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Can We Commit? Explaining Discipline in Nonviolent Movements

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CAN WE COMMIT? EXPLAINING DISCIPLINE IN NONVIOLENT MOVEMENTS

Abstract

The purpose of this article is to identify factors, which may influence nonviolent discipline in nonviolent movements. Nonviolent discipline is a critical component in nonviolent movements, but has not received close scholarly attention. Empirical evidence indicates nonviolent campaigns are twice as likely to achieve their goals as violent resistance, and maintaining nonviolent discipline seems not only to contribute to securing a successful outcome but may also provide a better chance of preventing recurring conflict. To explain what drives discipline, two nonviolent movements are examined for comparative analysis: China, Tiananmen Square 1989 and South Korea, Gwangju³ 1980. Both movements took place in East Asia, where there has been a recognized increase in nonviolent movements since 1979. Three factors: the timing of events, the way space is occupied, and the role of external media appear to have influenced whether nonviolent discipline was able to be maintained in each case study.

Introduction

Nonviolent discipline has been identified as a critical component in nonviolent movements. Stephan and Chenoweth state that “[s]cholars of nonviolent conflict have highlighted nonviolent discipline as a key variable in explaining the success of nonviolent campaigns” (Stephan & Chenoweth, 2011, p. 257n3). However, nonviolent discipline is also something of an unknown quantity, used broadly in the literature, with little clarity about how it is generated or sustained. Therefore, investigation into how this is maintained is worthy of closer examination and may

contribute to a greater understanding of what nonviolent discipline is and how it can be best maintained in nonviolent movements.

The apparent increase in nonviolent campaigns over the last century has been accompanied by growing academic interest in the phenomenon of nonviolent movements (Zunes, 1994). In particular, there is significant interest in the rise of nonviolence and decreasing levels of violence in East Asia¹ (Svensson & Lindgren, 2011a; Svensson & Lindgren, 2011b; Kivimaki, 2010a; Kivimaki, 2010b; Tonnesson, 2009). Interestingly, “almost a third of all non-violent uprisings since 1946 have occurred in Asia, most of which took place in East Asia” (Svensson & Lindgren, 2011, p. 225). Nonviolent discipline may be one ingredient in what appears to be an increase in nonviolent movements in the East Asian region.

The popular opinion that violent tactics are more effective than nonviolent methods is being challenged by the increase in, and success of nonviolent campaigns. Empirical evidence also suggests that 53 per cent of the time nonviolent campaigns achieve success while in comparison, violent resistance is successful only 26 per cent of the time (Stephan & Chenoweth, 2008). It is posited, in order for a nonviolent campaign to be successful, it depends on unity, leadership, strategy and nonviolent discipline (Ackerman & Rodal, 2008; Stephan, 2006; Stephan & Mundy, 2006). Nonviolent discipline within a campaign “is a function of leadership, training, and effective internal communication. . .” (Stephan, 2006, p. 76). Nonviolent discipline is subsequently the collective responsibility of a group to commit to nonviolence, equally self-discipline is a critical element if discipline is to be maintained (Sharp, 1973). Therefore, leadership and communication structures within a campaign carry a responsibility to educate individuals about *not* using violence against violence (Ackerman & Rodal, 2008; Stephan, 2006). Effectively transferring this information, however, may present a challenge for movements planning to commit to nonviolent discipline.

There are several reasons, which illustrate why research in nonviolent discipline may be beneficial. First, a commitment to nonviolent discipline within a nonviolent movement can heighten international and local empathy for the campaign whilst enticing a wide cross-section of society to participate. Both of which, can raise costs for and increase pressure on the parties who repress the nonviolent campaign (Stephan & Chenoweth, 2008). Second, it is difficult for a government to justify using violence against nonviolence as this has much more potential for backfire, especially when nonviolent activists are perceived to be more moderate than parties using violence and therefore appeals to a sympathetic public (Stephan & Chenoweth, 2008; Sutton, Butcher & Svensson, 2013). Third, maintaining nonviolent discipline has also been argued to add to the level of freedom a post-conflict population may experience² (Ackerman & Rodal, 2008). It is also suggested that maintaining nonviolent discipline has the benefit of both “winning the war and securing the peace” (Stephan & Chenoweth, 2011, p. 202). Therefore, maintaining nonviolent discipline seems to not only contribute to securing a successful outcome but also providing a better chance of preventing recurring conflict.

Although there are exceptions, the general pattern is clear. When nonviolent campaigns fail to remain disciplined in the exclusive use of nonviolent methods, or when they coexist with violent competitors in the political

environment, we are more likely to see recurrent violent conflict between government and insurgents (Stephan & Chenoweth, 2011, p. 218).

This article compares two case studies, examining factors that may have influenced a commitment to nonviolent discipline. To date, there has not been systematic analysis of how nonviolent discipline might be affected in nonviolent campaigns. A comparison of two nonviolent movements, one of which appears to remain nonviolent, while the other abandons nonviolence for violent tactics, may help illuminate this gap in current research.

China, Tiananmen Square 1989 and South Korea, Gwangju³ 1980 have been chosen as the case studies for the following reasons. First, both countries are part of East Asia and thus examples of nonviolent movements in a region where there has been a significant increase in nonviolent movements since 1979 (Svensson & Lindgren, 2011a; Svensson & Lindgren, 2011b; Kivimaki, 2010a; Kivimaki, 2010b; Tonnesson, 2009). Second, the case studies share many similarities. Both were pro-democracy, attempting to free themselves from oppressive regimes, initiated by university students, and both ended with massive loss of life at the hands of their respective governments. Third, interestingly despite the similarities, there were clear differences. Apart from the fact that in one case nonviolent discipline was maintained while in the other it was not, the timing of events, the physical space the protests occupied, and the part external media played in each case study, appear to offer significant variation.

Theory and research on nonviolence and nonviolent discipline is growing, however public information specific to Tiananmen 1989 and Gwangju 1980 is limited. There is on-going government control over politically sensitive material—either restricted or censored—which may limit access to documents of relevance to the case studies and thereby influence results. Nevertheless, the information, which *is* available, adds an important contribution to research on nonviolent discipline.

This article will proceed as follows. First, the phenomenon of East Asian peace will be touched on. Second, the method of analysis will be outlined. Third, the case studies will be introduced and three factors: the timing of events, the way space is occupied, and the role of external media, will be presented. Following on, there will be a comparative discussion of how the three factors may have influenced each of the case studies. Fourth, the conclusion will be presented and further research avenues identified.

East Asian Peace

Since the early 1980s there has been a noticeable increase in nonviolent protests and uprisings in East Asia¹ (Svensson & Lindgren, 2011a). Over the same period a decrease in armed conflict has been noted which has subsequently ignited interest for peace researchers (Svensson & Lindgren, 2011a; Kivimaki, 2010a; Goldsmith, 2007; Yan, 2003). These trends show a decrease in violent conflict and an increase in nonviolent action (Svensson & Lindgren, 2011a; Stephan, 2006). However, evidence of peace in East Asia does not automatically assume that this region has become more skilful in the art of being peaceful. Research is interested in the reduction of levels of violence in East Asia and *what* exactly may have enabled such a change (Tonnesson, 2009). The reasons for why general change has occurred in East Asia may also be of relevance to

understanding the specific conditions, which contribute to maintaining nonviolent discipline in each of the case studies.

The literature addresses reasons why East Asian peace occurs and offers many possible explanations. However in the context of this discussion, only the following empirical trends will be briefly outlined as a context for the case studies and how nonviolent discipline may be influenced.

Peace and Conflict research has been gathering data and analysing trends which indicate signs of East Asia becoming more peaceful since the 1980's. Approximately 4.2 million battle-related deaths were recorded for 1950-1979, while there was only an estimated 100,000 battle related deaths between 1980-2005, indicating a decrease in violent campaigns in the East Asian region (Tonnesson, 2009). Nonviolent uprisings in the same region have also been on the increase and have doubled in number since 1979 (Svensson & Lindgren, 2011a). These figures are interesting to measure alongside Stephan and Chenoweth's findings that statistically nonviolence campaigns achieve success double the number of times a violent campaign will succeed (Stephan & Chenoweth, 2008). The statistics raise an interesting question: has the increase in frequency of nonviolent campaigns influenced the broader trend of nonviolent campaigns achieving more successful outcomes, and if so what are the conditions, which have facilitated success? There are several possible explanations for the conditions which influence why nonviolent campaigns have increased in East Asia, which may also be applicable in other contexts.

First, there may now be greater costs in armed warfare and the benefits no longer outweigh these, making nonviolent action a more desirable alternative (Svensson & Lindgren, 2011a; Zunes, 1994). Second, there is a growing awareness that unarmed or nonviolent movements can be very powerful and are able to meet their goals with even more success than violent conflict (Svensson & Lindgren, 2011a; Ackerman & Rodal, 2008; Stephan & Chenoweth, 2008; Zunes, 1994). Third, the knowledge that military struggles have problems developing democracy once the conflict ends, has influenced decisions made by resistance groups to use nonviolent tactics rather than violent methods (Svensson & Lindgren, 2011a; Ackerman & Rodal, 2008). The empirical evidence makes a strong claim that there has been a significant increase in nonviolent protests in East Asia and a greater chance of success in nonviolent campaigns overall (Svensson & Lindgren, 2011a; Ackerman & Rodal, 2008; Stephan & Chenoweth, 2008; Zunes, 1994). Investigation into nonviolent movements, which have occurred in East Asia, is therefore relevant to understanding the conditions, which create increasing levels of nonviolence and may shed light on how nonviolent discipline is maintained in individual campaigns.

Methods

Within the nonviolence literature there is a distinct lack of close case study analysis comparing nonviolent campaigns that are successful or unsuccessful in achieving campaign goals (Schock, 2013). This article seeks to not only make a contribution to the gap in nonviolent campaign comparative analysis, but also build up theory around the concept of nonviolent discipline. The theoretical assumptions made in this article also invite future research to test the theory.

In the following section, there will be a systematic comparison of two case studies; Tiananmen 1989 and Gwangju 1980, lifting out the concept of nonviolent discipline as the goal that was successfully or unsuccessfully achieved. The variations between the two cases pose the intriguing puzzle, why do some nonviolent movements manage to maintain nonviolent discipline, while others abandon nonviolent methods for violence? Analysis and discussion of specific factors identified in the case studies; namely the timing of events, the physical space the protests occupied, and the part external media played, may provide reasons for explaining the aforementioned research puzzle.

In order to tease out the variations existing between Tiananmen 1989 and Gwangju 1980, a descriptive comparison of both movements has been used as the method of analysis, drawing on primary sources and relevant academic literature. The choice of methodology is specific for two reasons: firstly, it is intended to complement existing quantitative research, and secondly, to fill an information gap with a detailed case study comparison.

A qualitative research contribution, such as this, adds to existing quantitative analysis by providing another viewpoint from which researchers can interpret information. Examining the literature by way of a comparative case study analysis, gives a voice to events which quantitative methods are not designed to provide. Subsequently, the body of research gains even greater accuracy and depth to an understanding of nonviolent campaigns and the ways nonviolent discipline may be influenced.

Outline of Events

Tiananmen 1989 was a nonviolent pro-democracy movement led by Chinese students, most living in the Beijing area (Sharp & Jenkins, 1989). The gathering point was Tiananmen Square, which students occupied and used as their base to protest from (Hershkovitz, 1993). Students used nonviolent tactics, including a hunger strike, which helped to attract the attention of the media and the support of the people of China (Zhao, 1997). Peaceful protests began in the spring of 1989, and ended with devastating violence approximately seven weeks later in Tiananmen Square (Lui, 2000; Sharp & Jenkins, 1989).

Gwangju 1980 began as a nonviolent movement however nonviolent discipline was unable to be maintained. Issues of government had been present ever since North and South Korea were separated by war in 1950. From 1979-1980 there were a series of democracy inspired nonviolent protests and demonstrations. Seoul was at the centre of the student protests in 1980 demanding General Chun Doo Hwan step down, but students all over Korea were involved. Military martial law, which closed universities and arrested key political figures, was implemented across the entire country (Shin, 2003). In May 1980 under martial law, paratroopers and military police entered the southern city of Gwangju and sealed it off from the rest of the country. This action was not anticipated, and neither was the ensuing level of violence (Shin, 2003; Choi, 2003; Warnberg, 1987). Roads were closed and phone lines disconnected to the region while the national media reported almost nothing of what was happening in Gwangju (Lewis, 2002). The strength of Gwangju's 'people power' was exemplified as crowds turned up in the thousands to support the nonviolent protests in the first few days of the movement (Shin, 2003). The


movement quickly changed over the course of about three days from one of nonviolent protest, to violence, ending with heavy casualties at its conclusion ten days later.

The protest movements of Tiananmen 1989 and Gwangju 1980 both progressed through three stages, which will be outlined as follows:

Stage One: Tiananmen 1989

Tiananmen 1989 was triggered by the death of Hu Yaobang⁴ (Kim, S., 2000; Mason & Clements, 2002; Ackerman & DuVall, 2000; Tong, 1998; Zhao, 1998; Zhao, 1997; Calhoun, 1989). It began with protest followed by students presenting the government with a list of demands, which were ignored. The protests were deemed a “turmoil” by the government, however the students resolved to continue, regardless of the government threat that demonstrations would be banned (Yang, 2000, p. 601; Tong, 1998, p. 316; Calhoun, 1989, p. 21).

Figure 1 Stage One: Tiananmen 1989



Stage Two: Tiananmen 1989

There was increasing public support for the movement, as well as media involvement and further attempts to negotiate between students and the government officials (Tong, 1998). Some of the students started a hunger strike in an attempt to alert the government to the serious nature of the protests (Lui, 2000). The student's refusal to abandon the Square also disrupted Gorbachev's stay in China at the time, attracting further media attention and greatly embarrassing the Chinese government (Zhao, 1998; Calhoun, 1989). In response, martial law was employed from May 20, 1989 (Zhao, 1998). Stage Two indicated the end of negotiations between government and student parties (Lui, 2000).

Figure 2 Stage Two: Tiananmen 1989



Stage Three: Tiananmen 1989

Martial law was implemented at this stage (Yang, 2000). Troops were deployed but then disabled by citizens who prevented the military entering the city. These troops were replaced, and protesters calmly used nonviolent tactics such as human barricades in attempts to halt the armed soldiers (Lui, 2000). Protesters were warned to evacuate Tiananmen Square as the 27th Army⁵ used violence to disperse the crowds (Ackerman & DuVall, 2000). The resulting death toll was somewhere between government estimates of 300 and unofficial estimates of up to 10,000 people killed (Ackerman & DuVall, 2000).


Figure 3 Stage Three: Tiananmen 1989



Stage One: Gwangju 1980

Gwangju 1980 also began with large student protests throughout Korea. Martial law forces were deployed to Gwangju, closing off contact from the national protest movement. Gwangju student protests were greeted by a violent response from the military (Shin, 2003). Citizens joined student protests and there were attempts to negotiate with the military. Stage One in Gwangju ended with “the bloodiest day” as troops opened fire on the crowd gathered in the city centre (Lewis, 2002, p. 20). This appeared to end hope for peaceful resolution (Shin, 2003).

Figure 4 Stage One: Gwangju 1980



Stage Two: Gwangju 1980

The Citizens’ Army was formed and forced the military out of the city enabling a period of relative peace. The city was under self-rule for approximately five days (Kim & Han, 2003; Shin, 2003). During this stage leadership underwent several dynamic changes and a large number of citizens chose to support the armed resistance rather than the Settlement committees who were attempting to negotiate with the military presence⁶ (Lewis, 2002).


Figure 5 Stage Two: Gwangju 1980



Stage Three: Gwangju 1980

Stage Three began with troops re-entering the city. Members of the Settlement Committees formed human barricades in front of the tanks, stopping the troops from progressing (Lewis, 2002). Negotiations continued with the martial law command (Lewis, 2002). However, the military took control of the city again the next day (Shin, 2003). The death toll has never been agreed on, but approximately 500 killed and 3,000 people injured appear to be reasonable estimates (Shin, 2003).

Figure 6 Stage Three: Gwangju 1980



Influencing Nonviolent Discipline: Time, Space and External Media

The following section will examine conditions, which may influence whether nonviolent discipline is maintained. Critical comparison of the two case studies, drawing out three factors: timing of events, occupation of physical space, and the part external media played may cast light on why nonviolent discipline was maintained in one case, but not the other.

Timing and Nonviolent Discipline

It appears there are two types of timing, which may have influenced and created different conditions in each case study. First, the timing of each nonviolent movement, in other words the broader political and environmental context from which a movement emerges. Second, the timing of repression against participants in the nonviolent movement. The next section will address both types of timing, and the influence on nonviolent discipline, relative to each case study.

Broad Context

Tiananmen 1989 and Gwangju 1980 took place in East Asia at a time when peace research identifies a significant increase in nonviolent movements. Broadly speaking, the historical timing

of both Tiananmen 1989 and Gwangju 1980 is not that different: both took place in the 1980s, both were under oppressive regimes and both began with student movements campaigning for democracy. However, there are key variations in timing related to the emergence of each campaign, which appear to influence the cases differently.

Tiananmen 1989 occurred within a broader geo-political context of nonviolent resistance and protest for regime change, of which there are several examples. The Philippines nonviolent 'people power' movement successfully took down their dictator in 1986. Other large-scale movements were seen in Tibet 1986 and in Taiwan from 1979-85 (Svensson & Lindgren, 2011a). The first Palestinian Intifada, using nonviolent action began in 1987, and in 1988, just one year before Tiananmen 1989, Chile also staged a successful nonviolent campaign (Schock, 2013). Although not successful, the nonviolent movement led by students in Burma (Myanmar) 1988, may have also influenced Tiananmen 1989 students' choice to use nonviolent methods. Increasingly nonviolent movements were not only a legitimate alternative to violent campaigns, but were also proving to gain successful outcomes.

The timing of when Tiananmen 1989 emerged may not have been spontaneous but influenced to some degree, by the broader shift documented throughout this decade, from violent tactics to an increase in nonviolent methods of engagement. As a result, Tiananmen 1989 may have deliberately chosen nonviolent methods. It is plausible therefore that Tiananmen 1989 participants' commitment to nonviolent discipline was influenced by the success of previous nonviolent movements.

Tiananmen 1989 occurred in a moment of political opportunity which students were able to exploit. People had been repressed for many years under the Mao government however the gradual weakening of political control in China's universities through the 1980s has been one reason suggested for why students mobilised (Zhao, 1997). University students, aware that political control in the university and dormitories had relaxed, voiced opinions, which previously had been censored (Zhao, 1997). Some students who participated in Tiananmen 1989 had also participated in earlier protests such as the 1986-87 demonstrations (Mason & Clements, 2002). The previous protest experiences of these students may have encouraged other students to act, in what appeared to be a moment of political opportunity in 1989.

Gwangju 1980 also arose out of political instability, under an oppressive military regime, which was becoming increasingly controlling and resulted in student protests. It was a time where students demanded policy change, release of political prisoners and declared a lack of support for the regime (Shin, 2003). Gwangju was a city known for its struggle for democracy from the early 1970s (Na, 2003). As with Tiananmen 1989, Korean students involved in previous protests brought their experience to Gwangju 1980. A tradition of dissent⁷ was often referred to during the uprising, which boosted the morale of Gwangju citizens and inspired the Citizens' Army leaders who were respected for their extensive experience in activism (Shin & Hwang, 2003). It is more difficult to make the same historical timing connections with Gwangju 1980. For a start, to state what is obvious, Gwangju 1980 emerged at the *beginning* of a decade of considerable change, consequently not exposed to the influence of other nonviolent movements that came later in the decade. Could the fact Gwangju 1980 did not emerge at the same time as Tiananmen 1989, have any effect on failing to keep nonviolent discipline?

When Repression Occurs

Both Tiananmen 1989 and Gwangju 1980 were repressed by martial law troops, however the timing of *when* they were repressed appears to have an affect on the ability to commit to nonviolent discipline.

As already mentioned, there were three stages identified in each movement, yet it is noted the three stages did not occur over the same time frames. Therefore regardless of similarities, closer examination reveals the timing of specific events in Tiananmen 1989 and Gwangju 1980 were quite different and may have been significant to how nonviolent discipline was influenced in each case.

The moment of political opportunity in Tiananmen 1989 could be interpreted two ways. First, there was a chance for students to openly express shared political views at odds with the government without fear, allowing a collective ideology to emerge (Zhao, 1997). Second, changes in political structures also imply that there were divisions within government. This may have provided students with *time* to establish a commitment to nonviolent action, while government struggled to establish a united political point of view. However, whether students would have mobilised anyway had there not been weakened political control is difficult to say. “[I]n some instances, collective action can generate political opportunities where none existed previously; in other instance political opportunities can clear the way for collective action” (Morris, 2000, p. 447).

Tiananmen 1989 began in springtime and ended approximately seven weeks later (Lui, 2000; Sharp & Jenkins, 1989). At first, students were driven by strong emotions in their attempts to interact with the leaders of state, yet from this intensely charged emotional period the largest and most successful demonstration was held, which in turn generated energy for a student hunger strike (Yang, 2000). The hunger strike was an opportunity to indicate to the government that nonviolence was a strategic choice, which by not being repressed at this point may have strengthened a collective commitment to nonviolent discipline. However, once the government withdrew from negotiations and declared martial law, there was only a matter of a few days before Tiananmen 1989 was successfully repressed with violence.

In contrast, rather than being an opportunity for students to unify and maintain nonviolent discipline, the quick and violent response of the regime in Gwangju 1980 appears to have swiftly strangled students’ efforts to maintain nonviolent discipline. As a result of violent military engagement, Gwangju 1980 may have been far more inflammatory and emotive much earlier on in the first stage of the movement, as people reacted to the swift violence of the government with feelings of deep injustice.

Gwangju 1980 began on May 18, and ended approximately ten days later. The first stage created outrage, fear and anger within a very short space of time, which set the scene for people to mobilise, unified in support of Gwangju students. It is suggested the *type of grievance*⁸ a group experiences may contribute to the readiness of people to participate in dissident action (Mason & Clements, 2002). The citizens of Gwangju may have initially united as a result of the unexpected

violence, experiencing a collective emotional response or reaction, which then contributed to the willingness of people to take part in protest. The situation challenged perceptions of normal interaction, characterised in this case by the extreme violence of the military which “led citizens to participate in the Uprising as an expression of basic, communal emotion related to the values of human dignity, justice and peace” (Na, 2003, p. 180). Na claims Gwangju 1980 began as a “spontaneous” uprising, and then evolving into a movement with complex smaller organisations such as the Settlement Committees (Na, 2003, pp.179-181). Describing events as ‘spontaneous’ implies time was a luxury Gwangju 1980 did not have, and may have influenced people’s inability to maintain nonviolent discipline. The emotionally charged atmosphere generated by unexpected military violence may also have undermined any power community based organisations may have held to assist in maintaining nonviolent discipline.

The [G]wangju citizens’ idea—to demonstrate peacefully against martial law and to protest violence—was blown away. The exorbitant violence of the troops was what did it . . . [r]ank incomprehension was overtaken by a sense of outrage (Kim, C., 2000, p. 8).

If there is insufficient time for leadership to organise strategic nonviolent tactics and plan for how a collective emotional response or reaction might be managed, nonviolent discipline may struggle to be maintained however good the intention. It is hypothesised that if a grievance is experienced without adequate time to develop a nonviolent response it may negatively influence whether nonviolent discipline can be maintained.

Tiananmen 1989 and Gwangju 1980 both initiated protest movements in a time of political change yet contrasting political conditions. The timing of *when* repression occurred in each movement, poses the question whether this is an important factor influencing maintaining nonviolent discipline over time.

Space and Nonviolent Discipline

The way space is organised may also be a factor, which aids collective action and influences why nonviolent discipline is maintained in some cases, and not in others. The physical space of a particular environment may be interpreted as a ‘social structure’ and play a role in the mobilisation of people (Zhao, 1998). The spaces in Tiananmen 1989 and Gwangju 1980 may have influenced whether nonviolent discipline was able to be maintained in three ways: first, the geography or physical layout of a city, second, spaces where networks and communication could be developed and third, the way symbolic space was occupied and who occupied the space.

Physical Space

Tiananmen 1989 took place in the capital city, Beijing, which by location alone may have increased the visibility of nonviolent protests. The physical layout of space in Beijing, such as individual campus design, the close proximity of one university to another, and Tiananmen Square itself, may be factors which enabled mobilisation during the spring of Tiananmen 1989.

In Beijing the design of each university campus was physically secure, enabling internal student networks to develop in safety. Individual universities were also in close proximity to each other

which may have aided the communication and mobilisation of student protest groups as there is much more likelihood of participation when there is the knowledge that many others will also be involved (Mason & Clements, 2002). The ecological design of Beijing appeared to contribute in a positive way to the mobilising of Tiananmen 1989 and may have been a factor which contributed to maintaining nonviolent discipline by reinforcing feelings of safety, and the knowledge that others close by were also committed to nonviolent participation.

Gwangju however appears to have been disadvantaged by its physical environment for two reasons. First, Gwangju is geographically isolated. It is surrounded by mountain ranges, which during Gwangju 1980 enabled the entire city to be sealed off by military troops, so movement in or out of the city was almost completely restricted (Hinzpeter, 2000). Second, although Gwangju is the sixth largest city in Korea, it historically represents an isolated people. Gwangju is cut-off both metaphorically and geographically from the capital city Seoul and its political decision-making (Warnberg, 1987). Both these forms of isolation have cultivated a long history of regional discrimination in Korea and may add to the explanation of why Gwangju subsequently has a history of protest and dissent. Subsequently, Gwangju's protest history may also have been justification for the government to target Gwangju students perceiving them to be a political threat, or merely an easy target to frame as rebels. However, although regionalism may have isolated Gwangju citizens, it may have also united people. "Although it would be difficult to assess the precise extent of its influence, this regional resentment seems to have played a role in the uprising" (Shin & Hwang, 2003, p. xx).

In terms of the specific location of universities in the Gwangju area, geographically some university campuses were in close proximity to each other and to the downtown area. However martial law abruptly closed all universities, disabling them as a gathering space for demonstrations in the first stage of the protests.

Communication Space

As mentioned previously, in Tiananmen 1989 the university campus and in particular the dormitory was a space able to facilitate student networks, which appears to have helped mobilise protests and may have also contributed to maintaining nonviolent discipline. Chinese students were evolving out of an oppressive political system, into a way of thinking with a renewed sense of ideological freedom (Zhao, 1997). The tight networks created by the university dormitory provided both solidarity and pressure from peers, helping to mobilise the student protests, which led to the gathering at Tiananmen Square. Dorm culture and the physical space this created for meeting and discussion may have helped the development of student's ideas, networks of communication and a subsequent commitment to nonviolent discipline.

Gwangju 1980 was also initiated by students, who emerged from strong university networks, however perceptions it was *led* by students, are not entirely accurate as "college students... were just the catalysts, the first participants" (Lewis, 2002, p. 12). This may be explained by the fact that once martial law troops occupied Gwangju, connections to the national student protest network were severed, abruptly isolating Gwangju students, exposing them to extreme violence and sending many into hiding.

Occupied Space

Tiananmen Square provided a specific public space for protestors to gather in which may have influenced whether nonviolent discipline could be maintained. It provided a structure—both physical and symbolic—which gave leaders a space in which to occupy and assemble large demonstrations. Tiananmen Square as a symbolic place of protest may have helped to unify not only other students but also the wider community of Chinese citizens who were aware of the square's significance (Kim, S., 2000). It is acknowledged that there were difficulties establishing united leadership between the various university groups gathered in Tiananmen Square and it did create problems when negotiating with the government (Zhao, 1998). However, Tiananmen 1989 managed to maintain general cohesion in maintaining nonviolent discipline amongst the gathered students, which may have been aided by shared occupation of Tiananmen Square and associated symbolism of protest and power.

The military occupation of Gwangju meant that city space was controlled by armed troops, and meetings in public spaces such as university campuses, were limited and dangerous. One of the reasons for a lack of student leadership was because students were the immediate target of this violence, forcing many of the would-be student leaders to escape and go into hiding if they had not already been arrested (Shin, 2003). Subsequently the way space was controlled by martial law troops ultimately created a leadership vacuum. Students and citizens may have been far better equipped to have maintained nonviolent discipline—even under conditions of extreme violence—had student leadership not been compromised.

However, these networks were put under pressure when public spaces were unsafe to gather in. Although Gwangju citizens attempted to form networks as the situation escalated, it remained unclear who was in leadership, and it was very difficult to know who could be trusted at an official level. When the Citizens' Army and the Settlement Committees formed to fill the leadership vacuum, there was a semblance of acknowledged leaders, but anyone in negotiation with the martial law command was treated with suspicion by Gwangju citizens (Lewis, 2002). Support was given instead to the growing armed resistance, which had an emotive campaign and leaders who had experience in previous protests. However there still seemed to be disagreement overall as to how the situation was to be handled. The lack of safe spaces for meeting or gathering in may well have also affected Gwangju people's ability to resolve issues, plan for nonviolent engagement and feel united while under threat from the martial law troops.

[A]fter a final effort to persuade the hard-liners to surrender their weapons, those young people and ordinary citizens who wanted to turn in the guns and settle the uprising left the Provincial Office Building and only those who decided to continue fighting remained (Lewis, 2002, p. 49).

In comparison to the isolation experienced by Gwangju 1980, Tiananmen 1989 was made very public, exposed by the nature of its location in Tiananmen Square, the symbolic seat of political and protest power in the capital city. Public exposure meant that the situation for Tiananmen 1989 was almost the complete opposite of Gwangju 1980. Tiananmen Square in particular was “the frontier between the inner zone of the rulers and the outer zone of the ruled...[giving] the

Square its potency as the site for popular political action” (Hershkovitz, 1993, p. 406). The Tiananmen Square student demonstrations were noticed by the government, Chinese citizens, media and the international community. Beijing—and specifically Tiananmen Square itself—provided a central platform for students to act nonviolently before China and the wider world. In contrast, Gwangju was situated in an isolated region, which enabled the military government to carry out violent repression in relative secrecy.

Media and Nonviolent Discipline

The media is capable of transmitting information about a nonviolent movement beyond the immediate location of the action. However, the way media chooses to frame and report on a nonviolent movement may influence nonviolent discipline. The impact of media on nonviolent discipline may take place in different ways. For example, it informs international actors which may make costs much higher for the government should they choose violent repression which may indirectly or directly strengthen the campaign’s nonviolent discipline. An awareness that the ‘world is watching’ may also influence participants’ choice to remain nonviolent. The way nonviolent discipline is affected by media reports may also depend on the positive or negative media framing of nonviolent action.

Media and External Actors

In Tiananmen 1989, students were able to use their prominent position in Tiananmen Square to catch the attention of the media. A timely visit of Gorbachev meant that there was also heightened access to international media (Yang, 2000). The foreign press coverage of the students’ nonviolent protest appeared sympathetic to the student’s cause, especially when it could be identified as a movement which was pro-democracy and therefore, anti-communism (Kim, S., 2000). Stephan and Chenoweth suggest that involvement of external actors can improve the potential advantage a nonviolence movement may have with their ‘opponent’ although this still requires more research (Stephan & Chenoweth, 2008).

In comparison, Gwangju 1980 was treated very differently by international media. Within Korea itself, there was very limited access to information about Gwangju as events unfolded in May 1980 (Kim, S., 2000). The burning of broadcasting stations in the city further disabled the ability of news to be relayed in to or out of the city. It also seems difficult to discern which news sources were to be believed, as government was not only censoring media activity but also issuing reports of North Korean spies being instrumental in the Gwangju uprising (Shin, 2003). By way of martial law and the power of the National Security Act the Korean government exercised tight control and surveillance over the media. As a result, foreign journalists in Gwangju could not access or report on events without the Korean government’s severe censorship (Kim, S., 2000). Freelance journalists who had managed to get into Gwangju were also unsure whether information leaving the city was being broadcasted accurately to Seoul and beyond. Henry Scott-Stokes comments on the information he relayed to the *New York Times*, from his source in Gwangju, and how “[r]eading this piece now, I am struck by how the grey prose of the New York Times diluted the drama” (Scott-Stokes, 2000, p. 109).

Positive and Negative Media Framing

At a glance, news headlines of reports⁹ about Tiananmen 1989, suggest media empathised with the student demonstrators. These examples are from each of the three stages of Tiananmen 1989: “Chinese Students March for Democracy” (April 18); “Hunger Strikers, Heart of China Protest” (May 19); “In Beijing, Rage and Despair over the Soldiers’ Brutality” (June 5).

In contrast, examples¹⁰ of headlines from Gwangju 1980 give a snapshot from each of its respective three stages: “Rioters Rampage in Kwangju With Arms Seized From Military” (May 22); “Old Grudges Spur a New Revolt in South Korea” (May 25); “South Korean Troops Retake Kwangju From Rebels in a Predawn Strike” (May 27).

A comparative study by Kim (2000) also notes the variation in the way each case was reported. Although these examples are both written after the events in each case, they continue in the same vein as the headlines reported at the time. The *Washington Post*’s headline describing the events in Tiananmen Square read: ‘White House Condemns China Murder’ while the *New York Times* report on Gwangju headlined as: ‘As Tanks Rumble Off, a South Korean City Springs Back to Life’ (Kim, S., 2000, p. 32)¹¹. Although the violent events at the conclusion of both cases were similar, they were reported in very different ways (Kim, S., 2000). Kim surmises that U.S. newspapers were influenced by government foreign relations and policy, which subsequently impacted on the way events from both movements were reported (Kim, S., 2000).

Media Influence

The international media’s positive coverage of events in Tiananmen 1989 may have assisted students in maintaining nonviolent discipline in two ways. First, attracting positive international media attention encouraged confidence to use nonviolent tactics and therefore reinforced a commitment to maintain nonviolent discipline. Second, media portrayal of students in a sympathetic light as they maintained nonviolent discipline against a powerful regime, may have decreased the risk of violent repression while the world looked on (Stephan & Chenoweth, 2008; Sutton, Butcher & Svensson, 2013).

In Gwangju 1980, media may have contributed to the failure of nonviolent discipline, as “[e]xternal assistance . . . may be counterproductive if, by association, it hurts the credibility of a movement” (Stephan & Chenoweth, 2008, p. 43). The international media’s less positive coverage of events in Gwangju 1980 and the subsequent failure to maintain nonviolent discipline may have occurred in two ways. First, the international media’s negative view of Gwangju 1980 left citizens with nothing to gain by maintaining nonviolent discipline and nothing to lose by using violence, which in turn may have reinforced the negative perspective of the media. Second, people felt isolated and misrepresented by the media, and anger and frustration towards the government, which may have ignited violence and reduced commitment to nonviolent discipline.

Tiananmen 1989 was given national and international media attention, which appeared sympathetic to the student’s cause, reinforced in the way Tiananmen 1989 was framed in media reports. The media may have positively impacted on students’ commitment to nonviolent discipline as it received supportive international media attention. Gwangju 1980 not only lacked adequate media access to the city and heavy censorship, but the international community also

reinforced a negative view of Gwangju as a rebellious uprising. The negative portrayal of Gwangju 1980 may have reinforced Gwangju people's feeling of isolation and given little encouragement to try any tactic other than violence.

Discussion

Having examined the two case studies, three broad influential factors have been identified as making a significant contribution to the conditions under which nonviolent discipline is maintained.

The first factor is the timing of events. The time frame each case emerged into may have influenced whether nonviolent discipline was maintained. Both Tiananmen 1989 and Gwangju 1980 took place in the 1980's, a decade which saw a significant increase in nonviolent action and protest. However, while Tiananmen 1989 was more than likely influenced by this, Gwangju 1980 emerged at the beginning of the decade and lacked the same exposure to examples of successful nonviolent campaigns.

Both Tiananmen 1989 and Gwangju 1980 moved through three stages, however, in the case of Tiananmen 1989 the stages took place over almost seven weeks whereas Gwangju 1980 lasted ten days. It is argued Tiananmen 1989 had more time to form a unified commitment to nonviolent discipline and strategies, which could support this. For example, the timing of the hunger strike seems important to mention because had the government banned protests at this point, would students have continued to exercise nonviolent discipline?

Although leadership was not cohesive, there seemed to be *enough* general agreement and *enough* self-discipline—reinforced by networks such as the dormitory culture and supported by the symbolism of Tiananmen Square—to maintain nonviolent discipline. Nonetheless it is also critical to consider that martial law was only enforced in Stage Three of Tiananmen 1989 at which point the movement was quickly put to an end. The question lingers, was Tiananmen 1989 able to exercise nonviolent discipline for approximately seven weeks, because of a strategic commitment to remaining nonviolent, or was nonviolent discipline sustained merely because the students were not confronted by violent repression during this time?

Comparatively, the enforcement of martial law in Stage One of Gwangju 1980 meant there was little time to prepare for the extreme violence of the military troops, or plan and organise a nonviolent campaign. Strong leadership was not in place because the student leaders, who might have played a more significant role in maintaining nonviolent discipline, became a target and went into hiding. Although citizens did unify, possibly driven by a strong emotional reaction and fuelled by the history of regionalism and repression, nonviolent discipline was not maintained.

The discrepancy in timeframe in regards to *when* the protesters had to engage with government violence in each case study may be significant. The political situation in each case also impacted on the timing of events. The different timing of events surrounding both case studies is a factor, which may influence whether nonviolent discipline is maintained.

The second factor suggested as influential for maintaining nonviolent discipline, is the way space is occupied. Tiananmen 1989 was located in the capital city and occupied central Tiananmen Square. The powerful symbolism of Tiananmen Square may have contributed to the confidence of students, and also provided a physical central gathering space for the protesters. Both the symbolism and the physical location were factors, which played a part in student unification, which in turn, helped maintain nonviolent discipline. Strong student networks within the dorm culture also provided a space to facilitate purposeful tactics, develop dissident political ideology, gather confidence and a united nonviolent stance, knowing others were also committed to maintaining nonviolent discipline from the very first stage of the movement.

Comparatively, Gwangju 1980 was contained by martial law troops in an isolated region where access to social spaces was tightly controlled by the threat of violence. As a result there were not many public locations to gather which were safe and this may have contributed to the resentment of a city unable to congregate without fear of being harmed or killed. Gwangju's physical, political and economic isolation from greater Korea were factors in Gwangju's history of regional discrimination, which it seems, also played a significant part in contributing to Gwangju 1980's inability to maintain nonviolent discipline. Tiananmen 1989 was enabled by its space while Gwangju 1980 was controlled by its space. The case study comparison suggests that nonviolent discipline is easier to maintain in a very public setting. If public spaces are available to mobilise, gather in, and occupy these may be elements that influence maintaining nonviolent discipline.

The third factor identified as important for maintaining nonviolent discipline is the influence of the external media. Stephan and Chenoweth write that "[e]xternally, the international community is more likely to denounce and sanction states for repressing nonviolent campaigns than it is violent campaigns" (Stephan & Chenoweth, 2008, p. 12). Tiananmen 1989 may have been able to use this to their advantage with significant media attention, informing the public at both a national and an international level. The students were portrayed in a favourable light as they maintained nonviolent discipline. The fact there was considerable international media interest in Tiananmen 1989, made it more difficult for the government to justify violent repression in the initial stages, and may have contributed to the students' ability to maintain nonviolence.

International media did not give Gwangju 1980 the same sympathy as Tiananmen 1989. There were inaccurate reports of events and government censorship of information, which contributed to a negative view of Gwangju 1980. The unfavourable media attention Gwangju 1980 received was not positive for maintaining nonviolent discipline, and appeared to reinforce the isolation of the region, adding to existing feelings of resentment. The international media's empathy for Tiananmen 1989 may have positively impacted on students' commitment to nonviolent discipline. Equally, the negative portrayal of Gwangju 1980, may have reinforced Gwangju people's feeling of isolation and given little encouragement to try any tactic other than violence.

Conclusion

This article has provided an explanation of factors, which may influence maintaining nonviolent discipline within nonviolent movements. Nonviolence theory and the phenomenon of East Asian peace forms a context in which the two case studies Tiananmen 1989 and Gwangju 1980 have

been compared. In particular however, three factors have been identified as making a significant contribution to the conditions, which influence nonviolent discipline: timing of events, the way space is occupied, and the role of external media.

Tiananmen 1989's democracy movement emerged in a decade of change, where nonviolent movements were on the increase. The weakened political structures in China, contributed to the development of student networks within university dormitory culture. The dormitory created an important physical and ideological space for incubating ideas and gathering momentum, until the nonviolent movement was ready to emerge. Space, as a social and symbolic structure along with positive international media coverage, are argued to be factors which influence nonviolent discipline.

Gwangju 1980 emerged out of a national movement protesting against the military regime and demanding democratic governance. Nonetheless, swift martial law intervention and isolation of the city resulted in violent interaction between martial law forces and Gwangju citizens. Regionalism, a history of protest and the military's control of space may have all played a part in creating a negative view of the situation, reinforced in the highly censored media reports. All of which may have contributed to Gwangju's inability to maintain nonviolent discipline.

The findings presented in this article only illustrate one piece of the research puzzle concerning the broader field of nonviolence. In order to deepen our understanding of how nonviolent discipline is maintained in nonviolent movements, more empirical research is needed. First, it would be interesting to undertake a broader study of nonviolent movements, which occurred in East Asia in the same decade, comparing the conditions, which have been identified in this study with other movements, for more robust understanding of how nonviolent discipline is maintained in nonviolent movements. Second, it would be useful to pursue more in-depth investigation into the increased frequency of nonviolent campaigns in East Asia and testing if there is any direct correlation with the broader claim of nonviolent campaigns being twice as successful as violent campaigns. Third, research into the short and long term outcomes of Tiananmen 1989 and Gwangju 1980 would be beneficial, focusing on how nonviolent discipline might have influenced either set of outcomes. Of particular interest, would be to determine at what point a movement can be considered a success or failure. Fourth, a more detailed exploration into the timeframe between nonviolent action and violent repression and whether this has an impact on maintaining nonviolent discipline, invites further investigation. Finally, the influence of media in nonviolent movements and how this may affect maintaining nonviolent discipline has emerged as a factor of interest in this article. Further research into how this may affect a commitment to nonviolent discipline would add to the literature on conditions, which influence maintaining nonviolent discipline.

Notes

1. Since the early 1980's in East Asia, a marked downward trend in violent conflict, and a notable increase in nonviolent uprisings have been recorded (Svensson & Lindgren, 2011; Svensson & Lindgren, 2010; Kivimaki, 2010a; Kivimaki, 2010b; Tonnesson, 2009).

2. A study investigating the correlation between the way a conflict is resolved and the levels of freedom experienced in a post-conflict society where there has been a change or transference of governing power, found that sustaining nonviolence was a critical factor in the degree of freedom attained (Ackerman & Rodal, 2008, p. 119).

3. From 2002, the Romanisation system for the Korean language (Hangeul) was changed from the McCune-Reischauer (1939) system to a new National system of Romanisation (updated 2002). This article will use the updated Romanisation system. Therefore for purposes of consistency in the text 'Kwangju' will read, '[G]wangju' (UNGEGN Working Group on Romanization Systems 2003).

4. Hu Yaobang, party leader with the Chinese Communist party, who lost his role as general secretary after showing empathy with the 1986 student movement.

5. The 38th Army, occupying Tiananmen Square while the students demonstrated was replaced now by the 27th Army which, it was understood, had been kept in isolation from any external information or influence and were informed that they were moving out to contain a situation of "counter-revolutionary uprising" (Lui, 2000, p. 143). It was also implied that these soldiers had been picked from the outlying rural areas, where standard Chinese was not fluently spoken, so as to be less sympathetic with the urban-living protestors (Ackerman & DuVall, 2000, p. 425; Calhoun, 1989, p. 28).

6. On May 22, during the period of self-rule, the Settlement Committee—made up of professors, lawyers, some students and leaders of the religious community—was formed (Ahn, 2003, p. 15; Kim & Han, 2003, p. 215; Na, 2003, p. 182; Lewis, 2002, p. 27).

7. It was the students in particular who had an impressive history of political protest in Korea. This appears to have established a kind of trust between Korean students and citizens in the recognition that the students were valid representatives to lead people in dissent and protest against the government (Lewis, 2002, p. 80).

8. In this article *grievance* has been interpreted as generating a 'collective emotional response or reaction.'

9. Articles from 01/01/89-01/07/89 were selected from The New York Times online archive, which was searched using the search string: "Tiananmen square OR dissent OR rebel*"

10. Articles from 01/05/1980-31/06/1980 were selected from The New York Times online archive, which was searched using the search string "Kwangju OR Gwangju OR dissent OR rebel*"

11. These two examples of U.S. newspaper reports were compared in a data collection and analysis study based on news articles in the month following each respective incidents' violent conclusion (Kim, S., 2000, p. 28)

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Holding Sacred Space: Resolving the Narrative of Displacement through Mythogenesis

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HOLDING SACRED SPACE: RESOLVING THE NARRATIVE OF DISPLACEMENT THROUGH MYTHOGENESIS

Abstract

Peace and friendship terminology in international treaties is often used interchangeably. While the history of treaty making reveals a particular clarity about different sorts of treaties in Ancient Greece and Rome, the modern use of peace and friendship treaties is less clearly demarcated. The phrase ‘perpetual peace and friendship’ has been used in many international treaties since the Treaty of Westphalia in 1648. This article provides a brief history of international treaty making involving the use of ‘peace’ and ‘friendship’ terminology. The categories of peace treaties and friendship treaties are explored, paying particular attention to treaty making by the major powers. The conclusion recommends further exploration of the concepts of peace and friendship in treaty making, while cautioning that research might reveal more inconsistencies between promises made in these treaties, and the realities of practice and motivation.

Introduction

Kofi Annan says that we are responsible for the security and welfare of one another, that in coming together through our commonalities we can connect and, from there, celebrate our differences with respect and understanding (2006). For too long we have studied differences in culture, ideology, history—the local symbolic languages—while ignoring the universal values, ideals, and experiences that make us human. It is time to expand our vocabulary; it is time to consciously connect with our mythologies and to understand our own narratives at individual,

communal, regional, and national levels. This effort will be made more complex by the new global language of multimedia, business, and finance but we have to start somewhere.

On September 11, 2001 when the World Trade Center was attacked, the United States government closed their airspace and all international flights were diverted to Canada. The Canadian government concentrated on air traffic control and the simple question of where to put these unexpected visitors, but one community did much more. The town of Gander in Newfoundland found over 6,000 people on their doorstep, people who did not know there was a crisis until they had landed in a strange place with little explanation as to what was happening or why. It was left to the airlines and the people of Gander to tell the passengers what had happened. Physically and psychologically displaced, these passengers deplaned and were welcomed with open arms into a community that provided not only the basics of shelter, food, and clothing but helped them to understand what was happening, to write letters to their families, and find to strength and friendship in a time of crisis (Defede, 2002).

Gander, a town of approximately 10,000 people is by no means an affluent place. Newfoundland's unemployment rate is consistently in the double digits and Defede notes that "Newfoundlanders live like a people under siege. Isolated on an island and powerless against the harshness of the weather, they have learned to count on one another for survival," and their animosity towards a federal government whom they feel has stripped them of their natural resources and left them with little in return is palpable (2002, p 4). But their willingness to help others is part of their cultural and mythological identity, it is perhaps the primary manner in which they relate and orientate themselves in and to the world (Defede 2002). So while the federal government was trying to find place for people to sleep, the citizens of Gander were signing up to provide people with food, showers, and a warm safe place to be. Local business owners provided toiletries, teachers helped to get letters and faxes written and sent to loved ones.

Community leaders of Gander took the opportunity to Hold Sacred Space for those stranded by using their localized cultural and mythological identity to draw from the universal well of friendship and compassion and the citizens of Gander followed suit. The entire town stopped and focused on the group of displaced people who needed help on many levels. They shared their food, their homes, their hearts, and their stories so that the anxiety and anger of those who had been diverted could turn to friendship and hope. In 2002, over 2,000 of those who were 'stranded' in Gander returned to renew their friendship and celebrate their shared experience (The National. television: 2002).

This narrative could have had a very different outcome had the community leaders focused on the cost of hosting so many, or expressed anger and resentment at being called upon to provide such services when larger and much more affluent communities were not asked to do the same. Resentment and anger within the community could have spilled onto the unsuspecting deplaned passengers. The community leaders could have restricted the cultural identity of helping to mean helping fellow Newfoundlanders and the community could have given the bare necessities of food and shelter while making certain that those in their care were aware of what and how much was being given. How then would that have added to the distress of the stranded passengers? Would the events of that week be cause to return to Gander? I think not. Instead, the leaders of this exceptional community understand that in times of crisis we lose our place in life and can

only react to what we are presented with. The ability to reflect and integrate information gives way to the immediacy of the situation. These leaders provided multiple localized communities with an integrated narrative that adequately explained the situation at hand in a way that provided everyone with hope and strength—this is Holding Sacred Space.

Holding Sacred Space is a process of ensuring that our own connection with the universal is maintained while creating space for the process of mythogenesis. Mythogenesis is the integration of experience through knowledge, belief, and understanding; it is the process by which a mythology manifests changes at the local level. Myth is the integrative power in the aftermath of the experience.

Eliade says, “confronted with it, man senses his profound nothingness” (1987, p 10), yet this notion is not one that the psyche can cope with. Psychologically, we need to find meaning or understanding in experience, and it is mythology that enables us to find hope and meaning in the nothingness. The term mythology has come to connote a fictional story or set of stories generally pertaining to the folklore or cosmology of a peoples and much of myth’s meaning is lost in this definition. *Mythos*, in fact, refers to a lived reality that is communicated through speech or an oral tradition and *logos* refers to the knowledge or experience of that lived reality (Hatab, 1990).

The mythology of an individual or a peoples is the symbolic language and iconography through which their internal or essential lives are brought into physical manifestation. If mythology is a lived reality, then it is not an ideology but a living, growing, evolving experience representing and reflecting relationships with self, each other and the divine; “the life of a mythology derives from its symbols as metaphors delivering, not simply the idea, but a sense of actual participation in [such] a realization of transcendence, infinity, and abundance...” (Campbell, 2002a, pp xx-xxi). A mythology, then, goes beyond mere narrative or story, but rather represents a connection to self, community, and ancestry that is necessary for an individual to locate her/himself within self, community, and the world at large and provides an internal *logos* for the questions “Where do I come from?” and “Where do I fit?” (Campbell, 2004, p xviii).

A current, living, functional mythology is necessary for development and maturation. As we experience life, questions such as ‘Why is my life like this?’ and ‘Why is this happening to me?’ are added to the previous two questions. The ‘why’ questions can be as potentially destructive as they can be nourishing and supportive of growth. If the individual is truly engaged in living mythology, the understanding and integration of life experience is provided. If, however, there is an unconscious and unbalanced mythology or a rigid *mythos* with no applicable *logos*, that same individual is more likely to respond to the ‘why’ questions by applying a basic cause and effect principle. Employing a cause and effect principle can lead to blame of the perceived cause and those who perpetuate that particular cause. The danger is, of course, that blame generally leads to a search for retaliation and the narrative generated arises from pain and fear.

Joseph Campbell and the four main functions of mythology: metaphysical, cosmological, sociological, and psychological (2002a) begins to illuminate the intricacy of living mythology. While the metaphysical and cosmological functions are generally acknowledged, the sociological and psychological functions are often ignored. The sociological function of mythology establishes the values, ethics, and structure of a given society. Within this context, religion is one

manifestation of the sociological function of mythology. Other manifestations include systems of law, trade, and foreign policy. The sociological function is not simply a means through which an individual is conditioned to society, but rather social institutions act as a marsupial pouch necessary for “fostering a wholesome maturation of the psyche” (Campbell, 2002b, p xv).

Campbell contends that humans are all born premature as children require several years before they can begin to be self-sufficient (2002b). Comparatively, other animals do not spend the same amount of time rearing their young. From infancy through adolescence (and often beyond) human children require a marsupial pouch – a secondary womb – from which they can safely view the world and in which they can continue to grow and mature. Campbell further states that humans are “congenitally dependent on society” and that society “is both oriented to and derived from the distinctive psychosomatic structure of [hu]man” (2002b, p 35).

As such, social institutions and their structures serve as a support for both individual and societal development. Not only do institutional structures provide support, they also allow the individual to project onto and be reflected by the society. Continuous projection of experience by an individual leads to reflection provided by social structures, which in turn allow for integration of experience resulting in lived reality and the expression of that reality – mythology. In this manner social institutions act as mirrors and the reflection they provide is only as accurate as the integral structure of the mirror. If the institution is fulfilling its function, it will directly and accurately reflect what the individual is projecting with minimal distortion. If, however, the institutional structure has lost its integrity, the reflection provided by its mirror will be distorted in all manner of ways creating a ‘fun house’ effect. What is reflected back to the individual then becomes a grotesque distortion of self, environment, and situation that can lead to the individual responding and reacting in an apparently inappropriate manner. The structural integrity of social institutions then has a direct effect on the psychological function and development of both the individual and collective by virtue of this reflective ability.

The psychological function of mythology operates at both the individual and collective or societal levels and “...is to foster the centering and unfolding of the individual in integrity...” (Campbell, 1968, p 6). Since this process serves to foster “a wholesome maturation of the psyche” (Campbell, 2002b, p xv), and it is the interaction between sociological and psychological functions that allow for integration and forward momentum, the commitment of social institutional structures to the process of myth-making as mythogenesis would seem vital for a psychologically healthy community.

Mythology, as a flexible structure, provides a pedagogical path complete with milestones in the form of rites of passage, symbols of growth, and acknowledgement of a life lived in connection with the flow of divine energy. When all four functions are consciously active within the psyche of a community, the process of mythogenesis (the progression of living myth) can occur spontaneously and in tandem with the movement of a peoples; when one or more functions are unconsciously active, people can feel overwhelmed by circumstance which often leads to either a victim or a persecutorial mentality resulting in conflict. Holding Sacred Space is the act of allowing space and time for the process of mythogenesis to occur actively, consciously, and in a balanced manner.

If narrative is the tool we use to negotiate experience and understand perception, then what happens when internal and external narratives do not match, when there is a break between community and national narrative, or national and international narrative? What happens when personal story is broken by an unexplained car accident that displaces that person from his/her own family and that person is the sole survivor?

What happens when community story is shattered by a bomb dropped from the sky by some unknown entity for unknown reasons? What happens to a national narrative when their mythology is, literally, blown up? Or, when an entire group of peoples is eradicated (perhaps by genocide and perhaps by expulsion) from a nation's history?

This kind of break in narrative is often reflected by a psychological break (Hillman, 1983), leaving a person or group open and vulnerable to whatever story is available to or imposed upon them. While the psyche struggles to make sense of the situation, to mend the narrative in some way, anger, bitterness, helplessness, frustration, and a sense of abandonment are just some of the feelings that can arise. The patch worked narrative then becomes a place to vent these feelings and as personal anger is added to communal anger, the anger becomes its own force often seeking retaliation or revenge. But there is a point at which this anger can be arrested and a clear narrative developed so that unmitigated revenge is no longer a goal.

Where does narrative develop but in the liminal space between events and experience. And if, as Cassirer contends, language and mythmaking go hand in hand (1946), then this liminal space may well be the place of living mythology. To psychologically hold a person or people in this liminal space is Holding Space, is it sacred because it is the place where we connect with ourselves, each other, and divinity (Hillman, 1983). During times of crisis it is the elders in the community who provide the narrative context that people use to integrate and interpret their experience. Holding Sacred Space is the act of allowing people to find meaning in their experience, and to help them integrate that experience mytho-psychologically in a way that provides a narrative of strength and hope, of generosity and courage, of understanding and compassion rather than fear and anger. Holding Sacred Space is a process of ensuring that our own connection with the universal is maintained while creating space for the process of mythogenesis. Mythogenesis is the integration of experience through knowledge, belief, and understanding; it is the process by which a mythology manifests changes at the local level. Mythology is the integrative power in the aftermath of the experience, and this is Holding Sacred Space.

In my family there are two distinct narratives with respect to the British occupation of India. My parents, who lived through partition and civil wars have always told me that while its true that Indians seldom fought with each other before the British occupation, we cannot forget that the British also brought the railway, postal service, increased foreign trade and a host of other things. Events are put into context of the times, there is no point in being angry at the British now—how many of them actually had anything to do with that time? And we do not hold people accountable for things they have not done. Events of the past are honoured, as are people, but with compassion and understanding for all.

My cousins, however, have a very different narrative: anything that ever has, does, and will go

awry on the Indian subcontinent is the direct result of the British people. My cousins dutifully denounce all things British without understanding why. The people they meet and the things they see do not correspond with the 'Evil British Empire' of their narrative. Holding on to a narrative that is borne of anger, that is not connected to mythology or integrated into experience, becomes void of meaning and can hold nothing but anger. Since my cousins are not connected with anger towards the British, they use that narrative as a place to vent their anger towards other situations. Those other situations then are not resolved and we end up with generations of people who focus their anger towards a particular group of people without knowing why. When story becomes divorced from mythology, it becomes rigid. It stands for the sake of itself and serves to isolate people from one another.

Local ideas and elementary or universal ideas, as introduced by Bastian, are two broad categories of meanings that infuse the four functions of mythology (1895 as cited in Campbell, 2002b). Local ideas refer to the symbolic language and iconography found at a cultural level. The symbols are largely derived from the history, ancestry, culture, and environment of a particular society. These are the constructs we are raised with, the sociological function of mythology is manifest in local ideas. Elementary ideas are universal rather than localized, they are akin to Jung's collective unconscious and can be seen as archetypal (Campbell, 2002b) as they represent the experience of the ineffable, aspects of divinity that are void of symbolic language and iconography – the metaphysical function of mythology. Local ideas use symbolic language to attempt to bring internal, universal experiences into lived reality via an external or shared communication, yet it is at the localized level that conflict often erupts as the result of differing symbols or icons even though the universal idea may be the same. Conflict is further inflamed when the symbolic language has ceased to evolve and becomes steeped in dogma and rhetoric. This circumstance is reflected in hostilities between peoples over the name by which a population refers the divine. When referred to as *God, Allah, Yahweh, Oshun, Brahman, or Guruwari* we are looking at local symbolic language, yet all refer to the universal concept of the divine. By becoming overly attached to our own local ideas, we lose connection with the universal ideas and with the experience the local idea is attempting to elucidate. In other words, we are all speaking different dialects of the same archetypal language and need to remember that local language is symbolic and should not be literalized (Jeremias as cited in Coomaraswamy, 1944). When local language or ideas are literalized, they become calcified and unable to aid in the process of mythogenesis. Without appropriate localized language, individuals struggle to hold on to something that is known and understood while fighting against that which is deemed unfamiliar.

Symbolic language is metaphoric in nature rather than allegorical. Localized symbolic language is the expression of archetypal ideas within a specific cultural and historical context. This is a function of language that has been somewhat lost in the attempt to focus on language solely as a vehicle for communication illustrating a subject-object relationship. The nature of symbolic language is that an experience or knowing of an experience, a *logos*, is both represented in and communicated by language. Avens says that "language as saying is not human speech ...but that which enables man to stand in the openness of things ... it is not man who speaks but language..." (2003, p 86). Language moves from experience to expression of experience and should not, from this perspective, be contained within any specific context. When language is

forced into a contained and specified cultural and historical context, it loses its connection with the archetypal idea and dies (Campbell, 2002b).

There is, for example, an idea and experience of 'forest'. The particular word 'forest' relates to a group of trees and local flora and fauna within a specific area. In German, the word is *Wald*, in French *forêt*, and in Sanskrit *āraṇya*. Each word looks and sounds different in a localized context. There may even be a specific forest that culturally or regionally is invoked when the word is spoken, yet regardless of the local manifestation of 'forest,' there is an archetypal experience of forest that can be accessed through the underlying narrative or symbolic nature of spoken language. In Aven's terms, forest speaks and the localized interpretation is brought to mind so that we can access forest (2003).

The symbolic language adapts to include new experiences and information in order to integrate change into the mythology so that knowledge, belief, and understanding are evolving within the context of experience. An expanded symbolic vocabulary is a by-product of the process of mythogenesis. From another perspective, mythogenesis is the translation of experience into the expression and communication of that experience. The triangle of knowledge, belief, and understanding can be represented as a two dimensional diagram (Figure 1 below):




Figure 1. Triangle of Mythogenesis

For the image to become animated and three-plus dimensional so that experience is integrated and the psyche can move forward requires the matrix of myth as illustrated in Figure 2:




Figure 2. Iterated archides spiral.

Myth then, is the superstructure or fabric that holds space on which the experience of life can unfold.

Though each concept comprising the triangle must be defined for the purposes of discussion, the definitions should remain flexible, for just as myth holds space for life to unfold, each side of the triangle also possesses the capacity to expand, contract, and flow, the one into the other.

Knowledge is defined as the facts, forms, conventions, and learned societal obligations. In this sense, knowledge is not *logos*, knowledge of lived experience, but factual, linear knowledge that

is appropriate to a specific time and place. Knowledge by this definition then, is anything for which an external construct has been internalized, consciously or otherwise. In contrast, belief is defined as a 'knowing' that is accepted as valid but for which no satisfactory explanation can be articulated.

Belief is comprised of dream, vision, intuition, and inherited knowledge i.e., internalization of external constructs has already occurred, and to the current generation, the knowledge has become belief. In the case of inherited knowledge, constructs withstand the tests of time, space, and place to become belief. The amorphic relationship from knowledge to belief is by no means unidirectional.

Belief that is stagnant or outmoded is challenged and influenced by new knowledge. Knowledge may also provide confirmation or a satisfactory explanation of belief, as when Einstein's theory of Dark Matter becomes a satisfactorily articulated explanation for the belief in a divine force moving the universe forward. The third apex of the triangle, understanding, is the experience of connecting both knowledge and belief in all possible permutations and combinations. Understanding is experience and the reflection of that experience such that the internal resonance or vibration of an experience both shapes and is shaped by knowledge and belief.

The integrative completion of an experience can also be illustrated by the four-part syllable AUM, where AUM is comprised of A-U-M-silence and where A is consciousness (knowledge), U is dream consciousness (belief), M is deep sleep (experience) (Campbell, 2002b), and silence is myth. Silence is the force that brings the resonance of AUM to physical or phenomenological completion and integrates the experience, as a whole, into being. Silence is the matrix on which the experience of AUM is grown.

If the initial triangle of knowledge, belief, and understanding – as in the above example, AUM – has multiple variations, namely that specific individual, societal, and cultural experiences are triangulated, then multiple versions and variations of similar experiences are triangles within triangles. The variants create a fractal geometric space that produces an infinite number of variations on a piece or section of mythic matrix. Variations are dependent on the factors of knowledge, belief, and understanding as well as individual versus societal myth matrix. Though it could be argued that individual and societal matrixes are themselves part of the same fractalated space.

As triangles of experience overlap and grow into previously unexplored parts of the mythic matrix, dispersion of particular experiences or parts of specific experiences may occur. Multiple triangles of experience along the same mythic matrix could account for the recurrence of particular mythic themes over prolonged periods of time such that AUM in areas where Hindu and Buddhist traditions are prevalent is HAU in areas where Islam is prevalent. Overlapping triangles of experience along the same mythic matrix show variations, but adhere to the same structural skeleton.

The matrix of myth, as an integrative force, allows knowledge, belief, and understanding to be flexible, changeable, and to evolve. The fractal nature of space indicates infinite microcosms

reflected within infinite macrocosms. Each triangle is perhaps more prismatic in nature, each existing within and connected to one another, all supported by a matrix of myth.

During integration there is opportunity to support and facilitate the process by consciously bringing archetypal or universal ideas to the forefront. Derived from the sociological function of mythology, religions include the universal concepts and experiences of faith, hope, and compassion. So that, for example, the trials experienced by displaced peoples are not to be marginalized or simply written out of history. Likewise, the mythology of a host community should not be imprinted indiscriminately onto that of the displaced peoples. Displaced peoples need not be seen in terms of strictly national or international displacement due to war and genocide, but can also be seen as: an abused wife or child being displaced from a family unit, runaway children trying to find stability, or people who opt to join gangs rather than be feel displaced from society.

If, as Campbell says, bricks are universal ideas and architecture is the local language, then mythogenesis is the process by which buildings are broken, renovated, repaired, and redecorated (2002b). In the event that local architecture is broken, as is often the case, people must be allowed to move through their feelings of anger, sadness, hatred, grief and other intense emotions that may arise as the result of trauma. Memories need to be incorporated into the mythology but without attachment to the emotions that were experienced during the events of the crisis (Hillman, 1983).

Those who find themselves displaced need to have their experiences honoured, to be able to truly feel the experience in a physical place of safety. Holding space for mythogenesis to occur allows people time and space to integrate their experience and find themselves and their place in society again. Once safely in the realm of archetypal ideas and experience, universal values and ethics of sympathy, compassion, and helping those in need can be used. The idea of hosting the divine as brought to us in the form of people in pain, to sit in the elementary acts of prayer (intention) and meditation together – using whichever local symbolic language and iconography is most helpful and comforting to those in pain – is a prevalent archetypal experience. It is a process of having an experience, naming the experience and then growing to embrace the experience within the safety of the societal marsupial pouch.

One symptom indicative of a non-operational sociological function of mythology is individual and collective displacement. This is usually indicative of institutional structures allowing themselves to become irrelevant by literalizing and concretizing the local symbolic language. As previously stated, it is the function of institutional structures to remind society and its individuals to see through the local to the elementary so that no one and nothing becomes stagnant.

People must be allowed to move through their feelings of anger, sadness, hatred, grief and other intense emotions that may arise as the result of trauma. Memories need to be incorporated into the mythology but without attachment to the emotions that were experienced during the events of the crisis. Campbell refers to this type of processing as a biological functioning of mythology: the inherent need to both process and place events into perspective as well as into mythology (2002b). Campbell states that there is an inherent need to tether the individual psychic experience to a communal mythos and the experience of a specific environmental or physical

location. This process occurs all over the world and Campbell traces it back as far as the paleolithic period (2002b). This notion also links back to the statement of Eliade's that "[hu]man senses his[her] profound nothingness" (1987, p 10) and this is something the psyche simply cannot cope with. In order to survive, the psyche must find meaning and it does so by way of mythology and the mythogenesis. Mythology and mythogenesis are not the answer to, nor do they address the question of theodicy. It is not a question of good and evil nor a justification for suffering that provides meaning, it is how the experience is integrated into the mythology by way of mythogenesis that offers understanding of the experience. The question then becomes how do we help *logos* (experience) find a meaning in *mythos* (expression of lived experience) that stems from a place of strength, hope, and compassion?

By using the local ideas of those who are displaced we can, through language and the shared archetypal experiences, offer a narrative that brings internal strength, the power and wonder of the journey of life, faith in divinity, hope for the future in opportunities that had, perhaps, never been thought of, and a sense of internal peace through forgiveness. Forgiveness is an act performed and offered for the benefit and liberation of the one who forgives, not for the forgiven; it is an opportunity to release hostility and sadness in order to move through the trauma displacement brings. Forgiveness may come in the form of forgiving persecutors, the situation, the universal forces at play, or self. Forgiving oneself and God are the most difficult, and the best we can hope for is to plant the seeds of forgiveness and to tend the seeds. As being in crisis does not allow space for anything other than basic survival, forgiveness, as defined here, releases emotional attachment to a situation and the resulting circumstance to provide space for movement and growth.

To offer a narrative that supports mythogenesis and aids in nurturing the psyche (therefore fulfilling the sociological function of mythology) Bastian's methodology, developed for studying mythology, can serve as a starting point (Campbell, 2002b):



1. Begin with an elementary (archetypal) idea
2. Examine the influence of local climatic (weather patterns) and geographic (landscape) factors on the processing of local ideas
3. Look at the impact of varying local traditions upon each other



Since Campbell says that the only way into the elementary is through the local (2004), Bastian's method can be amended and expanded for use as a preliminary working model for Holding Sacred Space with the intent of allowing mythogenesis to occur.

1. Begin with local idea
2. Look at impact of varying local traditions
3. Examine climatic and geographic factors




In this way, we re-label our triangle from:

to:



To complete the process requires a few additional steps as well as iterating the triangles to illustrate movement, growth, and integration:

4. Experience the elementary (archetypal) idea
5. View the new experience, change, event, circumstance from within the elementary (archetypal) idea starting with the matrix of myth:



6. Evaluate influence of climatic and geographic factors – perhaps looping back to elementary idea if necessary
7. Account for influence of varying local traditions on each other given new parameters – loop back to through 4-7 to create an interlacing, multi-dimensional spiral (Figure 3) that accepts and incorporates new experience, circumstance, and populations as they occur:




Figure 3. Multi-layered archides spiral

The matrix in this case, is an archetypal idea or a mythological idea rather than a mythology. So, once space is created through safety, releasing of emotions, and accepting the potential of a new narrative it is possible to begin – from the archetypal and universal – to expand the local symbolic vocabulary to include the symbolic vocabulary of the host environment. The common elements between those displaced and those who are hosting are the archetypal experiences and practices that make us human. From this sacred space, we can facilitate a learning of local symbolic language, allowing for the physical local language to adapt in response and effort to embrace the guests and their mythology. The indication and implication is that this process will eventually operate reciprocally and it is necessary to provide the same safe space and facilitate the same process with those people from the host community. The goal is for those who are displaced to be offered time, space, and support to understand and integrate their experience. The next step is to allow for mythogenesis to occur so that the local mythos reflects the displaced population as having the strength and courage to overcome tremendous difficulties and to find place in a new space. During this particular phase it is perhaps best to have people focus on abstract realities and goals by posing questions like ‘You have a new life, what do you want that life to be?’ Start with the conceptual and gradually move toward the concrete. The local mythos should also reflect the kindness of the host community and how both populations were necessary to create an enriched and enlivened community. If, as Campbell says, bricks are the archetypal ideas, but the architecture is local (2002b), then mythogenesis is not about destroying and wholly discarding old or broken buildings, it is picking up the bricks and building a new building or renovating an existing building.

A specific methodology for the process of Holding Sacred Space and facilitating mythogenesis is difficult to formulate at this time as the process is largely based on experience.

The physical manifestation and application of the process will differ according to the experience of the facilitator and other participants, yet there are certain core elements that are necessary for the process of mythogenesis to maintain its integrity. First and foremost, the facilitator must understand the difference between the local symbolic language and the elementary ideas and experiences. Furthermore, the facilitator must be grounded in the experience of the archetypal or universal rather than being attached to the localized or symbolic. Though we are all attached to our symbolic language and iconography to some degree, an inability to let go of that language will necessarily result in a negative experience for all participants and a mythos of further persecution and abandonment for those we seek to help. In relation to this is the ability to sit and bear witness, or hold space, for those in crisis while they move into, through, and out of a critical state. Being present without prejudice or avarice, without the need to shape, form, create,

interpret, or decipher any of what is happening within that container of safe space is key and this, above all, is what the facilitator is to be accountable for.

The process requires time and commitment from all those involved, yet many participants are resistant and will not appear to be experiencing the process. For these people, seeds have been planted and the new mythology may arise months or years later. All who participate in the process learn, through experience, what it means to connect with the universal and all will have some experience with learning, without prejudice, new symbolic language. This facilitates open communication in other areas of life and at other times as there is suddenly a need (the biological function of mythology) to continually reconnect with the universal and to understand as well as to be heard.

Creating sustainable peace requires teaching and learning an epistemological approach that incorporates an inclusive view, one that celebrates the differences among populations as adding to the richness and flavour of life rather than encoding difference as threatening. To be truly sustainable, any approach must provide both strength of structure and the ability to adapt to change of time and circumstance. By allowing a system to evolve from naturally occurring processes, it is possible to affect epistemological change in a few individuals who are then in the world differently and who continue to affect those they come into contact with. Though the proposition of Holding Sacred Space is presented as a post-conflict remedy, one by-product is effecting epistemological change and potentially preventing large scale, destructive conflict.

This process is suitable for individuals as well as communities; it transcends social standing, education, culture, time, and space. It is a process that uses the psyche's natural processes and their manifestations to facilitate a path that is harmonious – though not without passion and not without the normal joys and disappointments of life. Holding Sacred Space and facilitating the process of mythogenesis is also a process of returning us to ourselves and allowing our symbolic language to return to the function it serves best, as the provider of structure and shared communication of lived reality when the underlying experience is shared universally. It is a place of growing psychologically to meet experience in a whole and embodied manner. A different style of communication begins and its basis is one of understanding and compassion.

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‘Perpetual Peace and Friendship’ in International Treaties

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‘PERPETUAL PEACE AND FRIENDSHIP’ IN INTERNATIONAL TREATIES

Abstract

Peace and friendship terminology in international treaties is often used interchangeably. While the history of treaty making reveals a particular clarity about different sorts of treaties in Ancient Greece and Rome, the modern use of peace and friendship treaties is less clearly demarcated. The phrase ‘perpetual peace and friendship’ has been used in many international treaties since the Treaty of Westphalia in 1648. This article provides a brief history of international treaty making involving the use of ‘peace’ and ‘friendship’ terminology. The categories of peace treaties and friendship treaties are explored, paying particular attention to treaty making by the major powers. The conclusion recommends further exploration of the concepts of peace and friendship in treaty making, while cautioning that research might reveal more inconsistencies between promises made in these treaties, and the realities of practice and motivation.

Introduction

‘Perpetual peace and friendship’ has been promised by contracting parties to international treaties since the Treaty of Westphalia 1648, and this terminology has continued to be used throughout the modern treaty-making era. This article provides a brief history of international treaty making involving the use of ‘peace’ and ‘friendship’ terminology. The different uses of ‘peace’ and ‘friendship’ treaties are explored, with particular attention paid to treaty making by the major powers. There is a short discussion about the origin of the concept of ‘perpetual

peace' and whether friendship in treaty making should be understood as a pragmatic arrangement rather than an idealistic promise.

A brief history of treaty making

The most common term for the contract that records an agreement marking the relations between sovereigns, states and nations is 'treaty'. The first recorded treaty is thought to have been agreed around 3000 BC between the Sumerians and their neighbours. There are several references to treaties in the Old Testament such as the peace treaty referred to in Joshua 9:15 between the Gibeonites and Israelites in 1451 BC (see Bunn-Livingston, 2002, p.79). The Treaty of Kadesh signed in about 1280 BC was a peace treaty recorded both in Egyptian hieroglyphs and in Akkadian, using cuneiform script between Ramses II of Egypt and the leader of the Hittites, Hattusili III.

According to Bederman (2001), treaty making was used extensively by the Greek city states, with about 400 treaties signed from about 338 BCE. There are clear classifications of different sorts of treaties. Those signed at the end of hostilities were divided into peace treaties, declarations of neutrality, or amnesties. Alliances were distinguished as defensive or offensive. There were commercial treaties that give protection to foreign traders. Treaties of friendship were a form of alliance, distinct from military agreements. Friendship treaties or *philiai* were agreements between polities that gave each party the status of 'friend' as distinct from 'ally'. An alliance committed the parties to give each other military assistance, not a necessary commitment for friends. But friends could become allies if they entered into a formal alliance.

There are clear distinctions made between different sorts of treaties in Ancient Rome too. So there were treaties of surrender (*deditio*) and unequal alliances (*foedus iniquum*), and various Roman subordinate client states were friends (*amicus*) or allies (*foederatus*). Roman practice was to establish peace and friendship with polities on its periphery, but although these *amicitia* relationships were similar to the *philiai* established by the Greeks, *amicitia* tended to represent unequal treaty arrangements (Bederman 2001).

In the treaty making that forms the basis of current international relations arrangements, there is not such a clear distinction between different kinds of treaty. A treaty according to the International Law Commission is defined as:

Any international agreement in written form, whether embodied in a single instrument or in two or more instruments and whatever its particular designation (treaty, convention, protocol, covenant, charter, statute, act, declaration, concordat, exchange of notes, agreed minute, memorandum of agreement, *modus vivendi*, or any other appellation) concluded between two or more States or other subjects of international law and governed by international law (see Brownlie 1990, p.605).

Peace and Friendship Treaties in Modernity

Although in general 'peace' signals an end to hostilities whereas 'friendship' has denoted treaties related to commercial and security concerns (including access to economic resources, territorial

integrity, access to harbours, trading lanes and fisheries), there is no clear distinction made between peace and friendship. These two terms have often been used together or interchangeably in international treaties, especially since the Treaty of Westphalia (1648) where an explicit link was made between peace and friendship (Devere 2014). The goal of the Treaty of Westphalia is expressed as the attainment of a 'Christian and Universal Peace, and a perpetual, true, and sincere Amity' (see for example, Devere, Mark and Verbitsky 2011, p.52).

Both peace and friendship treaties were used in North America by the competing European powers of Britain and France to gain the cooperation of first nation people. For example, the Great Peace of 1701 was agreed between 1300 delegates of the Iroquois Confederacy, and New France and its allies, in Montreal to end almost 100 years of war (Devere et al 2011, p.53). In the Pacific the special relationship between Britain and Tonga was formalized in a series of friendship treaties agreeing that 'there shall be perpetual peace and friendship' between the Queen of Great Britain and the King of Tonga, their heirs and successors, and their respective dominions and subjects' (Article 1 1897 Treaty).

Peace Treaties

While it is not always easy to distinguish between peace and friendship treaties, the United Nations Peacemaker Database identifies 775 documents that it claims are understood broadly as peace agreements. Only two of these documents contain 'friendship' in the title. The Treaty of Taif between the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and the Kingdom of Yeman, entitled in the English translation 'a Treaty of Islamic Friendship and Arab Brotherhood' (20 May 1934), is the oldest peace treaty listed on the database. The only other peace treaty whose title refers to friendship is the 1942 Rio Protocol between Peru and Ecuador entitled in English 'the Agreement on Peace, Friendship and Boundaries'. Another peace document, entitled the 'Agreed Minutes' between Kuwait and Iraq in 1963 refers in the preamble to 'the restoration of friendly relations, recognition and related matters' in an attempt to 'eliminate all that blemishes the relations between both countries' and there is reference to the talks between the delegations being conducted 'in an atmosphere rich in fraternal amity, tenacity to the Arab bond and consciousness of the close ties of neighbourliness and mutual interests' (Preamble). The desire to develop 'friendly relations' and 'good neighbourly' relations are also expressed in the 1994 Treaty of Peace between Israel and Jordan (Preamble and Article 2:3.).

Other peace treaties focus on kinship more than on friendship and neighbourliness. The 1991 treaty between the Syrian Arab Republic and the Lebanese Republic is translated in English as 'Treaty of Brotherhood, Cooperation and Coordination'. The preamble refers to 'the distinctive fraternal ties' that link the two republics and draw strength from 'roots of kinship, history, common affiliation, joint destiny and shared interests' as well as 'the belief that the attainment of the fullest cooperation and coordination' will serve the interests of both countries.

Friendship Treaties

There is no equivalent United Nations list of friendship treaties and very few definitions of what constitute friendship treaties. A survey by Devere (2014) of treaties signed by the major powers that contain the words 'friendship' or 'amity' in their title finds that the USSR and the USA

signed friendship treaties with the greatest number of states (39), followed by the UK (21), China (19), Japan (13), France (8) and Germany (6). Treaties containing 'friendship' or 'amity' also include reference in the title to terms such as 'cooperation', 'mutual assistance', 'good-neighbourliness', 'peaceful coexistence', 'diplomacy', 'alliance' and 'partnership' as well as 'commerce', 'navigation' and 'boundaries'.

Linking friendship and commerce can be traced back to the Treaty of Amity and Commerce between France and the thirteen American Colonies of 1778. Between 1849 and 1968, the United States signed friendship treaties with over thirty countries. These were known as FCNs, standing for Treaties of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation (see Devere 2014). The United States no longer uses friendship terminology for these types of treaty which are now named Bilateral Investment Treaties (BITs). This more accurately reflects the contents of the treaties, which have not changed significantly (Vandervelde 1988).

The Treaty of Good Neighbourly Friendship and Cooperation between the Russian Federation and the People's Republic of China of 2001 has been described as concerning the sales of arms from Russia and China, although spokesmen for both parties have stated that the treaty was not about military cooperation (Donaldson and Donaldson 2003).

Friendship treaties were used by Britain or the UK as one of the main tools for building and maintaining the British Empire during the 17th and 19th centuries (Roshchin 2011). The chain of friendship became a metaphor for the covenant or general entente between Britain and the Indians of the Great Lakes from 1783 to 1815 (Willig 2008). During the 19th and 20th centuries, Britain was one of the four trading nations, along with the United States, France and Germany, who used friendship treaties to divide the island nations of the Pacific Ocean between them to ensure trading routes and safe harbours. Britain signed several friendship treaties with Tonga (1879-1968) and Samoa (1879). Germany also had a friendship treaty with Samoa (1879) as well as with the Marshall Islands (1885). The first FCN of the United States was with the King of Hawaii (1849) and the US had other friendship treaties in the Pacific with Tonga (1886) and later with Kiribati (1979), and Tuvalu (1979). France's friendship treaties were with the Cook Islands (1991), Tonga (1855 and 1980) and Vanuatu (1993).

Initially treaties were agreed explicitly between individual monarchs or emperors. So for example, Article 1 of the 1855 Convention of Peace and Friendship between France and Tonga reads 'There shall be peace and friendship in perpetuity between Tupou, King of Tonga, and His Majesty Emperor Napoleon III' (United Nations Treaty Series). The same terminology continued to be used as treaties became more common between governments or states (Gale and Devere 2010). The concept of 'perpetuity' was similarly part of the wording that continued into the twentieth century, with reference to 'perpetual peace and friendship' or 'perpetual friendship and peace' recurring.

Perpetual peace and (pragmatic) friendship

The concept of 'perpetual peace' can be traced back to the French author Charles-Ireneé Castel, abbé of Saint-Pierre, whose proposal for an international organization to maintain peace between states was the inspiration for Kant's 1795 essay, *To perpetual peace: A philosophical sketch*.

Kant regarded it as a moral duty to act to bring about perpetual peace, while he also acknowledged that peace was a material good. For Kant, justice would reign not just between states, but also in the human race generally, when perpetual peace between the nations of the world was assured. While he identified perpetual peace as a moral ideal, he also assures us that it was a practicable, although not definitely attainable goal (see page 61). Perpetual peace, not perpetual war, was seen as a natural state. According to Kant 'nature guarantees the coming of perpetual peace, through the natural course of human propensities, not indeed with sufficient certainty to enable us to prophesy the future of this idea theoretically, but yet clearly enough for practical purposes' (p. 157).

One of the distinguishing features of friendship as a relationship is mutuality or reciprocity. Thus one would expect that friendship contracts would indicate reciprocal benefits and obligations. As Roshchin (2009) claims, the use of friendship in international politics to describe relationships between nations 'allowed for a variety of conceptualizations of friendship articulated in diverse contexts' and 'differentiated between public and private friendships, contracted legal friendships and affectionate relations.' (p.12). In his analysis of British and American treaties with indigenous peoples, he demonstrates that 'friendship was one of the central concepts legitimizing the process of acquiring new territories, establishing dependencies and running the colonies' (p.114). Thus friendship was associated with the maintenance of imperial power, justifying and legitimating unequal roles, establishing overseas territories and launching favorable trading regimes (pp.114-115). Rather than establishing perpetual peace, these friendships, driven by pragmatic calculations were limited in scope and time. And rather than creating a unified international community, this practice of friendship simulates particularism causing divisions.

The conceptual confusion between the idealism inherent in the promise of 'perpetual' peace or friendship and the pragmatic reality of friendship limited to exchanges of unequal benefits needs further exploration. There is growing evidence of dissatisfaction with the promises of 'perpetual peace and friendship' from many of the partners to these treaties with the international powers. Work on the different perspectives and understanding of treaty partners demonstrates that misunderstandings and misinterpretations have led to mistrust (see for example, Ligaliga 2013). However, clarifying the motivations and intentions behind the promises of 'perpetual peace and friendship' may well expose practices that are inconsistent with these promises. Rather than lead to understanding and unity, this may reveal further reasons for mistrust and cynicism about treaty making.

Conclusion

Peace treaties form an essential part of international relations, usually signaling an agreement at the end of hostilities. The sorts of relationships referred to in agreements that are designed to lead to better relationships after conflict include brotherhood, neighbourliness, and friendship. The role of friendship treaties is less clear, however, there is a link made between friendship and peace in the wording of many of these treaties. The phrase 'perpetual peace and friendship' has recurred throughout international treaties since the Treaty of Westphalia in 1648 and it is Kant's 1795 essay that has identified perpetual peace between states as a moral ideal and a practicable goal.

The link between peace and friendship is not explained in the academic literature but the friendship associated with treaties has been interpreted as a pragmatic metaphor for contractual relations. Treaties that contain the words 'friendship' or 'amity' in the title have been used extensively, by the USA, USSR, Britain, China, Japan, France and Germany, in agreements that concern investment, arms sales, maintenance of empire and ensuring trading routes. There is growing evidence of dissatisfaction from treaty partners in the friendship promises made. There is also work being carried out that analyses some of the inconsistencies, mistranslations and misinterpretations that might account for different expectations about the contractual relationships. However, there is room for much more research into the link between peace and friendship in international treaties and the impact of these treaties on relationships between states.

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‘Protect your God-Given Properties and Wealth’ Some Emerging Trends in Ethno-religious Conflicts in Northern Nigeria

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‘PROTECT YOUR GOD-GIVEN PROPERTIES AND WEALTH: SOME EMERGING TRENDS IN ETHNO-RELIGIOUS CONFLICTS IN NORTHERN NIGERIA

Abstract

This paper examines the responses, trends and patterns of ethno-religious conflicts in four predominantly prone states of Sokoto, Borno, Kano and Kaduna, in Northern Nigeria. The study employed a qualitative methodology, involving the use of in-depth interviews (IDIs), focus group discussions (FGDs) and content analysis in the collection and interpretation of data. Interviews were conducted among a cross section of twenty-four (24) household heads, and twenty (20) participants were involved in the focus group discussion sessions held in each state. Major findings revealed that constant return-migration down south during periods of conflict has drastically reduced because of the new religious gospel of ‘Protect your God-Given Properties and Wealth’ preached by both religious and political leaders. Respondents confirmed the existence of militia, youths and sects pilling up arms in Churches, Mosques and Palaces. Identity formations were noted as critical along lines of religious denominations, districts, period of settlements as well as trade. Lastly, the study concludes that both religious and political influences have contributed a lot more in enhancing ethno-religious conflicts in no small measures, than in fostering peace and unity among Nigerians.

Introduction

Nigeria as a country is made up of different and diverse communities spiced along various ethnic, religious groupings, persuasions, and different social orientations both in the rural and urban enclaves, having about 395 ethnic groups (Osaghae 2001). Ethnicity however, becomes a cultural characteristic that connects a particular group of people to each other. The concept is rooted in the idea of societal groups, marked especially by shared tribal affiliation, religious faith, shared language, cultural and traditional origin. Ethnic groups as “human groups (other than kinship groups) held together by the belief in their common origins, provides a basis for the creation of a community” (Mbaku 2001:61). However, ethnicity can be seen as referring to differences in language, religion, colour, ancestry and culture to which social meanings are attributed and around which identity and group formation occur (Nagel 1995:443). Ethnicity can result from choice or ascription, either an individual chooses to be identified with a recognized ethnic group, or membership in a certain ethnic group can be imposed on him by the greater society (Barth 1969). This implies that while individuals can choose their ethnicity, the choice must be acceptable to society. Ethnicity is a combination of individual choice and social imposition (Mbaku 2001:61). Furthermore, ethnicity is not a permanent trait but a changing group characteristic, which means that the boundary of an ethnic group as a social category can change (Barth 1969:17). By definition and features, ethnicity in its true sense has got no relationship with violence or conflict of any type as it has become with regards to the crisis in Nigeria, where the influence of two foreign religions (Islam and Christianity) have given ethnicity a different meaning. Imperatively, ethnicity and religious differences ought to bring along solidarity and support among a people who share a common ancestral lineage or history irrespective of location and not the reverse.

Ethnic diversities, based on the inherent differences as in the case of Nigeria, spiced with leadership problems, however, bring along with them misunderstanding resulting into conflicts which are most times violent. The large army of the unemployed which is a characteristic of most countries in sub Saharan Africa comes as the energizing factor in the conflagration of ethno-communal and religious conflicts in Nigeria (Adebago 1988; Ikuomola 2010). Specifically, in Nigeria, there is a growing phenomenon of differentiation based on ethnicity. There is also the religious dimension to this phenomenon. The conflict here is usually between the two major religions in the country: Christianity and Islam. The nation’s configuration depicts religion as intertwined with ethnicity. Odiase-Alegimenlen (2001: 48) explains that the two-pronged nature of the problem is compounded by the fact that while the majority of Northerners are Muslims, a larger number of Southerners are Christians. This ensures that practically all conflicts between any of these groups of people could easily degenerate into religious or sectarian conflict. The pathological dimensions of ethnicity and religiosity in Nigeria have become a recurring decimal when some groups are discriminated against or deprived of satisfaction of their basic material and psychological needs on the basis of their identity (Faleti 2005).

The history of violence in Nigeria showed clearly that apart from the civil war experienced in 1967-1970, ethno-religious violence became common in SAP and Post-SAP periods which marked the beginning of humiliation, oppression, victimization, feelings of inferiority and other forms of experiences which wear away a person’s dignity and self-esteem and lead people of

different ethnic background, migrants and non-migrants to resort to vengeance as a tool in settling political, economic and social issues bothering the Nigerian masses, mostly the poor and unemployed, a large chunk who are mostly youths and women (Danfulani 2002). The elites as a social group (religious and political) across the various ethnic divide, and as a social institution have come to dominate the affairs in leadership positions with an overriding influence on the social life of the people. Their activities and personalities have also been linked to the series of conflicts in the society either as a harbinger, channel of information and analysis of the conflicts, or as part of the escalation or resolution of the conflicts (Salawu 2004).

Similarly the response of the state tends to escalate the situation. This of course, is worsened by a weak institutional mechanism reinforced by the perverted federal structure of the Nigerian state inherited from the military rule that stunts efforts aimed at tackling the problems holistically. The inability of the state to manage these crises effectively endangers the nascent democracy and weakens the fabric of the state, thus threatening its survival. This study there examines the trends and patterns of ethno-religious conflicts in northern Nigeria. Specifically the study seeks to understand the trends and patterns of ethno-religious conflicts in various settlements around key economic areas, patterns and trend of identity formations, and the emerging trends and responses to ethno-religious conflicts in Northern Nigeria.

Research Setting and Methodology

The study setting comprised of four states of Sokoto, Borno, Kano and Kaduna and forty-four (44) respondents. Two major cities in each state were selected with high population of settlers¹ (migrants) from both Eastern and Western parts of Nigeria, (the Igbo and the Yoruba specifically). The table below shows the selected states and the communities involved in the study.

States and	Borno	Kano	Sokoto	Kaduna
Selected	1.Gubio	1.Karaye	1.Sokoto*	1.Kaduna*
Communities	2.Maiduguri*	2.Kano*	2. Kware	2.Zaria

*Township and seat of Government

The study employed principally qualitative methodology involving in-depth interviews (IDIs) among a cross section of twenty-four (24) household heads and four (4) focus group discussions (FGDs) were conducted involving twenty (20) participants (males and females) in the four selected states. The study population comprised of the three dominant ethnic groups (males and females) among the Hausa/Fulani (host community), the Yoruba and the Igbo migrants and settlers. Data collected were subjected to content analysis from which relevant information and themes emerged. The collection of the data took place between 5th of February -30th of April, 2009.

Trend and Patterns of Ethno-religious Conflicts in Various Settlements and Markets (trading centres)

Significant trend of ethno-religious conflicts in the Kano and Kaduna, from responses revealed a clear cut difference from that of Sokoto and Borno states (extreme states of the north). Among

sampled respondents, it was clearly stated that religious violence tends to crop up most times, during the period of festivals or important ceremonies, most especially before the holy month of Ramadan or Easter celebration. For others, it occurs more during the ember months (September-December) when most Easterners do travel back south for holidays: Ethno-religious violence and attacks were said to be common along transportation routes and settlements that are far from police posts, army barracks and other security corridors. Narrating one of his ordeals, a migrant trader from the eastern part of the country noted that:

In festive seasons, especially during Easter and Christmas celebrations, the anxiety and fear that some sects may waylay passengers travelling down south are common. For this reason passengers are forced to travel with licensed security guaranteed vehicles (Kano).

On the contrary, a Moslem faithful noted that most violence are actually planned and targeted not only at Christians but also at indigenes and non-believers alike:

The last conflict that ensued in Kaduna area was cause by a preacher, who could not control his words. Can you imagine a preacher in a Moslem dominated north telling us that Islam is not a good religion that Moslems pray uncountable times without love and all sort of things that I cannot remember, is that not enough to cause trouble? (Kaduna).

This opinion accounts for one of the reasons transportation cost is usually very high during festive periods. Discussants revealed that transporters do charge extra for providing private security agents that will accompany passengers down their journey. Passengers are indirectly forced to pay more for security of their lives and properties, as the government cannot guaranty complete security on the highways. Similarly accounts from the Muslim faithful also revealed that over the years some Christians have developed strategies of laying ambush for indigenes on their way to the farm especially during the period of harvest.

The season of harvest is a joyous period in the north, people wake up very early and immediately after prayers move to the farm. Normally the men and boys will leave separately from the women, but this is no longer the case since 2006, when a farmer was killed in his farm...till date the villagers still believe the assailants were migrant or non-Moslem residents in the community (Kano, city/ Respondents/Male/32years).

The analysis of conflict in the four states, where this research was conducted revealed that most of the conflicts occurring over the years are usually linked to either a religious group/sect or ethnic group. This an overwhelming number (80 percent) of respondents agreed. A common response among non-Hausa-Fulani residents (Igbo and Yoruba) and other ethnic minority group in the selected states point to the fact that there were plans by the core Hausa-Fulani Muslims to first of all wage a Jihad inside the Muslim communities of the north, mostly the Hausa tribes to defeat the secular; and second, wage an Islamist Jihad against the rest of the non-Muslim groups, principally the Yoruba and the Igbo, to establish a greater emirate of Nigeria. One of the major trend and patterns identified by the study is the increasing guerrilla style of warfare where irregular soldier, religiously and politically motivated youths formed themselves into groups of irregular paramilitary units in various neighbourhoods, usually with a political objective to stop other ethnic groups' religion from spreading and from being practiced in the public domain. Narrating such circumstance, a clergy noted:

It is usually unannounced, it could be anytime, the last one in Borno was terrible, though the rumour was everywhere that some churches will be attacked, we never knew it was going to be the ECWA church here in Maduiguri, the police and other security operatives before the attacked were informed, but they too were caught unawares, it has become a guerrilla way of oppressing non-Muslims and non-indigenes (Borno, Metropolis/Male/49years).

Ethno-religious Conflict and the Sharia Law

Highlighted also by both Muslims and non-Muslims where the issue of the implementation of Sharia law, which non and liberal Muslims living in the North felt was targeted at them, their businesses and religion. According to a female market leader in Kano, 'When the issue of Sharia came on-board first in Zamfara state, and later in other eleven states, we all knew that it was geared towards reducing our dominance in trade and expansion of our religion...they know that as successful as we have become so also is the Christian religion spreading.' On the contrary, a Muslim cleric revealed that most settlers who are not Muslims tend to be afraid of the Sharia law as if it was meant for them. The truth is that over the years a lot of youths and political leaders have derailed in the true practice of Islam, dressing patterns are nothing to write home about, increasing level of crime and corruption which was not the case many years back. The high level of crime and deviance in Northern Nigeria irrespective of ethno-religious crises was widely accepted as true: narrating the high level of security a Igbo indigene based in Kano noted that:

While we were growing up in the North in the mid-1970s, the north was the best and the most peaceful place to live, there was hardly buildings and houses fenced, gated neighbourhood surrounded with security personnel, electrical and security gadgets of various kinds. The situation has worsened that the fear of violence and reprisal are now the beginning of wisdom (Interview/Kano/Male/67 year old).

The above responses buttresses Subarau's (2001; 2005) viewpoints that the revitalized implementation of Sharia law and its expansion from the personal, (for the Islamic faithful only) to a more general aspects in twelve northern states represents one of the most turbulent cases of public policies, violence and religious unrest in the contemporary history of Nigeria. The Sharia controversy pitted Muslim populations, who believe that it is the pure law revealed by God, against southerners, middle belt, and northern Christians who fear that the Sharia movement will violate their rights and reduce them to second-class citizens

Spill Over Effects from Other Areas of Conflicts

Constantly highlighted were the reactions and behavioural changes among migrants and indigenes to situation of conflicts between Christians and Moslems in other states. For instance the incidence of ethno religious violence in Plateau states had a great impact on the attitude of settlers and indigenes in Borno, Sokoto and Kano and Kaduna. A long time settler noted that 'subsequently thereafter innocent individuals are usually found dead in outskirts locations'. Another account of an elder revealed that most times stories are framed to gain sympathy from government and other religious groups:

They become hostile, anytime there is crisis in other towns, not necessarily within the states; their attitude is nothing to write home about, they behave as if we indigenes here in Borno are the cause of the mayhem wherever it may have occurred. Sometimes these attitudes and behaviours irritate us and can further be capitalised upon and the spread of further violence.

This picture as painted by the respondent shows that the occurrence of ethno-religious conflicts and fear of reprisals can change people's perception of others as well as the labelling of the other parties as deviant and subsequently, relationships are strained and conflicts become imminent.

The Recruitments of Nigerians and Chadians as Security Operatives

The highpoint of ethno-religious crisis in the study areas revealed that the influx and uncontrolled migration of Chadians and Nigerians into the country, to a large extent have come to serve as a catalyst to the religious crisis in Nigeria. Also discussed was the deliberate staging of crisis in the north by religious extremists and politicians in opposition camps who capitalised on the high rate of poor Chadians and Nigerians in Nigeria to foment trouble. The general belief shared among Moslim respondents was that most of the ethno religious crises are being staged managed, and directed by people who have contacts with wealthy Islamic fanatics from within and neighbouring countries of Chad and Nigerians; and those who want to make a statement in sympathy with their Palestinian brothers. Similarly, 20 percent of the Moslem respondents attributed the crisis, not only to poverty but to opposition groups in government.

A particular response revealed that a careful look will tell that the hands of those in opposing political parties, some highly placed individuals in government and business moguls, as evident in the Plateau and Borno crisis in recent times cannot be unconnected with emerging ethno-religious crises in the country. He concluded that 'it is in this regard that the various fact finding mission's reports are either not released or perpetually on-going with the culprits, financiers, brain and key actors behind the whole scene protected, and the injustices continue. Only the poor becomes victims of the law after being used, they are left alone to security agents, arrested and sentenced, while the same set of people strategize for future crises.'

Irrespective of the religious background of respondents it was clearly stated that the use of Nigerians and Chadians as security operatives in various homes in the north have not only increased the migratory pattern of the poor, uneducated and most times unskilled labourers into the country. Several scholars have attributed their influx as dangerous (Eselebor 2008; Ikuomola 2010). A household head in Kano noted thus 'the neighbourhood security jobs they are being recruited into have over the years built their ego and capacity in religious conflict in Nigeria'. The use of these sets of migrants' mostly adult and youthful males is a common feature in urban centres in Nigeria (Adisa 1997). The various interviews and field observations made revealed that some religious scholars are catching on the high poverty level in Niger and Chad Republics to import children and youths into camps for religious education (Almajiri schooling system). However over time it has been reported that some unscrupulous Islamic teachers are now using the system to enrich themselves by sending these innocent children to the streets as beggars

(Ohadike 1992; Danjibo 2009). The implication however was revealed as a trend in ethno-religious crisis.

Once there was an issue in the outskirts of Kano city, a woman chased a set of small boys begging for alms away from her kitchen. Some neighbour saw her action and labelled her enemy of Islam, if not for the intervention of the traditional head; the incidence would have led to violence. Since then we are now extremely careful about beggars on our streets. (Kano Metropolis/Woman/ 38years).

In consonance with the above, an account of a religious leader showed that the poor are humans and should not be treated as animals ... 'they are Moslems and every Moslems anywhere in the world is a brother, so we just need to help our brothers to survive, no matter what the state does to stop them we will help them, nobody should treat them as outcast'. (Kano). The issue of sympathy and solidarity were also emphasized as pointers to ethno religious violence as can be inferred from the above statements; however the killings in various crises were categorically kicked against. General comments from the Focus group discussion (FGDs) sessions revealed thus:

Though, some of these issues are just while others are based on selfish and personal interests. I cannot comprehend why fellow Nigerians or Africans kill themselves for issues that are thousands of miles away and not directly related to them. It is a pity such is happening these days in the North (Borno/Female/ 65years).

Religious doctrines are easily sold to the poor. With a plate of food, regular square meal, they are easily convinced to take up arms and fight individuals tagged as un-believers (Kaduna/Male/ 56years).

The situation has become so bad that, Nigerians, Moslems, non-Moslems, Hausa, Fulani, Tiv or Junku, the fear of the average Nigerian and Chadian is the beginning of wisdom (Kano/Male/45years).

Patterns and Trend of Identity Formations

Local ethnographers have connected patterns of settlements and locations as key factors connecting fear, disturbances to social relations, linking social identity and social exclusion with the identity of particular people (Taylor 1996; Garland 1996; Loader et al. 1998). The settlement patterns and identity of indigenes and non- indigenes, migrant-settler discourses are major issues confronting lifestyles of people, jobs and survival options available to individuals of diverse ethnic background in the same locale. The Sabongari² area in most states of the federation, more evident in the north and western Nigeria is usually reserved for migrants and settlers mostly based on religious affiliation. The character and meaning of safety and wellbeing at different levels of social formation is quite evident in the different ways they manage their fears which have a significant impact upon their daily lives. The idea of indigenous/native versus migrant/settlers differentials in residential and occupational location was to give room for free expression of lifestyles and cultural activities without necessarily interfering with that of the natives. According to Ibrahim, (2001), the differential is an inbuilt system of conflict prevention

and resolution. However these concepts have gone beyond expression of one's cultural differences to that of hatred and jealousy for the migrants, while the natives have come to see the settlers going beyond their surrounding and influencing activities hitherto not within their jurisdictions cum settlements.

In recent times Identity formations was noted by the households among the interviewees as very strong along lines of religions, denominations, districts, time of settlements as well as trade. Religious identity was described along lines of Islam (Moslems), orthodox churches (Holy Roman Catholic, Anglican, Baptist and Methodist churches) and Pentecostals. About half of the respondents (Igbo and Yoruba) were of the orthodox churches, as against 20 percent in the Pentecostal faith. There were little or no differentiation noted by respondents with Christian background regarding denominations of Moslem faithful, however there was a general consensus that sects exist within Islam. Ethno-religious crisis existing between groups of different faith was linked to the style and practices of modern day Pentecostal preachers described as insensitive to the fact that they are operating in a terrain dominated by Moslems. A view expressed by over two-third of the respondents. A Hausa trader noted in Kano that: Christian religion and churches have been in the North long time ago, but there was no problem because they were all located within the area reserved for settlers and non-indigenes. The crisis began when Pentecostalism started spreading in the 1980s, beyond areas reserved for non-Moslems. The spread was not even the issue, but the use of their language, the construction of words...some of these preachers even go beyond using local dialects in saying all sorts of derogatory words directly against Moslems and the Islamic practices in the open. The next thing is usually reaction from natives and the faithful.

The aggressive style of Pentecostal churches has also been found wanting by the national assembly as becoming unbearable in terms of excessive noise, the mounting of loudspeakers, and other electronic equipments in major cities in Nigeria. A situation described as capable of disturbing the peace of residential settlements and creating noise pollution. Also the early morning call for prayer and other vociferous activities of mosques curators and churches were also said to have gone beyond the necessary decibel in reaction to each other's religion. This observation was made on the floor of the house for a bill to regulate religious activities in Nigeria (Terhemba 2010). Other trends of identity were linked, understood as a multidimensional set of categories that are culturally and historically produced. Apart from religious denominations of Christians and sects in Islam, districts, time of settlements as well as the commercial activities (trade) settlers involved themselves in over time is used as a form of identity. The social values held by a particular group over others are connected to the definition of group member's professional identity. Identity in this sense becomes plural in usage, and never a stable or fixed category because it is always in formation (Hall 1996; Danfulani 1998; Gee 2000- 2001). The settlement pattern of migrants and latter settlers of different ethnic configurations were observed to be located in a concentric zone called SABO. Every Hausa/Fulani community, historically reserve certain part for non-natives. Business districts and type of trade and interest was also described by respondents as clearly different prior to independence, however the building of modern markets have brought both settlers, indigenes and people of myriad ethnic groups together. While the Igbo categorically dominate the electronic, textile and spare parts markets, the Yoruba, the building sector and electrical and mechanical

repairs. Food produce are evidently controlled by the indigenes with middle men from other ethnic background.

A common observation, drawn from the constant interaction among traders in Monday markets in Maduguri (Borno) and Tambuwal (Sokoto) shows that the Igbo and Yoruba traders do classify Hausa/Fulani and people from neighbouring countries of Chad and Niger as one. A situation many Indigenous Hausa/Fulani of the Nigerian divide frown at and have come to query. The labelling of one another was pinpointed as ‘though small but mighty’. This was used by key respondents (religious leaders in all locations) to describe the power labelling has in generating, as well as intensifying some of the conflicts and violence between Christians, Moslems and other minority ethnic groups in the North. Among the Yoruba and Igbo respondents, labelling was described as existing but the fact that both ethnic groups are from the south, and at the same time more of Christian population, tends to reduce conflicts between them. Succinctly narrated, various discussants ascribed to religion and ethnic identity thus:

Christians: For the fact that the Igbo and Yoruba here are all strangers and hustlers in another man’s land, religious differences do not create a problem, because even though the Yoruba person is a Moslem, s/he cannot be seen as a stranger. It is in the same vein the Hausa/Fulani also refer to us as cheats (people whose businesses are not clean). The onus therefore rest on us southerners to be united (Kaduna).

Moslems: The unregulated activities of traders do not help matters; you see other tribes in the markets selling products that Islam preaches against. Some of these traders still go in the open to sell pork, alcohol and immoral films and pictures that corrupt the soul all in the name of business. These may look minor but I am telling you some of the past crises were caused by their attitudes (Kano).

Minority Ethnic groups: for us, we are seen as people who ought not to be in the north, just because most of us especially among us Kanuri, we are not regarded as human, it is even worse when one is not even a Moslems. They refer to us by all sorts of names; our girls are usually referred to as prostitutes and unclean, to the extent that intermarriages are frowned at. There is a common belief that as a minority group we should be the same, in terms of religion and way of life. The imposition of Hausa language by the colonial administration has also given them that belief that every minority should bear Hausa names, when in actual sense of it we are different (Borno).

The above narratives point to the fact that there are a lot of underlining issues that are capable of spurring ethno-religious crises, such as labelling, association and identity either by religion, culture or alliance or in opposition to the tents of the dominant groups. The following labels were highlighted by respondents as conflicts enhancers: Labels such as ‘settler’, ‘native’, ‘non-native’, ‘host community’, ‘foreigner’, ‘native foreigner’, ‘stranger element’, ‘squatter’, ‘non-squatter’, ‘immigrant’, ‘migrant’, ‘indigene’, ‘non-indigene’, mbák, Gambari, Hausa-Fulani, nyamiri, nasara, ngwa, arna, kirdi, and baro among many others are used daily in Nigeria to describe, stigmatise or stereotype the “other” as a category who “does not belong”. In Borno and Sokoto states, it was emphatically stated that it is no fiction that there are a lot of migrants from Chad, Niger and Cameroon being recruited for the sake of politics and religious violence. This goes to

buttress the fact that both politicians and religious clerics were involved in spurring ethno-religious conflicts in northern Nigeria. According to a school teacher in Kaduna, since the high level of unemployment resulting from desertification, a lot of youths are now being fed by religious clerics and sects' leaders instead of fending for themselves. The resultant effect is their usage as foot soldiers in tormenting non-Muslims and migrants settlers in various settlements and trade centres.

This was also highlighted in 2009, by Alhaji Ali Dandume, a minority leader in the Borno House of Representatives when he said that "Boko Haram" in Borno state was an assemblage of youths who were school drop-outs and university graduates who were not gainfully employed and who believed that their state of hopelessness was caused by the government that imposed western education and failed to manage the resources of the country to the benefit of all. Ideologically, any member who fought and died for the cause of an Islamic/ Sharia state by destroying modern state formation and government establishment would automatically gain "Aljanna" (paradise or heaven). Tell Magazine aptly captured the ideology and philosophy of Boko Haram sect thus:

The mission of the sect was to establish an Islamic state where 'orthodox Islam' is practised. Orthodox Islam according to him (Mohammed Yusuf, leader of the sect) frowns at Western education and working in the civil service because it is sinful. Hence, for their aim to be achieved, all institutions represented by government including security agencies like police, military and other uniformed personnel should be crushed. That was the genesis of the recruitment of unemployed youths into the sect. (Tell August 10, 2009:34)

However sampled opinion of respondents revealed that among all core northern states, Sokoto and Borno (until recently) were the most peaceful. Commenting on the above, a discussant buttressed the fact that:

Ethno-religious conflicts have been less severe, not until the Boko Haram crises brought out its ugly face. As observed and documented, the issue of the Boko Haram compare to the other northern states has its foundation in Borno.

In today's Borno state, life and commercial activities have taken a new pattern of relation and association along market zones. For instance, in Bank of the North motor spare parts market, it was observed that migrants and settlers close up their shops on daily basis between 4 and 5 pm. Reasons attributed to this was linked to the fear of being killed as well as precautionary measures to avoid religious fanatics of the Boko Haram sect. However this is not to discredit the fact that records have shown that Borno and Sokoto states, before now were the most peaceful states in northern Nigeria because of the seat of the Sultanate in Sokoto (Spiritual Head of all Moslems in Nigeria), and the extremity in terms of distance and weather conditions of the two states; excessive heat from April to October; extremely dry dusty and cold wind that blows from the Sahara toward the western coast of Africa, especially between November and March. Low level of economic activities of the states are also found not to encourage migrants hence the two states are more homogeneous than other northern states of the federation.

Emerging Trends and Responses to Ethno-Religious Conflicts in Northern-Nigeria

Most survey, have shown that ethnicity and religious affiliation are the two highest ranked identity makers for a vast majority of Nigerians than other indices such as state, national, and regional identities (Ellsworth 1999; Danfulani 2002; Salawu 2004). Though the research results revealed that northerners (people in the defunct northern region) are more tenaciously inclined towards religious identification, and southerners (people in the defunct Western, Mid-Western and Eastern regions) were more likely to rank ethnicity first, ethnicity was discovered to be the second highest ranked identity country-wide after religion, with state and national identity coming third and fourth, respectively. However, issues relating to emerging trends and responses to ethno-religious conflicts in northern Nigeria were investigated. This study revealed that unlike in the 1980s through 1999 (the beginning of the present democratic experience) migrants have come to develop thick skin and ever prepared in reacting to any crisis or violence be it religious or ethnic in colouration. Narrating the cause of this development, an Igbo leader noted that:

It became so annoying, that anytime there was an ethnic or religious crisis, Igbo traders are usually the target. Our shops are burnt, properties destroyed, Igbo dominated churches are burnt down in protest even when it was obvious that the cause of the crisis has nothing to do with the Igbo, their place of residence, trade or worship. These acts have made every trader and migrants to adopt the boys scout slogan 'be prepared'. There is no one in this community who is not ready to defend himself or herself, properties and family (Kaduna/Male/49years).

Another female discussant, wave a sigh of relief, thanking God for the current situation, she highlighted the fear migrants had with the declaration of Shari'ah in Zamfara and eleven other states in northern Nigeria:

We were prepared to relocate either back south or other northern states in the middle belt where the law was not in vogue. We had the feeling that it was meant to witch-hunt us Christians it took various religious leaders, pastors, and deacon, catholic priests among others to convince us not to leave. The gospel at every service then became 'Do not let your labour be in vein, why must you run away? Trials will come. It is one of those moments (Sokoto)'.

The highpoint of the crisis was said to have brought about a radical and militant youth groups in various churches as noted by a Pentecostal clergy 'when it became unbearable in Kano and Kaduna, the youths gathered themselves, and resolved to protect the church and their family. The only way to do this was for them to become militant in character and fight back in various reprisals' Another respondents concluded that 'to be frank the singular act of resistance has reduced the incessant attack on churches in Kano and Kaduna, as well as attack on Christian faithful of other denomination. It was not as if we directly asked them to take to arms, but when it became necessary to use arm the youths readily obliged' (Clergy /Zaria-Kaduna).

For another respondents in Kano, narrating the origin of the increasing militancy in Christian community in Northern Nigeria, he noted that it all started when the Ikemba of Nnewi, (Chief

Odemegwu, Ojukwu) addressed a gathering of Igbos in Kano, citing the situation in the Gulf/Middle East, he emphasize that Israel though small, do not run from the perennial crisis in midst of the Arabs, so Igbo or any other tribe should not be seen as running away in a country that belongs to all. The address also made it clear that continuous return home will further propel indigenes to perpetuate heinous crime on their properties and investment, a situation he described as an ‘act of cowardice’. They were therefore advised not to run away from their properties and investments during conflicts no matter the magnitude. Since then youths across Kano and other neighbouring states have yielded to the advice. This was noted in a discussion with elders in Kware, Sokoto state:

It is no longer news in the north that Christian youths are also pilling up weapons in church compounds envisaging any attempt of religious conflicts to defend their church wish is also taken as their own properties.

The impact of the ‘new gospel’ was noted to have drastically reduced sudden migration out of perceived or real conflicts in recent times, compare to the 1980s and mid-1990s. In Kano and Kaduna respondents revealed ‘nobody is scared of any type of conflicts...we have seen enough and now prepared’ In some cases it was said to have ceased completely ‘constant return-migration down south during ethno-religious conflict is a thing of the past, nobody is a coward. Nigeria belongs to all of us’. Religious sermons and preachers were also key instrument used in achieving this fit. As narrated, a discussant summarised the new gospel message that emerged overtime as ‘Protect your God-Given Properties and Wealth’ if they are not protected the devil will steal and destroy them’ this is supported by biblical passage ‘the thief commeth only to kill still and to destroy’. This goes to say that both religious and political leaders during religious sermons and political campaigns have a way of either escalating conflicts or amelioration them. Similarly respondents confirmed the existence of militant youths and sects pilling up arms in Churches, Mosques and Palaces of notable chiefs and traditional rulers; a development once attributed only to Moslems in Nigeria. This development Eselebor (2008) highlighted as a factor in the proliferation of small arms in Nigeria and neighbouring countries.

The historical analysis of itinerant traders and their business successes revealed that often times, host communities become jealous of the achievement of the migrants in their settlement and quest for territorial expansion for commercial activities as evident in religious attack in settlements and centres such as Kafanchan, Jos, Keffi, Lafiya, Suleja, Minna among others. The apparent prosperity of settler-elements exposes them to the control of the lucrative sectors of the economy, confers on them economic strength and power. This economic advantage has its corollary in the political power advantage both of which consign the host community to an inferior economic and political power status, a situation that is vehemently resented and resisted as evinced by the history of conflicts in the region (Ibrahim 1990; Adogame 2006). It must be stated that this is currently exhibited in Nigeria, in the growing tendency for crisis to emerge between those who are perceived as so called “indigenes” and those who are regarded as “settlers” and are therefore considered “outsiders”.

Conclusion and Recommendation

It is important to state here that ethnicity is clearly important to Nigerians, identities vary significantly among groups and regions, and they fluctuate over time. Ethnic feeling has become intense over time with the increasing rate of unemployment, desertification and the reoccurrence of political and ethno-religious crisis and influences in different parts of the country. In general terms religious and political influences in Nigeria have contributed a lot more in post ethno-religious conflicts more than in measures to stop the menace out rightly. In addition, ethnic sentiments have waxed at election time, and waned between elections. Lastly a variety of factors influence the intensity of ethnic feeling, including socio-economic, modernization and proximity to resources which do not impact on the increasing number of poor in the Northern Nigeria. In the light of the above it becomes imperative for various governmental agencies in charge of security and safety to put in place specialised ethno-religious agencies for conflict prevention and management alongside religious, traditional political and neo-political institutions to detect early warning signs and put a halt to ethno-religious conflict in Northern Nigeria. This will go a long way in fostering unity among all identities especially among major and smaller ethnic groups within the study area, which were not included in this study.

Notes

1. Settlers in this study were categorised as those who have lived in the community for over twenty years.
2. Also referred to as strangers' quarters or compact ethnic settlements with a basis for religious consolidation.

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Understanding the cultural dimension of intractable conflict: What are the implications for peace education practice?

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UNDERSTANDING THE CULTURAL DIMENSION OF INTRACTABLE CONFLICT: WHAT ARE THE IMPLICATIONS FOR PEACE EDUCATION PRACTICE?

Abstract

Societies marked by a sharp ethnic or religious cleavage are vulnerable to outbreaks of mass violence. Understanding the cultural dimension to such conflicts carries important implications for improving peace education practice in divided societies. Typical peace education practices have been criticized for being overly-naïve in ignoring the cultural environment or not doing enough to address the surrounding ‘culture of conflict’. Insights on the cultural dimension of intergroup conflict can help educators to design peace education practices that actively address the role that cultural factors play in perpetuating conflict in their societies. This paper will examine the cultural dimension to intractable conflicts and draw conclusions as to how peace education practice in divided societies can better be shaped to address this phenomenon.

Introduction

Societies marked by a sharp ethnic or religious cleavage are vulnerable to outbreaks of mass violence (Sen, 2006; Staub, 2011; Tilly, 2003; Volkan, 2006). Such intergroup violence results in widespread human suffering and yet often members of the groups involved are reluctant to seek a peaceful resolution which might involve compromise and, ultimately, reconciliation (Gayer, Landman, Halperin, & Bar-Tal, 2009; Halperin & Bar-Tal, 2012). This has led to number of long-running, intergroup conflicts to be described as ‘intractable’ (Bar-Tal, 2007; Kriesberg,

1998), as the participants in the conflict view it as irreconcilable, and fear that the compromises necessary for peace would threaten their very sense of existence as a group. This subjective, psycho-cultural dimension to the conflict can continue even when political agreement on the more substantive issues has been reached (Tropp, 2012). Examples of such conflicts can be found in Israel-Palestine, Sri Lanka, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Kashmir, and to a lesser extent in post peace-agreement Northern Ireland and Rwanda. This paper will examine the cultural dimension of such long-term inter-group conflicts, with particular reference to how peace education practice can be shaped to meet the challenge of children being socialized into a 'culture of conflict'.

Typically, approaches to understanding the dynamics of violent intergroup conflict have focused on either political or psychological analyses. The political approach looks at the interests and strategies of the groups involved (Ross, 2007) while the psychological perspective tends to assume that human behavior such as aggression and negative categorization of other groups are universal elements of the human psyche (see Stigler & Herdt, 1990). While both these approaches offer important insights into how conflicts emerge and escalate, they miss the importance of the cultural dimension in intractable conflicts. An examination of the role of culture in long-running conflicts helps to explain how support for conflict proliferates among group members, and to illuminate the specific processes whereby emotional investment in the conflict is passed on from one generation to the next (Bar-Tal, 2007; Galtung, 1990; Hammack, 2009; Nasie & Bar-Tal, 2012; Ross, 2007). Culture works to shape the political goals and strategies of groups involved in long-term conflict (Marc Howard Ross, 1997) and it is culture that encourages or discourages certain attitudes and behaviors among members of a group (Bonta, 1996; Fry, Bonta, & Baszarkiewicz, 2009).

This is not to say that culture controls all – an individual involved in perpetrating a violent act can't simply insist 'my culture made me do it' and be freed from all responsibility. Individuals do internalize cultural beliefs to a greater or lesser degree (Hammack, 2010; Staub, 2011). However, in the particular context of intractable conflicts group identity and cultural belonging have been shown to be very important to individuals, and amid the uncertainties of conflict they often internalize group narratives and beliefs to a high degree (Bar-Tal, 2007; Halperin & Bar-Tal, 2012; Hammack, 2006; Hammack, 2009; Hammack, 2010; Staub, 2011; Volkan, 2006). It has also been observed that culturally-mediated processes of delegitimizing the narratives and beliefs of the other group(s) in the conflict are also at work in intergroup conflicts (Bar-Tal, 2007; Bar-Tal & Hammack, 2012; Ross, 2007; Salomon, 2009; Staub, 2012). Thus, culture plays an important role in shaping belief and behavior in these conflicts, by encouraging and giving focus to human capacities for aggression and violence, and by discouraging the development of empathy or compassion for members of the perceived enemy group(s) (Brown, 2001).

In particular, understanding the cultural dimension to such conflicts carries important implications for improving peace education practice in divided societies. Formal and informal educational initiatives are part of children's socialization into a particular culture and therefore, peace education is well placed to address the cultural dimension of conflict. Indeed, peace education has been named by UNESCO as one of the pillars of a 'culture of peace' (de Rivera, 2009).

However, while peace education aims to inculcate the values, skills and dispositions necessary for peaceful living (Harris, 2004; Reardon, 1988), these goals face substantial challenges in contexts of intractable conflict (Bekerman, 2005; Bekerman & Maoz, 2005; Bekerman & Zembylas, 2011; Duffy, 2000; Rosen & Salomon, 2010; Salomon, 2011; Zembylas, 2012). The impacts of short-term peace education interventions in situations of intractable conflict have been shown to be limited and somewhat impermanent in the face of the on-going culture of division, resentment and fear in which students live out their lives (Bekerman & Zembylas, 2011; Rosen & Salomon, 2010; Salomon, 2006). Thus, typical peace education practices have been criticized for being overly-naïve in ignoring the cultural environment or not doing enough to address the surrounding 'culture of conflict' (Bekerman & Zembylas, 2011; Salomon, 2011; Zembylas, 2012).

The role of culture in supporting intergroup conflict and violence is increasingly recognized. There is a growing body of scholarship addressing some of the cultural factors which contribute to the intractability of intergroup conflict (see Bar-Tal, 1998b, 2007; Bar-Tal & Hammack, 2012; Devine-Wright, 2003; Galtung, 1990; Gayer et al., 2009; Hammack, 2006; Hammack, 2009; Hammack, 2010; Jarman, 1997; Nasie & Bar-Tal, 2012; Ross, 1997; Ross, 2007; Staub, 2011, 2012; Volkan, 2006). When internalized by individuals, culturally-disseminated beliefs and narratives can embed prejudiced and hardline attitudes in the minds of individuals, helping to undermine support for a peaceful settlement (Bar-Tal, 2007; Halperin & Bar-Tal, 2012; Hammack, 2006; Nasie & Bar-Tal, 2012; M. H. Ross, 2007). Moreover, certain types of culturally-propagated beliefs can encourage support for repressive measures and violent action against others (Bar-Tal, 2007; Bar-Tal & Hammack, 2012; Galtung, 1990; Maoz & McCauley, 2005; Staub, 2012).

To date, however, the literature has had a disparate quality, with authors tending to focus on one or a few of the aspects of culture that can contribute to intractable conflict. In some cases, authors explore how support for violence arises from differing conceptions of cultural content such as 'societal beliefs' (Bar-Tal, 2007), 'master narratives' (Hammack, 2008) or 'psycho-cultural dynamics' (Ross, 2007). Other authors have focused in on the role of particular cultural factors in contributing to conflict, such as education (Bar-Tal, 1998a; Bekerman & Zembylas, 2011), collective memory (Cairns & Roe, 2003; Devine-Wright, 2003), public rituals of commemoration (Volkan, 2006) or media discourse (Jusic, 2009).

While this diversity of scholarship is indicative of a vibrant field of enquiry, there is also value in attempting a synthesis of the main themes in the literature. Such a synthesis offers an overview of the cultural dimension to intractable conflict; the types of cultural content which encourage support for conflict, and the particular cultural processes whereby individuals are socialized into these group beliefs and narratives and thus come to see intergroup violence as an unavoidable consequence of their group's identity and history.

An understanding of the themes in the literature can help peace educators be more grounded in their approach to working in situations of intractable conflict, supporting them to formulate practices which draw on the existing cultural frameworks of program participants (so that programs will seem less alien and more attractive to them). Insights on the cultural dimension of intergroup conflict can help educators to design peace education practices that actively address

the role that cultural factors play in perpetuating conflict in their societies. Understanding the ways in which culture (and by extension, education) works to build support for violence can also, ultimately, offer insight as to how cultural processes can be redirected to contribute to envisioning and enacting a culture of peace.

This paper will examine the cultural dimension to intractable conflicts and draw conclusions as to how peace education practice in divided societies can better be shaped to address this phenomenon. The first section will give definitions of the main terms involved in this discussion, while the second section will make more explicit the connection between culture and intergroup violence. The third section will give a brief overview of some of the main themes in the literature on the types of cultural content and cultural processes that can encourage support for intergroup violence, making conflicts resistant to peaceful resolution. The fourth and final section will consider the implications for peace education, and make recommendations for improved practice in situations of intractable conflict.

Culture and socialization

‘Culture’ can be an amorphous term, leading it to be ignored by psychologists and social scientists who mistrust its intangible and flexible nature. ‘Culture’ was first used in its current meaning by English Anthropologist Edward B. Tylor, who described culture as "that complex whole which includes knowledge, belief, art, law, morals, custom, and any other capabilities and habits acquired by man (sic.) as a member of society" (Tylor, 1871, p. 1). Later social scientists have defined culture as a system of shared beliefs and meanings that shape collective behavior. An often cited definition is that of Geertz (1973, p. 89) who defined culture as ‘an historically transmitted pattern of meaning embodied in symbols, a system of inherited conceptions expressed in symbolic forms by means of which men (sic) communicate, perpetuate, and develop their knowledge about and attitudes towards life’. Scholars of culture tend to view behaviors, institutions and social structures as culturally-constituted phenomena (Ross, 1997).

For the purposes of the present discussion ‘culture’ can be defined as a human environment of shared understandings and customary activities into which individuals are born. What the individual learns about the world is mediated through the lens of this cultural environment - shared understandings are internalized by the individual through transmission of information via language and symbols, by observation of the actions of others, and by active participation in social practices such as rituals and celebrations. Thus, culture is both content (information/meanings) and process (transmission / enactment). This distinction will become important later at the paper when examining some similar features in the culture of societies experiencing intractable conflict.

Culture is intimately related to socialization, where children learn from contact with their surrounding human environment what is believed to be true, what it means to be a member of their group, and what is desirable or undesirable behavior. Primary socialization is understood to be that which takes place in the family, while secondary socialization is that which takes place at school and in their wider community.

Intractable conflict and divided societies

The term 'intractable conflict' was first developed by Kreisberg (1993) as part of a conceptual framework to analyze the relative tractability of conflicts. While some conflicts are short-lived and quickly resolved, intractable conflicts are characterized by a number of features. These features include their long duration, the presence of direct and structural violence, and the presence of a 'socio-psychological infrastructure' whereby participants in the conflict adapt to difficult circumstances by becoming more entrenched in their political positions and more resistant to settlement or compromise (Bar-Tal, 2007). Intractable conflicts are often rooted in a fear of extinction, resulting in strong negative feelings towards others (Vallcher, Coleman, Nowak, & Bui-Wrzosinska, 2012; Volkan, 2006). They are characterized not only by mutually-opposing group identities and narratives, but also by a strong level of emotionality which hampers the pursuit of a purely political settlement focused on material interests (Bar-Tal, 1998a, 2007; Hammack, 2006; Vallcher et al., 2012; Volkan, 2006).

The term 'divided societies' is sometimes conflated with intractable conflicts but its definition is more inclusive, if not so clearly delineated. Any society with a major social division could be called 'divided' but while most experience some degree of conflict it may not always reach the level of intergroup violence and hostility that would define it as 'intractable'. While direct violence may be absent for long periods of history, divided societies are characterized by patterns of social segregation, often contain structural inequalities between ethnic or religious groups, and are vulnerable to escalating tensions between those groups which can spill over into mass violence when trigger events occur (Staub, 2012).

Peace education and culture of peace

Peace education is the attempt to educate people into valuing peace and co-operation over conflict and competition, and to provide them with the skills and dispositions necessary to handle conflicts non-violently and to work towards building peace in their society (Harris & Morrison, 2003). It is by its very nature a value-laden project, but one which is gaining increasing attention as a way to bring about the changes in human consciousness out of which a new, more peaceful and more equitable world can be built (Page, 2004; Reardon, 1988; Salomon & Cairns, 2010). Peace education has arisen in Western countries out of a concern for how education systems were contributing to war in the early twentieth century. However, more recently peace education programs have been applied in countries experiencing a very particular history of enmity and division, for example in Northern Ireland (Duffy, 2000; Lascaris, 2001), Israel-Palestine (Salomon, 2006) and Sri Lanka (Lopes Cardozo, 2008). The hope is that such educational initiatives – often based on models imported from other countries – will help to build a culture of peace that will ultimately contribute to sustainable peace in the wider society (Salomon, 2009).

Due to the nature of education systems around the world, peace education practice tends to take the form of short-term, structured programs which are delivered by outside agents such as non-governmental organizations rather than by the public school system (Salomon, 2002). The focus is typically on changing personal beliefs and attitudes rather than questioning the cultural or social aspects of the conflict. Most peace education programs in divided societies aiming to

reduce individual prejudice levels in the hope that these individuals will become active agents of social change (see Bar-Tal & Rosen, 2009; Bekerman, 2007; Duffy, 2000; Salomon, 2009).

‘Culture of peace’ is a concept that has become increasingly popular in United Nations communications in recent years. United Nations resolution (A/RES/52/13) defines a culture of peace as involving values, attitudes, and behaviors that reject violence, endeavor to address the root causes of conflict and aim to solve problems through dialogue (de Rivera, 2009). Peace education is considered to be an important foundation to the project of building a global culture of peace (de Rivera, 2009; Salomon, 2009).

Connecting Culture and Conflict

With his theory of ‘cultural violence’, Johan Galtung (1990) brought to attention the role of culture as the element of society which supports and justifies both direct and structural violence towards others. Galtung identifies a number of aspects of culture which can be subverted to promote support for violence, including art, education, science and religion. He defined cultural violence as the ‘sub-strata’ that underlies other forms of violence, a layer of human beliefs and practices which are slow to change and which can lead to repeated outbreaks of violence if they are not addressed. According to Galtung, culture is a powerful factor in explaining violence because it directs and constrains the moral decision-making of group members.

Culture plays a key role in the socialization of children into adult members of a given society. Cultural transmission – the inculcation of group knowledge into individuals – can be seen across human groups and even among animals. Interaction with a particular cultural environment has been shown to be a key factor in the development of worldview and values (Bronfenbrenner, 1979; Mead, 1928; Rogoff, 2003; Vygotsky, 1929). The particular circumstances in which a child grows up has been referred to as a ‘socio-ecological niche’ (Bronfenbrenner, 1979) with the surrounding culture playing an important role in shaping that niche. Through their participation in group culture, new generations are introduced to a shared system of meanings and values. Thus, beliefs and narratives about group identity and conflict can be transmitted between individuals through cultural processes such as use of language (Morin, 2013; Rhodes, Leslie, & Tworek, 2012), visual symbols (Jarman, 1997), and through participation in collective activities (Rogoff, 2003).

However, while all human groups have some form of cultural system which encourages a significant degree of conformity in belief and behavior among group members, cultures can vary widely in the beliefs and behaviors which are held to be true and good. Anthropologists have identified a number of cultures where aggression and violence are widespread, and others where such attitudes and behaviors are strongly discouraged and as a result, are virtually unknown (Bonta, 1996; Fry et al., 2009). It is, then, only certain types of cultural content (beliefs, narratives, identities) which have been shown to make violent behavior more likely among group members, especially those individuals who identify strongly with the group (Bar-Tal & Hammack, 2012; Eidelson & Eidelson, 2003; Staub, 2011, 2012; Volkan, 2006).

Culture can contribute to intergroup conflict by disseminating and reinforcing beliefs and narratives that present the conflict as justified and even desirable. Internalization of negative

beliefs about other groups, which are often disseminated culturally among groups engaged in long-term conflict, can lead to ‘delegitimization’ or ‘devaluation’ of other groups (Bar-Tal & Hammack, 2012; Sen, 2006; Staub, 2011). These socialization processes begin early, with young children raised in the belief that conflict and division are normal. In Northern Ireland children as young as three years old were found to have begun the process of internalizing an exclusionary sense of group identity through their preference for the cultural symbols of their own group, while children as young as five expressed negative feelings about symbols associated with the other main social group (Connolly, Kelly, & Smith, 2009). Indeed, group beliefs about identity and the conflict can become embedded in the shared ethos of an entire society (Bar-Tal, 1998b, 2007). This in turn contributes to widespread support, whether tacit or explicit, for violent actions against members of other groups and for the creation of repressive social structures which discriminate against those who are not members of the in-group (Bar-Tal & Hammack, 2012; Maoz & Eidelson, 2007; Maoz & McCauley, 2005; Staub, 2011).

However, while cultural factors can play a significant role in maintaining and increasing support for violent conflict they should never be seen as fixed or completely deterministic. Cultures are dynamic; they can and do change over time, as the example of Germany before and after World War Two has shown (Snyder, 2011). Furthermore, the relationship between the individual and her surrounding culture is co-constituting (Bronfenbrenner, 1979; Rogoff, 2003). Thus, while individuals are shaped by participation in a culture, they are also capable of refusing to internalize some elements of their culture and of exercising their agency by challenging and changing the cultural environment in which they live. In this way, from the actions of free-thinking and motivated individuals, cultural change can begin to emerge (Staub, 2012).

Peace educators can engage with the cultural dimension of conflict not only as a negative factor whose influence needs to be reduced, but also as a potential arena for generating social change. Inspiring individuals to become involved in challenging and changing that ‘sub-strata’ of cultural violence offers hope of meaningful social change, if a point can be reached where enough individuals in a situation of intergroup conflict can come to recognize that their interests and identities are ultimately interdependent with those of others.

The Cultural Dimension of Intractable Conflicts

While each particular context of conflict is different, divided societies – especially those characterized by ‘intractable’ conflict – have been observed to share a number of similarities in the types of beliefs and narratives that are widely shared among group members. Contexts of intractable conflict are marked by the presence of two or more groups who are opposed not only regarding their political goals, but whose cultures are characterized by mutually opposing understandings of what is at stake in the conflict and the relative worthiness of the groups involved (Bar-Tal, 2007; Bar-Tal & Hammack, 2012; Kreisberg, 1998). These particular psycho-cultural features can greatly reduce support for pursuit of a peaceful settlement, even when continuation of the conflict is materially damaging to all involved (Bar-Tal, 2007; Eidelson & Eidelson, 2003; Hammack, 2009; Maoz & Eidelson, 2007). This psychological infrastructure of conflict becomes embedded in unquestioned cultural understandings which shape both the information which is communicated to young people, and the daily and ritual activities in which they participate (Bekerman, 2009; Bekerman & Zembylas, 2011; Hammack, 2011). In this way,

culture, as a framework for interpreting and making meaning about the social world, becomes a factor in the perpetuation of intergroup animosity by inculcating oppositional beliefs and narratives in the minds of succeeding generations.

Any discussion of the cultural dimension to intractable conflict is complicated by the array of different terms used by different authors (eg. beliefs, narratives, psycho-cultural dynamics) and also by the very fact that many of the concepts are closely inter-related making it difficult to define clear differences between them. To try and outline more clearly the literature on the subject, and what it tells us about the cultural dimension of intractable conflict, this paper explores 'cultural content' and 'cultural processes'. 'Cultural content' refers to those shared understandings – whether in the form of beliefs or narratives – which contribute to members of a group supporting conflict. 'Cultural processes' refers to the actions which transmit those shared understandings to members of the group and help to encourage the internalization of ideas which encourage support for the continuation of intergroup conflict.

Cultural content

The content of cultures carries shared narratives and beliefs about one's own group and its position in the world, a shared past, and a desired future. In situations of intractable conflict, these elements coalesce into a strongly-experienced and emotive sense of group identity which defines the in-group in opposition to another group or groups (Bar-Tal, 2007; Hammack, 2008; Ross, 2007; Sen, 2006; Staub, 2011; Volkan, 2006). These shared cultural frameworks (however distorted they may be) help individuals to make sense of the difficult situation of on-going conflict and offer a degree of ontological stability regarding identity and self-worth in uncertain and stressful social circumstances (Bar-Tal, 1998b, 2007; Bekerman, 2009; Hammack, 2008). However, the resulting tendency to negate the equal legitimacy of other beliefs and narratives, and the tendency create a positive sense of group identity in opposition to the perceived inferiority of another group can have serious consequences for prolonging and deepening conflict (Bar-Tal, 2007; Bar-Tal & Hammack, 2012; Halperin & Bar-Tal, 2012; Hammack, 2006; Volkan, 2006).

Cultural content can take the form of shared beliefs and narratives and collective emotional orientation. In situations of intractable conflict these tend to center on ideas about group identity and the nature of the conflict. 'Societal beliefs' are cognitive structures shared among group members, forming a common understanding of reality which directs public discussion of events and shapes decision-making by leaders (Bar-Tal, 2007). Narratives are more complex cognitive formations, weaving together select information into a coherent story that reaches back into the past (in the form of collective memory), explains the present, and envisions a desired future destiny for the group (Cairns & Roe, 2003; Hammack, 2008). 'Collective emotional orientation' has been used to describe how groups engaged in conflict can develop shared, long-lasting emotions such as pride or shame, anger or passivity which help to shape how group members behave in the conflict (Bar-Tal, 2007). These three forms of cultural content overlap and are interconnected; shared beliefs underpin collective narratives, and both are imbued with a strong emotional dimension which makes it difficult to persuade people to change their position by presenting rational arguments.

Collective beliefs about group identity and the nature of the conflict have been argued to play a significant role in embedding conflict and contributing directly to the intractability of certain intergroup conflicts (Bar-Tal, 2007; Bar-Tal & Hammack, 2012; Eidelson & Eidelson, 2003; Gayer et al., 2009; Halperin & Bar-Tal, 2012). These beliefs relate to the necessity of conflict and the impossibility of making peace without incurring unacceptable losses (see in particular Gayer et al., 2009; Halperin & Bar-Tal, 2012). Beliefs about the nature of the conflict are also highly contested between groups – with differing perceptions of what is at stake and who is responsible for making the compromises necessary for peace playing an important role in preventing the formation of inter-group understandings of the conflict which could help generate ideas for resolution of the conflict (Bar-Tal, 2007).

Group narratives play an important role in forming a sense of shared identity within a group, and also a sense of how that identity is intimately related to conflict with another group or groups (Hammack, 2006, 2008; Nasie & Bar-Tal, 2012). While such narratives about self and other are widely shared within the group they are often deeply different between groups, contributing to polarization in society (Hammack, 2009; Hammack, 2010; Ross, 2007). In particular, narratives of victimhood and /or superiority can contribute to hostile and uncompromising attitudes towards other groups (Roccas & Elster, 2012). Studies of Israeli and Palestinian adolescents have shown that they have largely (though with some individual variation) absorbed their group's collective narrative into their worldview, and even into their own life narratives (Hammack, 2006; Nasie & Bar-Tal, 2012). The Israeli adolescents defined themselves as members of a group who had overcome great suffering established a progressive country in their ancient homeland, in the face of opposition from 'backward' Arabs, while Palestinian adolescents saw themselves as members of a group who had been unfairly and violently ousted from their natives lands by aggressive interlopers. In the case of members of both groups, greater identification with their own groups' narrative correlated with greater support for continuation of the conflict with the other group (Hammack, 2006).

The role of collective memory in promoting and justifying intergroup conflict has been increasingly recognized (Bar-Tal, 2007; Cairns & Roe, 2003; Devine-Wright, 2003; Ross, 2007; Volkan, 2006). Collective memory is inherently selective, creating group narratives about the past which focus on the heroism of actions by one's own group, attributing evil motivations to actions of the perceived enemy group (Cairns & Roe, 2003; Ross, 2007; Volkan, 2006). Group members harken back to particular 'chosen traumas' or 'chosen glories' - historical events which provide a sense of shared identity, and an emotive framework for interpreting present events and deciding what is desirable action (Volkan, 2006). Thus, collective memory, woven into shared narratives about the group's past, often lends legitimacy to participation in conflict as a much-needed reversal of past trauma and / or reclamation of past glory.

The topic of 'collective emotional orientation' (Bar-Tal, 2007) over-laps with that of beliefs and narratives, but merits a short description of its own due to the particular power of certain emotions, when mobilized, to cause support for violent action. The term can be applied when a majority of members of a social group have internalized certain emotions associated with their collective narrative and overall sense of identity. Emotions such as shame, anger and fear have been shown to make individuals more likely to engage in violence (Gilligan, 2003; Scheff & Retzinger, 2002). The collective nature of the emotions make a group more likely to act in

concert, once those emotions have been mobilized by events in the real world or by rumors and claims made by political leaders. Hence, the reactions of groups in intractable conflict to seemingly unimportant events – which in fact have high emotional and symbolic importance for group members – can seem savage and irrational to cultural outsiders who do not share the same emotional orientation.

Ultimately, all these cultural elements – shared beliefs, group narratives and collective emotions – coalesce into a strongly-experienced sense of group identity. While human beings have multiple group identities and affiliations including gender, citizenship, and ethnicity, intractable conflicts are marked by the salience of a single identity category. This identity is usually essentialized, exclusionary, defined in opposition to the other group(s) in the conflict, and believed to confer a superior moral status on members of the group (Roccas & Elster, 2012; Sen, 2006; Staub, 2012; Volkan, 2006). Constant exposure to the surrounding cultural content of beliefs, narratives and collective emotions means that this sense of group identity becomes interwoven into the individuals' self-concept and can lead them to hold negative attitudes toward other groups even where they have had no contact with them (Connolly et al., 2009; Hammack, 2006, 2008). The need to defend this sense of identity, which is believed to be under threat from others, provides a powerful framework for in-group solidarity and for motivating collective violent action (Bar-Tal, 2007). Thus, it is important to understand how cultural processes play a part in communicating and exclusionary and oppositional notions of identity, embedding them in the minds of individual group members.

Cultural processes of transmission

While beliefs and narratives relating to group identity and the nature of the conflict form the substance of the psychological infrastructure of intractable conflict it is in processes of transmission that the cultural dimension of conflict can be seen at work. Cultural transmission – through processes such as direct communication, display of symbols rituals and customary behaviors – can pass on from one individual to another and from one generation to the next the beliefs and narratives which encourage support for continuing the conflict rather than seeking peaceful resolution. This transmission takes place through a number of processes that can be more easily observed and addressed than the deeper, often invisible, cultural architecture of shared understandings.

Firstly, and most obviously, information about what group members are expected to believe and how they are expected to behave is transmitted through direct linguistic communication. Direct communication enhances the specificity of social learning by pointing out to children what is important for them to internalize from their environment (Morin, 2013). Language can have a powerful impact on the psyche when internalized as belief – for example studies have found that hearing generic terms used about members of other groups led children and adults to develop essentialized beliefs about those groups (Rhodes et al., 2012). Given that holding essentialized ideas about other groups often leads to devaluing them as human beings, and that such devaluation raises the propensity to support violence against that group, (Bar-Tal & Hammack, 2012; Ross, 2007; Sen, 2006; Staub, 2011), it is clear that that use of language can be an important factor in promoting or reducing support for intergroup conflict.

Examples of direct communications which can build intergroup animosity and mutual delegitimization include biased content in history textbooks (Bar-Tal, 1998a), family conversations where parents use derogatory language to describe other groups in front of their children (Allport, 1954), when teachers explain the current social situation to students in terms of subjective group narratives (Bekerman & Zembylas, 2011; Zembylas, 2012) or when another group is framed as ‘enemy’ in political speeches and in media discourse (Jusic, 2009). This cultural transmission of information is easy to discern but can be difficult to counteract because of its all pervasive nature; young people growing up in a context of intractable conflict can receive these messages on an almost daily basis, and they often fail to recognize the subjective or biased nature of the communications (see Bar-Tal, 2007; Hammack, 2009; Hammack, 2010; Nasie & Bar-Tal, 2012; Volkan, 2006).

Information can also be communicated through symbols that have a shared meaning for group members. Visual symbols and artwork can depict narratives of group origin, victimhood and resistance in visually-arresting terms (Jarman, 1997). The strategic placing of flags in Northern Ireland, for example, makes implicit claims to territory which can be highly contested and can even lead to violence, even though no words have been spoken and no one’s physical existence has been directly threatened (Bryan, 2007). In a direct counterpoint, the creation of a new flag for South Africa in the 1990s symbolized a new, more inclusive identity for the country as a whole. Not only flags, but also public art, tattoos, customary dress, and visible gestures (eg. the black power salute) can all be used to convey groups’ beliefs about their identity and about the conflict in which they are engaged.

In addition, beliefs and narratives can be conveyed through the enactment of ritual behaviors which not only reflect those beliefs and narratives but also help to further embed them in the minds of individuals (Ross, 2007; Volkan, 2006). Examples of such cultural activities include commemorations of war dead, public holidays to celebrate past victories, or conducting religious ceremonies in sites of contested historical significance. These ritual acts can be heavy with significance for group members, and can mobilize powerful emotions of loss and anger which in turn contribute to desire for retribution against the other group – thus keeping the conflict alive in the minds of group members, even when direct violence has died down. For example, Serbian leader Slobodan Milosevic hosted a rally at the battlefield of Kosovo in 1989, drawing on an existing Serb narrative of historic victimhood but also deepening it and giving it new life by re-awakening the collective humiliation of the battle of Kosovo in ritual and symbolic form (Volkan, 2006).

Finally, cultural narratives of identity, separation, and superiority play a role in constituting social structures and the very ways in which people live out their daily lives (Bar-Tal, 2007). Structural violence, such as discrimination and poverty, is given legitimacy by the cultural understandings of members of a dominant group (Galtung, 1990). In more symmetrical conflicts, groups can still support social separation, an example being the continuing norm of segregated living and schooling among Catholics and Protestants in Northern Ireland (Nolan, 2012). How educational systems are configured, with schools in contexts of intractable conflict often segregated, can be a reflection of culturally-held beliefs about the inevitability of conflict and the desirability of separation (Hromadzic, 2009; Smith, 2006). Once cultural beliefs and narratives are enshrined in social structures in this way, they can become even more resistant to change –

they have become institutionalized as part of how the social world is constructed. Just by virtue of living in that social world, young people can start to internalize the culturally-constituted reality of intractable conflict as inevitable, and even desirable.

Discussion

Information, symbols, enactment and structures create a cultural environment that has a powerful educational effect on young people. Growing up in a situation of intractable conflict, they are constantly interacting with the shared beliefs and narratives of their own group, forming a sense of personal identity that is inevitably linked to the wider group identity to some degree. At the same time they are unlikely to encounter the narratives and beliefs of others, except in a way that delegitimizes them. This cultural participation has a particularly strong educational power because it provides young people with a lived, emotional experience of belonging and group loyalty that is central to their sense of identity as both individuals and group members. It is important to understand that it is difficult for anyone to embrace new ideas which challenge their core sense of identity – particularly a group identity that has been developed since birth by interaction with their culture, an identity which provides them with a sense of psychological protection in an unstable social environment. Finding ways to constructively and compassionately address polarized and exclusionary identities is a key challenge facing peace educators in divided societies.

However, this is not to deprive individuals of their capacity for personal agency. Not all individuals internalize the content of their culture to the same degree (Hammack, 2010; Staub, 2011) and this is a phenomena which peace educators can strive to better understand as it offers hope for more effective interventions. An understanding of the multiple ways in which culture can contribute to individuals supporting conflict and violence can benefit peace educators, by illuminating the many ways in which students have been induced to relinquish their agency as the price for group belonging and for gaining a sense that the conflict is necessary and justified. Thus, peace education can become an emancipatory process if it leads students to recognize and question the ways in which participation in their culture as it currently stands has lead them to give-up their own capacity for independent thought and action. In reawakening a sense of individual agency, even amidst powerful cultural forces that support the status quo, the work of envisioning and enacting a new ‘culture of peace’ can begin.

Implications for peace education practice

The primary implication for peace education practice is that culture matters, and cannot be ignored. Students cannot be conceived of as ‘blank slates’ but rather educators must recognize that even from an early age many of them will have internalized the surrounding psycho-cultural infrastructure to a significant degree. Not only does ignoring this cultural dimension of the participants’ psyches lead to less effective peace education programming, it also misses the opportunities to engage students in observing, understanding and critiquing their social world.

Secondly, while culture must be directly addressed by peace educators, this process should be handled sensitively. Any peace education practice which aims to awaken a sense of critical agency among members of a divided society – where the intention is to become critical of the

conflict rather than of the other group – will need to take into account the difficult emotional terrain which their students need to navigate in order to reach the point where they can critically question the essentialized and constructed nature of their own groups' identity. Helping students to understand why certain topics are so emotional for them, and how those emotions can be manipulated by political leaders, must be done in a way which respects their need for a strong sense of group identity. Identities are an essential psychological construct for human beings, and that group belonging is an important human need. A more fruitful path may be to help students to understand the consequences of holding essentialized views of their own and other groups, and to invite them to explore possibilities for more inclusive and complex conceptions of their identity, conceptions that recognize the inevitable interdependence between human beings.

Furthermore, examination of local cultural processes offers a rich source of material for discussing, and thus critically unpacking, the contribution of culture to intractable conflict. The value in critiquing those workings in their concrete and local manifestations is that students will become better able to critically-appraise the messages that are communicated to them by other members of their groups. An example of this in practice would be to explore different newspaper accounts of same event by journalists from different backgrounds, with the aim of gaining insight into how pre-existing group narratives filter our perception of events and how polarized or oppositional narratives can contribute to conflict between groups.

Understanding the powerful role of culture in constituting individual beliefs and building support for divisive social structures and direct violence, also, conversely, offers hope that the power of culture can be harnessed to build support for a more peaceful vision of society. Every culture has its own resources for peace, from traditional conflict resolution processes to examples of historical figures who have worked non-violently for change or to build bridges between groups. Drawing on these local cultural resources can mean that the idea of 'peace' seems less alien to students who have grown-up with conflict as the defining element in their sense of group identity. The power of culture can also be drawn upon by encouraging students to actively engage in envisioning a culture of peace, for example by designing inclusive symbols, or imagining rituals which would allow everyone involved in the conflict to grieve their losses together. Out of these envisioning exercises, can emerge concrete plans for program participants to start enacting a more peaceful culture in their daily lives.

Finally, there is an important recognition to be made that peace and conflict are not simply abstract concepts, but are culturally embedded, lived experiences. Thus, peace educators should look to move beyond abstract discussions in the classroom to find ways of embedding peace in the environment in which students live. There is an important potential for schools to become micro-cultures of peace even in hostile social terrain (see Clarke-Habibi, 2005; Danesh, 2006). Understanding the cultural dimension of conflict, we can see that support for peace is most likely to flourish when peace is no longer an abstract intellectual concept but when it is embedded as part of the cultural environment. Thus, peace educators need to give attention to the many ways in which peace can be enacted in the daily life of schools, and to begin design programs that reach out into the surrounding community of parents and relatives, neighbors and friends.

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A Gandhian Approach to Peace Movements in the 21st Century

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A GANDHIAN APPROACH TO PEACE MOVEMENTS IN THE 21ST CENTURY

Abstract

Mohandas Karamchand Gandhi renowned for his non-violent movement, that led India to freedom from the British rule, is recognized as the father of non-violent resistance. However, his concept of non-violence is narrowly understood as pacifism or peaceful resolution to conflict. This paper contends that Gandhi had a much broader vision of non-violence: he perceived its opposite - violence - in the fundamental sense of 'violation,' which refers not just to physical violence but includes structural inequities that result in rivalry, aggression and wars. Gandhian philosophy, still relevant today for peace movements, compels us to expand the definition of violence to question fundamental injustices both within and between countries. Drawing on Gandhian notions such as *ahimsa* (non-violence), simple living and praxis, *dharma* (spirituality), *sarvodaya* (welfare of all), and anti-racialism, this paper calls for re-defining the concept of violence and to develop multi-layered and inclusive approaches in the struggle for attaining global peace and justice.

Introduction

The anti-colonial resistance initiated by Mohandas Karamchand Gandhi (1869-1948) played a key role in unseating British rule in India. This paper contends that Gandhian philosophy is still relevant today, not in India alone, but in contemporary global struggles for global peace and justice. While a large number of Gandhi's writings pertain to the socio-economic direction that he believed India should pursue, overall, his philosophy was shaped by atrocities committed by

the privileged on the dispossessed. As such, his writings contain powerful critiques of violence, colonialism and imperialism that provide a springboard for imagining alternative strategies in the struggle for peace and justice in the 21st century.

While anti-war movements in North America have largely focused their attention on specific conflicts, drawing from Gandhian thought, this essay maintains that peace is not merely the absence of violence and war, but a continuous revolutionary process of eradicating structural inequalities that lead to hostilities in the first place. The history of North American peace and anti-war movement demonstrates that once a particular conflict ends – whether Vietnam, Gulf War, or the war on erstwhile Yugoslavia – the movement dissipates without interrogating or tackling the underlying system that is the source of conflict and hostility. As such, there is an urgent need to critically reflect and re-envision fundamental notions of violence, non-violence and peace that have hitherto informed anti-war and peace activism.

While Gandhi's influence on the peace movement in the United States was felt as early as the 1920s, his impact has been most evident in the pacifist sector of the U.S. peace movement. Peace groups, such as Quakers, regarded pacifist methods and the principled rejection of violence as ethically more appropriate than violence in attaining social and political objectives. By 1957, the Gandhian method of *satyagraha* or direct action for peace became more widely known as American peace groups mobilized for action against the threat of continued nuclear testing (Walker, 1965; Gandhi, 2001). With the civil rights movement gaining momentum in the 1960s, Gandhi's civil disobedience technique came to be accepted as appropriate to the American scenario and a necessary step beyond the traditional methods of education and persuasion. However, one of the major shortcomings of the peace movement, as mentioned by historian Charles Walker (1965) - and reiterated by Arun Gandhi (2001) - is that the movement is insufficiently integrated with a non-violent revolutionary program that works towards a just world order. Resistance to war and violent policies alone is reductionist unless it is linked to micro and macro struggles for a new social and economic order.

Although Gandhi has been recognized as the father of non-violent resistance and his methods of direct action have permeated anti-war and peace movements (eg. see Johansen et al, 2012 for a recent call to non-violent action against US imperialism), this paper argues that Gandhian non-violence is much more than civil disobedience or the mere abdication of violence in the attainment of social change. It is imperative, therefore, to re-visit Gandhian thought on non-violence in greater detail. A holistic conception of Gandhi's non-violent method is incomplete without consideration of other inter-connected principles that he exemplified, such as simple living and praxis (personal transformation), *dharma* (spirituality and the ultimate goal of self-realization), and *sarvodaya* (welfare of all). Moreover, living as a citizen of a colonized nation and completing higher education in England enabled Gandhi to develop keen insights and unconventional views about human civilization in both India and the West. His thinking about modern civilization as well as racial prejudice provides useful commentary to understand contemporary imperialism and to contemplate alternative resistance strategies that are pivotal to the politics of peace. The next section elaborates Gandhian ideas relevant to anti-war and peace movements, while the subsequent section urges furthering the anti-war agenda using a Gandhian lens if we are to achieve long-term peace.

Gandhian concepts for global peace:

Ahimsa (non-violence):

While Gandhi has been recognized as a prominent philosopher of non-violent approaches to conflict-resolution, his notion of non-violence is often narrowly comprehended as passivity, pacifism, rejection of violence, or at best as non-violent civil disobedience (Burrowes, 1996). Gandhi had a much broader vision of non-violence than is currently acknowledged – at the core of his concept of non-violence was the creation of non-violent societies and economies that lead to non-violent states. Gandhi emphasized that socio-economic exploitation is the root cause of violence and conflict; as such, anything that smacked of exploitation is violence. He perceived ‘violence’ in its fundamental sense of ‘violation’, which refers not only to physical forms of violence, but encompasses emotional harm and psychic terror when people are subjugated, repressed or exploited. Violence, in its broad sense therefore, has a structural connotation: it refers to “all those forms of indirect exploitation and structural marginalization which limit reflectivity and self-realization” (Steger, 2006, p. 333). Viewed this way, Gandhi's definition of violence includes the structural violence of poverty, inequality, overdevelopment, underdevelopment, denial of basic needs, and racism (termed ‘racialism’ by Gandhi) and other forms of discrimination. The term ‘structural violence’ was first coined by Johan Galtung, who was inspired by Gandhi's life and writings.

Critique of modern civilization and capitalism:

Based on this expanded definition of violence, Gandhi viewed modern society to be imperfect as it continues to practice violence in almost all spheres of life. As early as in 1909, he dismissed the new modern civilization as a short-lived phenomenon, chiefly because he perceived it to be exploitative of human beings and the natural environment. Questioning the unending modern pursuit of material pleasure and prosperity since the dawn of the Industrial Revolution, Gandhi compared modern civilization with a *Bhasmasur* (destructive monster) that indulges in overusing Nature's bounty through over-production and over-consumption. A civilization that equates consumerist lifestyles with development, according to Gandhi, cannot be civilization in the true sense of the term.

For Gandhi, wars of aggression and economic prowess of rich countries are nothing but a natural extension of the values and beliefs in acquisitiveness, materialism, and capitalist expansion. In colonial times, the resource base to support capital accumulation typically came from peripheral regions as a vast amount of their wealth was amassed by the imperial centers of Europe. Even today, consumption by the rich is sustained and expanded at the expense of the poor. For instance, consumption patterns of the wealthy result in growing demand for various foods, flowers, textiles, and other commodities. Consequently, land in developing countries is increasingly used to grow cash crops (bananas, sugar, coffee, tea etc) for export to wealthier countries and for consumption by domestic elite (see for ex. Bracking, 2007; Escobar, 1995; George, 1997; Goldsmith, 2001; Ismi & Schwartz, 2007; Robbins, 1999; Veltmeyer & Simon; 2005). The compliance of developing countries in contemporary times is attained through economic policies, such as structural adjustment programs, which are imposed on poorer nations via the World Bank and International Monetary Fund controlled by rich nations.

Capitalist growth has also created numerous complex problems such as ecological imbalance, alienation, cutthroat competition, increasing inequalities both within and between nations, growing violence, conflicts and wars (Harvey, 2003; Hiranandani, 2007; McNally, 2006). While environmental problems, such as climate change, have surfaced largely in the post-Gandhian era, Gandhi could foresee the future and visualize the dangers inherent in the capitalist development models that ensued after the Western industrial revolution. Gandhi cautioned against the limits of the modern lifestyle and warned about what later came to be known as the 'consumerist culture' and a 'waste-centric society'. His famous statement "the Nature has enough for everyone's need but not for everyone's greed" (Gandhi, 1947 quoted in Dwivedi, 1990, p. 207) has become incredibly relevant today.

Simple living and praxis (personal transformation):

Rejecting capitalist modernity and its underlying beliefs in acquisitiveness, self-centeredness, competition and exploitation, Gandhi emphasized that the sensible course was to live one's life in a simple way without exploiting or exerting undue pressure on one's environment. Gandhi likened capital accumulation and materialism to thieving: "I suggest that we are thieves in a way. If I take anything that I do not need for my own immediate use, and keep it, I thief it from somebody else" (Gandhi, 1947 cited in Bose, 1948, p. 269). He abhorred the culture of excessive consumerism and competition that leads to envy, aggression and strife on the micro level and violent wars on the macro level. Drawing on Gandhi, the writings of Kumarappa (1949) are instructive:

While pacifism hopes to get rid of war chiefly by refusing to fight and by carrying on a propaganda against war, Gandhiji goes much deeper and sees that war cannot be avoided as long as the seeds of it remain in man's breast and grow and develop in his social, political and economic life. Gandhiji's cure is, therefore, very radical and far-reaching. It demands nothing less than rooting out violence from oneself and one's environment. (quoted in Bose, 1981, p. 160)

To this end, Gandhi suggested every individual must make voluntary changes in his personal life by reducing his wants to the minimum. The Gandhian prescription of simple living puts a check on unlimited consumption and unending exploitation of natural resources. Naess (1986 cited in Weber, 1999) observed that Gandhi believed in the inter-relationship between self-realization, non-violence, and biospherical egalitarianism (equal rights for biosphere elements).

Throughout his life, Gandhi lived an exemplary life of simplicity and wrote extensively about simple living in harmony with nature. His daily life epitomized his deep concern for the environment. Gandhi believed in praxis - more than his spoken and written texts, the testament of his life reveals all that he stood for. His statement "my life is my message" (quoted in Bose, 1981, p. 159), suggests that Gandhi's life, principles and values informed his actions, since he was no academic theorist but rather an activist and a practical philosopher. Gandhi had prophetically warned: "A time is coming when those who are in mad rush today of multiplying their wants, will retrace their steps and say; what have we done?" (quoted in Moolakkattu, 2010, p. 153). Gandhi's rejection of material abundance and waste has been widely accepted by

progressive ecological movements since the 1970s (ex. Guha, 2006; Meadows et al, 1972; Naess, 1987; Schumacher, 1973; Weber, 1999). With current debates and alarming concerns about climate change, Gandhi's prediction has come true, although it took several decades for the world to comprehend the gravity of the situation.

Dharma (spirituality and self-realization):

Gandhi believed peace cannot exist on earth unless it is acknowledged that all life is one, emanating from a Universal Self, and that interdependence between peoples and co-existence with Mother Nature is imperative for human survival. Gandhi believed in devoting the intellect and all our faculties to the evolution of the soul "What would it profit a man if he gained the world but lost his soul into the bargain?" (Gandhi, 1939 quoted in Vyas, 1962, p. 29). He believed that separating spirituality from society would breed corruption, greed, power mania, and exploitation of the vulnerable (Kumar, 1996).

Ethics are, thus, central in Gandhi's conception of peace. In an era of conflict between and within nations, unless wrongdoing and untruth in one's own self and in society are rooted out, we will continue to be "at war with ourselves, and, therefore, at war with one another" (Gandhi, 1947, quoted in Bose, 1981, p. 160). Moral regeneration, for Gandhi, is a pre-requisite for sustained peace.

The central agent in all of Gandhi's thinking is the individual or *vyakti* comprising of the trilogy of body, mind, and human spirit (soul) in contrast to Emmanuel Kant's notion of duality of body and mind that has informed modern societies since the Western Enlightenment of the 17th and 18th centuries. Similar to Western liberal discourse, individual freedom and integrity rated high in Gandhi's assessment; however, unlike liberalism's emphasis on the 'rational,' autonomous and competitive individual, Gandhi placed importance on 'individual in society' rather than 'individual per se.' If the 'individual in society' becomes devoid of ethics, the social fabric will gradually crumble. Gandhi's notion of *dharma* or spirituality (differentiated from organized religion that can degenerate into fundamentalism) believes in the notion of our shared humanity – other people are an extension of one's own self. From this perspective, harming others is basically self-harm.

Gandhi believed that the individual must rediscover the right mind and live according to ethics encompassing unity, love, tolerance, peace, which are eternal and universal. For Gandhi, human relationships are in an incessant state of flux and, therefore, human life is in a continuous process of 'becoming' (Bose, 1981). Gandhi's principle of *ahimsa* (non-violence) recognizes this and endeavors to heal and reconcile, since it believes in the possibility of transforming human minds. For Gandhi, there is no victory or defeat; there can be only a pursuit of certain kind of values.

Sarvodaya (welfare of all):

To understand Gandhi's perspective on peace and justice, it is essential to comprehend his goal of 'Sarvodaya' or well-being of all without any discrimination between the rich and the poor, strong and weak, or good and bad. *Sarvodaya* was not only his primary objective, but also his

central principle in the attainment of peace. *Sarvodaya* calls for self-giving in socially beneficial labor and involves a continuous struggle towards social and economic equality (Bose, 1981). Unlike classical and neo-classical economics and their utilitarian principles that believe in ‘the greatest good of the greatest number’, Gandhi believed in the holistic well-being of all, not merely of the greatest number. *Sarvodaya* was a philosophical position of morality that Gandhi believed must underpin all human actions. In contrast to the emphasis in mainstream economics on personal acquisitiveness and material advancement, Gandhi adopted a holistic approach to well-being: in his view, societies must strive to promote not just the economic, but also more importantly the spiritual, psychological, physiological, and social well-being of all. Gandhi’s concept of *Sarvodaya* also incorporated a firm belief in *Antodaya*, that is, welfare of the least advantaged. He believed societies and states must give foremost importance to the welfare of those who occupy the lowest rungs of social and economic hierarchies. *Antodaya* was the pathway to *Sarvodaya* (welfare of all).

Gandhi’s principle of *Sarvodaya* has implications beyond the inhabitants of the nation-state. *Sarvodaya* is an extension of the Indian concept of *Vasudhaiva Kutumbakam*, a Sanskrit term that refers to global human family or the entire humankind, as enshrined in the Vedic and Upanishad wisdom of India’s ancient civilization. While it is true that Gandhi always began his struggles for justice at the local micro level, his vision surpassed the exigencies of local or national barriers. According to Gandhi:

My patriotism includes the good of mankind in general. Therefore, my service of India includes the service of humanity... My patriotism is not an exclusive thing. It is all embracing and I should reject patriotism which sought to mount upon the distress or the exploitation of other nationalities. I want to realize brotherhood or identity not merely with the being called human, but I want to realize identity with all life, even with such things as that crawl on earth (Gandhi, 1925, quoted in Prabhu & Rao, 1960a, para 6).

Thus, Gandhi’s version of patriotism was towards the entire universe, instead of the narrow concept of patriotism for a country.

Removal of Racialism:

Gandhi’s thinking on life and human existence was transformed by twenty-one years of experience against racism (termed as ‘racialism’ in his writings) and denial of civil liberties and political rights to Indian immigrants in South Africa. Gandhi’s scheme of life drew no distinction between different religions or ‘races’. Gandhi was repulsed by racism: in the context of racist legislation of South Africa, he questioned “[i]s a civilization worth the name which requires for its existence the very doubtful prop of racial legislation and lynch law?” (Gandhi, 1946 quoted in Narayan, 1968, p. 192). For Gandhi, racism is a new caste system that is much worse than the ancient but dying caste institution of India because the racialized system “shamelessly proclaims that white civilization requires the erection of legal barriers in order to protect itself against Asiatics and Africans” (Gandhi, 1946 quoted in Narayan, 1968, p. 193).

As is well known, while racism was initially used to control bonded labor in the plantations, it later became the underlying ideology of classical imperialism, legitimizing violence and plunder

of the colonies on an unprecedented scale (McNally, 2006). Today, the link between racism and First World dominance is more concealed; however, it undergirds contemporary corporate plunder of 'Third World' resources. Countries of the global South are viewed as dumping grounds for toxic wastes, hazardous chemicals and fertilizers, and even contraceptives and pharmaceutical drugs that are banned in the North (Bidwai, 1995; Shah, 2005; Stebbins, 1992). Furthermore, racialized 'national security' apparatus in North America and elsewhere, particularly in the post-9/11 era is itself a form of violence because it capitalizes on fear, violates human rights and has become an excuse for racism and sadism (Thobani, 2007).

Even contemporary benevolent efforts such as 'peacekeeping' are rooted in the colonial project. Peacekeeping for many Westerners is Rudyard Kipling's 'white man's burden' that exhorts white men "to take up the thankless burden of meeting the needs of their 'new-caught sullen peoples, / Half devil and half child'" (Razack, 2004, p. 4). Peacekeeping, mostly militarized, imagines the international as a space where 'civilized' peoples from the North go to the South to fight with 'evil'. Without reflecting on their implication in the terrible histories of the 'Third World,' Northerners view themselves as innocent parties carrying the white man's burden of instructing and civilizing the natives.

For Gandhi, the real 'white man's burden' "is not insolently to dominate colored or black people under the guise of protection, it is to desist from the hypocrisy which is eating into them. It is time white men learnt to treat every human being as their equal" (Gandhi, 1946 quoted in Prabhu & Rao, 1960b, para 7). Citing the golden rule 'do unto others as you would that they should do unto you,' Gandhi questioned "...or do they take in vain the name of Him who said this? Have they banished from their hearts the great colored Asiatic who gave to the world the above message?" (Gandhi, 1946, quoted in Prabhu & Rao, 1960b, para 8). Gandhi further admonished that those who agree racial inequality must be removed but do nothing to fight the evil are impotent. It was imperative for Gandhi to eradicate racism from all spheres of life: "we cannot do right in one department of life whilst [being] occupied in doing wrong in any other department. Life is one indivisible whole" (Gandhi, 1927 quoted in Prabhu & Rao, 1960b, para 1).

Drawing lessons for contemporary anti-war and peace movements:

Gandhian thought facilitates critical analyses of contemporary imperialism and offers alternative visions for broad-based peace movements. From Gandhian perspective, violence in the international arena is not restricted to armed conflict alone, but it includes structural violence of poverty, inequality, overdevelopment, underdevelopment, denial of basic needs, racism and other forms of prejudice and discrimination. Such expanded conception of violence encompasses systems of 'free market' capitalism that blatantly protect Western markets and push 'Third World' countries to dismantle their trade barriers; structural adjustment programs imposed by the World Bank and International Monetary Fund on indebted countries that have led to further impoverishment of their populations; trade wars created by the World Trade Organization that have converted trade from cooperative agreements to coercive arrangements resulting in starvation deaths and distress suicides of thousands of farmers in 'Third World' countries; and displacement of millions of people by large-scale development projects funded by the World Bank, and such mechanics of capitalist expansion and imperialism (see for instance

Chossudovsky, 2003; Danaher, 1994; Farmer, 2005; Kim, Millen, Irwin, & Gershman, 2000; McNally 2006; Prigoff, 2000; Roy, 2004a, 2004b; Shiva, 1997; 2000; 2002). Such re-conceptualization of violence, according to Gandhian thought, must also include repression and psychological colonization in supposedly democratic societies via thought policing and assaults on privacy and civil liberties, particularly in the era of the 'war on terror', that constrain the flow of truthful information and critical reflection on world affairs (see Carey, 2005; Chomsky, 2002; Chomsky, Mitchell, & Schoeffel, 2002; Chomsky, 2003; Miller, 2005).

Likewise, Gandhian approach calls into question received definitions of terrorism that, in the mainstream discourse, is limited to violence by Islamic fundamentalists. While violence in any form by any person or group is reprehensible, one-sided conception of terror that does not account for state terrorism and violence in its varied forms perpetrated by governments at home and abroad is equally repugnant. Official definitions of 'terrorism' fail to examine domination and genocide against Aboriginal and indigenous communities in North America and elsewhere. Similarly, the gross injustices of slavery and colonialism are frozen in history and conveniently deleted from public memory amidst a burgeoning industry of 'national/homeland security' (see Roy, 2004b; Thobani, 2007). The 'nation', after all, as Benedict Anderson (1983) points out, is merely an 'imagined community' that not only requires people to construct a sense of shared identity with large numbers of other people whom they will never meet, but also involves fantasies of belonging, kinship and shared history based on supposedly common ideology and customs and a sense of homogeneity. While nationalism can evoke a sense of responsibility and commitment to the national community, this dedication and the resultant 'patriotism' are often unquestioning and entail a herd mentality. With its commitment towards 'my country, right or wrong,' nationalism easily degenerates into zealotry and fascism and fanaticism (Sorenson, 2003). Narrow-minded nationalism and patriotism, according to Gandhian thought, abandon the common interests of humankind and are, therefore, incompatible with the essence of the peace movement.

Furthermore, even as resistance movements against neoliberal globalization and corporatism gather momentum in various countries, supposedly democratic governments have unleashed various forms of repression to tighten their control. Civic protest has been redefined as 'terrorism' and protestors and dissidents are dealt with as trouble-makers (Bishop 2002; Earth Island Institute 2001; Klein 2002; McNally, 2006; Roy, 2003, 2004). Indeed, state terrorism and repression unleashed by nation-states is necessary to maintain structural inequalities and elitist interests of the rich at the expense of the poor.

Thus, unless received definitions of violence, terrorism, peace-keeping and patriotism are questioned and expanded to expose systemic injustices and the dangers of narrow, uncritical exclusionary nationalism, the anti-war movement will continue to adopt a band-aid approach that merely protests one war after another without addressing the root causes of conflict or its side-effects of domestic repression. Instead of a narrow focus on conflict and war, Gandhian perspective compels peace and anti-war movements to turn their gaze to consumerist and racialized societies. Peace movements must examine excessive materialism and varied forms of violence and untruth in their own societies in order to develop a ground-up approach that rejects and opposes all forms of capitalist exploitation. That the structure of capitalism relies on expropriation, exploitation, domination, commodification, and 'accumulation by dispossession'

(see Harvey, 2003, p. 137-182) is a reality that most people in the 'First World' may not accept, largely because their lives and belief systems are shaped by the mythologies which support this predatory system. One of the profound failures of peace and anti-war movements, particularly in North America, has been their fixation on an end to this or that conflict as their limited goal.

Here, it is contended that overt violence is a systemic and structural product – unless structural violence (economic, environmental, communal, social, imperial, colonial violence) is dealt with, movements against particular conflicts will attain only piecemeal and temporary results. Reformism, therefore, is unequivocally inadequate. A Gandhian approach compels us to transform the underlying exploitative system of structural violence that results in an unending string of discord, disputes, tensions and aggression (Hiranandani, 2007). Only when fundamental change occurs at the centers of imperialism can we anticipate change in the policies directed at the peripheries of contemporary imperialism.

Instead of vacuous calls for 'peace,' an alternative framework based on Gandhian philosophy must not only oppose unjust wars but also reject the culture of materialism, acquisitiveness within, which in turn leads to exploitation of natural resources without. In this vein, it is imperative for the anti-war movement to build alliances with other grassroots organizations engaged in struggles for social and economic justice. Indeed, a severe weakness of North American anti-war movements has been their failure to make substantial connections with alter-globalization, anti-poverty, indigenous solidarity and other social justice movements across the globe.

Furthermore, an expanded understanding of imperialism must also include elite supremacy in developing countries who disproportionately benefit from globalization at the expense of impoverished masses in their countries. The discourse against imperialism usually considers developing countries as homogenous, ignoring class exploitation by the elite who invite Western domination on their lands for their self-interests. Strategies for promoting global peace and democracy, therefore, should demand accountability not only from the centers of imperialism, but also from the ruling elite classes worldwide. Ours is an age of exploitation of the poor by the rich both within and between countries.

Moreover, Gandhian philosophy redefines peace strategies as a holistic way of life that focuses on inner spiritual and moral development of human beings and promotes harmonious co-existence with Nature, while recognizing our shared humanity. A Gandhian approach to non-violent individual lifestyles that lead to non-violent societies and economies is imperative to creating non-violent states and a world order in which people do not perish in the name of economic growth. Peace cannot be just and sustainable unless we acknowledge and change the violence and inequities inherent in our own daily practices of consumption. The struggle against violence and imperialism, therefore, must begin at the individual or the micro level: it must encompass *a way of life* that resists excessive consumerism, materialism and warfare against Nature in its varied forms.

Finally, exclusionary tendencies within the anti-war movement have largely remained an unexplored arena. In the North American context, issues of racism within the movement simmer beneath the surface, despite their implications for broad-based mobilization. In an open letter,

Bloom et al. (2003) denounced racial dynamics and practices within the anti-war movement in the United States. Long-standing racial patterns of operating hinder the nurturance of the broadest possible long-term struggle against war at home and abroad, thereby impeding the attainment of social justice. Bloom et al observe that the perpetuation of racism within anti-war organizations takes many different forms: resistance by predominantly white organizations in sharing leadership with activists of color; the failure of predominantly white organizations to endorse or participate in anti-war activities sponsored by people of color groups; a discussion environment that excludes or belittles the contributions of activists and organizations of color; and disparaging or insensitive remarks by individuals, to name a few. These dynamics have alienated individuals and organizations of color and have undermined the forming of broad-based alliances.

After all, the greatest toll of repression, militarism and war is on people of color, both within North America and abroad. Following 9/11, the longstanding aggression against people of color has intensified in the name of an endless 'war on terror'. Overseas, that war is waged on Iraq, Afghanistan, the Philippines, Colombia, Puerto Rico and other nations of the 'Third World'. Inhabitants of these nations are viewed through a Eurocentric lens as alien demons, in order to rationalize their domination and destruction. At home, the state demonizes and criminalizes people of color in order to rationalize police abuse, brutality, harassment, and outrageous violation of privacy and human rights in the name of 'crime-fighting' and 'security'. Secret detention and deportation of immigrants without due process, racial profiling, incarceration and cutbacks of social services are all part of the same arsenal used by the state to repress people of color and obstruct their progress. Since people of color are war's principal targets, they have the greatest interest in halting the belligerence and militarization; as such, activists of color have politically astute perspectives and rich ideas to strengthen the peace movement. Mobilization against the war machine, as Bloom et al. (2003) assert, must encompass "the spectrum of needs, aspirations, goals, intellectual resources and colors of a multiracial, multinational and multilingual and multi-class mainstream" (para 14). Moreover, from a Gandhian standpoint, further research and examination about racism and other forms of exclusion – overt and subtle, witting and unwitting – that underlie foreign policies, globalized systems of capitalism is urgently required (see Hiranandani, 2010)

Concluding remarks:

More than a hundred years ago and in more than one way, Gandhi had predicted modernity's paradox of technological advancements and economic productivity on the one hand and the ruthless generation of misery in the form of increasing poverty and inequality, environmental degradation, and increasing alienation that provide breeding grounds for violent conflict and global wars. Gandhian thought has persistently furnished a critique of modernity and offered alternative visions for a peaceful human civilization. Gandhi was not anti-British or against any government; rather he was against untruth and injustice. This paper has posited that an expanded understanding of Gandhian philosophy exhorts us to re-examine our notions of non-violence and to adopt everyday practices of resistance to attain a just world order.

While peace and anti-war movements oppose mainly military hegemony of the centers of imperialism, Gandhian perspective compels us to re-visit and expand this framework: economic

and militaristic policies of rich countries are, after all, a manifestation of a widespread culture of materialism, accumulation by dispossession, and racism rooted in hegemonic capitalist ideologies. From a Gandhian standpoint, the violence of discrimination, oppression, thought-control and socio-economic exploitation, no matter how subtle, eventually degenerates into overt violence and aggression since organized violence is needed to maintain unjust systems. In order to ensure a peaceful society, it is imperative to examine and eliminate the underlying structural violence in the first instance. Peace cannot be sustained when the majority of people globally are forced to engage in a daily battle for food, water, shelter, and dignity. Social and economic equality is, therefore, key to a nonviolent and free society in Gandhian thought.

Indeed, Gandhian framework offers a powerful critique of the contradictions and ambiguities of Western Enlightenment and modernity that have been precursors to much of the colonial domination and imperialism. Gandhian thought can inform an alternative Enlightenment that interrogates the narrow focus of Western enlightenment on scientific technical rationality and ushers an era of regeneration of ethics and contemplation of our spirituality and interconnectedness with the rest of the Cosmos, which is pivotal to attaining long-term global peace. As Martin Luther King Jr. stated “if humanity is to progress, Gandhi is inescapable. His life, thought and action are inspired by the vision of a humanity evolving towards a world of peace and harmony. We may ignore him at our own risk” (quoted in Moradian & Whitehouse, 2000), p. 1). Gandhian approach is as relevant, and more so in contemporary anti-war and peace movements, as it was in India’s anti-colonial struggles in the first half of the twentieth century.

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Enabling positive contact: The challenges surrounding integrated, multicultural education in divided societies – the case of Sri Lanka

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ENABLING POSITIVE CONTACT: THE CHALLENGES SURROUNDING INTEGRATED, MULTICULTURAL EDUCATION IN DIVIDED SOCIETIES- THE CASE OF SRI LANKA

Abstract

Segregated education perpetuates existing inequalities, while creating new disparities for future generations. However, creating a fully integrated, multicultural, peaceful schooling environment is very challenging in most 'peaceful' nations, but is especially true for post-conflict countries. Several studies demonstrate that an educational environment which fosters contact between majority and minority students, result in a decreased level of prejudice towards the 'other' identity. While this finding is encouraging in implementing integrated education programmes, it alone is insufficient to address the numerous forms of discrimination that minority students face in various context-specific environments. This essay explores the complexity surrounding implementing inclusive, integrated education in a peaceful, co-operative, multicultural environment, by reviewing the gaps in previous empirical studies. To highlight the importance of context specificity, the case of post-conflict Sri Lanka is used to emphasize some of these contextual considerations that are often ignored when scrutinising the effectiveness of integrated, multicultural education.

Introduction

All children have a right to a primary and secondary education under the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948) and the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child (1989). However, in reality, many do not have access to education, especially in war torn and post-conflict nations (Bush & Saltarelli 2000). Furthermore, societal and structural inequalities further polarize the privileged from the underprivileged in many developed and developing nations (Davies 2004a). Therefore, segregating the underprivileged from the privileged (based on ethnic, linguistic or socio-economic grounds), further propels the societal deprivation of the underprivileged. Integrated, multicultural education aims at addressing these inequalities within a transformative educational pedagogy (La Belle & Ward 1994; Sleeter & Grant 1987; Davies 2004a; Brock-Utne 1999).

Integrated, (desegregated) education emerged during the civil rights movement in America, where segregated schooling resulted in glaring educational discrepancies between students of colour compared to white students (Irizarry 2009). Multicultural education aims at mitigating societal and structural inequalities of those from a minority background (La Belle & Ward 1994), by taking a social re-constructionist perspective (Sleeter & Grant 1987), and by using an empowerment approach towards societal transformation (Brock-Utne 1999). Therefore, it is logical to assume that multicultural education cannot take place in an enforced segregated environment, where majority and minority populations co-exist. However, it is important to investigate if integrated, multicultural education can enhance social cohesion in a peaceful schooling environment, especially in post-conflict nations, given its multiple challenges?

Education, (its reforms and policy) can be used to advocate peace, or as a tool to foster conflict and separatism (Davies 2004a; Bush & Saltarelli 2000), especially in the instruction of language, religion and history in post-conflict regions. Tawil and Harley (2004) refer to Gellner (1983), and state that the primary role of education as building nations. The authors propose that as the relationship between violence and the construction of a state shift, so would the relationship between schooling and violent conflict, as it was with the case of Sri Lanka (Davies 2004a), Bosnia-Herzegovina and Serbia (Quaynor 2011), among many others. Therefore, education paves the path for a specific national identity to be formed, and it may also reinforce existing social inequalities by either avoiding dealing with prejudice and abuse, which occurs directly or structurally.

Integrated, multicultural education and the contact hypothesis

The aim of integrated, multicultural education should be to provide an open, friendly, non-discriminatory environment to all students (from diverse backgrounds) in order to facilitate learning and academic achievement in an inclusive manner. The broader aims of integrated, multicultural education (especially in post-conflict societies, should be to create a society that can live together in peaceful co-operation and mutual understanding (Nieto & Bode 2008). The principle of transformation through integration utilizes the contact hypothesis popularized by Allport (1954). Contact theory asserts that prejudice is a result of ignorance about the 'other' identity, which is derived from unfamiliarity. Therefore, Allport states that intergroup contact will lead to positive, changed behaviour if: both parties have equal status and are represented in

equal numbers; work towards a common goal, while abstaining from competition; have prolonged contact with opportunities for friendship; and have the support of the governing authorities and the community.

Studies conducted on integrated, multicultural education demonstrated reduced prejudice towards the 'other' identity by utilizing the principles of co-operative, participatory learning as opposed to individualized, competitive models of learning (Slavin, 1983, 1985; Johnson et al. 1984). Similarly, Slavin's research claims that group work and participatory learning increases the academic achievement levels of students over individual, competitive models. A Jigsaw classroom¹ is an example of this, as it has the potential to demonstrate an optimum learning experience for positive contact between diverse students.

Integrated, multicultural education sometimes includes bilingual education, depending on the goals of the programme. The language of instruction is politicized in post-conflict settings, as it is often a reflection of societal divisiveness or privilege of a certain group (Heynemann & Todoric-Bebic 2000). Some examples would be the use of French instead of Arabic in Morocco or the use of English or French in some African countries, instead of their native language/s. Bilingual education in multicultural, divided societies should aim to promote social cohesion, integration and cultural understanding through learning in more than one language (Garcia 2009). The practical purpose of bilingual education falls into one or more of these three main categories:

- (i) to preserve a minority, native language and culture such as Māori in New Zealand (Spolskya 1989; Lourie 2011), preserving the indigenous Inuit in Canada (Wright & Taylor 1995);
- (ii) to integrate and immerse students who have migrated into a new land in the dominant language of that country; and
- (iii) to respect the linguistic heritage of other cultures who have a history of migration in a particular location. For example, French in Canada (Blake et al. 1981; Aboud & Sankar 2007), and Spanish in America (Wright & Tropp 2005), or Arabic in the occupied territories in the Middle East (Bekerman 2005).

The generalized findings indicate that student's short-term inter-ethnic experience of integrated bilingual education is positive, but their long-term integration and ethnic understanding is dependent on the wider environment consisting of teachers, parents, principals, the political environment, geographic region and its tensions (Bekerman 2005; Yablon 2009; Bekerman & McGlynn 2007). Within a post-conflict context, research on integrated schools in Northern Ireland focussed on education for co-existence and citizenship education in Catholic and Protestant segregated areas (Leonard 2007; McGlynn 2007; 2009b; Niens & Chastenay 2008).

It is important to note that the nature of the division in Northern Ireland is based on political divisions and historical war memories, rather than religious divisions. Even though research has indicated that 74% of parents in Northern Ireland prefer integrated schooling, currently more than 90% of the schools are segregated (Brown & Hewstone, 2005, p. 260), and integrated education only caters for 6% of the population (Ferguson, 2010, p. 53), therefore, the spill over benefits of integrated schooling are limited in Northern Ireland for the time being.

Most of the research conducted on integrated, multicultural education indicates that prejudice is

reduced as positive contact is increased for prolonged periods of time. However, it is important to examine the historical reality of negative contact when integration has been enforced through the rule of law to bridge the barriers in segregated societies. The explanations for societal segregation are complex and context specific, and the proceeding section highlights the importance of understanding the causes and complexities of segregation.

The context specificity of societal segregation and its impact on minority students

The education system in post-conflict Sri Lanka has been segregated along linguistic (which is inevitably ethnic) lines, in the years prior to independence in the 1948. There have, therefore, been very few opportunities for students to have inter-ethnic contact, further re-enforcing the generational spiral of division and prejudice between the Sinhalese and Tamil, specifically, Sinhalese Buddhist and Tamil Muslim people, in rural areas. As a general trend, many war-torn and post-conflict countries have segregated education systems, which continue to foster societal inequalities and ethnic stereotypes.

Globally, as social and structural segregation occurs at a civil society level, this is reflected in the schooling environment. Schools in each region face unique challenges, which reflect the wider societal issues and divisions faced by the civil society of that nation. Marginalization, social and educational exclusion of immigrant children are also experienced by their parents, and prejudice towards refugee and asylum seekers are plentiful in most developed nations, especially in the United Kingdom and in Europe (White 2010), where the majority of the native population feel threatened when the numbers of immigrants increase. Similarly, discrimination against Roma people have been widespread for centuries throughout Europe, and even after several years of legal desegregation, Roma children are still under segregated education systems in the Czech Republic, Greece, Croatia and Slovakia among other nations (Amnesty International 2013). Due to poverty and lack of parental education, Roma children do not have the early childhood care that many other children do, and are therefore schooled with students who have mild mental disabilities, while others are segregated into Roma-only schools which are separate from the mainstream schooling system (Mayer 2013), further isolating Roma from the mainstream population and depriving them of an equal education and equitable employment opportunities for generations.

Adverse reactions towards non-voluntary contact, (or negative contact), with 'other' identities is a historical phenomenon. For example, in America, Clark (1987) draws attention to the phenomena of racially motivated *white flight* (by relocation or enrolment in public schools) due to the desegregation of State schools. Furthermore, according to Reitz (1984), progress in the American economy has been "historically associated with Anglo conformity" Reitz (1984, p. 501), and therefore the race-based residential developments in Buffalo, further re-enforced Anglo dominated class structures, which precluded African Americans from opportunities such as access to private education, employment and decent housing.

Most of the literature surrounding the contact hypothesis fails to pay adequate attention to the negative effects of forced integration and therefore, it is insufficient in informing policy at a practical level. According to Pettigrew (1998), as experimental results support the contact hypothesis, some researchers make the short-sighted mistake of concluding that contact in itself will reduce prejudice and facilitate friendships, while societal inequalities remain unchanged,

such as in the Middle East (Salomon 2004). Therefore, in an educational environment, it is unlikely that short term positive contact will contribute to the long-term goal of achieving peaceful co-existence if the greater societal and structural inequalities are not mitigated simultaneously.

The preceding section provides a context specific example of how the British colonial hegemonic rule in Sri Lanka paved the path towards societal and educational segregation. Colonialism leads to a threatened sense of national identity (for the majority native population), which inevitably fosters an environment conducive to a separatist struggle with the marginalized, minority. This pattern is consistent in most post-conflict countries with a history of colonization.

Implications of a colonial past - educational segregation in Sri Lanka

Sri Lanka has a long history of colonization beginning with the Portuguese in 1505, the Dutch in 1658, and finally the British in 1796. The historically linguistically and ethnically segregated schooling environment can be attributed to divisions in identity created and utilized to govern the country during the period of British colonization, which was re-created by proceeding Sinhalese nationalistic governments after independence was granted in 1948. Sri Lanka's population is over 20 million, and over 74% identify as Sinhalese (of which over 70% are Buddhist), and just over 11% identify as Tamil, who's primary religion is Hindu, followed by Islam and Christianity. The remaining 19% of the population identify themselves as Indian Tamil, Sri Lankan Malay, Moor and Eurasian (Burgher) (Government of Sri Lanka 2010a; 2010b).

The societal and class divisions in Sri Lanka have been attributed to the British '*divide and rule*' policies, which permeated most vocations from the civil service to education. Most of these policies were aimed at managing the working classes. Ethnic and class divisions were useful distinctions in granting vocational privileges to the elite classes and to converted Christians. As a colony, English was enforced as the dominant language in schools, while the vernacular Sinhalese and Tamil were prohibited from being taught in Christian schools. Even to this day, there are older '*elite*' Sri Lankans who were raised under the colonial regime, who cannot read or write in Sinhalese or in Tamil.

The Christian missionary schools implemented the language policy of 1833, which instructed students solely in English, and therefore, those who attended Christian schools were educationally and vocationally privileged (Solomons & Moscardini 2008). According to Punchi (2001), under the British Administration, the education system was planned by creating fee-levied English medium schools (for the upper classes), and vernacular schools for children of lower to middle class families. The main purpose of the English medium schools were to produce civil service officers while the majority of the citizens were intended for manual labouring jobs. The divisive system, (managed by a select elite sector of society), successfully prevented the majority of the population from learning English. The exclusive linguistic and religious policies disenfranchised most of the working class of Sri Lanka, who identified as Sinhalese, Buddhist at the time.

According to Wilson (2000), Christian missionaries concentrated their activities and set up schools in predominantly Tamil areas, therefore disproportionately benefiting Tamil people over Sinhalese. Consequently, most Sinhalese, Buddhists had little opportunity to progress within the colonial patronage system as did Christians, who were predominantly Tamil and Burghers (Solomons & Moscardini 2008). Subsequently, after independence was granted in 1948, Sri Lanka underwent its first nationalization policies. The policies restricted Tamil representation in politics and in the civil service. In 1956, Sinhala was made the official national language and Buddhism the national religion, failing to give recognition to Tamil. The restrictive policies, lack of employment opportunities (especially in the civil service), and the district race-based quota system for university entrance (which restricted Tamil enrolment in universities in specific regions), gave rise to the separatist militant group Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) in the late 1970s.

The Northern and Eastern province of Sri Lanka was administered by the LTTE for a number of years, and therefore the children of the North and the East were victimized by the civil war. The thirty year violent conflict between the LTTE and the Government of Sri Lanka (GoSL), prevented essential infrastructure and developmental resources which were needed to run successful schools, therefore the academic achievement level was lowest in the Northern and the Eastern provinces (World Bank 2005). Children were also subject to forced recruitment into the LTTE as child soldiers, and most teenagers had to leave school to support their families financially. Therefore, currently, most of the Tamil survivors of the North and East are predominantly employable in labouring or trade vocations due to an interrupted education during the war. Of course, many children in these areas lost their lives along with their family (Bush & Saltarelli 2000).

A linguistically segregated schooling system further perpetuates divisions along ethnic lines (Bastian 1999; Colenso 2005). Colenso (2005, p. 423) states that from data collected prior to 2005, less than 1% of schools were bilingual (teaching in both Sinhalese and Tamil), with few joint extra curricular activities, and primarily segregated teacher training. Furthermore, schools were given very few resources, training and incentives to integrate values of peace and morality into educational activities. Segregated schooling systems are common in divided societies, and are responsible for further perpetuating societal inequalities and divisions through exclusion (Niens 2009). This is confirmed by a survey conducted by the World Bank in 2004, where 18% of students claimed to have had little or no opportunities of learning a second national language, and this figure rises to 61% in the Northern-Eastern province (World Bank 2005, p. 88).

Since 2001, selected schools across Sri Lanka have introduced an English medium for students to undertake all subjects (except for vernaculars) from the year in which they sit their Ordinary Level examination (at approximately 15-16 years of age). The implementation of an English medium and the establishment of bilingual public schools throughout Sri Lanka provides an opportunity for schools to engage in integrated, multicultural education for the first time in the recent turn of the century. One of the main challenges in increasing the number of bilingual and English medium schools is the shortage of skilled teachers who can effectively teach in English as well as Sinhalese and/or Tamil (Karunakaran 2011). Therefore not all bilingual programmes provide quality teaching. While integrated education (in a multicultural environment) has been taking place for many decades in Sri Lankan international schools, these schools are reserved for

children of ex-pats, international exchange students and wealthy local students from higher socio-economic backgrounds. Most international schools are located in metropolitan cities such as Colombo and Kandy, and due to their privileged nature, do not represent a realistic blueprint for integrated education that can be implemented in public schools. However, it would be extremely valuable to investigate the approaches to integration and multiculturalism within international schools, and to evaluate the applicability of these teaching methods in a public schooling environment.

The next section attempts to articulate the challenges in mainstreaming integrated education in Sri Lanka while maintaining a peaceful schooling environment. Most of the literature on multicultural education fails to recognise the context specific challenges that post-conflict nations experience with desegregation. The literature also falls short in recognising practical barriers towards maintaining a harmonious, peaceful environment, when the external, contextual environment is ridden with contradictions of cultural and structural violence.

The boundaries of a peaceful school

What is a peaceful school? Is it a school, which operates peacefully within a non-turbulent environment, or a school, which decides to mitigate existing inequalities within a turbulent environment? There are several external environmental calamities in Sri Lanka (social, political and environmental), which have a negative impact on communities. Recent attacks on Muslim shops by Buddhist nationalists and some clergy (Strathern 2013; BBC 2013) have polarized communities further on religious and ethnic grounds, mostly in rural areas. If attitudes of racism, prejudice and violence is rife in the community, and possibly in the household, students are inevitably forced to witness acts of violence against 'outsiders' and in some cases, forced to join violent rallies by friends and family members. There are several very difficult issues that are pertinent for a rural school attempting at integrating Tamil (mostly Hindu, Muslim and Christian) and Sinhalese (mostly Buddhist and Christian) students in an environment that fosters mutual understanding and an appreciation for diversity.

Research within the Occupied territories in the Middle East (Salomon 2003; Beckerman 2005), have indicated that attempts at integrated education is futile if the external socio-political environment is an environment of oppression and violence. In fact, the school environment can and will mirror the external environment of violence. Therefore, it is important to note the impact that the values, attitudes and actions of civil society, the neighbourhood community and family have on the possibility of fostering a peaceful, integrated schooling environment.

What is to be taught and how?

How can integrated, multicultural education achieve its goals of building collaborative relationships while progressing academic achievement, not to mention social transformation? Countless amounts of literature have been devoted to listing a plethora of idealistic, morally transformative behavioural aims, which students should aspire to achieve and teachers should aspire to emulate and teach. Grossman (2008) lists eight main citizenship values (amalgamated from the literature) which multicultural education aims to address:

- “the ability to look at and approach problems as a member of a global society.
- The ability to work with others in a co-operative way and to take responsibility for one’s roles/duties within society.
- The ability to understand, accept and tolerate cultural differences.
- The capacity to think in a critical and systemic way.
- The willingness to resolve conflict in a non-violent manner.
- The willingness to change one’s lifestyle and consumption habits to protect the environment.
- The ability to be sensitive towards and to defend human rights (e.g. the rights of women, ethnic minorities, etc.).
- The willingness and ability to participate in politics at the local, national and international levels” (p. 41).

Needless to say, there are variations in the degree of importance of these citizenship values, for example, the desire to resolve conflict in a non-violent manner should take precedence over the willingness to participate in politics, which is the sole choice of the individual concerned. Therefore, it must be noted that broad, holistic educational aims with little critique of their applicability is of little value in terms of implementing educational policies. In contrast, Agada (1998) proposes dialogue based teaching techniques that encourage reflective, critical thinking in the student and in the teacher, by questioning the dominant paradigms that influence perspectives, group norms and stereotypes. However, research has indicated that avoiding discussing sensitive issues related to the conflict is common in most post-conflict regions such as Northern Ireland (McGlynn 2011), the Middle East (Bekerman 2005), Rwanda (Freedman et al. 2008; Quaynor 2011), amongst many others.

Furthermore, authoritative governments have complete control over how the syllabus is taught, for example, the Rwandan government instructed teachers to teach that the genocide was a result of colonialism rather than a reaction to ethnicity (Quaynor 2011). Alongside the ability to freely discuss contested issues, the teaching of history and the dominant narratives in textbooks is an important determinant to the effectiveness of integrated, multicultural education in post-conflict nations. In Bosnia-Herzegovina and Serbia, textbooks stressed loyalty to ethnic identity over peace education (Quaynor 2011). Similarly, national identity and the struggle for independence were prominent in textbooks from South Africa and Mozambique which stressed the importance of African countries having the freedom to determine their own destiny over individual human rights (Quaynor 2011).

In Sri Lanka, educational segregation coupled with divisive textbooks contributed to the civil war. Tamils were portrayed as invaders, and the narratives of national heroes were chosen on the basis of a victorious defeat of Tamils (Heynemann and Todoric-Bebic 2000). The indoctrinated discourse of textbooks in Sri Lanka had a role to play in promoting the Sinhalese nationalist policies, which inevitably led to a Tamil separatist movement.

Teaching history in post-conflict countries is surrounded by many context-specific complexities, especially after a civil war. How can atrocities about human rights abuses and genocide be communicated, let alone taught in an impartial manner, where civil society views and historical narratives are divided? While this essay does not focus on the method of teaching, a moral

approach to teaching is proposed, which does not re-enforce societal divisions, by not critically questioning the morality and tone of the text (McCully 2010). In Sri Lanka, the military victory over the LTTE is glorified, especially as the notion of peace was often challenged as a means of supporting a separatist struggle. The armed forces are honoured as war heroes and any attempts at addressing the human rights violations carried out by the government or the armed forces is not tolerated. State-led violence is legitimized so far as it protects the sovereignty of Sri Lanka, which brings further challenges in teaching the implications of violence throughout history. It also brings further challenges to teaching the importance of alternative, non-violent methods of conflict resolution within the mainstream education system.

Individual inequalities, which are difficult to address

Education generates and reflects inequalities globally, and most countries (developed and developing) have regional developmental disparities in the resources devoted to schooling. The performance and aptitude of most students is a reflection of their level of personal privilege in society. Students whose parents are teachers or experts in an area often excel academically over their colleagues. Students who are in poverty, victims or witnesses to domestic violence, are discriminated or bullied in school, or have a handicap or a physical impairment, find it more challenging to excel in academic life. In fact, there have been many cases of stress related student suicides globally, which do not factor in most multicultural educational literature or in civic educational research, which is used to inform policy. There are several psychological programmes in Sri Lankan schools for students who lost family members as a result of the civil war, but what is the extent and efficacy of this support? In an authoritarian system, while the legal framework of human rights education is integrated into the syllabus, actually making a public claim against State will probably result in a physical threat to the student in the best of circumstances.

Should a peaceful school have defined boundaries if it aims to transform society within an emancipatory framework, and challenge the existing societal structures of violence? A very difficult question for the leadership of schools is to consider the extent that a school should be involved in a student's personal life or in their home environment. In cases of reported physical abuse, the state protection mechanism is enforced, but what is the quality of support the student receives? These are difficult questions to ponder when implementing an integrated, multicultural educational programme. Not all minority students experience discrimination and integration is not the solution to all the problems faced by some students. Therefore, creating a peaceful schooling environment has global, regional and local structural challenges. A school can however, work towards mitigating direct violence and harm inside the school environment. The abolishment of corporal punishment in most countries is an achievement in the right direction.

Conclusion

This essay has demonstrated some of the context-specific challenges of implementing integrated, multicultural education in post-conflict nations. First, as demonstrated in Sri Lanka, contested values about the glorification of war, is a huge impediment in maintaining a culture of peace within a schooling environment, even through desegregation. Secondly, multicultural education utilizes an emancipatory framework, in order to mitigate societal inequalities. If the dominant

narrative of a nation glorifies those who were victorious at war, rather than the civilian victims of war, the result of multicultural education will be superficial, as it will fail to instill aspects of civic or moral education that is vital for societal transformation. Third, there are many levels of societal and structural inequalities that would lead to educational inequalities, especially in rural schools. Therefore, not all children will have an equal opportunity at gaining an education, and rural, poor, minority students may undergo various levels of oppression and discrimination depending on their identity (or imputed identity), than would students who have access to education in metropolitan areas of privilege.

However, education does have a significant role to play in terms of reducing prejudice and discrimination by creating an environment of positive inter-ethnic contact. The style of teaching and leadership in the school is paramount for fostering an inclusive environment, which enables critical thinking and learning. Scenarios of participatory group learning can be facilitated in almost all subjects, but the level of dialogue or discussion-based teaching will vary according to the subject matter and the goals in the syllabus. As Agada (1998) asserts, co-operative learning strategies could empower students to understand and relate to different perspectives within a multicultural society.

Notes

1. Jigsaw classrooms emphasize collective learning through collaboration, instead of competitiveness by mixing students and facilitate learning by striving for common goals.

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The Unacquainted: Oppression of a Townie

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THE UNAQUAINTED: OPPRESSION OF A TOWNIE

While I was in school
Discoveries were made
By accident and sagacity
Of the little things
I was not in quest of.
My favorite occasion
Was to wake each morning
To a certain air
Of alienated splendor
Carried by a wave
Of soul-crushing surrender.
Thrashing with self-scrutiny
Navigating the vast repressive webbing
I continually sought
The abstract plans for
Overcoming my “townie” status.
Whether chosen, forced, necessary, or desired
The townie is best known
As a one-dimensional
Unassuming simpleton
Always subject to
Facts being blurred by fiction.
You’d think that making my self at home

Within an “alien world”
Would be within my talents
Since I had been practicing it
Daily and nightly
For many years
One could say I had many classrooms.
However, without a shadow of a doubt
I wallowed in retrospect
Attempting to steer clear of
The sharp peaks and edges
Of townie style oppression.
When feelings of inadequacy
Summoned a lively bolt
My solution was retreat
One of my grad peers said it best
I reminded him of
A free-minded Nietzschean cat.
“This cat creates the nature
Of all existing creatures
She walks patiently,
Seems to not care
About the people around her
And never comes close to anyone.
Yes, a free-minded Nietzschean cat;
She is the ghost,
Like a scent,
Or a silhouette,
Never to be heard from again.”
The truth was that
My soul consisted of multiple identities
And the only place
I seemed to belong
Was to the world and yet
I wanted to speak from,
And sometimes only about,
The harsh condition of seclusion.
I experienced a loss of visibility
But as a “shy” person
Invisibility was enjoyable at first
Because knowledge of my everyday life
Was unimportant.
Over time however
Invisibility translated into
A state of non-personhood,
Where waves of conversation
Crest and broke over my head

Rendering my voice inaudible
And deafening
Like a thunderous tide gushing in.
My interests became invalid
What mattered least
Was what I needed
And everything said or done
Was terribly wrong
In need of correction.
The gift of acceptance
Meant for every individual
Was not, according to some
Meant for me.
Somehow I expected
This experience would be different
I never believed
I would lose confidence in
Everything about myself
That I valued.
But facts blurred by fiction
Has never been something
Meant to inform anyone
About anything in me
That is beyond question.