristic of the 90 percenters, and is indicative of why they are such an important group to try and reach – they often honestly do not realize they are doing anything wrong. If someone knows he is hurting people, and in fact wants to hurt people, about the only ways to get him to stop will be legislation or brute force. But 90 percenters just need to be shown
that their actions are inadvertently causing pain, and they will be moved to change their behavior on their own.

Glass spends a lot of time talking about words: how they can hurt, and also how they can heal. He stresses how important it is for speakers to think about their word choices, to choose language that is inclusive, and to consider the pain that the inadvertent butt of a pejorative term might feel. Just as he felt pain and the need to conceal his identify upon hearing the word “gay” being tossed around negatively, even though it was not directed at him, Glass asks his audiences to think about people they might unintentionally be harming when using other pejorative terms, such as “retarded.” The fact that the speaker doesn’t intend harm is really beside the point – if harm is caused, the speaker is still culpable. As speakers, Glass argues we are responsible for the impact our words have on their listeners. Since we cannot know the effect our words might have, we ought to exercise caution when speaking, and be as sensitive and inclusive as possible. Better to accidentally make someone feel good with your speech than to inadvertently make someone who’s already having a hard time feel even a little worse (Carolla 2012).

Make It Funny

Comedians are not known for their sensitive language. In fact, easy laughs have long been bought at the expense of marginalized groups and the individuals located at the extremes of an issue (consider the most recent series of rape jokes that have lead to controversy), sometimes with ill will and sometimes simply in pursuit of a good punch line. Glass calls out other comedians as well as regular citizens when they complain that his injunction to avoid certain words restricts their artistic freedom and basically amounts to censorship. If an individual finds it impossible to be funny, or to adequately express herself, without using words that negatively target a marginalized group, well, that individual must not be very funny, or have a very good command of language. Glass and many other comedians have built successful careers without falling back on cheap, insensitive jokes. It’s also important to note that refraining from using words like “gay” pejoratively does not mean shying away from the subject of sexual orientation altogether. On the contrary, Glass’s project hinges on the open discussion of sensitive subjects. The best way to make a gay person feel comfortable enough to come out is to make it clear, through one’s words and actions, that being gay is no different than being red haired or left handed (Glass & Grotstein 2014).

A prime example of using humor to help one come to terms with difficult truths came from Glass’s own comedic community, when he himself experienced difficulty openly identifying as gay after so many years in the closet. Rather than being silent, or even solemnly supportive, Glass’s comedian friends use their craft to laugh with, rather than laugh at, Glass and his situation. After listening to Glass admit on WTF with Marc Maron that he was afraid of being typecast as “the gay comedian,” Jeff Garlin greeted him with a boisterous shout out to his “favorite gay comic” across a crowded comedy venue, turning Glass’s fear into a laugh. Jim Gaffigan asked if his roommate Chris knew (Chris was Todd’s boyfriend), and Marc Maron joked in the forward to Glass’s book, The Todd Glass Situation, that Glass has to check in regularly to confirm that he’s still gay, as if it’s something that might go away (Glass & Grotstein 2014). Comedienne Jen Kirkman takes every opportunity to maintain a running joke regarding romantic rumors between the two of them, sometimes complaining loudly that she can’t get Glass to stop hitting on her, at other times fretting
that she worries he might have taken an interest in other women (Glass 2013 & Glass 2014, May 16).

The genius of these jokes is that they serve as subtle nudges to the 90 percenters. If you laugh at the Kirkman or Maron bits it is because of the absurdity of expecting a gay man to become straight. While this is funny, it also reminds audiences that any similar expectations they hear people voice in a non-humorous context are equally absurd. Similarly, the humor of Garlin’s bit is that it is ludicrous to think Todd’s friends and colleagues, who know him well, would suddenly begin to identify him primarily by his sexual orientation. In hearing this joke, the 90 percenters are reminded that identifying an individual in terms of her sexual orientation, ethnicity, or other irrelevant factor is also wrong-headed. Talking about Susan, the Asian from work, is just as inappropriate as talking about Todd, my favorite gay comedian.

A Method for the Masses

Todd Glass uses his comedic power and his ability to draw an audience to try and turn 90 percenters into 100 percenters. He seeks to help already tolerant, right-minded people to recognize their remaining problem areas and to turn them into full-on supporters of social justice causes. A great advantage of Glass’s method is that it’s particularly conducive to use by ordinary people who care about social justice – rather than being a full time job, it is something each of us can do as we go about our daily lives. Glass encourages all people to speak up when they hear something that isn’t right, or that could be better. He offers tips for how to do this effectively, coating a serious message in a sweet layer of funny to help it go down easier. For example, when one finds herself in a situation where an individual is saying something ignorant, intolerant, or wrong-minded, Glass recommends asking the speaker how old he is, and following the answer up by expressing shock that the speaker isn’t more elderly, given that he “talks like an old person.” Glass advises drawing the bit out, assuring the speaker that he’s not judging him for his beliefs, but instead is simply incredulous that someone of his age would be talking like that. Glass argues that this display of persistent befuddlement will jar the speaker into realizing how absurd his own words sound without infusing the situation with tension or hostility (Ray & Nanjiani 2014).

Letting everyone in the room know that you stand as an advocate for social justice can go so far in helping a struggling individual feel more comfortable with her identity. It can be the push someone needs to enact changes in their own lives. Speaking up when someone uses a word that can cause harm, whether it appears to be meant maliciously or not, can change minds and change vocabularies. Anyone can be a leader in increasing the atmosphere of acceptance in the public spaces they occupy. This is how change happens, with each of us, refusing to remain silent not only when we witness an egregious wrong, but when we observe small moments that might, as Glass put it, be assaulting some silently struggling person with countless paper cuts.

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Shifting Practices of Peace: What is the Current State of Unarmed Civilian Peacekeeping?

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**SHIFTING PRACTICES OF PEACE: WHAT IS THE CURRENT STATE OF UNARMED CIVILIAN PEACEKEEPING?**

**Abstract**

Unarmed civilian peacekeeping (UCP) has grown in recognition and practice in the past several decades. Evidence suggests that UCP is as effective as traditional military peacekeeping operations, but is more cost-effective and more likely to assist local civil society organizations to build long lasting peace. However, a comprehensive account of the state of UCP, including location, organizations, activities, training and risks remains elusive. This paper offers a description and analysis of unarmed civilian peacekeeping activities from 1990 to the present, by gathering information from the literature, organizational websites and from a survey sent to organizations. Notable findings include: UCP has grown significantly since 1990, as evidenced by widening geographical presence and growth of UCP organizations. Additionally, while there have been injuries and fatalities, the rate is lower than for traditional military peacekeeping. Finally, information regarding training, principles and activities prompts reflections on issues such as appropriate and best practices, challenges in defining UCP, and the implications of core values.

**Introduction**

Unarmed Civilian Peacekeeping (UCP) is a concept that has grown in theory and practice over the past several decades. Perhaps known best by the activity of providing protective accompaniment
to civilians in situations of potential violence, UCP has evolved from several small organizations to a large array of groups that implement a wide spectrum of sophisticated and evidence-based activities with international influence. UCP represents a conscious shift away from perpetuating the cycle of violence by utilizing nonviolent interventions to reduce violence in both local and global conflicts. It is a response to the call to go beyond simply condemning war, to also engage in effective strategies to reduce global reliance on military operations, and to engage in processes that create and nurture authentic cultures of peace.

Unarmed Civilian Peacekeeping has been touted as “the next generation of peacekeeping” (Tshiband, 2010) and has been showcased as “transforming the world’s response to conflict” (Nonviolent Peaceforce, 2014a) because it is effective (Mahoney, 2006; Schirch, 2006) and likely much less costly than traditional military peacekeeping missions (Schweitzer, no date; Tshiband, 2010). Thus in many ways, UCP represents a transformative shift in how we respond to violence both at the local and global levels. However, In spite of the increase in activity, a common definition of UCP remains elusive, as does a comprehensive account of the number and size of operations, nature of strategies, length of training for personnel and risks associated with the work. The purpose of this study is to describe the current state of UCP in terms of these aspects. Information presented represents UCP activities from 1990 to the present. By attempting to compile all UCP activities over the past several decades, it is hoped that progress can be made to achieve an accurate and common understanding of activities and trends, method of defining UCP, and to document the scope, breadth and trends of its practice globally. A systematic description of current practices will also hopefully identify gaps in terms of information on UCP as well as variations and inconsistencies in ways organizations, practitioners and researchers interpret the role of UCP.

Background Information

Unarmed Civilian peacekeeping has already been described with great detail in the literature (see Schweitzer, 2010; Schirch, 2006; Mahoney & Eguren, 1997), but nonetheless remains a term not well-recognized outside humanitarian and activist circles (Godbout, 2012).

Unarmed Civilian Peacekeeping (UCP) utilizes non-military (civilian) personnel to perform various roles traditionally conducted by armed soldiers. The goal is the same: to prevent or reduce direct violence between warring factions or to protect civilians from being targeted by violent conflict. Whereas traditional peacekeeping operations, best known by United Nations Blue Helmets, seek to reduce violence through the implicit or explicit threat of using violence or military force against those who do not comply, unarmed civilian peacekeepers utilize nonviolent strategies to influence parties to refrain from violence. Nonviolent forms of influence include the power of moral authority, economic and political leverage, media attention, specialized training in nonviolent strategies (such as mediation, de-escalation and relationship building), the power of numbers and specialized communication strategies such as rumor control (Schirch 2006).

Peacekeeping, whether traditional or unarmed, is often juxtaposed against the concepts of peacebuilding and peacemaking, whereby peacebuilding involves addressing the political, economic and social determinants of violence in order to create positive peace, and peacemaking involves diplomatic efforts such as mediation and negotiation to resolve conflict before it becomes
violent. Peacekeeping is a more specific activity, typically involving a third party preventing groups in conflict from harming each other, and thus ideally creating the space for peacebuilding and peacemaking to occur (Galtung, 1996).

Peacekeeping has evolved greatly over the past 60 years and is now more often implemented with complimentary peacebuilding and peacemaking activities, often blurring the lines among these three interrelated activities. Peacekeeping, however, is still primarily viewed as a military endeavor. While traditional military peacekeeping has demonstrated effectiveness in reducing violence between warring parties and protecting civilians in the process (Koko & Essis, 2012), unarmed civilian peacekeeping is touted as going beyond the goal of reducing violence (negative peace) to actively building cultures of peace, by engaging and building local capacity, and by challenging the belief that arms and violence are the most effective deterrents to violence.

Utilizing unarmed civilians to reduce violence against civilians and between warring parties probably goes back for centuries, and was popularized by Gandhi’s vision of a peace army or “shanti sena” (Weber, 1996), which created a nonviolent effective force in curtailing violence between groups, and influenced current groups engaged in UCP. Following Gandhi’s example, the number of UCP organizations has greatly expanded since the early 1990’s (Mahoney and Eguren, 1996). When UCP organizations sprouted up in the eighties and nineties, often faith based western responses to human rights crises in the global south (such as Central America), organizations relied upon volunteers with minimal training and shoe string budgets. UCP has evolved since that time, both in scope and in sophistication, as evidenced by the conceptual framework developed by Nonviolent Peaceforce (2014b) outlining key principles, skills, methodologies and sources of guidance for UCP, and by the development of a comprehensive curriculum to educate students of UCP. UCP has now found its way into the discourse of the United Nations by tying its principles and actions to current nomenclature of humanitarian work, including the concepts of protection of civilians (POC), responsibility to protect (R2P), human rights law and the building of cultures of peace (Nonviolent Peaceforce, 2014b).

Further evidence of UCP’s expanding scope can be demonstrated by the creation of domestic UCP programs that target violence in urban neighbourhoods (for example, Cure Violence) and in schools (for example Chicago School Project), grounding UCP in the broad rubric of nonviolence and building cultures of peace.

With this seemingly rapid expansion of both scope and application of the practices of UCP, it seems timely to take stock of where and how UCP is occurring around the globe. Specifically, this project has undertaken the quest to describe the following:

- What organizations are engaged in UCP?
- Where is UCP occurring?
- What does UCP look like?
- How are UCP practitioners trained?
- What are the outcomes?
- What are the risks to UCP practitioners?
Methodology

Because no standardized definition of unarmed civilian peacekeeping exists, developing inclusion criteria for UCP organizations erred on the side of inclusion, using broad criteria, hoping to ensure all organizations and projects engaged in UCP would be captured by this study. As Carriere states (personal communication, December 6, 2013) “UCP is like a harmonica... you define it one way, you get a lot of projects; but defining it another way, you get much less”. For the purposes of this project, organizations were included if a) they engaged in one of the main strategies of UCP (accompaniment, protective presence, monitoring and reporting), b) the organization had an “on-the-ground” presence in the area they were working, and c) the organization utilized nonviolent principles and strategies. Utilizing these criteria excluded organizations whose main purpose is to gather information on human rights issues (such as Amnesty international). Although monitoring and reporting is a key component to UCP, in itself is not comprehensive enough to be considered peacekeeping. The criterion of nonviolence excluded some large organizations such as the United Nations, who do have civilian teams engaged in peacekeeping. However, current data on UN operations made it difficult to separate their unarmed peacekeeping from their conventional military operations, and also from other United Nations civilian staff whose work would more typically fall under peacemaking or peacebuilding activities. The list of organizations and projects (for simplicity, referred to as “organizations” henceforward) was gathered through literature search and consultation of UCP practitioners. Ultimately, a list of 50 organizations that engaged in UCP activities from 1990 to the present was formulated. Organizations that did not meet the criteria included organizations that stopped UCP activities before 1990, and organizations whose activities primarily focussed on peacebuilding (for example Friends Peace Teams) or did not have a long standing presence on the ground (for example Bahrain Witness). Arriving at a precise number of UCP organizations was complicated by the fact that organizations often collaborated to form coalitions with new names. For example, in Haiti, a number of UCP organizations coordinated their efforts under this new name of Cry for Justice. Another collaboration example is ACOGUATE, which is a coalition of up to eleven organizations from around the world, who coordinate UCP efforts in Guatemala. Table One lists the fifty organizations that were included in this study.

Table 1: Fifty Organizations that have engaged in UCP Activities since 1990

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Organization</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AAPGuatemala</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ACOGUATE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Balkan Peace Teams (Otverene Oci)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Beati I Construttori di pace</td>
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<tr>
<td>Breaking the Silence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cadena para un retorno acompanado (CAREA)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Christian Peacemaker Teams</td>
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<tr>
<td>Collectif Guatemala</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cry for Justice Coalition</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cure Violence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ecumenical Accompaniment Program in Palestine and Israel (EAPPI)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fellowship of Reconciliation</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Next, information gathered on the activities of these 50 organizations was gleaned using the following methodologies: literature review, review of organizational websites and a written survey sent out electronically to the 39 organizations that were thought to be currently operating.

Utilizing these sources, information was gathered on the following topics: locations of activities, length of operations, length of training, number of UCP staff/volunteers, types of UCP activities,
organizational principles, risks to UCP personnel, and mission outcomes. Twenty-two organizations responded. Of those who did not respond, it is unclear in some cases whether the organization (or at least the website) was still operational. In one case, the website URL disappeared and was replaced with a dating service. Of the 22 organizations that did respond, the overwhelming majority commented that the questions were difficult to answer, as organizational records were either non-existent, incomplete or were kept in numerous sites; a common theme among these responses was that organizational capacity was stretched in order to complete the survey. One organization stated that their records no longer existed as their computers had been seized by the police.

By the end of the data collection phase, some organizations had been contacted up to four times with no response. Nonetheless, all of the 22 organizations that responded acknowledged that they considered themselves an organization conducting UCP, thereby validating that the criteria used for this study were sufficiently specific.

**Results and Discussion**

**Growth and Distribution of UCP**

The map in Figure One highlights the countries and regions where UCP organizations have operated since 1990, as well as cumulatively showing how many organizations have operated in each country or region.

**Figure One: Number of UCP Operations by Country/Region since 1990**
It is worthy to note the wide distribution, including implementation of projects on six continents. The number of organizations per region, however, indicates that some countries and regions, such as Colombia, Guatemala and Israel/Palestine, support a proportionally high number of UCP activities. In total, 35 countries and regions have engaged UCP missions, by a total of 50 organizations since 1990.

Table Two highlights the growth of the number of UCP organizations by way of a timeline. The overall growth from 1990 to 2014 is fivefold: an increase from 7 to 35 organizations.

This study intended to measure the growth of UCP by utilizing number of UCP practitioners. However, very few organizations had sufficiently reliable statistics to be able to determine overall numbers of UCP practitioners, let alone temporal trends. Therefore, the data allowed only for highlighting the growth in number of organizations.

Table Three displays the spread of UCP over time, to increasingly larger number of countries and regions.
A comparison of the information presented in Tables Two and Three demonstrates that the geographical growth is less than the growth of organizations. In other words, more organizations have been practicing in similar regions. Colombia represents a good example; by 2014, fourteen organizations were engaged in UCP in that country, an increase from just one organization in 1994.

Most of the 50 organizations included in this study do not publicize their annual budgets. However, several of the larger organizations, such as Peace Brigades International, include this financial information on their website. For example, the Peace Brigades International annual budget increased from $282,406 in 1992 to 2,611,301 in 2013 – an increase of over nine times, not accounting for inflation. It is not possible to interpret whether Peace Brigades growth is typical; nonetheless, the data suggest that UCP has grown in the past 24 years in many ways: in quantity of organizations, in growth within organizations, and in geographic proliferation.

The significant rise in UCP does raise important issues. Firstly, it implies that UCP is gaining in popularity, perhaps due to its effectiveness and/or due to growing popularity. It is not clear from these figures whether the increase in supply of UCP is in response to an increase in demand. If there is an increase in demand, it is also unclear if this is due to increased awareness, increased need, or both.

Additionally, as the number of organizations practicing UCP increases, there is potential for great disparity in understanding, philosophy and practices of UCP. However, there has been a great deal of coordination among organizations, as evidenced by groups collaborating under an umbrella group (as with Cry for Justice in Haiti) or groups from various countries recruiting and training volunteers where they are coordinated in the target country by another organization (as with ACOGUATE in Guatemala).

**Training for UCP Practitioners**

The training of UCP practitioners has an important impact on the overall work of UCP operations. Training Information was gathered on 13 of the organizations. Table Four highlights the length of training for individuals who are commissioned to do UCP.

![Table 4: Length of Training for Unarmed Civiclian Peacekeepers by organization (N=13)](image)
The table describes a range of 1 to 42 days for UCP training, with a median training period of 10 days. Training consisted of a variety of delivery methods, including online self-study and small group workshops. Typically, organizations provided initial training in the practitioner’s country of origin, followed by more training in the country of the operation.

Although length and quality of training were not used as criteria in this study to determine whether an organization’s activities qualified as UCP, quality and content of curriculum may be something that will be considered for inclusion criteria in the future, as UCP continues to grow, mature and increase in legitimacy and stature. The scrutiny to which foreign UCP personnel in Guatemala were subjected is described by Mahoney and Egan (1997), where North American and European accompaniers were often stereotyped by government officials as having naïve analysis coupled with questionable training. Considering the critical situations in which UCP personnel are placed, and the scrutiny and potential mistrust that are inherent in working with parties in conflict, it stands to reason that training will continue to be an issue at the forefront of UCP evolution.

UCP Activities and Principles

An intention of this study was to systematically describe the specific activities of UCP that were utilized by the individual organizations. Data from 49 organizations, utilizing definitions of eleven activities of UCP (such as protective accompaniment, information gathering and reporting), was gathered. Definitions were adapted from a list developed by Nonviolent Peaceforce (2014b) and were included in the surveys to assist participant organizations in categorizing their work with consistency. Table Five displays the frequency in which organizations engaged in various activities.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 5: Number of Organizations Engaging in Various UCP Activities</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Accompaniment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Observing/Reporting</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Protective Presence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inter-positioning</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Relationship Building</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Training</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Solidarity/Nonviolent Action</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Diplomacy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Early Warning/Early Response</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Creation of Safe Spaces</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rumor Control</td>
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</table>

Not surprisingly, the two most frequent activities reported were accompaniment and observing/reporting of human rights abuses. However, a notable limitation in interpreting this data is that the organizations who completed the survey reported engaging in many more activities than those organizations whose information was taken from their website. It is possible, therefore,
that complete information of activities is not articulated on organizational websites. Additionally, although clear definitions for the activities were provided, it is likely that due to some overlap in not only the definitions but also the activities themselves (such as protective presence and interpositioning), respondents may have varied in their interpretation of their organization’s activities. Further research in this area is necessary to better understand the frequency and breadth of activities among the various organizations engaged in UCP.

Nine UCP organizations reported engaging in solidarity activities or nonviolent direct action. Christian Peacemaker Teams, for example, expressly positions itself in solidarity with oppressed groups, such as Palestinians in the West Bank and First Nations communities on the North American continent. Additionally, International Solidarity Movement, which works exclusively in Palestine, has engaged in accompaniment of Palestinian civilians to trials, for example (which could be considered a neutral or nonpartisan activity), but also has directly engaged in nonviolent action and civil disobedience, alongside and in solidarity with Palestinian activists. This raises the related issue of the organizational principle of non-partisanship, which, according to Coy (2012) has significant ramifications for the organization’s goals and impact, and for the safety of those engaged in UCP. Coy contends that members of those organizations engaged in solidarity activities are likely more prone to arrest and injury.

The issue of non-partisanship is not only important but also complex. According to Coy (2012), non-partisanship implies dealing with all parties with an open mind, objective reporting, refraining from nonjudgmental responses when voicing concerns. Sixteen of the 50 organizations represented in this study declared themselves as nonpartisan. It is interesting to note, however, that for several of these organizations, website information and campaign letters include highly charged terms in their campaigns to raise awareness on human rights issues that, in the opinion of this writer, placed them in close solidarity with the people whom they are accompanying. One might add that it may be nearly impossible to remain strictly nonpartisan when working in situations where the power differential is substantial or when a specific group who is requesting protection is engaged in activities that might be considered extremely crucial, such as protecting fundamental human rights of vulnerable groups. Furthermore, the use of the dichotomous terms of partisanship and non-partisanship may not be appropriate in many situations, as partisanship may connote bias or favoritism. This language may distort realities where one-sided violence is so pronounced and even supported by national governments and international actors. Labeling the work of protection of civilians in situations of extreme violence and power imbalance as non-partisan may be unfair and miss the point of the purpose of UCP. This, then, raises the core issue of the term UCP, whereby peacekeeping connotes strong attention to non-partisanship. It is interesting to note a growing use of the term “unarmed civilian protection” (keeping the familiar acronym of UCP) but broadening the spectrum in terms of how the important work is carried out.

Deaths and Injuries among UCP Practitioners

The following table highlights the number of deaths, injuries and kidnappings that have been reported by UCP organizations since 1990. Of the six UCP deaths, one was due to a car accident and thus not directly related to UCP activities.
Table 6: Fatalities and Injuries among Peace Keeping operations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Unarmed Civilian Peacekeeping</th>
<th>United Nations Peacekeeping**</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Nonpartisan organizations</td>
<td>Organizations engaged in Solidarity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fatalities</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Injuries</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*this figure is an overestimate as its denominator is comprised of data from only 13 of the 50 UCP organizations.

**source: United Nations, 2014

It is interesting to note that certain danger “hotspots” exist, such as Palestine (where four of the six fatalities, and eighteen of the twenty injuries occurred) and to a lesser extent, Iraq. It would be interesting to speculate on the reasons for this but in reality it may be difficult to confidently suggest any statistical correlation. It is noteworthy, however, to consider that five of the six deaths occurred in organizations that do not self-define as nonpartisan, but rather have clearly declared solidarity with an oppressed group. Only one death occurred in an organization that was considered nonpartisan. With regards to serious injuries, 5 occurred in organizations considered nonpartisan, while 15 occurred in organizations that engaged in solidarity-based activities. This perhaps supports Coy’s premise that partisanship places UCP practitioners at risk for injury and death.

Another speculation is that the deaths and injuries are more correlated to the local context of the operation rather than the values of the UCP organization. For example, Christian Peacemaker Teams incurred two injuries among their practitioners in Palestine, but none in Canada. In both locations, Christian Peacemaker Teams has been very publicly engaged in advocating for the groups they are accompanying. Their informal slogan of “Getting in the way” attests to their assertive tactics, which, worthy to note, have led to physical injuries in one region (Palestine) but not another (Canada). As mentioned previously, eighteen of the twenty reported UCP injuries occurred in Palestine, with five of the eleven organizations with presence in Palestine reporting injuries to its members. The high fatality and injury rates among UCP practitioners in Palestine raise the issue of whether UCP does not lend itself to working in certain social or political contexts, such as the current situation in Palestine where powerful extremist influences oppose UCP activities (Schirch, 2006). On the other hand, perhaps it speaks to the need to draw even more attention to the seriousness of the situation, if UCP are being targeted at rates significantly higher than in other locations.

A comparison of UCP fatality rates with the fatality rates of traditional military peacekeeping operations is also noteworthy. According to a survey of the Canadian public’s opinions on UCP (Janzen, 2014), a main reason for public reticence in supporting UCP was the belief unarmed peacekeeping was too dangerous – more dangerous than traditional peacekeeping as UCP staff have no weapons for protection. It is important to determine whether this perception is supported by the data.
At the outset of this study, a goal was to collect data in order to make a reliable comparison between UCP deaths and deaths among UN peacekeepers. Unfortunately, an accurate comparison was not possible with the data, as an accurate denominator (total number of actors engaged in UCP) could not be determined from the data. However, considering that the fatality rate among all UN peacekeeping staff (including civilian staff) is 2.7 percent (United Nations, 2014) and considering there are six documented deaths among UCP actors, for the risk of fatality to be equal (2.8 percent fatality rate), the cumulative number of UCP actors would only need to be 259. While the data does not give us an accurate total number of UCP participants, we can create a denominator using data from the thirteen organizations which reported accurate staffing numbers since 1990. The number of UCP practitioners from these thirteen organizations is 3065. Using this incomplete (underestimate) number, the fatality rate for UN peacekeeping mission staff is more than twelve times as high and UCP front line staff. Although this is a rather crude comparison, it certainly provides a benchmark for further investigation, and challenges public perception that UCP is dangerous. Thus, utilizing the statistics available, it can be suggested that unarmed civilian peacekeepers have been at significantly less risk of fatality than conventional UN (armed and civilian combined) peacekeeping staff.

Outcomes of UCP Operations

The positive impact that UCP has achieved has been thoroughly documented by others (Schirch, 2006; Schweitzer, 2009; Nonviolent Peaceforce, 2010, Mahoney and Eguren, 1997). Although Mahoney and Eguren document many examples of human rights worker testimonials from many global contexts who believe their lives had been spared as a direct result of international accompaniment, much of the UCP evaluative data relies upon either human rights actor perceptions of safety or reports that quantify organizational activities. As Hoffman (2014) points out, the ability to accurately measure the success of violence prevention activities remains unmet, as the goal is essentially attempting to measure something (violence) that ostensibly was prevented and thus is nonexistent. Therefore, our best indicator often defaults to documenting and quantifying violence prevention activities. Nonetheless, some organizations described the impact of their programming. Their descriptions have been divided into the following categories: immediate benefits, long term benefits, and capacity building/empowerment.

Many organizations describe how their protective presencing strategies, such as physical accompaniment, resulted in immediate benefits to human rights workers. These benefits included protection from murder, rape, and injury due to the presence of unarmed civilian peacekeepers. The benefits were further described by ability of the human rights workers to carry out their critical work in conditions that would have otherwise been impossibly unsafe.

One organization describes the immediate effects of their civilian peacekeeping work as follows:

Before our arrival in the village of At-Tuwani, in the South Hebron Hills (Palestine), shepherds could not graze sheep on their land; children at risk of settler attacks could not get to the school; houses were demolished. Today, thanks to (our) presence . . . shepherds graze sheep every day, children go to school in safety and many families are returning to the area.
In addition to these tangible immediate benefits of UCP, other organizations describe longer term benefits that result from their work in documenting and reporting on human rights abuses. One organization wrote that their advocacy work and awareness-raising has led to governmental policy changes in countries such as Canada (with regards to Aboriginal communities and indigenous rights) and the United States (treatment of Iraqi detainees held in American prisons). Another organization attests that their education campaigns have made it more difficult for large corporations to take advantage of lax enforcement of environmental and human practices in countries such as Guatemala and Colombia.

A third category of impact is capacity building. Nine organizations stated they engage in activities to empower and train local groups and individuals. Typically, these workshops focus on the theory and practice of nonviolence and conflict resolution. However, empowerment has also come to local human rights groups more indirectly. When UCP actors model nonviolent strategies, local organizations and their adversaries may sometimes come to model this behavior (as reported by one group working in Sri Lanka), or at least, take advantage of the improved safety to carry on with their work in human rights and social justice. One Colombian group states the following:

The physical accompaniment and the protection provided by the peace observers in the communities have been important, but essentially the political support for our struggle has been the key element. (They) were active during the final phase and had a great impact with the political accompaniment which finally led to the recognition of Cocomopoca as a collective owner of the land in Alto Atrato.

We can interpret from this that an important outcome of UCP is the creation of safe spaces so that local actors can complete their mandates to their greatest existing capacities. Testimonies such as these support the premise that UCP is able to go further in building cultures of peace in ways that conventional military peacekeeping operations cannot.

Conclusion

Unarmed civilian peacekeeping may well be shifting the practice of peacekeeping by moving beyond the reliance on military frameworks to reduce violence. Unarmed civilian peacekeeping has been growing in practice and in recognition since 1990, as evidenced by the geographical expansion, the increase in organizational budgets, and the growing number of participating organizations. The study has highlighted gaps in information, notably, accurate statistics on the number and deployment trends of UCP practitioners. This study has also described the variety in length of training of UCP practitioners which highlights the importance of standardized education as well as the establishment of best practices.

Although the impact of UCP has been described here, significant literature has already detailed the positive sequelae of UCP activities. More research is needed to demonstrate, not only to academics and practitioners but also to policy makers and the general public, that UCP is effective, economical and likely goes further than conventional peacekeeping operations in working toward building cultures of peace.
This study also highlighted the relative safety of UCP in relation to conventional peacekeeping operations, by demonstrating that fatality rates for UCP practitioners appear to be significantly lower than rates among members of conventional UN operations.

Because no agreed-upon definition of UCP exists, determining inclusion/exclusion criteria is inherently problematic. It is hoped that this paper will further the cause to develop specific criteria and guidelines, with regards to practices, training, principles, so that UCP can mature and improve. Issues such as training, values (particularly non-partisanship) will continue to mold the scope of UCP in the future.

This study is limited due to the fact comprehensive information on many organizations was not available. The descriptions provided here nonetheless can be considered a starting point for further inquiry and discussion as to what constitutes UCP, what training should look like, what best practices should be adopted by UCP organizations. It is evident from this paper that UCP is being considered a legitimate strategy to reduce violence in many different settings and is legitimately transforming the world’s response to conflict. For those who seek a world that is free from war and violence, unarmed civilian peacekeeping is an increasingly evidence-based strategy to address conflict non-violently, thus pragmatically building cultures of peace on a global scale.

References


Talking to Cartels? The Catholic Church’s Response to Drug War Violence in Acapulco

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Keywords: Drug Crime, Cartels, Catholic Church, Peacemaking

TALKING TO CARTELS? THE CATHOLIC CHURCH’S RESPONSE TO DRUG WAR VIOLENCE IN ACAPULCO

Abstract

When the “kingpin strategy” of taking out top leaders of organized crime groups in Mexico made its way to Acapulco, gunfire spilled into the streets. Ordinary citizens became victims as crime groups splintered and fought for lucrative territory. The Catholic Church had the vertical and horizontal reach to be a first responder for victims and a salient actor in organizing citizen peace building efforts. This paper focuses on interviews of local peace builders and clergy to probe for evidence of church actors engaging in dialogue with organized crime group members. The conclusions reveal a unique social role the church offers as a third party intervener as well as cautious interest in the role of mediator. However, a lack of training and context prevents these transactional opportunities from occurring at the macro organizational level.

Introduction

Generating a dialogue with Mexican drug cartels is an absurd idea to law enforcement authorities and to victims who often seek retributive justice. As an aspiring peacemaker, however, I wanted to know if creating a space for open discussion could be achieved. After twenty years of leadership in small business development, I understood the intricate operations and structures necessary for business success. I saw a parallel with the organizations of crime syndicates. I saw intelligent human beings figuring out a way to thrive in a system of economic and educational inequality,
albeit, through breaking the law. If they had the opportunity to speak, what would they say about
the system? If they wanted to escape the lifestyle without losing their lives, where and to whom
could they turn? These questions form the basis of social reconciliation and my vision for talking
to cartels.

While there is an obvious link between the world of business and the world of organized crime
groups (OCGS), one side is considered legitimate and the other illegitimate. In the business
environment, grievances are handled through conflict resolution tools including dialogue,
mediation and arbitration. In the criminal world, they are handled through violence. Through my
business experience and peace education, I recognized the themes of grievances and enemy
perceptions in both realms, enabling me to examine and diagnose the problem. In order to address
the issues facing OCGs in terms of the lack of opportunity to voice societal grievances, to
contribute to finding solutions, and if desired, to have access to options for returning to the path of
legitimacy, I found three important questions: (1) who are the players; (2) how would the dialogue
occur; and (3) at what organizational levels should the dialogue occur?

This article will address those questions through a case study of Acapulco, a city deeply affected
by organized crime violence. The city came under the direct siege of violence for six months
between 2011 and 2012 as crime groups fought for lucrative territory. The Catholic Church acted
as a first responder to victims. In many cases, responses from civil society to the violence
materialized due to the training and organizing efforts provided by Catholic institutions in
Acapulco. For example, listening centers for victims were established and education for clergy and
citizens in conflict resolution occurred. Therefore, the Church provided a strong candidate and
answer to my first question regarding the players in a dialogue with cartels.

In order to determine how dialogue could occur, and at what organizational levels, I held
interviews with clergy, civil society actors and a group of citizen peace builders in Acapulco (who
will be referred to as Diplomantes). The Diplomantes received conflict resolution training over the
course of sixteen weeks in 2012 and 2013 through a ‘Diplomado’ program, funded in part by
Catholic Relief Services. The Diplomado was entitled “Diploma in Citizenship for Peace and
Conflict Resolution.”

The methodology of my research was investigative and exploratory. Literature, frameworks, and
existing peace theory identify the Catholic Church in Mexico as a primary player in developing an
inclusive dialogue. Twenty-two interviews gathered over a period of eleven days support these
findings. Dialogue with violent armed actors carries risks. For the security of all parties in Mexico,
names have been changed or withheld.

By asking questions and revealing useful frameworks, I concluded that driving forward the topic
of dialogue between the community and cartels is valuable to achieving social reconciliation.
Additionally, it could serve as a pivot point, which may lead lawbreakers to a path of
legitimacy. While the context and setting of dialogue remains open ended, it is clear the Catholic
Church has a foundation in place to direct the route to resolution.
Overview

The health of Mexico’s government is fragile. To strengthen its civic immune system, the state needs to examine structural factors that contribute to economic inequality because they are at the root of its problematic transnational underground economy. Unfortunately, significant segments of the problem are linked to multi-national policies, placing Mexico in the midst of a long, dark night. In the meantime, the state has been called upon to provide armed security to protect citizens when the cartels fight each other for territory. However, the state does not have a mandate to manage the parallel moral crisis the underground economy has generated. This crisis cannot be overlooked. It is linked to the shared norms, beliefs and social capital mechanisms in Mexican society. Its embedded quality must be understood before implementing actions of a transactional nature such as dialogue or mediation with members of organized crime.

The moral crisis has ties to the state of the economy, both pre and post ‘drug war’ initiation. The election of former President Vicente Fox in 2000 marked the end of 71 years of one-party rule in Mexico where drug production and trafficking was tolerated (Beittel, 2013, p. 8). In addition, the people I interviewed in Acapulco, had deep insights. For example, from a peace activist:

We let this in. As long as they didn’t touch us, as long as they bought apartments and cars and laundered their money with lots of purchases, and when it was only one or two groups, we allowed it. And then when the violence started, it was a mess and we said ‘we don’t want this.’ (Name withheld, personal communication, July 30, 2013)

Indeed, threads of tolerance for petty dishonesties, including bribery, have become woven into the social fabric. A high school principal described it this way:

We are part of the corruption. It begins when the traffic policeman tells you, ‘you didn’t stop at the red light, the fee you are going to pay is 1000 pesos, but if you want, I can stop writing the ticket and maybe we can arrange something,’ just to give you an example.

Asked if she saw any hope she replied in one word: education. “We have to do something, we have to change this way of being” (Name withheld, personal communication, August 5, 2013).

The transition to decrease impunity during Vicente’s administration led to violence directed at the government as well as violence between and amongst organized crime groups (OCGs)(Beittel, 2013, p. 8). Mexico’s ongoing decentralization of political power and budding democracy provided a weak and unstable platform in which to wage a “drug war”. In fact, rather than a drug war, Mexico is facing a “complex factional economic conflict” (Carpenter, 2013, p. 149).

Furthermore, the demands and exploitations of globalization pitted against the fragile and often-corrupt infrastructure in Mexico created an environment where inequality and lack of opportunity flourished. The following interview excerpt with Elena Gonzalez, a university dean, on July 31, 2013, denotes the fallout:
JE: What other thoughts do you have about reducing the organized crime violence in Acapulco?

Elena: I think that the government, the municipal government or the state government or the federal government do not give the services they deserve in all the neighborhoods that are full of gangs, if they don’t attend the people who are living in those areas, the violence will continue. These people, finally, are fighting because they never had a decent place to live, they didn’t have water, they didn’t have services, they didn’t have electricity. And if they walked to the bus 10 minutes they have arrived to the great Acapulco and they don’t understand why these people have this and they don’t.

JE: Why are these infrastructure (elements) withheld?

Elena: Because they stole the money. They gave the money to all the areas to the rich areas and the other who didn’t complain and didn’t know their rights and didn’t know what to do then they forgot about them – and whatever they have to pay over there (taxes) they put it in their pocket and it has been decades of the same thing - well that’s the result, at least here in Acapulco. The most violent cities have the deepest differences between rich and poor.

Interviews in Acapulco revealed concern that the identity of what it means to be a citizen has been juxtaposed against the economic benefits of breaking the law. This marriage of economic disparity to a depleted morality exists in a state where citizens are wary of reporting any crime to authorities for fear of reprisals. For these reasons, I found the institution of the Catholic Church, though rife with its own scandals and blights on its reputation, to be the likely interlocutor. The Church has a vast micro to macro reach in Mexico, in part, due to its size and number of allied organizations, institutions and universities.

Background on the Situation in Mexico

On September 26th, 2014 – police in Iguala, Guerrero, Mexico fired on buses carrying college students to a protest. As of the writing of this paper, 43 of those students are missing in what is believed to be an example of underhanded cooperation between authorities and an organized crime group (OCG) (ABC News, 2014). This scenario is indicative of the fight in Mexico to maintain an illicit drug trade worth billions of dollars.

The “king-pin” strategy employed by former Mexican President Calderon between the years of 2006 to 2012 involved a focus on arresting top or mid-level leaders in all the major OCGs (Beittel, 2013). The result of eliminating the cartel leaders unleashed a so-called ‘drug war’. Newly splintered cartels fought each other for territory (See Appendix A). They also fought authorities attempting to regain a measure of human security. The resort city of Acapulco in the state of Guerrero was the municipality with the highest overall homicides in 2012 (Molzahn, Rodriguez & Shirk, 2013).

At the peak of violence in Acapulco during the fall of 2011, several narco-criminal enterprises fought for control of the city’s smuggling routes and other illicit business opportunities (Flannery,
2012). Many citizens were directly impacted by gunfire on the streets, kidnappings, extortions, car thefts and murders of innocent victims. Eventually federal authorities responded by deploying the Navy and Federal Police to patrol the streets.

I asked Eduardo, a prominent citizen, public servant and leader with strong family and municipal ties to the development of the city, to give me some history on organized crime in Acapulco. Here is an excerpt from our interview on August 5, 2013:

**Eduardo:** Six years ago (2007), the head of the Beltran Leyva Cartel (BLO) lived in Acapulco, in Las Brisas - the best neighborhood. He controlled all of Acapulco and everything was fine, there was no homicides - no violence. His children attended the McGregor School.

**JE:** Really?

**Eduardo:** Yes – and - he bought the house across the street from the school. When his people dropped off the children in the morning, they would go to the house. They were the security for the kids.

**JE:** And everyone knew this. It’s amazing.

**Eduardo:** Well - President Calderon decided to go after the heads of the cartels. And they (the Mexican Army) killed this guy (Arturo Beltran Leyva) in Cuernavaca. So when they killed him, in my humble opinion, only the Beltran Leyva’s had counterparts in the U.S. to export the drugs to. And the other groups didn’t have those contacts. So they had to find other ways to make money. And they started extorting people and kidnapping. Of course they also sell drugs, but how much drug do you need for the local population? So all of these people that worked for the BLO splintered and others tried to get some of the business here. And it made a mess. And it’s still a mess.

**JE:** Before the BLO splintered, was Acapulco a distribution or trafficking route? Where were the drugs coming from?

**Eduardo:** In my opinion, for many years the state of Guerrero has been the number one producer of poppy. And number three in marijuana. So since this is a mountainous state, all of the poppies and marijuana are grown in the mountains, so they would harvest.

**JE:** So this is a production state?

**Eduardo:** Yes, not necessarily trafficking. There are beaches and lots of places where you can get to in a boat – for trade from Columbia. And then it goes by land. The land routes were the ones the BLO had secured. In my opinion, it was a land route.

**JE:** And they were crossing the border at some point?
**Eduardo:** Yes, at El Paso, Ciudad Juarez or Tijuana into San Diego. But before the kingpin strategy, the BLO leader had Acapulco under his control. He did not go into extortion or kidnapping.

**JE:** So you think there is still production occurring, but they don’t have the contacts in the U.S. to bring it to the U.S. so now it is only sold here.

**Eduardo:** Yes and no. The fields exist - how do they sell it? I don’t know. The Caballeros Templarios of Michoacán are trying to get some of the business here. The Army and the Navy are trying to secure this area near the coast.

### The Theoretical Basis for the Catholic Church as Third Party Interveners

Eighty-five percent of the Mexican population professed to be Catholic in the 2010 census, making it the second most Catholic country in the world (Pew Research, 2013). In Mexico, the church embodies a constituency on both sides of the conflict. Its worshipers include the ‘good guys’ and the ‘bad guys’. In terms of drug war violence, this could translate to situations where priests find themselves ministering to both the victim and the family of the victimizer.

The Church’s response to OCG violence in Mexico is best divided into three levels; the macro (or national), the mezzo (or regional) and the micro (or local parish/grassroots).

Clergy encounters with organized crime members occur at the micro level. These members attend church services, request religious ceremonies for their families, pray to the saints for safety and protection and sometimes meet with clergy in the confessional when they want to escape a life of organized crime and go into hiding (Padre Fernando, personal communication, August 2, 2013).

On the mezzo level there are non-governmental organizations (NGOs) like regional offices of Catholic Relief Services (CRS) and Catholic universities and media who are likely to influence social movement and provide funding to the grassroots level. I found no evidence of direct contact with OCG members at this level other than a mission to tend to OCG victims, and to develop programming to help them avoid becoming victimizers.

At the macro level, my interviews revealed a cautious interest in the possibilities of dialogue. The Mexican Bishop’s Conference produced a document to frame the pervasive situation of organized crime in Mexican society. The document is a 2010 pastoral letter entitled: *Que En Cristo Nuestra Paz México Tenga Vida Digna (That Mexico May Have Life with Dignity in Christ Our Peace)* – to be referred to as the *Nuestra Paz* document for the remainder of this article). While the Nuestra Paz document did not directly prescribe mediation or dialogue with OCGs, it did mention assistance with mediation in conflicts: “as bishops of Mexico, we offer our service for mediation in conflicts, to overcome the senselessness of violence and find paths to peace and reconciliation through dialogue” (MCB, 2010, p. 114).

In an email correspondence, Padre Lucero of Acapulco, a priest, prominent activist and media commentator, wrote of the pastoral dialogues in Columbia between bishops and organized crime gangs having a goal to decrease the impacts of violence on the population. He believes there will come a time when there are conditions for dialogue in Mexico, but said currently there is an attitude...
of distrust toward those in contact with criminal groups (Lucero, personal communication, August 20, 2013).

Leonardo Xavier is the director of a non-governmental organization that has been a driver behind community peace building programming across Mexico. The following is an excerpt from our interview July 25, 2013:

**JE:** Has anyone attempted direct dialogue with organized crime members?

**Xavier:** There was a bishop who was approached. The group was losing a battle with another group and they wanted to negotiate a way out without being killed. The bishop was too afraid to do the mediation so he refused it. But I believe this kind of thing could be done. The bishops need training in it.

The concept that religious actors can be effective diplomats and peacemakers is well established. Specific examples include the initiation of the “Gang Truce” in El Salvador in which Bishop Colindre played a lead mediation role; the peace accord ending the 1992 civil war in Mozambique, brokered by the Catholic Sant’ Egidio organization; the leading role played by the Reverend Desmond Tutu in the end of apartheid in South Africa; Engaged Buddhism in Cambodia; and the civil rights leadership provided by the Reverend Martin Luther King, Jr.

Following on the heels of the 911 tragedies, Johnston (2003) admonished that the worldview of the separation of church and state does not exist in Islam (p. xii). Johnston further proposed the need for the “strategic inclusion of religious factors in the policymaker’s calculus” and defended faith-based diplomacy as a key resource (p. xi). Scott Appleby (2003) advised that alternative approaches to conflict resolution include the use of faith-based tenets.

These authors are not alone in their recognition of the salience of religion in diplomacy. The United States Defense Department has recognized the benefits of liaising with local religious leaders in places like Afghanistan and Iraq with a core of chaplains whose job it is to engage local religious leaders (Hayward, 2012). Hayward concluded that, “Religious peacebuilding increasingly has been accepted in what was previously a secular conflict resolution field, and U.S. government agencies have begun mainstreaming religious engagement into their work” (pg. 8).

While the church in Mexico may have moral authority, it does not have the role of administering the rule of law. This allows the church to prescribe a lens that does not view people as “enemies who must be destroyed” but rather describes it’s battle as being “against the power of evil that destroys and dehumanizes people” (MCB, 2010, p. 42).

This important attitudinal framing of the enemy is the foundation of a powerful narrative the church can provide in mending public perceptions and bridging social reconciliation. These narratives provide tools for peace building because they point to commonalities between the victim and victimizer (Stein, 1996). This capacity to alter beliefs has been identified as a useful mechanism for an intervener in mediation (Duncan & Kaufman, 1989). It mitigates negative enemy images that often fuel the justification to use violence.
Using Ricigliano’s (2012) SAT (structural, attitudinal and transactional) model and systemic theory for peacebuilding, one can visualize and more fully appreciate the systems at play in Mexico.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ricigliano’s SAT Model</th>
<th>Mexico</th>
<th>Catholic Church in Mexico</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Structural</strong> (systems and institutions designed to meet basic human needs)</td>
<td>Economic disparity enhanced by globalization</td>
<td>Institutional reach 85% profess to be Catholic Both sides of conflict</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Attitudinal</strong> (shared norms, beliefs that affect cooperation between people/groups)</td>
<td>Moral Crisis (poverty vs. breaking law)</td>
<td>Enemy images re-framed but potential for distrust</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Transactional</strong> (processes and skills used by key people to manage conflict/collaborate)</td>
<td>Organized crime ‘Drug war’</td>
<td>Dialogue with cartels?</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The structural reach of the Church is evident. The message of eliminating enemy images and advancing social reconciliation provides an attitudinal connection. The unchartered territory between the Church and OCGs remains the transactional component. Ricigliano defines *transactional* as the processes used by key people on both sides to manage conflict and collaborate to solve problems (Ricigliano, 2012).

**The Church as Interlocutor: Macro Level**

The possibility for engagement between church actors and OCGs depends on the opportunity and reasons for contact. In the meantime, the Church can prepare by examining their attitudes, their skills in mediation and dialogue and the inherent risks to their safety. I had the opportunity to interview a macro-level player in the Catholic clergy, one who meets with the President of the Mexican Republic. This high-ranking official with the pseudonym O. Francisco, framed it in this manner:

"The challenge is in how we start a dialogue if this breaker of the law is being pursued and he has to be condemned in the loss of the victim, either way I personally believe that the challenge as a society and as a church is to bring alternatives to that person so we can be close enough for a different path than breaking the law."

Asked whether the church was in a better position to dialogue because it is not tasked with administering justice, Francisco said,

"That issue is where I place the law project, being with the victims, there’s an intention of finding the guilty as a path to solve a victim’s problem. That is not the church’s work or function. It might be for the authority that is responsible for justice. How we collaborate to that process, without having to be the involved with ‘where is the guilty, who is the guilty’

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that’s a huge challenge for the church - to be part of the legal process of the victimizer, to collaborate without having to participate directly in the execution of justice.

I asked if he thought direct dialogue with organized crime members would ever be a part of his strategy or any strategy. He said, “the day will come and it will be possible” to have this kind of interaction but “right now there are no possibilities for it”. Francisco’s list of reasons for this conclusion included security, the morals and ethics surrounding it, the lack of possibilities for it and the possibility of generating a violent or bad consequence. When asked if the church was the best actor if dialogue with OCGs were to occur he said, “Well, I don’t think it’s the best actor but surely it will be an important actor.” He agreed that if members of these groups wanted to talk, they would want to talk to an important authority but not a legal authority, though he clarified that agreement by adding, “If I as a church have moral authority on that violator, I am going to be an important actor.” When asked if the church could mediate for those who want to get out of organized crime without being killed he said, “Yes, they could help but it has to be something confidential” (O. Francisco, personal communication, August 2, 2013).

Padre Lucero wrote in his aforementioned correspondence, “in my opinion, there is no possible solution to violence if they (OCGs) are not taken into account to offer options to make them return to the path of legality.” When asked if Catholic leaders need training in this type of interaction with OCGs he replied, “We are not trained for this dialogue. We must learn to develop appropriate pastoral perspective strategies and know how to handle the dialogue process” (Lucero, personal communication, August 20, 2013).

In addition, the relationship between the government and a religious actor will affect the possibility for involvement in mediation. In 1992 the Community of Sant’ Egidiio, a Catholic laity organization, mediated an end to the civil war in Mozambique. Sant’ Egidio was seen as a neutral organization with no political or economic agenda. Since they were the mediator and not the government, the government maintained a distanced position of not conferring legitimacy to either party. Sant’ Egidio sought the expertise of international organizations including the United Nations and 10 other countries in orchestrating the mediation (Smock, 2004).

The relationship of the Church with the state of Mexico has a turbulent past. However, they have realized normative relations in the last couple of decades. The fact that high-level clergy are meeting with the state’s executive level leaders shows a margin of communication if not collaboration. If the Church were to emerge as an actor for dialogue with OCGs, they would need information in line with the following admonishment from Griffiths & Whitfield (2010):

Those who engage with armed groups have the responsibility to have regard for the political and humanitarian imperative not to make things worse. This involves careful analysis of the armed group itself, with attention to its leadership, ideology, patrons and capacity, but also a clear-eyed assessment of the mediator’s own capacities and comparative advantage. (p. 16)

One comparative advantage is the ethnocentricity provided by a Church actor inside Mexico. There is less risk of external values being imposed upon the situation (Ricigliano, 2012, p. 141).
Interlocution and Risk: Micro Level

Two of the three local Catholic priests I interviewed had heard of Catholic leaders dialoguing with members of OCG. Both emphasized the risk and the complexity of doing so. One of the priests indicated there had been no strategy to engage in dialogue other than the kind that comes up naturally from OCG members requesting religious services. Several of the other Diplomantes had heard of parishes trying to convince OCG members to reduce violence through the message or prayers given by the priest during Mass, offering to them that it is ‘not too late to change.’

Local priest Padre Fernando described members of OCGs pounding on his parish door and screaming to protest the parish’s peace building activities. One reason offered for this was the proximity of the church to local prostitution venues where OCGs do not want business disrupted. The following excerpt is from an in-depth interview with Padre Fernando on August 2, 2013:

JE: Is it possible to have dialogue with members of organized crime?

Fernando: Yes. But above all, priests - people trust priests. In addition, regular everyday people are afraid. Some of these organized crime leaders get close to (priests) because they trust them or because they need a religious service, and by that way the priests can talk to them and they can also invite them to stop. They try to convert them, not only religiously but to change their ways. There is not a strategy in that area. To get close to them, they have to be repentant – convinced they did something wrong. Looking for that, searching for that, because most of them are persons who suffered a lot when they were children.

JE: Yes, I think that’s one kind of connection to have.

Fernando: Most of the ones who have gotten close to the priests - it’s because they are desperate, they are at the limit. When they are about to die or because they cannot take it anymore, the organized crime leaders, they don’t believe in the government. There are lots of persons involved, not only these ones that are killing – no - behind that there are so many others. In Acapulco, there are people from Russia, from Italy, and the U.S. with those interests. And the leaders, they are like their workers. They are like the ones at the bottom of the scale. And many of them are threatened, or have a life that is threatened or their families are threatened.

JE: Have you ever heard of a situation where a member of organized crime, and maybe at a low level, maybe at a high level - they want to get out but they don’t want to get killed?

Fernando: Yes.

JE: Do they go to priests for that?

Fernando: Yes. They come for confession.
**JE**: But not for mediation to help them get out of organized crime?

**Fernando**: No.

**JE**: So they are confessing and then they are probably hiding?

**Fernando**: Yes.

Mexico is a dangerous place for Catholic priests, the second most dangerous in the America’s according to Agenzia Fides. The agency tracks violent deaths of religious persons. Here is an example of one report from 2007:

**Rev. Ricardo Junious, OMI**, aged 70. A confrere found the body of the priest on the dormitory floor with hands and feet tied, the priest had been strangled and there were evident signs of torture. Highly esteemed for his missionary work and pastoral zeal and assistance for the poor, in recent times Fr. Ricardo had been fighting drug trafficking and selling of alcohol to minors, which was happening around his parish. (Agenzia Fides, 2013)

**Conclusion**

The Catholic Church’s large constituency provided a vast horizontal spread. Moreover, its powerful independent position stratified its vertical reach. Together these variables placed the Catholic Church in a structural position to influence the public sector, establishing the Church’s legitimacy as a primary actor in dialogue.

For the most part, however, tending to victims is the Catholic Church’s immediate focus in Acapulco. The Church instituted measures to prevent victims from becoming victimizers, a valuable service reinforcing its legitimacy within the local population. At the same time, the Catholic Church employed social fabric building initiatives to reconstruct a law-abiding morality using peace education. These initiatives are either underway or in the early phases of implementation. Despite its efforts, extortions, homicides and kidnappings continue to be in the daily news, reinforcing the need to move forward with a multiparty dialogue.

Evidence such as the Nuestra Paz document proves that the Catholic Church maintains a unique social responsibility distinct from the role played by law enforcement and government authorities. It shows the church provided attitudinal material for building a narrative that seeks to eliminate enemy images. This narrative facilitates values such as forgiveness and reconciliation. Both tenets foster anthropological value by supporting society to heal from violent conflict through models of social reconciliation (MCB, 2010, p. 105). As societal ills gain momentum, the Church’s responses appear to be in tandem with unveiling, understanding and addressing the moral crisis that aligned itself with the economic disparity the country faces.

I discovered that direct engagement with OCGs was not in the current strategy of the church, but it is neither out of sight nor out of mind. At the national and regional levels, a decision and plan to train bishops, priests and others in dialogue must first occur. The Catholic Church would need to
address the pastoral perspective on its moral and ethical position in approaching a dialogue, as well as how to handle the dialogue process. In addition, the risk to church actors dialoguing with violent armed actors must be taken into consideration in the logistical plans.

The transactional question of dialogue with crime group members identifies the key players, including how and why they would collaborate. Dialogue opportunities for the sole purpose of establishing communication and relationship would be the first goal to precede larger future endeavors of mediation. Even if dialogue is used to build community relations and serve as a foundation for future programs, questions abound pertaining to the logistics and context of the dialogue. In terms of logistics, these questions are: Would members of OCGs come to the table? Can conditions be clandestine enough to insure everyone’s safety or would it require the security conditions that only imprisonment of OCG members would provide?

In terms of context for dialogue: Could these imprisoned kingpins provide insights into the roots of organized crime, and how those roots contributed to their operations? What would they have to say about the system if given a voice to express societal grievances? If there were options to return to a path of legitimacy, what recommendations would they have in hindsight, regarding ways to escape the former lifestyle? If they wanted to escape without losing their lives, where and to whom could they turn? These dialogue questions could lead to next steps of involvement by the Church. For example, could the Church negotiate safe surrenders?

The immediate crisis has passed in the municipal area of Acapulco. The Catholic Church continues to assist the victims and address gaps widened by the moral crisis. Additionally, as a result of the federal police presence and military patrols, which provides a negative peace, there is considerably less violent conflict. It is physically safer for public bystanders. Nevertheless, an absence of violent conflict does not equate to sustainable positive peace.

It is the Catholic Church’s efforts that continue to advance reconciliation and help heal grieving communities. The authorities’ presence and actions provide peacebuilders with better conditions to address the harm caused by this complex factional and transnational economic conflict. More importantly, present environmental conditions will aid the Catholic Church in initiating dialogues with drug cartel members. While there may be risk, it is more risky to let unspoken grievances foment the cycle of social grievances and enemy perceptions, reproducing social ills and thwarting the possibility of sustainable levels of peace.

Acknowledgements

Thank you to all the fearless contributors in Acapulco. It was my honor to hear your voices and witness your projects firsthand. I was deeply impressed by your convictions:

> We waste time when we look for someone to blame or passively wait for the government to solve problems that are shared by all. We must act now, each in his or her own area of competence….with our commitment to build peace that the people of Mexico may live with dignity. (MCB, 2010, p. 41)
I would like to thank Ami Carpenter, David Shirk, Charles Reilly, Lee Ann Otto and Father William Headley at the University of San Diego for encouraging me to go to Acapulco and for opening the doors to make it possible.

Appendix A


**References**


Dictatorship Declassified: Latin America’s “Archives of Terror” and the Labors of Memory

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“DICTATORSHIP DECLASSIFIED: LATIN AMERICA’S “ARCHIVES OF TERROR” AND THE LABORS OF MEMORY

Abstract

This article analyses the potential uses of recently declassified and digitized archives produced by Latin American security forces and U.S. government agencies to help uncover transnational histories of Cold War-era state violence and repression. Drawing on research in U.S. documents and Latin American intelligence archives—Paraguay’s “Archive of Terror,” Argentina’s Historical Archive of the Directorate of the Intelligence Police of the Province of Buenos Aires, and Guatemala’s Historical Archive of the National Police—the authors demonstrate how such archives add new dimensions to social justice research, opening up legal, historical, cultural and pedagogical options that had been out of reach before their recovery. Though human rights advocates, lawyers, and researchers have only begun tapping their potential, it is clear that they change what we can know about human rights violations, with practices of state repression laid...
bare, with file after file documenting in bureaucratic language the daily operations of institutionalized violence.

**Introduction: Archiving Terror**

Asunción, Paraguay, May 1975. The surveillance report’s mundane details belie its importance as evidence of secret, coordinated targeting of political opponents by Southern Cone dictatorships, joined in a deadly alliance that would soon be formalized in Operation Condor:

At 15.30 hours ... he arrived, ... exchanged $20 for 130 guaraníes. He took a taxi and went to the Hotel España, room 15, he rested, he bathed, he changed his clothes.

At 16.45 he went to LAP [Líneas Aéreas Paraguayas]... [then] to the Peruvian consulate for a visa, then returned to LAP. At 17.30 hours, he ... exchanged $200... and paid for his ticket....

Around 20.00 hours he went to the Cine Victoria... [then] to the post office and made a call to BUENOS AIRES. From there he went to the restaurant HAMBURGO.

He returned to the hotel at 23.45. He read the paper, drank whiskey. He went to Carrussel, was there for about an hour, [then] returned [to the hotel] with [a woman named] SANDRA. She left the hotel at 4.00. (He spoke with the concierge who told him that if the girl left before dawn there would be no problem.)

He slept until approximately 13.00 hours on Saturday. He went for lunch ... went to two bookstores. (The history of Paraguay interested him, the Chaco War, migration.... He didn’t buy a book.)

He returned to the hotel around 15.30. He read, had a snack, ironed his clothes.

He ate dinner at 20.00 hours. At 20.45 he was detained.¹

The detention and disappearance of twenty-eight-year-old Jorge Fuentes Alarcón was an operation involving security agents in Paraguay, Argentina, and Chile. Fuentes was a Chilean, passing through Paraguay as a courier for the leftist Revolutionary Coordinating Junta, or JCR, an umbrella group linking several of the region’s guerrilla forces. Before being picked up by Paraguayan security forces, he had been traveling with Argentine Amilcar Santucho, also a member of the JCR and the brother of a leading Argentine *guerrillero*. With both men apparently under surveillance, Santucho had been detained by security forces upon arrival in Paraguay the day before. In custody the two were subjected to torture and interrogated by Paraguayan intelligence, with the collaboration of intelligence operatives from Chile and Argentina. Documents show that Fuentes was subsequently handed over to the Chilean secret police and from there became one of the region’s tens of thousands of disappeared. Santucho spent several years in Paraguayan prisons and was exiled to Switzerland in 1979.
Details about the Fuentes and Santucho cases have been uncovered in formerly secret Paraguayan intelligence files, part of a massive collection of documents located by human rights lawyers in 1992 and subsequently made public in a repository known as Paraguay’s “Archive of Terror.” In a scenario that has been repeated elsewhere in the region, the files fell into the hands of human rights lawyers in late 1992, after a tip from a police informant prompted a request for documents housed in a police station in the suburbs of Asunción (See Nickson, 1995 and Slack, 1996 for more on the Paraguayan Archive of Terror). What was stored there turned out to be decades of records—over two tons of materials—from the Department of Investigations of the Capital Police, an institution one researcher described as the “nerve center of state repression” (Nickson, 1995, 127) in Alfredo Stroessner’s Paraguay (1954-1989). Following a political struggle, the documents were transferred to Paraguay’s High Court, and together with other police and military files recovered shortly thereafter, the intelligence records were made publicly available at the Archive of Terror. The materials are now digitized and searchable.

The first Latin American document collection of its kind to be recovered and made public, the Archive of Terror provides a “historic passkey into the horror chambers of the Southern Cone military regimes” (Osorio and Enamoneta, 2007). Similar document caches subsequently discovered in Argentina and Guatemala have further opened up research possibilities, facilitated academic and legal partnerships, and enhanced the labors of memory and justice at sites of some of the most horrific violence of the Cold War era. This article explores the ways in which these types of official archives—along with and alongside declassified U.S. government files—complicate and reshape processes of collective memory making in societies with recent histories of state violence and opposition. With documents drawn from multiple archives disclosing information about illegal detentions, interrogations, and disappearance of political opponents—some like Fuentes and Santucho active in militant opposition, thousands more perceived as “subversives” because they failed to support military regimes or worked for social change—formerly secret archives, especially when used in tandem with nongovernmental archives, testimonios, and other forms of historical sources, add a fascinating and multi-layered new means of remembering dictatorship.

Containing millions of records produced by and for the repressive apparatus of dictatorships, official archives hold the promise of revealing the fates of thousands of disappeared victims; at the same time they offer up fragmented, hidden histories of the people and groups—the perceived threats—that Latin American military regimes confronted. The records on Jorge Fuentes Alarcón and Amilcar Santucho, for example, include their fingerprints and mug shots, “fichas” with their personal data, aliases, and dates of detention, and most chillingly, their interrogation questions and answers likely obtained under torture [Image 1].

**Image 1:** Detention record for Chilean Jorge Fuentes Alarcón, created by Paraguayan police, May 1975. Source: Paraguayan Archivo de Terror and National Security Archive, fotograma 00016F 1121.
The Archive of Terror also contains correspondence about these prisoners that passed between military officials in Paraguay and Chile, and Paraguay and Argentina, documents vital to exposing Operation Condor procedures and proving that collaboration among Southern Cone security forces went beyond the sharing of intelligence; we learn from archival records that Condor operations included coordinated kidnappings, clandestine detention and interrogations, and secret prisoner exchanges [Image 2]. In the Fuentes and Santucho cases and scores of others, we see Paraguayan, Argentine, and Chilean military officers in a coordinated—and documented—extrajudicial battle against political opponents, with Paraguay positioned at the geographic crossroads.

**Image 2**: Thank you letter from Chilean intelligence chief to counterpart in Paraguay, written two days after Fuentes Alarcón was turned over to Chileans. The Chilean officer expressed a hope that “this mutual cooperation will continue to grow toward the common goals of both our services.”

Source: Paraguayan Archivo de Terror and National Security Archive, fotograma 00022F 0152.
There is no question that research on an international alliance such as Condor is enhanced when declassified documents from multiple sites are studied simultaneously. Moreover, the digitalization of the Archive of Terror and other intelligence archives facilitates the integration of scholars and activists working in physically separate locations, with research agendas enriched in the process. These developments have had profound implications first and foremost for human rights prosecutions. Evidence like that on Fuentes and Santucho is breaking new legal ground, with a massive trial on Operation Condor underway at the time of this writing. With over 170 victims in the case from Uruguay, Argentina, Chile, Paraguay, Bolivia, Peru, and Ecuador, and twenty-five former high-ranking military officers as defendants, the trial is likely to include 500 witnesses and last for two years (Osorio, 2013). Documents identified with the help of hemispheric research partnerships have been presented as evidence enabling Argentine prosecutors to prove that Argentine, Chilean, Uruguayan and Paraguayan forces collaborated in criminal acts.3

The promise of these archives for research and scholarship goes beyond the courtroom, though, potentially helping to shape the way societies remember and narrate the past and re-imagine the future. Before we had access to these kinds of official materials, repression could be examined in far less detail, with information based largely on individual cases and survivor testimony. Exposing the dark and previously unknowable world of security forces, official documents erase the deniability and distance surrounding repression, and even pose the opposite problem: they provide nothing but minute details, thousands upon thousands of pages of details, filtered through a particular and limited perspective. With time and patience, however, these sources allow
researchers to enter the world of security forces and learn about political repression from the inside out, its everyday processes and practices, strategies and rationales.4

There is a further benefit to studying collections like these: because intelligence forces could be highly and horrifyingly effective in their efforts to repress opposition, their files reveal new details about the people and movements they were targeting. From surveillance, interrogation, and the looting of detainees’ backpacks, offices, safe houses, and family homes, military regimes collected information on what opposition figures were doing or trying to do, their contacts, networks, travels, goals, even those mundane observations about lives under surveillance, like Fuentes’ taste in books. Prisoners carried with them personal letters and notebooks, along with intimate knowledge of leftist groups across the region. Photographs are among the files, pleas from prisoners’ families for information. As clerks in the security forces dutifully logged these materials into the official record, police and military archives became repositories of oppositional histories. Flawed as state perspectives on their “enemies” may be, such archives help to fill out histories of activism, histories that challenge representations of apolitical victimhood that so often accompany human rights memorial narratives. Emerging from the depths of military archives, such evidence of histories of struggle, interpreted carefully and alongside testimonial narratives and other sources, can add substantially to what we know about political opposition as it interacted with the forces seeking to eliminate it.

The complexities surrounding these archives make their use daunting, with their “discoveries” fraught and plagued by uncertainties. There are, of course, people who knew of their existence all along; what happens when control is wrested from them? How does this happen? Are the files secure? Who will control access, and where will funds come from for cataloging and digitalization? Does it feel unsafe for the public to view the materials? Will individuals whose lives are captured there, or their loved ones, feel subjected to yet another violation if those details are made public? Even if access becomes readily available, how do researchers interpret and disseminate what they find, the daily details documenting societies under siege? How do investigators and scholars situate archival documents in relation to other means of understanding repression and its repercussions? How can the archival contents be brought to broader publics and become part of collective narratives, and of efforts toward peace?

These questions remain unsettled and, appropriately, unsettling. They underscore the relentlessly evolving character of memory construction and the fragility inherent in shared attempts at recollection and reconciliation. But it’s clear that the study of formerly secret state documents has the potential to transform processes of collective memory making, not only by unshrouding the inner workings of dictatorships, but by bringing to light official surveillance records on an array of social sectors such regimes deemed enemies of the state—militant or unarmed, activist or guilty by association. How and what the declassified record contributes will hinge largely on the work of future researchers engaged in cross-border collaborations, on the importance placed by civil society on transnational processes of public reckoning, and on the democratic institutions entrusted with their historic preservation.

In what follows, we focus on cases in two additional archives—an Argentine archive comprised of documents gathered by the Directorate of the Intelligence Police of the Province of Buenos Aires (DIPPBA) and Guatemala’s Historical Archive of the National Police (AHPN)—to examine
how such document collections contribute to legal, political, and cultural struggles in the context of democratization, and how they help build more nuanced understandings of Cold War Latin America. When given the sustained attention they demand, the archives speak. The voices that emerge from this cacophony at times reinforce, at times contradict the until now almost impenetrable uniformity of official doctrine, revealing its fraught construction. They divulge the messy underside of repression, the small acts of resistance that shaped it from within, as from without, the winners and losers within the military state apparatus, and the consequences for the body politic.

Argentina’s Intelligence Police Archive

In Argentina, the secret records of the intelligence police of the province of Buenos Aires, amounting to approximately four million pages, were discovered six years after those in Paraguay, and are now organized in a public archive administered by the Provincial Commission for Memory in La Plata. The DIPPBA records detail surveillance activities conducted by multiple security forces throughout the province of Buenos Aires. As with the Paraguayan archive, they reveal years of clandestine efforts by Argentine forces against a wide array of people and organizations, and show a sometimes stunning efficacy on the part of intelligence agents seeking to stamp out leftist opposition. A photograph found in the collection, for example, published in 1960 in the newspaper El Día, portrays a group of twelve people gathered together, workers who had denounced police abuse during a demonstration at their factory [Image 3].

Image 3: This photograph published in El Día in 1960 and found in the DIPPBA archive, features workers who denounced police brutality in response to a labor conflict at their factory. They were identified by number and tracked by intelligence officers. Source: “Imágenes Robadas, Imágenes Recuperadas” (Zout, 2005).

Each person in the photograph was assigned a number written in marker in the photo’s margins, and police investigators had opened a case file on each of them. In another example, a large map of the city of Rosario, Argentina was turned into an elaborate display tracking the “anti-subversive situation,” with I.D. photographs of political activists overlaid onto the city and arrows connecting one small group of “subversives” to another. In effect, the intelligence police had transformed a
map of Rosario into a visual guide for kidnapping assignments [Image 4].

**Image 4**: “Feced’s map” tracking the anti-subversive situation in Rosario, Argentina, and environs. Source: “Imágenes Robadas, Imágenes Recuperadas” (Zout, 2005).

For a number of reasons, research in the DIPPBA collection has been done mostly by Argentines. Documents pertaining to the period 1976-1983 have been set aside for use by the courts in ongoing human rights trials and a special petition is required to access them; furthermore, strict privacy rules ensure that no documentation regarding specific individuals is released without the consent of those individuals or their family members. Despite these hurdles for researchers, access is possible and vital: when considered alongside findings in other archives and the established historical record, these materials have the potential to reshape what and how we remember. Our research related to the journalist and political prisoner Jacobo Timerman is a case in point [Image 5].

**The Timerman Case**

Detained and imprisoned in Buenos Aires province in 1977, Jacobo Timerman was well known within Argentina, and his arrest also attracted the attention of U.S. officials and the international human rights community. The volume of materials about his detention found in the U.S. declassified record is therefore almost as significant as that found in the DIPPBA archive. This is in part because Timerman’s case represents one of the Carter administration's earliest attempts to foreground human rights in its foreign policy agenda.

In anticipation of the thirtieth anniversary of Timerman’s release from detention in 1979, a collaborative, multi-focal research project was designed to better understand the case: a study of the Argentine security forces’ documents located in the DIPPBA Archive, with the help and guidance of its then-Director, Laura Lenci, and a parallel examination of the U.S. declassified record guided by Carlos Osorio at the National Security Archive. This was the first coordinated
research effort between the National Security Archive, the DIPPBA archive, and the College of William and Mary, with students and faculty working simultaneously alongside archivists in Argentina and the U.S. We were initially attracted to the project because it crystallized interdisciplinary concerns regarding representation, testimony, memory, and narrative as refracted through the frame of police surveillance and Cold War diplomacy; we soon found that access to documents from both U.S. and Argentine archives offered unexpected insights, sharpening our understanding of a case that until then had been shaped almost exclusively through Timerman's own testimonial account (1981).6

Image 5: Jacobo Timerman’s “ficha” (surveillance register) at the DIPPBA archive. Source: Lenci et al.

Prisoner Without a Name

Jacobo Timerman was known for his pioneering leadership of the Argentine daily, La Opinión, which he created in 1971. Conceived as a newspaper that would be politically centrist, economically right-wing, and culturally leftist, it was a critically acclaimed publication whose serious, independent, and hard-hitting news coverage quickly made it the go-to source for a majority of urban, educated, upper and middle class Argentines. Like much of its readership, the paper—and Timerman himself—initially supported the coup that brought the military to power in 1976. That support was short-lived, however, and the paper soon became outspoken in its criticism of the regime and its brutal repression.

When Timerman was detained in 1977, he undoubtedly was targeted because of his paper's left-leaning commentary and critique of human rights abuses. But he also was accused by the military regime of "economic subversion" because of his alleged connection to financier David Graiver. Graiver was one of the paper’s major investors and, at the same time, was accused of bankrolling the Argentine Montoneros guerrilla group. Timerman was initially taken to the Jefatura de Policía
in La Plata, where he was tortured and interrogated over a period of months. He was tortured in other secret detention centers and held for over two years before eventually being stripped of his citizenship and expelled from the country.

Timerman's detention generated international pressure, mobilizing the North American Jewish lobby and members of Congress to take action against Argentina's military junta. His case also received significant attention from Patricia Derian, President Carter's Assistant Secretary of State for Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs. Following his release in September 1979, Timerman went on to publish the testimonial narrative about his experience that did perhaps more than any other publication at the time to put the gross violations of human rights under Southern Cone dictatorships on the global map: Prisoner Without a Name, Cell Without a Number (1981).

And yet, today the mention of Timerman generates unease in Argentina’s human rights community, the primary engine of memory narratives regarding the country’s last brutal dictatorship. Timerman's case is troubling because in addition to being a prisoner, he had close ties to some members of the military establishment, ties that undermine his status as a victim. He does not fit the profile of the heroic journalist speaking truth to power and staunch defender of democratic institutions. It is well known, for example, that Timerman supported the 1966 Argentine military coup led by General Juan Carlos Onganía, and that a decade later, in his own words, "The revolt against the Perón presidency found its principal proponent in La Opinión, for we insisted on the need to fill the vacuum in which the country dwelt... [W]hen the army seized the government [in March 1976], the entire country, including the Peronists, breathed a sigh of relief" (26). While no one would question the facts of his case – illegal detention, torture, deportation – the details surrounding it are usually raised in conjunction with questions of corruption, excesses, hubris, and deceit.

So how does a study of the declassified record alter our understanding of Timerman's ordeal and its meaning? To answer this question, it makes sense to start with Timerman's own attempt to shape what we remember: the text he published from exile in 1981. Prisoner Without a Name, Cell Without a Number details the horrors to which he was subjected during his captivity; it also frames the Argentine story as another chapter in the global saga of Jewish persecution. This framing was arguably a strategic move, and an effective one. In the U.S. context where the book was published, the explicit link it established between the Argentine regime’s version of "night and fog" and the Holocaust struck a powerful chord, effectively destabilizing U.S. support for the military's war against the threat of a leftist insurgency. But in spite of this success, the book's framing and ideological subtext also made it the subject of controversy. Critics questioned his privileging of the Jewish narrative (Reati, 2004, 109). And they pointed to the book’s silences, especially regarding Timerman’s alliance with financier Graiver (Lipsky, 1981, 26; Camps, 1982, 27). When pressed by the Wall Street Journal’s Seth Lipsky about his association with Graiver and his reasons for eliding all references to this facet of the case against him, Timerman reportedly told him that the Graiver affair was irrelevant to the story he wanted to tell: “What did Graiver have to do with his kidnapping, his torture, anti-Semitism? Nothing” (Mochkofsky, 2003, 411). The book raised other fraught issues, including Timerman's early acquiescence to the military regime, and especially, his portrayal of commander-in-chief Jorge Videla as a moderate struggling to contain more extremist factions within the Junta.
The work of analyzing hundreds of declassified government documents to illuminate Timerman’s case involved a team of seventeen undergraduate students, four researchers at two archives, and two faculty members at William and Mary. The research findings were intriguing and strongly corroborated two of Timerman’s central arguments: that internal rifts plagued the Argentine military in the late 1970s and were in fact aggravated by his case; and that anti-Semitism was rife among members of the security apparatus. That same record, however, also clearly linked the circumstances of his arrest and persecution to his association with David Graiver and the charge of “economic subversion,” factors that Timerman himself declined to address. It became clear that Timerman’s relationship with Graiver made him vulnerable to accusations of “illicit association” that in turn opened the door to persecution.

Testimonial Narratives and the Archive

Timerman insisted in his account that President Videla struggled to protect him against military hardliners, asserting that Videla even threatened to resign were Timerman not released (28-29). This assertion troubles dominant memorial narratives that categorically dismiss the possibility that General Videla might have been a moderating influence on more extreme elements within the armed forces. But a close look at the declassified record very much supports this interpretation. It is unclear whether Videla put his own tenure on the line over Timerman, but internal divisions over his case among the military forces are evident in both the U.S. and Argentine record, suggesting that he served as a pawn in these disputes.\footnote{Two documents in particular support Timerman’s assertions: a U.S. Embassy cable sent to Washington upon Timerman’s release and exile, and an Argentine intelligence report referencing the same period found in the DIPPBA archive.}

The first document summarizes a meeting between U.S. Ambassador Raul Castro and General Roberto Viola in which the latter is reported as stressing “that the expulsion decision had created bitter divisions within the military and had ‘caused deep wounds which would take a long time to heal’” (Osorio and Enamoneta, 2009). The Argentine archive implies the same, as evidenced in a summary statement by the Comisión Asesora de Antecedentes (CAA), a group comprised of intelligence officers from the different branches of the Armed Forces and associated security apparatus, whose responsibilities included evaluating and classifying individual cases according to broadly ideological categories, and whose reviews often culminated with orders of detention. The CAA report draws almost verbatim from an editorial published in an Argentine daily: “In spite of the series of articles in support of subversion that he [Timerman] published in his morning daily, Independiente, no one even mentions it. Besides this, which constituted a clear and evident case of ILLICIT ASSOCIATION, in reality he served equally the ERP, FAR, PAP, ‘Montoneros’ or any other extremist organization, the Junta and Executive powers overlooked Timerman’s own confessions when he was interrogated in La Plata.”\footnote{The changes between the newspaper text it cites and the intelligence report are worth underscoring: placing in all caps the elements that seemingly substantiate the charges of extremism and illicit association, the CAA summary also inserts the statement, “nadie se hace eco de ello,” [no one even mentions it]. The subtext here is clear: the decision to release Timerman represented a failure on the part of the regime to wage its war against subversion. It is a critique echoed in a series of hardline editorials that appeared in local dailies attacking those responsible for succumbing to internal and external pressures to ignore the evidence linking Timerman to "la subversión disociadora" [disruptive subversion] of La}
Opinión and demanding a public accounting for his release.9

The declassified record similarly demonstrates the anti-Semitism of the intelligence apparatus. We learn that Timerman’s framing of his persecution and detention through a post-Holocaust lens is at least partially accurate, even if it is not the driving force behind them. Without the archives, the question of the role his Jewish identity played in his persecution would remain a supposition; with the declassified record, it becomes undeniable.

We find in the DIPPBA archive, for example, that years before the 1976 coup, surveillance of Timerman already had established him as someone to watch because of his Judeo-Marxist affiliation. Referencing his membership as far back as 1942 in the Junta Juvenil por la Libertad, a Communist youth organization, intelligence files consistently record his nationality as "Russian," a euphemism in Argentina commonly used to refer both to Jews and Communists and suggesting a questionable allegiance to the nation (Lenci et al., document sets 20.595 and 18.365). Among the documents, the following characterization dating from 1959 appears:

A trustworthy source in his sphere of action has defined him literally: "He is a Jew without scruples, shrewd, intelligent, astute and capable but very dangerous. Like a good Jew he works only for himself. Three years ago he got around on foot like all journalists, now he has an automobile, house and his own dollars. He's hooked up with various foreign businesses and serves their interests for his own benefit. (Lenci et al., document set 18.365, image 44)

Again, Timerman's questionable character is linked to his Jewish identity and his international commercial success, a combination that from a surveillance perspective makes him "very dangerous," eventually earning him the DIPPBA classification of "delinquent subversive" and the CAA classification of "F4," indicating a person with “a record of Marxist ideology that makes advisable the denial of entry to or continuation in public administration, denial of collaboration, denial of state sponsorship, etc.” (Lenci et al.).

As Argentine archivists at the Commission for Memory have underscored, of particular interest here is the process used by the intelligence community to transform ordinary citizens into targets of surveillance: the files on Timerman clearly show “how the different intelligence services gradually provided information to transform the figure of a successful journalist and entrepreneur into a dangerous ‘subversive delinquent.’ In other words … [they] show how a ‘person of interest’ became a ‘target.’ And how that status became fixed: intelligence activities on Timerman continued (while he was detained, when he was expelled from the country and until the 90s)” (Lenci et al.).

And yet, even as declassified documents provide a great deal of evidence supporting Timerman's arguments, they simultaneously call attention to the uneasy complicities that paved the way for state terrorism. In piecing together these sources a picture emerges—of ties to the military, of strategic and troubling silences—that complicates Timerman’s story, helping to explain why his memorial narrative has proven so difficult to integrate, so troubling to other formulations of the past.
Whether viewed as a brilliant, arrogant, and at times ruthless journalist whose ethical conduct left much to be desired, as a victim of anti-Semitism and political persecution and staunch defender of human rights, as a pawn in the internal confrontation between different factions of the armed forces, or as a dangerous subversive undermining the stability of Argentina's western, Christian, and capitalist union, what seems to be at stake in the struggle between these various representations is the power not only to define Timerman and his legacy, but also to define through him the experience of authoritarianism in Argentina. Timerman's story is also that of the broader Argentine middle class whose complicity, like that of the media, facilitated the dictatorship, only later and gradually shifting its position to decry the human rights abuses committed in the name of fighting subversion. Timerman's case troubles the contemporary Argentine imaginary because it underscores the implementation of state terrorism as part of a continuum that remains in place today, calling attention to the uneasy pacts made in the name of national security, stability, and order. These stories, too, can be found in the archives of dictatorship.

Guatemala’s Historical Archive of the National Police

In another seminal case of official document recovery, a massive assortment of Guatemalan National Police records was discovered by accident in 2005 by staff of the governmental Human Rights Ombudsman’s office, following years of official claims to truth commissions that no such institutional records existed. The moldy, vermin-infested collection turned out to be the most voluminous of the secret archives discovered to date, nearly eighty million pages covering a century of police work in Guatemala’s capital and throughout the country. Over thirteen million pages of documents—especially those pertaining to the deadliest years of Guatemalan counterinsurgency, the 1970s and early 1980s—have been carefully cleaned and scanned, and like the collections in Paraguay and Argentina, made electronically searchable. Accessible to the public on-site and online, the holdings of the Historical Archive of the National Police (AHPN) detail the inner workings of a police force put to the service of the Guatemalan state’s long and brutal crusade against “anti-Communist subversion” and, in fact, virtually all post-1954 efforts toward socio-economic and political reform (See AHPN website for links to From Silence to Memory: Revelations of the AHPN (2013) and the digital archive at https://ahpn.lib.utexas.edu/ See also Lovell, 2013; Weld, 2012 and 2014; and Doyle, 2007).

The discovery of the archive was an event more fraught and portentous than the uncovering of perhaps any other Latin American collection because of an utter lack of post-war social and political reconciliation or a shared narrative among Guatemalans about the country’s thirty-six year armed conflict, a period when some 200,000 people were murdered or forcibly disappeared, an estimated 93% of them by state forces. The state and army thoroughly defeated the leftist insurgency in the early 1980s, and though they faced a political stalemate and were forced to meet the guerrilla armies at the negotiating table a decade later, government and military leaders conceded little, and definitely not the certainty that they had been fully justified in their methods of fighting without quarter to save the patria. In 1998 the government publicly refused to accept the findings of the UN-sponsored truth commission (among many damning charges, the truth commission ruled the state responsible for “acts of genocide” in parts of the highlands), and that same year the Presidential Staff murdered the bishop overseeing the Catholic Church’s parallel historical investigation into the war. The official narrative was unequivocal: the only criminals of the war period were those terrorists who had opposed the state, and they and their sympathizers
would not be forgiven for the devastation they brought on the country. Even years after the 1996 peace accords, vilification, threats, and violence remained common against human rights advocates and others who continued to be labeled “subversives” and “terrorists” when they insisted on digging into past atrocities. Since the war’s end thousands of Guatemalans have come forward to denounce criminal violence by the army, and exhumations of clandestine cemeteries all over the country have helped create powerful counternarratives. Yet on the eve of the archive’s discovery, as historian Kirsten Weld writes, “[e]ven in the face of abundant testimonial and forensic evidence, Guatemala’s air still hung thick with a homegrown holocaust denial” (2012, 36).

It was in that setting that the National Police records were discovered, an event Kate Doyle of the National Security Archive described as “the discovery of a lifetime, the long-abandoned scene of a terrible crime” (2007, 58); Weld labeled it an “archival bombshell.” Immediately the police archive, Weld writes, was thrust into a “high-stakes public debate about truth-telling, postwar reckoning, justice, and the uses of history in present-day politics” (2012, 37).

Financial and technical assistance poured in to support the recovery of the records, predominantly from European donors (see Doyle, 2007). Securing the materials and beginning to organize them into a workable archive was a massive undertaking, but within several years it began to bear fruit: documentary evidence from the AHPN quickly made its way into the criminal justice system, helping to propel legal processes that previously had been obstructed at every turn. Alongside new techniques of forensic anthropology and DNA testing that were helping to prove Guatemalan human rights crimes, the AHPN provided official documentary evidence for trials in the Inter-American Court of Human Rights and eventually in Guatemala’s own courtrooms.

The collection broke legal barriers in Guatemala beginning with a trial for the 1984 murder of unionist and Communist party activist Edgar Fernando García (on the case see Doyle, 2013 and Doyle and Willard, 2011). The 2010 trial resulted in the conviction of two police officers found responsible for his kidnapping, and in 2013 the “intellectual authors” of the crime, the former head of the National Police and another high level police officer, were convicted for ordering and overseeing Fernando García’s disappearance. Hundreds of internal police records were used in the case, documenting García’s detention and disappearance, establishing chain of command, and demonstrating links between the National Police and Military Intelligence. U.S. government declassified documents discussing Guatemalan counterinsurgency strategies and police and military collaboration were also admitted as evidence.

More cases followed, drawing on evidence from the AHPN, from forensic anthropologists and statisticians, and even from the Guatemalan military itself, after two stunning internal documents surfaced, both placed anonymously into the hands of Kate Doyle: an official logbook known as the Death Squad Dossier that contained records on 183 detainees, most of whom were assassinated in the 1980s, and a highly detailed field report of an army scorched earth sweep in the western highlands called Operation Sofia (On the Death Squad Dossier, see Doyle, 2011. On Operation Sofia, see Doyle, 2009).

All of these forms of evidence, along with the testimony of hundreds of survivors and witnesses, were put forward as Guatemalan courts considered—and will in 2015 reconsider—the case of genocide and crimes against humanity against former head of state Efraín Ríos Montt.
Like the archives of dictatorships in Argentina and Paraguay, the AHPN holds the promise of altering far more than criminal investigations. In Kirsten Weld’s fascinating ethnographic study of the National Police archive, she found that for many of the staffers laboring among its dusty files, their work is also about recuperation of histories denied and struggles stymied by decades of repression, about finding evidence to counter official narratives about delinquent “subversion” and a counterinsurgent state that saved the nation. Many staffers at the AHPN came of age as activists and leaders during the civil war; others are younger and determined to help shape a different future. They see the archive as contributing to a change in perspectives on the conflict era by facilitating a reevaluation of histories of resistance that have long been silenced, or overwhelmed by regret over unthinkable losses, inadequacies, and mistakes. As one AHPN staffer explained to Weld, “The dignification of the guerrillero (guerrilla combatant), not of the assassin … that is where the archive will contribute” (2012, 43). Records detailing state terror will show Guatemalans, they hope, the magnitude of repression that previous generations faced as they—nonetheless—pushed for change.

Weld draws on Sonia Combe (1994) and her notion of the “repression” of archives, how the “repressed archive signifies the ‘power … of the state over the historian’” (Weld, 2012, 39). The AHPN project would turn that relationship on its head. The project and its staffers, Weld argues, work to reverse that formulation, transforming the liberation of these archives into an opportunity to begin asserting the power of the historian over the state. If the repressed archive represented silence, disempowerment, and social control, then the declassified terror archive offered a tantalizing chance to imagine a new history and a new politics for Guatemala, in which the walls of impunity would be dealt enough incremental blows that they might, one day, start to crumble. (2012, 39)

Kate Doyle writes movingly on this facet of archives’ potential as well. A citizen who lived repression “needs the files,” she writes. “Contained within the records of repression in countries around the world is evidence not only of brutal abuse but also of defiance and social protest—a rejection, even during the most intense periods of state violence, of a regime’s economic and political project, and a re-imagining of what the country might become” (2007, 64).

It’s a heady idea, especially in a place such as Guatemala where rearticulations of collective memory have faced such overwhelming obstacles. The AHPN has envisioned a broad mandate for itself as a publicly engaged investigative and educational institution housing what it terms the “documental patrimony of the Guatemalan nation.” As part of the International Coalition of Sites of Conscience, it aims to create a Memory Center for Conciliation, “to generate, through dialogue, meeting spaces for amity [concordia] through knowledge and acceptance of the truth” (AHPN, Memoria). Public education about the armed conflict is perceived as vital so that Guatemalans “not only know what happened, but also better understand the present and thereby contribute to the construction of a true peace” that has thus far proved elusive (AHPN, Memoria).

The AHPN has dedicated a team of staffers to assist researchers and the public in general with investigations in its collections. With documents spanning a century, the archive contains
information on untold facets of Guatemala’s troubled history, and visitors can investigate any number of issues. It is possible, for example, to explore the archive’s files to examine the thorny subject of ethnicity and its relevance to histories of opposition and counterinsurgency, a piece of Guatemala’s recent history that has been especially misunderstood and understudied (for a study of ideas of race and class in Maya oppositional organizing, see Konefal, 2010).

The question of genocide in Guatemala, the subject of intense legal and political debate, reflects a complex history in which state counterinsurgency was directed against a multi-ethnic opposition, but an estimated 83% of the dead—a vast majority of them killed at the hands of the state—were Maya. Even in the 1970s, many Maya activists perceived state repression as ethnically based, and remember it that way today. Interviews make it clear that many of them view state counterinsurgency violence as having been directed against themselves as community leaders, and at the same time, as Mayas, and that they understood the state to be waging war against the pueblo maya at large. Those experiences and narratives in the late 1970s in turn helped to define and further notions of pan-community Mayaness.

The government and armed forces were keenly aware of how to play the ethnic card in their battle against the Left, aware of tensions surrounding ethnic identity within opposition movements and adept at manipulating them. As in Argentina, without access to official records in Guatemala, we could only imagine how ethnicity shaped practices of repression or official strategies relating to Mayas. But with internal security documents now available at the AHPN and elsewhere, it has become possible to probe such issues by entering relevant search terms into a database. The case of a pivotal figure from the civil war era, Emeterio Toj Medrano, is illuminating in this respect.

**Emeterio Toj Medrano and the “Indian Question”**

Emeterio Toj Medrano is from the highland community of Santa Cruz del Quiche. A K’iche’-Maya, he was a liberation theology-inspired Catholic catechist and radio broadcaster in the 1960s and 1970s, a founder of the indigenous-led campesino organization Committee for Peasant Unity (CUC), and eventually a member of the largest of Guatemala’s insurgent armies, the Guerrilla Army of the Poor, or EGP. He came to have a special role in the EGP—to serve as a bridge to other Mayas in more ethnically-focused opposition movements, working to bring them into cooperation or collaboration with the EGP in 1979, 1980, and 1981.

When Emeterio Toj was captured by Guatemalan security forces in July 1981, the army quickly realized who and what they had. Rather than kill their captive—the more routine procedure after interrogation—the state kept Toj in detention for months. Extensive torture was followed by a brief “recuperation” period, and then Army officers forced Toj to make the rounds of indigenous communities, urging Maya leaders to cooperate with the army. Toj was well known as a broadcaster and community organizer all over the western highlands, so he could be perversely useful for the state.

He was made to hold a televised press conference, broadcast nationally, and to read in front of foreign officials and the press a lengthy statement in which he denounced the guerrilla EGP and claimed that they used Mayas as cannon fodder [Image 6]. He repeated the requisite stereotypes of the Guatemalan Indian: he had been duped into cooperating with the EGP, he said, because he was an uneducated indigenous man. He and all Mayas only wanted to work, dutifully and peacefully. Emeterio Toj escaped from military custody soon after that press conference, and rejoined the EGP.11

What the Historical Archive of the National Police adds to this story is that Emeterio Toj and many like him had, in fact, attracted the interest of security forces already a decade before his detention, prior to the founding of his peasant organization, prior to the guerrilla armies entering the Guatemalan highlands, prior to highland “insurgency” in any real sense. A detective report in the police files from June 3, 1973, for example, shows the kinds of things that concerned the security forces at that time, and what they were doing about them. From a summation at the top of the detective’s report [Image 7]:

> Anonymous source indicates that on the weekends, groups of young people led by Jesuit priests go to Quiche to concientizar [raise consciousness of] indigenous people, posing questions such as “the ladino [white/mestizo] isn’t the same as you? Who is better and why?” (AHPN, No. de ficha F35378)

This is the lead-in to a lengthy report on young Maya catechists in 1973 in Toj’s hometown. The detective prepared a list, like countless such lists, focused on the work of young Mayas labeled “jóvenes comunistas”—Communist youth—engaged in catechizing projects among other Mayas. It explicitly names the “Communists” in Santa Cruz and the surrounding municipalities who were leading discussion groups, normally on Wednesdays and Saturdays. The report contains thirty-six names, in all caps—teachers, administrators and directors of six schools, literacy promoters, and one intrepid radio broadcaster, Emeterio Toj Medrano. It includes the neighborhoods where they all lived, places where they worked, the location of a small farm where “suspicious people” met on Saturday nights.
For historians of Guatemala and likely for the people who—eerily—find records on themselves and friends and family in the now-public archive, police documents like these are not exactly surprising. The same is true of the contents of the other intelligence archives discussed here; there are strong parallels between this record of surveillance and Argentine reports on a young “Russian” Jacobo Timerman, for example. The Guatemalan National Police report from 1973, like the Argentine files, confirms what people such as Emeterio Toj remember and have long recounted about closing possibilities for change and reform in the early 1970s, well before the highlands were decimated by Guatemalan Army tactics of “scorched earth.” The police archive shows security forces intent on tracking earlier activism among Mayas specifically, which confirms widely held memories and perceptions of repression. Like the Argentine files, these documents are important in helping to prove such patterns, lending credence to such narratives with the historical specificity that has been missing. In Guatemala, a place where courts have stalled and obfuscated, where defendants’ supporters continue to insist that war took place in the highlands, and not ethnically specific slaughter, documentary evidence is now emerging to back up the claims and perceptions long voiced by witnesses to genocide. As we have seen, it is more difficult to dismiss such narratives when evidence is written in the state’s own hand.

Conclusions: 21st-Century Research on 20th-Century Crimes

These official, formerly secret archives are imperfect, incomplete, and utterly biased. Researchers’ fixation on them can annoy – even offend – human rights victims and advocates who have been documenting these histories by other means since the depths of the Cold War. As Argentine journalist Luciana Bertoia (2013) puts it, “All in all, secret archives ring ‘fetish.’ Secret, prohibited,
when they are discovered, they are thought to be a talisman that can prove what survivors, relatives and experts have been reporting for decades.” Yet such archives do add a crucial new dimension to research into human rights violations and repressive regimes, opening up legal, historical, cultural and pedagogical options that had been out of reach before their recovery. Though human rights advocates, lawyers, and researchers have only begun tapping their potential, already it is clear that they change what we can know about human rights violations, with practices of state repression laid bare, with file after file documenting in bureaucratic language the daily operations of institutionalized violence. Many of those files have already been put to work in the region’s courtrooms.

Beyond their role in enhancing criminal prosecutions, official archives—as the cases discussed here show—can make powerful contributions by disrupting the black and white, good and evil narratives that have dominated the post-conflict imaginaries of these regions. For better and worse, formerly secret documents can expose the humanity along with the inhumanity of security forces; the logics and illogic of repression; and the dynamic interplay of human beings caught in webs of violence and intrigue beyond their control. They help us understand how systems of repression develop, how they transform potentially neutral actors into agents of death and torture, and what social, structural, and legal policies human rights practitioners and scholars must seek if they can ever hope to make “nunca más” a reality. The archives invite further research on General Videla in Argentina, for example, and his efforts to contain hardline factions in the military; they invite a deeper exploration of ethnicity as it motivated and shaped repression and violence; they permit closer examination of opposition groups, their methods, motives, successes and defeats. And they allow a deeper understanding of the human connections forged through clandestine operations, in darkness—connections that enabled the horror and were also pursued to fight it.

It is impossible to conceive of collective memory-making processes in the future that do not in some way engage with this body of evidence. The challenges such archives pose for reconstructing local, national, transnational, and hemispheric histories of repression are daunting. While they promise a great deal—information regarding the lives and fates of victims, insights into the logics of state terrorism, its tensions, petty bureaucracies and global complicities—the labors of memory will demand sustained attention and alliances across regional, generational, national, and institutional borders. Understanding the archives and using them responsibly to shape our shared memories of the past will entail arriving at a common set of principles attentive to the profound ethical dimensions of the task ahead. But only by bringing these hidden files out of the shadows will we develop effective practices of citizenship fit for new democratic imaginaries, imaginaries premised on justice and human rights.

Notes

1 Archive of Terror document number (código) 00080F0776. Emphasis in original. This and other unaccredited translations are by the authors. The first formal Operation Condor meeting took place shortly after this episode of surveillance, in November 1975. For more see Dinges, 2005.

2 Approximately 60,000 of these documents are available online through the Proyecto Memoria Histórica, Democracia y Derechos Humanos (MHDDH), a collaboration between Paraguay’s Corte Suprema de Justicia, the Universidad Católica de Asunción, and the National Security
Archive. See http://www.aladin0.wrlc.org/gsdl/collect/terror/terror_e.shtml The rest of the archive is publicly available in Paraguay at the Corte Suprema in Asunción. For much more on the document collection, see Boccia Paz, González Vera, and Palau, 2006.

3 The work referenced here involved research partnerships between the Washington, D.C.-based National Security Archive, the Provincial Commission for Memory in La Plata, Argentina, and our undergraduate students at William and Mary who, working in tandem with archivists in La Plata and in Washington, D.C., earned academic credit while compiling and analyzing documents for National Security Archive publications and for human rights trials in Argentina. Student assignments of this kind—especially collecting evidence used to try military officers for illegal detentions, torture, and disappearance—can be deeply rewarding, and as they see it, a far more “real” experience than most coursework.

4 Digitalization lets us integrate the declassified record into the classroom, too, providing a valuable way for educators to incorporate primary documents into their teaching. As educators work with students to sort through and interpret the wealth of materials buried in the declassified intelligence archives, file by file, these archives help expand understanding of Cold War histories.

5 U.S. government declassified records are valuable to human rights cases across the Americas, especially those involving well-known figures. The path to public access is quite different in the U.S.: it usually results not from dramatic discoveries of document caches (or document leaks), but rather according to a strictly limited declassification process, often prompted by Freedom of Information Act petitions. Portions of declassified documents are frequently blacked out by the heavy hand of the government archivists who release them. Despite the limitations, however, records from the U.S. State Department, C.I.A., and other agencies contain detailed accounts of Cold War-era repression and violence in Latin America. See U.S. Department of State Freedom of Information Act website, “Argentina Declassification Project,” and The National Security Archive digital collection, Argentina, 1975-1980: The Making of U.S. Human Rights Policy, which includes over 2,000 primary source documents obtained through FOIA petitions chronicling U.S. policy vis-à-vis state terrorism in Argentina. For the C.I.A., see http://www.foia.cia.gov/

6 At least two other works deserve mention here, in addition to Timerman's testimony. They are Carrió's El caso Timerman: Materiales para el estudio de un 'Habeas Corpus' (1987), and Camps' account, Caso Timerman: Punto Final (1982). For a more recent and expertly researched study, see Mochkofsky's 2003 biography, Timerman: el periodista que quiso ser parte del poder (1923-1999).

7 For an excellent overview of the internal disputes that destabilized the armed forces, see Canelo, 2004.


10 Ríos Montt was convicted of genocide and crimes against humanity on May 10, 2013, but the ruling was overturned days later on procedural grounds. As of this writing, the case remains in contention, with a 2015 court date proposed for resuming the trial in Guatemala, and a new petition challenging the latest ruling before the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights. For an excellent summation of trial proceedings day by day, see http://www.riosmontt-trial.org

11 For more on Emeterio Toj Medrano and his detention, see Konefal, 2010, ch. 6.
12 Official documents are replete with such concerns about exposing supposedly “dupable” Mayas to subversive ideas. Another surveillance report in the AHPN, for example, highlights suspicious courses being given at the University of San Carlos: “Subject: confidential report that in this [institution] indigenous language classes are given and that they are attended by Nicaraguans and Cubans.” See “Give Me Back That Moment,” a film for AHPN by Kim Munsamy.

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“Whose Peace Are We Talking About?” The Need for Critical Gender Analysis in Peace Education

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“WHOSE PEACE ARE WE TALKING ABOUT?” THE NEED FOR CRITICAL GENDER ANALYSIS IN PEACE EDUCATION

Abstract

This article focuses on the use of peace education in post-conflict societies and argues for the importance of addressing gender-based violence in peace education and the potential it has for community healing and gender equality. It begins with an overview of peace education and what Bar Tal describes as its "elusive nature" (2002), then discusses the potential that peace education will produce harmful stereotypes and inequalities in and outside of the classroom. Further, the article reviews feminist contributions to gender and peace-building, and critiques the limited attention and research regarding the relationship and effects of gender and peace education.

Introduction

Since the end of World War Two, peace education has been a buzzword for many activists, as well as local and global politicians as a method for social healing and conflict resolution. Yet, the popularity of this term can obscure the fact that issues often arise out of the lack of critical inquiry into its application within conflict and post-conflict areas. While endeavoring to educate young students about peace is a noble pursuit, it may have the negative side effect of producing discrimination, intolerance, and further violence. This is particularly the case when talking about
gender inequality and gender-based violence in peace education. Few works have been published on how peace education addresses gender and sex norms, discrimination, and sexual and gender-based violence and little research has been conducted on how gender dynamics within post-conflict communities are affected by particular peace education programs. This article explores the consequences of this lack of critical gender analysis in peace education. By not researching how gender and sexuality are being addressed in peace education programs, our understanding of the complex relationship sexuality and gender have in peace and conflict is limited and may lead to greater inequality and potential harm to students.

For the purpose of this article, I will be focusing specifically on the use of peace education in post-conflict societies. In the first section, I will provide an overview of peace education and what Bar Tal describes as its "elusive nature" (2002). From there I will discuss peace education's potential to produce harmful stereotypes and inequalities in and outside of the classroom. Next, I will review feminist contributions to gender and peace-building, and critique what I see as a limited amount of attention and research paid to the relationship and effects of gender and peace education. I will then be recapping what research has been done on gender and sexuality in peace education and what questions still need to be addressed. Lastly, I will argue for the importance of addressing gender-based violence in peace education and the potential it has for community healing and gender equality.

The “Elusive Nature” of Peace Education

In 1945, the United Nations has declared peace education an integral tool for the building and maintenance of peace (Page, 2008). The United Nation's support for peace education is placed in several documents, including Article 26 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948), the Declaration of the Rights of the Child (1959), Article 29.1 of the Convention on the Rights of the Child (1989), Hague Agenda for Peace & Justice for the 21st Century (1998, 1) and the UNESCO Declaration and Integrated Framework for Action on Education for Peace, Human Rights, and Democracy (1995, Article 29). While originally peace education's primary directive was to study the causes of war and its prevention (Ardizonne, 2001, 16), by the 1970s it became more conscientious by linking education to liberation from social oppression and human rights. In the 1980s, peace education turned its focus from the individual peace process to a broader scope of human coexistence and harmony. By the 1990s, peace education returned to a more “humanist” approach of prioritizing civil, domestic, cultural, and ethnic forms of violence and its prevention, along with the notion of social justice. During this evolution, there has been a “broad consensus that peace education should stimulate reflective and critical dialogue in the classroom” (Lopes Cardozo, 2008, 20). In 2001, peace education came to the forefront during “The International Decade for a Culture of Peace and Non-violence for the Children of the World” (2001 to 2010), in which the United Nations, UNESCO, and UNICEF promoted and pushed for peace education programs to be adopted throughout the world (UNESCO, 2010).

Peace education is commonly defined as education of, and for, peace that "foster[s] changes that will make the world a better, more humane place" (Bar-Tal, 2002, 28). Peace education is also used as an umbrella term for many other educational programs, such as human rights education, global education, conflict resolution training, democracy/civic education, and tolerance education. All these forms of education share the common goal of "education [for] a culture of peace"
Peace education’s primary objective is to understand the "root causes of all forms of violence and their subsequent eradication" (Ardizonne, 2001, 16). Ideally this is accomplished by invoking critical dialogue with students that will challenge stereotypes, prejudices, and contested histories and reasons for war. The changing of behavior is a central thread throughout peace education literature (Fountain, 1999; Bar-Tal, 2002; Jones, 2006). UNICEF defines peace education as the "process of promoting the knowledge, skills, attitudes and values needed to bring about behavior changes that will enable children, youth and adults to prevent conflict and violence, both overt and structural; to resolve conflict peacefully; and to create the conditions conducive to peace, whether at an intrapersonal, interpersonal, intergroup, national or international level" (Fountain, 1999, 1). It is this focus on behavioral change that Daniel Bar-Tal (2002) argues peace education is different from traditional education since it requires a different pedagogy.

Peace education is seen as more of an "orientation" than a subject matter because it needs to stay open-minded in order to embrace contrasting perspectives and to avoid reinforcing negative dogma. Peace education has to be relevant, and therefore requires "experiential, active learning that increases internalization and reflection" (Bar-Tal, 2002, 28). Peace education is also incredibly teacher-dependent (Jones, 2006, 189). Bar-Tal describes peace education as a type of socialization process which emphasizes the imparting of specific values, attitudes, beliefs and skills, "acquisition of peaceful behavioral patterns, [and the] internalization of specific worldviews" (2002, 29). As a socialization process, peace education extends beyond the classroom to change local communities and society as a whole.

While there are a number of reports and articles written about what peace education should consist of, there remains no universal peace education program. Instead, it is at the discretion of states, local communities, educational institutions, and individuals to decide what form, philosophy, and practice of peace education they want to employ. Because peace education needs to be seen as being relevant to societal needs, current issues that preoccupy a specific society and location play a dominant role in how peace education is constructed and implemented (Bar-Tal, 2002, 29). For example, in Ireland peace education takes on the form of "education for mutual understanding" between Catholics and Protestants (Hayes & McAllister, 2009), while in some African countries peace educators talk about poverty and raising the standard of living (Harber, 1996). Similarly disparate, in India peace education is commonly equated with Gandhian studies, whereas in the United States peace education consists of teaching students in secondary school conflict resolution to reduce interpersonal violence (Harris, 2004, 239).

In addition to differences in application, societies differ in their commitment to peace education. "Whereas some see it as an important mechanism to change society for the better, others may avoid reference to controversial issues and restrict it to particular objectives or even ban it altogether" (Bar-Tal, 2002, 29-30). Because peace education programs do not take place in a vacuum, there is the potential to reproduce harmful stereotypes, prejudices, and further violence in and outside of the classroom. In her work with a peace education school in Sri Lanka, Mieke Lopes Cardozo (2008) examines the “two faces” of peace education. Lopes Cardozo argues that although the minister of education in Sri Lanka stressed the need for peaceful cohabitation between the Sinhalese majority and the Tamils minority, the biased history textbooks, the omission in classrooms to speak about the historical roots of the conflict, the tendency to use only one language
in the classroom, and the unequal distribution of teachers and educational material created a hostile environment that reinforced certain essentialist identities based on ethnicity, religion, tribalism, and extreme nationalism (2008, 23-24). This potential to produce inequality and hatred is particularly concerning considering the amount of research studying the impacts of structural violence and inequality in peace education programs remains quite low.

The potential to produce inequality and further bias in the classroom is further complicated when looking at individual teachers and instructors of peace education. The complexity of both the “subject content and pedagogical process of teaching for peace” requires a considerable demand and challenge on educator's professional skills as well as on their own personhood (Kirk & Mak, 2005, 23). Betty Reardon (2001) writes that teachers in peace education need to practice reflexive teaching in order to be caring, nurturing, and encouraging to students' comments and questions. Yet, Reardon's emphasis on reflexive pedagogy ignores “the personal dimensions of being a peace educator” (Kirk & Mak, 2005, 23). For peace education in post-conflict communities, local educators often face similar violence and trauma as their students. While being teachers in a peace education program can be great opportunity for local actors to work with their community for social change and repair, there is potential to further reproduce sexist, homophobic, and racist social norms within the classroom. Teachers are first and foremost persons, and with that comes personal bias and the potential reproduction of repressive social norms. Employing international or non-local educators to peace education programs may not relieve this concern as they may also bring their own prejudices into the classroom.

Conflict and violence affect a community and its educational system in a multitude of ways. Periods of violence and unrest affect families through “the loss of relatives, physical violence, rape, and the need to leave home,” along with leaving many other physical and psychological scars. The damage and danger of war-torn areas creates serious problems for students, especially girls, in relation to attending school and financing their education. Schools can be potential sites for terrorist attacks or used as bases for militia groups (Novelli & Lopes Cardozo, 2008, 478). Because of its close connection to the family and the younger generations, education is usually one of the first aspects of civil society to be affected when conflict arises. Therefore, peace education is heralded by many western and non-western NGOs as one of the most direct solutions in solving and mending war-torn areas. With the growing number of resources directed towards peace education, the need for critical reflection and analysis has become a rising concern among many activists and scientists. There remains very little research on the short-term and long-term effects of peace education in post-conflict societies. As Wayne Nelles writes in “Bosnian Education for Security and Peace Building” (2006), research by NGOs and academics on peace education have yet to be adequately compiled, surveyed, or widely reported. Today, there is still no thorough synthesis on the research conducted by local communities, western and non-western academics, governments, and organizations concerning peace education (Nelles, 2006, 236). Secondly, there is no consensus or shared criteria on how to measure a specific peace program’s educational contribution to local violence resolution and prevention. Nelles argues that a majority of published works on peace education are dependent upon diverse perspectives coming from different ethno-cultural groups and on the biases and interpretative frameworks of the researchers themselves (2006, 236). This is particularly concerning since many large political bodies such as UNESCO, World Bank, and UNICEF depend upon the assessments and suggestions produced by these different groups and academics. Without an adequate summary of the research being
published, it is impossible to critically gauge the quality and accuracy of the work, which could lead to further problems in the development of social policies and initiatives.

Johan Galtung writes that peace cannot be seen as merely an absence of war. If peace was just the absence of war, then “highly unacceptable social orders would still be compatible with peace” (1969; 169). We must therefore look at the multilayers of violence as being not only direct, but also structural and indirect. Panayota Gounari writes that in any attempt to define and structure the boundaries and content of peace education, it is important to understand violence as both a concept and a practice (2013). In order to do this, Gounari argues that we must look at violence in three distinct, but related ways: subjective violence, objective violence, and systemic violence. Subjective violence is the most visible of violence because it is enacted by identifiable social agents and actors, such as in the case of mass murder, crime, and terrorist attacks. Objective violence, however, is far less visible as it is inherent to the social norm or the “normal state of things” (2013, 72). Racism, classism, sexism, and homophobia are all forms of objective violence. Systemic violence is inherent to political, economic, or social systems and is sustained through both subjective and objective violence. All three violences are intertwined during times of both conflict and peace, yet often in peace education only subjective violence is focused upon. By focusing only on subjective violence, the invisible systems, social norms, and mechanisms that produce such violence remain unaccounted for. As Mieke Lopes Cardozo writes, “It is not enough to simply control the symptoms; it is necessary to address the root causes of conflict. In order to do this, peace education programs must be grounded in an understanding of the complex dynamics of the context in which these programs are situated” (2008, 31).

Without addressing social inequalities and the multilayered nature of violence, peace education’s goal to foster a community of peace becomes unattainable. Therefore, there must be increased investigation into the relationship subjective, objective, and systemic violence have within peace education programs. This is particularly the case when talking about gender violence. Until very recently, subjective violence against women during times of conflict, such as abduction, war-time rape, and forced sterilization, went unrecognized or ignored in post-conflict peace-building efforts. Even today, addressing objective and systemic gender violence in post-conflict societies, such as with sexism and gender inequality, is lesser prioritized or often ignored. Yet, by ignoring the subjective, objective, and systemic intersections of gender violence, peace-building and social repair will be hindered. What progress there has been in regards to addressing subjective, objective, and systemic gender violence in peace-building owes its start to international feminist scholars, activists, and leaders. In the next section, I will further explore and summarize feminist scholars and activists’ contributions to peace studies and from there critique an ongoing gender-bias in peace studies and peace-building initiatives.

**Feminism and Peace Studies**

Modern feminist perspectives on peace emerged in the 1980s as a "coalescence of the women's movement and the peace movement as well as the feminist critique of the constructs and methods of individual social sciences" (John, 2006, 138). The most important contribution by feminists has been the widening of peace studies to include gender. Central to feminist conceptualizations of peace is the recognition of a continuum of gender-based violence (Bunch, 2003). For feminists like Cynthia Enloe (1988), Brigit Brock-Utne (1985, 1989, 2009), and Carol Cohn (1987, 2003), gender
cannot be separated from war and peace because both are gendered entities in which violence, conflict, peace, and reconciliation are all heavily influenced by gender norms, ideals, and practices. Brigit Brock-Utne (2009) expands upon this relationship between gender and conflict by claiming that it is the unequal power between men and women that causes violence against women and legitimates war (1989, 210). Gender relations, especially in terms of gender inequality where masculinity is prioritized and femininity is silenced, create an inharmonious and potentially violent world.

The pursuit of a militarized masculinity (Connel & Messerschmidt, 2005) divides the country and stagnates social cohesion and peace. Carol Cohn and Sarah Riddick (2003) point out that the arms race during the Cold War was as much a race to prove one’s masculinity as it was a race for security. In her research on nuclear defense intellectuals, Carol Cohn (1987) critiques what she sees as the gendered relationship between nuclear force and masculinity. Missile envy could easily have been translated to penis envy, while disarmament meant emasculation for the large super powers. From the “patting” of nuclear war heads as an exchange for touching the ultimate “high-tech phallic power” to talking about “penetrating” virgin lands—i.e. non-nuclear tested lands—with nuclear missiles, the intertwine of militarized masculinity and feminization of the other played a fundamental role in the language of defense (Cohn, 1987). This effect continues today as nations such as the United States and North Korea continually challenge the “masculine potency” of their adversaries. The institutionalization of militarized masculinity and male dominance continues during so-called peace times. Therefore, regardless of being in a period of peace, women remain susceptible to gender-based violence and threat of violence because of male-dominance and misogyny. This leads Charlotte Bunch to question “whether peacetime provides an accurate description of the lives of most women” (2002, 8). If gender-based violence and gender inequality continue on in times of peace, can there really be peace for all members of society?

The linking of nationalism and the nation-state to complicated political and social conceptions of masculinity and femininity has led some feminists to debate whether women should ever participate in war or to dismiss war entirely as ultimately a patriarchal and misogynist endeavor (Bunch, 2002, 8). As a response to what many feminist see as underlying misogyny and patriarchy of war, feminist scholars and activists emphasize feminine values such care, compassion, and cooperation in peace-building (Chan, 2011). Rather than simply stopping a conflict, feminist scholars like Betty Reardon (2001) argue for a “positive peace” that promotes social justice, life affirmation, equality, and gender inclusivity. Positive peace constitutes a peace-building process that involves non-repressive dialogue and action in everyday human interactions (Chan, 2011). Shun-hing Chan argues that women are uniquely positioned to become educators and leaders in positive peace efforts as they face multiple oppressions and challenges throughout their daily lives (2011). Yet, this potential to build positive peace remains under-supported as women continue to be seen both locally and internationally as weak and inferior to men. As a result, spaces, expressions, and relationships seen as belonging to the feminine domain become invalidated and dismissed.

Birgit Brock-Utne (1989) argues that it is because of gender inequality that boys and girls in the developed and developing worlds are taught differently about peace. Young girls are raised with the assumption that they are naturally nurturing, while boys are brought up to be competitive and aggressive. Looking at Brock-Utne’s example of military training in Western countries, she notes
that where military service is compulsory, only men are enforced to enlist. Basic military training involves an intense period of indoctrination during which men are taught not only basic military skills, but also are made to change their values and loyalties (Brock-Utne, 2009, 208). “This thinking means learning to look at other fellow human beings as enemies and it includes learning how to kill. This socialization may explain why women are more likely than men to support conscientious objectors, to be against war toys and against war” (Brock-Utne, 2009, 208).

Margaret Ward (2002) points out that the failure to address women's roles and gender inequality leads to a dangerous blind spot in peace building in which the lack of gender parity and the failure to address the gendered nature of war and peace leads to greater fracturing of society and increased violence (292).

Several studies have found a positive relationship between gender equality within a state and the peaceful relations the state has with other states (Gleditsch et al., 2002). In Gender Equality and Intrastate Armed Conflict (2005), Erik Melander (2005) conducted a multinational quantitative comparison on female representation in the government and the level of intrastate-armed conflict. What Melander found was a negative relationship between the two variables, where higher amounts of female members in the government led to a lower number of conflict and violent acts in the state and between states. Melander concluded that while there was a general essentialist conception that women were more adverse to war then men, having a more equitable society in terms of gender relations between women and men encouraged other relations in society, such as religion, class, and ethnicity, to become more egalitarian as well (2005, 695-714).

Melander's findings are further supported by feminist and women peace activists working on the ground. Despite the end of active combat and conflict in their community, women remain disadvantaged and susceptible to further violence due to gender inequality and sexism. This has led many women peace activists to argue that peace cannot be achieved unless there is gender equity. Research on women-led peace-building initiatives has shown the creative and brave interventions women peace activists have made in local and international conflict resolution (Chan, 2011; Naraghi-Anderlini, 2005; Rajeswari, 2002; Shitemi, 2002). Having different life-experiences than men, women peace activists have proven themselves to be effective leaders in building a more equitable and just society. Yet, despite the growing attention by feminists, women activists, and recent scholarship on women in war and peace, peace studies has remained limited in recognizing women's contributions and the importance of a feminist and gender analysis (hooks, 1995). The failure by peace theorists to recognize women's roles in peacekeeping has been a source of frustration for many feminists writing about peace. Brigit Brock-Utne (2009) argues that within peace-building today, the continued gender inequality and invisibility of women within the developed north has lead to the invisibility and silencing of women from the history of peace work and education.

Even though women frequently build the backbone of peace organizations, they [women] are seldom given credit for their work. They are mostly made invisible in history books. Conflicts, which are solved non-violently, or the work for peace, especially the work of women for peace, do not find their way into history books. It is difficult to educate about peace when the textbooks youngsters are required to read are mostly on war (2009, 215).
Due to the growing number of women working on the topic of peace today—although still the minority—one could make the argument that women are not completely silenced from the discussion. However, patriarchy and gender inequality within governments and academic institutions continue to limit women’s agency to affect social change and rhetoric. The involvement of women in the process of peace-building and post-war social repair has remained limited, structurally ad-hoc, selectively taken up, and insufficiently supported by international institutions (Mojab, 2008). This can be clearly seen in the failed attempts of gender mainstreaming in the United Nations. In the 1990s, the term “gender mainstreaming” became popular in international conflict resolution and peace-building operations as a way to address the issue of gender in peace operations. The intent was to include gender considerations in addressing needs, hardships, and opportunities for communities as well as creating a more gender-balanced community within peacekeeping missions (Nduka-Agwu, 2009, 180). Gender mainstreaming became more prevalent alongside a new shift in peacekeeping in the United Nations in which militarized force was put aside in favor of delegation, consent, and civil policing (Nduka-Agwu, 2009, 179). The passing of UN Security Council Resolution 1325 regarding women, peace, and security in 2000 was seen as a milestone in establishing a more gender-inclusive and egalitarian atmosphere in the UN and its on-the-ground peacekeeping missions. Resolution 1325 requires “gender concerns to be treated as a distinct and relevant component of all mission politics and actions” (Nduka-Agwu, 2009, 180). Sexual violence is another aspect of the resolution that attempts to separate sexual violence from other acts of violence and “larger gender objectives on policy” (Nduka-Agwu, 2009, 180). However, ten years after the passing of UN Security Council 1325, there have been few noticeable effects seen on the ground. In his assessment of the 1325 resolution, Donald Steinberg writes that despite its laudable intentions, gender inequality and gender-based violence continue to be ignored.

More often than not, gender mainstreaming in post-conflict repair and peace-building has merely become a numbers game, or, in this case, a failed numbers game of increasing the number of female-bodied persons at the United Nations. Yet, even with the advancement of some women, there remains a significant gender inequality when it comes to positions of power and influence (Cook, 2007). Stephen Lewis writes that despite all the lip-service and promises made by United Nations member states on gender inclusivity and equality, only 5.7 percent of United Nations ambassadors are female-bodied (2005, 122-23). In the upper levels of administration, women remain the minority with most of the female workforce at the United Nations being located at lower-level positions. In addition, initiatives and programs designed for gender mainstreaming at the United Nations are often unstable and insufficiently supported (Lewis, 2005).

Faced with economic crises and questions of legitimacy, post-conflict states tend to quickly set aside transformative gender policies in favor of state survival and defense (i.e. militarization) (Pettman, 1996, 140; Borer, 2009, 1172). In “Displaced Women In Northern Ghana: Indigenous Knowledge About Ethnic Conflict” (2008), Brenda Faye McGadney-Douglass notes that although during the Ghana Guinea Fowl War more than 200,000 people, mostly women and children, were displaced, internally displaced women were left out of the post-conflict peace-building process (326). Issues affecting internally displaced women were often dismissed as “domestic matters” and seldom given the international attention needed to garner the gender and culturally specific services required (324). This created a serious problem in finding adequate solutions to not only internally displaced women, but also limited resettlement services and community rebuilding programs.
The failure to incorporate women’s voices in peace-building efforts leads to further marginalization of women, as well as creating considerable limitations in post-conflict reconstruction.

State recovery programs tend to focus more on the need to absorb demobilized male soldiers and provide opportunities to rebuild men’s status in society as well as the patriarchal family by reverting to "traditional" gender roles and forcing a greater gender divide (Pettman, 1996, 140). Women often suffer from unequal land redistribution, receiving of aid, and programs for social mobility. Women peace builders, as well as female soldiers, are routinely pushed aside in the rebuilding and peace process, sometimes making them even more marginalized than they were during times of conflict. In addition, gender violence during times of peace tends to increase as women are oftentimes left in a vulnerable state by having few resources and living in a dangerous environment, further fracturing family life and community healing.

Women are the carriers, both physically and mentally, of the day-to-day realities of war and are most likely—although not always—to discourage their men from becoming involved in violence (McGadney-Douglass, 2008, 335). Yet, because of gender inequality brought on by patriarchy and sexism, both within conflict areas as well as the international arena, alternative voices of survival and social change from women living in the everyday realities of conflict and post-conflict societies are continually pushed aside. For peace education, the crisis of women during times of peace should be enough to invoke greater attention to the failure of gender mainstreaming and the protection of women. Yet, as we see in the next section, this has not been the case.

**Peace Education and Gender**

Although some work has been done to define and describe the elements that constitute "successful" peace education programs (Page, 2008), less work has been done on how social inequalities and structural violence have played a role in peace education. An area that in particular has been overlooked by the majority of academic attention to peace education is the role of gender and sexuality (Boaz Yablon, 2009, 689; Brock-Utne 2009, 1989, 1985; Cook, 2007). The lack of critical inquiry of gender and sexuality in peace education is alarming considering peace education can hardly be considered "neutral territory." Instead, it is constantly affected by social, temporal, and spatial forces as well as teachers' and students’ beliefs and past experiences that dictate how peace education will be taught (Dunne et al., 2006). Removing gender makes a holistic, integrated and respectful analysis of peace education impossible (Cook, 2007).

So why have there been so few studies on gender and peace education? Sharon Cook argues that within North America, the backlash against feminism has led many researchers and educators reticent to incorporate any controversial topic regarding race, sexuality, or gender into peace education due to the risk of losing financial and institutional support (2007, 68). A second explanation for the absence of gender analysis in peace education concerns the field's flexibility and inconsistent pedagogy. As stated before, peace education must be adaptable to the specific needs of a society in which it is employed. Education trends therefore have a significant influence on peace education. While this may be an opportunity to expand and critically engage with
different subject matters and pedagogies, it also leads to greater fracturing of focus in peace education. As Cook explains,

Eager to incorporate new developments and constituencies--for example, in the areas of diversity education, violence prevention, and civic education--peace education has expanded rather wildly in all directions. As new areas have been added, others, especially those perceived by some to be divisive, have been scaled back or not developed at all. This has not resulted in wholesale and sudden deletion of areas of work but in a gradual loss of support-death by a thousand cuts. Thus, gender has been largely ignored or sometimes discounted as discriminatory, while the focus of peace studies has narrowed so that the area under examination is more immediate and instrumental to our current needs (2007, 67).

By not looking at how gender and sexuality are being addressed in peace education programs, our understanding of the complex relationship sexuality and gender have in peace and conflict is limited and may lead to greater inequality and potential harm to students. An example of this can be seen in a study on citizenship education within the UK. Madeleine Arnot (2006) notes that citizenship courses in the UK often prepare learners for a gender-divided world. A student’s ability to understand and question the ideals and discourses surrounding citizenship depends heavily upon their gender, which then situates their agency, or ability to participate, in preexisting gender inequalities (74). Due to gender inequalities, only certain topics were discussed within the class, as seen by the fact that the violation of human rights in the form of gender-based violence was not even considered an appropriate topic for citizenship education (Arnot, 2006). However, without recognizing these forms of gender violence and opening the floor for students to absorb and intellectually discuss gender and gender-based violence continued gender inequalities will remain invisible. For this reason, peace education has much to gain by including a greater gender analysis.

Previous research on how gender affects teachers, parents, and students' education and understanding of peace has been limited to the more stereotyped notions of women being “natural” peacemakers and men being “natural” warriors. Research that has tried to incorporate a gender-analysis into peace education has often equated gender as being synonymous with “women.” Conflating gender as “unspecified women's issues” allows for other aspects, such as men, masculinities, and violence against men go unnoticed (Nduka-Agwu, 2009, 182). Instead, men are depicted as the primary aggressors and decision makers in conflict and peace building, while women are either silenced entirely or placed into the background as nameless victims. This creates a false dichotomy that not only dismisses women's agency in war and peace, but also ignores other aspects, such as violence against men (Borer, 2009, 1171). Attempts to increase women's rights and agency will be considerably limited and may in turn cause more violence against women without also addressing masculinity, gender-based violence against men, and men's experiences in war and peace (Nduka-Agwu, 2009, 182).

This lack of critical gender-analysis in research on gender and peace education can be seen in the 1993 study by Myers-Walls et al. on parents and peace education as well as Yaacov Boaz Yablon's 2009 research on peace education and gender in Israel. In a survey of fathers and mothers educating their sons and daughters about war and peace, the Myers-Walls et al. study found that fathers focused more on the details of combat and conflict and less on peace building when talking to their
sons. Yet, instead of analyzing gender tropes and norms brought forward from the survey, the authors viewed the survey's results as further proof of the masculinizing of war and the feminizing of peace (Myers-Walls et al., 1993, 71). In Yaacov Boaz Yablon's study with Israeli Jewish and Arab high school students, the students were tested on their willingness to participate in peace education programs that were aimed to enhance positive relations between Jews and Arabs as a means for conflict resolution (2009). Gender and group differences were tested before and after youths’ participation in the program. The study found that female youths had a more positive attitude about peace and showed more willingness to participate in future peace and conflict resolution programs than their fellow male students (2009, 697). From these results, Boaz Yablon argued that the results of the study should be seen as further support for the notion that women are more "dovish" than men with regard to the use of force and that women can benefit more from peace programs than men (697).

What remains lacking in these studies is the critical inquiry into how gender and peace are constructed and challenged in peace education programs. How is peace education gendered? How are gender roles and practices being reconstituted, challenged, and changed in peace education? How does gender affect the way teachers conceptualize and implement peace education for students? What other socio-factors intersect with this process, such as wealth, sexuality, class, ethnicity, and past experiences of teachers and students? These questions are incredibly important when thinking about the complexity of gender in times of conflict and peace. Without critical insight into the relationship between gender and educating students about peace, violence and harmful stereotypes will continue to be prevalent. What is most needed is a gender analysis of peace education that not only brings the complexity of gender relations and gender-based violence to the forefront, but also seeks to address the complex relationship gender has in education (Borer, 2009, 1170). If our task as researchers and educators is to change violent behavior and attitudes, then gender must be placed front and center. By ignoring gender, we are blinding ourselves to key factors of why and how violence within a community occurs, as well as silencing persons' experiences of conflict.

The need to address gender-based violence and experience in the classroom

Bad decisions can kill people, and in this case the vast percentage of those dying are women and children. To write women out of this sad story by refusing to engage the disabling effects of gender discrimination is intellectually dishonest and morally repellent. The result is to hobble any clear-sighted teaching of the viciously interrelated issues at play (Cook, 2007, 65).

War plays out on a gendered battlefield. Who benefits and who suffers from civil unrest are dependent on one's social position in a society and their relationship with the outside world. Likewise, peace also plays out on a gendered battlefield. Much of the same criticisms that can be placed against the framing and handling of war and its denial of gender diversity and inclusion can also be placed on peace building. Throughout times of peace and violence, women and girls are to be found in multiple vulnerable and conflicting positions in which they will struggle to survive. Because of their close connection to the community, women and the female body can be tactically targeted. As Reid-Cunningham writes,
Women are more than just the spoils of war or the passive victims of genocide: civilian women are the material that war is waged with, and women may be used in a variety of strategic ways. Many more civilians than soldiers perish in modern wars, and women are “tactical targets of particular significance” because of their role within the family and social structure. Women are singled out as principal targets for the most effective destruction of a culture because of the centrality of their social roles in the family and community (2008, 282).

During the Bosnia-Herzegovina conflict (1992–1996), Muslim women were routinely captured by Serbian forces and forced into “ethnic cleansing” in which they were systematically and repeatedly raped. The after effects have led to further ethnic divisions and anger between communities as well as rejection, isolation, and further violence for the survivor and their family (Reid-Cunningham, 2008, 282). Other attacks on the domestic side of life, such as the destruction of property, forced family separation and displacement, disruption of gender roles, and age ceremonies for girls and boys, continue to leave scars upon the landscape that cannot easily be healed. These scars remain in the community long after the battle is over. It is important not only to include these acts of violence, such as forced displacement, rape, and property destruction, but also the contribution of gender and gendered experiences of violence into peace education.

When mentioning gendered experiences with violence, I am explicitly referring to how specific violence is targeted towards gendered bodies. While women's experiences during times of war and peace and their agency in peace building are issues that need to be more thoroughly addressed in the studies of peace and peace education, it is important not to stereotype women as being only victims and "natural" peacemakers. By stereotyping women as “naturally” inclined for peace and men “naturally” inclined for war, hierarchical gender norms are maintained and a much-needed critical gender political consciousness cannot be fostered (Poe, 2010). bell hooks (1995) argues that although it is necessary to continually critique patriarchy, it is also important to "clarify women's political engagements and not ignore our power to choose to be for or against militarism" (60). As evidenced in articles by R. Charli Carpenter (2006), Simona Sharoni (1995), and Mats Utas (2005), both men and women are victims and enablers of violence and militarization. British feminist Leynne Segal writes, "While it may be true that women are more concerned about peace and a better world...this does not necessarily mean that women are any less nationalistic, racist, or committed to class privilege than men" (2003, 148). Although the implications of rape and other forms of violence in times of war are very different for women and men, as women can become pregnant as a result of rape and men experience "feminizing" and humiliation of their masculine identity through male rape, the impacts it leaves on their mental and physical wellbeing, as well as the effects it has on their communities and families, are both extremely devastating (Cockburn, 2010, p.145). When talking about gender violence, it is important therefore to recognize the “intersubjectivity” of others in which their subjective experiences are intertwined with other gendered, classed, sexual, ethnic, and religious power relations (Poe, 2010). Yet, in peace education, the complexities brought out by gender, as well as the influence of other social factors that intersect with this, are still not recognized.

Despite the vital need for critical gender analysis in peace education, peace education can be a useful mechanism for addressing gender norms and gender-based violence. One way to accomplish this is through Birgit Brock-Utne's distinction of peace education between “education
for peace” and “education about peace” (2009). Education for peace focuses on the affective way of learning and deals with attitudes and changes in behavior towards ethnic differences and oppression, while education about peace is concerned with the cognitive side of learning and pays attention to the presentation of information and building of knowledge. This distinction that Brock-Utne makes is noteworthy since education for peace challenges the normative way of thinking about a current culture and allows the opportunity for critical retrospection, while education about peace avoids the discussion by focusing strictly on the knowledge of peace without making any reference to the cultural condition. As Brock-Utne writes, “It is easier to work with information meant for knowledge building than to engage students through questions and activities that may lead to a rethinking of stereotypes and a change in attitudes” (2009, 209). By opening a dialogue where educators, administrators, and students can talk about the social conditions, conflicting histories, and discourses around multiple intersections of violence, it stops peace education from being a narrowly defined set of criteria that will lead to further oppression and unrest. Creating critical dialogue in the classroom and addressing gender-based acts of violence, both in the present and the past, will help to alleviate the stigma and silence that many of these acts have caused upon individuals and their communities. Peace education can create a space where agency and voice can be given to students to address past wrongs and present obstacles. Allowing students to address social pressures, limitations, and violence based upon gender will help them to not only heal, but also facilitate an open dialogue that will deconstruct gender norms and challenge gender inequality on the local level. Without paying attention to gender inequality and gender-based violence in peace education, violence against men and women will continue to grow. Research is still needed to understand how gender roles, gender norms, and gender-based violence within peace education programs are being addressed and in doing so, we will not only have a better picture of how violence is being framed within the classroom, but also a better advantage in constructing programs that will address gender inequality and gender-based violence.

Conclusion

In her research on Sri Lanka, Mieke Lopes Cardozo notes that there were many actors involved in the creation and implementation of peace education (2008, 21). Western and non-Western NGOs, national and international governments, military powers, religious groups, along with local community members and administrators all have an impact on how peace education is produced and applied to the student body. In order to avoid the “negative face” of peace education, one needs to critically analyze the potential impact these actors have in shaping peace programs. It is therefore important for researchers to go beyond the “educational parochialism” of looking only at the nation-state, which predominantly showcases only male concerns, and overcome the “pervasive ethnocentrism” that raises Western post-developed societies as the primary physical and intellectual model for design (Novelli 2008, 483). It is clear to say that the Western countries are far from being the egalitarian and peaceful nations they claim to be. Secondly, as previously stated, gender inequality and the limiting of women from the peace process continues to be the norm in Western-dominated international spheres like the United Nations. One could argue that the dismissal of the voices and experiences of gender violence in conflict areas from peace education is a continuation of the biased gender practices already established through colonialism and Western hegemony. The need for a self-reflective attitude when talking about gender equality in post-conflict countries is therefore incredibly urgent. By doing so, not only are gender issues
brought up on both sides of the world, but the discussion also opens up the doorway for a more effective policy.

Moving beyond “educational parochialism” involves not only critique, but also the inclusion of alternative voices within peace education (Novelli 2008, 483). In “An African Perspective on Peace Education: UBUNTU lessons in Reconciliation” (2009), Tim Murthi explains that cultural attitudes and values provide the foundation for social norms and systems of meaning by which people live. “As human beings whose identity is defined through interactions with other human beings, it follows that what we do to others eventually feeds through the interwoven fabric of social, economic and political relationships to impact upon us as well” (Murthi 2009, 226). Therefore, when implementing peace education, one needs to take into account the surrounding culture, history, and social structure. The best solution is by incorporating local members, especially marginalized women and men from the community, into the peace education process. By doing so, peace education goes beyond the transmission of knowledge to the involvement of the participants in their own social reality so they become subjects of their own history (Marks, 1983, 290).

On paper, peace education, like other forms of education, may resemble an ideal program that encourages humanitarianism and compassion. Yet, as researchers like Mieke Lopes Cardozo, Mario Novelli, and Brigit Brock-Utne write, it can have a large and sometimes very different effect when implemented in the real world. Without independent investigation and critical analysis on gender and sexuality, sexism and homophobia will continue to propagate within peace education programs. In the end, what I hope to achieve with this paper is to further encourage critical debate on peace education policies and programs and to have researchers be mindful of how gender and sexuality are being framed within peace education programs, along with recognizing the voices that are being left out of the discourse. By doing so, not only will the rhetoric and implementation of peace education be more encompassing and effective, but society, both globally and locally, will also become more egalitarian.

References


Deliberative Dialogue in Support of Peace and Social Justice

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DELIBERATIVE DIALOGUE IN SUPPORT OF PEACE AND SOCIAL JUSTICE

Abstract

Deliberative dialogue is one of the civic pedagogies in higher education. It is also regarded as a tool for solving public problems, addressing policy issues, and fostering peace. However, little is known about how higher education institutions use deliberative dialogue to prepare college students to work for peace and social justice. In this paper, the nature and general uses of deliberative dialogue are explored, and its role in peace and justice education is described. Based on a preliminary assessment of deliberative dialogue forums at one university, the paper identifies issues of current concern, outcomes of the forums, and challenges encountered. Systematic research on deliberative dialogue as a method of promoting peace and social justice is recommended.

Introduction

Although pathways to peace and social justice are many and varied, it is generally accepted that education is the best starting point. Education for peace and justice taps the power of education to help students understand issues of local, national, and international significance so they can act on those issues (Elias, 2005). Accompanying a growing interest in comprehensive peace education is the use of innovative methods to educate for peace and social justice (Finley, 2013; Harris & Morrison, 2003; Navarro-Castro & Nario-Galace, 2010). One such method that has been adopted in higher education is deliberative dialogue (Harriger & McMillan, 2007; Wright, 2009). However,
not much is known about how higher education institutions use deliberative dialogue to prepare students to work for peace and justice.

**Education for Peace and Social Justice**

The field of peace education has grown considerably over the past three decades, as have approaches to peace education. Moreover, peace education has evolved from its fuzzy conceptualization and narrow definitions centered on disarmament and conflict resolution (Bajaj & Chiu, 2009; Toh & Bjerstedt, 1993) to become decidedly more coherent and comprehensive. Peace education nowadays is multidimensional, promoted as interdisciplinary, and goes beyond the confines of the classroom (Bajaj & Chiu, 2009; Finley, 2013; Harris & Morrison, 2003; Navarro-Castro & Nario-Galace, 2010; Snauwaert, 2012).

Peace education—the educational policy, planning, pedagogy, and practice aimed at developing awareness, skills, and values for the pursuit of peace (Reardon, 1988)—is no longer limited to teaching nonviolence and conflict resolution techniques. Scholars and practitioners have pointed to the intersection of peace education with human rights education (Bajaj & Chiu, 2009; Snauwaert, 2012), development education (Bajaj, 2008; Bajaj & Chiu, 2009; Navarro-Castro & Nario-Galace, 2010), and environmental education or education for sustainable development (Bajaj & Chiu, 2009; Harris & Mische, 2006; Mische, 1994; Reardon, 1988; Toh, 2006). In one scholar’s view, the symptoms of structural violence and ecological destruction are usually linked to human rights violations and to the “unjust consumption of the earth’s resources” (Toh, 2006, p. 12).

Given “the direct impact of environmental changes on food accessibility and living conditions as well as environmental degradation and competition over resources as a cause of unrest and conflict” (Bajaj & Chiu, 2009, p. 442), it is not surprising that environmental education is now bound up with peace education. Moreover, as Harris and Mische (2006) have explained, peace education and environmental education both fall within the tradition of education for social responsibility through which students learn about pressing problems and search for solutions. According to Harris and Mische, “The goals of peace education as related to environmental education include preparing students to live responsibly within the life community, nurturing and preserving its rich diversity, and not exceeding the limits of its self-renewing capacities” (p. 2).

Yet, more can be done to promote “positive” peace as opposed to “negative” peace. Whereas negative peace is, in essence, the prevention or absence of direct, physical violence such as war, positive peace is the presence of norms, policies, systems, and practices that promote human dignity, meet human needs, and uphold social justice (Galtung, 1969; Harris & Mische, 2006). Education for positive peace, then, is congruent with education for social justice.

There are distinct similarities between peace education and social justice education. Peace education has been described as process-oriented, inquiry-based, experiential, critical, reflective, value-based, dialogical/conversational, and empowering (Reardon, 1988; Reardon & Snauwaert, 2011; Snauwaert, 2012).Aligned with this pedagogy is the concept of critical/analytic reflection, which “pertains to the discernment of power, an understanding and critique of the functioning of social institutions, knowledge and analysis of the structural dimensions of social life, and the
impact of power, institutions, and structures on the quality of life” (Reardon & Snauwaert, 2011, p. 3). Social justice education has been described as intellectual and analytical, experiential (with a requirement for critical reflection) and collaborative, value-based, multicultural, and activist (Bowen, 2014; Wade, 2001). The activist element, manifested in action against structural injustices, can be linked to empowerment as an outcome of peace education. A likely precursor to empowerment is conscientization, or the raising of critical consciousness, championed by Freire (1970). Critical consciousness is awareness of existing unjust situations and of how systemic societal forces limit and promote opportunities for particular groups.

It stands to reason that some institutions of higher education have embraced a pedagogical approach that treats education for peace and education for social justice as inextricably intertwined. Among them are Catholic colleges and universities, which, according to Elias (2005), have accepted the following definition of justice and peace education:

Justice and peace education constitutes a multidisciplinary academic and moral quest for solutions to the problems of war and injustice with the consequential development of institutions and movements that will contribute to a peace that is based on justice and reconciliation. (Fahey, 1986, p. 3)

Fahey (1986) has recommended the inclusion of an experiential learning component in courses designed for justice and peace education. Similarly, Bajaj & Chiu (2009) have suggested that peace education be approached pedagogically as experiential learning characterized by the active participation of students in analyzing, reflecting, and taking action against social injustices. Justice and peace education that does not prompt action, individually or communally, is considered “inadequate, incomplete, or purely idealistic” (Elias, 2005, p. 167). Indeed, there is widespread acceptance that peace education should allow students not only to become informed about the value of fair and just social structures but also to play a role in upholding or developing such social structures (Page, 2008). In line with this, a principal goal of peace education programs is to transform students into agents of positive social change (Bajaj & Chiu, 2009; Harris, 1988; Harris & Morrison, 2003).

Campus Context for Deliberative Dialogue

Dialogue has been identified as both a peace-building method (Bajaj & Chiu, 2009) and a peace-building skill (Kester, 2010). It can clarify public thinking, contribute to constructive communication, and build understanding (McCoy & Scully, 2002; Yankelovich, 1999). Although it is a contested term, deliberation is understood as involving critical thinking and reasoned argument that can provide an avenue for citizens to contribute to public policy (McCoy & Scully, 2002). As explained in the next section, deliberative dialogue integrates dialogue and deliberation. A Deliberative Dialogue Series is organized annually on the main campus of Barry University in Miami Shores, Florida. At this Catholic institution, faculty and administrators meld peace and social justice education through curricular and co-curricular programs (Finley, 2013). The Deliberative Dialogue Series is among civic engagement programs organized by the Center for Community Service Initiatives (CCSI) to help sustain Barry’s commitment to social justice (CCSI, 2013). The civic engagement programs promote what Altman (1996, p. 375) has termed “socially responsive knowledge.” This entails educating students on the problems of society, having them
experience and understand social issues, and providing opportunities for the students to develop skills to address those issues.

The deliberative dialogue forums at Barry University are aimed at eliciting “voices and views from campus and community” on diverse social issues (CCSI, 2013, p. 16). Furthermore, the forums bring together campus and community partners to work toward a common understanding of such issues, practical ways of addressing them, and recommendations for workable public policy (CCSI, 2014).

**The Nature and Uses of Deliberative Dialogue**

Deliberative dialogue reflects the integration of dialogue and deliberation in the public sphere. McCoy and Scully (2002) have placed it in the context of civic engagement, noting that it involves face-to-face communication among stakeholders on issues of common concern. Clearly, special attention must be paid to the structure of this kind of discourse if specific objectives are to be achieved. In that regard, dialogue stands in sharp contrast to debate (Table 1). A fundamental difference between the two is that one seeks to understand, the other to persuade.

**Table 1**

*Differences Between Debate and Dialogue*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Debate</th>
<th>Dialogue</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Assuming that there is one right answer, and that you have it</td>
<td>Assuming that many people have pieces of the answer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Attempting to prove the other side wrong</td>
<td>Working toward common understanding</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Emphasizing winning</td>
<td>Emphasizing finding common ground</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Listening to find flaws and make counterarguments</td>
<td>Listening to understand and reach agreement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Defending one’s assumptions as truth</td>
<td>Revealing assumptions for reevaluation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Searching for weaknesses in others’ positions</td>
<td>Searching for strengths in others’ positions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Seeking a conclusion or vote that ratifies one’s own position</td>
<td>Discovering new options, not seeking closure</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(Adapted from Gerzon, 2006; Yankelovich, 1999)
Although agreement is an intended outcome of a dialogue, deliberative dialogue does not call for complete consensus. Rather, it calls for finding common ground. As McCoy and Scully (2002) have explained,

[C]ommon ground should not be confused with absolute consensus. When participants reach common ground, they find areas of general agreement. These agreements may lead to some group-supported action ideas and some action ideas that only a portion of the group supports. This is important because participants in a deliberative dialogue feel more at liberty to consider and generate new ideas when they are not obliged to reach total agreement. (p. 125)

Critics of deliberation have mentioned its potential to force homogeneity on heterogeneous communities and to hamper adaptation to change. And some have raised “the possibility that stronger, more eloquent, better informed [participants] will unfairly influence weaker participants” (Harriger & McMillan, 2007, p. 23). That may depend on the model (including the structure and process) of deliberation. Long-standing models are study circles, national issues forums, and citizens jury panels (Guzman, 1999). If the process is meant to “create a sense of agency” for each participant, as McCoy and Scully (2002, p. 126) have pointed out, there needs to be equitable participation and effective facilitation. Facilitating public deliberation obviously requires skills in framing the issue, asking thoughtful and probing questions, and encouraging deep reflection.

Proponents emphasize that deliberative dialogue can be used to solve public problems and address policy issues (McCoy & Scully, 2002). However, its effectiveness in prompting civic action and influencing policy decisions has not been fully explored. The promise that deliberative dialogue holds is indicated by a few studies in the United States and elsewhere (e.g., City of Calgary, 2004; Cronin, 2008; Landon, 2004; Wright, 2009). Deliberative dialogue was used, for instance, in examining state education policymaking, particularly in seeking to resolve tensions between education reform efforts and public support for those efforts (Southwest Educational Development Laboratory, 1998). In a Canadian city, it was used in the decision-making process regarding shelter for the homeless (City of Calgary, 2004). Additionally, deliberative dialogue was employed at the community level in the United States to ease tensions and address conflicts related to natural resources (Wright, 2009); and in New Zealand, it was used in the process of sustainable biotechnology governance (Cronin, 2008).

Deliberative dialogue has emerged as one of the “powerful civic pedagogies” in higher education (National Task Force on Civic Learning and Democratic Engagement, 2012, p. 32). Harriger and McMillan (2007) have highlighted its role in building democratic skills and fostering “robust democratic dispositions” (p. 143). Such a role advances deliberative democracy, which requires authentic deliberation before decision making. As Colby and her colleagues have noted,

Deliberative democracy particularly emphasizes the value of discussing public problems under conditions that are inclusive and respectful, conducive to reasoned reflection, and premised on mutual willingness to understand others’ perspectives and involve the possibility of refining values around common interests and developing mutually acceptable solutions. (Colby, Beaumont, Ehrlich, & Corngold, 2007, p. 30)
Furthermore, deliberative dialogue has been identified as a method for “fostering and sustaining cultures of peace” by supporting open communication, understanding, and social cohesion (Chakraverti, 2009, p. 270).

A Modified Model of Deliberative Dialogue

Barry University’s Deliberative Dialogue Series has three general aims. They are as follows: (1) Provide a forum in which campus and community members work toward a shared understanding of social issues; (2) promote democratic processes, practices, and participation; and (3) advocate public policy to address specific issues.

The deliberative dialogue forums offer students an opportunity to apply civic knowledge and hone civic skills, and consequently to develop the capacity to promote peace and social justice. Moreover, the forums are meant to inspire both individual and collective action in the pursuit of social justice.

Accordingly, the university uses a modified model of deliberative dialogue. The series is organized as 90-minute forums held four or five times a year. Each forum has a specific topic and is structured to include representation from all major stakeholders in civic engagement—students, alumni, faculty, staff, and community members. At least one representative of each stakeholder group serves on a panel of lead participants. Their role is to provide background information, research evidence, experiences, and perspectives on the issue. They also stimulate discussions of different aspects of the topic. Lead participants from the community reflect diversity in terms of race/ethnicity, age, gender, socioeconomic background, education, and experiences. For example, an exonerated Death Row prisoner brought a unique experience to one forum, and a previously homeless woman similarly shared a life-changing experience in another.

A university faculty or staff member serves as the moderator/facilitator who introduces the topic and the panel of lead participants; draws others into the discussion so they are not merely an audience; and encourages questions, ideas, and shared reflection. As part of the facilitation process, the moderator is expected to explain the “ground rules” with a view to promoting respectful exchange while exploring the complexity of the issue and the diversity of perspectives.

The organizers recommend an experiential learning approach to involving students in the deliberative dialogue forums. The preferred experiential learning method is service-learning, “a high-impact pedagogical strategy designed to enrich the curriculum, foster civic responsibility, and improve communities” (Bowen, 2014, p. 51). Students participating in service-learning are expected to provide service that addresses the issue in some measure. In this context, service could include, for example, community-organizing activities through nongovernmental and community-based organizations already addressing the issue; direct service to marginalized groups; and advocacy activities.

Advocacy has been defined as “the pursuit of influencing outcomes—including public-policy and resource-allocation decisions within political, economic, and social systems and institutions—that directly affect people’s lives” (Cohen, de la Vega, & Watson, 2001, p. 8). Through advocacy activities, university students can play a role in making institutions more responsive to community
issues and human needs. Carried out effectively, advocacy gives voice to ordinary people and increases their power to influence public policy. Therein lies the connection between advocacy activities and the deliberative dialogue forums.

The practice has been to hold the academic year’s first forum in September as part of the Peace Month observance on the university campus. The forums, however, do not focus on peace per se; they cover a range of social justice issues and thus support peace education. Some of the issues analyzed in the ongoing series are capital punishment, civil rights, crime and violence, educational inequity, environmentalism, immigration, and poverty (Table 2). The connection between peace and environmental issues, for example, has been made clear in the literature (e.g., Bajaj & Chiu, 2009; Harris & Mische, 2006; Mische, 1994; Toh, 2006). Further, concomitants of poverty (i.e., hunger and homelessness) were discussed in one of the forums as symptomatic of structural violence.

Table 2

*Issues and Topics for Deliberative Dialogue*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Issues</th>
<th>Topics</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Capital punishment</td>
<td>The Death Penalty: An Eye for an Eye?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poverty</td>
<td>Hunger and Homelessness: Beyond Band Aids</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civil rights</td>
<td>Civil Rights and Social Justice: Have We Come Far Enough?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civil rights; crime and</td>
<td>The Right to Bear Arms: A Deliberative Dialogue on Gun Rights and Gun Control</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>violence</td>
<td>The Poor Becoming Poorer? From Poverty Wages to a Living Wage</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poverty</td>
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<tr>
<td>Immigration</td>
<td>A Nation of Immigrants? Attitudes and Approaches to Immigrant Reform</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Environmentalism</td>
<td>Environmental Sustainability: Who Will Be Left Behind?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Educational inequity;</td>
<td>College Access and Rising Tuition</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>economic disparities</td>
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*A Preliminary Assessment*
An informal, preliminary assessment of the Deliberative Dialogue Series was conducted recently, using a “feedback” form and non-participant observation. Students and faculty were asked to provide feedback indicating their perspectives on the forums. The primary purpose of the observation was to see the interactions among panelists and other participants and to get a sense of the effectiveness of the forum structure.

The assessment revealed a positive impact of the deliberative dialogue forums on values and attitudes in terms of self-awareness, civic responsibility, and ecological concern among students. In particular, students felt “more open-minded,” “willing to discuss issues respectfully with others who hold different views,” and “more interested in taking care of the environment.” Some suggested that the forums heightened their awareness of social injustices while others indicated “a new appreciation of the diversity of the community” in which the university resides.

In relation to students, outcomes pertaining to knowledge acquisition, skill development, and follow-up action constitute the main findings of the assessment. These outcomes are summarized in Figure 1.

**Figure 1**

*Key Outcomes of Deliberative Dialogue*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Knowledge</th>
<th>Skills</th>
<th>Actions</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>• Social justice/social change (concepts and issues)</td>
<td>• Active listening</td>
<td>• Vigil and letter writing as advocacy against the death penalty</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Diversity (broadly defined)</td>
<td>• Critical thinking</td>
<td>• Distribution of fact sheet on environmental preservation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Functions of nonprofit and nongovernmental organizations</td>
<td>• Effective communication</td>
<td>• Donation of used household items and school supplies to charity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Roles of citizens in a democracy</td>
<td>• Reflection</td>
<td>• Service with nonprofit and nongovernmental organizations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Democratic processes</td>
<td>• Purposeful monitoring of public events</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Decision making</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Ability to challenge unjust practices</td>
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</table>
Students, who were part of a diverse group of participants, reported that they learned more about the concept of social justice and about specific social justice issues (e.g., capital punishment and human rights). They also learned about the work of nonprofit and nongovernmental organizations, several of which were represented on forum panels; roles of citizens in a democracy; and democratic processes beyond voting (e.g., sending petitions to legislators).

With regard to skills, students were observed demonstrating effective communication and critical thinking on various issues during the forums. One student noted that “it was important to listen carefully to what others are saying”; another stressed the need to “disagree respectfully.” Students who were among the lead participants (panelists) prepared for the forums by doing research and monitoring public events.

As a follow-up to the forums, there were discussions on the death penalty (by sociology and criminology students) and the living wage (in a political science class), and there were related service-learning assignments. In addition, faculty reported that students took part in various activities to mark the World Day Against the Death Penalty. Activities included a film screening and discussion, presentations by exonerated convicts, training by Amnesty International, a vigil, and an advocacy project. Regarding the advocacy project, students sent letters to state government and prison officials calling for an end to the death penalty.

Further, the deliberative dialogue on environmental sustainability generated a fact sheet, “Environmental Preservation: 10 Tips for Students.” The first tip urged students to “Follow the 3 R’s: Reduce, Reuse, Recycle.” The second tip, “Don’t throw it away—give it away,” contributed to the success of Dorm Drive 2014, a project through which campus-housed students donated dozens of items (mainly clothing, household items, and educational supplies) at the end of the spring semester. Rather than discard the items as they moved out of the residence halls, or take them home, the students offered them as donations to benefit needy people in the local community.

For their part, faculty members from several academic departments used deliberative dialogue as a teaching-and-learning approach and as an opportunity to build partnerships with community agencies. Some faculty members required their students’ attendance at the forums and participation in follow-up activities. The opportunity to interact with community members and students was especially important to a faculty member who participated in the forum on college access.

Three faculty members commented on forums that they attended:

I participated in the [Civil Rights and Social Justice] deliberative dialogue and I think it was a total success. The combination of faculty, students, and community leaders was a great format, which made the forum interesting and informative.

The dialogue on the death penalty was a catalyst for me to write two grants for collaboration between the university and FADP [Floridians for Alternatives to the Death Penalty]. ... The intended purpose was to build a community organizing model in South Florida that would train students to raise awareness about anti-death penalty efforts.
The dialogue on hunger and homelessness got me thinking about ways to support students in moving from a charity mindset and looking at service through a social change lens. ... It’s one thing to collect and donate food to a homeless shelter; it’s quite another thing to help people gain skills and access to affordable housing. ... Clearly, education and advocacy are feasible ways.

Two others commented on the general purpose and utility of the deliberative dialogue forums:

The deliberative dialogue series creates a space to discuss pressing issues of national and international importance from a variety of perspectives. The expertise of panel members and the high level of student participation these events generate, ensure a deep discussion that goes beyond party platitudes and media sound bites.

Deliberative dialogues provide a forum where diverse views can be exchanged. They bring together people with different perspectives on critical issues and give all who participate a lot of important information to consider. The dialogues encourage a safe space where controversial topics can be discussed and people are encouraged to exchange their views. One of the problems with dialogues is when people come in with closed minds and are not willing to alter their opinions based on new evidence they may gather about a topic. But in participating in and observing several dialogues, I have seen people reach that “a-ha” moment where new information helps to reshape their views. It does not happen all the time, but when it does it is a special moment which demonstrates the efficacy of engaging in these exercises.

By participating together in deliberative dialogue forums, students, faculty members, and community representatives saw opportunities for collaboration to further address some of the issues. In general, they viewed the forums as a contributor to participatory democracy that values community voice and citizen involvement.

The findings of this assessment suggest three broad areas of “promising” impact:

- Development of civic knowledge and skills—Deliberative dialogue forums serve to fill knowledge gaps while elucidating relevant concepts. The forums can support the application of knowledge to social justice issues by preparing students to take an informed stance on those issues and develop self-efficacy to help implement changes in society.

- Community partnership building—The forums support the development of partnerships between the university and the wider community. Campus and community stakeholders can develop working relationships and identify new ways to collaborate.

- Participation in democratic processes—The forums are instrumental in promoting participation in democratic processes. In addition to learning some
of the functional details of deliberation, students can gain skills in using advocacy as a bridge between awareness and social action.

The assessment revealed a few challenges as well. The first of two main challenges concerns “time constraints” in relation to the usually large attendance at the forums, which inhibited equitable participation. To deal with that challenge, the organizers probably need to set aside more time (beyond 90 minutes) for each forum.

The second challenge has to do with facilitation of the forums. In this regard, the assessment identified the need for the kind of facilitation that would move participants intentionally from talk to action. For most of the Deliberative Dialogue Series, the facilitators left it up to participants to pursue their own efforts as a follow-up to the forums. A recommended approach is to have the moderator/facilitator pose questions near the end of each forum, regarding participants’ views (changed or unchanged) on the issue, alternative courses of action, and the next steps. Suggestions and decisions from the forums should be recorded and summarized. If appropriate, a report should then be prepared and sent to local or state policymakers.

It is important to point out that the evidence presented here is largely anecdotal and that any conclusion regarding the effectiveness of deliberative dialogue is tentative. A rigorous assessment of the deliberative dialogue forums is needed. Such an assessment could be designed to identify the depth of knowledge and level of skills acquired, and the contribution of both to students’ “sense of agency” (McCoy & Scully, 2002, p. 126). A robust assessment also could shed light on the challenge of moving from discussion to action.

**Conclusion**

Deliberative dialogue integrates two forms of public deliberation to promote civic learning and engagement. Its broad appeal rests in its structure and process: It is structured in a way that encourages participants to seek mutual understanding as well as opportunities to collaborate in addressing social concerns.

Barry University’s Deliberative Dialogue Series has made a modest contribution to the development of civic values, knowledge, and skills among students; the building of community partnerships; and the promotion of democratic processes and practices. While not addressing peace explicitly, the deliberative dialogue forums have contributed to the discourse about peace and social justice by exploring such issues as environmentalism, poverty, civil rights, crime and violence, capital punishment, and immigration.

Getting a clearer understanding of the role of deliberative dialogue in promoting peace and social justice necessitates systematic research. For now, it is clear that the action-eliciting potential of deliberative dialogue has not been fully tapped at this university. Improving the scheduling and facilitation could go a long way in fulfilling the purposes of the forums.

Wherever in higher education it is organized, a fundamental purpose should remain: Deliberative dialogue should support civic learning and engagement and, at the same time, empower students as agents of peace and social justice.
References


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**Keywords:** Ecology, Peace, Violence

Philosophers and practitioners of pacifism and non-violence are often charged with naivete and irresponsibility. Theorists from Max Weber and Michael Walzer to Jean Bethke Elshtain and Richard Posner allege that we are more concerned with moral purity, are insensitive to the harsh and violent realities of political life, and thus at best naive and misguided. At worst, we allegedly promote the greater evil through our dogmatic refusal to accept the moral necessity of violence whether in war, national security or domestic policing. Anyone committed to a genuine positive peace has to meet this challenge and develop a theory and praxis that is sensitive to the evolutionary conditions of human life, to the practical possibilities of human behavior, and an appreciation of the influence of power, privilege and oppression on human existence. Likewise we need clear-headed, sober and empirically sensitive analysis to establish the practical possibilities of peace in the face of challenges both from realist-minded political and moral philosophers as well as from the just war tradition. To respond in any other way would be irresponsible. Dr. Fox’s book does a marvelous job of meeting this challenge.

The argument of the book is stated succinctly at the outset: 1) To provide a secular understanding of the fundamentals of peace; 2) to show that peace is a realistic goal; and 3) to show that war is an ineffective means of promoting human survival and flourishing. In effect, the core goal of the book is to demonstrate the irrationality of war and the rationality of a principled non-violent pacifism (xv).

Dr. Fox defines war in the following way:
War is a situation or process of openly hostile (and generally armed) struggle between two or more organized groups whose premeditated intention is to inflict damage and/or death upon each others’ members and destroy each others’ territory in the interest of achieving a desired end (5).

But war is not merely a matter of violent struggle, it is also, and more fundamentally, a state of consciousness, a militarized state of mind. Six myths structure our contemporary militarized consciousness:

1. The history of humanity is to be understood in terms of the warring decisions of great leaders
2. Adequate government requires a strong inventory of advanced weapons that leaders must utilize ‘when necessary.’
3. Wars solve human problems and advance interests more effectively than other engagements
4. ‘Our’ wars are never invasions or acts of aggression, undertaken always in defense of shared ideals and cherished ways of life
5. War is a core element of human and national identity
6. Human nature is inherently aggressive and warlike

All of these are core beliefs of contemporary militarized consciousness and the violent philosophies which drive it. In varying ways, they underline both political realist and just-war theoretical reasoning about the necessity of war. Thereby they provide a foundational justification for the institutionalization and utilization of mass violence in the pursuit of state interests as well as allegedly moral goals such as humanitarian intervention and the responsibility to protect, among others. Core beliefs they may be, but each myth is, Dr. Fox argues, empirically false and theoretically unsustainable.

At the foundation of the book is a detailed exploration of sources from history, anthropology, sociology, social psychology, economics and political science. Each is deftly employed to show that the Machiavelli and Hobbes inspired story about the violence of humanity and of the past is false. Humans are not the violent competitive actors presupposed by such political theory.

The consequence is a profound challenge to political realism and just war theory, since Dr. Fox suggests that arguments for war based upon political necessity are incoherent. If war can never be morally necessary, then prudential defences of war turn out to be immoral and irrational hypothetical imperatives. Similarly, just war theory loses its core force, since the absence of alternatives, i.e. necessity, is one of the conditions both *ad bellum* and *in bello*. If there are always alternatives, then war is never the lesser evil and thus is indefensible.

Dr. Fox’s book offers more than this powerful critique of the classic justifications for war. He provides an excellent account of the social, psychological and economic impacts of war as well as a fine analysis of the key role played by legitimacy in both the perpetuation and transformation of social orders. No political state of affairs and no act of social violence occurs without the (typically manipulated) consent of a governed population. Furthermore, the account of legitimacy is nuanced.
in tying the justification and legitimacy of war to the presence of a masculinised (and, one should add, racist and classist) consciousness and social order. Without this masculinised military consciousness, war would not happen. It is this, fundamentally, which conditions populations to accept the ‘necessity’ of war.

Another virtue of the book is that, while it is resolutely secular, it leaves considerable space for religious believers from many different traditions to intertwine their nonviolent beliefs with the core arguments. It invites intercultural dialogue on peace – under the umbrella of a generally secular and evolutionary model of human behavior. As such, Dr. Fox’s peaceful culture is envisioned for fallible, occasionally squabbling and conflictual human beings, not Gods. There is nothing utopian about this and no claim or appeal to a transcendent world. On the contrary, if his presentation of the evidence is right, it is the justifications for war that are naive and irrational – grounded as they are in empirically indefensible views about human nature.

The book provides a constructive conception of peace and suggests positively how societies might be structured to promote peace and to escape from our current entrapment in a militarized consciousness. Peace has both subjective and objective components; its objective conditions are found in presence of the material conditions of a decent life, negative peace and a range of social and political goods; subjectively it is found in the self (252); the latter proceeds from self-knowledge, discipline and a calm and balanced mind. An education in compassion, as well as the transformation of political, economic and social conditions to further unlock compassion and extend it to currently marginalized groups is essential.

In particular the pursuit of a genuinely compassionate peace culture requires that we explore and internalize core insights from feminism (we should also include critical race theory, disability studies, Marxism and queer theory). Eliminating war and reducing violence require that we recognize that the injustices done to marginalized groups are significant for everyone. No peace culture is possible that fails to develop solidarity with what Albert Camus referred to as the community of the oppressed – all of those excluded from the conditions of flourishing by the institutional environments in which they live. As animals and eco-systems are the most invisible in human thinking about war, Dr. Fox’s commitment to the marginalized also requires us morally to consider other beings and ecological systems.

This is not to say that the book is tension-free. While it is extremely rich, there is an uneasy acceptance of violence in certain places which requires further discussion. For example, Dr. Fox suggests that even a strongly committed pacifist might be willing to accept a UN style peace force mandated to use lethal force ‘when necessary’ to bring about a peace (175) But I have my doubts about this, since the institutions needed to make such a force effectively lethal have to promote the masculinist dispositions necessary to kill. And they must do so not merely in their soldiers or police officers, but also in the bystander population, since they also have to inculcate the same norms if a population is to support such violence. This is in tension with the strong feminism of the book. To defend it requires that one show that the training in lethality could be done in a way which does not structurally replicate the systems of oppression that he so rightly targets. I am skeptical about whether this can be done.
I also worry about the idea that war should be illegal (175-6) – beyond immoral – since the practice of law and most, if not all, legal theory, presupposes socially organized violence; to bring the rejection of war under the heading of law seems to bring the prisons, the police and other violence-causing institutions along with it that are also arguably incompatible with a peace culture. Dr. Fox does suggest that declaring war illegal would be, mainly, a symbolic act and a rejection, by nations, that war is the norm and the final source of conflict resolution when all other means have been exhausted. Its role would be delegitimation and a means of denying states the avenue for claiming the rightness of their cause. But the issue of sanction still floats here, since appeals to the International Criminal Court and other international mechanisms does not make them any less oppressive or violent, and thus does not show how the tension between the violence of law and a peaceful culture can be negotiated. Similarly, (293) in an analysis of terrorism he suggests that the successful resolution of counter-terror operations is the result of good police and intelligence work. But the violence of police and intelligence counter-terrorism operations often exceeds what we normally call war, and even where it does not achieve such levels, it still often involves extraordinary levels of violence and lethality.

If law is to play a significant role, then significant work needs to be done to imagine a non-violent law and the effective non-violent social institutions necessarily to ground it. These are worries, but they do not mar this excellent book. If anything they challenge us to think further about the nature and possibility of a peaceful law as well as to take it seriously.

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Keywords: Race, Ferguson, Black Women, Leadership, Michael Brown

Soon after the tragic circumstance leading to the Ferguson, Missouri race riot during August of 2014, an aunt of the first author texted family members with the message, “Let us pray for Michael Brown and his family.” The news coverage related to the incident and the resulting riots reflected protests and riots of the 1960s: tear gas, army tanks, and White policemen referring to African Americans as “animals.” As a native to the area in conflict, the first author wanted to do something to prompt positive change. How could she as a young Black woman assist in helping others move beyond misplaced rage related to historical inequities and slights, and towards a proactive peaceful approach to address underlying racial inequity that contributed to the fate of young Michael Brown?

Black women have historically served as peacemakers when holding leadership. Contemporary heroine Antoinette Tuff, who saved over 800 people during August of 2013 by peacefully negotiating with a 20 year old mentally ill man at Ronald E. McNair Discovery Learning Academy (Tuff, 2014), serves as an example of how the intersectional identities of Black women as double minorities in America position them to hold unique leadership qualities that facilitate peacemaking.
This piece explores how Black women use peace emanating from spiritual leadership to abate racism, address conflict, and create more harmonious environments. One exercising spiritual leadership “compris(es) the values, attitudes, and behaviors that are necessary to intrinsically motivate one’s self and others so that they have a sense of spiritual survival through calling and membership” (Fry, 2003, p. 3). Black women in leadership consistently note religion or spirituality as support systems within their professional and personal lives (Davis & Chaney, 2013). Thus, this review utilizes spiritual leadership as a conceptual framework for understanding how the position of Black women enables them to become agents of peace.

*Black Women in Leadership: Their Historical and Contemporary Contributions* (Davis & Chaney, 2013) examines the leadership of Black women within macro and micro systems of society. Macro systems include public education, industry, social services, and civic organizations. Micro systems discussed comprise Black women’s influence within families and the church. The collection provides historical and contemporary models of leadership within these contexts. The work holds significance, as scholarship featuring the leadership of Black women currently often focuses merely upon professional administrative contexts and experiences. With few exceptions (i.e., Rosa Parks, Fannie Lou Hamer, Shirley Chisholm, and Angela Davis), the accomplishments of Black female leaders have historically been ignored, minimized, or primarily linked to those of prominent Black men (i.e., Dr. Martin Luther King Jr., Colin Powell, and President Barack Obama). The work highlights Black women peace activists and workers, beyond that of Rosa Parks. Reflecting upon peace, rooted in the spiritual leadership of the group, promises to provide a historical foundation for work on contemporary Black female leaders engaged in peacemaking. The lessons learned from these women, past and present, contribute to our understanding of peacemaking, negotiation, and leadership.

In examining the varied contexts (i.e., historical, societal, and familial) that foster Black women’s leadership in their families and communities, the work places Black women at the center of leadership experiences they create and maintain. The double minority status of Black women and the multifaceted leadership roles they take on in home, civic life, church, and the workplace, positions them to yield unique spiritual peace-oriented approaches to problem solving and decision making. These leadership traits have been passed down from Black mothers to their daughters for centuries.

Part I of the book focuses upon leadership within communities and families. Thompson-Rogers centers upon the realm of spirituality in her demonstration of how Black women have historically held leadership roles in the church. In Chapter 4, Tickles offers a case study illustrating the leadership of an African American mother towards her family and community.

Part II explores the leadership of Black women in education, both historically and in contemporary society. It opens with two historical pieces, “Each One, Teach One: Black Women’s Historical Contributions to Education,” by McPherson and “Black Women’s Historical Leadership in African American Home Education,” by Hudson and Davis. The work of Esnard and colleagues then features the experiences of Black female educational leaders in K–12 settings. Illustrations of Black female leadership at the postsecondary level follow, including chapters on the professional development organization Sisters of the Academy. All of these examples illustrate spiritual leadership and addressing problems that yield greater peace and belonging for all involved.
Black Women in Leadership uniquely explores Black women’s leadership in varied contexts, highlighting past and current examples. Reflection upon the past illustrates that spiritual leadership among Black women serves as a legacy which current women of African descent continue. Such a contribution renders Black women as agents of peace within micro and macro social realms.

References


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The Ghosts of Jeju is a 2013 documentary film by Regis Tremblay that reveals the untold history of the U.S. role in Korea after World War II. It won the Best Expose Documentary Film Award this year at the Chicago Peace on Earth Film Festival and has been seen by thousands of people in the States and more than 15 countries around the world, including Russia and China. It has recently been translated into Korean, Japanese, and Chinese.

I went to Jeju Island, South Korea in September 2012, thinking I was going to make a short film about a non-violent, peaceful protest by the indigenous people of Gangjeong Village against the construction of a giant naval base to accommodate America’s “Pivot to Asia.”

What I discovered was the untold and hidden history of the United States in Korea after World War II, when aided and abetted and commanded directly by the United States Military occupation forces, as many as 60,000 men, women, and children were accused of being Communist sympathizers and massacred in a scorched earth campaign in 1947-48.

The film is a shocking documentary about the struggle of people who are the direct descendents of that tragic massacre set in the context of the American presence in Korea for the past 70 years. The film reveals horrible atrocities at the hands of the U.S. Military then, and the sometimes brutal repression of this seven year non-violent struggle against the construction of that naval base by tens of thousands of militarized, Korean National riot police.
Using previously secret and classified photos, film and documents, this is the first English-language documentary about the struggle of the brave people of Gangjeong Village who are peacefully opposing the military advance of the United States, just as their parents and relatives did in 1947. As then, they are being arrested, jailed, fined and hospitalized for resisting this base that has already destroyed their UNESCO protected environment, and will displace their 500 year old farming and fishing village.

And yet, the indomitable spirit of the villagers and their supporters who have not lost hope in spite of overwhelming odds, will inspire and motivate everyone who believes there is a better way to live together on this planet.

This film, produced for less than $4,000 and funded by friends and NGOs, has been translated into Korean, Japanese and Chinese. I have toured with the film across the U.S. to 30 cities from coast to coast, and 22 universities including UCLA, The University of Chicago, Boston College, and the Univ. of Minnesota.

Interviews with Professor Bruce Cummings, arguably the leading authority on Korea and Korean-American relations, Charles Hanley, Pulitzer Prize winning author of the Bridge at No Gun Ri, Bruce Gagnon, Coordinator of the Global Network Against Weapons and Nuclear Power in Space, and Oliver Stone lend credibility and insight into the larger geopolitical implications of this struggle.

There are also touching interviews with activists who have been protesting daily for more than seven years: Catholic priests, Jesuits, Catholic nuns, Buddhist monks, and young activists, who have been arrested, jailed, fined, and even hospitalized because of the brutality of the riot police. Because of the deep and profound reactions of audiences, and the powerful way people everywhere identify with this struggle on Jeju, organizations like Veterans for Peace, Pax Christi, Dorothy Day Workers, and many other peace and justice groups as well as universities have spread the film by word of mouth through their networks.

As I travel with the film and participate in question and answer sessions and dialogue, I am struck and often brought to tears by the responses of audiences. Korean Americans hug and kiss me and thank me for telling this story that for 50 years was a crime to even speak about. Americans, young and old, stand and applaud even before the film has ended.

People everywhere have responded with deep emotions to The Ghosts of Jeju not only because it relates the untold history of the U.S. in Korea since WWII, but because the survivors of this massacre on Jeju are again resisting US military expansion and hegemony with the building of the base. Audiences cry, express anger, disbelief, embarrassment, and shame. But, in every case, people ask, “what can we do.”

The conclusion of the film presents my response to that question:

“In the face of what seems to be inevitable defeat, many are protesting with their bodies and hearts and all of their energies. Their spirit and determination are infectious; each individual contributing to a formidable mass that we would all like to believe is
indomitable. There are many in this struggle, each assuming different roles. They find strength in each other, their community and their past.

More and more people around the world are noticing. There are more who understand the long-range folly of the dark forces that would destroy our planet.

Gangjeong may be lost – maybe not; but through the struggle, the voices of Jeju and Gangjeong are reaching the four corners of the earth and making incremental gains. By visiting Gangjeong, I learned we each have a voice. As we become more knowing, the voice gains amplitude, authenticity and responsibility.

With citizenship in this country comes a responsibility for its deeds. There is hope only in the belief that committed people can bring peace to the world…and that is the message of Jeju. The least we can do is amplify their voices.

What is at stake in our time is not who is stronger or which system is better, but the survival of us as one species in harmony with the only home we have. What is at stake if we are to survive is a common understanding by all who people the earth about who we are and how we are connected to each other, to the earth and the entire universe. That is our hope and the prayer we lift to the heavens today.”

Going to Jeju changed my life in very profound ways. I feel a very deep bond of love and solidarity with the people of Korea and Jeju. I now consider myself a citizen of a world without borders. I have been deeply enriched by each and every person I have met on this incredible journey that happened, not by plan, but quite by accident.

Only on my way back to the States, when I visited the 4.3 Memorial commemorating the April 3, 1947 massacre on Jeju, did I begin to understand that my film would become much, much more than a protest against a military base. I understood for the first time what the people of Gangjeong had been telling me during my three weeks with them, “you won’t understand our struggle until you visit the 4.3 Memorial.”

Additional research led me to understand the magnitude of the U.S. presence in Korea and the true intentions of the “Pivot to Asia” in the larger geopolitical context. The Ghosts of Jeju has been described as “shocking, eye-opening, and deeply disturbing, and a film every American must see.”

I am angry about the impending doom of climate change, poverty, endless wars and killings, and the inability of nation states to solve these critical issues upon which survival of life depends. But, I find peace, hope and inspiration in the brave people who put their lives on the line for peace and justice and the many people who thank me for making The Ghosts of Jeju.

I will continue to use my films to expose the effects of war, militarism, and predator Capitalism on people, nations, and the planet, and to demonstrate that there is hope only in the massive, peaceful, popular uprisings occurring all over the world where people are demanding peace, justice, an end to poverty and tyranny, and a new way of living together on the only home we have.