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Why Security Needs Liberty

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WHY SECURITY NEEDS LIBERTY (Essay)

Abstract

A tentative non-legal essay on the broad reasons why the United States ought to give apparent “terrorists” the same basic rights it extends to its most “upstanding” citizens.

The “hyperreality” of what was until recently officially referred to as the “War on Terror” should be obvious, by now. For one thing, there is its quasi-metaphysical dimension as a conflict that could evade definite physical boundaries of both place and time (Wittes, 2008, p. 50; Yoo, 2003, p. 429)—a notion from which the Obama administration’s rhetoric is only now beginning to shy away. And, then, there is its exaggerated simulation of the very notion of “war,” with dramatic new norms of brutality—between “enemy combatants” (another *verbum non gratum* of President Obama’s mere rhetoric) on one side making a spectacle of murdering civilians, and on the other side making a mystery of their own “harsh” techniques. (For an examination of the irregular status of CIA operatives under the international laws of war in particular, see, e.g., Burt & Wagner, 2012.)

But some “philosophical” implications of these notions have seldom been examined. For example, while it may be inherently more difficult to distinguish between “enemy combatants” and civilians (and thus easier to “invent” new enemy combatants—by designation or by inspiration), what should we make of the fact that the disappearance of traditional conflict boundaries may also have entailed the blurring of identities between the conflicting parties? After all, homegrown jihadists—however rare—have been a source of some concern in the United States, Great Britain and other Western nations.

Identifying in any way with a declared enemy is bound to make people feel uncomfortable, to say the least. And, beyond that, some might argue that doing so (“empathizing with evil,” as they might describe it) would be dangerous and fundamentally immoral. On the one hand, it might seem too short a step to delegitimizing one’s own self-interest: it might be seen as a projection of weakness and experienced as an abdication of self-respect (see Gelven, 1994, pp. 122-123). (And perhaps for a subset of people the same should be said of “appeasing” the enemy’s less violent supporters.) On the other hand, for all the U.S. forces’ “harsh” techniques in the War on Terror, arguably, the fact that organizations such as Al Qaeda acknowledge that they *specifically* and systematically intend to target civilians is sufficient to dissolve all moral equivalence between the parties. U.S. drone attacks, for instance, may well kill civilians; however, that is not what the United States acknowledges to be its specific intent in carrying them out. (For another example: specific intent seems essential to the difference between a suicide attack and a suicide mission.) And then perhaps some could argue even further that making a mystery of one’s own brutality is somehow inherently less immoral (or at least less “indecent”) than making a spectacle of it.

That said, arguably also, the methods of Al Qaeda or any other group still do not “therefore” necessarily provide an acceptable (retaliatory or other) basis for the United States’ extrajudicial drone attacks or other “harsh” practices. Some might insist that, given their methods, the organizations’ members and sympathizers deserve to be stigmatized as enemies in the most radical or primitive sense; enemies in a war that one might describe as “the ultimate acknowledgement of not living in a shared community and having shared values” (Luban, 2005, p. 225). In other words, some might be morally tempted to treat the members and sympathizers of Al Qaeda and similar organizations as the ultimate “other,” just the kind of “monsters” who could plan and celebrate the horrors of 9/11. However, in response, it might be appropriate to recall for a moment Friedrich Nietzsche’s (1989) warning that: “whoever fights monsters should see to it that in the process he does not become a monster” (p. 89). And here the meaning of this warning would not merely be to question the moral justification for *retaliating* against brutality with brutality, or to compare the terrorists’ techniques with those of U.S. forces in degree of brutality; rather, a more fundamental question would ask independently whether U.S. counterterrorism—i.e., going to the “dark side,” as former Vice-President Cheney famously put it, or letting the “gloves come off,” as one former CIA Counterterrorism Director less-famously put it (National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the U.S., 2004)—has put the American identity at risk.

The American identity is at risk, as suggested earlier, first and foremost because of the dimensions of the War on Terror as a conflict without definite boundaries of place—which may confront the United States with a dilemma: either to risk importing some of the alienating practices of its foreign wars into its domestic policy (i.e., into its relationship with U.S. persons), or, instead, to risk exporting some of the enfranchising characteristics of its domestic policy into its foreign wars. Advocates of the former option may seem to include at least to some extent President Obama, who, in recently justifying the extrajudicial targeted killing of U.S. citizens such as Anwar Al Awlaqi (Department of Justice, n.d.), seems to have reaffirmed the strongest interpretation of former Bush administration lawyer John Yoo’s argument that “the government may reduce the individual liberties of even citizens in order to more effectively fight” wars—because it should place “the interest in effectively waging war first” (Ku & Yoo, 2006, p. 218).

Perhaps some might see this last argument for the primacy of military effectiveness (or of “national security”, more generally) as simple “common sense,” especially if the concept of “liberties” evokes in their minds some general value equivalent of an interest in physical freedom from imprisonment (forgetting that when it comes to targeted killings at least, what is at stake is also the security of the few). Surely, most people naturally consider death worse than imprisonment. This “common sense” is reflected as much in the American legal system, where sentences of life imprisonment are ordinarily considered less severe than the death penalty, as in international humanitarian law, which “allows intentional lethal force only when necessary to protect against a threat to life, and where there are ‘no other means, such as capture or non-lethal incapacitation, of preventing that threat to life’” (Cavallaro & Sonnenberg, 2012, p. 131). The basis for this can be seen simply as a brute fact of ordinary subjective preferences, or more “objectively” (and more interestingly for our purposes) as an implication of reasoning such as that “without physical security there is likely to be very little liberty” (Posner, 2006, pp. 9, 47)—or, alternatively, that, whereas the taking of a life by mistake must always cause totally irreparable harm to its victim, taking one’s physical liberty or comfort needs not (since, in the latter case, some relief, however limited, remains possible, in principle). (But compare Redish & McNamara, 2010, p. 1401; Cole, 2004, pp. 1791-1792.)

Even so, the degree to which such “objective” reasoning might need to be limited could reveal a second, more “extraordinary” way in which the American identity is at risk in the War on Terror (or in any war, for that matter). For one thing, regardless of time or place, concerns with security must always be constrained by concerns with the risk of paranoia or the cost of panic—that is, with the possibility that one’s focus on security might sometimes become pathological or otherwise inherently counterproductive. But other similar risks are especially pertinent to the spatial and temporal characteristics of “national security” issues. In particular, there is the kind of risk associated with Benjamin Franklin’s (1818) remark (strictly interpreted) that “those who give up essential liberty to purchase a little *temporary* safety deserve neither liberty nor safety” (p. 142). In other words, on one level of interpretation, there is the possibility that importing the alienating traits of war into domestic policy, even on the basis of an emergency (thereby violating the liberty of U.S. persons supposedly for a limited time in order to save that very same liberty—also for a limited time), might be counterproductive for both safety and liberty in the long run. And, then, on a stronger interpretation, even if short-term security measures could somehow be “justified” for the sake of longer-lasting (or even *permanent*) security, it could still remain that indefinite or permanent suspensions of “essential” liberty would be unacceptable—perhaps as too alien or even debasing. This would be the second way in which the American identity might be at risk in narrowly prioritizing “national security.”

Under this view, we should probably interpret “essential” liberty as *at least* a little bit more than a casual interest in physical liberty from imprisonment. For example, we could say that “essential” liberty refers (at least in part) to the more fundamental question of freedom of choice—so that we could logically maintain that even when imposing death on a person (by removing all future opportunity for choice) is worse treatment than imprisoning her, she could still perhaps rationally prefer choosing death (by creating a special opportunity for choice) to being imprisoned under some circumstances.

At this point, one question could be whether this means that any significant number of Americans really should see meeting the standard of “essential liberty” as essential enough to their identity that they would find it worth dying for under relevant circumstances—perhaps, indeed, as a matter of self-respect (compare Gelven, 1994, p. 267). If so, then, for better or worse, recognizing this should make it a little bit trickier for them (*ceteris paribus*) not to identify at least a tiny bit more with their “suicidal” enemies in the War on Terror (at least prior to raising any question about moral equivalence).

We might find such persons, for example (though perhaps paradoxically), in the U.S. military—which, in order to justify its recruits’ service to the nation and to secure their commitment to the institution, continually “indoctrinates” them by appeal to ideals of liberty defined by both democracy and self-sacrifice (see, e.g., Hartle, 2004, p. 77). This should further suggest that “essential liberty” does not refer to a “selfish” freedom to do as any individual (U.S. soldier especially) pleases but rather to the independence or autonomy of (*at least*) fellow citizens—the kind of presumptive respect for the “equality and dignity of others” that is required for “democratic self-rule” in the United States (see Cole & Lobel, 2007, p. 201; Cole, 2007, pp. 1735-1737, 1745-1747, 1751; Cole, 2003, p. 2567; Holmes, 1996, pp. 196, 264).

There is a degree to which we should reasonably expect this kind of doctrinal or ideological reinforcement to create sincere behavioral commitments (see Jost et al., 2009, p. 309), especially since its narrative is aimed primarily at U.S. persons—members of the military, potential recruits and their communities (as opposed to being a mere “bluff” aimed at potential enemies). If so, then, just as former Vice-President Cheney insisted (with some backing in public opinion) that internal criticisms of his administration’s war policies could hurt troop morale (Cillizza & Slevin, 2005), even hawks should also recognize that troop morale could be hurt if the U.S. government became increasingly identified with arbitrary force instead of “liberty.”

Moreover, this ideological concern should have been especially relevant in the War on Terror—given not just its spatial dimension but also its temporal dimension (notwithstanding recent calls for winding down the “war” effort against Al Qaeda specifically). Indeed, the “threat of terrorist attack is not a short-term phenomenon requiring temporary sacrifices, with the promise of an eventual return to normalcy, but a long-term condition;” meaning that it becomes “all the more important that [the U.S.] adopt means for addressing [it] that are consistent with [the nation’s] deepest principles” (Cole, 2006; Cole, 2004, p. 1774).

It turns out, more generally, that taking the potential influence of ideologies seriously can be especially helpful in making sense of a number of otherwise-puzzling facts about this new “condition.” For example, consider, on the one hand, how it can help justify at least looking for the potential political conditions or causes that may trigger the jihadists’ suicide terrorism, instead of hastily dismissing such practice as *a priori* irrational (which could be strategically misleading). And, perhaps more importantly, on the other hand, it can help make sense of the United States’ own seemingly “irrational” (or disproportionate) reaction to terrorist attacks. Specifically, consider the fact that, though the War on Terror might seem “metaphysical” in one sense, or might put U.S. identity at risk in another, still it is not *really* an existential war—because of the relative infrequency and relatively-low historical death tolls of terrorist attacks, plus the truly insignificant chance of terrorists ever acquiring *and successfully using* powerful

nuclear weapons (see Jackson, 2005, pp. 92-93; Muller, 2008, pp. 32-44). Given this fact, we might logically expect the U.S. government to be more concerned with, say, highway safety—which claims over 30,000 domestic lives every year, compared with less than 3,500 domestic deaths in terrorist attacks since 9/11, yet receives a budget of less than \$1 billion, compared with, say, the Department of Homeland Security’s counterterrorism budget of \$35 billion (see National Highway Traffic Safety Administration; Kramer & Hellman, 2013). Or consider the contrast in media coverage between the recent Boston marathon bombing (three deaths and 144 injuries) and the West Fertilizer Co plant explosion (fourteen deaths and 200 injuries) (Levs & Plott, 2013; Holland, 2013). Do these discrepancies suggest that U.S. institutions react irrationally (i.e., perhaps as a result of panic or paranoia), or, in the alternative, that their preferences are not accurately described by “utilitarian bioethics,” so to speak? In other words, it seems that, in order to maintain a very basic “rationalist” explanation for the high priority the United States gives to counterterrorism, we might have to interpret that response not so much as a physical security issue, but more as an ideological security issue. In other words, we might have to assume that terrorist attacks matter more than highway or industrial safety because terrorists issue an ideological challenge—they threaten a way of life, a set of symbols, or a public order that is fundamental to the political identity that Americans share (see Waldron, 2006, pp. 454, 463, 497, 501).

This is perhaps the sense in which we might also make sense of Bruce Ackerman’s (2006) concept of “effective sovereignty”—which finds its concern in the government’s control over basic homeland security (pp. 21, 42) or, as others might put it, in “the confidence placed in [the] organized authority” of the state (Wedgwood, 2002, p. 328). In this sense, however, the flip side of “effective sovereignty” would be a concern that the state’s violations of its own fundamental principles (principles such as essential liberty) might equally undermine the confidence placed in it.

What is more, many theorists insist that the fundamental principle of presumptive respect for essential liberty regards not only the independence or autonomy of other Americans but also that of fellow human beings in foreign countries—i.e., it refers to “universalistic values” (see Holmes, 1996, p. 264). After all, as Alexis de Tocqueville (2000) noted two centuries ago, the United States’ founding principle of minority rights, for example (however inconsistently applied), derives its authority, not from the “sovereignty of the people” (nor merely from the strategic recognition of the impermanence of majorities within the American democratic system), but rather from the “sovereignty of the human race” (pp. 227, 230, 240, 246-248)—hence, when he alludes to the risk that a great people could debase its character through majority tyranny, he must be speaking not just of internal minorities but of universal rights.

Some might insist on limiting the concept of political “minority” to speaking only of persons with “strong U.S. connections,” on the assumption that only such persons might bear the risk of abuse for “partisan purposes” (see Heymann & Kayyem, 2004, p. 18). However, this assumption is very weak, considering how easily we can imagine an American president attacking a weak foreign country recklessly (or based on shoddy intelligence) as a way of scoring short-term “partisan” political points at home. In such a case, would we not appropriately refer to the population of that country as a distant political minority—meaning, as a set of persons with little or no voice in the American political process in spite of their special vulnerability to inequitable

treatment (based on the fact that attacking them might seem to increase American security without putting American liberty at risk)? (Compare Holmes, 2009, pp. 316, 343; Cole & Lobel, 2007, pp. 27, 37; Cole, 2007, pp. 1745n, 1749; Cole, 2002, pp. 957, 981).

Of course, there is a degree to which any government must by definition make its citizens a priority—if not by virtue of the practical implications of statehood, then at least by virtue of the ideological implications of nationhood. However, this fact needs not carry the implications that some might think. For example, one could argue that foreign suspects need pose “no greater danger to the United States than a citizen who is a suspected terrorist,” and that “neither the liberty nor the security side of the equation varies with the passport or location” of the suspect (Cole, 2007, pp. 1745n). Some might imagine that foreign suspects always pose a greater potential danger to the United States than U.S. nationals simply by virtue of, say, presumably having a greater ability to hide (and to be protected) in foreign jurisdictions. However, clearly citizen enemies are sometimes given shelter by their foreign allies as well, and, under those circumstances, they arguably pose an even greater threat than foreign nationals (say, because of their familiarity with the country, or their ability to infiltrate it). This was the case with Anwar Al Awlaki, some counterterrorism experts argue. Accused of plotting attacks against the United States from Yemen—where he was killed by a CIA drone in 2011—Al Awlaki was probably a high-value target not *really* because he was any kind of “senior leader” of Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (which arguably he was not) but rather because he was “uniquely positioned to threaten the United States,” *specifically* by virtue of being a U.S. citizen (see Fishman & Mudd, 2012).

On the other hand, it remains true that foreign citizens abroad stand, by definition, outside the “American social compact” (Wittes, 2008, pp. 114-115). They clearly fail to “earn” American protections in any way, since they are not required to observe the duties of American residence or citizenship (although one should point out that, by legal convention, most Americans “earn” those protections automatically from the accident of birth). Moreover, foreign citizens abroad are subject to the duties of other citizenships and the jurisdiction of other sovereigns, such that any claim by the United States to unilaterally “guaranteeing” them U.S. rights would be imprudent or meaningless. Therefore, we might conclude, while the “sovereignty of the people” may not rule *unconditionally* over the “sovereignty of the human race,” still, from any government’s perspective, it must *ultimately* rule.

Nevertheless, the relevant ideological distinction between nationality and alienage, in general, is arguably not so much a matter of basic rights (besides voting, for instance) as it is a matter of exclusive guarantees and privileges. Thus, for example, while it might be imprudent or meaningless for the United States to unilaterally “guarantee” (in the strongest sense of the word) the safety and liberty of foreign citizens abroad, still it might be essential that the United States at least not deny the safety and liberty of those people.

In sum, we can conclude that even the foreign conduct of the War on Terror should be expected to put at stake, in the long run, the moral legitimacy of the United States not just in the eyes of those “others” whose fellow community members are routinely and extra-judicially targeted as terrorists but also in the eyes of Americans themselves (and American soldiers in particular). In this sense, presumptive respect for the essential liberty of others abroad should be understood as

a fairly direct yet perhaps badly underestimated factor of national morale over time—and thus as an indirect factor of national insecurity, beyond provoked and unprovoked external threats (compare Holmes, 2009, pp. 313, 332). And, perhaps in some cases, the failure to recognize the importance of this factor is likely to result, for better or worse, in the actions of individuals such as Daniel Ellsberg and Bradley Manning.

Given the rarity of such actions, some might still doubt the ambition of the kind of analysis (of identity into security) provided in this essay. However, this would miss the point. The real test of the approach provided here would not really be the extent to which more information is leaked or reported about the United States' failures to meet its own declared moral standards. In fact, such failures often become public knowledge. The problem is often rather that they are not publicly recognized as such, often because they are improperly framed through both implicit and explicit, general and specific self-defense rationalizations—which, as Mark Brandon (2005) has noted, can in fact render claims of living up to the American ideal non-falsifiable. In fact, the fickle underlying nature of rationalizations might help explain the inconsistency of current American public attitudes toward indefinite detentions, on the one hand, and targeted killings, on the other (see Cohen, 2012). Instead, the test of the approach provided in this essay should be the extent to which the demands of the American ideal can be—as hinted earlier—invoked (and faced) independently of the kind of questions of retaliation and comparison that enable quasi-ideological self-defense rationalizations.

In any case, the point of this analysis is certainly not to suggest that the United States needs always err on the side of protecting just anyone's physical or moral integrity more than it protects the physical integrity of the majority of its population. Rather, at the very least, the point is simply to suggest that any focus on America's physical integrity that does not also strive to maintain America's moral integrity (in the form of a minimal degree of respect for universal liberty) might be inherently counterproductive to a degree that remains troublingly undefined.

There are, nonetheless, concrete institutional measures that the United States can take in its conflict with organizations like Al Qaeda to insure as much as reasonably possible against this perhaps-deceptively remote danger. Some of these measures are basically provided by the core requirements of due process—judicial by rule (for individualized checks and balances) and executive by exception, before or after the deprivation of any basic right, depending neither on the degree of prosecutorial certainty or the publicity given to any apparent terrorist but simply on the practical feasibility of judicial process. (Thus, for example, it might admittedly be difficult to provide *pre*-deprivation judicial due process in the heat of battle, or to an apparently-active terrorist hiding abroad and with no “next friend” in the United States.)

Granting all terrorist suspects their day in court as a rule would be no guarantee of treating them with moral integrity; however, it might be one of the United States' most significant institutional commitments to that end.

Finally, while there are even more basic *strategic* or pragmatic reasons why the liberty of even confirmed enemies or their supporters might sometimes be desirable—for instance, as both a means and an incentive to obtaining their cooperation against their more dangerous peers—these are not the focus of this essay.

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Drone Warfare: A Worldwide Terrorist Threat

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DRONE WARFARE: A WORLDWIDE TERRORIST THREAT (Essay)

Abstract

Drone warfare epitomizes U.S. war mongering around the world: We can kill anyone anywhere; it's right and just because we did it, and there is nothing you can do about it. The author uncovers hypocrisy, immorality, illegality, and a dangerous trajectory of technologically advanced weaponry inherent in the U.S. drone policy.

Hypocrisy

One of the most important moments in US diplomatic history regarding the use of force occurred in 1837 with follow-up proclamations continuing through the following decade. At this time, the United States was denouncing Great Britain for its cross border attack on the *Caroline*, a steamboat near Niagara Falls that was helping supply arms, ammunition, and volunteers to rebels leading an insurrection against the British in Canada. The rebels had garnered much support and sympathy from Americans, especially those along the border. The British, however, were aware of such support, and in December 1837 decided to attack the *Caroline* in U.S. territory. The attack resulted in the destruction of property and the assassination of American citizens on U.S. soil. United States Secretary of State, John Forsyth, reacted with 'the most painful emotions of surprise and regret,' and regarded the act as one that is 'subject of a demand for redress.' The British minister H.S. Fox replied to the incident by saying 'the destruction of the *Caroline* was an act of self-defense' – a claim the U.S. today is always quick to mimic. The U.S. minister in

London, Andrew Stevenson, demanded reparations, while Dan Webster of the State Department gave a thorough condemnation.

The act is of itself a wrong, and an offense to the sovereignty and the dignity of the United States, being a violation of their soil and territory – a wrong for which, to this day, no atonement, or even apology, has been made by Her Majesty's Government. (Yale Law School, 2008)

Webster followed up these remarks with support of the President of the United States.

[The Government of the United States] does not think that that transaction can be justified by any reasonable application of construction of the right of self-defence under the laws of nations ... the extent of this right [of self-defence] is a question to be judged by each particular case; and when its alleged exercise has led to the commission of hostile acts, within the territory of a power at peace, nothing less than a clear and absolute necessity can afford ground of justification. (Yale Law School, 2008)

Webster then proclaims the paramount phrase regarding the use of force later to be the basis of international law and the UN Charter. 'It will be for [Her Majesty's] Government to show a necessity of self-defence, **instant, overwhelming, leaving no choice of means, and no moment of deliberation**' (my emphasis). (Yale Law School, 2008)

While a noble principle, the United States would radically violate it by invading and annexing half of Mexico the following decade. Nevertheless, the U.S. made a credible and morally persuasive argument against the British attack.

Fast forward to today. Putting aside the much larger infringements of this principle, namely the aggression against Afghanistan and Iraq, let's draw our attention to the ongoing international drone assassination program.

As if taking words straight from 'Her Majesty's Government's' mouth, U.S. State Department legal advisor, Harold Koh, retorts 'the United States has the authority under international law, and the responsibility to its citizens, to use force, including lethal force, to' – wait for it – 'defend itself, including by targeting persons ... who are planning attacks.' (Hodge, 2010)

Using this logic, the British were right in attacking U.S. citizens. Or, to relate to current international affairs, Iran could attack Israel or the United States 'to defend itself' by assassinating Israeli and American officials 'who are planning attacks,' which is now hardly a secret. Maybe Harold Koh would argue for Pakistan or Afghanistan to 'use force, including lethal force' against the U.S. since they carry 'the responsibility to its citizens' to protect their country. Of course this is unthinkable. Refusing to be held to the same standards as others, especially one enunciated by the United States in the past is the definition of hypocrisy.

Immorality

Drone strikes, which have drastically escalated under President Obama, have killed somewhere between 3,000 and 4,700 people according to The Bureau of Investigative Journalism (TBII).

(The Bureau of Investigative Journalism, 2013) In February 2013, Senator Lindsey Graham, a supporter of the use of drones, acknowledged approvingly that ‘we’ve killed 4,700’ people and many ‘innocent people, and I hate that, but we’re at war.’ (Neuman, 2013) Out of this number, only two percent are high-level militants. The Center for a New American Security (CNAS), a conservative think tank, citing Pakistani sources, reports drone attacks in Pakistan ‘since early 2006 have killed around 14 militant leaders and more than 700 Pakistani civilians, or just over 50 civilians for every militant killed.’ (Fick, 2009) If the ratio is extrapolated across all areas affected by drones, over 4,000 civilians may have been killed. That is more than the number of deaths on September 11, 2001. This is what Obama’s nominee for CIA Director, John Brennan, calls ‘exceptional proficiency [and] precision’ with not ‘a single collateral death.’ (Kelley, 2013) The most conservative estimates from substantially unreliable sources like the Long War Journal and New America Foundation report ten percent and thirty-four percent, respectively, of those killed by drones in Pakistan (the most researched area impacted) were civilians. (Bergen & Tiedemann, 2009) (Roggio & Mayer, 2009) Doing the math and extrapolating the ten percent estimate with the TBIJ casualty report, around 470 civilians were killed by drones. That would be about 27 Sandy Hooks, 39 Aurora, Colorado shootings, or 31 Columbine shootings. Using the thirty-four percent estimate the numbers increase: around 1,598 civilian deaths, or about 532 Boston Marathon bombings. Not bad, they argue.

The unreliability of these conservative estimates stems from their acceptance of the U.S. government’s definition of militant: any military aged male in a strike zone. (Becker & Shane, 2012) Much of the American press uses the same definition (George Orwell would be impressed). Even using these conservative estimates, the utter disregard for the substantial loss of civilian life tells us a lot about our nation’s morals.

According to U.S. officials, the justification for the drone policy is to kill al-Qaeda militants, although we should not exclude ‘bombing low-level guys’ who may ‘deserve a Hellfire missile up their ass’ as the former National Security Council official, Roger Cressey, so eloquently phrased it. (Mayer, 2009)

Osama Bin Laden, the highest al-Qaeda militant, along with his family and close cohorts, didn’t get a Hellfire missile, but, instead received a more traditional assassination squad made up of Navy Seals who put bullets up their ass. Even though Bin Laden was unarmed and could easily have been captured to stand trial, the concept that the U.S. can assassinate at will anywhere in the world was too strong as Obama and his cabinet chose what we typically think of as a terrorist tactic – murder – rather than the rule of law. Reports and images of Americans celebrating in New York City circulated across the world. After all, it only took two invasions and a death toll of around a million people to finally kill the man thought to be responsible for the September 11 attack. Following the death of Bin Laden, investigative journalist Allan Nairn commented on the immorality of the assassination program.

Bin Laden is dead, but the world is still run by bin Ladens ... This was ... a big killer, the United States Government, killing another, someone who’s actually a smaller one, bin Laden. And the bin Laden doctrine that, to take out the CIA office that was at the World Trade Center, it’s OK to blow up the whole World Trade Center to teach Americans a lesson, it’s OK to slaughter thousands of Americans – that doctrine lives on in the

American White House, in the American Pentagon ... and in seats of authority all over the world. (Nairn, 2011)

Illegality

Dating back to the early thirteenth century, the Magna Carta has established fundamental rights that are at the core of modern western civilization. It was written in protest to King John of England's authority, particularly over civil liberties. The United States Bill of Rights and the concept of Habeas Corpus – the legal writ that requires a person under arrest to be brought before a judge or court – among other political and civil rights, stem from the ideas articulated in the Magna Carta.

Much of the Magna Carta has been forgotten – pushed off into Orwell's memory hole for its inconvenience. Half of the document dealt with 'the commons,' that is, resources that are shared by all. Any mention of the commons today – which will need to be seriously considered to stave off environmental disaster – is quickly disregarded as socialist demagoguery, and, likewise, not worth mentioning. Other parts of the Magna Carta, such as the concept of due process, still lives on albeit selectively. With the increase in the use of drones for assassination and use of indefinite detention by the most politically influential state in the world, the United States, we already see the most important amendments in the Bill of Rights, along with civil liberties articulated in the thirteenth century, going closer to the flames of our memory hole.

Almost every Tuesday, President Obama and a select panel of advisors such as political strategist David Axelrod and counterterrorism official John Brennan meet to decide who will die by a drone strike during the week. (Whitehead, 2012) (Sarah Palin may not have been too off base with the concept of death panels after all). Dubbed 'Terror Tuesday,' Obama and his advisors have the authority to choose victims off of a 'kill list' – excluding civilians that will inevitably be hit – without judicial oversight or due process. No evidence is needed to show how suspected militants are a threat that is 'instant, overwhelming, leaving no choice of means, and no moment of deliberation' against the United States. Indeed, if only two percent of those killed are high-level militants as evidence suggests, such an allegation is laughable if it weren't for its horrific consequences.

Shockingly, the only legal justification is a memo and verbal statements from U.S. officials saying it is legal. The logic works like this: Given that we did it, it follows that it is legal and legitimate. For example, a CIA spokesman told the New Yorker that the agency 'uses lawful, highly accurate, and effective tools and tactics to take the fight to Al Qaeda and its violent allies. That careful, precise approach has brought major success against a very dangerous and deadly enemy.' (Mayer, 2009) Paraphrased, they are saying 'we told you it is lawful and legitimate; what more evidence do you need?'

Rather puzzling is to hear denunciations of torture and indefinite detention while drone strikes are killing more than double the total number of prisoners held at Guantanamo Bay during both the Bush and Obama administrations combined. The argument seems to be torture and indefinite detention is objectionable and illegal, but killing, on the other hand, is laudable and legal. John Yoo, the attorney infamously known to justify torture during the Bush Administration, should be

kicking himself for not thinking of killing all the prisoners instead of merely justifying torture. Obama, a lawyer himself, learned the lesson: Just kill them and get it over with.

Prior to the 1990's numerous presidents had signed executive orders banning international and domestic assassination including Gerald Ford, Jimmy Carter, and Ronald Reagan. For example, Executive Order 12333 under President Reagan states 'no person employed by or acting on behalf of the United States Government shall engage in, or conspire to engage in, assassination.' (National Archives, 1981) During the Clinton Administration, the euphemism 'targeted killings' gained momentum among political and military leaders, especially those aligned with Israel, and arguments for its use against anyone the government describes as a 'terrorist' began making headway. (Former president of South Africa, Nelson Mandela, was only taken off of the 'terrorist list' in 2009 – luckily, he wasn't bombed). Yet, rhetorical opposition among U.S. officials to 'targeted killings,' particularly by Israel, existed through 2001. Even the American Ambassador to Israel, Martin Indyk, claimed 'the United States government is very clearly on record as against targeted assassinations ... They are extrajudicial killings, and we do not support that.' (O'Connell, 2012) In specific reference to drones, then CIA Director George Tenet is quoted as saying it would be 'a terrible mistake [for] the Director of Central Intelligence to fire a weapon like this.' So much for all of that.

International human rights law is fairly explicit in regard to assassination, or 'extrajudicial executions.' The Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the International Covenant of Civil and Political Rights explicitly protect the right to life, due process, and the rule of law. The U.N. special rapporteur on extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions, Philip Alston, was simply ignored by U.S. officials when he asked for a legal justification on the use of drones for assassination. The recently leaked memo to the National Broadcasting Company (NBC) attempts to justify how the authority of U.S. officials alone can be judge, jury, and executioner for citizens and non-citizens. (McClam, 2013) Just hours after President Obama's 2013 State of the Union Address, a drone strike was ordered in Kunar Province, Pakistan, killing four women, five children, and one man. The one man was reported to be the chief of staff to the governor in Kunar Province. (Queally, 2013) The United States is also guilty of bombing rescue workers and funeral mourners. Were 50 civilians who rushed to help those hit by a Hellfire missile an imminent threat to the United States? Was there no other option than to kill 20 civilians at a funeral? (Woods & Lamb, 2012) Numerous cases like these along with psychological trauma and terror in communities impacted begs the question: Is Obama and his administration going to be held legally responsible? This is a rhetorical question.

One more question to ponder regarding the legality of drones is much more revealing. If China was carrying out a drone assassination program against the United States, would all the current U.S. commentators, political and military strategists, and government officials come rallying to the legal defense of China? I think any honest individual can find a quick answer to that question: No. Such urgency to end Chinese drone strikes would cause the most extreme outrage and probably lead to large scale war. I am willing to bet Chinese officials, like the British and Americans before them, would argue 'self-defense' and all strikes being 'lawful' and 'legitimate' would release a memo 'proving' its legality.

Future Trajectory of Drone Warfare

Such a hypothetical scenario is unthinkable in the immediate future, but it is not so certain for the near future. Some military analysts think it's inevitable that a drone attack against the United States will happen given U.S. precedent on the use of drones today. Writing in the *Armed Forces Journal*, Major Charles Kels, who is also an attorney for the Department of Homeland Security, warns that 'the U.S. has a special obligation to set an example of the lawful and ethical prosecution' of the drone program because 'China is watching closely, and everything we do and say will most certainly be used against us when the Chinese inevitably launch a full-scale drone strike program of their own and we contest its legality.' (Kels, 2012)

Before U.S. citizens acquiesce to the use of drones for government sanctioned killing at the whim of a few political officials, we should contemplate the impact of these same weapons used against us. Already, four U.S. citizens have been killed by drone strikes including a sixteen year old in a decision described as 'an easy one' by Obama. (Becker & Shane, 2012) According to information released by the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) through a Freedom of Information Act lawsuit, the U.S. government and local police are already flying drones in U.S. airspace in about 90 areas across the United States. The extent of the domestic drone program is still largely unknown. (Kopstein, 2012)

The expansion of drone warfare is part of a general policy to increase the technological capacity of the armed forces. Although it should not be exaggerated, there is much worry of an 'America in decline' as worldwide economic and political power for the United States has steadily declined since the end of World War II. One of the strategic advantages the U.S. hopes to carry with it in the future is an unparalleled military of which technological innovation will be central. Military intervention needs to be 'decisive' according to liberals, and 'demoralizing' according to hawks. Leading statesman Zbigniew Brzezinski, former National Security Advisor to Jimmy Carter, describes how the U.S. military will fit into the role of global hegemon in the future.

The essential formula for making decisive intervention possible, is to combine the technological advantages of the revolution in military affairs, especially in precision weaponry [such as drones] and massive firepower, with airlift sufficient for rapid deployment of troops capable of heavy combat. Such a standby capability would go a long way in giving the United States, which already controls the oceans, the means to react to almost any local conflict deemed threatening to significant American interests. (Brzezinski, 2004)

Brzezinski adds 'this capability is certainly within U.S. reach – and it is noteworthy that no other power in the world can even aspire to such a global-reach capability ... America's current preponderance, and the geopolitical advantages to the United States of having such a decisive capability are self-evident.' (Brzezinski, 2004)

Likewise, historian Alfred McCoy, who has done extensive research on the U.S. military, illustrates such a vision of the U.S. military.

It's 2025 and an American "triple canopy" of advanced surveillance and armed drones fills the heavens from the lower-to the exo-atmosphere. A wonder of the modern age, it

can deliver its weaponry anywhere on the planet with staggering speed, knock out an enemy's satellite communications system, or follow individuals biometrically for great distances. Along with the country's advanced cyberwar capacity, it's also the most sophisticated militarized information system ever created and an insurance policy for U.S. global dominion deep into the twenty-first century. It's the future as the Pentagon imagines it; it's under development; and Americans know nothing about it. (McCoy, 2012)

Such a scenario may sound satisfactory in the offices of the Pentagon, but in the real world can have a similar effect to nuclear weaponry: An arms race for military technology across the world. It's worth bearing in mind that the nuclear weapon was quickly acquired by an official enemy of the United States, the Soviet Union. Imagine a nuclear armed drone. Already, Iran has acquired technology to fly surveillance drones into Israeli territory. Besides igniting anger and fueling terrorism, drone strikes could also result in more direct blowback – an attack with the same weapon.

We can only guess what the future has in store, but unless precautions are taken today to stop drone strikes that already have been a human catastrophe in the Middle East, there is reason for grave concern for the future use of technologically advanced weaponry. Unless there is a drastic change, which seems unlikely, drone warfare will continue far into the future. What we see today may only be the beginning of much more to come.

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Democratisation and Armed Conflict in Africa: Critical Perspectives

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DEMOCRATISATION AND ARMED CONFLICT IN AFRICA: CRITICAL PERSPECTIVES (Essay)

Abstract

Democratisation is closely associated with the enabling environment for political integration and development. Paradoxically, the history of democratisation in Africa, has remained the history of national disintegration. After decades of democratisation in Africa, evidences emanating from many African states show that the democratisation process is antidemocratic and highly divisive. Serious political crises and violence in many African states such as Cote D'Ivoire, Congo, Mali, and Nigeria among others illustrate the continuing fragile nature of the democratisation process in Africa. Therefore, this paper examines the linkages between democratisation and armed conflict in African states. It reviews extant studies on the violence that has characterised the process of democratisation in African states. Indeed, the democratisation process on the continent is not only being questioned, but has also become endangered. The degree to which democracy is consolidated in Africa is contingent on the attainment of peace, stability and development in the Africa continent.

Introduction

Democracy is an essential prerequisite for development and stability throughout the world. In contemporary Africa, one of the major explanatory factors for the state of development and

peace has a lot to do with the extent to which the continent has embraced and institutionalised democracy since political independence in the 1960s (Ake, 1996; 2000). After the departure of the colonial oligarchies, which had entrenched an autocratic and conflict-prone governance regime, African states embraced authoritarian rule. Africa has been a theatre of various forms of conflict marked by both exogenous and endogenous factors including the Cold War and authoritarian rule, for the larger part of its post-independence existence. African countries have been engulfed in political turmoil, violence and civil war in the course of competition for political power and control of resources. These conflicts have become so pervasive such that civil strife became a tragic and persistent plight of the population with the exception of Botswana, Mauritius, Malawi, Namibia, Tanzania and post-apartheid South Africa, which have been spared from civil strife and civil war (Adebajo, 2005).

Therefore, post-independence Africa witnessed a pervasive trend of political instability, which in turn undermined development and postponed for a long time the democracy-building agenda in a majority of these African states. This paper, thus examines the linkage between democratisation and armed conflicts in Africa. It reviews extant studies on the violence that has characterised the process of democratisation in Africa. This study argues that the notion of the relative weaknesses and strength of states is germane to the analysis on democratisation and armed conflict in post-colonial African states. Indeed, studies have identified both the short and long term perspectives on political violence and armed conflict in relation to the change in the mode of governance, in particular the holding of multi-party elections, and political violence related to the consolidation of semi-democracies or the “premature” closure of democratic transitions respectively (Jackson, 1990; Rothchild and Harbeson, 2000; Soderberg and Ohlson, 2003). It has been argued that these two aspects are closely related in the sense that the same factors that increase the likelihood of armed conflict in the initial stages of democratisation are also at the core of the explanation for the high level of violence in “consolidated” semi-democracies (Soderberg and Ohlson, 2003).

In the first two decades of independence, there were some forty successful coups and countless attempted coups in many African states (Cooper, 2002; Meredith, 2005). This period was widely regarded by the United Nations (UN) as the “lost” two decades ((Cooper, 2002; Meredith, 2005). The experience over these two decades demonstrates vividly that without democracy and peace, people-centered development can neither be realised nor sustained. It would seem that post-independent regimes in Africa had not succeeded in “curing the ills of the past”. Indeed, as Nkrumah rightly pointed out, allowing the same conditions that existed during colonialism to exist in the post-colonial states will culminate in the people mobilising all the resentment which overthrew colonialism against their leaders (Nkrumah, 1963)). The present situation in Africa states has validated Nkrumah’s prophesy that unless real transformation takes place that reverses the colonial legacy, development will prove a distant mirage; democratic consolidation will remain elusive and political stability and peace will remain unachievable.

It is incontrovertible that development and peace cannot be achieved under conditions of armed conflict that in turn generates political instability. This implies that a sustainable people-centered development requires a democratic setting. Democracy and development require political stability within an environment in which there exist effective mechanisms for the constructive management of conflict. The development-democracy-peace nexus is increasingly becoming a key feature in the extant literature (Makinde, 1996; Chan, 2002; Kotze, 2005; Leftwich, 2005).

Why has Africa experienced conflict that has in turn adversely affected its democracy and development prospects?

One need to take cognisance of the fact that since the collapse of the Cold War and the demise of apartheid in South Africa, a new momentum for democratisation has set in throughout the African continent and this momentum has been accompanied by a noticeable trend of reduced incidences of inter-state violent conflict. The democratic transitions of the early 1990s have helped reduce inter-state violent conflict considerably, thereby confirming the thesis that democracy can also become a conflict management tool (Harris and Reilly, 1998). However, intra-state conflict still constitutes one of the major challenges facing the achievement of the triple agenda of development, democracy and peace in Africa as the violent conflict in Sudan's Darfur region, the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), Côte d'Ivoire, Libya among others clearly demonstrate. It is evident that the challenge for peace-building and democracy-building is enormous and daunting, yet not insurmountable in contemporary Africa. The fourth wave of democratisation, drawing on Huntington's classification, reached most states in Africa, as well as Eastern Europe, the former Soviet Union, some parts of Asia and the Middle East, in the late 1980s and early 1990s (Huntington, 1991).

According to Huntington, the third wave of democratisation began in Portugal in 1974 and then spread through Southern Europe and Latin America in the 1970s and 1980s. However, several authors have argued that the present wave of democratisation, closely related to the end of the Cold War, should be referred to as a fourth wave (Huntington, 1991; Chege, 1995; Ottaway, 1997; Young, 1999; [McFaul](#), 2002; Soderberg, and Ohlson, 2003; Popescu, 2012). In this fourth wave, internal and external factors interacted to spark a wave of political liberalisation, followed in many cases by democratic reforms. The liberalisation of political space that came through pluralism, multiparty politics and constitutional reform was a major achievement on the African continent where authoritarian one-party and military regimes previously held sway (Osaghae, 2004). The outcome of the wave of democratisation varied from genuine transformations and relative success, to halted transitions, backslides to authoritarianism, military coups and state disintegration in most African countries, with the large majority of these countries falling somewhere between these extremes (Soderberg and Ohlson, 2003). This development led some scholars to argue that democratising states, notably in Africa, are more likely to experience armed conflicts than are mature democracies (Mansfield and Snyder, 1995). In retrospect, these findings seemed to challenge the policy prescription shared by many political leaders in the West that the spread of democratisation around the globe would lead to widespread peace.

It has been argued that African states are now witnessing the typical problems significant for the early stages of state-building, namely, the lack of unconditional legitimacy for state boundaries and state institutions, inadequate societal cohesion, and the absence of societal consensus on fundamental issues of social, economic, and political organization (Ayoob, 1995). These problems typically arise in the early stages of the state-building process when state-makers attempt to impose order, monopolise instruments of violence, and demand the exclusive loyalties of their populations. This situation, in turn, leads to violence and insecurity as state elites attempt to broaden and deepen the influence of the state, and in the process clashes with the interests of strongmen and segments of the population that perceive the extension of state authority as posing a direct danger to their social, economic or political interests. The problems of state-making and

regime security in many post-colonial states are further complicated by two other factors that were either absent or very weak during the early stages of state-making in Europe and the United States, namely the demand for political participation by increasing numbers of politically mobilised people and the demand for a more equal economic distribution (Ayoob, 1995).

Recent statistical findings support such a correlation between democratisation and armed conflicts, but with some important clarifications (Glickman, 1995; Joseph, 1999; Soderberg and Ohlson, 2003). In particular, Ward and Gleditsch have shown that as states become more democratic they reduce their overall chances of being involved in wars with other states by approximately half (Ward and Gleditsch, 1998). However, rocky or especially rapid transitions or reversals are associated with an increased risk of war involvement. When it comes to civil wars, or intra-state wars, studies have found that in-between forms of governance, what is sometimes referred to as semi-democracies, that is, states that are neither fully autocratic nor fully democratic, are more prone to intra-state armed conflicts than are other states. These findings support the notion that changing the mode of governance, no matter the direction, clearly and strongly increases the probability of civil wars. However, such change alone does not explain the higher frequency of conflicts in semi-democracies, as the conflict propensity of semi-democracies does not seem to change over time. “Consolidated” semi-democracies, where no significant political change has occurred for some time, are still more conflict prone (Hegre, 2001).

Indeed, Africa poses some of the most difficult and challenging questions in relation to state weakness, democratisation and political violence. The dynamics and outcome of the fourth wave of democratisation have raised questions that expose relatively unexplored theoretical frontiers. This is because empirical experiences of democratisation in most states in Africa would seem to be at odds with some of the assumptions and predictions found in mainstream theoretical works on democratic transitions and democratisation. This is particularly true in relation to ideas about the legitimacy and capacity of the state itself and the ability of the current democratisation process to overcome and outlast pre-democratic structures of power (Soderberg and Ohlson, 2003). Indeed, in many post-colonial states in Africa, the state entity itself is weak and lack legitimacy. This weakness is further often exacerbated by the lack of capabilities and resources that are required in order to overcome this structural weakness (O'Donnell and Phillipe, 1986). As a result of this deficiency, a large number of countries in Africa are either stuck in the democratic transition without moving towards consolidation or have already experienced a partial or complete reversal of the transition process.

In some cases, such as Central African Republic, Ghana, Kenya, Lesotho, Mauritania, Nigeria and Togo, the transition was accompanied with large-scale occurrences of political violence or the outbreak of intra-state armed conflict (Draman, 2003). In explaining this outcome, Herbeson argued that democracy sustainability in a state is related to its progress in areas of contestation in which the advancement of democracy competes with other interests and goals (Harbeson, 2000). Democratisation requires a radical shift in the nature of political power, something which is likely to be opposed by those that stand to lose from such political change. Progress towards democracy, therefore, is likely to be the outcome of conflict, power struggles, possibly even violence, and of non-democratic pacts among political organizations (Ottaway, 1997a).

It is pertinent at this point to question the fact that in spite of the advances in democratic governance and competitive elections across Africa which has earlier been referred to as the fourth wave of democratization, most African states still lack the political will to conduct credible elections and fully embrace the tenets of democratic governance, with a few exception such as Benin, Ghana, Mali, Mauritania, Niger, and Sierra Leone which have managed to conduct credible elections in a short period of time following their democratic transitions (Soderberg and Ohlson, 2003). However, African continent has moved from a situation in which only four countries including Botswana, Mauritius, Senegal and the Gambia practiced some level of multipartism in 1990 to one in which 34 countries were rated “free” or “partly free” in the 2006 *Freedom in the World* Publication of the Freedom House. In another publication, Freedom House lists 17 “electoral democracies,” eight of which Senegal, Mali, Ghana, Benin, Namibia, Botswana, South Africa, Lesotho are classified as “free” and the rest joining the 22 other states that are classified as “partially free”; 14 states are classified as “not free” (Freedom House, 2008). It is noteworthy that since 1990, the number of African heads of state and government who voluntarily retired or left office after losing an election has increased to nearly 40, compared to only three heads of state between 1960 and 1990 (Freedom House, 2008). This reflects the changing political face of Africa, even though there are still daunting challenges confronting the African continent.

Democratisation and Armed Conflict in Africa

The majority of contemporary theories on democratisation and democratic transitions have built on the empirical experience of democratisation in Europe or in the United states. These theories often assume the prior existence of a Weberian state. In this regard, Max Weber’s definition of the state has remained a benchmark for most contemporary social science analysis. According to the Weberian dimensions, there are the vertical and horizontal features of a state. The vertical dimension establishes the connection and the right to rule, between society and political institutions and regimes. On the other hand, the horizontal dimension defines the limits of and criteria for membership in the political community that is ruled (Holsti, 1996).

In terms of legitimacy, vertical legitimacy is, thus, the belief by the population in the rightfulness of the state and its authority to rule the state. Where legitimacy claims and popular expectations overlap or coincide, the state gains significant strength, as rule is based on consent of one form or another. The horizontal aspect of legitimacy refers to the nature of the community over which formal rule is exercised, to the attitudes and practices of individuals and groups within the state towards each other. In the weak state, there is often no single community, but numerous communities and groups that shape the nature of politics and authority structures. If the various groups and communities within the state accept and tolerate each other, horizontal legitimacy is high (Soderberg and Ohlson, 2003). Horizontal legitimacy, however, fails to develop or is destroyed when one group or a few groups or communities systematically and over a period of time oppress, exploit, forcibly assimilate, or threaten the security of other groups and communities as witnessed in Sudan. The political system that institutionalises exclusions sidelines one or some groups in terms of participation, access to power, and allocation of resources. Consequently, those who are excluded find it hard to extend loyalty either to other groups or to the state (Soderberg and Ohlson, 2003).

As Soderberg and Ohlson further indicated, the relationship may also be reversed; dubious vertical legitimacy may create, maintain, or exacerbate horizontal legitimacy (Soderberg and Ohlson, 2003). The point must be made that legitimacy is a variable rather than a constant. States may, thus, be placed on a continuum of strength, where the great majority of states most of the time fall somewhere between two ideal-types. At the one extreme are strong states with strong linkages between the components, all encompassed within high degrees of horizontal and vertical legitimacy. At the other extreme are states where central governmental authority has collapsed or failed, that is, where there is no or little public order, the central political leadership commands limited authority or loyalty, and a variety of groups and factions have armed themselves to resist attempt to establish order and integrate the community as was the case in states such as Angola, Democratic Republic of Congo, Liberia, Rwanda, Sierra Leone, Somalia and Sudan. Indeed, Africa has been identified as a continent with the largest number of collapsed states and a larger number of failing states (Zartman, 1995; Rotberg, 2003).

Closely related to legitimacy is the personalisation of the state. In many states, leaders attempt to erase the distinctions between the state and the ruler, which according to Weber is termed patrimonialism. This is a situation in which the objective interests of the state are indistinguishable from the subjective interests of the ruler of the regime in power. Post-colonial states often show a hybrid political system in which the customs and patterns of patrimonialism prevail along side with modern state features. The ruler ensures the political stability of the regime and personal political survival by providing security and selectively distributing services. African politics are often characterised by neo-patrimonial norms of political authority and forms of governance in which case President Mobutu of former Zaire and President Moi of Kenya are frequently cited manifestations of neo-patrimonial authority (Bratton and Van de Walle, 1997). Chabal and Daloz argued that most states in Africa are not just weak in term of the Weberian ideal-type, but it is also essentially vacuous because the exercise of central political power has not been separated from the overriding dominance of localised and personalised political contests (Chabal and Daloz, 1999). In many African countries, therefore, the state is no more than a facade masking the realities of a patrimonial and personalised state which is largely devoid of any political legitimacy in the eyes of the population. Consequently, weak states have problems in democratising and in carrying the process of transition to democracy to fruition.

The instrumentalisation of the prevailing political disorder may function as a disincentive to the establishment of a more properly institutionalised state on the Weberian model as well as implementing a democratic political system. The important merit of the above arguments is that they point to the highly negative potential of patrimonial structures. Undoubtedly, these structures pose problems for legitimacy, security and processes of state formation and nation building (Buzan, 1991). However, it should be noted that many weak states have made considerable moves towards greater legitimacy. In addition, when legitimacy is really low, even minor improvements in degrees of rule of law and good governance may generate major improvements in terms of closing the legitimacy gap.

From a security perspective, the principal distinguishing feature of weak states is their high level of concern with domestically generated threats. In the majority of conflicts in Africa, the conflict issue concerns power over government (Wallensteen, and Sollenberg, 2001). Governments in weak states are preoccupied with the short-term political perspective because their security and

their physical survival are dependent on the strategies they pursue for the moment. As such, it may be rational for regimes to adopt policies that, for example, utilise scarce resources for military equipment and manpower, to perceive opposition movements demanding greater participation as threatening, and to regard communal movements that promote alternative identifications and loyalties as dangerous (Job, 1992). Indeed, to understand politics in the weak state context, Chabal and Daloz argued that one must consider the ways in which individuals, groups and communities seek to take advantage of the resources that they command within the context of political and economic disorder (Chabal, and Daloz, 1999).

As Job has pointed out, many Africa states, the state itself is an issue in most conflicts (Job, 1992). Consequently, the result is less effective security for all or certain sectors of the population, lack of capacity of centralised state institutions to provide services and order and increased vulnerability of the state and its people to influence, intervention and control by outside actors. This internal weakness will in the long run also make the state more vulnerable to external threats, not least from neighbouring states (Buzan, 1991). Thus, the security problems associated with the weak state are easily spread across state borders and are likely to have a negative effect on other weak states in the region, a development that soon tends to grow into a self-enforcing and negative security dynamic in the entire region.

In terms of election, contemporary literature on democratisation suggests that elections in weak states are likely to be unsuccessful for two different, although related, reasons. First, the holding of multi-party elections or the prospects of elections in weak and divided states often work as a highly destabilising factor and encourages an “ethnification” of politics, which in some cases lead to political violence or armed conflicts. The second is that many authors have seriously questioned whether the holding of multiparty elections in weak states serves as a vehicle of political change, and argues that elections are more likely to lead to sedimentation of the existing power structures through a “premature closure” of the process of democratisation, than a genuine kick off for further democratisation. This is premised on the fact that in Africa, political parties are primarily based on ethnic or regional ties, they tend to lack a clear policy platform or ideological orientation and they often lack linkages to specific societal interest groups or civil associations (Cranenburgh, 1999). The most obvious and visible manifestation of politicised ethnicity in new multiparty political systems has been the overt or covert ethnic character of the majority of the emerging political parties (Ottaway, 1997b).

Therefore, De Gaay Fortman argued that, it is likely that elections will trigger violence, and it also explains the reasons why some people and many political leaders equate democracy with violence, instability and disorder (De Gaay Fortman, 2000). Indeed, the introduction of a multi-party system has not meant increased diversity for the individual voter. What appears to be a multi-party system from a distance or within the national legislature is in fact a series of patronclient networks, each representing a distinct ethno-regional constituency. The case of Zambia clearly serves to illustrate this pattern. Increasing internal and international pressure forced the incumbent regime of Kenneth Kaunda to hold multi-party election in 1991. Yet, as noted by Barkan, once in power, the new government of Fredrick Chiluba’s Movement for Multi-party Democracy (MMD) ruled like its predecessor, or worse, through standard patronage methods accompanied with state repression (Barkan, 2000). Politics in Zambia after the introduction of democracy has thus not changed either structurally or in the approach to

governance. This is also partly the reason why, in a majority of African countries that have held multi-party elections in the 1990s, incumbent authoritarians have remained in power or have been re-elected (Barkan, 2000).

The Angola case is another illustrative example in which after the the 1992 Bicesse peace agreement between the Movimento Popular de Libertacao de Angola (MPLA) and the Uniao Nacional para a Independencia Total de Angola (UNITA), the election that was conducted took the form of winner-take-all constitutional models. In this context, the political system envisaged a strong presidential system such that prior to the elections, both parties were confident to win, and, thus, rejected any proposals about introducing a political system based on power sharing. The outcome of the election that showed that UNITA had lost both the legislative and the presidential votes led to rejection of the results by UNITA and consequently, UNITA resumed its military campaign and Angola slipped back into civil war (Ottaway, 1999).

The nature of the problem of democratising weak states has three interlinked dimensions which, taken together, constitute a formidable challenge to participants in the process as well as to the external actors seeking to support it (Chabal and Daloz, 1999). While democracy is, by definition, a method of resolving societal conflicts in a non-violent manner, the route to it, that is, the process of democratisation, is a revolutionary and conflict-generating process (Chabal and Daloz, 1999). This is so because it involves dramatic changes which include new methods of deciding who is to have political power, new methods for exercising political power and often and as a consequence new balances of power and new power holders. It goes without saying that this is conflictual, particularly in a weak state where the hold on state power is often the only route to influence and wealth. Moreover, the structural conditions for moving successfully from democratisation to consolidated democracy are most often lacking in weak states. The process may therefore be halted or reversed, leading to façade democracy, renewed autocracy, state failure or some other point on the so-called semi-democratic continuum (Chabal and Daloz, 1999).

In the 1990s, democratisation has been regarded as the standard solution to the problems associated with Africa. Carothers argued that democracy promoters in the West in general rely on one basic model of democratisation when setting out to promote democracy in African countries (Carothers, 1999). This model is mainly built on the experiences from the early third wave of democratisation in the 1970s and 1980s in Latin American and southern Europe. The majority of those countries did not only experience relatively peaceful democratic transitions, but they all more or less followed the same pattern of transition. The model consists of a set of lists of key institutions and processes centred around three main categories, elections, state institutions and civil society. Democratisation is assumed to proceed along a relatively set path due to growing popular pressure, discontent and eroding legitimacy, the non-democratic regime is forced to initiate a political liberalisation. Subsequently, opposition groups and civil society grow stronger and will eventually pressure the government to hold multi-party national elections. After the election, an elected government will take power and continue the process of democratisation through gradual strengthening of democratic state institutions. As noted by Carothers, the model incorporates a two-ways process, as it is presumed that gradual democratic consolidation involves both top-down change through institution-building and bottom-up change through the strengthening and diversification of civil society.

However, in the aftermath of the spread of political liberalisation and democratic reforms in Eastern Europe, the former Soviet Union and Africa, which is termed the fourth wave, the model has been severely discredited. The democratic transitions of the 1990s have seriously undermined the notion that democratisation naturally proceeds in any regular or orderly sequence even though the holding of multi-party elections is still implicitly placed at the centre of the promotion of democracy in Africa (Cranenburgh, 1999). The West, often, regards the holding of elections as the key that will open the door to broader democratisation. Equally important to point out, is the strong call for the holding of multi-party elections from segments of the population in these countries who regard the holding of elections as both a powerful symbolic event and a real and visible sign of democratic progress. However, election at all costs might not just have limited effects for democratisation, it might be directly counterproductive to the process of democratisation in weak states (Cranenburgh, 1999). As is clear from the experience of African states including Senegal, Benin, Sierra Leone, Mauritania, Zambia, Congo-Brazzaville, Ivory Coast, South Africa, Madagascar, Angola, Niger, and Kenya, who have experienced alteration through elections, when an electoral revolt takes place it merely brings in similar leaders with similar practices, and the political-economic elite closes ranks to exclude reform and development.

On the African continent, there has been escalating and repeated communal violence directly related to the election process in at least four cases, the Congo, Algeria, Rwanda, and Burundi. Rwanda is often cited as the most dramatic cases of increased ethnic violence directly linked to the holding of multi-party elections. The violence represented a deliberate attempt by a group of people whose exclusive power was being threatened by the peace agreement and the introduction of a democratic power-sharing system, to halt a process that, if completed, was going to deprive them of their power (Longman, 1997). However, the open ethnification of politics does not necessarily have to be so destructive. Benin is a good example of the opposite trend. The country has a long history of ethnic rivalries and ethnic conflict and the majority of the members of the incumbent regime and the army were from a particular region and one ethnic group. However, the outcome of the holding of election in 1990 did not only change the ethnic power balance in the country, but it did so in a remarkably peaceful way (Longman, 1997). However, in Rwanda the strong ethnic colour of both the government and the army prove detrimental to a transition to democracy (Longman, 1997).

As Lemarchand has argued, the empirical evidence from the democratisation processes in many Africa states seems to suggest that democracy in these states is generally perceived as a zero-sum game with definite winners and losers among the different ethno-regional communities (Lemarchand, 1992). Similarly, Young pointed out that the introduction of competitive political parties often serve to mobilise and politicise regional, ethnic, religious, and racial solidarities in divided states. In these situations, elections might intensify disintegrative pressures on fragile states, without contributing to either stability or legitimacy (Young, 1999). However, De Nevers argued that democratisation can prevent or dampen ethnic conflicts if the forces pushing for democratisation recognise and acknowledge the ethnic differences that exist within the state and if they can accommodate the interests of different groups in a way that is perceived to be fair and evenly handed early in the transition process (De Nevers, 1993).

Another issue, also closely related to the dynamics of the transition process itself, concerns the cohesion of the opposition. If all the main ethnic groups in the state are united in opposition to the previous regime, either in a movement or a coalition, democratisation is likely to stand a better chance at avoiding ethnic conflict. In addition, whether the political leaders are moderates rather than extremists in their positions, both in relation to how to carry out political change, and in terms of degree of hostility and extremism towards other ethnic groups, is an important factor. In the case of Benin, during the National Conference, there was a relatively high degree of coherence and unity within the opposition, and moderates were comparatively stronger than radicals within both the government and within the opposition, something that is likely to have contributed to the peaceful transition. In Rwanda, however, in spite of perceived initial success, the opposition soon split along a moderate-radical axis, where the radicals soon emerged with the upper hand (De Nevers, 1993).

Although the electoral processes in African countries have led to armed conflict only in a limited number of cases, the holding of multiparty elections, or the prospects of elections, have contributed to the large-scale use of political violence and atrocities on civilians in a large number of countries. The multi-party election in Kenya in 1992 and the large-scale violence that accompanied it is an illustrative example (Muigai, 1995). In a weak state, incumbent leaders and local strongmen have at their disposal an endless array of tools with which they can manipulate voter preferences and election outcomes, so as to fit their private, sectarian interests. The behaviour of Charles Taylor's many private security forces in the Liberian countryside prior to the election victory in 1997 provides another case in point of the hazards involved when elections take place prematurely in a democratic transition.

Armed Conflict and Its Implications for Democracy and Stability in Africa

Democratic governance is perceived by academics and in the practitioners community as a system for peaceful resolution of conflicts. In spite of this, recent findings show that democratisation in its first stages increases the likelihood of armed conflict. According to the main theories about the prerequisites or favourable conditions for democracy, most African countries constituted an infertile terrain (Joseph, 1999). However, the pacifying effect of the ongoing democratisation wave in Africa helps in reducing the incidence of intra-state conflict in such a manner that indicates that democratisation can become part of the broader agenda of post-conflict reconstruction too. However, there is the need to exercise caution, taking into cognisance the fact that democracy can accentuate diversity and also provide room for multiple popular demands. If this diversity is not well managed and if these demands are not met, instability could result. Therefore, as much as democracy could add value to post-conflict reconstruction, if not well managed it could trigger instability or political violence.

Huntington argued that under conditions where the institutional foundation of democracy is weak and popular demands are huge and not met by the state, instability becomes the end-result and this leads to political decay or disorder (Huntington, 1968). A case in point is the flawed democratisation and peace process in Angola. The Angolan situation provides sufficient evidence that elections alone are insufficient to bring about political stability, reconciliation and peace. The Angolan conflict is one of the most protracted and costly conflicts in contemporary Africa. However, considerable progress has been made towards constructively resolving this

conflict. In Southern Africa, the example of Lesotho clearly indicates the reverse, that is democracy and elections could add value and become a political asset for post-conflict reconstruction. Lesotho's 1998 violent conflict involving a power struggle for control of the state by the country's political elite was well managed through constitutional engineering (ACCORD, 2004). There is general consensus in the democracy discourse today that one way of building peace and democracy in post-conflict societies requires, among others, electoral systems design (ACCORD, 2004). It is for this reason that the example of Lesotho's electoral system reform is cited as one of the key lessons of experience for other African states embroiled in intrastate violent conflict. Since the electoral reform, Lesotho has experienced less political instability, has broadened the party political representation in the national assembly and enjoys a relatively enhanced level of public confidence in election management, credibility of the outcomes of elections, and legitimacy of rule.

Evidence indicated that states emerging from conflict within the preceding half-decade have a nearly 50% chance of finding themselves in conflict again (Collier, *et al.*, 2003). Some settlements, as in Liberia and Mozambique, are examples of gradual and hopefully permanent change, real transition out of conflict (Hampson, 1996; Rotberg and Albaugh, 1999; Ali and Matthews, 2005). Whether these will lead to successful takeoff into development and democracy, once the conflict itself is eliminated, is still a question for the future, but it is certain that security and satisfaction of proximate grievances are the necessary, even if not sufficient, openings for broader reform. State where conflict are likely to occur include Guinea, Nigeria, Cameroun, Sudan, Southern Sudan, Chad, Zimbabwe, Democratic Republic of Congo, The Republic of Congo, and perhaps even South Africa (Rice and Patrick, 2008; Baker, 2008). In terms of the democratisation process in Africa, what is more likely is the continuation of a transitional system that has been termed "democratic autocracy (Barzun, 2002).

It is pertinent to take cognizance of the role of the West in stunting democratic possibilities on the African continent. The Sierra Leone example is a clear case in which Western intervention and influence stifled such possibilities. This is because the yearning and struggle for a democratic space was organically conceived by the people who have had to live with dysfunctional political systems and who clearly knew what they wanted until Western discourses about democratic possibilities raised its political expectations and changed the agenda for political struggle in the country. In this regard, Joseph acknowledged that the pronounced role of external forces in promoting democratic transitions in Africa has not always been in the best interest of the continent (Joseph, 1999). The international financial agencies, which dominate economic policy and resource mobilisation in Africa, he noted, are ill-equipped to play the role of "political midwife" in democratic transitions on the continent (Joseph, 1999). Similarly, the roles of Western countries have not always worked for democracy in the conflict-ridden African states in which they have intervened. Western intervention into transitions has in some instances created the possibility for hijacking popular mass aspirations by replacing local aspirations with different sets of concerns and the West's imperialist agendas. Some have suggested that in the absence of self-development and self-government, profit-making and decision-making have passed into or remained in the hands of foreigners (Leonard and Straus, 2003).

African internal wars receive external attention, including from the UN Security Council, only when they become long and intense, and remedial action only comes slowly. Therefore, the

deficiency of the relevant international organizations; the UN Security Council and the African Union and above all their members is more easily diagnosed than remedied. The introduction of troops is a heavy hammer with which to hit the nail, but when they are needed, appropriate numbers, mandates, and coordination are crucial (Zartman, 2008). It is high time that African conflicts are first and foremost seen as an African responsibility. As the case of Zimbabwe indicated, AU members first need to stand up to their colleagues in Sudan and Ivory Coast, among others, reminding them that they are responsible for the well-being of their own citizens and that gang warfare is not conduct appropriate to a state. Indeed, African states cannot move to tackle the challenges of democratization and development until they have eliminated the debilitating internal conflicts that tend to arise from deprivation and discrimination, which are the major shortfalls in democratization and development in the continent.

Conclusion and Recommendations

The history of democratisation in Africa has remained the history of national disintegration. The democratisation process on the continent is not only being questioned, but has also become endangered. Evidences emanating from many African states show that the democratisation processes is antidemocratic, very repressive and highly divisive such that society degenerates to dangerous levels of breakdown of law and order. Serious political crises and violence in many states in Africa illustrate the continuing fragile nature of the democratisation process in Africa. Indeed, the democratic process has taken different turns and trajectories in different countries, with different levels of progress. While elections have become more regular, and other components of liberal democracy relatively improved compared to the situation that obtained two decades ago, the democratisation process remains a major challenge for many African states.

Therefore, regardless of the form of government, or the number of political parties present, the substance of democracy will not emerge in these African states unless some degree of legitimacy is present. Specifically, certain conditions will have to be met if legitimate governments are to emerge, which include provision of basic human needs for the populace, respect for human right, equal opportunities for all, fair distribution of resources among the populace, freedom of speech, among others. Indeed, democratisation in an authoritarian state means redistribution of the power that has been hitherto centralised and monopolised. The political leadership will have to redistribute power in the system and allow some of the institutions to remain autonomous, in particularly the military and the judiciary. There should also be a separation of the legislative and the executive. In a democratic system, power cannot be based on coercion or mobilisation from the top.

Therefore, democratisation requires a change in the nature of power itself and in the institutions needed to generate it. The bestcase scenario for the contemporary democratic transitions on the African continent is a gradual transition from conflict and tension that will lead to the opening of the process of liberalisation, institutional development and democratic consolidation. The need for constitutional engineering and enhanced conflict management mechanism if Africa is to move towards democratic consolidation and peace cannot be overemphasised. In this regard, in multi-ethnic states, elections should come later rather than earlier in the democratisation process, because the early period of democratisation creates opportunities for increasing the stridency of ethnic claims, through expanded popular expectation and adversarial nature of the electoral

process. As the experiences of many states in Africa such as Senegal, Benin, Sierra Leone, Mauritania, Zambia, Congo-Brazzaville, Ivory Coast, South Africa, Madagascar, Niger, and Kenya indicated, election in the early stage of the democratisation process might be directly counterproductive. In the case of Zambia in particular, the introduction of democracy did little to structurally change the mode of governance, rather it merely brought in similar leaders with similar autocratic practices.

It may be argued that, instead of early elections, a process of democratisation should perhaps in many cases begin by a consensus-seeking exercise, which sets out to create broad national cohesion around the rules of the political game. It is highly likely that the institutionalisation of constitutional mechanisms will generate the emerging civil culture of trust, tolerance and compromise that is deemed necessary for a peaceful electoral process. The example of Sweden, whereby even under much more favourable conditions than those prevailing in the weak states in Africa, the transition from autocracy to democracy lasted for over 500 years, is an indication of the daunting challenges inherent in the process of democratisation. However, present strategies for democratisation seems to build on the notion that it is the holding of elections that provides the necessary condition for institution-building and constitutional engineering. In cases where the respect for the rule of law and protection of civil and political rights are not guaranteed before the elections are held, the elections might directly contribute to political violence and violations of human rights. In many weak states, these preconditions are largely absent. Hence, elections in the weak state context inevitably become an instrument for manipulation by the state as well as the opposition.

In the conflict resolution literature, power sharing has increasingly been seen as a way of shaping the democratic political game in multi-ethnic societies. Power sharing is defined as practices and institutions that result in broad-based governing coalitions generally inclusive of all major ethnic groups in society which can reconcile principles of democracy in multi-ethnic states. The argument is that simple majoritarian systems contain special problems for ethnically divided societies. Minority ethnic groups fear electoral contests when the principle of simple majority rule is operative as they expect to be permanently excluded from power. The most frequently cited form of power sharing is that of consociationalism. Many analysts have argued that one of the main reasons why the 1992 Bicesse peace agreement between the Movimento Popular de Libertacao de Angola (MPLA) and the Uniao Nacional para a Independencia Total de Angola (UNITA) in Angola failed, was the design of the political system. The political system envisaged a strong presidential system and thus, in effect, the presidential election took the form of a “winner-take-all” system. Prior to the elections, both parties were confident to win, and therefore rejected any proposals about introducing a political system based on power sharing. When the election results indicated that UNITA had lost both the legislative and the presidential votes, the party rejected the results and declared the elections fraudulent. Shortly thereafter UNITA resumed its military campaign and Angola slipped back into full-fledged war. One lesson commonly derived from the Angolan debacle concerns the dangers of winner-take-all constitutional models and the advisability of power sharing systems.

However, one may be inclined to argue based on empirical studies that it is too simplistic to assume that all majoritarian systems are undemocratic and all power-sharing systems are democratic. It has been suggested that power sharing can only work where there is a genuine

desire and commitment among the respective leadership, and sufficient innovation to create appropriate structures and institutions that simultaneously accommodate all groups. There is also a need for regional cooperation among the states in Africa, particularly with regards to democratisation in weak states. The fact that borders between weak states are porous may lead to the spill over of problems as well as progress across borders. Therefore, neighbouring states may play a role in determining the success or failure of any democratisation process. In this regards, regional interaction may promote non-violent solutions to transition-related conflicts.

As Zartman pointed out, African countries are far from take-off. At best, they may be able to get into a higher gear and move a bit faster into a transition towards greater development and democracy. Undeniably, some of the machinery is working, and one may hope that the time of total breakdowns is past. However, Africa needs an ethical revolution, in which the ethos of survival is replaced with an ethos of responsibility. Africa needs to instill the notion that “Africa” and not “outsiders” is responsible for its destiny, in which case that responsibility is shared by the electors and elected. Indeed, the degree to which democracy is consolidated in Africa is contingent on the attainment of peace, stability and development on the Africa continent.

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Revelation on Johan Galtung's Approach to Peace: Implications for the African Peace

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REVELATION ON JOHAN GALTUNG'S APPROACH TO PEACE: IMPLICATIONS FOR THE AFRICAN PEACE (Essay)

Abstract

Johan Galtung is an author whose works can bear repeated exploration and interpretation because he has struck the right chord in the emergence and development of the field of conflict resolution at the right time. His message goes beyond his native city of Oslo, beyond his country Norway, and beyond the developed and the developing countries, to the whole world. Attempts have been made to confine him to one culture, 'the culture of violence' and of 'poverty', which is that of the Third World; but the greater the efforts to do so, the more it we should realize that his message is universal, applying to both the developed and the developing countries (Galtung, 2002). His message is that of cultural freedom and self-dignity, which are every person's birthrights, as well as the essence of our existence. It is interesting that even in Africa, Johan Galtung was not unknown, despite the fact that the authorities tried to give his works their own interpretations to misrepresent him. He has served as a professor for peace studies at universities all over the world, including Columbia (New York), Oslo, Berlin, Belgrade, Paris, Santiago de Chile, Buenos Aires, Cairo, Sichuan, Ritsumeikan (Japan), Princeton, Hawai'i, Tromsø, Bern, Alicante (Spain) and dozens of others on all continents. He has taught thousands of individuals and motivated them to dedicate their lives to the promotion of peace and the satisfaction of basic human needs. This essay examines the relevance of his work for peacebuilding in Africa.

Introduction

The emergence of peace and conflict research in Scandinavia is noticeable, most remarkably in the influential work of Johan Galtung. His output over the past 35 years has been phenomenal and his influence on the institutionalization and ideas of peace research seminal. Galtung, a Norwegian, became a visiting professor at Columbia University in 1958, returning to Oslo in 1960 to help found a unit for research into conflict and peace at the University of Oslo—the precursor to the International Peace Research Institute, Oslo (PRIO).

He was also the founding editor of the *Journal of Peace Research*, launched in 1964. This is as expected because of his prominence in the field of conflict resolution in the 20th century, and predictably, in the 21st century too. He has mediated in over 100 conflicts between states, nations, religions, civilizations, communities, and persons since 1957. His contributions to peace theory and practice include conceptualizations of peacebuilding, conflict mediation, reconciliation, non-violence, theory of structural violence, theorizing about negative vs. positive peace, peace education and peace journalism. Galtung's unique imprint on the study of conflict and peace stems from a combination of systematic scientific inquiry and a Gandhian ethics of peaceful means and harmony (Galtung & Næss, 1955)

Galtung has conducted a great deal of research in many fields and made original contributions not only to peace studies but also, among others, human rights, basic needs, development strategies, a world economy that sustains life, macro-history, theory of civilizations, federalism, globalization, theory of discourse, social pathologies, deep culture, peace and religions, social science methodology, sociology, ecology, future studies. He is founder (in 2000) and rector of the Transcend Peace University, the world's first online Peace Studies University. He is also the founder and director of Transcend International, a global non-profit network for Peace, Development and the Environment, founded in 1993, with over 500 members in more than 70 countries around the world (Galtung, 2007). As a testimony to his legacy, peace studies are now taught and researched at universities across the globe and contribute to peacemaking efforts in conflicts around the world. As a recipient of over a dozen honorary doctorates and professorships and many other distinctions, including a Right Livelihood Award (also known as Alternative Nobel Peace Prize), Johan Galtung remains committed to the study and promotion of peace.

Like all prolific writers in conflict Resolution, his works have been subjected to contrary interpretations, to appropriation and misappropriation and to eulogies and calumny, depending on the side taken by his interpreters. Galtung, of course, was not writing a history of any particular conflict. Rather, he is trying to outline the broad principles that are common throughout conflict in general. This essay notes, therefore, that no theoretical concept can tell the whole story of Africa. Within the case study of Africa, there is room for different interpretations and Galtung's represents an enlightened framework that can be applied.

The profundity of his model has made it possible for different cultures and different generations to find him relevant to their situations. It is in that, that this essay seeks to revisit Johan Galtung's ideology of structural violence, especially in his application to the field of conflict resolution, to highlight lessons on what is applicable to Africa as we embark on a long period of depression and starvation because the foreign aids that Western countries send to Africa in the name of poverty in Africa do not reach the poor masses who need the aids the most. Western donors like America and the United Kingdom pump billions of dollars to help better the living conditions of the poor masses in Africa.

However, the poor people who need the aid the most get nothing at all. Instead those in higher positions spend the money on themselves buying big cars and building mansions both home and abroad, while the poor die from extreme poverty and starvation. The majority (about three-fourths) of the poor population in Western and Central Africa (about 100 million people) are poor subsistence-farmers who live in villages and farm just to feed themselves and their families. Perhaps, we may rectify this problem if we understand Galtung's explanation of structural violence and direct violence as a framework to help understand the workings of power in a non-judgmental sense. However, Galtung's own terminology distinguishes between ill states and healthy ones. This will try to review his concept of structural violence, as either an approach or strategy and as a method and theoretical framework. Thereafter, it will examine the regionally adopted conflict resolution strategy and see how it can benefit from Galtung's notion of structural violence.

Before going further, there are some conceptual clarifications that have to be made, because the two concepts concerned often get confused. The concepts are those of approach and method. One, at times, hears conflict scholars/practitioners talk of approach as though it is a method. The distinction between approach/strategy and method is very significant in that one is the framework for the other, but can, nevertheless be differently conceptualized. An approach is both a theoretical and an administrative framework. It is a strategy for attacking. If we take the Galtungnean approach as an example, it refers to the ideology of socio-cultural conflict, which provides the motif and the motivation for this type of violence, which is wider and purely theoretical; containing abstract principles underlying a particular view or approach to life.

On the other hand, a method refers to the pedagogical (or *andragogical*) technique for imparting knowledge. Method can be regarded as the micro-instructional techniques and it operates in the sociological and psychological realm i.e. the socio-psychology of learning. Thus, when we talk of the Galtungnean theoretical framework, we must keep in mind what actually happens when the famous 'socio-cultural circle' has been formed, i.e. the freely participative dialogue which leads to the compilation of the generative terms, the composition of the primer and the mechanical technique of resolution of conflict. This distinction (i.e. Galtung distinction) is very important in that when we talk of resolution of conflicts; we are referring to only the sociological and the psychological strategies or ideologies of violence for the understanding and delivery of resolution, without touching on what method we shall be using—whether it is the traditional, the functional, the Galtungnean theoretical framework or a combination of them.

Galtungnean Peace Ideology and Approach

Galtungnean ideology makes sense only within the context of Galtung's ideology of socio-structural violence, which is motivated by the Galtung general theoretical framework. Galtung's ideology of violence uses a wide definition, articulating sub-divisions of "structural violence" and "cultural violence" along with "direct violence". In fact, Galtung's definition of violence is probably among the widest possible to use, for he sees violence as "avoidable insults to basic human needs and, more generally, to life, lowering the real levels of needs satisfaction below what is potentially possible". Galtungnean structural violence addresses the ways in which social structures or institutions prevent people from fulfilling their basic needs. This is clearly an extremely wide definition of violence and includes institutionalized systems of inequality such as racism, sexism, nationalism, classism and ethnocentrism, as well as poverty, inadequate water supplies, and insufficient health care. For Galtung, direct violence is tied to structural violence in that structural violence can lead to conflict and then to direct violence, whether within the family or in terms of hate crimes or war (Galtung, 1990).

By cultural and social violence, Galtung means:

.... Those aspects of culture, the symbolic sphere of our existence—exemplified by religion and ideology, language and art, empirical science and formal science (logic, mathematics)—that can be used to justify or legitimize direct or structural violence. Cultural violence makes direct and structural violence look, even feel, right or at least not wrong.

Moreover, according to Galtung, both direct and structural violence create needs deficits. When either happens suddenly, we can talk of trauma. His underlying assumption is simple: violence breeds violence.

Violence is needs deprivation; needs deprivation is serious; one reaction to it is direct violence. There could also be a feeling of hopelessness, a deprivation/frustration syndrome that shows up in the inside as self-directed aggression and on the outside as apathy and withdrawal" (Galtung, 1990).

This type of explanation for violence is widespread and common to many sociological and psychological theories of violence. What is specific to Galtung's argument, and other similar ideologies of cultural violence, is the contention that there are clear and direct relationships between how societies organize their cultural meaning systems and the level and types of violence these societies engage in. Galtung developed the distinction between direct violence (e.g. masses are murdered), structural violence (e.g. masses die through poverty) and cultural violence (i.e. whatever blinds us to this or seeks to justify it). We end direct violence by changing conflict behaviours, structural violence by removing structural injustices and cultural violence by changing attitudes. In addition, Galtung added his further distinction between negative peace and positive peace, the former characterized by the absence of direct violence, the latter by overcoming structural and cultural violence. Another influential idea attributed to Galtung is the conflict triangle and the analytical distinction between three methods that could be undertaken by the international community in response to conflict; peacekeeping, peacemaking and peacebuilding (Galtung, 1996).

The core of the Galtungnean theoretical framework is socio-cultural, the creative raising of consciousness and self awareness to the reality of one's socio-cultural setting, the creative raising of consciousness and self awareness to the reality of one's structure and institutional existence, with a view to creatively transforming it through positive and critical action. This is the famous Galtungnean praxis, which is a combination of the social and the cultural and of reflection and action. In specific terms, socio-cultural ideologies are the creation of critical consciousness of people to the reality of their situation, to the culture of violence in which they are sunk. It is seeking to critically analyze the oppressive and hopeless situation with a view to attaining understanding of the factors responsible for the dehumanization. That is, the reflection aspect which must now be symbiotically balanced by allowing the knowledge to realize in them the energy, the motivation and the will to change the circumstance.

Briefly characterized, a Galtungnean theoretical framework has a strong cultural and psycho-social overtone. The source of the oppression of the people is basically socio-economic and psychological, being the fundamental factor in all other types of societal arrangement. The economic and the cultural set-ups are, for example, essentially, the erection of the oppressors or the powers-that-be, which set-ups would naturally not jeopardize the interests of those who set them up. Thus, any change in the situation of the oppressed must be sought; not in economic or cultural amelioration, but a social transformation of the structures predisposed to oppression. Hence, that conflict, which is the instrument for the liberation can never be neutral; it must reflect in orientation, objective, process and content, the ideology of the oppressed or hopeless classes.

Violence is, however, of three types—direct violence, structural violence and cultural violence. Whichever, it is, it is strongly ideological and cultural. The violence that domesticates is that system put in place by the oppressors classes to perpetuate themselves in the position of leadership: it may be authoritarian or democratic; the intention is still the same—to keep the masses in their oppressive and hopeless state of the structural violence. To Johan Galtung, socio-cultural conflict, under authoritarian systems of government is even worse than the rigidly democratic, in that the former is an example of a false philanthropy which beguiles and deceives the masses into believing that their conditions are improving (through the benevolence of the oppressors) when, in actual fact, they are being subtly but more deeply enslaved with poverty, inequalities, and injustices (Galtung, 1990).

Violence for liberation is, on the other hand, the type needed by the oppressed. It is the type needed to make them human by restoring to them the socio-cultural freedom that can free them from 'direct violence' by changing attitudes, which is the very essence of their humanity. It is the type that helps them to overthrow the oppressor, and positively, to start creating their own history and making their own culture of peace and self-actualization.

It is within the context of this general theoretical framework and specific ideology of violence that we must situate Galtung's notion of structural violence. Psychological and social skills are set within the objective of liberating the masses from the shackles of needs deprivation, oppression, injustice, and inequalities etc., which are political and economic before being social and cultural. Hence, violence is defined by Johan Galtung as 'avoidable insults to basic human needs, and more generally to life, lowering the real level of needs satisfaction below what is

potentially possible' which I can easily refer to cultural action for freedom. The theoretical framework simultaneously attacks political and cultural oppression through socio-political revolution, followed by the socio-cultural skills of conflict resolution.

The core concept here is that of structural freedom which not only defines their existence but also gives them the psychic satisfaction of being in control of their own destiny from social structures or institutions. The methodology is also well-documented by Johan Galtung as being made up of two parts—the dialogic sessions (which are participatory and free-wheeling discussions of a theme of their own choice, which psychologically motivate and prepare them for the second part (structural violence). The drastic reduction in the trend it takes to make the citizens in his socio-cultural circle violence is a testimony to the effectiveness of this framework of structural violence, and it is what commends the Galtungnean theoretical framework of structural violence, even to those cultures and political institutions that are far different from those in which the framework was hatched and perfected.

Rationale: Galtung's Theoretical Framework of Structural Violence

Without going into minute details of the Galtungnean theoretical framework of structural violence; it has two objectives that immediately commend themselves to us in his ideology (Galtung, 1969). First, there is the fact that any approach or method must have a distinct ideological underpinning. Galtung himself has carefully analyzed for us (in structural violence) the ideological underpinnings of the original framework of socio-cultural conflict methods. Galtung's ideology also has that strong capitalistic and materialistic ideological background from social structure or institutions. Except the approach matches the ideological background, the efforts at implementation may be frustrated and frustrating because both will not work in tandem: a capitalistic and materialistic ideology cannot properly spawn or buttress a voluntary approach or method (Galtung, 2000).

The second objective lesson pertains to how best to conduct the resolution exercise through the understanding of the concept of structural violence. Secondly, it has been established that successful resolution operations need social, economic, cultural, political and religious mobilization and general political institutions. Socio-political aspects, as expressed in moral and cultural terms, are a pre-requisite for a successful resolution exercise. The association of conflict resolution with political participation has in most cases served as an incentive for conflict resolution practitioners to flock to the conflict resolution training centers: Johan Galtung's experience in Oslo is a good case in point. Generally, what my review of Galtungnean theoretical framework has shown is that conflict resolution cannot, and should not be conducted in isolation of other parameters of development whether political, economic, social, cultural or even religious. The adoption of framework of structural violence by the United Nations peacekeepers in the 21st century, with all its utilitarian or welfarism; and social, economic and political orientation is still another testimony.

Using the theoretical framework of structural violence and readily available data, one can easily begin to understand the nature or causes of the increasing perennial conflict in a number of states in Africa. This essay argues that Johan Galtung's concept of structural violence provides an important theoretical framework that helps guide our understanding of the reasons for conflict

and the stage of Africa's continuing progress towards a new era of 'positive peace'. This essay, however, also notes that no theoretical concept can tell the whole story and while Galtung's concepts and terminology are useful, awareness and appreciation of their shortcomings is also fundamental for a full appreciation of a case study such as Africa (Galtung, 1996).

Implications for African Conflict Resolution and Peace Campaign

I can now see how the above lessons apply to Africa's new 'all-out' efforts at making resolution the multidimensional tasks in African states. The lesson that I have learnt from comparative resolution methodology is that successful resolution practice in Africa nations can have transplanted root, branch and flowers from social, economic and political aspect of the society. What makes a successful resolution successful may lie completely outside of the resolution itself. Hence, it will be foolish not to expect that Johan Galtung's ideology can be successfully transplanted to all African countries.

Take the economic aspect as an example. In Africa, poverty is correlated with infant mortality, infectious disease; shortened life spans and inequalities that produce suffering and death. Structural violence occurs whenever people are disadvantaged by political, legal, economic or cultural traditions. Again, the economic volatility of Oslo or of the Eastern European countries is exactly replicated in Africa, even with all its current economic consciousness. Thus, the best that we can do is to catch the liberation spirit and the theoretical framework of the successful Galtungnean practice, adapt the dynamics that was responsible for its success in Oslo and modify the processes without losing the spirit of resolution.

Now, to the next aspect of the lesson drawn from Galtung's framework of structural violence, framework can be linked to political aspect of the society. Politics is another area that is part of social structure or institution in Africa that is preventing citizens from fulfilling their basic needs. Political variables have usually been a strong motivator of structural violence and success in conflict resolution (much stronger than economic premises). The Galtungnean ideology has a strong political base and undertone, and so, it was successful in Norway and some Scandinavian countries. The lesson is that the present situation (i.e poverty level) in African countries should be closely associated with political institution and structure of the society i.e. majority not minority in the society in order to bring about inequality. And if we do away with inequality and injustice that are associated with structural violence, the awakening of consciousness among the masses in Africa must be linked with the necessity for them to acquire resolution skills to fully participate in the new democratic processes in Africa.

If political motivation correlates well with participation in resolution, what secure the most durable benefits are other factors of development such as the economic, social and cultural skills. Even though Johan Galtung stopped short with the political factors while it may be true that the poor, the hungry, the neglected minorities and other disadvantaged and 'oppressed' groups can be liberated and mobilized to break loose from their oppressive conditions, their efforts can be facilitated by equipping them with the necessary economic and social skills. Empty political promises may not be effective in fully mobilizing parties for conflict resolution.

We can link the last aspect of Galtungnean ideology that can also serve as a lesson for African conflict resolution to the socio-cultural aspect of the society. Socio-cultural theories link to social and cultural dimensions of life. Social explanations of violence might stress competition for scarce resources in Africa or conflict between particular social groups in Africa. Cultural theories might emphasize the meaning that particular forms of violence have within a given society in Africa, describing violence as a kind of serious game or as a ritualized release of built-up tension. These are sensitive aspect of social structure or institutions in African societies that can also prevent masses in Africa from fulfilling their basic needs. The understanding of the issues in the lesson from Galtungnean theoretical framework demonstrates how African conflict resolution scholar-practitioners must be able to develop a spectrum of conflict resolution approaches in the area of what Lederach (1997) refers to as 'ethnoconflictology'—the study of how people make sense of conflict situations and the appropriate (cultural) common-sense methods of resolving them.

This spectrum can bring an end to social structure or institutions that can prevent African citizens from fulfilling their basic needs. African scholars and practitioners in conflict resolution have historically underestimated the importance of culture in conflict and conflict intervention. Yet, most would now agree that culture does matter. A lack of sensitivity to cultural issues can have a limiting impact on the effectiveness of conflict resolution initiatives, including resolution. The reality of contemporary conflict resolution requires that culture and social dimensions of life be considered as it influences conflict intervention and resolution on several different levels. Having outlined a generalized judgmental framework for violence, Galtung makes a profound moral judgment. He designates some aspects of structural violence to be attributable to sick states and some aspects as perfectly normal within healthy states. Galtung (1967) explains the difference between the two sides to this moral assertion and justifies the position he has taken. While certain serious theoretical questions should be asked regarding the stability of Galtung's political philosophy, in a normative sense, the structural theory and concept of structural violence provide an extremely useful guide to African conflict resolution engagements.

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Feminist Peacebuilding: Merging Theory and Practice in Pisco, Peru

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FEMINIST PEACEBUILDING: MERGING THEORY AND PRACTICE IN PISCO, PERU (Essay)

Abstract

This article operationalizes Chandra Talpade Mohanty's theory of the Anticapitalist Transnational Feminist Practice through John Burton's Human Needs Theory and application of peacebuilding approaches to development. Through the analysis of personal experience in post-earthquake Peru, the author describes the complexities of on-the-ground development. The movement from anticapitalist theory to peacebuilding practice, both as a volunteer and as a university study abroad instructor, supports her conclusion that although globalization is a root cause of structural violence, an economic solution is sometimes the option that best meets a woman's immediate needs. In order to meet immediate needs while implementing long-term structural changes, collaborative, locally-coordinated solutions must be implemented both into development work and the feminist teacher's classroom.

Feminist Peacebuilding: Merging Theory and Practice in Pisco, Peru

When I lived and worked in a post-earthquake environment in Pisco, Peru, I saw firsthand how poor infrastructure, corruption, and violence hinder the reconstruction of a city. I was in the coastal city of Pisco, a four-hour bus ride south of Lima, in the spring of 2011. Four years after Pisco's earthquake, people still suffered from typhoid and lacked basic necessities such as adequate sanitation infrastructure. The magnitude 8.0 earthquake, of August 15, 2007, destroyed 70% of the homes, and caused approximately 600 deaths with 383 people dying in the city of

Pisco alone. I worked with a Peruvian-American Non-governmental Organization (NGO) that aided Pisco by building homes, schools, hospitals, and community centers. My job was to assess the needs of people who requested help from the NGO. Many stories I heard during that time, and decisions I made, have been amalgamated into the story of Sara.

Sara was a single mother of three children. Although Sara requested help from the government after her home was destroyed, she did not qualify for funding. She lived with her brother, his two children, and his wife in their small two-room home. Sara was a strong, independent woman who was determined to start her own bakery and needed help constructing a building where she could both operate her business and live with her children. She asked for my organization's help.


I am a white, highly educated, American woman, and through layers of privilege, experience, and circumstance, I had the power to make decisions that impacted her livelihood. I am still becoming comfortable with this responsibility. As an NGO worker, I was not only impacting Sara's and her children's lives, but it is apparent that if my organization met her immediate needs, we were contributing to a larger system of globalization that causes environmental and social destruction as the products Sara would sell—Coca-Cola, bread, and perhaps bottled water—all benefit from globalization and contribute to socio-environmental degradation.

Because I was so deeply impacted by my responsibility in Pisco, last August I returned to school to get my PhD. I wish to be better equipped to evaluate and possibly make change in the globalized system that influences the livelihoods of everyone, but especially those of women. In my work, I am most concerned for women like Sara who are often the primary victims of the structural violence associated with globalization. Self-awareness is a key component to both feminism and peacebuilding, and when I reflected over my experience in Pisco, I was left wondering: how do I, a white, southern, straight, academic, politically-progressive woman represent people of other classes, races, nationalities, and sexualities without reinstituting oppression? In addition, I could not help but question: do my values change when I transition from theory to practice?

It is from these questions and conflicts that I operationalize Chandra Talpade Mohanty's theoretical concept of the Anti-capitalist Transnational Feminist Practice through the application of both John Burton's Human Needs Theory and peacebuilding approaches to development. I combine these theories as I found Mohanty's theory of upmost assistance when using my scholarship as activism, learning how to represent other people in my work, and approaching issues of race, class, and educational privilege as well as individual responsibility. When approaching peacebuilding practice, however, it was difficult to find on-the-ground approaches that did not incorporate capitalism or globalization. I decided on Lisa Schirch's definition of strategic peacebuilding: "an interdisciplinary, coordinated approach to building a sustainable *justpeace*—a peace with justice" (Schirch, 2004, p. 6). In figure 1, I map out the process described throughout this paper. Although the process is always climate dependent, sometimes cyclical, and is not by any means fool proof, it is a visual representation of my thought process as an academic professional and practitioner.

Although with this analysis I am dissecting the violence and conflict of the situation, I want to remind readers that the people of Pisco welcomed other volunteers and me with open arms. We were strangers in their homes, their schools, their hospitals, and their businesses. We worked together to find solutions to improve their livelihoods and make their livelihoods more secure.

Figure 1: Feminist Peacebuilding Theoretical Model



The Pisqueños exhibited resiliency, pride, and kindness in incredibly instable situations. Even though, as you will read, the situation was difficult, people were always kind and grateful, and I am forever indebted to their hospitality.

Supporting Literature

There are many empirical studies on the topic of gender and peacebuilding. In 2000, the United Nations passed Resolution 1325, which “urges all actors to increase the participation of women and incorporate gender perspectives in all United Nations peace and security efforts” (UN, 2000, para. 1). After this resolution passed, multilateral, bilateral, and unilateral organizations began to emphasize women’s participation in international development and peacebuilding, resulting in increased research and funding for peacebuilding projects that focused on gender. These studies, although informative, are neither supported by international development, peace psychology, nor conflict resolution theories, and do not incorporate a theoretical framework in published work. Scholars and practitioners undeniably maintain that even though women were only recently recognized internationally for their peacebuilding participation, the leadership of women in peace movements has been present for decades. Women have protested by tying themselves to trees, voiced their opinions to congress, and started movements against social and environmental injustice. Women have taught, lead, studied, and supported political movements. Women have worked in the mines and lost children to war and hazardous waste. Women’s bodies are the most sensitive to ecological destruction, and we are subject to higher levels of rape and domestic abuse during post-conflict and post-disaster situations. Although not always recognized, women’s participation in peace and justice is historically significant and continues to grow, especially in a world where we experience more ecological destruction and war, and the instances of natural disasters are debatably more common today than in past decades (Warren & Cody, 1994, p. 5; York, 1996, p. 328).

Although there is institutional and scholarly support for gender and peacebuilding, there are also no peacebuilding theories that use a gendered lens to simultaneously break down capitalist relations while offering women economic agency in the overwhelmingly large, mysterious globalized system. I find this predicament to be one of my biggest challenges as a peacebuilding practitioner. Mohanty provides an appropriate means for representing women, discusses the dangers of generalizations, and gives extensive critique on negative impacts of globalization through her Anticapitalist Transnational Feminist Practice approach. Mohanty’s critique, along with John Burton’s human approach to conflict analysis and Lisa Schirch’s strategic approach to peacebuilding program planning, connects gender and peacebuilding while providing women with agency. Thanks to this combined approach, I am able to take a critical step into the peacebuilding and development fields.

Many peace theorists and feminist scholars speak of the violence created by capitalism and globalization, but none provide a detailed, accurate, gendered description while simultaneously giving women agency and avoiding victimizing essentialist claims.

Vandana Shiva, internationally renowned ecofeminist, speaks extensively to the violence constructed through international development, capitalism, and globalization (Shiva, 1988, pp. 272-273). Although I find much of Shiva’s argument powerful, as she thoroughly describes the structural, political, and economic forces that create systems of patriarchy, in many instances,

she does not address culture. This leaves the reader to believe that development policies changed all traditional cultures from peaceful, egalitarian societies to ones of violence and inequity. Although international development policies and colonialism have altered many traditional cultures, all traditional cultures were not egalitarian before capitalism. As such, a deeper analysis of Sara's culture is necessary as Peruvian culture is a mixture of indigenous, European, Asian, and African traditions, and all have a significant influence on Peruvian gender relations. Ecological economist Bina Argarwal created the theory of environmental feminism and critiques Shiva's accounts of traditional egalitarianism and ecofeminism through her research on environmental projects in Southern India. Argarwal shows that in many ways, traditional Indian cultures are not egalitarian and have a deeply embedded patriarchal system that did not result from neoliberal development policies. Through an ecological economics approach, Argarwal exhibits how traditional caste systems and patriarchal structures denote and control environmental projects in a developing world context. Argarwal states that development projects should not give all environmental responsibilities to women as this can recreate traditional systems of patriarchy and move away from, not towards, a more egalitarian system (Argarwal, 2001, p. 9). Although I support Argarwal's thesis as her research undoubtedly moves away from harmful essentialist generalizations, much of her work does have an environmental focus, and this is not directly applicable to Sara's situation.

In addition, Mexican activist and deprofessionalized scholar Gustavo Esteva provides political, structural, and individual recommendations for moving away from the global market system. Esteva supports a cultural imaginary beyond capitalism, envisioning a move beyond formal democracy to a radical democracy that "emphasizes what people themselves can do to transform their social relations and their living conditions, rather than social engineering and legal or institutional changes... with a clear purpose of reorganizing the society from the bottom up" (2010, p. 67). He calls for a reorganization of society that includes urbiculture (cultivating food in cities), appropriate technology, autonomous healing practices, and indigenous productions of knowledge (Esteva, 2010, p. 68). Although Esteva's approach could create a more peaceful structure that supports a more egalitarian society, he does not take a gendered approach.

I finally refer to the work of peace theorist and feminist Elise Boulding. She was a renowned peace scholar who focused much of her work on gender and peace education. She called for readers to listen to women and criticized patriarchal and industrial systems. Boulding supported women's activism, and was critical of the disconnects between development, environment, and human rights projects. In addition, she was supportive of initiatives and social imaginaries that envisioned cultures of peace. Although Boulding was monumental in the disciplines of peace education, development, and feminism, I found her research more focused on NGOs and education than what I need for my work (Boulding, 2000; Boulding, 2001).

Peacebuilding in Pisco - Merging Theory and Practice

Many of the theorists mentioned use an analysis appropriate for studying the structural violence associated with capitalism and globalization; however, Mohanty provides the best framework. One implicit goal behind the Anticapitalist Transnational Feminist Practice is for western feminists to continuously self-assess and be aware of their privilege and position as an outsider throughout the entire research and pedagogical process (Mohanty, 2003). Reflection is also a key

component to peacebuilding practice and is necessary before implementing any peacebuilding development program (Schirch, 2004). Figure 1 (number 7) accounts for self-assessment as a feminist peacebuilder lives with a global to local consciousness, understands of her position as insider/outsider in the research field, and constantly reflects on her fluid position throughout her pedagogical and scholarly work.

From the work of Gustavo Esteva and Madhu Suri Prakash (1998), Mohanty acknowledges the haves (one-thirds world) and have-nots (two-thirds world). Although this distinction does not recognize colonialism, it describes people through quality of life, thereby acknowledging the elites in both the North and the South (2003, p. 242). Mohanty operationalizes Esteva and Prakash's work by calling on feminists, particularly western feminists, to theorize from the experience of two-thirds women as, "any analysis of the effects of globalization needs to centralize the experiences and struggles of these particular communities of women and girls" (Mohanty, 2003, p. 235). As women's bodies and lives are hardest hit by the impacts of globalization and as they are traditionally the first to mobilize for environmental justice and peace, (Warren & Cody, 1994, p. 6), it is clear that a "feminism without and beyond borders" (Mohanty, 2003, p. 234) is necessary to create theories that address the structural violence caused by globalization.

Mohanty also refers to the "sexual division of labor" to display how feminist scholars can colonize by universalizing the "work" experience of all women. Using statistics of single mothers, Mohanty demonstrates how being "single parents" in upper class United States can be seen as liberating, while in lower class, or the third-world context, it can be a result of poverty. This specificity of context is definitely needed in Sara's case as she was a single mother, and in a Peruvian context this can be seen as a sign of poverty, but in an American contexts, as with lesbian mothers, this can be seen as a sign of liberation (Mohanty, 2003, p. 35). The sexual division of labor must be portrayed carefully and show the social and political structures that construct livelihoods.

This is also a critique of research methodologies that generalize social and demographic data – as data production itself can be the production of power. "As a matter of fact, my argument holds for any discourse that sets up its own authorial subjects as the implicit reference, that is, the yardstick by which to encode and represent cultural others" (Mohanty, 2003, p. 21). Generalizations can reinstitute and strengthen the hegemonic and patriarchal forces underlying the capitalist system (Mohanty, 2003, p. 31). I use quantitative data to present structural context, but to avoid potentially victimizing generalizations, I predominantly approach peacebuilding through qualitative methods (number 1 in Figure 1) such as autoethnography, narrative praxis, appreciative inquiry, participant observation, and interviews.

In Sara's situation, for instance, it was important for me as a development worker to actively listen to her needs as a complex individual. Does she have access to clean water? Does she currently live in a stable home? What connections does she already have in the community? What community and state resources are already available? This process also included weighing her needs against the needs of other women in Pisco who were requesting similar assistance while simultaneously working with a very small budget. Qualitative methods have the ability to provide women and/or communities agency while recognizing assets. With a qualitative

methodology, it is more difficult to make generalizations that can lead to additional victimization and violence.

As mentioned prior, Sara was left homeless after the earthquake, and was forced to live with her brother. She cared for her three children, provided them with emotional support, but needed assistance to provide a more secure situation for her family. As most people living in Pisco, she probably grew up there and perhaps lost her job after the earthquake (Cairo, et al., 2010, p. 41). The ceiling of her brother's house was also made out of plastic tarp, so it was relatively easy for robbers to cut through the plastic. She told us that she was promised money from the Peruvian government, but after applying found out that she did not qualify for the aid.

After listening to Sara's story, it is necessary to determine what needs are being deprived by the economic, social, and physical realities that shape her life. To determine human needs, peace psychologists often use Human Needs Theory, created by John Burton, which "offers an alternative to the theory of power politics, the dominant school of thought in political science" (Christie, 1997, p. 316) by managing conflict and social justice through determining individual needs. There is little agreement concerning the relationship, hierarchical-nature, and number of human needs existing in our world, but it is evident that the need for security is denied by direct violence, and the need for economic well-being and self-determination are denied in the presence of structural violence (Christie, 1997, p. 317). I would argue that after listening to Sara's narrative that her needs of security and economic-well being were not being met.

I would next determine the structural violence, as displayed in Figure 1 number 3, that shapes Sara's situation. As the creator of Peace Theory, Johan Galtung (1969, pp. 170-171) notes (as cited in Christie, 1997, p. 323), "people die from direct violence... but they also die from structural violence, which is caused by the way social, political, and economic structures are organized". As a feminist peacebuilding practitioner, it is of utmost importance to break down and understand structural violence. Implicit, as well, in Mohanty's analysis is the, "use of historical materialism as a basic framework and a definition of material reality in both its local and micro-, as well as global, systemic dimension" (2003, p. 223).

In Sara's context, Peru has a population of 29.3 million people, a booming tourist industry, and an ever-improving quality of life. The country also boasts one of the richest indigenous cultures in the world; for example, in Cusco, the former capital of the Incan Empire, Cusqueños celebrate the summer solstice by having a party practically everyday throughout the month of June. That being said, the poverty rate is still at 27% (The World Bank, 2013), and like many Latin American countries, there is a large financial divide between the few wealthy elite and the poor majority. The government, although relatively stable with new social policies implemented by President Ollanta Humala, was haunted by corruption and terrorism throughout the 1990s. Peru's location on South America's Pacific coast also makes the country particularly vulnerable to earthquakes. When the Spanish colonized Peru, they rebuilt it with adobe, which literally crumbled during Pisco's earthquake, and of the approximately 1,000 structures that were destroyed during the earthquake, many were made of adobe. After the Pisco earthquake, the Peruvian government promised \$2,000 (6,000 Peruvian Soles) to families who lost their homes; however, many impacted families did not qualify for the funding leaving people like Sara to live illegally in homes made of plastic or live with relatives (Blondet, Vargas, Patron, Stanojevich, &

Rubiños, 2010, p. 1). In addition to losing their homes after the earthquake, almost a third of Pisqueños lost their jobs, violence was rampant throughout the city, and the local government was plagued with instability.

In addition to the political, geographic, physical, and social instability of Pisco, sanitation and infrastructure in Pisco did not meet the same standards as other cities in Peru. Before I arrived to Pisco, the NGO that I worked for *required* that I receive a typhoid vaccination. Women like Sara were most vulnerable to waterborne diseases, such as typhoid, as supported by Warren and Cody, in “large portions of the southern hemisphere women and children bear the responsibilities, determined by gender and age roles, of collecting and distributing water; thus the women and children are the ones who are disproportionally harmed by the presence of unsafe, or unpotable water” (1994, p. 7).

Many women I met in Pisco were responsible for cooking, cleaning, and caretaking of family members; therefore leaving them in constant contact with dirty water. People even warned that boiling the water was not enough to safeguard against disease. This, in turn, created a barrier as women have to buy water for their families. The unemployed, such as Sara, could sometimes not afford to buy bottled water, and perhaps had to make-do with boiling unpotable water.

In addition, the floors of the temporary plastic homes were usually made of earth, and after the earthquake, as waste disposal was not present, the city streets were always littered with trash. So if you went for a five-minute walk outside of your home, you were likely to step on human, animal, and household waste. The combination of earth floors made children and women especially vulnerable to sickness as women and young children stayed home during the day, and earthen floors are incredibly difficult to clean. In response to this and a lack of indoor plumbing, much of my NGO’s response was to build a concrete floor, provide a plumbing system and/or build a composting toilet outside of the home.

In some instances, unstable government situations, infrastructures, and livelihoods, such as that in Pisco, can result in psychological distress. Structural violence sometimes leads to secondary violence, which “includes civil wars, crime, domestic violence, substance abuse, and suicide” (Schirch, 2004, p. 23). I am not a psychologist nor were any members of the Pisco assessment team, but as with most natural disasters, there is empirical evidence that Pisqueña women were also most susceptible to Posttraumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD) (Cairo, et al., 2010). This does not mean that Sara suffered from PTSD, but it does mean that psychological trauma should be considered in development, post-conflict, and disaster relief. One of the two hospitals was destroyed, and “five months after the earthquake, only two Ministry of Health psychiatrists remained in the area to handle psychopathological disorders that might have been related to the disaster” (Cairo, et al., 2010, p. 39). As there were so few psychiatrists, a basic knowledge of trauma and its symptoms may be beneficial for NGO workers to better understand and collaborate with the individuals and community with which they are working.

I found providing outlets and a safe space for trauma relief also beneficial for my relationships with certain women in Pisco. I taught yoga to Pisqueña women twice a week, which by no means gives me the ability to professionally assess a psychological state, but after our practice, women would confide in me. Some seemed to *still* be experiencing psychological stress - three years after the earthquake. According to Cairo et al. (2010, p. 43), higher psychological stress occurred

due to the fact that the earthquake happened during mass, leaving over two-hundred people dead in the collapsed church. The tragedy in the church not only left many people with the loss of family and friends, but it also left mourning people, mostly Catholic, without a place to worship after such a traumatic event.

The secondary violence and instability created in natural disaster situations makes any approach for recovery complicated. Like all people, Sara's life is complex, and I look to peacebuilding as an approach to creating locally driven solutions. The field of peacebuilding is that, "which prevents, reduces, transforms, and helps people to recover from all forms of violence," (Schirch, 2004, p. 9). Peacebuilding also aims to "create societies that affirm human dignity through meeting human needs and protecting human rights" (2004, p. 13). By focusing on human needs and security as well as local assets and capacity, peacebuilding looks to approach both the roots of direct and structural violence through meeting immediate needs and making long-term, sustainable plans for the future. In contrast to some traditional development strategies, peacebuilding focuses on local needs and acknowledges the violent structures that support violence.

In my position with the NGO, I asked two key questions to determine appropriate approaches to Sara's situation. First, do we deny Sara funding or do we satisfy her short-term needs thus perhaps fueling globalization? Next, how do we decrease the structural violence that is occurring in Sara's life? Our scope of work as an NGO was to construct homes and buildings, so in order to meet Sara's security and economic needs, we would have to build Sara a small house/store in Pisco. The house would be secure, and she would not fear larceny or violence. She would also be able to open a store where she sold bread, bottled water, ice cream, and Coca-Cola.

All of these products are tied in some way to a transnational corporation as one can assume that the flour for the bread is imported or at least controlled by a multinational corporation, the milk is Nestle, and in addition to selling bread, she was going to sell Coca-Cola and bottled water (owned by Coca-Cola). If the global economic system crashed, so would her business. If there are petroleum shortages and prices skyrocket, her business could plummet. This does not include the environmental, social, and economic destruction that results from the corporate practices of these industries nor the multiple contradictions associated with international aid.

I know that long-term peaceful, human security cannot be met with the same system that created the insecurity, inequality, and oppression. I do believe, however, that when working towards sustainable development, defined in *Our Common Future* as the ability to, "meet the needs of the present without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs" (1987, p. 43), a combination of immediate solutions and long-term structural changes must be implemented. For this reason, I supported meeting Sara's economic and security needs by building her a home and store, and it is also for this reason, that I sometimes depart from Mohanty's framework. I cannot call myself *anti-capitalist* or even *anti-globalization* as I sometimes use capitalism and globalization to meet the immediate needs of women like Sara.

To address structural violence in Pisco, other peacebuilding actors were collaborating with my NGO to address other issues in Pisco. Peruvian mental health professionals, government officials, and development workers and planners provided additional services for people like

Sara. There were local community based organizations providing assistance to single mothers, an architectural firm from Lima that was creating a strategic reconstruction plan, and conversations throughout the town on ways to continue to clean the streets of Pisco after the earthquake. There were also universities testing different approaches to building so that homes are both more structurally sound and culturally appropriate. These conversations, research projects, and plans were happening, however, in a violent, unstable environment where women like Sara were still deprived of basic human needs.

Bringing the Classroom to Pisco

I was lucky enough to return to Pisco in the summer of 2012, this time as a university instructor teaching and leading a course I designed, called “Building and Designing with Nature in Peru”. When I returned, I was relieved to see that much of Pisco had been rebuilt. The streets that were once again intact, restaurants were open, and a new church was open for worship. Women like Sara had bakeries, everywhere, and tourism agencies had popped up to serve foreigners and Peruvians alike hoping to visit the local ancient ruins, the wildlife at the Islas Ballestas, and the dramatic beach at the Paracas National Reserve.

In Pisco, I was once again welcomed with open arms, warm smiles, and gratitude. I was also once again faced with a dilemma. How do I teach students with an anti-capitalist approach when we are doing development work? How do I prepare students for an experience that will change the way they live – for better and for worse? How do I explain to them the complexities of peacebuilding without stumbling over these same complexities myself?

I return to Mohanty when maneuvering through the paradoxes of peacebuilding, development, and pedagogy. “Feminist activist teachers must struggle with themselves and each other to open the world with all its complexity to their students (2003, p. 252). In her pedagogical work, Mohanty brings to consciousness the ways in which local practices in the one-thirds world have social, environmental, and economic implications to societies across the globe. By constantly linking the global to the local in both work and humanizing the two-thirds woman’s experience, she portrays an accurate picture of the impact globalization has on two-thirds women while demonstrating the agency a woman has in her own life (Mohanty, 2003, p. 227).

Although I did struggle, many times, the students saw the impacts of globalization, capitalism, and the complexities associated with peacebuilding and sustainable development. They learned this through assigned readings and hands-on volunteer work, but more than anything, they learned from listening to women like Sara and understanding that what she needed was not dictated or prescribed by a development agenda or a theorist, but by her own personal experience. By seeing the large system and all its contradictions and the layered, globalized realities of Sara’s life and our own lives, the students and I have a deeper understanding of how our individual, community, state and nationwide decisions influence more than just our individual selves, our local communities, and our country; our actions have, in fact, global impacts.

Finally, as I return to my original questions, I admit, that as a young scholar, I am still learning how to acknowledge privilege. Although I am still working through this, I hope to use my

privileged education as an asset in peacebuilding practice. In addition, after my analysis, I realize that my values do not change when I make the transition from theory to practice. If I theorize from the two-thirds woman, both in classroom and in practice, I am comfortable with finding solutions on a capitalist continuum because I do not determine or understand the needs of another woman. I can only work with women to find solutions that are best for their situations, and if this includes a solution that feeds the bigger economic system, that is what we will pursue.

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Power, Peace and the Political: Arendt's Alternative to Perpetual Peace

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POWER, PEACE AND THE POLITICAL: ARENDT'S ALTERNATIVE TO PERPETUAL PEACE (Essay)

Abstract

Why is it whenever we speak about peace, we begin by referring to war? Pacifism, rather than being defined as pro-peace, is seen as an 'anti-war' ideology. Peace activists do not march for peace; they protest war. It seems that our definitions of peace are always defined in relation to war. I think the answer lies in the most oft-quoted adage about war and peace, to be found in *On War* by Carl von Clausewitz: "To secure peace is to prepare for war ... war is not an independent phenomenon, but the continuation of politics by other means" (1976, 28-32). Sadly, our ability to reflect on peace without reference to war has been dramatically limited by such thinkers as well as the reality of human history that often seems to be nothing but a series of wars temporarily interrupted by moments of peace.¹ No exception to this trend, Hannah Arendt (1906-1975) nonetheless sought to appreciate peace on its own terms and not on those of war or violence. Thanks to her idiosyncratic approach to the political – the source of both immense inspiration and frustration to her readers – one can unearth a notion of peace that is not simply the cessation of war. Arendt's notion of political peace is a powerful one, rooted in plurality and relationality that arises from horizontal relations of solidarity between people. By contrast to many notions of peace that have become part of our contemporary game of politics, it is thus neither rooted in a notion of sovereignty, nor is it connected to a vertical hierarchy of violence (or the threat of violence). Given humanity's failure to create real peace, it is perhaps time to realise how problematic it is that our definition of peace is determined by our notion of war. In order to shed

ourselves of this framework, let us think outside the box of politics, a box Arendt has always sought to circumvent and consider what a powerful political peace could bring to our shared world. Yet, as is always the case when stirred by Hannah Arendt, one must begin with by introducing her distinctive notion of the political, her emphasis on the horizontality and relationality of plurality, and her seemingly powerless definition of power.

The Political, Plurality, and Power

Less than a year after her death, Maurice Cranston described Hannah Arendt as “altogether *hors catégorie*” (1976, 56). Shiraz Dossa wrote “Hannah Arendt stands out among contemporary ‘classical’ thinkers as one whose thinking constitutes political philosophy in the proper sense of the term” (1980, 310). It is precisely because of this unconventional approach that Arendt’s writings are famously difficult to classify. It is precisely because of her unique approach that I have chosen to refer to Arendt’s approach as ‘the political’, always to be distinguished from more classical definitions of politics.² I approach her notion of the political as phenomenological, or as she describes it - from the between. While Hannah Arendt never draws an explicit distinction between politics and the political, as many contemporary thinkers do for a diversity of reasons, it is clear that her phenomenological orientation to the political is not easily digestible for those familiar with the norms of both political science and political philosophy.³ An exception to this trend, David Ingram’s definition does aptly describe what Arendt understands to be central to the political.

‘Political philosophy’ is roughly cognate with thinking hard about the presuppositions underlying political order. These presuppositions include: the nature and justification of political rights and duties; the meaning and role of power – as distinct from violence – in maintaining political order; the metaphysical reality of political groups and their political relationships; the constitution of political identity and community; and the relationship of the political to the non-political, i.e., economic, social, cultural, and purely personal, aspects of human existence. (2002, 1)

Her ability to approach the political from this phenomenological perspective is what makes it methodologically innovative and also opens the possibility for unique and original insight into a realm defined by experience. Connected to this, it is important to always recall that the experience that marked Arendt’s reflection on the political was that of totalitarianism. For her, totalitarianism must be understood as the phenomenon that destroyed the political.

It was the advent of totalitarianism that sent Arendt back to free action, the source of political experience; for although totalitarianism did not succeed in destroying the world, it made clear that our entire tradition, not only of the political but of moral and legal thought as well, of religion and authority in general, had come to an end. (Kohn qtd. in Gordon 2001, 241)

As such, if one understands what is destroyed by totalitarianism (according to Arendt in *Origin*), one can begin to grasp what the political means. *First*, the political is the rediscovery of a shared

world by means of public spaces of interaction. *Second*, the political is created between people in their human condition of freedom and plurality. *Third*, the political is always related to a series of other distinctions such as: labour, work and action; freedom of the will and political freedom; and, private, intimate, social and political. With the completions of *Origins*, Arendt continued to develop her notion of the political – this time inspired by the Romans and Greeks – in the *Human Condition*. As Arendt first states in this work (and repeats in every essay thereafter), the political realm is a space of action shared by people, in the plural, and does not exist for a person, in the singular. “Action, the only activity that goes on directly between men without the intermediary of things or matter, corresponds to the human condition of plurality, to the fact that *men, not Man*, live on the earth and inhabit the world” (1958, 7). As actions consist of words and deeds, which are meaningless without the presence of other human beings, it is being together in the presence of others, communicating – whether agreeing or disagreeing – that defines the political for Arendt (1958, 58). Dialogue, debate, exchanging opinions, sharing interests creates a togetherness, the ‘post-foundational foundation of a political community’: “The revelatory quality of speech and action comes to the fore where people are *with* others and neither for nor against them—that is, sheer human togetherness” (1958, 180). The political thus only exists between individuals,⁴ and is as such a fundamentally relational term. It is this intersubjective approach to the political as well as her emphasis on what is created and shared in the between by means of words and deeds that characterises Arendt’s unique notion of the political. While it may now be clear why Arendt cannot be easily discussed in political science or philosophy courses, without a serious series of caveats, one central term must still be clarified if we are to understand how Arendt peace to the political – plurality. As the condition of the political, plurality is that which makes possible both the relationality fundamental to a public space and its agonistic interactions. More than multiculturalism, more than diversity, plurality is the fact that every single human being is utterly unique while always already in relation to others. A fellow political phenomenologist, Hwa Yol Jung describes this well.

However attractive and precious the terms *self-reliance*, *rights*, *autonomy*, and *independence* may be, they are disconnected with affiliation, association and interdependence. Interdependence, that is, interdependence cum difference, cannot and must not be anathema to the human ... condition of plurality. (2000, 149)

We are thus both absolute individual and yet never autonomous or fully independent from others. It is this tension between individuality and interdependency that characterises relationality – a horizontal asymmetrical relation between people – and that is the reason why all political spaces are always already spaces of alterity and difference. It is this emphasis on the horizontality of the political, the dynamics between people, and her emphasis on difference that allows her notion of the political to speak to so many who feel alienated from politics which is traditionally defined by a series of vertical ‘power’ relations.

The question Arendt’s notion of the political raises is: what exactly arises from a space of a plurality? The answer – power. Power is the heart of the political and the only hope for peace in the world. Let us begin with the clearest definition Arendt offers of power from *The Crisis of the Republic*:

Power corresponds to the human ability not just to act but also to act in concert. Power is never the property of an individual; it belongs to a group and remains in existence only so long as the group keep together. When we say of somebody that he is 'in power' we actually refer to his being empowered by a certain number of people to act in their name. The moment the group, from which the power originated to begin with (*potestas in populo*, without a people or group there is no power), disappears, 'his power' also vanishes. (1972, 143)

What is clear from Arendt's understanding of power is that it is not synonymous with any definition of 'power' used in political science or philosophy. The closest parallel is what is commonly referred to as 'people power' (a redundant term in Arendtian terms). To help maintain this distinction, I distinguish 'power' or what Arendt refers to as strength, (a singular endeavour), or force (only natural forces), and violence) from the terms power or empowerment. Given her phenomenological approach to the political, it is not difficult to provide examples of situations in which one can experience this power of empowerment. Consider the last time you wished to express a dissenting opinion in a group but felt afraid to do so. As soon as another person, or several people, took the risk and voiced their disagreements, you suddenly were able to muster the courage to communicate your own views. The feeling of not being alone; being supported is precisely a feeling of power that arises via empowered by others. This is an experience often described by minority groups and has played a major role in grassroots movements such as feminism, the environmental movement, conscientious objectors (to name but a few). Arendt's notion of power is both immensely empowering and reaffirming of her attitude of hope and trust in humanity's potential when acting politically.

To counter the common claim that Arendt is politically naïve, let us consider a few historical examples of power: the 'Quit India' movement that led to the peaceful ejection of the independence of India; the Solidarność movement in Poland; the civil rights movement in the States, and the student movements in 1968. All of these movements require plurality, freedom and created true political power, a power that changed the world without violence – that is without destroying it as totalitarianism had. What is most remarkable is that the potential power of plurality is greater than that of totalitarianism even without the use of violence (or the threat of violence/punishment that is currently used in politics). "Power is actualized only where word and deed have not parted company, where words are not empty and deeds not brutal, where words are not used to veil intentions but to disclose realities, and deeds are not used to violate and destroy but to establish relations and create new realities" (1958, 200). The fact that power cannot be connected to violence, strength, or force is yet another reminder of why Arendt's notion of political peace need not be connected to war (or to a vertical hierarchical chain of rulership).

Unlike traditional 'power politics', which is rooted in fear and thus always needs to plan for a future when its 'power' will be under threat, "power can be divided without decreasing it, and the interplay of powers with their checks and balances is even liable to generate more power" (1958, 201). Power increases with participation, it flourishes in plurality - proof of its non-totalitarianism ways. Yet, in addition to power's ability to generate plurality and to bring about change, power also plays a fundamental role in providing the political with a sense of security that it lacks, especially when contrasted with the continuity of labour or the products of work.

Power is what springs up between people ‘acting in concert’ (which should not be interpreted in a Habermasian sense, for it does not require any form of consensus) and yet it is also the experience that remains with us, and shared with us by those who have experienced the unforgettable feeling of empowerment (of being part of something greater than just me), that is the basis for stories for generations to come.

Power preserves the public realm and the space of appearance, and as such it is also the lifeblood of the human artifice, which, unless it is the scene of action and speech, and of the web of human affairs and relationships and the stories engendered by them, lacks its ultimate *raison d’être*. (1958, 204)

Due to its roots in plurality, power breeds power, thus further sustaining its own power. While this is to be admired and encouraged as long as it remains connected to its source (both the consenting and dissenting opinions), it seems to lack any safeguard against its transformation into a less desirable form of ‘power’. In other words, because Arendt’s notion of power is developed as a response to totalitarian domination, it seems to have the potential to become exactly that which it is intended to prevent. Power all too often seems to be on the verge of overstepping an invisible boundary that is constantly in flux between the passion of plurality and the violence of mob rule. Arendt considers this reality, which is not new to the political.

It has always been a great temptation, for men of action no less than men of thought, to find a substitute for action in the hope that the realm of human affairs may escape the haphazardness and moral irresponsibility inherent in a plurality of agents ... Generally speaking, they always amount to seeking shelter from action’s calamities in an activity where one man, isolated from all others, remains master of his doings from beginning to end. This attempt to replace acting with making is manifest in the whole body of argument against ‘democracy,’ which, the more consistently and better reasoned it is, will turn into an argument against the essentials of politics. (1958, 220)

Arendt thus accepts that plurality is the source of political power, for better or worse, and yet this does not prevent her from embracing it, putting her trust and hope in humanity. The inherent ‘cheques and balances’ of Arendt’s concept of power require an immense trust in human plurality and individual responsibility. While this confidence in human nature is rooted in her positive philosophical anthropology, almost in defiance of the horrors she herself experienced, it is not an easy position to maintain. Although we may attempt to avoid or deny this reality, Arendt argues, we should not underestimate others or ourselves and this is the fundamental political lesson she has to teach us.

So What Does This Have To Do With Peace?

Unlike Clausewitz who views ‘war as a continuation of politics by other means’, Hannah Arendt views peace as the continuation of the political. Peace is the status quo of a vibrant political space, one filled with difference and agonism from which all forms of violence are excluded. The political is thus the means to secure peace. As Arendt rarely presents her position in this manner, it is up to her readers to develop this argument. In order to do so, we will take a closer look at three pieces. The *first*, written in 1950, entitled ‘Peace or Armistice in the near East?’ was

published in *The Review of Politics* and is an analysis of the possibility of real peace in Palestine and is as timely today as it was 60 years ago. The *second*, written in 1963, entitled *On Revolution*, implicitly develops the argument that revolutions are expressions of true peace as they are spaces of political empowerment. The *third* piece is by Elisabeth Young-Bruehl, Arendt's friend and biographer, entitled 'The Promise of Hannah Arendt's Politics'. It is a speech delivered as the 2008 J. Glenn Gray Memorial Lecture and brings together Arendt's work on statelessness and the issue of peace.

The only title of Arendt's extensive oeuvre that contains the word peace is already quite revealing of her views on the relationship between peace and politics – they are adversaries. Politics may lead to the signing of an armistice, that is to the cessation of violence, but it cannot lead to peace. An armistice is, according to Arendt, is "a program and formulae from the outside" of which there are too many as concerns the Middle East and "none of them has ever been acceptable to either side" (60). It is a tool of politics, a vertical exertion of strength, a top-down method of temporarily ending violence that never permeates down into the between and is thus nothing but a precursor to further violence and war. By contrast, "a good peace is usually the result of negotiation and compromise, not necessarily a program. Good relationships between Jews and Arabs will depend upon a changed attitude toward each other ... not necessarily upon a formulae" (60). It is a horizontal relation that grows in the between (rather than bottom-up as this 'upper echelon' is not essential to the political). Peace for Arendt arises from within a shared political space, and yet this space is not possible without relationships between those who are 'at war'. It is thus essential that relationships, not necessarily of elites or politicians, but simply between the people develop.

While this might seem like a naïve fantasy, it is worth recalling that prior to the interference of the colonial 'powers', the Jews and Arabs were not arch-enemies, rather as Semitic people they shared a great deal of culture and lived without extreme violence (this is equally true of Jews and Poles for over 800 years prior to the Shoah).⁵ This is also a view expressed by Judah L. Magnes, once president of the Hebrew University, in a speech presented to the Anglo-American Committee of Inquiry in 1946 in which he claimed that 'Jewish-Arab cooperation is not only essential, it is also possible. The alternative is war.' While some may argue this is just Judaic idealism or a remnant of the past, there remain people today, such as Edward Said, who claim that Jews and Palestinians have a shared history of exile and dispossession which could be the basis of solidarity which aligns it 'in our age of vast population transfers' with 'refugees, exiles, expatriates and immigrants' (2004).

According to Arendt, it was those on 'the outside' that sowed the seeds for this enmity by means of economics (a claim that strikes me as even more true today). "The Jewish and Arab failure to visualize a close neighbor as a concrete human being has many explanations. Outstanding among them is the economic structure of the country in which the Arab and the Jewish sectors were separated by, so to speak, watertight walls" (63). Rather than build and develop Palestine together, money was thrown at Israel by many Europe countries (trying to pay off their Shoah guilt), the US and world Jewry. This economic wall is but one example of what prevents real peace from coming to the Middle East – a lack of shared projects whether political, cultural, economic or other. "With the exception of the Haifa municipality [today the most peaceful and multi-religious area in Israel], not a single common institution, not a single common political

body has been built up on the basis of [human neighborliness]” (67). This is precisely how the political can bring peace; by creating a space for the expression of hopes, desires, frustrations, needs, ideas etc, in a non-violent manner, something shared – even if only disagreements – between adversaries. Without such a space, there can only be an armistice from above and no real peace on the ground.

In the final section of her article, Arendt raises an issue that is central to *Origins* and of the utmost political importance today: the relationship between war and statelessness. The basic right Arendt has always passionately argued is essential for peace, is that of ‘the right to have rights’ (1951). What this fundamentally boils down to is a right to have a community, to belong to a shared space, to have a home in the world. Without this basic right, there are no others to ensure your rights, one is alone in the world and such an existence is for Arendt, inhuman. As long as there are stateless people, those excluded from a shared space or community, there can be no peace in the world.

The most realistic way to measure the cost to the peoples of the Near East of the events of the past year is not by causalities, economic losses, war destruction or military victories [all of which are the methods of calculation most used in politics], but by the political changes, the most outstanding of which has been the creation of a new category of homeless people, the Arab refugees. (76)

This claim reinforces that Arendt’s notion of peace arises not from above – whether human or divine but from the between. It is only when those who share a common geographical space, whether by choice or necessity, are willing to create a shared space, willing to recognize each other’s right to have rights, that peace is possible and this only by means of the political. Oddly enough, it is this basic tenant of peace that Arendt claims is the lost treasure of the revolutionary spirit. Often overlooked by scholars interested in Arendt’s writing on revolutions is the introduction to this book entitled ‘War and Revolution’. In it, she clearly distinguishes war from revolution on the basis of their relationships to power and freedom. Whereas wars justify the use of violence to bring about peace and freedom, the revolutionary spirit is one that is empowered by freedom and rejects violence (most often for the simple pragmatic reason that they have less strength than those ruling them) and can, if true to its public spirit, lead to peace. Arendt seeks to demonstrate that the revolutionary spirit, which is non-violent, has been lost because of social questions and the failure to appreciate the importance of “public freedom, public happiness, and public spirit” (221).⁶ While this rightly strikes many as nostalgic and naïve, it nonetheless is worth considering Arendt’s claim that given the nature of modern warfare, the only hope for peace is a rediscovery of this revolutionary spirit.

Foreshadowing Mary Kaldor by a half-century, Arendt argues that the nature of modern military technology has led to the blurring of lines between military and civilian realms and the possibility of total destruction. As such, governments and their militaries have been forced to make their goal the “develop[ment of] weapons that will make war impossible” (16). The world will be ruled by a permanent state of fear because of the continued threat of violence, which evidently makes any real peace impossible.

The insight that peace is the end of war, and that therefore a war is the preparation for peace, is at least as old as Aristotle, and the pretence that the aim of an armament race is to safeguard peace is even older, namely as old as the discovery of propaganda lies ... (16)

It is clear that for Arendt all violence, whether by military means or the fear of a cold war, is precisely what Clausewitz defined as peace. The question she raises is whether humanity as a species is capable of thinking beyond war, of thinking of real peace? “Could it not be that our present perplexity in this matter indicates our lack of preparedness for a disappearance of war, our inability to think ... without having in mind this ‘continuation with others means’?” (14). While today almost all wars are fought using the empowering rhetoric of ‘freedom’, Arendt aims to demonstrate – by returning to the beginning of revolutions of the 18th century – that the spirit and principle, that is now being abused by warfare, is that of freedom - a freedom opposed to violence. What she shows in the roots of both revolutions – French and American – is the immense political power that both revolutions initially demonstrated (but quickly shattered) and their ability to empower political change. In this sense, Arendt dreams of the lost treasure of the revolutionary spirit as an alternative to war, as the hope for peace in the world. “Is it too much too read into the current rather hopeless confusion of issues and arguments a hopeful indication that a profound change in international relations may be about to occur, namely, the disappearance of war from the scene of politics?” (14). While there is no doubt that Arendt is partially blinded by nostalgia for the past and exceedingly sanguine given the grim realities of life in the 20th century, her argument remains persuasive: the alternatives are clear, fear and annihilation or political peace. While the former may seem inevitable and is certainly the path we are on, the latter only requires the recognition that we must share the world with others who want nothing but to feel at home in the world.

It is precisely in this vein that Elisabeth Young-Bruehl brings together the issues of statelessness and peace. “Statelessness is the key roadblock to world politics [the political] and to world peace” (3). The existence of refugees, ‘*sans papiers*’, and illegal immigrants in the world mean that peace is not yet possible. All of these people lack a place to call home and the ability to have community which means that there remains members of humanity who refuse to recognise the other’s right to be at home in the world. Peace is a political responsibility that requires that we accept that when even one person does not have a home, no one should feel comfortable being at home in the world. What Arendt tries to demonstrate is that our fundamental relationality makes it such that it is impossible to ever truly be at home in a world in which another is denied their humanity.

She took off from the concrete experience that each person’s humanity is dependent upon every person’s (and thus every state’s) refusal to commit a crime against humanity, a crime expelling persons or people from the human circle, from humanity. Each person’s humanity is, in this sense, a microcosm of humanity [an ancient Talmudic belief]. (5)

While this is certainly true, I believe Arendt goes even further by demanding that we take positive measures to bring about peace rather than simply refusing to do more harm. So what does this political responsibility call us to do? We are called to create more shared political spaces, to transform politics into the political, to protest, to dissent, to revolt, and to challenge

those who refuse anyone the right to have rights. It is only by means of action that we ourselves are reconnected to others, to our human community, and able to avoid the greatest danger of our times – thoughtlessness. The banality of evil Arendt referred to in her controversial series of arguments published as *Eichmann in Jerusalem* was precisely his ability to disconnect himself from other human beings, to dehumanise himself and others to the point that he no longer recognised any human community. The political is the place and shared space in which we create a human community and the hope of true peace for all those with whom we share the earth.

An Alternative to the Politics of Perpetual Peace

By now it is certainly clear how Arendt's approach to peace differs from those inspired by Clausewitz (whether realists or just war theorists etc), but it is not yet clear how her approach differs from those with whom she shares the same goals such as Kant's vision of perpetual peace. While there is no doubt that Arendt was inspired by Kant's political and aesthetic writings (his epistemological and moral writings to a lesser degree), and shared his dream of world peace, her approach to peace is in fact a critique of Kant's vision of perpetual peace. In this final section, I will briefly consider three aspects of her critique: *first*, Arendt's notion of relationality assumes a basic heteronomy rather than autonomy as the latter prevents any real peace in her view; *second*, Arendt is highly critical of any approach to peace that does not challenge the sovereignty of the nation-state; and *third*, Kant's 'right of world citizenship' does not fully address the contemporary reality of statelessness that was of central concern to Arendt's understanding of peace (as well as to Derrida whose views in this regard are closely related).

Arendt's peace is a powerful one; a power rooted in intersubjective relationality. What is perhaps surprising is that power is in fact weakened by the idea/ideal of autonomy. As such, Arendt is highly critical of Kant's prioritization of autonomy over heteronomy. It is her contention that this characteristic Enlightenment thinking (on autonomy, individuality, independence, etc.) is partially responsible for the rise of the private realm at the cost of a shared public space required for the political. Peace cannot be created from in the between if those individuals do not experience and recognize themselves as fundamentally interdependent, inter-related and as co-creators and co-responsible for the world. While Arendt appreciates individuality, she remains highly critical of any approach to the political (or the moral) that fails to recognize that the world we live in is one of plurality rather than singularity. It is for this reason that peace can only arise from within a space of plurality, a plurality that is heteronymous.

While this first critique is what separates her from most liberal theorists, it is her view on sovereignty that is most critical of Kant's vision for perpetual peace. The political is antithetical to any form of state sovereignty. All of Kant's preliminary articles still remain too firmly rooted in the notion of statehood, a notion that can scarcely be separated from notions of nationalism. Kant opens *Perpetual Peace* with a phrase that fails to recognize exactly what foundation is necessary for a real peace.

WE need not try to decide whether this satirical inscription, (once found on a Dutch innkeeper's signboard above the picture of a churchyard) is aimed at mankind in general, or at the rulers of states in particular, unwearying in their love of war, or perhaps only at the philosophers who cherish the sweet dream of perpetual peace. (1917, 106)

It is precisely Kant's inability to differentiate between a horizontal peace 'aimed at humankind in general', a vertical peace created by states and an elitist peace of a few philosopher kings, that distinguishes Arendt's peace from his vision. It is only the former, a horizontal relational political peace, that is worthy of pursuing. Kant remains unable to appreciate that peace must arise between people and not between states. While his second (and third) definitive articles do suggest some limits to the rights of the state, for Arendt the entire approach to the political rooted in state sovereignty is one that fails to recognize that not only is this the cause of statelessness, which makes peace impossible, it is also because of our vertical model of politics based on the state's 'power' that we so often experience a sense of world-alienation that draws us into the private sphere and away from our fundamental relationality. The paradox Arendt describes in her earliest writings is the following:

If the nation-state secures the rights of citizens, then surely it is a necessity; but if the nation-state relies on nationalism and invariably produces massive numbers of stateless people, it clearly needs to be opposed. If the nation-state is opposed, then what, if anything, serves as its alternative? (Butler 2007, 25)

Her response to this paradox is one that is clearly inspired by Kant and yet nonetheless critical of his failure to recognise the dangerous link between nations and states, as well as his failure to challenge the 'powers' of states. Instead, she seeks a federation that refuses any claims to national sovereignty as well as any claims to individual sovereignty – only a federation rooted in plurality and relationality can bring about peace. In more concrete terms, she refers to a federated Jewish-Arab state and is highly critical of any form of nationalism, whether Zionist or Palestinian. Defining the political by means of nations or states destroys power in the name of vertical 'power' and leads us further away from peace by creating more statelessness. "In 'Zionism Reconsidered' (1944), she argued forcefully that the risks of founding a state on principles of Jewish sovereignty could only aggravate the problem of statelessness that had become increasingly acute in the wake of the First and Second World Wars" (Butler 2007). Thus, as early as 1944, Arendt already foresaw what the future of the Middle East would be without real peace between Jews and Arabs – a divided space defined by fear, statelessness and violence.

Given that Kant could not have foreseen the tragic reality of statelessness today, he is to be immeasurably applauded for even suggesting that there be a notion of world citizenship. Nonetheless, it does not fully address the contemporary reality of statelessness partially due to the limitations of universal hospitality. While Derrida has rightly shown that any form of unconditional hospitality is as impossible as is limiting hospitality in the name of justice, Kant fails not only to see the tension between this right of universal hospitality and state sovereignty, but also how easily it is – at least in the current century – to dehumanize another or to transform a stranger into an enemy. While Kant sees the earth as by right shared by all human beings, and the importance of learning to live on it together, he greatly limits the meaning of hospitality by allowing states to refuse entry, to define the length and terms of entry, and denying any permanent right to hospitality. "Hospitality signifies the claim of a stranger entering foreign territory to be treated by its owner without hostility ... It is not a right to be treated as a guest to which the stranger can lay claim ... but he has a right of visitation" (1917, 138). Arendt's *Jewish Writings*, as well as her 1951 *Origins*, clearly demonstrate the importance of challenging a states

right to refuse, a states right to decide who is a guest, an enemy or stranger and the Importance of founding this right to have rights, this right to belong not on state sovereignty but on intersubjective relationality, on a community of difference that arises from sharing a space and creating a world together. While Kant appreciates the importance of horizontal relations in the effort towards peace, he fails to realize the friction between the horizontal and the vertical. It is precisely in Arendt's courage to challenge the vertical politics of peace that she develops a relational peace that is not only free from the violence of war, but also free from 'power politics' that prevent real peace.

Conclusions

Hannah Arendt once said 'You know the left think that I am conservative, and the conservatives think I am left or I am a maverick or God knows what. And I must say that I couldn't care less. I don't think the real questions of this century get any kind of illumination by this kind of thing.' It is precisely such an idiosyncratic response that defines Hannah Arendt's view on peace. She had no interest for such politics, rather she dedicated her life to the search for the political in the name of real peace. She recognised that a sincere interest in peace called for a reflection that went beyond the violent and speechless confines of war. It is this latter realisation that brought Arendt to develop a notion of the political rooted in power and plurality. Without her unique approach to the political as a space of empowerment by means of words and deeds, Clausewitz's adage rings true. Any peace defined by politics, defined by those who desire to maintain their 'power', any peace that is based on exclusion – such as that of the state – cannot ever be anything other than a precursor to war. What Arendt has clearly demonstrated is that real peace must be fundamentally rooted in power, relationality and plurality. What is now essential is that humanity realise that politics is a far cry from the political and that only together, in the between, can we begin to change this.

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¹ While it is nearly impossible to find a moment in recorded history when one part of the globe was not engaged in warfare, it is true that the windows of peace have differed significantly in terms of both length and quality.

² Dick Howard also helps to clarify this distinction when he writes, "the framework of meaning defined by the political is not itself the object of everyday politics" (2002, 131).

³ Arendt's phenomenological method is a source of some of her valuable insights; it is also responsible for some of her weaknesses. ... Thanks to it she focuses her attention on structures rather than formal features and analyses activities and experiences as integral wholes. Further, she pays close attention to the differences between activities and appreciates their distinctive character, thereby avoiding positivist reductionism. Again she does not analyse concepts in the abstract but locates them in their experiential contexts and uncovers the structures of underlying experiences. (Parekh 1981, 182-3).

⁴ Furthermore, what is equally significant is that it both unites and differentiates individuals, a tense but critical combination.

⁵ She refers to several treaties that demonstrate this claim: the friendship treaty of 1919 between King Feisel of Syria and Chaim Weizmann and the 1922 Jewish-Arab conference in Cairo "where the Arabs showed themselves willing to agree to Jewish immigration within the limitations of the economic capacity of Palestine" (71).

⁶ Analogously, she claims, in *The Human Condition*, that the public political realm is being hollowed out by the social.

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What Does a Reciprocal Peace Process Look Like?

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WHAT DOES A RECIPROCAL PEACE PROCESS LOOK LIKE? (Essay)

Abstract

A peace process is a relationship between parties in conflict that aims to resolve or transform existing discord. Peace processes usually involve group representatives—states, nations or collectivities and they are commonly conceived of as a top-tier or a ‘track one’ process. The reality is that a peace process affects and therefore should include members from every facet of the social world from the individual to the group and vice versa. But can a peace process build relationships between societal levels? Reciprocities are human transactions that provoke future interaction. A reciprocal peace process creates or sustains social ties between parties in discord. Building upon Diamond and McDonald’s conceptualization of the nine levels of diplomacy (1996) this paper contemplates what a reciprocal peace process looks like and considers if multi-track focused processes permit a creation or transformation of positive relationships within the peacemaking system.

PEACE PROCESS DEFINITIONS

The diplomatic and political efforts to negotiate a resolution to a conflict, esp. a long-standing conflict <http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/peace+process>

Any social process undertaken by governments who want their citizens to believe they are trying to avoid armed hostilities <http://wordnetweb.princeton.edu/perl/webwn?s=peace%20process>

A situation wherein indigenous societies must negotiate permanent and legally binding issues without being given anything with which to do so, usually by way of unelected officials
<http://www.kabobfest.com/2011/07/the-dictionary-of-u-s-political-speech.html>

Introduction

Reciprocity a fundamental component altering relationships between individuals, groups or nations in discord. Defined as “the evolutionary basis for cooperation,” (Molm et. al., 2007, p. 199) and the building block of “social fabric,” (Galtung et. al., 2000) reciprocity is an exchange between parties that can remove social obstacles and encourage future cooperation (Andersen, et. al., 2008). The following paper explores what impact reciprocity has in building peace? Can societies, governments or other representatives decide to engage ‘so called enemies’ and stimulate positive relationships using reciprocity?

Utilizing the social constructs of diplomacy envisioned by Diamond and McDonald in their book ‘Multi-Track Diplomacy: a systems approach to peace’ (1996) this paper investigates if and how multi-level peace processes utilize reciprocity. Once the parameters of reciprocity have been determined this paper will investigate nine international peace processes to evaluate whether or not the bonds of affective relationships have been created and if there is space in ‘multi-track’ diplomacy for reciprocity.

Because “only one person need perceive conflict in order that it may exist,” (Tidwell, 1998) modern discord between persons, groups or nations can be conceived of as a perception that signifies a lack of, or, breakdown in relationship. Lederach considers that conflicts are a form of dysfunctional relationship but that a ‘damaged relationship’ is not only a source of the discord but instrumental in its ultimate resolution. He posits that repairing a dysfunctional relationship can occur as long as the reconciliation is “built on mechanisms that engage the sides of a conflict with each other as humans” (Lederach, 1997, p.26). Relationships are not static and affections can shift gears repeatedly over-time but ‘relationship’ as a concept captures the dynamic exchanges that transpire between parties that allow for an endless possibility of transforming human interaction (Saunders, 1999). Nevertheless, engaging one another as ‘human’ can be problematic when forms of conflict resolution such as dialogue or mediation, are disabled by ‘broken’ relationships that lead to very minimal contact. A goal in broken or damaged relationships is to stimulate positive encounters to instigate or re-instigate contact constructively.

Conceptualizing Violence

A common reason that relationships break down is the presence, incidence or perception of violence. Violence can include actions that result in physical harm (direct), structural (indirect) violence such as discrimination or oppression and culturally condoned aggression, either direct or indirect in nature (Galtung 1990). Violence leads to negative relationships and constructive relationships that foster positive interactions are often lacking once a conflict has become established. Because conflict can be conceived of as rational or symbolic—seeking resources or

recognition—or both (Lebovic, 2003), transforming conflict is challenging and many attempts can falter. Attempting to transform negative relationships into positive relationships might mean avoiding both the rational and symbolic forms of the conflict and instead focusing on the human relationships themselves.

What is a Peace Process?

The phrase ‘peace process’ has come to refer to a gradual process in which steps are taken to resolve a difficult conflict (Quandt, 2005). A peace process seeks to contribute to conflict transformation in an existing theatre of discord where perhaps both, perhaps one or perhaps neither party is ready or ‘ripe’ for change (Zartman, 2001).

Peace processes can involve encounter, dialogue, resolutions or restraint and many are modeled on dispute resolution techniques that use mediation, negotiation, diplomacy, and cooperation to solve problems with equal parts empathy and assertiveness (Saunders, 1999). Peace processes are neither time-bound nor cyclical and many attempts may be required. Peace processes can be derailed by spoilers—individuals or organizations invested in continued discord or only partial (negative) peace (Galtung, 1996; MacGinty, 2006). And, peace processes are frequently organized in terms of ‘official’—track 1 or diplomatic—processes and informal components and practices that seek to alter public perception and intergroup relationships (Diamond & McDonald, 1996).

Diamond and McDonald conceive of a nine level system of peacemaking that includes ‘multi-tracks’ of diplomacy: governments (track 1), professionals/NGOs (track 2), business/commerce (track 3), private citizens (track 4), education/training (track 5), activism (track 6), religion (track 7), funding (track 8) and the media/communications (track 9) (1996). The ‘multi-track’ system recognizes that peace is impacted by both formal and informal processes and by groups and individuals in a variety of community roles from a variety of social perspectives. In the multi-track system peace processes occur from myriad directions and contribute to goals of reconciliation and well-being. Diamond and McDonald envision that peacemaking is a system, “a complex organism, like a family...[with] different parts...[and] different roles” (1996, p.9) and their analysis seeks to recognize the value of building peace at all levels of society between individuals, groups, genders, and cultures. Importantly, they illuminate the impossibility of ‘shared culture’ and the difficulty crossing tracks professionally, ideologically and objectively. While a track 3 enterprise may want to create a profit to uplift marginalized communities a track 1 initiative may want a peace accord that mobilizes international actors to behave. As those on track 7 see their role in terms of spiritual well-being a track 6 group may be more interested in empty bellies and bleeding injuries than divinities. Despite such cross-track challenges, Diamond and McDonald identify that there is among all levels a shared commitment that motivates individuals or groups from every track and that although the system is uncoordinated and tracks act independently it nevertheless shares a “positive ideal” that can contribute to building peace (1996, p. 17).

In *Multi-Track Diplomacy* (1996) Diamond and McDonald identify how a multitude of social actors can contribute to peacemaking and they recognize that making peace includes the insight that peace processes occur all around us in myriad incarnations. A peace process is indeed a ‘process’ a set of incremental steps that either achieve or fail to achieve a particular aim. And

while Diamond and McDonald (1996) recognize the importance of relationships in peacemaking—indeed they conceive of their systems approach as an interactivity of relationships—they envision ‘diplomacy’ as the main social process used to foster interaction and connectivity. They imagine diplomacy as a practice that can be utilized by a variety of actors to form relationships and then expedite an intention or objective. Diplomacy differs from reciprocity in one very important way. Diplomacy is a systematic, interactive process that uses relationship to attain an objective. In reciprocity, the relationship is the goal. Diamond and McDonald imagine that the use of diplomacy leads to an increase in peace. They perceive that positive peace is not something you can measure but rather, that it is “a potential, a possibility, an ever-changing condition... not an objective to be accomplished by a certain date but a vision, a direction in which to head, one step at a time” (2006, p.13). As a tool of conflict transformation, diplomacy sets out to use relationship as a way to build peace. As a tool of connectivity reciprocity sets out build relationship, to impact discord and possibly prevent future conflict altogether.

Reciprocity

Reciprocity is a social medium that exchanges aid (actions or resources) in the present for cooperation in the future (Molm, 2010). Through reciprocity social ties between strangers become stronger and reciprocity becomes an ‘art,’ the goal of which is to secure for the self (or others) favors, resources or privileges that benefit the individual, group, society or the world at large. In laypersons terms and game theory scholarship reciprocity is called a ‘tit for tat’ or ‘you scratch my back and I will scratch yours’ methodology (Fudenberg & Tirole, 1991) But there is more to the art of reciprocity in social functions than merely being a social medium of exchange, gratitude, indebtedness and obligation. Reciprocity breeds reciprocity. Social psychology illumines that the role of reciprocity in social interactions actually creates the conditions for the return of behaviors and attitudes (Larson, 1998). An end in itself, the art of reciprocity uses an exchange of benefits to secure and stimulate future interaction. Once a reciprocal bond is created a relationship results and as the foundation of human social interaction reciprocity not only fosters constructive interaction in the present but it may act to inhibit destructive relations in the future.

Reciprocity can be positive or negative, direct or indirect, instrumental or symbolic (Molm et.al. 2007). Positive reciprocity is considered cooperative and kind while negative reciprocity is punitive and includes acts “of harming those who wrong us” (Friedman & Nirvikar 2003, p.155). Analysis of long-term conflicts will often involve popular and ‘official’ histories that document activities perceived of as violent and destructive by one side of the conflict and therefore justifying or necessitating retaliatory actions ‘they did *this* so we did *this*.’ Indeed, the strength of negative reciprocity is evident when investigating how past experiences and present perceptions frame interactions between parties. Negative reciprocity, although destructive and retributive does signal the existence of a relationship and the goal in a relationship of negative reciprocity is to stop damaging interaction immediately and contribute only constructive benefits going forward.

Direct forms of reciprocity involve exchanges of benefits between parties while in indirect reciprocity an actor who receives a benefit may, instead of reciprocating the original ‘giver’ turn and benefit others (Molm et. al., 2007). In a direct reciprocal relationship the primary parties

exchange and benefit from a closed circle of prosperity while in indirect relationships the recipients can include outside individuals. While direct reciprocity can be seen to stimulate relationships between individuals indirect reciprocity has a wider pool of beneficiaries. In global discords where notions of history and civilization transpire, indirect reciprocity may have a greater impact on conflict by conceiving of the scope of exchange, as it does, to include and therefore benefit outsiders. Indirect reciprocity can here be considered a way of broadening relationships of direct reciprocity to impact, include and encounter others.

Instrumental reciprocity refers to the intrinsic ‘value’ of a benefit (Molm et. al., 2007). Assessed monetarily or in terms of its utilitarian quality, the ‘benefit’ in instrumental reciprocity can alternately be reciprocated with exchanges more or less generous than the original benefit or equal to the original benefit creating a “forward-looking (or equilibrium)” reciprocity (Cabral et. al., 2011, p.1). symbolic reciprocity refers to:

The value conveyed by the act of reciprocity itself...Acts of reciprocity provide symbolic value by conveying information about the partner and relationship. This information allows actors to make inferences about the partner’s intentions and potential benefits of interaction with the partner. Information also conveys sentiments that create affective bonds (Molm et. al., 2007, p.201).

In a peace process, the symbolic value of a reciprocal benefit is important because although instrumental reciprocity is valuable and can create a “space of recognition” (Lederach, 2005, p.35) between parties when forming relationships, symbolic reciprocity carries along with it significance “over and above the instrumental value of the benefits provided” (Molm et. al., 2007, p.201) creating “high levels of trust, mutual regard, and feelings of commitment” (Molm et. al., 2007, p.200). Symbolic reciprocity adheres to important cultural traits of understanding that see positive gestures as valuable and perhaps even more valuable than the item of exchange itself echoing the maxim that ‘it is the thought that counts’ not a particular instrumental manifestation.

In order for a reciprocal benefit to be considered symbolic it requires three qualities: it has to be a long-term exchange of benefits, there must be a sense of uncertainty regarding a return of benefits and it must be deliberate (Molm et.al. 2007). When exchanges are uncertain, voluntary and occurring over a period of time reciprocal benefits obtain symbolic value resulting in solidarity, affective regard and social bonding. That ‘uncertainty’ becomes a tool of mutability wherein parties’ can increase positive affection through action and the possibility of future beneficial interaction strengthens the bond of beneficial relationship.

The importance of beneficial relationships to transforming conflict lies in the value of previous social interactions. We are, “social creatures that have the capacities to identify and recall the earlier behavior of specific individuals, and to reward or punish them contingent on earlier behavior” (Friedman & Nirvikar, 2003, p.156). In this regard, the relationship of the future is contingent upon interactions in the past. Therefore, in order to transform conflict, instigating and sustaining positive reciprocity is critical to forming and maintaining relationships. Conflict transformation, “is focused on building relationship between antagonists” (Lederach, 1997, p.34) and reciprocity is a direct contributor to the creation of affective

social bonds and new and stronger relationships. Peace builders focus on relationships because “it connotes the potential of transformation by changing the way people interact—by focusing on the interaction itself” (Saunders, 1999, p.33). When interaction is cooperative and caring it can be termed positive reciprocity but when interactions are violent they almost certainly result in more violence (negative reciprocity).

Conflicts come in various forms and contain many types of violence.

Violence can be distinguished by its scale, such as interpersonal or collective violence; by the social space in which it occurs, such as violence in the home or in the public sphere; by its motivating force, such as ‘domestic’, political, racial, terrorist violence and the like; and by its intentionality, which contrasts direct violence with indirect structural violence (Brewer, 2010, p.16).

Because conflict contains some or many forms of violence when seeking peace it may be useful to focus on future nonviolent interactions rather than past violent actions. A peace process seeks to “restore the connective tissue necessary to...reestablish a functioning society” (Saunders, 1999, p.26). However, a peace process is often concerned with negotiating social values of exchange in order to produce a “concrete agreement” between adversaries and as such may focus on interests instead of issues and settlements instead of relationships (Saunders, 1999, p.85.).

A Reciprocal Peace Process

A reciprocal peace process does not result in a contract or negotiated settlement, rather, it forms beneficial partnerships of “unconditional altruism” that can transform prior antagonisms and form long-term positive regard resulting in continued constructive interaction (Kolm, 2008, p.17). If a peace process is to be considered reciprocal it has to include a number of features: it has to seek or result in a long-term relationship, it has to provide benefit to those targeted in the reciprocal exchange and it has to contribute to the goals of positive peace and therefore not only achieve “peace by peaceful means” but act to prevent future violence (Galtung 1996).

There are thousands of peace processes that seek or have sought to contribute to making peace. In the following section this paper will briefly describe the parameters of nine different peace processes to investigate whether they can be considered reciprocal peace processes. While the scope of this paper does not allow for an exhaustive exploration of each peace process the goal of this analysis is to identify the main actors, intentions, instruments and outcomes of these processes. While many organizations and collectives seek to foster development and well-being in places of poverty and limited infrastructure the following peace processes have been selected because they are active in areas with prior or ongoing inter-ethnic/national violent conflict.

Track 1-Governments: Dayton Accords (Bosnia)

Actors

The Bosnian war erupted in 1992 as a result of the breakup of the former Yugoslav Republic. The war lasted for three years and combatant groups emerged from three ethno-nationalist groups: Orthodox Christian Serbs, Catholic Croats and Muslim Bosniaks. The territorial goals of

the war pitted the Serb Army, Army of Republika Srpska, against a coalition of Croats and Bosniaks, the Army of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina. The conflict was bloody, often targeting civilians and involved ethnic cleansing and rape camps.

Intentions

As the Serbs were seen as the aggressors in the war the Dayton Accords (1995) sought to end the Bosnian conflict and to bring political stability to the territory of Bosnia-Herzegovina. The intention of this peace accord was to end the military confrontations, stop civilian attacks and set up two distinct units within Bosnia—Republika Srpska and the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina—in order to separate and stabilize the warring ethnic groups.

Instruments

Several international actors created a contact group that arranged for the warring factions to meet in Dayton, Ohio and discuss the parameters of a peace accord. Peace talks were mobilized by participants from NATO, the EU, Russia and the USA and included the President of Serbia (Slobodan Milošević), Croatian (Franjo Tuđman), and Bosnia-Herzegovina (Alija Izetbegović) and American Secretary of State Warren Christopher.

Outcomes

The Dayton Accords ended violence in Bosnia and resulted in limited ethnic harmony between the former combatants. The three ethno-nationalist groups involved in the dispute are even more separate than prior to the conflict, few ethnic refugees have been able to return home and less than 10% of war criminals have been arrested. The Dayton Accords stopped the armed conflict but have done little to transform ethnic animosity or produce a harmonious multiethnic state.

Track 2-Professionals: Truth and Reconciliation Commission (South Africa)

Actors

The Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) was set up in Cape Town, South Africa to provide a venue of testimony for both victims and perpetrators of the Apartheid—the racial segregation of whites and blacks in South Africa. In addition to allowing speakers to bear witness to their experiences the TRC worked through three different restorative justice groups: The Human Rights Violations Committee, the Amnesty Committee and the Reparation and Rehabilitation Committee.

Intentions

The goal of the TRC was to work toward reconciliation between victims and perpetrators of the Apartheid system, to allow offenders to ask for forgiveness and to empower the victims of Apartheid to become active participants in community restoration. The TRC conducted their investigations in public and were permitted the legal right to grant amnesty to criminals who confessed their offenses. The intention of the TRC was to work toward national unity in a country that had experienced decades of racial division and violence.

Instruments

South Africa passed the Promotion of National Unity and Reconciliation Act in 1995 as a legal mandate to provide restorative justice in post-Apartheid South Africa. The committees were set up to aid the victims of racial aggression, investigate human rights abuses and to consider amnesty applications from the perpetrators of violence.

Outcomes

Choosing to take a reparative approach to post-Apartheid justice instead of a punitive style resulted in the opportunity for individuals to share their experiences, their truths and thus create a public record of the atrocities. The TRC has been criticized as a vehicle for testimony rather than justice however, it was instrumental in transitioning from the Apartheid regime to a democratic South Africa and as it stands as the first vehicle of its kind it was successful in helping some people put away the violence past to build a more peaceful future.

Track 3-Commerce/Business: Path to Peace (Rwanda)***Actors***

Rwanda Path to Peace is a non-profit organization that includes the United Nations Development Fund for Women (UNIFEM) businesswomen from the United States and Rwandan weavers, some from the association of genocide widows, to produce and sell traditional Rwandan baskets at Macys—an American department store.

Intentions

The Rwanda Path to Peace group strives to provide income to rural women in Rwanda and seeks to uplift the economy of Rwanda (and the livelihoods of women, girls and their families) through a mandate of ‘trade not aid.’ The collective makes ‘peace’ baskets and the women are using their enterprise to profit personally and normalize inter-ethnic relations in their weaving groups.

Instruments

This organization partners with local Rwandan women weavers to make and transport baskets to sell both in store and online. The women and their daughters make traditional sweet grass baskets and Macys sells them and then redistributes a portion of the profit back to the individual weavers.

Outcomes

Rwanda Path to Peace is one of many peace building enterprises that seeks to use local/global entrepreneurship to both support local development and transform previously isolating—village based—commerce to find new and profitable markets. This project reports that it employs several thousand women and contributes to the livelihoods and well-being of thousands of Rwandan citizens. The peace baskets are made by women from both Hutu and Tutsi backgrounds and have lifted thousands of families out of poverty.

Track 4-Private Citizens: The Sulha Peace Project (Israel/ Palestine)***Actors***

The Sulha Peace Project (SPP) is a citizen based encounter group that brings Israelis and Palestinians together in Israel and the West Bank to meet, talk, pray and embrace one another’s ‘full humanity.’ SPP includes West Bank Palestinians from Bethlehem, Jericho, Jenin and Nablus and Israelis from Tel Aviv and Jerusalem, from kibbutzim and development towns. The SPP welcomes participants from both religious and secular.

Intentions

The goals of the Sulha Peace Project are ‘to build bridges over the walls of fear, anger and anguish, and to open a common space of curiosity and hope’ and to embrace individuals from dissimilar ethnic communities as fully human. The intention of SPP is to soften hearts in a region hardened by years of violence and suffering.

Instruments

The Project organizes meetings throughout the year and has been conducting togetherness groups for over twelve years. The meetings include monthly ‘tribal fires’ that bring participants together in primal acts of togetherness that include food, music and personal testimony and shelter practices that create space for workshops and encounter. These processes bring diverse groups together along and among the tapestry of identities within the region. SPP conducts youth projects that bring Israeli and Palestinian young men and women together prior to Israeli military service and seek to build bridges between ethnic groups, genders and age groups.

Outcomes

SPP participants relate the outcome of their participation in personal testimony such as: "My image of the Jewish people was that they are my enemy and want to kill me no matter what. Now I like to build relationships with those people, and work together on changing each side's hostile perception of the other side," and "being together we learn to understand that pain, fear and mistrust are the same for the Palestinian Arab and the Jew in our country and anywhere in the world. The youth, the work and the egalitarian meeting that we've had have empowered my wish to work for peace."

Track 5-Education/Training: Peacebuilding & Development Institute (Sri Lanka)***Actors***

The Peacebuilding and Development Institute in Sri Lanka (PBD-SL) is an organization that partners with CordAid, Columbo University and International Alert Sri Lanka to provide regional training, courses and learning opportunities to South Asians working towards peace. Taught by quality academics and practitioners, the organization provides regional training for adults and youth and utilizes local field professionals and regional experts.

Intentions

PBD-SL works to provide training programs for South Asian NGOs that support peacebuilding practices, training and research. This tiered initiative seeks to respond to regional actors involved in fostering peace and development by supplying training and practical modules that allow participants to ‘live their learning’ on the ground and increase their effectiveness as soon as possible. The goals of PBD-SL are to share practical expertise and conduct research that analyses organizational effectiveness.

Instruments

PBD-SL offers core and specialized courses throughout the year in Sri Lanka that incorporate theoretical foundations and practical applications. Geared toward capacity building, the courses offered by PBD-SL are offered by professionals from a variety of fields including: mental health, economics, gender integration, monitoring and evaluation, peacebuilding, development and advocacy. General courses are offered in Sri Lanka as well as specialized courses throughout South Asia.

Outcomes

Started in 2009 the organization does not communicate their impact in their literature. They assert: ‘Practical in approach and based on the realities of the practitioners engaged; our training and learning programmes go beyond understanding what is involved in peacebuilding and development to knowing how to do it and to do it well.’

Track 6-Activism: The Ulster Project (Northern Ireland)***Actors***

The Ulster Project is a Christian based peace activist group that seeks to expose teens from Northern Ireland to the American melting pot through cultural exchanges. In these exchanges Northern Irish Youth between the ages of 14 and 16—‘half Catholic and half Protestant; half girls and half boys’—share accommodations with American host families.

Intentions

The project seeks to trigger change in the youth of Northern Ireland by giving them experiences of cultural encounter and peacemaking. The US, as a safe environment, provides a space of training and education that encourages Northern Irish teens to meet American youth, bridge cultural divides, eradicate militancy and behave nonviolently.

Instruments

Youth are sent to the US to stay with host families that share their confessional group and they participate with adult counselors from Northern Ireland who facilitate month long peace training: ‘The entire group of Northern Irish and American teens meet almost daily for activities, including encounter sessions, social activities, community service projects, and Christian worship.’

Outcomes

The Ulster projects proclaims that ‘Over 8,000 youth from Northern Ireland have participated overall through the end of the 2012 Project, and, to our knowledge, none have ever become paramilitary on either side. Moreover, the number of graduates from Northern Ireland is increasing by about 400 each year.’

Track 7-Religion: The Interfaith Peace Project (USA)***Actors***

The Interfaith Peace Project (IPP) is an American NGO and religious encounter group that invites educators and faith-based practitioners to form inter and intra-faith based learning groups.

Intentions

The IPP seeks to use spirituality as a platform for learning about peoples and practices from other faiths. Its goals include fostering tolerance, understanding and peace by celebrating the diversity of faith and the unity of humanity.

Instruments

The IPP creates learning spaces in formal and informal settings that include encounter groups, interfaith learning, dialogue sessions, pilgrimage, youth and child peace outreach and resource rooms where interested participants can learn about peace from a variety of religious traditions.

The IPP is active internationally and has an interfaith resource center based in Antioch California.

Outcomes

Yearly newsletters from the IPP showcase events and meetings that give testimonies to the success of the project including reflection from participants of interfaith encounters with Native America, Sufi, Yogic, Sikh and Christian traditions. Participants share their gratitude and learning about the ways of others.

Track 8-Funding: The United Nations Peacebuilding Fund (GLOBAL)

Actors

The United Nations Peacebuilding Fund (UNPF) support peacebuilding operations in 22 countries. This multi-donor global fund provides money for post-conflict initiatives that provide critical peacebuilding infrastructure. The UNPF supports projects in Africa, Asia, South Pacific and the Americas. Financial support comes from UN member nations and international donor agencies.

Intentions

The UNFP provides four important activities for building peace: peace agreements, coexistence training, economic development and human and technical capacity building with a particular interest in gender mainstreaming and supporting human rights. The fund seeks to deliver short, medium and long-term support to stimulate peace initiatives immediately post-conflict and before larger donor supports can be secured.

Instruments

Projects vary from one locale to another but commonly funded initiatives include counseling services, (psychological, social, financial, legal) health clinics, documentation assistance, election support, dialogue and conflict resolution preparation, employment assistance (adult and youth), victim recognition and human rights training.

Outcomes

The UNFP has supports innovative pilot peace projects and contributed to peace-building in every location in which they operate. This fund supports national capacity building, employment, education, disarmament, and liaison by working with governments, donor agencies and civil society groups. Some criticism has emerged that gender mainstreaming intentions have limited expressions on the ground and that local partners are often unaware of the structure and identity of UNFP funded projects.

Track 9-Communications: Media for Peace (NEPAL)

Actors

Media for Peace (MFP) is a multicultural radio station (Radio Nepal) and democracy advocacy resource group. MFP is an inter-governmental collective including the Nepal Ministry of Information and the Japan International Cooperation Agency that schedules religious, economic, democratic, musical, cultural, local and regional news information. The Radio Nepal broadcasts are created in cooperation with Asia Pacific Broadcasting Union and Asia-Pacific Institute for Broadcasting Development.

Intentions

The MFP project wants uses communications media to support peacebuilding and democracy in Nepal. MFP seeks to provide timely and accurate information to people in Nepal about Nepal. 'This project is positioned within Japan's program to support democracy in Nepal and aims to create an accurate, impartial and fair media for the democratization process through the revision of media policy and developing the capacity of media.'

Instruments

Using radio broadcasts and online streaming MFP provides access and programming content for Radio Nepal. Radio Nepal broadcasts by short wave and FM radio to 80% of the Nepal and is available by Internet broadband and WIFI where available. Radio Nepal broadcasts in English, Sanskrit and Nepali.

Outcomes

Launched in 2011 as a way of addressing misinformation regarding the peace process, intergroup rivalry and the constitutional progress the MFP initiative has yet to list impact testimonials on their website.

Evaluating Reciprocity

In order for a peace process to achieve symbolic reciprocity it must either seeking or resulting in a long-term relationship, it has to provide benefit to those targeted in the reciprocal exchange and it has to contribute to the goals of positive peace and act to prevent future violence. By these standards only one of the aforementioned peace processes is a reciprocal peace processes.

Several peace processes provide benefits and all contribute to positive peace and a reduction in violence but only the Track 4 Sulha Peace Project (Israel/Palestine) seeks to create long-term bridge building between cultures, communities, and individuals through frequent encounters and commitment to peace. The Ulster Project has long-term goals but there is no evidence that the cultural exchanges are repeated. Therefore, the Sulha Peace Project, because it has been running for over a decade and functions to create space for an exchange to benefits in frequent and ongoing encounters creates affective reciprocal bonds. In addition, because Sulha exchanges are uncertain, voluntary and occurring over a period of time they obtain symbolic reciprocal value. The value of these gatherings is greater than the meal or companionship or engagement of 'otherhood,' participants of the Sulha Peace Project are a symbol of positive encounter between two groups who have endured decades of ethnic conflict and therefore they are forging the relationships of the future, in peace.

Evaluating Multi-Track Peace Processes for Reciprocity

	Creates a long-term Relationship	Provides a Reciprocal Benefit	Contributes to Positive Peace
Track 1 Dayton Accords BOSNIA			✓
Track 2 Truth and Reconciliation Commission SOUTH AFRICA			✓
Track 3 Rwanda Baskets RWANDA		✓	✓
Track 4 Sulha Peace Project ISRAELI/PALESTINE	✓	✓	✓
Track 5 Peacebuilding and Development Institute SRI LANKA		✓	✓
Track 6 The Ulster Project NORTHERN IRELAND		✓	✓
Track 7 The Interfaith Peace Project USA			✓
Track 8 The United Nations Peacebuilding Fund GLOBAL		✓	✓
Track 9 Media for Peace NEPAL		✓	✓

Reciprocal Peace Praxis

The goal of much Peace & Conflict Studies scholarship is to put the knowledge gained from academic inquiry into action (Freire, 2003). This process is described as praxis—when information becomes a foundation for accomplishing something transformative. The goal of this short inquiry into the role of reciprocity in several incarnations of peace processes is to identify signposts of positive reciprocity that build relationships and that could be used going forward to enhance, stimulate or generate peace. The following practices form a reciprocity triangle:




Figure 1 Reciprocity Triangle

Peace processes may seek different outcomes or achievements depending upon which track they position themselves but positive reciprocal relationships can be a valuable consequence of any engagement. The results can not only contribute to present circumstances but can inhibit future incarnations of violence. Adding reciprocal peace practices to any peace process becomes important peace praxis by taking what we know about human interaction and using it to contribute to peace.

Conclusions

The goals of a reciprocal peace project involve creating a relationship between parties in discord. Reciprocal benefits are seen in this analysis to include information, affection, justice, security, recognition, compassion and understanding. As peace processes materialize from a variety of social standpoints arenas for impacting conflict and fostering peace are limitless. Reciprocal peace processes create relationships through an exchange of benefits overtime resulting in positive regard. Future peace processes may benefit from identifying opportunities to create constructive relationships with direct or indirect partners with an aim to maintain a positive relationship for the long-term.

While many of the peace processes surveyed in this paper contribute to peace, creating long-term positive peace will require more than legal agreements, fractional justice, economic prosperity or information it requires that social bonds be strengthened and for those who seek social, international or ethnic harmony to approach one another as full partners in peace. If peace processes are evaluated according to their 'positive' reciprocal nature then opportunities may exist to utilize the power of reciprocity to mend social fabrics frayed by conflict.

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Towards Peaceful Adaptation? Reflections on the Purpose, Scope, and Practice of Peace Studies in the 21st Century

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TOWARDS PEACEFUL ADAPTATION? REFLECTIONS ON THE PURPOSE, SCOPE, AND PRACTICE OF PEACE STUDIES IN THE 21ST CENTURY

Abstract

Our aim in this article is to articulate and consider a number of questions concerning the future purpose, scope, and practice of peace studies. Our premise, set out in the first section, is that the current era of growth and globalisation will necessarily give way to some degree of social and economic contraction, as the limits to growth implied by the interacting forces of ecological change and resource dependency are encountered. Against this background, we suggest that 'peaceful adaptation' could be an appropriate concept to guide consideration of and responses to future challenges associated with building more sustainable forms of society in a context of 'less'. The remainder of the paper works through a series of questions regarding the meaning of 'peaceful adaptation', and the potential roles of peace researchers and educators, taking into account the need for peace studies not only to study and contribute to adaptation processes, but to also to respond to the prospect that current systems for knowledge production, dissemination and maintenance may themselves be vulnerable. In each section, we point to examples of

existing work that provide promising starting points for engagement, but also highlight some issues and questions that need further attention, especially from the more normative standpoint(s) of 'peace'.

Introduction

Peace studies emerged as a formal area of academic research and education in the period following the end of World War II (Dunn, 2005). The traumatic experience of two 'World Wars' in the early part of the century prompted a determination to understand the causes of war, in the hope that this knowledge could improve prospects for a more peaceful future. This was reflected in the creation of a number of academic institutes dedicated to the study of violence and peace, supported also by specialist journals and associations. Peace research has changed considerably since its founding, evolving - as Peter Wallerstein suggests - in response to other 'traumas' or challenges of the twentieth century (Wallenstein, 2007, pp. 5-7). From the relatively 'narrow' concern with war causation, the peace research agenda has broadened and diversified, particularly following the end of the Cold War.

Among the many obstacles to peace in the 21st century, two developments arguably deserve particular attention, given their potential to significantly transform the world we inhabit: irreversible change to ecosystems, including (but not only) the climate system, caused by human activity (K. L. Anderson & Bows, 2008; K. L. Anderson & A. Bows, 2011; Richardson & Steffen, 2009; Rockstrom et al., 2009; Steffen, 2004); and the end of the era of abundant, cheap energy (referred to as 'peak oil') (Richard Heinberg & Lerch, 2010; Korovitz, 2010; Morrigan, 2010). Both trends, we suggest below, bring into question some major (Western) assumptions of the last two centuries – those of materialism, limitless growth, uninterrupted technological development, and continued globalization (Illich, 1992; NEF, 2010; Worster, 1993, pp. 203-219). Both trends have the potential not only to amplify or reconfigure existing problems of violence, but also create new challenges, particularly those associated with adaptation to a less benign climate system, and with addressing an unprecedented dependency on energy in the context of 'peak oil' (Dodds, Higham, & Sherman, 2009). As such, it can be argued that the challenge of building peace this century will be different from the pursuit of peace in an era of relative abundance, where belief in the possibility of material and social progress could be more easily sustained.

While ecological change and peak oil are, without doubt, two of the most important emerging challenges this century, peace researchers – with relatively few exceptions (Homer-Dixon, 2006; Klare, 2012) have yet to respond fully to their implications. Peak oil, in particular, has received scant attention to date, though it is, we suggest, rapidly becoming a more mainstream concern in other spheres¹. One intention in this paper is to explain why we believe peace research needs to

¹ In the last few years there have been reports from (or for) the IMF, the IEA, a German defence think tank, a coalition of UK business organisations, and the NGO 'Global Witness', all of which acknowledge the issue of 'peak oil' and seek to promote reflection on its implications. David King, former chief scientist for the UK government, published an article in the journal *Nature* in 2012, providing further evidence that this issue has gone mainstream. See: Jaromir Benes, Marcelle Chauvet, Ondra Kamenik, Michael Kumhof, Douglas Laxton, Susanna Mursula and Jack Selody. "The Future of Oil: Geology versus Technology". IMF Working Paper, 2012; International Energy

be more fully informed by an awareness of ecological change and peak oil, and what these trends might imply for the meaning of and prospects for peace – and peace research - in the decades ahead.

The paper begins with a discussion of the concept of ‘limits’ in ecological thought, and as expressed more recently in ‘peak oil’ discourse. This sets the context for a discussion of future scenarios implied by climate change and resource depletion, and the increasing importance of ‘peaceful adaptation’ to evolving conditions. The main body of the paper is then concerned with a series of questions addressed to peace studies, with the aim of reflecting on the purpose, scope and practice of research and education in relation to the task of defining and promoting ‘peaceful adaptation’. Questions cover a range of themes, from the meaning and conditions for peaceful adaptation and the kinds of knowledge and skills that might be needed to the sustainability of efforts to build and maintain peaceful structures in the future. We attempt, throughout, to show that there is a great deal of relevant work already in existence, and suggest ways in which this work can connect with and contribute to peace studies.

Limits to Growth

The idea that there are limits to the expansion of human population and/or to the extension of the industrial mode of society across the globe is by no means new, though it is often contested. Concern about the damaging impacts of industrialization and globalization emerged even as these processes were in their early stages, for example in the works of John Ruskin, Karl Marx, and Henry Thoreau (Foster, Clark, & York, 2010). These concerns were taken up by the emerging field of ecology, and amplified in the mid-20th century environmental movement—represented by figures like Rachel Carson, James Lovelock, Eugene and Howard Odum as evidence mounted of the polluting effects of modern society. (Worster, 1994) A recurring motif is a concern that the exploitation of nature for human ends may exceed nature's capacity to renew itself, with the result that human interests, health and well-being might also suffer in the process. In this perspective, the fundamental limit to human activity, particularly activity that involves extraction from or pollution of nature, is set by the same ecological systems upon which human life ultimately depends. For human (and other) life to be sustainable, these limits must be recognized and respected.

This idea of 'limits' found very clear and influential expression in the well-known 'limits to growth' study of 1973 (Meadows & Club of Rome., 1972; Meadows, Randers, & Meadows, 2004)) This was the first attempt to use computers to model future scenarios reflecting key trends of population growth, resource consumption, and environmental degradation. The study suggested that, if trends continued along a particular path, the human population would exceed the earth's carrying capacity sometime around the early 21st century. Although the ‘limits to growth’ study received much criticism at the time of publication, the findings of these studies

Agency, *World Energy Outlook 2010*, <http://www.worldenergyoutlook.org>; Bundeswehr Transformation Centre, “Armed Forces, Capabilities and Technologies in the 21st Century: Environmental Dimensions of Security”, Strausberg, November 2010. www.zentrum-transformation.bundeswehr.de; ITPOES, *The Oil Crunch: A wake-up call for the UK economy Industry*. Second report of the UK Industry Taskforce on Peak Oil & Energy Security, February 2010; Global Witness, *Heads in the Sand: Governments ignore the oil supply crunch and threaten the climate*, October 2009; James Murray and David King, *Oil's Tipping Point Has Passed*, *Nature*, 26th January 2012.

(and subsequent updates) have been shown to be remarkably prescient (Meadows et al., 2004), as the next section suggests.

The most recent, and perhaps most compelling version of a 'limits' discourse appeared in 2009, in the concept of 'planetary boundaries' (Aleklett et al., 2010; Rockstrom et al., 2009). Leading scientists are attempting to identify 'safety thresholds' in nine key areas, including the climate system, the oceans, soil and biodiversity. These thresholds indicate the point at which disturbance to a system might set in motion a range of feedback mechanisms, causing the system to change fundamentally and irreversibly, with profound implications for all forms of life that depend on it. (Adger et al., 2011) For example, climate scientists are concerned that a rise in global temperatures above 2 degrees (and possibly lower) will set in motion other processes – such as the thawing of Arctic tundra and consequent release of large quantities of methane – which will then further accelerate warming dynamics (K. L. Anderson & A. Bows, 2011; Folke & Gunderson, 2010; Pachauri & Reisinger, 2007). Scientists acknowledge that it is difficult to determine systemic thresholds with any certainty, and there is disagreement about whether the current set of boundaries is strict or realistic enough. Kevin Anderson, for example, suggests that the 2 degree target for climate change, as a global average, would still commit many parts of the world to much higher temperature rises and associated risks (K. L. Anderson & A. Bows, 2011). Nevertheless, the planetary boundaries project gives very clear and credible expression to the idea that human activity must take proper account of the natural world.

Ecological limits also include the non-renewable resources that underpin the emergence and development of industrial, modern societies. Thus, the concept of limits (to growth) is not only a concern articulated by environmentalists. In recent years, concern has been growing about the depletion of key resources, including oil, coal, gas, water, and a wide range of metals and minerals (Aleklett et al., 2010; Bardi, 2009; de Almeida & Silva, 2011; R. Heinberg & Fridley, 2010). The 'peak oil' debate in particular highlights the fundamental dependency of modern societies on this finite resource, which now faces the twin challenges of declining production rates alongside increasing demand. For some, this is a more immediate and concrete 'limit to growth', since the global economy simply cannot continue to grow without access to cheap and reliable supplies of energy (Nikiforuk, 2012). A realistic prospect for the coming decades includes increased price volatility, conflict over access to remaining resources, supply disruptions, and overall contraction of available supplies – all of which could cause severe economic and social impacts (Klare, 2012; Smil, 2010b).

Taken together, then, there is a significant body of evidence which suggests that our current way of life, premised as it is on high levels of material consumption, mobility, pollution, and both environmental and human exploitation, cannot continue without testing the capacity of both natural and social systems to breaking point.

The notion of 'limits' has, of course, been contested. Within ecology itself, as Worster shows, there has been a strong belief in the possibility of either accommodating or overcoming natural limits – through science, technology, and improved methods of environmental management (Worster, 1994). Indeed, for some time, it did seem possible that certain problems could be managed or addressed effectively: agriculture achieved significantly increased yields, even under conditions of declining soil fertility; damage to the Ozone layer caused by the use of CFCs was

more or less solved through concerted international action. An optimism remains, perhaps even among those promoting the notion of 'planetary boundaries', that the natural environment can accommodate a growing population, increased resource use, and pollution. Similarly, some remain optimistic about the prospects for continued increases in energy supply (Radetzki, 2010; Sorrell, Speirs, Bentley, Miller, & Thompson, 2012), or for overcoming the challenges suggested by 'peak oil', for example, through the rapid expansion and evolution of renewable energy technologies, or through timely changes in human behavior (Odum & Odum, 2001).

This is complex terrain, with many variables to consider. However, there are two important responses to the 'optimists'. One is a question about timing, and whether it is possible to address the causes of pollution or resource depletion before crucial limits are breached. The critical issue with climate change is whether realistic targets for reducing carbon emissions can be achieved before we transcend the critical threshold for atmospheric carbon (K. Anderson & Bows, 2012). This is a complex cultural, political and technical challenge. Similarly, Vaclav Smil, a leading energy analyst, is one of many who are skeptical about the possibility of a timely avoidance of an energy crisis, given the rate of production decline, the challenge of substituting all forms of energy (especially transportation fuel), the level of investment in the existing energy system, and the time and resources required for a transition to an alternative energy system (Smil, 2008, 2010a, 2010b). The second response to the optimists is also related to time, this time from a longer-term perspective. Those who argue that there is enough oil to last 50 or even 100 years can be accused of missing the important point: this is still a very short timescale, and only postpones the need to change how we access and use energy (Berry, 2010).

Adapting to Limits

Different authors have suggested a range of alternative scenarios for a world in 'overshoot'; a world that has exceeded the carrying capacity of ecological and social systems (Greer, 2008; Holmgren, 2009; Homer-Dixon, 2006; Hopkins, 2008). These scenarios can range from the apocalyptic to the utopian, positing either a rapid and violent collapse of modern society or a progress towards an advanced, enlightened society that produces no waste, no pollution, and that is powered by renewable technologies. Between these extremes there exist another range of possibilities which are unlikely to be linear or uniform in character, and may combine both progressive and regressive elements. Rather than speculate on the plausibility of these different scenarios, we can nevertheless understand something of our predicament by drawing on existing knowledge of how social and ecological systems function when they reach or exceed important limits (McIntosh, Tainter, & McIntosh, 2000; Tainter, 1988).

John Michael Greer, drawing heavily on the work of Joseph Tainter, has coined the term 'catabolic collapse' to explain what can happen to complex societies in overshoot mode: they feed upon themselves. (Greer, 2008) We have established above that the growth and maintenance of modern society depends on significant flows of energy and other resources. As society has become enormously complex, with increased economic diversification, social and geographic mobility, and complicated technologies, per capita energy-resource costs have increased exponentially. Crucially, these costs are not only required for growth, but for the ongoing maintenance of each new element in the system. For example, the construction of a new road network is not a one-off cost, but will add to the existing annual budget for road repairs. More significant, perhaps, is the construction of large and specialized bureaucracies and public

services (including the military), deemed necessary to the management of complex societies and accounting for large percentages of national GDP. When resources are abundant and cheap, or managed in a sustainable way, these costs can be met (or at least deferred, for example through borrowing). When resources become more scarce or costly to produce, as finite resources inevitably do, society begins to experience lower marginal returns in return for increased expenditures (Tainter, 1988, p. 195); it becomes more costly to simply maintain the existing system, leaving less available for the servicing of debt, or for investment (e.g. to produce more efficient technologies). If those systems are also vulnerable to disruption or accelerating decay – for example, by an increase in extreme weather events, through increased violent conflict, or through the deterioration of natural life-support systems – then the costs of maintenance will rise, reserves of capital will decline, and the problem of marginal return becomes more acute. With each crisis, society is weakened further and is less able to respond and recover effectively.

This, we think, is a likely scenario for the coming decades. We have a globalized system of unprecedented complexity, a prospect of declining and/or more costly resources, and significant potential for disturbances to existing systems as a result of climate change, other forms of environmental damage, and potentially increased social conflict. Tainter argues that declining marginal returns can already be observed in a number of areas in industrial societies – agriculture, energy and mineral production, research and development, education, health, government, military and industrial management (Tainter, 1988, p. 209). Viewed in this light, many current policies for responding to climate change and peak oil may be inappropriate, or at least, it may be too late to pursue policies that were viable some decades ago (when concerns about limits to growth were being aired), and that might have enabled a more comfortable process of adaptation.

From the perspective of peace studies, this analysis presents some important questions about the prospects for security, conflict and peace in the 21st century. All the existing problems of violence that capture our attention at present are likely to be reconfigured – and probably amplified – by the interacting forces of climate change, biodiversity loss, and soil erosion, and by the peaking of oil and other key resources (Abbott, Rogers, & Sloboda, 2007). A grasp of these emerging trends and their implications is thus essential for all of our work. Indeed, Ken Booth calls this the time of the ‘Great Reckoning’, “a unique world-historical challenge resulting from a particular concatenation of global-level threats” (Booth, 2007, p. 396). These include the environmental and resource issues discussed already, but add the compounding problems of a growing population, a proliferation of powerful weapons, and an absence of effective governance. Booth argues that if we fail to act decisively and wisely in the short-term, the long-term consequences of our acts or omissions could be severe. “Unless we are lucky, or wiser”, he suggests “the inhabitants of ‘the culture of contentment’ will have to learn to expect surprises – disasters – just like the majority of other people on earth. Ordinary life will cease to be ordinary. We cannot continue to assume that tomorrow will be like today” (Booth, 2007, p. 398). Neff et al sum up this challenge well:

“Perhaps the largest challenge is that few want to think about peak oil and other ecological threats such as climate change and soil depletion—never mind committing to precautionary change. Most of us prefer to continue the status quo, particularly if it has worked previously, if

we have invested in it, and if it functions acceptably well. Change carries cost and risk. So, however, does inaction” (Neff, Parker, Kirschenmann, Tinch, & Lawrence, 2011, p. 1596)

This is the working premise for what follows: ‘business-as-usual’ will become less and less viable, both practically and morally. What matters is how we respond to change.

Towards ‘Peaceful Adaptation’

Arguably, the peace and environmental movements of the last century often relied on moral discourses of limits, arguing that we ought to change our ways of life because it is harmful to people and/or the environment if we do not (Worster, 1994). The newer discourses of limits arising from ‘peak oil’ and research on planetary boundaries have a different focus: They posit that change is now an inevitable consequence of natural limits, and that we will shift from an era of growth and expansion to one of economic and social contraction.

A process of contraction arguably has both ‘negative’ and ‘positive’ possibilities. That is, there is potential both for increased violence (for example, arising from increased competition for scarce resources (Klare, 2008), or from failure of systems of food production (Lang & Barling, 2012)), *and* for changes that address some of the existing violence in modern societies (for example, by creating less exploitative systems of production and exchange, or fairer, more equitable forms of social organization, or increased happiness and well-being (De Young & Princen, 2012)). The challenge for peace studies, we suggest, is to engage in the process of determining the nature and extent of these possibilities, and to use our resources (which, as we discuss below, will themselves be subject to decline) to help influence change in ways that minimize violence and promote peace. This can be partly framed as an agenda for peaceful adaptation.

Adaptation is an attractive but ambivalent concept (Smit & Wandel, 2006). A focus on adaptation accepts the premise of change. It implies a dynamic, continuous process of response to changing conditions. A focus on adaptation also necessarily implies some acknowledgement of limits; of things that cannot easily be changed. It suggests some accommodation to existing conditions. For these reasons, it might make sense to foreground adaptation as a realistic, pragmatic approach to the unavoidable conditions of change and uncertainty that climate change and peak oil generate. Yet, at the same time, many types of response to these conditions could be considered ‘adaptive’, from different standpoints. For example, it might be considered ‘adaptive’ (in the short term, at least) for some countries to address their dependence on foreign energy resources through military means, including war. Adaptation also might be deemed an overly conservative or pessimistic concept, suggesting a strongly deterministic vision of the future which we have little or no power to influence.

The concept of peaceful adaptation, however, might address these limitations. It would encourage reflection on whether responses to limits and/or changing conditions are more or less congruent with a set of normative principles – for example, that measures to promote adaptation would not cause foreseeable violence, or that they are consistent with the need to protect ecological systems. Here there is also potential to consider the relationship between adaptive measures and more ‘positive’ concepts of peace; whether changes bring about conditions that not only prevent violence, but (for example) enable and promote beneficial relationships and increased resilience. Ultimately, what we mean by ‘peaceful adaptation’, not just in general terms,

but under the anticipated conditions of contraction, must be worked out. This constitutes a major agenda for peace studies, one that will itself evolve as the specific features of change become clearer, and through engagement in actual experimentation.

There is already a rich body of established and emerging work that is highly relevant to thinking about peaceful adaptation. In connecting with this work and bringing it to the centre of an agenda for peace research and practice, we would suggest the following themes and questions might be particularly relevant:

1. *What might visions/initiatives for peace mean in a context of declining energy and environmental deterioration?*

Modern discourses of peace have had an ambivalent relationship to the idea of limits. On the one hand, many peace thinkers have engaged in critical questioning of dominant narratives of progress, and have recognized some of the insights from ecology discussed above. On the other hand, the idea that certain limits could and should be transcended has clearly had a significant influence on mainstream conceptions of peace. There is, of course, a strong emancipatory aspect to peace work, driven by a concern with challenging or transforming social arrangements that limit or deny human potential (Curle, 1971; Freire, 1970; Lederach, 2005). It is also reasonable to claim that this emancipation has often been sought – on both the political left and the right – through the means of 'development'. That is, many peace thinkers – even if only implicitly – take for granted the possibility and desirability of economic growth, globalization, large-scale democracy, increasing freedom and mobility, and rising standards of living. Very few have, like Gandhi or Ivan Illich, explicitly called for an end to or a reversal of industrialization and 'development' (Illich, 1992).

Arguably, the predicament we are facing now is one in which we can neither turn the clock back to a less energy-intensive, less complex and possibly more peaceful past, nor maintain the conditions that have allowed us to avoid or defer dealing with difficult questions around inequality and redistribution, the sustainability of human relationships with the ecological systems to which they belong, and the costs of individual freedom. Conceptions of peace relevant to a context of contraction will need to confront these questions much more seriously, opening up some potentially challenging discussions about our values and expectations. If contraction implies having less and being able to do less, what are we willing to forego? Must we trade some liberty for greater resilience? What kinds of precautionary change would be sensible and (still) feasible? Rather than presenting contraction solely as a threat, some theorists and practitioners argue that it might also offer opportunities for positive change. After all, much of the violence we are responding to in the present world has its roots in the industrial system and processes of 'development'. Contraction could be an opportunity to address some of the underlying causes of contemporary violence. The transition movement, for example, has tried to frame the challenge of energy descent as – also – an exciting opportunity that could enrich rather than threaten participants' lives (Hopkins, 2008, 2011).³³ For transitioners, energy descent implies a process of re-localization that would enable communities to meet more of their own needs through local production and exchange. They suggest that this process could enable stronger, more organic forms of community and social connection, as local interdependence increases. It might enable people to achieve a greater degree of control over their lives, for

example, through more local scale mechanisms for decision-making, or through local enterprise. Less time might be wasted on work that is alienating or of marginal value; work might be harder, but also more meaningful. A local economic system, developed within the limits set by local environmental and social conditions, might be less wasteful and polluting. Some in the Transition movement and beyond take inspiration from the story of Cuba's adaptation to its 'Special Period' in the 1990s – a period where oil (imported from the Soviet Union and essential to a highly industrialized agricultural system) became scarce and expensive. (Hopkins, 2008) Many Cubans survived the impacts on farming and the economy through the re-establishment of small-scale food production systems, in both urban and rural contexts. These not only provided food, (unpaid) employment and some income, but they created a need for cooperation that in turn strengthened relationships and resilience in many communities. Other indications that economic contraction does not necessarily mean reduced prospects for peace can be found in data sets that challenge the priority of economic growth. These include The Spirit Level's evidence that what matters most to individual and societal well-being is levels of inequality rather than the extent of absolute individual or national wealth (Wilkinson & Pickett, 2010). Similarly, statistics published by the New Economic Foundation suggest that happiness does not increase with increasing material wealth, and thus raise serious questions about the tendency to link wealth and economic growth (NEF, 2010).

Nevertheless, voluntary energy descent does remain a marginal idea and an even more marginal practice. Nor do the current responses to recession and budget deficits by many states, and by the international systems within which they are embedded, offer much ground for hope that there is sufficient political will to shift assumptions and priorities. It is much harder, moreover, to identify positive aspects of less stable and benign ecological and climate systems, or to remain hopeful in the face of the increasing likelihood of major disasters. As the prospect of a '4 degree world' looks increasingly likely (K. Anderson & A. Bows, 2011), millions of people are facing extremely precarious conditions, often from a position of already high vulnerability and marginalization, and in contexts characterized by significant levels of conflict and violence (Smith, Vivekananda, & International Alert (Organization), 2007).

How, against this background, might we speak about peace? Which elements of our conceptions of peace can we sustain, which do we need to rethink? Can we find ways of realizing core values that do not depend on the continued and growing supply of cheap energy, and that might be sustained in contexts of contraction and instability? And what does this mean for peace practice?

2. At what scales or in which locations are peaceful responses to contraction and instability most likely to emerge? How might these interact with other parts of the system?

Adaptation to climate change and peak oil will necessarily require action at different scales, involving different actors (Adger et al., 2003; Adger et al., 2011; Cash et al., 2006). Contraction will not mean the end of all systems of global communication and trade. Nor is it likely that any single state or community can unilaterally pursue policies for adaptation without consideration of the possible role of or consequences for others. Therefore, there will remain a need for coordinated, cooperative action at a global, international scale (Dodds et al., 2009) (and thus a role for expertise in international relations and conflict resolution). Similarly, the state will

undoubtedly continue to be an important actor, guiding and implementing change through policy and law-making at national and regional scales. The key question, from a peace studies perspective, is whether responses at this level can or will reflect the imperatives for radical change implied by climate change and peak oil, whether it is possible to influence international actors – such as multinational corporations – to accept the case that business-as-usual is not an option.

Attempts to achieve coordinated action on climate change so far do not inspire confidence that effective action at the international and national scale is emerging, however necessary this is. It may therefore be more likely that we can identify, and influence, experimentation in peaceful adaptation at lower scales (Holt-Giménez, 2006).

It is also important to consider the relationship between scale and the possibility of more peaceful, sustainable relationships between people, and between people and their local environment. One of the causes of the current ecological crisis is the radical disconnection between individual actions and the effects of those actions within a globalized system. It is difficult to properly know or care about the impact of many everyday decisions, especially in relation to the purchase of food and other goods, because these impacts occur at great remove, many thousands of miles away. This has both practical and moral consequences (Gardiner, 2011). Conversely, when we operate at a more local, human scale, there is more immediate feedback when our actions cause harm, and the consequences affect us more directly (Berry, 2009; Schumacher, 1973). Localization, therefore, implies both greater incentive and greater opportunity to redress harmful actions, and to learn from mistakes. Adaptation at more local scales might therefore be a necessary – if not sufficient – precondition for restoring a more sustainable relationship with the natural world (Norberg-Hodge, 2009).

Similarly, there is evidence to suggest that peaceful relations between people are closely related to scale. Long-term and cross-cultural anthropological perspectives suggest that the most peaceful communities, relatively speaking, have tended to be small scale, with a high degree of social and economic interdependence and integration – and, conversely, that the increasing complexity of modern societies has been associated with a growing propensity for warfare (Fry, 2006). Mutual interdependence at a comprehensible and tangible scale, it seems, is crucial in creating a need for cultural mechanisms for handling and resolving conflict, and promoting cooperation. This point is also borne out in the extensive literature on group dynamics and could be considered a key insight of the social psychological literature relating to peace studies (Johnson & Johnson, 2009).

We believe it is reasonable, then, to recognize the close relationship between ecological and social sustainability on the one hand, and commitment to local scales on the other (Berry, 2012). It is also important to recognize that adaptation to a world with fewer resources, a less benign environment, and other anticipated risks will present different challenges for people in different parts of the world. Clearly, the challenge of adaptation for highly urbanized, industrial societies will be different than for communities that are more dispersed and land based (North, 2010). Even at a very local level, different communities may face quite different conditions, for example, in terms of the human and material resources available, the condition of the local built and natural environment, the character and dynamics of the local climate, and the nature of

relationships in the community (conflictive or cooperative). These and other factors will all bear on the prospects for peaceful adaptation, and therefore need to be analyzed with some attention to the details of local context.

In a context that has moved as far beyond sustainability as our current patterns of social interactions and relationships to the natural world, however, the recognition that a significant degree of localization is both likely and needed also raises a number of serious questions: Given that more or less all localities have, to a greater or lesser extent, been affected by activities, decisions and processes that happen elsewhere, where does responsibility for local adaptation now lie? In the light of predictions of the likely impacts of climate change, are some locations 'beyond redemption', either now or in the foreseeable future? Is 'sustainability' itself still a viable aspiration? As the pressures for people to migrate away from places that are becoming less and less sustainable increases, what happens to the idea of local adaptation – both for people who have been uprooted and for local communities confronted with the realities of adapting to a future of declining resources at the same time as facing the challenges of responding to the arrival of migrants or refugees? What might be the meaning and scope of solidarity in a world with very complex legacies of responsibility, differential capacities to adapt, and declining material resources? Against this background, how might strategies for local adaptation also encourage a sense of solidarity and responsibility beyond the boundaries of the local?

As the questions raised above suggest, while local adaptation looks both inevitable and necessary, and while there are strong arguments for the existence of links between localization, sustainability and peace, these links look more fragile and vulnerable in a context in which the conditions for ecological and social sustainability have themselves been deeply eroded. In the next section, we thus suggest an agenda of exploring the conditions that might shape the relative peacefulness of different attempts to adapt.

3. What conditions are conducive to the emergence of peaceful adaptive responses? What is the scope for agency in fostering these conditions?

Adaptation to changing climatic conditions and to economic contraction, and a range of different responses to disasters, are already happening in many locations across the world, including in very difficult circumstances. Analyzing these to discern the extent to which they might be called peaceful, to identify the conditions that have shaped their relative (lack of) peacefulness, and to reflect on the scope for agency in shaping those conditions would, we think, be a very valuable contribution towards an agenda of peaceful adaptation. The example of Cuba, as mentioned above, raises many interesting questions about the role of social, cultural, political and economic structures in enabling relatively peaceful large-scale adaptation. Did the fact that most land and many other resources were publicly owned and centrally controlled make it easier to re-organize food production under crisis conditions? Did the nature of the government and political culture – centralized, but with wide and active political participation – make collective and distributed action more likely? Did the fact that most Cubans already lived with relatively modest incomes and few trappings of a Western materialistic culture engender a comparatively stoic, pragmatic attitude towards the economic crisis? In asking questions like these, about relevant case studies of societies responding to ecological or resource limits, we can perhaps begin to understand possibilities or challenges in other contexts.

Similarly, the experiences of shrinking and declining cities and towns in contexts of de-industrialization and economic contraction (such as Detroit in North America and many parts of East Germany), the challenges they face, and the experimentation that they have generated, offer potentially interesting lessons too about the possible conditions for (peaceful) adaptation. For example, is there a relationship between improved access to land (e.g. the abandoned houses, gardens and streets in central Detroit) and the emergence of localized, community-run food economies? What other conditions are important to these 'bottom-up' strategies for adaptation – such as the existence of local leadership, knowledge about how to grow food on a small scale, or other forms of social capital? What is the point at which individuals or communities stop seeking external help, and begin to generate their own strategies for meeting key needs? What might be relevant indicators or measures of 'community resilience' – the capacity to deal with difficult change? What happens when parts of towns or cities are abandoned due to the declining ability to invest time or energy in their maintenance? Are there more or less peaceful ways of allowing 'wilderness' to return (Reimers, 2010)?

The work of the Post-Carbon Institute and its associates has helped to raise the profile of many issues on a 'post-growth' agenda, ranging from the technical, social and political challenges of building a renewable energy infrastructure, to questions about alternative livelihoods and economic models, the relationship between family, community and 'resilience', the implications of worrying future scenarios for family socialization and wider educational processes, and approaches to building alternative, less-energy intensive systems for meeting healthcare needs (Richard Heinberg & Lerch, 2010). Much of this work is written by individuals or groups already engaged in their own experiments in adaptation. The best examples are honest and reflective about the dilemmas, challenges and shortcomings in their efforts, and can be a useful resource for others considering how to develop their own strategies for adaptation (Astyk, 2012).

Finally, in a more formal academic setting, the Stockholm Centre for Resilience is a hub for a range of empirical research on social-ecological systems, providing particular insights into the interactions between social and ecological change. This includes a range of work on climate adaptation processes in different cultural and geographic areas, and highlights important questions about adaptation processes, the meaning of resilience, and the respective role of local cultural knowledge and outsider expertise (Walker & Salt, 2006). It also brings to the fore questions about governance at different scales, and about its role in enabling or frustrating adaptation.

Together, these and other examples of emerging and relevant practice offer a potentially rich and diverse focus for reflection on the meaning and prospects for peaceful adaptation. Yet, returning again to the issue of scale, it is important to keep in mind the potential limitations of these examples, or what they might not tell us about adaptation to the future challenges of climate change and peak oil. There is no precedent for a global economic contraction in complex, technologically advanced and highly interdependent world of seven billion people. Some, perhaps many, dynamics of change driven by the interacting consequences of ecological crisis, resource depletion, population growth etc. will be unexpected or difficult to anticipate. This uncertainty is one of the conditions for any efforts towards peaceful adaptation, and perhaps one of the biggest obstacles to planning for the future. This brings us to questions about what we know, or might need to know, in the pursuit of peaceful adaptation.

4. What kinds of knowledge and skills will be necessary and useful to peaceful adaptation processes?

Prioritizing adaptation will have a number of implications for processes and methods of knowledge generation, and for our understanding of the relationship between knowledge and social change. Among the many issues that might deserve attention here, we focus on three: the need to orient research more systematically towards the future, the need for a more holistic, systemic framework for analysis of complex problems, and the need for knowledge that is appropriate to relatively localized processes of adaptation.

To begin with, effective, peaceful adaptation to climate change and resource depletion will undoubtedly require different forms of precautionary action. The updated Limits to Growth scenarios show quite clearly that early, precautionary action – for example, creating low-carbon energy systems – offers (or did offer) the best chance for enabling a more stable environment and population, higher living standards, etc. (Meadows et al., 2004). The longer action is delayed, the more difficult the social, technical and political challenges of adaptation become, raising the likelihood of worst-case scenarios.

Precautionary, adaptive change requires knowledge that can be utilized in an assessment of complex future trends, to inform judgments about what kinds of action might be necessary, effective, and feasible. The problem here is two-fold. First of all, the nature of the challenges we face, especially at a global level, are incredibly complex, involving the interaction of a large number of different, dynamic, evolving elements. It is, quite simply, difficult to be certain about future trends, and so there will always be a degree of speculation involved. Secondly, as van der Leeuw and colleagues argue, many existing approaches to research are inadequate to this task, being too 'reductionist', dualistic, and short-term (van der Leeuw et al., 2011). Partly because of a deep-seated scepticism about speculative inquiry, they also tend to be backward-looking, rather than concerned with the future.

The recent special issue of the Journal of Peace Research on the relationship between climate change and conflict illustrates some of these tensions and problems (Gleditsch, 2012). The editors are explicit in their criticism of the 'speculative' nature of work by the IPCC and others on this important topic, on the basis that it is not (and cannot logically be) rooted in existing data. The special issue is a collection of mostly quantitative, large-N studies which attempt a rigorous assessment of existing data sets on violent conflict, correlated with factors like rainfall or temperature variation (which, in the absence of clear evidence of existing climate change, are used as proxies). Whilst these studies perhaps do avoid the charge of being 'speculative', one can nevertheless ask how useful they are to an assessment of the evolving and complex dynamics of climate change. The data sets cover relatively short time scales, the proxies are questionable (referring to annual 'weather' patterns, rather than the more complex dynamics and interacting social-ecological effects of climate change), and the discussion of causality is very limited. While these statistical studies of rainfall patterns do show some correlation between weather and forms of conflict, their focus is very narrow. What is needed are assessments of the complex interplay of social, ecological, economic and political factors, operating across different temporal and geographic scales (Gunderson & Holling, 2002).

There are, of course, already attempts to re-define the kinds of knowledge – and processes of knowledge-generation – that are needed. Many researchers and educators concerned with 'sustainability', for example, have been drawn to holistic epistemologies, such as systems or complexity theories, which transcend disciplinary boundaries. They argue that a grasp of the relationships between interacting elements in social-ecological systems is essential to any understanding of current issues, and for designing effective strategies for adaptation. C.S. Holling and his colleagues on social-ecological resilience take this perspective, and demonstrate repeatedly through case studies the limitations of efforts to manage single aspects of human and ecological problems (Carpenter, Folke, Scheffer, & Westley, 2009; Folke, 2006; Gunderson & Holling, 2002). In concentrating on and trying to control isolated variables the larger, more complex dynamics of the social-ecological systems are missed, with the result that solutions – perhaps successful in the short term – often cause further problems. Holling et al. suggest this can only be avoided through recognizing the partiality of most specialized, expert knowledge, and by aiming for more integrative, cross-disciplinary and humble approaches.

Van der Leeuw et al. argue for the importance of historical knowledge to the task of learning about the future, but call for a shift from an 'analogue' to an 'evolutionary' approach to the study of social-ecological phenomena (van der Leeuw et al., 2011). To be responsive to the challenge ahead, this would need to be transdisciplinary, holistic (taking a systemic view), focused on the dynamics of change through time (rather than apparent periods of stability), and take the very long-term into account.

Whatever the merits or limitations of these approaches, a discussion about the relationship between research, the future, and the problem(s) of adaptation is now very timely. This will not be easy, given the immense investment in existing ways of doing and evaluating research. However, we suggest that as peace researchers, we may need to be asking different, more future-oriented questions, and to explore new methods for answering them.

Yet opening different lines of investigation, we think, is only a partial response to the question of what kinds of knowledge and skills are likely to be relevant to peaceful adaptation processes. Like approaches that invest hope primarily in global governance or in state policies, the pursuit of expert knowledge has its limitations. If, as we and others have argued, a significant degree of localization looks like a significant and unavoidable consequence of energy descent, people's capacity to respond to changing conditions in ways appropriate to their specific locations will be an essential condition for peaceful adaptation. Peaceful adaptive responses are more likely to emerge when they are informed by a nuanced understanding of place – of the specific interactions and relationships within/between particular ecological, social and economic systems, at a scale that enables this understanding. This might involve forms of vernacular knowledge that are not typically part of academic discourse, or that might elude the professional knowledge worker. As Wendell Berry suggests, a rich knowledge of any locale might only be achievable through a sustained practical relationship in/with it, a point that has important implications for practice (Berry, 2009). To make a tangible difference to the chances of peaceful adaptation, relevant knowledge and skills would need to be embedded in everyday practices and relationships, readily accessible and widely shared. Indeed, we think that these characteristics

might eventually make a more significant difference to prospects for peaceful adaptation than theoretical sophistication or expertise.

There is an interesting and useful precedent for this idea in the concept and practical application of 'appropriate' or 'intermediate' technology' (Holmgren, 2010; Illich, 1974; Schumacher, 1973). The idea of appropriate technology has been motivated by an awareness of limits: limits to available energy, limits to the capacity of ecosystems to absorb the impacts of human activities, and limits, ultimately, to the power of human beings to control the effects of large-scale technologies. It was motivated, too, by the recognition that scale matters: that human beings feel more at home if the scale of their activities matches their lived experience, that feedback and responsive adjustments function better at smaller scales, and that the resilience of systems increases with the capacity for self-reliance at the smallest practical scale. Finally and importantly, the idea of appropriate technology was motivated by a strong concern for equity and social justice, and by a commitment to make a tangible contribution to meeting basic needs.

The idea of appropriate technology is part of a much larger tradition of critical engagement with dominant forms of knowledge production, of experimentation with alternatives. Another strand in this tradition that seems equally relevant to rethinking the purposes and practices of peace studies is the 'family of approaches' that constitute action For E.F. Schumacher, a central requirement of appropriate, or 'intermediate' technology was that it should be able to be operated by non-experts, in contexts where the availability of fossil energies and large amounts of capital could not be assumed. 'The equipment', he suggested, 'would be fairly simple and therefore understandable, suitable for maintenance and repair on the spot' (Schumacher, 1973). In a similar vein, appropriate technology would be labour-intensive, prioritizing the employment of large numbers of people over the use of sophisticated machinery.

We would like to suggest that a similar focus on 'appropriateness' might serve as a useful concept to guide our thinking about the character and roles of knowledge, experience and skills related to peace in an uncertain and energy-constrained future. If this argument makes sense, it implies a rethinking of ideas around expertise and professionalism. There are, of course, already efforts to develop more participatory approaches to research, and this might be one means for generating 'appropriate knowledge' in ways that involve larger numbers of people. In the aftermath of Hurricane Mitch, for example, the Central American 'Farmer to Farmer Movement' (Movimiento Campesino a Campesino) coordinated a participatory action research project that involved 2000 small farmers and 40 farmer organizations and NGOs in Nicaragua, Honduras and Guatemala in comparing the impact of Hurricane Mitch on agroecological and conventional farms (Holt-Giménez, 2006). The data that emerged from the study confirmed that, overall, agroecological farming practices increase resilience; at the same time, the study also helped to identify questions and practices that needed further consideration. Most importantly for our discussion here, the project generated knowledge that systematized experiences on the ground and drew out their research that was directly relevant to the small farmers involved in the study, and that could be re-embedded and shared via the movement's infrastructure and its farmer-to-farmer methodology for knowledge dissemination (Holt-Giménez, 2006).

Alongside such efforts to generate or test 'appropriate knowledge', we would also suggest that there is already a great deal of relevant knowledge in existence – in our field, we know a lot

about the challenges of building peace and managing conflict in difficult and changing conditions, but other fields of study clearly also have important things to say in relation to peaceful adaptation. In a context in which systems of knowledge generation and dissemination themselves may become increasingly vulnerable (on which more below), peaceful adaptation might actually be better served through sharing and embedding the knowledge we already have than through prioritizing new or 'cutting-edge' inquiry. This partly involves a task of translation, simplifying the existing stock of conceptual tools and practical experience about peace, conflict, and social-ecological resilience, such that it can be readily 'appropriated' and utilized by people in developing their own analyses and contextual responses to problems. There are many existing efforts to identify, disseminate and embed knowledge and skills relevant to peaceful adaptation. These include, but are not limited to, community-based adaptation and community-based disaster management and preparedness (Huq, 2011; Huq et al., 2005) (Eakin, Benessaiah, Barrera, Cruz-Bello, & Morales, 2012; Miles & Chang, 2011; Sok, Lebel, Bastakoti, Thau, & Samath, 2011). Such efforts to identify and embed appropriate responses to climate change, and to a range of emergencies and disasters at the level of local communities draw on both expert knowledge and detailed knowledge of local conditions, and at their best, they make tangible contributions to local capacities for peaceful adaptation.

There is, then, a rich and growing body of relevant work that, in different ways, could be interpreted as attempts to develop and disseminate 'appropriate knowledge'. While this is clearly welcome and important, we turn below to a set of questions that remain marginal to current discussions but that will become increasingly relevant if and when energy descent and contraction enter into the picture more centrally: What do declining levels of energy and capacity imply for existing and emergent mechanisms for knowledge generation, dissemination and exchange? How vulnerable are these mechanisms, and what scope might there be for increasing their resilience?

5. How might the capacity to work towards peace be sustained in a context of declining resources and increasing likelihood of disruption/disaster?

The nature of the challenges we have set out ultimately demands more than a refocusing or updating of research agendas, education and training, or peace-related projects. After all, academic institutions are not immune from the pressures that are likely to lead to contraction and/or disruption. The same applies to the majority of professionals and organizations working for peace. Peaceful adaptation, then, is not just a topic to be researched and taught, or a new framework that might inform professional peacework. It is also, and perhaps more seriously, a challenge that bears on the types of organizations that many of us work in, on the kinds and volume of activities we might engage in, and on the long-term viability of those activities.

Universities, like other complex organizations, are themselves expressions of the abundant, cheap energy that has underpinned industrialization and globalization. When that energy becomes more scarce or expensive, the complex and extended system of global higher education is likely to become less viable, at least in its current form, and it will be subject to declining marginal returns. The same applies to much of the 'peace industry' – it is very hard for organizations that engage in peace work to avoid reliance on external funding, and international organizations in particular are also highly energy-intensive. A likely scenario, then, is one of an

increased need for peace-related knowledge, skills and experience at the same time as the capacity to maintain and invest in current systems for the generation and dissemination of such knowledge and skills declines.

At this moment in time, we are probably close to what we might call 'peak information': Knowledge of all kinds is readily accessible to many of us via the media, the Internet and other mobile technologies (though it is important to remember how many of the world's people do not have ready access to this). In a present in which we take such easy access to knowledge, and to the mechanisms for sharing it quickly across geographic boundaries, for granted, it can be easy to forget how recent these developments are – or to accept that they may not endure. Our current systems for generating, storing and disseminating knowledge and information, however, may turn out to be less resilient than they seem. As Holmgren points out, 'informational infrastructure ..., like other forms of embodied energy ... is subject to gradual depreciation over time' (Holmgren, 2009; 2010, p. 118) – and in a context of declining energy, it will be increasingly difficult to counteract this depreciation. As well as such gradual erosion, the possibility of the sudden collapse of systems for knowledge generation and exchange, either in the form of temporary or localized disruption or, in the longer term, across wider systems, also needs consideration. Do we have back-up systems that could function if the institutions, information technologies and networks we have come to rely on broke down?

This, then, is a challenge to think about how the work of generating, communicating and applying knowledge about peace and conflict might be sustained without taking the infrastructure and resources provided by universities, professional organizations, or current networks and technologies, for granted.

If this account is plausible, it should encourage us to think carefully about how we might best use the physical and human resources we currently - still – have access to. David Holmgren suggests that

“the transition to declining energy availability provides a unique strategic opportunity to make the best use of existing wealth and non-renewable resources to rebuild natural and human capital. In general, the best use for non-renewable resources and technology should be to establish a system, rather than to maintain or harvest it, even if the 'establishment' process is a gradual one that takes place as a transition over a lifetime (or even generations)' (Holmgren, 2010, p. 48).

Above, we suggested the idea of focusing on 'appropriate' knowledge and experimenting with ways of embedding such knowledge as one response to this challenge. This is not to argue that the capacity to foster this kind of knowledge is not also vulnerable, but rather that while the capacity exists, it makes sense to priorities attempts to share and embed knowledge that might enable peaceful adaptation.

Such work, in turn, needs to be underpinned by the hope that it is worth doing even in a context of uncertainty. This, too, is a challenge: It is very hard to confront the converging crises of climate, energy, population, militarization, weak governance, etc., to accept that capacities for addressing these are more likely to decline than to increase, and yet to avoid despair or

resignation. Part of the challenge of sustaining work for peaceful adaptation is therefore existential; we need to reflect on how we might maintain a sense of purpose and integrity as we negotiate the 'great reckoning'. There are no easy answers to this question, though the question, we think, is as important to the sustainability of peace work as the issue of material limits. The most appropriate response, perhaps, is one that Wendell Berry points to in his recent Jefferson Lecture, as throughout his work. Drawing on E.M. Forster's *Howards End*, Berry suggests that 'it all turns on affection'. (Berry, 2012) As Berry himself recognizes, this too raises important questions; unfortunately, it is beyond the scope of this paper to explore these here.

Conclusion

Our aim in this article was to articulate and consider a number of questions concerning the future purpose, scope, and practice of peace studies. Our premise, set out in the first section, is that the current era of growth and globalization will necessarily give way to some degree of contraction, as the limits to growth implied by the interacting forces of ecological change and resource dependency (among other aspects of the 'great reckoning') are encountered. From there, we suggested that 'peaceful adaptation' could be an appropriate concept to guide consideration of and responses to future challenges associated with building more sustainable forms of society in a context of 'less'. The remainder of the paper worked through a series of questions regarding the meaning of 'peaceful adaptation', and the potential roles of peace researchers and educators, taking into account the need for peace studies not only to study and contribute to adaptation processes, but to also to respond to the prospect that current systems for knowledge production, dissemination and maintenance may themselves be vulnerable. In each section, we pointed to examples of existing work that provide promising starting points for engagement, but we also highlighted some issues and questions that we felt need further attention, especially from the more normative standpoint(s) of 'peace'.

We recognize that many of the issues we have raised demand much fuller discussion, and there are many related themes we have not had space to consider. However, our primary intention has been to encourage reflection on the underlying question of what, in a context of declining resources and accelerating environmental change, it might be worth prioritizing and investing in – in relation to the kinds of knowledge we might pursue, the systems we depend on, the norms and values we might try to foster and embody, and our emotional resources for sustaining peace-related work.

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Playing to Kill: Video Games and Violence

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PLAYING TO KILL: VIDEO GAMES AND VIOLENCE (Essay)

Abstract

Video games have become a new offer of leisure for the citizens in increasingly more countries in the world, opening a new realm of entertainment, which becomes especially attractive due to the hyper-realist approach of some of the titles. This article examines the relationship between violence and video games and the ideology that is implicit in many of the same, also raising the issue of how these games work to create “reality” – a matter of deep concern to parents and consumer associations.

Introduction: The Video Game, an Expanding Market Industry

At the international meeting Edinburgh Interactive¹, carried out in the summer of 2010, the financial company Avista Partners stated that “the video game industry generates annually about 105.000 million dollars, excluding independent developers and small publishers not listed” (Meristation, 2010). In addition, to disaggregate by categories, the main beneficiaries are Nintendo (\$34.959 million), other consoles and PC (\$33.223 million), online games (\$23.457 million) and games for mobile (\$8.257 million). These data refer to the consumption of all kinds

¹ “Edinburgh Interactive brings a mix of business, education and fun through a focused industry conference, a selection of free public screenings of new games and technology plus public sessions and information on how to get involved in interactive entertainment”, by Edinburgh Interactive webpage, available: <http://edinburghinteractive.co.uk/about> (consulted on 30/01/2012).

of products related to the video game industry, but in the chart below we can see how, in just six years, the traditional sale of video games has doubled worldwide, growing at an average of 12% annual rate.

Mercado Global del Videojuego - (en millones de dólares)

Región	2003	2004p	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009
Estados Unidos	7.557	8.198	8.438	10.158	12.762	14.080	15.067
EMEA ¹	4.003	5.980	6.756	8.656	11.161	13.026	14.312
Asia/Pacífico	8.978	10.086	11.108	14.053	17.974	20.657	23.087
Latinoamérica	489	531	539	606	724	778	832
Canadá	534	611	685	876	1.102	1.221	1.307
Total	21.561	25.406	27.526	34.349	43.723	49.762	54.605

¹Europa, Oriente Medio y África

Estimaciones realizadas por PricewaterhouseCoopers, citadas en el website de SIMBIM.


Source: Raposo, Ma

The age at which young people join this type of market is earliest ever, facilitated by the commitment of Governments in the introduction of the information technologies (ICT) in education spaces. Most of the players still oscillate between 18 and 49 years old, as we can be seen in Figure 2, but the sector in development towards maturity phase already represents more than one quarter.

On the other hand, it should be noted that the games in which it appears direct violence, which we are most interested for this brief analysis, only occupy 26% of the market (*Teen* and *Mature* games), according to data provided by the Entertainment Software Rating Board (ESRB)², although it could discuss if jump on a tortoise and kill her as "innocent" in a game rated as everyone, the Mario, violence can be considered.

Figure 2


gamer age distribution



Source: ESRB ratings report 2010

However, the small spectrum of occupies a large portion of the games, forming part of the lists of

Figure 3



NOTE: The ESRB assigned 1,638 ratings in 2010. These figures include instances where a publisher revised and resubmitted a game with the intention of receiving a different rating.

Source: Education Database online, 2010, available: <http://www.onlineeducation.net/videogame>

video game market of video best-selling

² The Entertainment Software Rating Board (ESRB) is a self-regulatory organization that assigns age and content ratings. "The ratings are designed to provide concise and impartial information about the content in computer and video games so consumers, especially parents, can make an informed purchase decision", ESRB webpage, Game Ratings & Descriptor Guide, available: http://www.esrb.org/ratings/ratings_guide.jsp (consulted on 30/01/2012). On Europe the rating used was created by Pan European Game Information (PEGI) and you can consult it at: <http://www.pegi.info/es/> (consulted on 30/01/2012).

month after month. Taking into account the sale of video games for the four most important platforms of today (PlayStation 3, Nintendo Wii, Xbox and Computer), we can see that games like Call of Duty series, Uncharted series, World of Warcraft, Halo series, have crept into the top of the charts in a very short time (Wikipedia, 2011). With the exception of Nintendo and Computer platform, where this type of game is not as successful, the rest of consoles profit from selling death explicitly. This data must add lot of games online, free of charge, that are not included in this count but which represent an important part of the market, as we have seen before.

Violence in Videogames


Violence projecting through the game is intended to be a sample of the real world, so the player is transported to a violent scenario where he is going to be part on action. Similarly, the game creates a visual and temporal proximity to try that people can internalize that space as a unique life experience, to facilitate the replacement of the real world by the fiction or the drill and the objectification of the imaginary (Contreras, 2003). According to Virtual Online: "A Virtual World is a place you co-inhabit with hundreds of thousands of other people simultaneously (...) The fact that you exist with other real people from around the globe adds a level of immersion that must be experienced to be believed".

Also, these speeches have just directed not only to the mind but also to the body, through the experience of the movements that you have to do for moving the characters in the game. This situation is reinforced again with new game modes that enable consoles such as Wii or Xbox Kinect³ mode, in addition to the already traditional war artifacts that can plug into the console as commanders of game: pistols, shotguns, submachine guns... For this reason, Contreras defends that: "the viewer not only understands violence, but that his feels. Messages are catalyzed a transformation driven by bodies which at the end of the reaction remain unchanged. The use of violence is a reaction that eventually does not alter the viewer" (Contreras, 2003).

This situation occurs especially in war games since, taking ideas from Zyzyk:

"there is an intimate connection between the virtualization of reality and the emergence of an infinite and infinitized bodily pain [...] do not biogenetics and Virtual Reality combined open up new 'enhanced' possibilities of torture, new and unheard-of horizons of extending our ability to endure pain (through widening our sensory capacity to sustain pain, through inventing new forms of inflicting it)?" (Zyzyk, 2002: 91)

³ "Play without command means play with the entire body. Kinect responds to your movements. So if you have to give a kick, it gives a kick. If you have to jump, jump. You know how to play. You only have to get off the couch", Xbox webpage, available: <http://www.xbox.com/es-es/kinect> (consulted on 30/01/2012)



Over these lines: FEAR 2 (2009) – Figure 4



Right: Call of Duty, Black Ops (2010) – Figure 5

lity it is being a great closeness between videogames and the real world, which is why the simulacrum of reality, video games, is becoming "to simulate a real more real than the real, the simulation of hyperreal" (Baudrillard, 2002). However, these images are not linked to the truth, they are representations of reality. In this case, the image is a fragment of the hologram in the world participating in the metamorphosis of the apparitions (Baudrillard, 2002). However, images are not related to the truth, they are representations of reality. In this case, the image is a fragment of the hologram in the world participating in the metamorphosis of the apparitions (Baudrillard, 2002). From the relationship between experiences, the projection of reality and the violence derives a culture of violence and simulation (Levis, 2003), where the player is part of the micro world created by the video game in which killing (in the case of violent games) becomes the only way to achieve the objectives and progress. Somehow, this situation becomes a symbolic representation of which is the player character and who did not suffer physical real consequences, showing violence as something banal and fun. What about the psychological effects?

There are many studies that have been made in this regard, so we will try to point out some elements. On the one hand, we find that video games broadcast a series of values based on the objectives to achieve. For violent games, the player can develop impulsive attitudes (the factor time obliges us to act without reflection), of hatred towards other groups through the creation of the image of the enemy (Iraqi, Nazis, Vietnamese, Arabs...), overly competitive (against each other), where the aim justifies any means to achieve this and, usually, in a Manichean view of the reality in which there are winners and losers, good and bad people, where you have to learn how to crush each other to survive (Gomez Del Castillo, 2007).

In this situation, Frederick Tong developed a manual (Video games and violence: guide for the action, 2008), within the framework of the promotion of youth development and violence prevention, for the proper use of video games in which presents risks to which children are exposed if they play violent video games:

- **Risk of desensitization:** Long-term frequent exposure to scenes of violence contributes to a desensitization of the spectator, accustomed to this behavior.
- **Risk to understand the violence as a solution:** many times, video games, television and films present violence as a resource that has succeeded. It takes

the risk of children to end up understanding that it is reasonable and feasible to resort to violence. The representation of violence becomes problematic when the aggressive behaviors lead to a positive result or they are presented as normal and obvious, and can reach these models of behavior be considered adequate.

- **Risk to "naturalize" of violence:** video games, violence is often presented as something absolutely natural, fruit of a passion that is not possible to resist. The violent instincts, as a sort of invasion that affects genes, to which the individual can oppose any resistance and which feel true pleasure, are presented in some video games.
- **Risk always associated with the violence of the winner without any moral discernment:** violence is presented as a path to success and this is, in many cases, the only objective pursued, appearing as a justifiable end.

Psychologically, many studies point out that there is a relationship between the use of violent games and the increase in aggressive attitudes, something that is already studying for a long time in the field of television and film. Now, with the advent of video games and interactivity, the picture is different (Estallo, 1997):

Television	Video games
- Real and fictional violence	- Fictional violence
- Look real violence	- Stylized and symbolic violence
- Passive attitude	- Active attitude
- Little or no control over the images on screen	- Complete control over all the action
- There is no control over the pace and the choice of images	- Control over the choice of images
- Little or no interaction during the viewing	- Frequent interaction with thirds during the game

Source: Juan Alberto Estallo Martí, *Psicopatología y videojuegos* (2007)

FIGURE 6

According to the study of Craig A. Anderson and Brad J. Bushman: “Each violent-media episode is essentially one more learning trial. As these knowledge structures are rehearsed, they become more complex, differentiated, and difficult to change”. Figure 7 illustrates long-term learning processes, identifies five types of relevant knowledge structures changed by repeated exposure to violent media, and links these long-term changes in aggressive personality to aggressive behavior in the immediate situation through both personological and situational variables (Anderson and Bushman, 2001).




Fig. 2. Multiple-episode General Aggression Model of the long-term effects of video-game violence. Adapted from Anderson and Bushman (in press).




Fig. 1. Single-episode General Aggression Model. Adapted from Anderson and Bushman (in press).

Fig. 8 (up). Single-episode General Aggression Model. Adapted from Anderson and Bushman (in press)

Fig. 7 (left). Multiple-episode General Aggression Model of the long-term effects of video-game violence. Adapted from Anderson and Bushman (in press)

University of Missouri-Columbia, have found that “people who play violent video games show diminished brain responses to images of real-life violence, such as gun attacks, but not to other emotionally disturbing pictures, such as those of dead animals, or sick children. And the reduction in response is correlated with aggressive behavior” (New Scientist, Phillips, 2005). John Murray (1994) says “be sure, there are many factors that influence the relationship between viewing violence and aggressive behavior”. However, this Outlook has been answering different studies, arguing that violence in video games has a causal relationship with the real violence. Daniel Jimenez is one of these detractors and he presents some studies⁴ in his article: “*Estudios Psicológicos: Los videojuegos no causan violencia real*”⁵ (Infoconsolas, 2009). To clarify and reply the criticisms, the American Psychological Association (APA) Resolution on Violence in Video Games and Interactive Media stated:

“There was an increase in aggressive behavior as a result of playing violent video games. The Resolution did not state that there was a direct causal link to an increase in teen violence as a result of playing video games, rather an increase in

⁴ Williams, D. & Skoric, M. “Internet Fantasy Violence: A Test of Aggression in an Online Games.” 2005 / Olson, C. “Media Violence Research and Youth Violence Data: Why Do They Conflict?” Academic Psychiatry, 28:2. 2004 / Bensley, L. & Van Eenwyk, J. “Video Games and Real-Life Aggression: Review of the Literature.” Olympia, WA: Washington State Department of Health. 2002 / Egenfeldt-Nielsen, S., et al. “Playing With Fire: How Do Computer Games Influence the Player?” Commissioned by the Danish Government and published by the Unesco Clearinghouse on Children, Youth and Media. 2004 / Baldaro, B., et al. “Aggressive and Non-Violent Videogames: Short-Term Psychological and Cardiovascular Effects on Habitual Players.” Stress and Health, Vol. 20, pp. 203-208. 2004 / Vastag, B. “Does Video Game Violence Show Aggression?” Journal of the American Medical Association. 2004.

⁵ Psychological studies: Videogames don't cause real violence, available: <http://www.infoconsolas.com/secciones/videojuegos-y-sociedad/estudios-psicologicos-los-videojuegos-no-causan-violencia-real> (consulted on 30/01/2012)

aggressive behavior, aggressive thoughts, angry feelings, and a decrease in helpful behavior as a result of playing violent video games" (Game Politics, 2006).

However, it is interesting to see why people like video games or why started in them. There is a documentary project on the Internet, called *The Gamer Inside*⁶, which through interviews asks the players how they feel.

War Games and Ideology

War industry and video games are becoming more intertwined, so it is difficult to think that it will be a reduction, in the short or medium term, of violence in the contents of these products. The result is the promotion of violence to the resolution of conflicts, which responds to specific interests of those who advocate a warmongering vision of social relations (Levis, 2003). In addition, war games, thanks to technological advances⁷, have reached a level of extreme realism and are even used for campaigns for recruitment and allocation of seats within the army in countries as United States. There is no longer enough to model the last screw of war machines, but also create a conflict, a justification, an enabling environment for a politically correct armed intervention (Gómez Cañete 2001).

In this way, the elements that we have been discussing throughout the article are used for transmitting certain ideologies and ways to proceed. Some examples⁸:



Grand Theft Auto is a series of games in which the action takes place through the stories of various criminals. Sex, prostitution, car theft, murder, love of money, hatred to justice and many other elements come together in this game where violence is present everywhere. Former lawyer Jack Thompson has been involved in a number of attempts to get families of murder victims to hold the *Grand Theft Auto* series accountable for the death of their loved ones. Video available: [Killing people at Grand Theft Auto IV](#)



Counter-Strike is a first-person shooter in which players join either the terrorist team, the counter-terrorist team, or becomes a spectator. Each team attempts to complete their mission objective and/or eliminate the opposing team. Each round is won by either completing the mission objective or eliminating the opposing force. It presents the dichotomy of two sides where players have to kill the enemy anyway. Video available: [Counter Strike violence](#).

⁶ Official webpage of the project: <http://www.youtube.com/thegamerinsideTUBE> (consulted on 01/02/2012)

⁷ Unlimited Detail Real-Time Rendering Technology, Preview 2011, available:

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=00gAbgBu8R4&feature=player_embedded / Future of Game Graphics: VFX Tech Demo, available: <http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=fBR4cT-0sKY&feature=related> (consulted on 31/01/2012)

⁸ The descriptions have been prepared based on the information given by Wikipedia, my own game experience and video games main pages.



The story of *Siren Blood* begins on August 3, 2007 and focuses on an American television crew that arrives in Japan to investigate and document the legend of Hanuda, a "vanished village" where human sacrifices are said to have taken place thirty years prior. Murders, blood and much violence mingle in a game that had to be adapted to the laws of several countries to enter the market, and which was banned in others. The realism of this game makes a unique experience of fear and suffering. Video available: [Siren Blood Course review](#)




"A tyrannical power hungry uses oil reserves of Venezuela to overthrow the Government and turn the country into a war zone". This is the introduction of *Mercenaries 2*, a game whose objective is to make money in the context of a war for oil in the Latin American country. The first part of this game took place in Korea in the North, but the increasing tension of the major powers has diverted the attention against Chavez. It will be the future? Video available: [Mercenaries2: Venezuela invasion. Fiction or reality?](#)



Mortal Kombat, commonly abbreviated *MK*, is a science fantasy series of fighting games. The series is especially noted for its realistic digitized sprites and its high levels of bloody graphic violence, including, most notably, its Fatalities: finishing moves. In all his years of history, this saga has sold more than 25 million copies, that has been transmitted creativity in the ways of killing the other causing the player with phrases such as: Finish him! Video available: [Mortal Kombat 9 All Fatalities / Finishing Moves](#)



In *The Suffering* the player controls Torque, a man who has been sent to Abbott State Penitentiary on Carnate Island, Maryland. In the game, the player is presented several opportunities to test their morality, usually in the form of a person who is trying to survive the horrors of the island. In most cases, the player is presented with three options: help the person (good), kill them (evil), or remain indifferent to their plight (neutral). Video available: [The Suffering: Prison Is Hell gameplay](#)



Battlefield 3 is a first-person shooter video game about war around the world. In this last game of the Battlefield series we find up to six maps related to alleged war in Iran and two more in the vicinity of the Caspian Sea. These games have already been used for recruitment and the positioning of troops according to the score. Can bed this game for training future military forces in future war scenarios? Video available: [The Controller: Battlefield 3 Finale](#)

Another example of differences between titles may be found in the Call of Duty and Battlefield series and how they use the experience of war. Both games seek to capture the rawness of the war, from hope to pain, as realistically as possible. Call of Duty is a burst of adrenaline and testosterone, the players have to kill people immediately but following a story, like they were the main character on a film's action. Battlefield, on the other hand, poses a conflict large scale that turns the player into a piece over one huge gear. Here is designing strategies and feel solidarity among comrades in arms, betting on team play to escape alive from the hell of combat (Ivan de Moneo, 2011).

However, the transmission of this ideology is not only through violent games. One of the most paradigmatic examples in the projection of a consumerist ideology is *The Sims*, a human simulation game in which the main goal is to make happy a family through consumption and social relations. In the case of the war games, I think that the reflection of Eduardo Galeano summarizes very well the current scene:


“Video games speak a language consisting of the rattle of machine guns, the terrifying music, the screams of agony and categorical orders: Finish him! Beat'em up! Shoot'em up! The war of the future, the future war: video games most widely offered battle fields where the player is forced to shoot first and return to shoot later, without doubt ever, against everything that moves” (Galeano, 1998: 72).

Different Videogames

After this short tour of the panorama of the current game, it must be said that there are also other initiatives, related with the stark reality, which can serve to promote peace and understanding the conflicts:



Food Force is a World Food Programs (WFP) video game made to teach children about the logistical challenges of delivering food aid in a major humanitarian crisis. Set on a fictitious island called Sheylan riven by drought and war, Food Force invites children to complete six virtual missions that reflect real-life obstacles faced by WFP in its emergency responses both to the tsunami and other hunger crises around the world. Video available: [Food Force – Interview to World Food Program.](#)




A unique interactive teaching tool in the field of nonviolent conflict, *People Power* was produced for The International Center on Nonviolent Conflict (ICNC). The game simulates nonviolent struggles to win freedom and secure human rights against a variety of adversaries, including dictators, occupiers, corrupt regimes, and to achieve political and human rights for minorities and women. The game models real-world experience, allowing players to devise strategies, apply tactics and see the results. Video available: [Video Games Promote Peace and Democracy](#)



Second Life is an online virtual world where can explore the world (known as the grid), meet other residents, socialize, participate in individual and group activities, and create and trade virtual property and services with one another. One of the most interesting campaigns carried out in this game is the presentation of the Darfur crisis virtually, so the player can experience it in a way. At the same time, the player can get involved in campaigns for support Darfur crisis or to know better what is happening there. Video available: [Save The Darfour On Second Life Event](#)



In *Global Conflicts Palestine* the player assumes the role of a freelance journalist who has just arrived in Jerusalem facing challenges. The goal is to create and get an article published for a newspaper by collecting quotes from the dialog in the game. The series allows students to explore and learn about different conflicts throughout the world and the underlying themes of democracy, human rights, globalization, terrorism, climate and poverty. Video available: [The concept behind the award-winning Global Conflicts game series explained](#) (You can consult all their videos on Youtube Channel)



Virtual Iraq is a set of virtual reality environments created to treat post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) in Operation Iraqi Freedom/Operation Enduring Freedom (OIF/OEF) combat service men and women as well as those who have served in Afghanistan. From a clinical standpoint, Virtual Iraq is form of Virtual Reality Exposure Therapy (VRET), a virtual reality approach to conducting prolonged exposure (PE) therapy, one of the most evidence-based methods of psychotherapeutic treatment for post-traumatic stress. PE is a cognitive-behavioral intervention in which the patient is virtually exposed (for 30-45 minutes per session) to a variety of stimuli (i.e., visual, auditory, kinesthetic, and olfactory) with the purpose of having the patient gradually face the fearful experiences that underlie his/her traumatic memories until habituation to the anxiety occurs. Videos available: [Virtual Better videos](#)

Conclusion

We have seen the risks involved in the use of excessively violent games throughout the work. I invite the reader to perform a screening of the proposals made, and if you prefer to feel the experience itself, to play any of the games here presented as an example, or any of the many others that are on the market.

Nevertheless, I think that video games offer a new communicative experience that goes beyond mere reception, as players experience the action, so it is easier to internalize these behaviors. That is why I believe that video games are a large laboratory that still the peace movements do not have benefited much.

I think, like Gómez Cañete (2001), that video games should not abandon the creation of monolithic vision of reality, they can be useful tools in the discovery of new relationships between the environment, humans and their culture. Urgently needed game that proposed new policy options to facilitate the divergent thinking to end up not falling in line with the single thought and to, ultimately, help overcome a model, the current in many ways, that doesn't work.

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Socio-Economic Status as a Predictor of Perceptions, Behaviors, and Administrative Responses Related to Bullying

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SOCIO-ECONOMIC STATUS AS A PREDICTOR OF PERCEPTIONS, BEHAVIORS, AND ADMINISTRATIVE RESPONSES RELATED TO BULLYING (Essay)

Abstract

Our nation has witnessed a recent epidemic of school shootings, which has given rise to major concerns among administrators about the possibilities of liability. The fact is that a common denominator among many of the shooters in incidents from Columbine to Paducah and Virginia Tech is that they were victims of bullying. Thus standardized “one size fits all” anti-bullying programs have become ubiquitous. The conceptual framework for these programs has been grounded in the pioneering work of Daniel Olweus. The fact that Olweus’ analytical framework tends to be static, ahistorical, and metaphysical reinforces the “one size fits all” approach adopted by school administrators.

The major contribution of this qualitative study is that it found that the variable of socio-economic status is a major predictor of forms of bullying and the remedial responses & programs

adopted by policymakers. Furthermore, the research conducted in racially segregated school settings utilizing a dialectical interpretation of race and class revealed that a reliance upon “zero tolerance” policies exacerbated the phenomenon of institutional racism.

Introduction

The recent massacre at Sandy Hook Elementary school in Newtown, Connecticut has given rise to the most powerful movement for stricter gun laws in the history of our nation. Although there is consensus regarding an “epidemic of gun violence” in our nation, the stakeholders manifest major conflicts in their analyses. African American leaders point out that the devastating impact of gun violence on their communities did not become an issue until a white middle class community was affected. The National Rifle Association representing a primarily white working class constituency asserts that proposed legislation will primarily impact “law abiding citizens.” The root of the conflict is the failure of analysts to take into account the contradictions inherent in a dialectical analysis of race and class.

The scholarship and policy implementation central to bullying suffer from the same analytical pitfalls. Olweus (1991), the major figure in the theory of bullying, emphasizes that, “bullying occurs with similar rates, frequency, and duration in all settings.”

Federal and state governments have provided a standard definition of bullying as aggressive behavior that:

- Is intended to cause distress or harm
- Exists in a relationship in which there is an imbalance of power and strength
- Is repeated over time (Limber, 2002; Nansel et al., 2001; Olweus, 1993)
- Involves physical actions, words, gestures, or social isolation

Thus, the standard definition of bullying leads to a standardized, “one size fits all” policy to address bullying. In a meta-evaluation of bullying programs, Vreemon and Carroll (2007) assert that “a one size fits all policy leads to limited efficacy.” The major contribution of the present study is to focus on socio-economic status as a predictor of the forms of bullying and the response of policy makers. Furthermore, the portion of the research conducted in racially segregated school settings utilizing a dialectical interpretation of race and class revealed that a reliance upon “zero tolerance” policies exacerbated the phenomenon of institutional racism.

Although the viability of “one size fits all” programs was questionable, school administrators perceive the strategy as protection from litigation. The focus of the present research is to question whether or not teachers and administrators define bullying and respond to the problem in a uniform fashion regardless of the socio-economic status of their student body. Although the whole school bullying prevention program by Olweus has been tested in school districts in suburban areas, no studies have examined the efficacy of the program in low-income areas, thus far. Likewise, few studies of the program’s impact have been conducted in inner-cities with high level of neighborhood and family poverty (Reynolds, 2001).

The Olweus Bullying Prevention Program has failed to consider the socio-economic situation of parents in impoverished communities, particularly African-American and Hispanic parents. Due to welfare reform legislation passed as early as 1996, many low-income, single African American and Hispanic mothers are required to seek employment with involves long working hours. Therefore, the demands leave little or no time to properly monitor children's behavior. Since the Olweus Bullying Prevention Program designates parental involvement as a key component for successful implementation, these contradictions contribute to the failing success rates in low-income schools.

Upon deconstruction of the pervasive bullying problem, several key elements were determined troublesome. That, in fact, students of lower socio-economic status experience more physical and blatant bullying than that of their upper socio-economic counterparts. The upper SES students, teachers and administrators reported problematic behaviors arising from covert or hidden use of technology as well as social isolation techniques.

Trends in Bullying Prevention

Fatal school shootings have forced the adoption of policies and procedures in our schools in an attempt to thwart catastrophic consequences of bullying and peer victimization. School bullying has been found to be most prevalent between the ages of nine and fifteen, during the stages of late-childhood and early-adolescence (Carney & Merrell, 2001). This being the case, the responsibility falls mainly upon the elementary and middle/high schoolteachers as well as administrations to prevent violent occurrences within the school walls.¹

State lawmakers and politicians have historically attributed to the curriculum development of our public school systems. Theoretically, federal mandates are passed to the individual states, and filtered down to individual counties and districts- always with the best intentions. However, in the case of bullying, there appears to be a disconnect between the administration and the needs of the students.

Upon federal and state mandate, school districts across America were required to adopt and implement anti-bullying strategies for use in the school setting by 2012. Many companies rushed to produce "one-size-fits-all," expensive, non-research based plans that have proven ill-effective among our student populations. While these "one-size-fits-all" curriculums generate hearty revenues for a number of publishers, and provide school districts with the necessary liability protection, the needs of our students remain unaddressed.

The Bias of Olweus' Techniques

Dan Olweus, PhD, is generally recognized as a pioneer and founding father of research on bullying problems and is considered a world-leading expert in the areas of community research and society at large. In 1970, he started a large-scale project that is now generally regarded as the first scientific study of bullying problems in the world, published as a book in Scandinavia in 1973 and in 1978 in the United States under the title *Aggression in the Schools: Bullies and Whipping Boys*. In the 1980s, Dr. Olweus conducted the first systematic intervention study

¹ "When Does Bullying Happen?" pathwayscourses.samhsa.gov/bully/bully_2_pg3_htm.

against bullying in the world, which documented a number of quite positive effects of what is now the *Olweus Bullying Prevention Program (OBPP)*. He was also the first to study the problem of bullying of students by teachers. Since 2001, he has been the leader of a government-initiated national initiative implementing OBPP on a large-scale basis in Norwegian elementary and junior high schools. Olweus continues to propagate that bullying scenarios occur at the same frequency across all cultures throughout the globe.

While many administrators are expected to initiate an effort, such as the adoption of the Olweus program, the reality is prevention plans such as the Olweus Bullying Prevention Plan are aimed to stop violence and bullying among middle class students. The middle class students and the middle class problems are drastically different from the poor and urban school issues. The rate, frequency, and duration at which low-income children are exposed to violence are much greater than those of their middle to upper class counterparts. There is the potential to exacerbate the problems of urban school children when enforcing the middle class prevention plan. Although the whole-school bullying prevention program has been tested in suburban districts, no studies have examined the efficacy of the program in low-income schools. (Hong, 2007)

Thesis Statement

There is consensus in the literature on bullying that the incidence of bullying is equal across race, class, and gender. However, the possibility that the forms of bullying- that is, the behavioral manifestations, vary as a function of race, class, gender, and cultural issues has not been adequately addressed. Is it possible that teachers and administrators working with children of low income households define, perceive, and respond differently to bullying behaviors when compared with the definition, perception, and responses of teachers and administrators offering educational services to children of middle class families?

Methodology

It is imperative that studies include a dialectical approach to the all-encompassing study of bullying. This ensures an equalizing agent that allows for cultural sensitivity while rebuking falsehoods and nonsensical stereotypes that potentially impede the effectiveness of accurate and reliable practices. A dialectical approach that examines the interrelated functions of race, class, behavior, and culture among behaviors of school children guarantees the development of a systematic framework by which the cross sections of school age children can be taught the appropriate skills necessary to foster a healthy, non-violent response to adverse peer behaviors.

In order to expand on previous research and cultivate an improved, research-based technique for addressing bullying, a qualitative data analysis methodology was used. Qualitative data exposes the depth of emotional and psychological trauma incurred by victims and bystanders enduring bullying at school.² Qualitative data collection reveals rich data that would otherwise be overlooked by quantitative data collection methods. In addition, qualitative data in the form of interviews, oral histories, and artistic renderings (for early childhood settings) gives holistic depictions of the focus of those involved. Qualitative data should include, but not be limited to, the student definition of the term “bully,” as well as descriptions of instances of violence

² Jette; Necessity of narrative form versus quantitative format

witnessed or experienced by the student. Data also incorporates the perceptions of students in areas regarding teacher and principal interventions. Personal accounts of bullying incidences are included, along with familial and student reactions. Also, the issue of media outlets such as “Facebook” and “MySpace” as a potential device for harboring violent actions must be addressed. Subsequently, the use of handheld electronic devices as an outlet for increased socialization opportunities must be questioned as to the potential negative capabilities of fueling covert bullying behaviors.³ The following is a detailed description of the initial stages of investigation:

First, two groups were determined and divided based on socio-economic status. Group A (subset: Principals- Rollins, Fields, Cole/ Teachers- Haburn, Frye, Williams) consisted of lower socio-economic status (SES), which included student populations of more than thirty percent that qualified for free or reduced lunch. Group B (subset: Principals- Smith, Kaiser, Nelson/ Teachers- Wright, Hartwell, Carroll) was comprised of upper SES, consisting of student populations that yielded less than thirty percent that qualified for free or reduced lunch.

The data was recorded, transcribed, and finally coded. The resulting data was expected to show disparity in definitions, perceptions, and reactions between teachers/administrators in differing socio-economic school settings. The behavioral manifestations of the lower socio-economic group proved to be that of direct, physical and blatant confrontations when compared to covert, indirect, and social isolation techniques exercised by those in the upper socio economic classes. Additionally, the methods of response among members of each group revealed drastic differences in definitions and strategies used by teachers and administration to alleviate the problems. Parental involvement was expected to differ as parents of lower socio-economic groups tend to confront the issues between children in comparison to upper socio-economic parents who tend to “brush it under the rug” or “play games” amongst themselves.

The study included data collection about students in a school setting with diverse populations. Such populations would include an even distribution of students falling in the low, middle and upper-income brackets. In addition, the population included a racially diverse sample in order to galvanize the dialectics of a study based on race, class, and gender.

The purpose of this study was to examine the difference in behavioral manifestations of bullying as they pertain to race, class, and gender in order to better construct an improved method of addressing and ending bullying in the classroom.

Using a case-study design (Merriam, 1998) data was collected from multiple sources. These sources included observations, archival data and face-to-face interviews. Using this variety and range of data sources ensured triangulation while maintaining integrity and translucency in data results.

Data Collection

Data sources included individual interviews conducted at the end of the 2010-2011 school year. Each source was interviewed at a place of their choice, and all interviews were free of

³ Justice for Children and Youth (JFCY): Cyber-Bullying- jfcy1.blogspot.com/2012/02/cyber-bullying.html

distraction, meaning that no students were present. The initial questions were presented at the onset of the interview. Teachers and administrators were told that their discourse is confidential and there will be no identifying information. All teacher meetings were audiotaped and/or computer-recorded for later transcription. Interviews were based on the aforementioned question set however teachers often deviated from these questions, administrators as well. Interviews lasted between forty-five minutes and one hour.

Method of Analysis

The interviews were coded using two varying methods. First, the text segments were coded as addressing one or more factors involving race, class, or gender issues as they pertained to bullying behaviors and trends in their classroom or school. Second, the text was analyzed using an open-code scheme which indicated segments of text that were coded in regards to changing perspectives- definition, current regulations, and potential improvement ideas. This revealed the differences in perspectives as to how teachers define bullying taking into consideration race, class, and gender differences. It was equally informative in the area of prevention and troubleshooting chronic bullying issues in the school settings; the comparison of current rules and continued mis-behaviors provided a segue into teacher perspectives regarding missing elements in current anti-bullying trends.

Methodology

The methodology and interview questions were designed to prompt teachers and administrators to give detailed descriptions of the problematic behaviors they were witness to inside their school environment and what responses to incidents they deem appropriate. Teachers and administrators reviewed their personal records of conduct referrals, suspension and expulsion reports and included these conduct reports in their interviews. Is it possible that the behavioral differences are a result of access to monetary funds used to secure advanced technology systems in the home and for personal use that allows for covert bullying behaviors among the upper SES students, while proliferating physical violence among lower SES students who are not privy to the technologically advanced gadgets and personal computer social networks. Although evidence shows that upper SES students demonstrate covert bullying behaviors in the act of social isolation, computer bullying via Facebook, MySpace, and IM, is it reality to declare lower SES students violent in an overt physically aggressive mode because of the lack of opportunity and access to computers and technology? And if so, would it not be necessary to devise anti-bullying strategies that address these differences in student manifestations of bullying behaviors?

Sampling

The participants of this study were certified teachers and principals serving the school and classroom no less than six years and as many as forty years. The administrators are responsible for monitoring and reporting bullying incidents to the school board and superintendent. They are also enforcers of school-wide rules based on the district guidelines. Teachers maintain the rules specified in the individual school handbook, determined by the administrators, as well as designing micro-level classroom climate techniques to manage bullying behaviors among students they oversee.

Participants

Participants of this study will include three administrators and three teachers serving two distinct populations of differing income status; a total of twelve participants. Study Group A will consist of three administrators (Mr. Rollins, Mr. Fields, Mr. Cole) and three teachers (Mrs. Haburn, Mrs. Frye, Mrs. Williams) serving school populations consisting of: more than thirty-percent of students receiving free or reduced lunch (a **poverty school**). Study Group B will also consist of three administrators (Mr. Smith, Mr. Kaiser, Mr. Nelson) and three teachers (Mrs. Wright, Mrs. Hartwell, Mrs. Carroll) however, they serve student populations in which less than thirty percent of students qualify and receive free or reduced lunch (a **non-poverty school**.) The following list details the demographics of each school in the study and includes state averages.

Sample

1. AAA Elementary (Poverty) (Subset A) Principal D Teacher D
 Ethnicity: White-62% Black-37% Hispanic-<1%
 Economically Disadvantaged: 79%
2. Top Academy (Poverty) (Subset A) Principal E
 Ethnicity: White-1% Black-97% Hispanic-<1%
 Economically Disadvantaged: 79%
3. Donovan Elementary (Non-Poverty) (Subset B) Principal A Teacher A
 Ethnicity: White-94% Black-2% Hispanic-2% Asian/Pacific Islander-2%
 Native American-<1%
 Economically Disadvantaged: 28%
4. Mitchell Elementary (Non-Poverty) (Subset B) Principal B Teacher B
 Ethnicity: White-100%
 Economically Disadvantaged: 28%
5. Missouri Hill Elementary (Poverty) (Subset A) Principal F Teacher F
 Ethnicity: White-99% Black-0% Hispanic-<1%
 Economically Disadvantaged: 48%
6. Dillensberg Elementary (Non-Poverty) (Subset B) Principal C Teacher C
 Ethnicity: White-99% Black-0% Hispanic-0% Asian/Pacific Islander-<1%
 Economically Disadvantaged: 24%
7. Arvada Elementary (Poverty) (Subset A) Teacher E
 Ethnicity: White-99% Black-0% Hispanic-<1% Asian/Pacific Islander-<1%
 Economically Disadvantaged: 51%

****Schools with more than 30% economically disadvantaged are considered “poverty schools” according to Federal Public School Guidelines.**

State Averages:

Ohio Ethnicity: White-76% Black-16% Hispanic-3% Asian/Pacific Islander-<1% Native American-<1%

Ohio Economically Disadvantaged: 36%

Indiana Ethnicity: White-75% Black-12% Hispanic-7% Asian/Pacific Islander-1% Native American-<1%

Indiana Economically Disadvantaged: 42%

Setting

The study will take place in 2011 in several Midwestern school districts. There will be seven individual schools with varying degrees of diversity within the populations, including rural, suburban, and urban classifications. All schools serve kindergarten through eighth grade. The demographics are accurate as of 2011-2012 school year statistics. Principals A, B, and C are representative of administrators serving the non-poverty schools along with Teachers A, B, and C. Principals D, E, and F, along with Teachers D, E, and F (are representative of administrators and teachers serving school populations with at least thirty percent poverty students.) The study represents racially diverse populations situated in urban, suburban, and rural districts.

Participants

The following are fictional names assigned to each principal and teacher, with factual descriptions applicable to the administrators' and teachers' careers.

1. Principal A: Mr. Smith has been a principal at Donovan Elementary for fourteen years serving a suburban population located near the western portion of Cincinnati, Ohio. He has been a long-time resident of the area. Mr. Smith was satisfied with his position and the direction in which the school is moving in areas of test scores and behavior improvements. This was a non-poverty school.
2. Teacher A: Mrs. Wright taught elementary school music and music education for six years at a suburban middle school located near the western portion of Cincinnati, Ohio. Mrs. Wright works with Mr. Smith serving the same population at Donovan Elementary. Mrs. Wright enjoys the majority of her classes, but did express concerns in the areas of behavior management in one particular class. This was a non-poverty school.
3. Principal B: Mr. Kaiser has been principal of Mitchell Elementary for seventeen years. This is a rural elementary with no diverse populations. It was described as a generational school- meaning that the families in that area have attended this particular school for many family cycles. Farming is a major industry in the area, and Mr. Kaiser recognizes the unique challenges of the families and their resources. This was a non-poverty school.
4. Teacher B: Mrs. Hartwell has been a teacher for forty years. She has taught all grades in Mitchell Elementary during her tenure. She was very descriptive and told many stories. Her portrayal of education throughout the years showed the changes that have occurred since she began teaching in 1970. Mrs. Hartwell was extremely concerned with growing problems in the area of school violence, especially female violence. This was a non-poverty school.

5. Principal C: Mr. Nelson has been a principal for forty-two years at Dillensberg Elementary. He planned to retire within three years. Mr. Nelson was proud of the “Excellent” rating that the school attained in 2007. This is a non-diverse school located in a small town in an otherwise rural setting in Indiana. This is considered a non-poverty school.
6. Teacher C: Mrs. Carroll has worked under the leadership of Mr. Nelson for thirty-three years. She has a reputation for extremely high expectations and strict discipline in her classroom. She instructs an inclusive classroom with students label emotionally disturbed. Mrs. Carroll was eager to discuss the successes and improvements that have occurred in her school. This is also a non-poverty school.
7. Principal D: Mr. Rollins, AAA Elementary, has been a principal at this urban, diverse school for twelve years. The school serves a population ranging from kindergarten to eighth grade. It has a majority of white, Appalachian immigrants with a large population of African-Americans and Guatemalans. The school has community supports that maintain safety and also contribute to the general welfare of the student body. Mr. Rollins was quick to recognize that the behavior problems are severe in his school and places blame on family and poverty issues. This is a severely impoverished school.
8. Teacher D: Mrs. Haburn, AAA Elementary, has been an elementary and middle school teacher for nine years and has an intervention specialist license as well. She instructs a diverse classroom, with several children on an IEP. Her concerns also revealed an increase in female violence at this school. She was a supporter of the zero tolerance policy, which was strictly enforced at the school. This is a severely impoverished school located on the west side of Cincinnati.
9. Principal E: Mr. Fields has been principal and founder of the charter school, Top Academy, for eleven years. She boasts the “Excellence in Academics” award for four years. The population is diverse, majority African American. This school attracts the brightest students through testing and pre-acceptance interviews. The emphasis is on parental involvement and community outreach. This is an urban school located North of downtown Cincinnati. It is a poverty school.
10. Teacher E: Mrs. Frye taught for thirty-five years at Arvada Elementary, a large suburban elementary serving a non-diverse population in Southeastern Indiana, approximately forty-five minutes from Cincinnati, Ohio. There are approximately 2,500 students in what is considered a poverty school. The students range from kindergarten to sixth grade. Mrs. Frye taught primarily second and third grade. There are no African-American students and less than 1% Hispanic. Considered poverty school.
11. Principal F: Mr. Cole has been principal at Missouri Hill Elementary for twenty years. MHE is an extremely rural school with high levels of poverty and majority white, Appalachian students. Mr. Cole expressed concerns with the community, the families, and the prospect of the village (which total population is 324). The major concerns were lack of work, drug and alcohol use, and physical/sexual abuse and neglect.
12. Teacher F: Mrs. Williams is a first grade teacher at Missouri Hill Elementary and has worked for Mr. Cole for eleven years. Mrs. Williams attended Arvada Elementary, but secured a job at MHE. She is vigilant about parental involvement and also expressed concerns about the violence in the small rural community that has been worsening over the past five to seven years. Mrs. Williams was eager to talk about situations she had witnessed that proved her theory about increased violence. Considered a poverty school.

Omissions in Research

The nature of bullying can be difficult to accurately target, as the perpetrators attempt to conceal, quite often, the violent behaviors in an attempt to avoid punishment. Therefore, a longitudinal study based on student perceptions of bullying and how those perceptions change over an extended period of time would be fascinating and informative. Such studies are currently lacking in the present literature on bullying. Time and growth are the two major determinants of increasing and decreasing instances of reported bullying. Research shows that bullying is at the lowest during early childhood and secondary school, with a dramatic peak during the middle school years. There are currently no studies mapping children's perceptions as they progress through the school system. Although these points will not be addressed in this study, it is necessary to mention that the student perceptions cannot be ignored.

Participant Research Questions

Do the behavioral manifestations of bullying vary as a function of race, class, gender, and culture? Olweus suggests that incidents of bullying occur at a similar rate and duration across all cultures and age groups at the international level. Therefore, the question arises: how does the bullying behavior manifest itself when comparing urban, suburban, and rural school environments with embedded socio-economic differences?

In order to address the above mentioned inquiry, the definition of bullying among teachers and administrators must be operationalized. Since it is the teacher and administrator who report and respond to bullying incidences, the data regarding the details of violence in the classroom can be skewed due to the subjective nature of identification of problematic behaviors.

This problem necessitates the creation of an improved method of combating these negative behaviors, bullying definitions must be realigned to target differences in student culture as it relates to socio-economic status. Therefore, the independent variable represented in this study is income as a predicting factor of bullying behaviors and the perceptions and responses of administrators and teachers (dependent variable).

Once the two subject groups are established, the following questions were administered to the teachers and administrators/principals of each socio-economic group.

1. Please define bullying as it pertains to you.
2. What are your personal thoughts regarding bullying?
3. What attempts do you make to thwart or alleviate bullying behaviors?
4. What effects have you witnessed as a result of bullying? Psychologically?
Physically? Socially? Academically
5. What actions have you witnessed or expected from teachers and administrators when confronted with peer on peer bullying behaviors?⁴

Significance of Study

⁴ Questions designed by Jette post pilot study

The richness of data and the comparative nature of the research design will create the possibility for further research agendas. The deconstruction of definition, perception, and response is a fundamental and necessary element in proper design of future anti-bullying campaigns. Prior to the composition of this study, there are no published studies to be accessed indicating the importance of race, class, and gender in anti-bullying strategy design.

Delimitations

This study focuses primarily on the teacher and administrator perspective. Parents and students were excluded, aside from comments recalled by teachers and administrators. Participants in this study are from the Midwest only. Convenience sampling was necessary for this project, therefore there are no claims of generalizability.

Findings

Every individual participant of the study declared “bullying” a major problem in their school and classroom setting. Administrators and teachers recognized that bullying is a major problem and can be damaging to the students mentally, physically, and academically. Both groups determined bullying to be dangerous to the welfare of individual students and the collective school climate. Every school was equipped with an anti-bullying strategy and some type of protocol for addressing incidents. There were no teachers or administrators that reported zero bullying in their building and/or classroom. This important declaration is evidence that the problem of bullying is pervasive and affecting all students in every socio-economic environment. The administrators and teachers participating in this study agreed that bullying can be “tricky” to pinpoint and this fact makes intervention difficult. Participants agreed that physical bullying was the “easiest” to combat, as the situations were blatant enough to determine a bully, a victim, and bystanders. In such cases, the bully is punished, the victim is offered in-school supports, and preventative measures are taken to thwart future attacks. These could include but are not limited to: in-school suspension, out-of-school suspensions, proximity adjustments, parent/teacher/administrator conferences, and psychological screenings.

The participants described problematic interventions for “sneaky” bullying, or covert bullying. Behaviors that included social isolation were most vehement due to the intense mental damage sustained by victims. Participants described victims of covert bullying as becoming depressed, withdrawn, and anxious. Teachers and administrators viewed loss of interest, dropped or failing grades, and general malaise as the main symptoms of students experiencing covert bullying. Participants also reported that the negative effects of covert bullying long outlasted those of outward physical aggressions between students. Participants went so far as to say that students engaging in overt bullying behaviors in the form of physical outbursts found their victims recovered much quicker than those of their covert counterparts. Students were apt to become “friends” or “be cool with each other” in the cases of physical bullying while students experiencing covert bullying violence never recovered while in that school setting. Participants cited instances of students resorting to alcohol, drugs, and/or self-harming behaviors as a result of depression and anxiety prompted by bullying experienced in and out of school.

Teacher and administrator definitions were typically similar, and any variances were due to elimination of behaviors that may have not been experienced in detail within their school setting. All physical aggression on a repeated basis was defined in the school policies as the basic example of bullying behavior, regardless of student population SES. Schools of the upper SES, (Donovan Elementary, Mitchell Elementary, and Dillensberg Elementary) determined that technological bullying was problematic and incorporated clauses in the handbook addressing the behaviors of students in and out of school. The student handbooks required student behaviors to reflect the school mission of community and responsibility at all times. Students (Donovan, Mitchell, Dillensberg Elementaries) were required to sign technology contracts requiring appropriate actions on all social media outlets, including personal computer usage, Facebook, MySpace, IM, cellular phones, YouTube, and texting. Students of lower SES schools, (AAA Elementary, Top Academy, Missouri Hill Elementary, and Arvada Elementary) were not offered or required to sign and abide by any such rules. Upon further probing, it was determined that the economic disparities were the contributing factors for such rules. For example, the teachers of the lower SES schools (AAA, Top, Missouri Hill, and Arvada) were instructed by administrators to avoid homework assignments and projects requiring internet and/or computer usage- as the majority of the student population lacked access to such technology. On the other hand, the teachers of the upper SES schools (Donovan, Mitchell, and Dillensberg,) were encouraged to promote technology use in their classroom with extended enrichment opportunities in the form of homework requiring home computer usage. These facts have a profound impact on this study. The upper SES schools reported high levels of covert bullying, while the lower SES schools reported escalated incidents of physical/overt bullying, thus supporting the initial hypothesis that the behavioral manifestation of bullying behavior will differ in accordance to economic status of student populations.

Findings of Low Income Schools (Group A)

Upon further analysis, the economic disparity amongst the schools revealed the details of deviations in behaviors among students of poverty and students of non-poverty. Mr. Rollins and Mrs. Haburn (poverty school) reported a decline in malicious and violent bullying, however, the remaining incidences remained at a higher level than that of the upper SES counterparts. Mr. Rollins and Mrs. Haburn, though interviewed separately, both attributed the decline of violence to an initiative taken throughout the school to promote diversity acceptance issues and a zero-tolerance violence policy. One basis of the zero-tolerance policy that contributed to its' success is that a student found guilty of physical aggression/bullying behaviors will be issued an out-of-school suspension, beginning with three days for the first offense. This poses a significant problem to parents, especially single-parent families that must make considerable adjustments to provide child-care for those days the student will be on home suspension. Payment for child-care services, or a failure to work during those days not only causes economic issues for the household, but also requires parents to address the situation and prevent it from occurring on a regular basis. Because the student population of AAA Elementary consists of 79% economically disadvantaged, this zero-tolerance policy can prove financially devastating to students' families who must contend with this policy. Although the school is of high poverty demographics, the population reflects an urban, extremely diverse atmosphere. The neighborhood consists of black, white, Hispanic, and Guatemalan populations that are essentially mirrored in the populous of the school. Mr. Rollins and Mrs. Haburn place blame on community, or lack thereof, as well as

parenting techniques as a reason for elevated overt bullying behaviors. They reason that a lack of supervision, due to the breakdown of the nuclear family and lack of resources, as the number one factor is increased violence in the community and school. Single parents forced to work, yet unable to pay for adequate child care services, often leave large numbers of children/minors in the care of elderly relatives that are not capable of meeting the needs- socially, mentally, or academically of school age children. A number of students are left in the care of relatives due to the incarceration of parent(s), or mandated drug/alcohol treatment programs. Another large percentage of students are placed in foster care due to neglect and/or abuse investigations. Mr. Rollins and Mrs. Haburn also chose to acknowledge this lack of familial cohesiveness as a factor in the elevated violence among community members. Rival gangs and clan disputes cause community violence to infiltrate the school setting. Mr. Rollins and Mrs. Haburn credit the anti-social behaviors of the adults surrounding the children as the confounding factor of increased violence in their school. Students lack a positive model, thus failing to develop healthy coping skills which lead to anger, frustration, and physical bullying among the student body.

Alike in their struggles, Mr. Fields (Top Academy) sounded the same frustrations as AAA Elementary. Most commonly, Mr. Fields addressed problems of conspicuous consumption, or lack of, among students. Students were regularly bullied or “beat up” for issues regarding clothing and looks- either owning expensive shoes such as “Nikes” and “DC” brand clothing (of which these items would be a point of contention) or not having stylish clothes and brand name shoes. Children would verbally assault those who were slated as having “nappy” hair, a lack of motherly care/nurture, body odor, or poor oral hygiene. These verbal assaults always escalated into physical attacks. And, Mr. Fields noted, they were repetitious in nature. Once a child is termed “nasty”, the title affixes itself to not only that child, but the siblings and parents/family. Mr. Fields’ school also is demonstrative of a racially and ethnically diverse urban population, whose poverty level lingers at 79%. The main issue that Mr. Fields deems as problematic is lack of basic care at home. The students who are bullied in Top Academy are bullied because of a failure by parents/guardians to meet basic needs such as food, shelter, and adequate clothing. Mr. Fields cited many examples of students arriving at school hungry, un-bathed, and wearing completely inappropriate clothing- such as a young girl wearing an old, used “flower girl” dress from a wedding or a provocative outfit obviously commandeered from someone else’s closet. These examples establish economic hardships as the number one cause of bullying behaviors in Top Academy. It also validates the fact that households that are unable to provide basic needs, i.e. clothes, food, medicine, for children are ultimately unable to provide advanced technology such as computers and cell phones for children’s usage, thus preventing covert bullying behaviors like texting, YouTubing, and Facebooking that the upper SES schools find so problematic. Rather, the poverty students resort to physical altercations and verbal assault as a means of defense and aggressive output.

While the two aforementioned schools prove to paint a typical picture of poor, urban school settings experiencing blatant, overt bullying behaviors, their poor, rural counterparts are experiencing similar tribulations. Mr. Cole and Mrs. Williams (Missouri Hill Elementary), along with Mrs. Frye (Arvada Elementary) are currently serving student populations that demographics show to be between 48% and 51% poverty. Although the racial diversity is limited in the rural school, 99% white/Appalachian students, the problems of violence within the school and communities are perpetuated by exasperating economic downturns. Mrs. Williams

was explicit in her comparisons of students from poverty homes and students from middle class households. “The bullies in my school are usually angry and frustrated children. They may not even be aware that the way they are expressing themselves is the result of mental issues and crappy home lives.” Examples of instances of overt physical bullying in the rural schools included students hitting, punching, fighting, hiding necessary personal belongings such as books, coats, purses, etc., mock slapping, verbal assaults, and writing slanderous notes. All of the complaints occurred on school property or on the school bus. Many student complaints were pre-empted by out-of-school skirmishes between families regarding a variety of non-school related issues such as property feuds, money issues, and adult-related circumstances. Mrs. Williams continued to delve deep into the issues at the heart of violence and bullying amongst children in the small, rural school system. In comparison, the middle class students attending the school, though the minority, have been placed into bullying situations either as victim or bystander. Mrs. Williams describes bullying behaviors as “contagious” and as having a “trickle-down” effect. The school has policies and interventions currently in place to combat the bullying, which has been described as “on the rise” over the past several years. Portions of the intervention have embedded family services, for example, students that are found to be exhibiting bullying behaviors are required to attend an evaluation meeting with the administrator, teacher, parents, and counselor. Mrs. Williams concurs that while this is very helpful, in many instances, this policy is punitive rather than preventive in nature and most of the time the damage has already been done. In addition, Mrs. Williams finds irony in the policy, citing that it is often the poorest students who hail from the broken families- the broken families are the people refusing assistance and experiencing addiction and mental illness issues, modeling poor behavior and coping skills, and thus proliferating issues among their children, other family members, and the community. All of this culminates in the bullying behaviors at school which are rarely solved by an evaluation meeting between administrators and school officials who are already viewed as “enemies” by these children and their parents/families.

Mr. Cole, Mrs. Williams, and Mrs. Frye all claim that the lack of resources for these geographically isolated communities is an irresponsible oversight by local and state government officials- or possibly a direct deprivation of government involvement at the local level. Regardless, they are disillusioned by the disparity between families in their communities. Mrs. Frye and Mrs. Williams describe instances that the negative behaviors of poverty stricken peers have forced students into defensive behaviors. Students are often aggressive at home, and they continue their aggressions at school. Students who are well adjusted find themselves becoming aggressors as a mode of defense in order to “survive” the un-pleasantries and jeering of their peers. According to Mrs. Williams, the entire argument as to how to fix the problem is much larger than what can be done by teachers in a school. Mrs. Frye is certain that the underlying issue is the age-old argument of nature versus nurture. Children are not born to be manipulative and violent. They learn these behaviors and use what defenses are at hand in order to cope and survive situations in the home. “Most often, and you can ask the kindergarten teacher, it is obvious that a child comes from a rough home life by the way they act in kindergarten.” Further exploration of teacher perceptions proved that by second grade, these behaviors are automatic-hitting, being abusive, acting out first—these are symptoms of “get or be gotten.” Students from households that have nurturing environments would never consider aggressive behaviors as a method of getting what they want. Those students are accustomed to sitting down and conversing, giving and taking, understanding empathy and the feelings of others. They have had

those behaviors modeled for them by parents; they have practiced these behaviors and experienced positive feedback that has ultimately reinforced these desired peer interactions.

A reiterating problem among rural and urban, poverty situations is that of supervision. Mr. Cole, Mrs. Williams, as well as Mr. Rollins, Mrs. Haburn, and Mrs. Frye all claimed to understand supervision as a number one determining factor in bullying behaviors. While rural students are geographically isolated in comparison with their urban counterparts, stopping bullying behaviors requires more than student/teacher/principal collaboration. The absence of hands-on parenting is making it difficult for teachers to effectively teach positive behavior modifications. Where urban parents have access to public transportation and government outreach programs, the rural parents are left to “figure things out on their own.” With little or no transportation options, obvious lack of employment opportunity and industry, increasing cases of drug and alcohol abuse in both rural and urban landscapes, and rising trends in domestic violence, teachers feel that the bullying behaviors are a direct manifestation of institutional violence perpetrated by omission of adequate government aide.

Administrators and teachers in both poverty and non-poverty populations reported that bullying behaviors were present in their school settings, and all school policies regarding violent physical behavior included bullying as an intolerable action that would result in variety of punitive actions/punishments. Interestingly, the lower SES schools did not feel the need to include covert bullying in their definitions, as they perceived this type of bullying as reserved for computer and cell phone use, to which the majority of their students lacked access. The term “covert” was not the definitive term used by teachers and administration in upper SES schools to describe the growing “nuisance” of technology in the school... rather it was referred to as “technological” bullying

Covert bullying is any type of bullying behavior that includes, but is not limited to, psychological or social violence without the onset of physical violence resulting in physical or intended physical injury. (Jette. 2011) While the majority of lower SES school officials are contending with “cut and dry” incidents of fist fights and blatant physical aggression, the upper SES schools are coming to understand the ramifications of covert bullying violence which is not nearly as transparent- resulting in definition, recognition, and intervention dilemmas.

Findings of Upper Income Schools (Group B)

Group B, consisting of Mr. Smith, Mr. Kaiser, and Mr. Nelson (principals at Donovan, Mitchell, and Dillensberg) and Mrs. Wright, Mrs. Hartwell, and Mrs. Carroll (teachers at Donovan, Mitchell, and Dillensberg) are serving student populations consisting of poverty levels less than 28% and in one case, 24% (non-poverty). Demographically, these schools are 94% to 100% white, exhibiting an obvious lack of diversity. Administrators and teachers at these schools reported a decline in overt bullying behaviors, often struggling to remember any instances of physical violence not only in their personal classroom, but in the entire school. Teachers and administrators at these schools describe the downward trend in physically aggressive student outbursts as “understandable.” The administrations, including school boards, have targeted the plight of aggressive bullying behaviors by pinpointing students exhibiting these behaviors and prescribing thorough evaluative psychiatric and counseling services be put in place for these

students and their families. They have also implemented support services for victims and bystanders (and their families) of violent attacks. Teachers and administration agreed that these measures were prompted by Columbine, Virginia Tech, and similar school catastrophes of the past.

While the upper SES schools are thwarting the outwardly physical bullying within their schools, they voiced grave concerns about the increasingly relentless assault of students via computer technology- specifically social media outlets used to slander, humiliate, isolate, and psychologically damage/abuse peers on a public stage such as Facebook, MySpace, YouTube, or the use of texting/sexting via cell phone and smart phones. The hindering of covert bullying is infinitely more difficult than the obstruction of outward peer-to-peer aggression. Mrs. Wright, Mrs. Hartwell, and Mrs. Carroll described their experience with covert bullying as difficult due to the “sneaky” nature of the actions or lack thereof. When they had discussions with their classrooms regarding bullying, students overwhelmingly responded that, although they were not necessarily “beat up” or physically abused, they had felt bullying due to comments, conversations, and innuendos posted on computers or text messages. The majority of students felt that they were bullied by others at least once in their school life. Students also revealed to Mrs. Wright, Mrs. Hartwell, and Mrs. Carroll that they more often experienced cases of social isolation which, to the students, was more disturbing than a peer-to-peer confrontation.

Group B (non-poverty school administrators and teachers) discussed the specific difficulties in countering peer-to-peer complaints that consisted of out-of-school occurrences. Mr. Kaiser and Mr. Nelson described occasions of student misbehaviors occurring on home computers that forced school officials to react with enhanced bullying definitions in the student handbook. Mr. Smith cited that problems of computer and cell phone use had at one time not been a problem, but recently- within the past five years- could no longer be ignored. Mr. Smith experienced several situations within the past year that resulted in parent conferences. Mr. Smith was made aware of bullying behaviors by students when two particular children made increasingly aggressive threats on Facebook. In an attempt to confront the situation, he was forced to involve parents whom had not been aware of the ensuing clash. The situation was resolved by administration and parents, however, the same type of incident occurred at Mitchell Elementary school, resulting with law enforcement intervention, prompted by parents. The issue of technology, though not a targeted problem for the lower SES schools, has become a prominent distraction in the upper SES classrooms. Although administrations have enforced the anti-bullying regulations regarding bullying via technology, teachers and administrators alike admit that “catching students in the act” is difficult and often borderline infringement of rights. Mrs. Wright, Mrs. Hartwell, and Mrs. Carroll allude to the fact that they are not responsible for the behaviors of students while they are under parental supervision... only while they are at school. But, the ever-complicating dynamics of technological bullying is making the partition between school behaviors and home behaviors more opaque than in the past. The discord between parental responsibility and teacher responsibility has become further blurred by the continuing nature of bullying behaviors and the negative impact these covert aggressions are having on students’ school endeavors. Students suffering from the effects of technological bullying, or covert bullying, are apt to demonstrate anxiety, depression, self-injury, and isolation. Mrs. Wright, Mrs. Hartwell, and Mrs. Carroll reported that students felt that social media outlets were used as a vehicle for the would-be bully to propagate their personal vendetta and generate

damaging rumors for the purpose of further socially isolating the victim and deliberately inflicting maximum mental torment. Students reported to them that “there is no escape” from a bully. Students reported that if they were bullied at school, or isolated by a student or group of students, that it continued at home via computer and texts. Students told teachers that the bullies had “ways” of making life miserable- all of the time. Examples included sending “listserv-style” invites to large groups of students about upcoming events or parties, with a disclaimer at the bottom that included a list of those “not invited.” Students described being anxious about the potential for bullies to take a cell phone picture of them doing something in school that they were not exemplary at, i.e. push-ups and pull-ups in gym class, and posting the picture or video to YouTube with a link to Facebook. Mrs. Wright and Mr. Smith (Donovan Elementary) stated that cell phones were never allowed on school grounds, a rule that was met with disdain by parents who specifically purchased phones for their children to use in case of emergency. Mr. Kaiser and Mrs. Hartwell (Mitchell Elementary) stated they also supported a no cell phone policy, though understood why parents would be upset, especially in the case of latch-key kids. Regardless, they spoke of an instance that a particular student exhibiting covert bullying behaviors took a cell phone picture of another student’s “less than cool” clothing and shoes and posted it on the Facebook- which in turn prompted other students to “comment” on the posting. According to Group B administrators and teachers (non-poverty schools), the participants determined from their personal experience in governing classrooms and schools, that the damages inflicted on victims and bystanders of covert bullying behaviors were as brutal, if not worse, than that of the physical bullying experienced by low SES teachers and administrators.

Group A (poverty schools) and Group B (non-poverty schools) outwardly described the on-going battle to prevent and intervene in both covert and overt bullying situations. There are explicit variances in the two bullying methods, and the behavioral manifestations have been found by this study to be a direct function of socio economic status. In spite of this, Group A (poverty schools) and Group B (non-poverty schools) expressed additional concern at the alarmingly high rates of increased female violence among student populations.

Analysis of Findings

The results chronicle the similarities and differences among teachers and administrators serving diverse populations and how they perceive and respond to bullying. Teachers and administrators are experiencing some of the same disturbing trends, yet strategizing in drastically diverse manners in an attempt to accomplish the goal of ceasing bullying behaviors. The goal of the study was to understand the perspectives of teachers and administrators accommodating diverse student populations that are experiencing bullying in and out of the school setting. By initiating discourse with in-service teachers and administrators, it was possible to deconstruct the definition of bullying- which first and foremost- is the most important element in creating effective, research-based methods of combating the problem. The investigation revealed that teachers and administrators are understanding bullying and the effects of the student population, very differently. While some teachers incorporated all types of bullying, such as technological and texting violence, other teachers felt that this problem was a moot issue, and as a result did not address the issue in the classroom. Teachers and administrators commonly reflected that the problems occurring with violence and bullying in their school setting was a result of lack of supervision, or community violence that was acting as a model of behavior for students. Parental involvement was a major factor, according to all of the teachers and administrators. The

involvement, or lack thereof, could be partially to blame for recurring violence, and a lack of coping skills for the bully, victim, and bystander. The obvious finding that supports the hypothesis, is that of socio-economic status contributing to the method and nature of bullying incidents. Clearly, the upper economic schools were not experiencing blatant physical violence at the rate and duration commonly experienced by lower economic schools. While the lower economic schools experienced higher levels of physical altercations/bullying, they did not report experiencing high levels of technological bullying as the upper economic schools reported. Also noteworthy, is the increase in female violence reported by all subjects. Although this one factor could potentially generate another study, it is an important factor that contributes to the overall increase in both covert and blatant bullying behavior. Lastly, expected results in the area of racial bullying were surprisingly reported to be a non-factor with the exception of a few isolated incidents. The initial expectation was that the lower socio-economic schools would rate physical/blatant bullying behaviors higher, with a higher demographic of black students. Although this was true in most cases, the rate of physical/blatant bullying behaviors was reported equally in the lower socio economic, Appalachian/majority white schools as well. This factor equates the fact of physical violence/bullying with socio-economic status, specifically lower, rather than with racial or gender issues.

The complexity of bullying via technology is perplexing to teachers and administrators. The teachers reported that the ramifications of students activity on social media outlets such as Facebook and MySpace has increased tension and bullying among student populations in the higher SES schools. Although it has not yet affected the lower SES schools at the same rate as the upper SES, teachers and administrators view the unsupervised usage of technology in the home as a major contributing factor, or perhaps the number one mode of covert bullying behavior. The anti-social behaviors occurring via computers, cell phones, iPods is seriously impeding the learning environment. As a safeguard to teachers and administrators, the school boards of many of the schools have placed clauses in student handbooks requiring students to sign technology agreements or waivers. Administrators have explained this movement as a “contract” between student and school in an attempt to promote positive behaviors that reflect the school’s mission of integrity in and out of the classroom.

There must be a paradigm shift that focuses on prevention. Currently, teachers and administrators are acting punitively- this is an understandable reaction since parents of victims are insisting on retribution for their child. However, it is imperative that anti-bullying campaigns are designed for the specific needs and dynamics of each school rather than addressing generalized behaviors of students across all cultures, SES, and racial backgrounds. The “one-size-fits-all” bullying solutions are not working, nor are they equipped to resolve the issues generated by covert bullying in the technology era. In order to act in accordance with state and federal mandates, administrators are apt to establish the “one-size-fits-all” bullying solution in order to relieve pressure from other administrators and school boards. The requirement to implement an anti-bullying campaign in schools by embedding the topic into general content is overwhelming to teachers and administrators who are already buckling under pressure to improve standardized test scores.

Therefore, an easy “fix” is to purchase one of the bullying prevention programs. The bullying prevention programs that are currently being offered may be initially effective, but have proven

no long-lasting positive outcomes. Teacher education programs should place intense emphasis on socio-cultural foundations and require future teachers to have a command of history, philosophy, and social elements of schooling and society. Peace-building strategies are often overlooked, or undermined by false theories in areas of multi-cultural education and positive school climate. Unless preventative, peace-building strategies are embedded into the educational process, legislators and administrators will continue to fight battles of school violence without determining and targeting the underlying causes; ineffectively “placing a band-aid on a gunshot wound.”

In his book, *When Work Disappears*, William Julius Wilson (1987) goes on to delineate programs for ameliorating the underlying problems of the “underclass” which go far beyond school based programs. In specifically addressing the prevention of violence among adolescent inner city youth, Deborah Prothrow-Stith (2005) also discusses antecedents of violence which are beyond the scope of educational policies.

Patterns of Discrimination by Class

Data analysis revealed emerging patterns among the participants of this study. Obviously, teachers and administrators all responded unanimously that the policies in place at their school were not effective in stopping bullying behaviors and acts of aggression and or violence via physical or covert means.

Teachers and administrators at the lower SES schools stated that the rates of bullying had decreased, in particular with Teacher D and administrator E, both urban schools and majority African American. However, upon further investigation it was revealed that both schools implemented a zero tolerance policy that was meticulously enforced. The policy requires expulsion of violent students, thus increasing these rates- almost always black males. Administrators and teachers claimed exhaustion from attempting to manage behaviors in order to keep students from being expelled. Due to the necessity to improve school attendance, thus improving standardized test scores, administrators were hesitant to expel or out-of-school suspend students. They preferred in school suspension, referred to as ACP. The student is placed in lock down- isolated from the rest of the student body- and assigned homework from the days’ classes. Students were monitored and “forced” to complete work correctly. Therefore, the school does not receive penalties for lack of classroom management, as judged by the number of expulsions/suspensions by the state government. However, the administrator and teacher did acknowledge that the expulsion rates were higher for their school than those of any suburban or upper-class school. Thus the patterns of institutional racism, already reflected in disparities in rates of expulsion and suspension, are exacerbated by current anti-bullying policies.

On the contrary, the upper socio economic schools (majority white student populations) reported that they did, in fact, publish a student handbook that included zero tolerance policies regarding drugs, weapons, and violence. Administrators and teachers declared that it was extremely rare- less than once a year- that “such extreme measures were necessary to resolve conflicts.” When asked to expound on this anomaly, participants explained that it is usually not necessary to carry out such punitive consequences because once parental involvement in the situation was established the families and the schools were able to “work it out.” Sometimes, school

psychologists or counselors could assist parents in promoting healthier choices. And, as the explanation continued, their school really didn't have problems with extreme violence. The worst case scenarios involving violence were dealing with social isolation, face book issues, texting... "things of that nature." Occasional fights resulted in detentions, Friday schools, or elimination from school functions such as field trips and sporting events.

Olweus Bullying Prevention Program fails to address the needs of poverty schools and their surrounding neighborhoods, while focusing primarily on middle-class suburban type schools. Because Olweus focuses primarily on student, classroom, and school- with additional parental supports, Olweus fails to consider struggles of the poor and under classes. Single-parent households often lack supervision. Parenting styles differ drastically from those of white suburban parents. Harsh discipline is likely to promote aggression in children, still, parents are more likely to employ this type in lower SES than higher SES.

Conclusions and Future Research

Based on the findings of this study, it is essential that bullying behaviors are targeted at a very early age, preferably pre-kindergarten thru second grade. The need to establish bullying as "not cool" with these youngsters will prevent bystanders from acting as bullies by omission. Bystanders, who are often overlooked, are the most powerful weapons in targeting bullying in the school setting. When a negative affect about bullying is established as a social norm among the school population, students acting as bystanders are likely to report and not tolerate bullying behaviors by a peer. Early intervention is crucial, since it is evident that bullying behaviors peak during the middle school years. Once bullying has been established as a pervasive problem among the student body, the majority of efforts to stop behaviors are punitive, like "putting a band-aid on a gunshot wound." Therefore, students who have been trained from early childhood to regard bullying behaviors whether blatant or covert, as unacceptable are the best method for stopping bullying. The behaviors specific to each school environment must be clearly defined and made age-appropriate so as to ensure children are capable of recognizing these undesirable actions. Children must also be instructed in the area of reporting peer misbehaviors. Students need to be aware of what to look for, how to report incidents, and to whom they should report. Most importantly, children should be positively reinforced for their personal initiative. Ultimately, other students will learn vicariously through the actions of other individuals.

The historical dominance of public education by the bureaucratic model Katz 1975... promotes uniform, "one size fits all" solutions to problems, which have as their primary objective, protection from liability. In the case of bullying, this is promoted by the seminal work of Olweus who, along with Stan Davis, views bullying as a global problem occurring at similar rates, duration, and frequency around the world. In contrast, the major contribution of the present study is to expand the conceptual framework of bullying to recognize variations introduced by recognition of the input of variables including socio-economic status, institutional racism, and gender.

Thus anti-bullying policies must be emancipated from a business model dominated by standardized workshops to policymaking grounded in on-going research utilizing a dialectical interpretation of the relationships among class, race, and gender as predictors of the dynamics of

bullying. The study of bullying must be infused into the curriculum of teacher education and educational leadership as well as the curriculum of public education.

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Interview with Michael Wayne Ustaszewski

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Interview with Michael Wayne Ustaszewski (Interview)

Introduction

Michael Wayne Ustaszewski was born in Toledo, Ohio in June 1959. His parents divorced when he was four; he then spent most of his childhood shuttling between his father's home, foster homes, and state institutions. In 1977, just before his eighteenth birthday, Michael was released from the Youth Detention Center in Columbus, Ohio and returned to Toledo. In August, he was living at the YMCA in downtown Toledo when an elderly resident was found murdered in his room. On 21 December 1977, Michael was convicted of aggravated murder and sentenced to "fifteen years to life."

I first met Michael in 2009, on the thirty-second anniversary of his arrest. Others in my family had met Michael when he was a teenager, but I had already gone off to college and was no longer living in Ohio. It was two or three years after they had become acquainted that Michael ended up in prison and in 1979 my family moved back east. Though my parents had visited Michael in various prisons over the years, traveling to Ohio was rare. But, in 2009, my mother and I were going to be driving from Minnesota to Canada, passing through Ohio. I thought it likely that this would be the last opportunity she would have to visit Michael so I suggested that, if she liked, we might take a slight detour and pay him a visit. About two weeks later, we found ourselves in Marion, headed to the prison on a sunny September morning.

I had seen Michael's photograph in the online Ohio Offender Search database. But, knowing how I look in my driver's license photo, I wasn't sure how much he might resemble that image at all. In fact, when we entered the visitation room and Michael strode in, I was surprised at how much better he appeared than the gaunt and aging man reflected on the screen of my laptop. He

was tall and solid, with an ear-to-ear grin. We found a space where we could all be seated and started chatting. It's somewhat odd to meet someone you've heard about for more than half your life but with whom you have no history.

Two years earlier, when my stepfather died and we called the prison chaplain, I became curious about this fellow about whom I had heard so much over the years. I discovered that, in 2005, having served 28 years in prison, Michael was represented by the Ohio Innocence Project in his application to have the evidence in his case undergo DNA analysis. That really piqued my interest, as they don't tend to assist those they don't feel have a convincing case. In 2006, a special agent for the Lucas County prosecutor's office, the same man who had been the lead detective on the original case, submitted an affidavit alleging that in January 1979, thirteen months after Michael's trial and shortly *before* the court issued its decision in his appeal, the evidence had been destroyed by order of the prosecutor's office. No longer a "DNA case," the Ohio Innocence Project withdrew their representation. Now I was really curious. But, it would be almost two more years before I began to learn more.

On that September day, for six hours, we talked mostly about his case. Knowing I was intrigued at the possibility that he had, in fact, been wrongfully convicted, I started asking a few questions. He was more than happy to provide the answers. We also talked about his visiting my family as a teenager. Apparently he once brought a friend along who had his eye on my sister and Michael "dotted [his] buddy's eye," not thinking it appropriate for his friend to hit on someone he felt was like a sister to him. There was a real mischievous sparkle in his eyes when he recalled those days. And, in chatting I learned a lot about the case. But, it would take far longer than six hours to gain an understanding of what it was about his life that led to his ending up being arrested for aggravated murder. It would take longer to get to know Michael and get a sense of who he had been and who he had become.

At the age of eleven, Michael had received his first juvenile sentence for possession of marijuana and discharging a firearm on the fourth of July. Between the summer of 1970, when Michael turned eleven years old, and the summer of 1977, when he turned eighteen, Michael was, as he writes, in and out of the Ohio Youth Commission "about five or six times." Remembering his first stealing offense when he ran away from Maumee Youth Camp, he writes, "I stole a candy bar out of a drug store and ate it on the steps outside. I was hungry."

Poverty has been a critical issue in Michael's life, both as a child and later as the accused. By the time he was arrested, Michael was living on a State stipend of four dollars a day and the meager income he could garner as a day laborer and prostitute. He had no choice but to rely on an attorney provided by the State who, the record shows, had little interest in finding out the truth, as opposed to disposing of the case. As a young white man, Michael did not face many of the challenges experienced by men of color. But, as a young man from a working class background and who had, essentially, been raised by the State, proving his innocence would be an uphill battle. In addition, there is little doubt that his earning money by having sex with men, in 1970s Toledo, also contributed to his negative experience with the criminal justice system.

In this interview, I asked Michael to respond to a variety of questions aimed at eliciting his thoughts about the impact of prison and how he has, thirty-five years later, remained relatively

hopeful about his future. I sent Michael the questions and he responded with typed answers. The material below is edited for length and has had minor corrections made for ease of reading. ME designates my questions; MU indicates Michael's responses.

* * * * *

ME: Can you tell me a little bit about what you recall of your first days in jail and then your first years in prison? What kind of difficulties did you face? How did you keep going?

MU: My first response was "I'm not guilty, and they will see that." As the days unfolded it was a very unbelievable situation. . . . I had seriously thought that the truth would win out, but that truth got me nowhere. I had felt badly betrayed and used as a pawn just to bring closure to their case. It was as if nobody believed me at all. One day while in the County jail I got a copy of a money order stub for 25 or 35 dollars, and I noticed that it was from my dad. I sat down on my bunk, looked at the stub, and thought to myself, "Dad really does love me after all" then all of a sudden all my emotions erupted inside. . . . My first glance in the big house was the Old Ohio Penitentiary in Columbus, Ohio. I had seen some old movies with James Cagney, and some other movies, but when I entered the prison it was nothing like the movies portrayed. It was so different. I was however given a set of khakis, like the kind you see in the Navy movies. The only thing missing was the folding hat you wore on your head. We was given wool hats instead and brogan boots, and we didn't call the cops "screws" or "turn keys." They made me stay locked in a cell the whole time I was there except to come out for recreation and to chow, and then right back to the cell. Because I had spent so much time in juvenile facilities, I was sort of familiar with my surrounding, but instead I was in the Big House, and they keep you in handcuffs and belly chains, and behind a huge stone wall with gun towers, and right in the middle of the yard was a gun tower where shotguns were actually pointed at you. I was ultimately sent to Lucasville. I had heard all sorts of stories about what was going to be done to me once I got there, etc., etc., but I was not afraid, my street survival instincts and juvenile days of living had all clicked in, and I would survive anything and make it out alive and be set free one day soon, when the light came. Well, there I remained for fifteen whole years of my life, and I never saw a shred of daylight, nor the glimpses of ever getting out – only hope kept me alive, and so did all my prayers, God only knows that there was somebody up there in heaven watching over me and answering most of my basic prayers. I will never forget those days either.

ME: In the past we've talked about some of the challenges you faced when you were young. You told me that you have forgiven your parents for what you went through as a child. Can you tell us a little bit about the process by which you came to be able to offer forgiveness?

MU: I was dumped into an orphanage home, twice, and never got to see my family members but a few times during my childhood days. I blamed my entire crummy childhood life on them due to their divorce. I felt cheated of a happy home, and I resented them for that for a very, very, very long time. As I got older, been reading my Bible, gathering God's wisdom in my daily living, and cracking open those law books, which was about five years into my sentence, I gave my life to Christ Jesus. Reading higher courts decisions and searching for their reasons for their decisions, and also reading the dissenting opinions of other judges helped guide me to understanding, wherein I was able to take my shoes off and step into theirs and see what they

saw. I began to see things in a different light. This is about when, on a visit, I held my father's hand and looked him square in his eyes and spoke directly to his soul. I said, "Dad, I want you to know that I thank you for being my father. I know that I have not been much of a son to you and caused you all kinds of grief and worries, and even stole from you, but I have felt bitter in my heart for the pain you have caused me that I had to suffer through so many situations. But, I am here to tell you right now that I no longer hold you accountable for how I was brought up. I want you to know that I honestly and truly forgive you for placing me in those orphanage homes and abandoning me. I just realize that you and mom were going through some things, and at the time that was the best you could deal with the situation." I could see in his eyes that he was very hurt in his soul. I was informed years later that my mother didn't want us kids in an orphanage home and separated, but the doctor told her that she had better do something or she would lose her mind, so my mother gave us boys to dad and she kept the girls. She said she was very sad about the whole situation. At a Kairos [Prison Ministry] meeting, several years [later] here at the Marion Correctional prison I finally had the chance and opportunity to open up with my mother and learn the whole truth. We both cried and I asked her for her forgiveness because I was holding it against her all those years, thinking she was a part of having me put away and abandoning me like that. She forgave me and told me how much she loved me and always would love me.

ME: While I know there is bitterness because of the injustices you've faced, you seem to have moved on from some of the anger that filled you in times past. How were you able to let go of some of that anger while remaining wrongfully incarcerated?

MU: I just know that from the wrongful conviction and the false accusations of my guilt, the pain I felt inflicted upon me, by a country I felt would not betray the innocent because of the good laws we have, I was devastated in the worst way you could possibly imagine. I felt absolutely nothing inside except a big black hole that was void of anything, and it only worsened as time passed. I felt nothing for anyone and I had no regard for anyone that was in authority and I didn't care who knew it because That Which They Made Me Is What I Became To Everyone. I did everything I could to fill that void up in my heart and soul; drugs, alcohol, sex, and much violence. But, most of all I stayed in the hole in solitary confinement for the first 5 years of the beginning of my life sentence. I was so far into what I was feeling that I could see no light at the end of the tunnel. They (the law) sentenced me to prison for the rest of my natural life, which meant that I would never see freedom again on the other side. Deep, deep, deep within me raged a simple little light that represented hope, because when I was all alone and away from everyone I cried for the most part in soaked, stained tears, the kind that sting your skin and burn your face raw, yelling out in twisted fear and anger, and having no understanding or perception of how to deal with what I was going through. I just knew that all the anger and hurt and bitterness that was festering up inside me was changing me into something that I did not want to become, so I stayed away from everyone and started building a wall around me, to protect myself, and allowing only who I wanted in there. Nothing made sense to me anymore, and I could get no one or anyone to listen to my side of the story, so I acted like I didn't care anymore about anything. Someone I knew there was killed and as I was sitting on the edge of my bed there into the cell I stared at the emptiness of a shadowed corner on the floor near the door, drifting off into that though I heard a small still voice say, "Michael, if you don't change your way you will be next." I then snapped out of the trance and I knew exactly what that voice was telling me, that I would

be killed violently as was another inmate if I didn't make an immediate change. I became real frightened, and prison was not the place I wanted to die. I wanted to live an old and happy life. I didn't want to die. I am innocent and I want out of prison. All these years I have been able to hang on to that hope, that one day I would be fully exonerated of this crime and set free, and that justice would prevail. I would definitely have to say that God replaced a lot of that anger with His love and grace and longsuffering, and loving kindness towards me, that now I am able to feel that way towards others. I just never believed that I would spend this much time in prison for a crime that I am totally innocent of. Hopefully I can share this with others that are in a similar sort of way in their lives, and that I can somehow make a difference to them so that that will not have to come this far in life the way I have.

ME: What words of advice would you offer to others who find themselves in difficult situations; for example, not just those who have been wrongfully accused, but even those who did commit crimes and find themselves in prison, youth who feel the world is against them, and just people having a hard time, in general?

MU: I would first like to say that if you're involved in any type of crime right now, get out of it right now. Stop whatever it is that you're doing because first of all you will one day get caught, or you may get hurt, and you will hurt the ones who you love and love you, and will end up hurting others who don't deserve to be hurt by you. Secondly, if you do not have an education and one is offered to you, please take it as a free gift because it will help you later on in life when you need that one job that you've been looking for that only qualifies if you have a G.E.D. or a certificate that proves you passed an educational course.

I tell the youth here this: that if you think or feel that the world is against you, it's not. It's just that there are some things going on that don't make sense to you, and you should not act out blindly (without thinking) but rather reach out and try to find some answers. They won't come as fast as you expect them to, but try to hold off until you do find the answer. Someone will have it for you, and it will be worked out for you. I also encourage you to think things through before you react on your instinct or on your feelings and emotions, because if you do your problem will only increase and become bigger than you. Seek out someone who is qualified to help you through whatever it is you're going through. Preferably someone who has gone through it themselves and came out of it alright.

ME: I know you've had really dark periods and then times of greater hope. If you had to identify the one thing that has kept you going all these years, how would you describe that?

MU: I would have to say that it is the anticipation of one thing to the other. Thinking that "this is it," and then it isn't it. And then saying "this is it," and then it's not, and then something else comes along and you think, "This – This is it," only to find out that it's not. Well, that becomes very tiresome and very irritating, but, as an "experience" as a whole, it's been a learning experience, if anything. But, being that it's taken this long, "enough is enough," and when is the line going to be drawn for it to finally end? I know that I am rather older now, and one's lifespan isn't that far away in ending. So, for the most part my whole adult life has gone away (lost forever), and there is not much left over. So – I would at least like to have what's left of it and

make the best I can of what's left, and live my own life and enjoy as much of it as I can while there is still life in me!

ME: Is there anything you'd like our readers to know about healing and transformation that you've not already mentioned?

MU: As far as the transforming, or transformation is concerned, Change, true change, has to start within. If change appears as an outward attempt to display itself, it will be recognized as phony, and the majority can feel those things as being transparent. And, the real you, the unchanged you, will appear to others and none of it will mean anything or amount to nothing. And, if you continue to try and "self improve" yourself in this way it will an unwelcome manner by others. It's like when you steal and do things over and over, and then lie about it every single time, soon enough nobody will believe in you and you'll be known as a liar. But, when you finally do come clean and tell the absolute truth, you still will not be believed by anybody because you have already built up your word and reputation as a liar (your word is no good).

In my own life, I have experienced a transformation. 1) I no longer desire to be involved in criminal activities, 2) that I remember where I came from and how I used to be and what I am like now, and I like the way I am now, and 3) I have absolutely no desire to be imprisoned where I have no liberty or freedom of liberty.

* * * * *

At many points over the last three and a half years, I have had to ask myself serious questions about the practicality of our battle with the system. I knew what the law required and the task that lay ahead. Many of the people involved in Michael's case are dead or face serious mental health issues. Ultimately, I came to the conclusion that even if we did not secure his exoneration, merely knowing that someone believed in him, was fighting for him, was a good thing. And, even though the obstacles to proving his innocence often seem insurmountable, we have had some successes.

In September 2011, the jailhouse informant who had testified against Michael recanted his testimony. The informant said that he had been approached by a sheriff's deputy who offered that he could "get a deal" if he would testify against Michael, saying that Michael had confessed to him. On the basis of his recantation, the Ohio Innocence Project, now also considering non-DNA cases, resumed work on Michael's case. Unfortunately, the State does not look favorably upon recantations as new evidence.

Michael, having entered prison with a ninth grade education, has been his own zealous advocate. Representing himself, he has filed motion after motion only to have the courts rule against him. In doing so, the doctrine of res judicata prevents the courts from considering those issues again. Thus, new evidence must be found.

Michael's story is but one illustration of a flawed and failing system. Yet, there *is* a small light within that darkness. In November 1992, Michael's first appearance before the Ohio Parole Board took place. He would be denied then and many more times in the coming years, most

recently in 2010. His refusal to admit guilt was considered evidence of his being a risk to society. Parroting their guidelines, the Board wrote, "There is substantial reason to believe that due to the serious nature of the crime, the release of the inmate into society would create undue risk to public safety, or that due to the serious nature of the crime, the release of the inmate would not further the interest of justice or be consistent with the welfare and security of society." It is not the duty of the Board to adjudicate guilt or innocence, that decision has already been made. Their job is to assess risk. But, while providing many opportunities to demonstrate lack of preparedness for release, a life of incarceration offers little opportunity to demonstrate that one does *not* pose a risk.

In my letter to the Board in 2010, I avoided discussion of innocence. That, I was told, was *not* something they wanted to hear. In 2012, with more evidence having been gathered and the feeling, quite honestly, that there was nothing to lose, I wrote a 13-page brief that outlined all of the problems with the case and why innocence mattered. I wrote, "While I realize that claims of innocence are well beyond the scope of this board's review, evidence supporting these claims is, I believe, relevant to your consideration of his readiness for parole and successful reintegration into society." After all, isn't the possibility that someone didn't commit the crime relevant to the assessment of their risk to society?

In October 2012, at Michael's appearance before a sub-set of the Parole Board, they – for the first time – asked him serious questions about the crime, about his involvement and the trial. They voted for parole. The next step was a vote of the full Board. They, too, voted to grant parole. The next step was to determine if the victim's family and/or prosecutor wished to appear at a hearing. They did. On 21 February 2013 – 35 years and 2 months to the day of Michael's conviction – a hearing was held in Columbus, Ohio. I offered a statement, as did the private investigator, one of Michael's sisters, and his public defender. So, too, did the attorney from the prosecutor's office and the victim's granddaughter. The Board asked good questions, particularly of the prosecutor. Shortly after noon, the Board announced that they would grant parole to Michael.

I asked Michael about his thoughts regarding life outside, to what he was most looking forward. He said, with absolute delight in his eyes, that for the first time in 35 years he would be able to take a bath. On Monday, 22 April, Michael stepped through the door of Marion Correctional Institution, incarcerated no more. He got down on his knees and gave thanks. Michael will be on parole for five years. It won't be easy and there will be constraints. But, as he has noted, he will be able to buy a candy bar when he wants. And, he was able to enjoy that bath. He's astounded by technology, but has learned how to use his iPod touch so that we can talk via FaceTime and he can email friends and family.

On June first Michael celebrated his 54th birthday, his first birthday outside of prison since he turned 18. He is anxious to find work, if someone will give him a chance. He recognizes that he is free from the walls of prison, but he admits to feeling less than free as long as he is on parole for a crime he did not commit and having to suffer the consequences of the label of "felon." But, he sleeps in a comfortable bed at night and for that he is grateful.

The Parole Board operates in a culture in which admission of guilt, demonstration of remorse, and the translation of those acts to having “accepted responsibility for one’s crime” are central to the process. The Board is obligated to deny – as they have - that a claim of innocence had anything to do with their decision. But, the fact that they chose to consider the evidence of Michael’s low risk, *absent an admission of guilt*, is indicative of a process that may, in fact, be evolving. Yes, prosecutors continue to refuse to consider that they might have made mistakes, as was the prosecutor’s response to this decision. Yes, police officers continue to refuse to consider that they might have made mistakes, as was the lead detective’s response to a reporter’s query about the evidence. But, the Parole Board, charged with evaluating Michael’s risk to society, demonstrated, in my opinion, that they are willing to play a role in transforming the criminal justice system – and transforming it in the right direction. Rather than responding lock-step to decades of bureaucratic directives and cultural imperatives, they acted with reason. It’s a small piece of the puzzle, but it is one that holds the potential to lead to transformation of the larger system of which it is a part.

Note: The world of incarceration is, among other things, both chaotic and oppressive. In addition to continually pursuing justice in his case, Michael has found a degree of peace through painting. Please visit <http://www.justice-for-michael.org/> and the facebook group *Justice for Michael Ustaszewski* for more information about Michael’s case and to view his paintings.

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Lessons Learned From the Field: The Blurring of Research and Advocacy with East African Muslim Youth

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LESSONS LEARNED FROM THE FIELD: THE BLURRING OF RESEARCH AND ADVOCACY WITH EAST AFRICAN MUSLIM YOUTH (Essay)

Abstract

Controversy has surrounded culturally specific charter schools, especially those serving predominantly Muslim youth. In my studies exploring an East African charter school, this controversy has influenced the way my research is interpreted by public audiences. In this paper, I will reflect on my role as a white, non-Muslim researcher studying the experiences of black, Muslim, immigrant adolescents at a culturally specific charter school that was created by Somali community members and specifically for Somali youth. I will describe the complex and sometimes troubling experiences I faced as I began to publish this research. Finally, I will conclude with a reflection on how I currently use my role as a member of the academy to support youths' perspectives, to dispel notions that their culturally specific charter school might be breaking the law, and to address other common concerns that surround the cultural and religious practices of Somali youth in American K-12 schools.

Context of the Research

Since the 1980's an increasing number of Somali Muslim immigrants have resettled in the United States. In Minnesota alone, the number has reached approximately 50,000 (Voth, 2001)¹. This is the largest Somali population in the country. Somali youth face many barriers in the resettlement process, with school adjustment being one of their greatest challenges (Berns McGown, 1999). Schools are thought to be places where white, Christian culture dominates, and where expression and practice of non-dominant religions, like Islam, is often resisted. For Muslim adolescent newcomers, schools become key sites of cultural and religious tensions (Sarroub, 2005; Zine, 2000). These tensions are particularly acute because students' family and community often espouse beliefs that are in direct conflict with U.S. adolescent mores (such as beliefs about dating, entertainment, and dress). In response to these tensions and in an effort to maintain their religious and ethnic identity, Muslim immigrant communities have begun to create culturally specific charter schools that give attention to youths' culture, language, and history.

The first charter school legislation was established in Minnesota. Today more than 30 of the state's 138 charter schools are culturally specific in orientation (Rimer, 2009). For an increasing number of minority populations, what makes these culturally specific schools appealing is that, unlike public schools, charter schools can be created by almost anyone and are specifically chosen by the families of children who attend (Finn, Manno, & Vanourek, 2000). These communities can therefore create schools that better accommodate their cultural values and beliefs and, they might hope, accommodate their religious practices, as well. This is especially appealing to communities like the Somalis who may be uncomfortable with the culture or curriculum of most public schools. While these charter schools, by law, cannot offer religion classes or overt religious instruction, culturally specific charter schools can offer an "Islamic" environment by virtue of the students they serve.

Whether it is possible for a culturally specific charter school to offer a specific cultural environment without overt religious instruction has come under controversy in several states. Occasionally, the public rhetoric evolves into the courts as has happened with Tarek Ibn Ziyad Academy (TiZA), a culturally specific school serving a mostly Muslim student population in Minnesota. Katherine Kersten, a Minneapolis Star Tribune news reporter, conducted an investigation of TiZA and accused the school of organizing and promoting prayer. Using a substitute teacher as a primary source, Kersten reported that TiZA staff members were involved in organizing the Friday prayers, that students were led to prayer by teachers, and that school buses left the school only after an after-school Islamic Studies class had finished (Kersten, 2008). In addition to these accusations, Kersten suggested other characteristics revealed that TiZA was a religious school: she pointed out that the school's executive director was a Muslim imam (religious leader), the school was sponsored by an organization called Islamic Relief, and that the school shared its headquarters with the Muslim American Society of Minnesota which houses a mosque. She also questioned whether 5- to 11-year-olds could reasonably be believed to organize their own prayer sessions without adult help, and was concerned about the ritual foot-washing of youth before prayer. The school has also been accused of posting religious displays

¹ The size of refugee communities is notoriously difficult to measure due to inaccurate census data gathered in apartment buildings with residents exceeding occupancy limits as well as changing immigration policies and fluctuating secondary immigration patterns.

in classrooms and hallways (*American Civil Liberties Union of Minnesota v. Tarek ibn Ziyad Academy*, 2009b).

After Kersten's report, which generated attention nationwide, the ACLU filed a lawsuit (*ACLU v. Tarek ibn Ziyad Academy*, 2009a, 2009b, 2009c) alleging that the school blurred the line between religion and public education (Chang, 2009). Part of this lawsuit is still in process. TiZA has filed counterclaims and crossclaims against the ACLU claiming that the school is being sued for the "Muslim-ness of its students" (Carlyle, 2010). TiZA's counterclaims and crossclaims have been dismissed (*American Civil Liberties Union of Minnesota v. Tarek ibn Ziyad Academy*, 2009d, 2010e). The Minnesota Department of Education also launched an investigation, but eventually found that the school, while violating some lesser statutes involving seat time and busing, was not teaching Islam to students (Birkey, 2008). TiZA contends also that it has corrected several of the alleged entanglement issues (*American Civil Liberties Union of Minnesota v. Tarek ibn Ziyad Academy*, 2009b).

Not unlike the attention surrounding the "Ground Zero mosque" in New York City, national attention over TiZA has been tumultuous. TiZA received threatening telephone calls and email messages and requested that the FBI investigate these threats as possible hate crimes (Furst & Lemagie, 2009). Not surprisingly, other culturally specific schools serving Muslim youth have been on edge.

Amidst this negative media attention, a few positive reports have been published about culturally specific schools serving Muslim youth. The New York Times reported that these kinds of charter schools are offering Somali refugee parents in Minnesota a stronger voice in their children's education (Rimer, 2009). Parents see these charter schools as "safe havens" from mainstream schools, a place where youth are protected from rapid and sometimes negative assimilation. The article highlighted that culturally specific schools allow students to maintain a dual American and Somali identity.

Yet mass media articles aside, very little research had been conducted in culturally specific charter schools. I wanted to conduct an in-depth study that would offer important insight about Somali Muslim youths' experiences in these community-based charter schools. Additionally, I wanted to know about white teachers' experiences of working in a school that was 98% East African and Muslim. In this context, I began my dissertation research at a Somali charter high school in Minnesota that I call "Kalsami²" High School.

Research Design and Methodology

During the academic years of 2005-07, I conducted two back-to-back qualitative case studies that investigated, at the time, the *only* culturally specific charter high school for Somali adolescents in Minnesota. Kalsami Charter High School was created by a Somali community with the specific intentions of serving Somali Muslim youth. In its third year of operation at the time of the study, the student population was 98% Somali Muslim, among whom the majority are Somali. The school had a Somali-led school board, a Somali co-administrator and several Somali-born teachers and educational assistants, although the majority of teachers were born in U.S. and

² A pseudonym.

white. Some of the religious accommodations Kalsami offered to its students were *halal* meals, gender segregated gym and health classes, prayer times and facilities, presence of community members and elders sitting in the hallways, and Arabic lessons.

In the first study, I focused on white teachers' experiences. I wanted to understand the cultural implications of teaching in an East African charter school. In the second study, I looked at how the school accommodated Muslim youth and how students' perceived their experience at Kalsami as compared to previous experience in mainstream schools.

Data Sources: Over the course of both studies, I conducted 21 individual interviews and 3 focus group interviews with students, and 24 individual interviews with Kalsami administrators and teachers. I observed two English classrooms between one and three times per week. Additionally, I attended parent-teacher conferences, staff meetings, and school board meetings.

Data Analysis: An interdisciplinary approach was used for the on-going analysis of the data for each study. I constructed categories from the data according to Merriam's (1998, p. 181) guidelines: by reading through one transcript and taking notes; grouping those notes together; and continuing with the next transcript. I then compared the categories, named them, and came up with a classification scheme. From that, I used multiple-source triangulation through mining the documents and re-examining notes from direct observations of the field site. These additional sources of data helped to refine and revise the categories identified from the research data. To establish credibility, I looked first and foremost for agreement from study participants. By restating, summarizing, and paraphrasing information received from a participant I was able to ensure that what I had previously heard was in fact correct. By gaining feedback on results from the participants, I added a believability assessment to the research findings (Guba & Lincoln, 1981).

Researcher role. It is not possible to objectively stand outside of participants' discourse and analyze it without the researcher's identity and interpretations affecting what they write. Inevitably, my participants' stories were affected by my own perceptions and by my interactions with participants. Even so, as a white, U.S.-born, not formally religious person, I believed (and continue to believe) that if research was conducted carefully, my perspectives could add to other perspectives by researchers who differ in age, ethnic background, religious faith, etc. Together our perspectives contribute to what Haw (1996) terms as the "melting pot" (p. x) of research so that they can be critically examined, reinterpreted and so contribute to debate in the area.

In order to conduct careful and meaningful cross-cultural research it was critical to find a methodological framework that a.) included the voices of the study's participants, and b.) involved reflexivity on the researcher's part. My overarching research goal was not to speak for my participants; rather, my research with Somali youth and their teachers was a place for *mutual* work. I relied on my participants' perspectives and cultural understandings to help me uncover and analyze multiple realities and experiences. By placing my participants' knowledge and experiences at the center of my inquiry, I strove to protect the cultural integrity of my participants and respect the authenticity of their words. For *that* is what drove my research—to seek out the voices, voices that are often marginalized and suppressed, and open up the spaces for those voices to be heard.

Findings

I believe that the rich and meaningful data of my research was a direct result of several factors. First, I was both explicit and transparent with participants about the goals of my study. This intention was highly motivating for them. White teachers hoped that the results of my study would serve to improve communication within their school. The Somali students I interviewed eagerly agreed with my intention to use their words to inform educators about how to make schools better places for black, Muslim immigrant youth. Second, as one year turned into two years of interacting with participants at Kalsami High School, I was made aware of the important role that time has in establishing relationships and trust between my participants and myself. While initially students may have viewed me with skepticism and reserve, my numerous visits to their classrooms, our lunchroom chats, my attendance at a wedding and their graduation ceremony resulted in a relationship where I felt much more like a comrade and non-threatening confidante. The same could be said for my relationship with staff participants. Teachers and administrators may have initially viewed me as an academic, and thus established a more formal relationship with me. But as the months went by, I worked to lower the formality and raise the comfort level of our relationship by developing camaraderie with them as a former K-12 teacher. The investment of time at Kalsami not only provided me with a necessary contextual piece for my study, but also served to develop a level of trust and engagement between my participants and I that I might not have otherwise known.

Yet along with this increased level of trust—dare I say ‘friendship’—between researcher and participants came an unexpected burden. How does one reveal important data that might hurt the participants that have come to trust you? How does one disclose information publically that might hurt the school’s reputation?

Uneasy moments.

Shortly after conducting my first study that focused on white Kalsami teachers, I learned of an opportunity to publish a paper that focused on teachers and their cultural adjustment experiences in schools. Having completed all of my interviews with Kalsami staff, I wrote a paper that specifically focused on white teachers’ perspectives of working at a Somali charter school. My data revealed that white Kalsami teachers felt conflicted about their responsibilities to students. I wrote that some of these teachers appeared intent on changing the behaviors and values of their students to a “better” set of behaviors and values (e.g., changing Somali girls’ ideas about women’s rights and dress code). I also wrote about teachers’ concern regarding Kalsami students’ knowledge of American culture and customs. Teachers wanted their Somali students to be able to successfully navigate the broader American community and worried that the culturally specific environment of the school might take away from that goal.

Another theme that ran through the interviews was that of teachers’ frustration with their perceived lack of power. White, middle to upper-middle class, and well educated, they were used to being given equal voice. While many of the women had worked in multicultural spaces before, and even in spaces where they were the only white person or the only woman, they had never been in a position where their race or education did not confer power.

While I had shared these findings with the Kalsami staff and made recommendations to them regarding these issues, specific quotes had never been presented and the tone of my presentation was always constructive. The article I wrote for publication was less restricted and I used quotes that revealed a clear frustration and concern on the part of white teachers. Publishing this piece was challenging to me; if the Somali administrators at Kalsami read this paper, would certain teachers' jobs be at risk? I pacified my fears with the belief that this tension was likely a shared experience at any culturally specific charter school where white teachers are a minority in their place of work. I reasoned that this reverse experience of teachers was important to discuss in current educational research—and an experience largely missing in current scholarship. My work would fill a necessary gap.

I was not prepared for the controversy that would surround my publication. The controversy did not come from the Somali administrators, or from the white teachers. Rather, as had happened over TiZA (the culturally specific charter school that was being sued by the ACLU), suddenly Kalsami faced religious scrutiny by those concerned about the separation of church and state in schools. In several blogs across the nation—using my words and data as evidence—Kalsami was accused of infusing religion into its' curricular goals. In one blog, Kalsami was even accused of appearing outwardly innocuous, but secretly serving the long-range objectives of creating new Islamic terrorists.

My initial reaction to these dangerous and erroneous accusations was to call these bloggers nativists and Islamophobic, but in the end I also had to blame myself. In a post 9-11 era, I should have realized that publishing such content would result in a frenzy by those living in fear of Muslims. Furthermore, I had made a grave mistake by including in my paper a rumor from a white teacher that the school's language teacher might have been teaching Arabic through the use of the Koran. While no other data in the paper touched on issues of teaching religion in schools, this one rumor, along with the tensions reported by white teachers, was enough for several readers to declare that the school was in violation of the constitution.

Within a day of the publication going live, I became aware of how the paper was being interpreted by the public. Because it was an online publication, I was able to pull the paper, remove the quote regarding the rumor, and change the overall tone to lessen the scrutiny. Damage had been done, but thankfully none that would come to hurt the school, the teachers, or the students.

Focusing on the students.

My publication agenda since then has primarily focused on community-based motivations for culturally specific charter schools and Somali students' experiences at Kalsami Charter High School. Reporting on data from both students and teachers, my publications have reported that Kalsami offered students a kind of protection from the negative influences that surrounded them in their mainstream schools. Some youth reported that attending Kalsami gave them a "second chance" to shed their previous images as oppositional and low-performing students and take on new images as "leaders," "role models," and scholars. Many of these youth attributed their success to Kalsami's "strict" and watchful environment, a high expectation ethos, and an authentic acceptance of their religion and culture. By attending a school that was supportive of,

and sensitive to, students' cultural and religious practices and where students shared a common identity, youth were able to maintain their faith and moral values, their ties to their family and community, and develop confidence in their abilities to become full and equal members of U.S. society.

While still acknowledging that some white, American-born Kalsami faculty have viewed the protective nature of Kalsami to be at times un-representative of life in the U.S., I have been careful to also reveal that many of these same staff—who had also worked in mainstream schools—felt that Kalsami was a far safer environment for kids than the environment of mainstream schools. Over the course of my two years of research at the school, several teachers who had originally expressed some concern about Kalsami's culturally protective environment had come to see that it had benefits. These teachers came to appreciate that community members are looking out for the students, and that the school is void of kids skipping school and getting involved in gangs or criminal behavior.

Yet even today, as my papers about students' experiences at Kalsami go under review for publication, I continue to be probed about the line between integration and separation. I must continually repeat to my reviewers that in my research I did not find evidence that showed Kalsami was going against the separation of church and state in its schooling policies. Besides a rumor that was never substantiated, I saw a school that was carefully adhering to the law. It has been revealing to continually have to defend my findings to others in the field of education. I believe that their reactions to my research reveal how little some in the field of education understand students' right to practice their religion in public schools. Additionally, these reactions expose how dominant society envisions "multiculturalism" as having nothing to do with religion.

Discussion

As researchers, we must be aware of our own actions and critically reflect on how we hear, what we say, the choices we make, the voice we use, and the development of practices routine to our research. Ultimately, by acknowledging the central role I continue to play in presenting my research publically, and by placing Somali students' perspectives as my primary focus, I feel better about my position to share this research with others. Using my role as a member of the academy, I believe that I am fulfilling my promise to authorize student perspectives in efforts to improve current educational practice and to inform existing conversations about educational reform.

Year after year, as I present this research at national conferences, I hear from other educators that the Somali youth in their states are not faring well in schools. I hear them describe these youth as ostracized and discriminated against in mainstream schools for taking part in religious practices such as praying, fasting, or wearing the *hijab*. I learn that these youth are often viewed through a deficit lens by both teachers and peers, and that these youth are frequently perceived as religiously "oppressed" or "fanatic," and as suspicious and threatening beings. These educators portray Somali youth as having little motivation to do well or stay in school and seem to have dwindling faith our society's ability to see them as hard-working, honest, and valuable contributors.

As I share my research publically, I argue that there is a critical need for educators to engage in a meaningful dialogue that respects all cultures, 'races' *and* religions. To begin this process, schools must acknowledge the grievances felt by a religious community that is often the target of prejudice and stereotyping. Religion has largely been ignored in most discussions about institutional racism. In order to counter discrimination like Islamaphobia, individuals must be held responsible for their attitudes and beliefs, and discriminatory practices must be made visible. No longer can we remain silent and complacent about issues that matter. Just as Pollock (2004) calls for educators to participate in the everyday act of talking about racial diversity, I would add that educators should expand these conversations to include religious and cultural diversity and their intersections. For the educators of East African Muslim youth, that means having on-going conversations with students to better understand what Islam is, to become aware of the difficult experiences these youth face in U.S. schools and society, and to develop inclusive practices that promote tolerance and understanding.

With growing numbers of immigrant and refugee youth, public schools are faced with enormous challenges of educating all students while demonstrating necessary ways to accommodate their cultural, racial, and religious identities. In the meantime, many Somali communities are deciding that culturally specific charter schools may be better able to meet their children's needs. The results of my research reveal that, for the case of Kalsami High School, there are many positive outcomes of attending a culturally specific school. While we cannot generalize that all culturally specific schools will produce the same outcomes as Kalsami, these findings suggest that educators should give more consideration to these kinds of schools.

Yet Somali youth and the culturally specific charter schools that serve as a refuge for them are vulnerable. In the case of Kalsami, I have come to see the necessity of using my role as a member of the academy to support youths' perspectives, to dispel notions that their culturally specific charter school might be breaking the law, and to address other common (and sometimes erroneous) concerns that surround the cultural and religious practices of Somali youth in American K-12 schools. By presenting and publishing my research locally and nationally, to Muslim communities as well as to leaders in education, I hope that I have now placed myself in a position to re-present and interpret the voices of these youth. I hope that my research will serve educators to better understand the academic issues and social demands associated with being a black, Muslim immigrant in U.S. schools and reveal to others how these experiences come to shape their identities. Additionally, I hope that this study has helped to fill a void in the research that investigates the rapidly growing culturally specific charter school phenomenon. Ultimately, I hope that this study will shed further light on how all schools can decrease the barriers students face in schools and demonstrate constructive and necessary ways to accommodate and respect the academic, cultural, religious and racial identity of Somali youth.

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Living Beyond Solitary: An update on Mumia Abu Jamal

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LIVING BEYOND SOLITARY: AN UPDATE ON MUMIA ABU JAMAL (Essay)

On September 14th I was sitting in a crowd of over 2,000 people at Riverside Church in NYC, anxiously waiting to hear an address by Mumia Abu-Jamal. As the crowd hushed, his recorded message crackled and began: "You may think you know something about solitary, but in truth you don't. You may have a loved one in prison who has experienced it and told you about it, but still I say, you don't know it. You know the word, and between the word and reality, a world exists. You don't know that world. But the closest we may come is to say it must be like life on another planet. One where the air is different, where the water is different. Where wildlife and flora and fauna mean different things. For as you know the word torture, you don't know how it feels. The pain, the loss, the humiliations all elude you. For solitary is torture - state torture, official torture, government sanctioned torture. Some may call that hyperbole or exaggeration, but I've lived in solitary longer than many, most perhaps, Americans have been alive (Mumia's Message)."

In the background of the message, the conversations of prisoners and the shouting of guards could be faintly heard. These noises weren't present in Mumia's recordings last year, or in the previous 28 years. From his conviction and sentencing to death row in July of 1982 until January of 2012, Mumia had been held in solitary confinement, as over 100,000 prisoners in the United States are currently (Devereaux, 2012). For those 29 years Mumia was in isolation in a tiny cell, only to be released in a dog cage-style pen for the remaining hour. Now, due to years of struggle by thousands of people, Mumia is in general population. There are voices in the background.

The years of struggle for justice for Mumia have not been struggles in isolation. Throughout his over thirty years in prison he has written eight books and hundreds of articles exposing the

horrors of the prison system, providing powerful insight about US foreign policy and national issues such as poverty and police brutality. The movement surrounding him has made powerful links fighting in alliance and on behalf of other political prisoners, against police brutality, against the death penalty, and against the entirety of the prison industrial complex. When Mumia was moved from SCI-Greene to SCI-Mahanoy in December of 2011 he was put in the position to brilliantly document another aspect of the United States prison experience. He was moved from the solitary confinement of death row at SCI-Greene to the isolation units designated for those in general population at SCI-Mahanoy (Washington, 2012).

It had been over a decade since Judge Yohn declared Mumia's sentence unjust and re-sentenced him to life without parole. Yet for those ten years Mumia was unjustly held on death row. When he was finally moved off death row he was slapped in the face by the Department of Corrections move to keep him in isolation, an isolation even more intense than he had faced on death row. However, international movements for justice responded quickly, collecting over 5,000 signatures demanding that he be moved to general population (Washington, 2012). His time in the Restrictive Housing Units of SCI-Mahanoy was a terrible injustice, but it made him aware of how widespread isolation has become in the prison system at large. He was able to see first hand how isolation is being used a weapon against prisoners more extremely than it was when he was imprisoned in 1981. His voice has strengthened the growing movement against isolation and continues to be a vibrant force speaking out for prison abolition.

Mumia's move to general population means that for the first time in nearly 30 years he can hug his loved ones when they visit, he can spend time with other prisoners, and has much greater freedom of movement within the prison. On January 30th, 2012 Mumia had his first contact visit with his wife in 29 years. They were able to hug and kiss for the first time in nearly three decades of being separated by plexiglass! On February 2nd, 2012 CUNY History Professor, Johanna Fernandez and executive director of the National Lawyers Guild, Heidi Boghosian had their first contact visit with Mumia. In a statement released after the visit Professor Fernandez recounted:

"He talked to us about the newness of every step he has taken since his release to general population a week ago. So much of what we take for granted daily is new to him, from the microwave in the visiting room to the tremor he felt when, for the first time in 30 years, he kissed his wife. As he said in his own words, "the only thing more drastically different than what I'm experiencing now would be freedom (Fernandez, 2012)."

Since that time I've had the privilege of visiting Mumia in general population four times. The changes in the visiting experience alone are remarkable. During the visits families come over to express their admiration and respect, with some requesting handshakes and hugs. In the previous 29 years Mumia had only seen children on the rare occasion that one was brought on the long trek to SCI-Greene and into the death row visiting booths, separated by inches of plexiglass. Now during visits he watches as many small children play and move about the general population visiting room.

Being able to eat together during visits, even the terrible prison vending machine food, feels miraculous. On my last visit Mumia he was joking about his darker skin tone. He said "people

thought I was light-skinned before, really I was just hardly let out in the sun.” Now his skin looks richer, healthier, and younger. It's astonishing that a man whose only human contact for 29 years came from guards during searches could adjust so quickly. All of these things are wonderful, but make it all the more sickening when I walk out of a visit after hours of great conversation and he remains behind as the gates clink shut.

Mumia's move off of death row is certainly a victory that should encourage and add momentum to prison justice struggles, but it is not the victory. He is not free and the prison-industrial complex continues to grow at a rapid rate. On August 23, 2012 Judge Dembe affirmed Mumia's sentence of life in prison with no possibility of parole (Grote, 2012), strengthening my view that there is little hope for justice in the courts until we build a broad enough movement to move public pressure in our direction.

One rallying point should be Mumia's latest book with Columbia University Professor, Marc Lamont Hill, *The Classroom and the Cell: Conversations on Black Life in America*. Abu-Jamal and Hill converse with comfort and ease, logic and love, about some of the most serious issues of the day. Their range of experience, both growing up in poor Philadelphia neighborhoods, with one serving life in prison and the other teaching at Columbia, provide them with an expansive view of Black life in America. *The Classroom and the Cell* is a must read for building a movement against the school to prison pipeline as it elaborates on Michelle Alexander's mind-blowing work, *The New Jim Crow*, by providing personal insights into our national epidemic of mass imprisonment, specifically concerning populations of color.

Hill and Abu-Jamal advance the goal post for the prison abolition movement by transcending academic discussion and delving deeply into personal reflection and palpable empathy. I've been educated and impressed by Mumia's previous books, but this is something different. This text is the closest one can come to getting to know this complex and beautiful man through the written word. *The Classroom and the Cell* brings the reader into the conversation with its honesty and vulnerability.

While the work focuses on Black life in America, Abu-Jamal and Hill passionately discuss the roles of nationalism, homophobia and patriarchy as interconnected systems of oppression. *The Classroom and the Cell* is a humanist work of profound love for people. The authors understand the necessity of building community in organizing social movements. *The Classroom and the Cell* should be a key in the campaign to push people to see Mumia and prisoners in general as flesh and blood, as real people grappling with terrible situations. *The Classroom and the Cell* is a perfect book to form a book discussion group around, to raise awareness about Mumia's case and the over two million others confined by the prison system (Longley).

Another notable effort to build momentum for Mumia's release is a new documentary called “Long Distance Revolutionary,” which focuses on Mumia's dramatic life as a writer, journalist, and revolutionary from Pennsylvania's death row. The new film has received rave reviews at preliminary showings and features luminaries such as Angela Davis, Noam Chomsky, Michelle Alexander, Cornel West, Ramona Africa and many more. While focusing on Mumia's personal journey, the film also contextualizes Mumia's life within the framework of COINTELPRO, movement building, US racism, and the rise in the prison industrial complex. Stephen Vittoria,

one of the producers of “Long Distance Revolutionary,” is also working on a new book with Mumia entitled *Murder Incorporated: Empire, Genocide and Manifest Destiny*. This latest book begins with the genesis of the American Empire and follows its 500-year march across the planet (JR, 2012).

In October of 2012 a street was named after Mumia in Bobigny, France, resulting from ten years of concentrated efforts, including the construction of a new street. The campaign was initiated by former mayor of Bobigny, the late Bernard Bersinger, who was inspired after he visited Mumia on death row in 1989. Current Bobigny Mayor Catherine Peyge said the street naming is part of her city’s fight for “respect and justice” for Mumia and others. Mumia’s son, Jamal, spoke during the ceremony, predicting his father will “ultimately” be freed and come to Bobigny to walk on “this street of liberation (Washington, 2012).”

This Bobigny street is not the first to be named for Mumia. In 2006 St. Denis, France named another street in Mumia's honor, provoking widespread outrage from the Fraternal Order of Police and many politicians. This 2006 street naming pushed the US House of Representatives to pass a resolution "condemning the decision of St. Denis, France, to name a street in honor of Mumia Abu-Jamal, the convicted murderer of Philadelphia Police Officer Danny Faulkner." The House voted 368-31 to condemn St. Denis and Mumia (Condemning St. Denis, France). The relative silence from the opposition regarding this latest effort at international solidarity is consistent with what appears to be their new strategy-- willful inattention. Many previous efforts by those pushing for Mumia's execution have only served to draw more attention and support. It appears that the opposition intends to pretend that that support doesn't exist. This media blackout makes it even more important to broadcast Mumia's voice beyond the prison walls.

On September 14th Mumia was a key speaker at a large event at Riverside Church in NYC with the demands of ending mass incarceration, freeing Mumia and all political prisoners, closing Attica and ending solitary confinement. Characteristically, his closing words were not about his case, but about building movements to put a stop to the entirety of the prison industrial complex. His are words we must heed:

...and the US is the world's undisputed leader in imprisonment of its citizens. Neither China, Russia, nor any other nation comes close. As scholar and law professor Michelle Alexander has aptly described it, the US has reconstituted the new Jim Crow, and as prison populations explode the law becomes increasingly more supportive of this repression, increasingly more supportive of solitary, and less tolerant of the notion of equal rights or even equal access to courts. These factors have continued to be a problem irrespective of whether under Republican or Democratic administrations. For repression is apparently truly bipartisan. But all is not gloom and doom. People have the power to transform their grim realities. All they have to do is fight for it, organize! When people get together and fight together they create change, they make change. If you want to shut down solitary confinement, you can do it. You've got to organize and fight for it. If you find the Prison Industrial Complex intolerable, than organize and fight it. This is not pollyanna-ish or pie in the sky. This is gritty and as down to earth as spinach. It's as real as dirt, as real as steel, as real as blood, as real as life. Whenever any social advance has happened it's because people fought for it...(Mumia's Message)

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Intergenerational Crime Prevention: Attempts to Save Children from Following in Their Incarcerated Parents' Footsteps

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INTERGENERATIONAL CRIME PREVENTION: ATTEMPTS TO SAVE CHILDREN FROM FOLLOWING IN THEIR INCARCERATED PARENTS' FOOTSTEPS (Essay)

Abstract

This paper examines the problem of intergenerational crime in the United States. It looks at the past research and current efforts on assisting children of incarcerated parents. With record-levels of incarceration, little government and public attention seems to have been made on the short and long-term effects of mass incarceration on the families of the imprisoned, especially children. This paper intends to address the issue and highlight the harmful effects of parental incarceration with the fact that little has been done up to now to resolve the problem. We are at the point where the imprisoned parents are meeting up with their imprisoned children. It is a cycle of intergenerational crime in which this paper analyzes and evaluates. The paper concludes with recommendations on how to deal better with this issue and reduce its overall negative impact.

Introduction

America's incarceration rate is at the highest levels in American history. Rising four times the levels since the 1970s, America's prisons have gone from approximately 500,000 inmates to 2.6 million inmates. Ever since the "war on crime" was declared in 1968 by President Richard Nixon, the United States has jailed tens of millions of adults. Despite the massive incarceration rate, there seems to have been very little consideration done at the highest political and legal levels regarding what the consequences would be for the children of the incarcerated adults.

60-70% of all inmates have at least one child (Lawson, 2007, p. 2) Research has found that children of incarcerated parents are far more prone to major character and social problems, especially later in life. All this causes many children to have serious problems inside and outside the school and home. Children of incarcerated parents, in fact, may have a 50% greater chance of ending up in jail like their parents than children of non-incarcerated parents (Grothaus, online).

Just like Willie Bosket and his family line in *All God's Children*, parental incarceration can have profound effects on children at a very young age and can stay with them and worsen well into adulthood. The cascade effect of parental to child incarceration is a long, prevalent, and sad state of affairs. This research paper will analyze and evaluate what American society has done in the last several decades to address this major problem of intergenerational crime. If children are truly our future, then there are millions of them who may already be condemned to incarceration before they even reach adulthood. This paper will look at the scholarly research, government and non-government programs, and overall system for dealing with children of incarcerated parents. It will finish with an evaluation of America's efforts for dealing with children of imprisoned parents and, then, provide a set of recommendations on how to improve the current system and give children of incarcerated parents a much better chance in life.

Contextual Parameters of Parental Incarceration

The current number of imprisoned adults is approximately 2.6 million. In 1973, there were approximately 500,000 inmates. There are an estimated 3.7 million people in other forms of corrections and who have been recently released from prison and on probation (Bureau of Justice Statistics, online). An estimated 14 million people are in jail (short term) awaiting their trials on an annual basis, with an estimated 70% or more ending up being innocent of the charges brought against them (Gabel & Johnston, 1995, p. vii and Santos, 2006, p. xiii) When you consider that 60-70% of imprisoned adults have at least one child and 32% have two or more children, it becomes apparent that incarceration affects more than just the adult and possible spouse (Lawson, 2007, p. 2 and Mumola, 2000, p. 2). It is estimated that 10 million children now have a parent who is incarcerated or is in some form of corrections and probation system (Bouchet, 2008, p. 2). This number continues to multiply. Children are clearly being hurt by the incarceration of their parents, both physically, emotionally, and psychologically. According to research, 71% of the incarcerated parents had jobs before being imprisoned and often were the primary financial providers in the home (Travis & Waul, 2003, p. 19). The incarceration of these breadwinners have had significant effects on the upbringing of their children, especially whether or not the children can continue to be provided for with food and a home with just one parent left, especially if that parent does not have a job. The emotional and psychological scars are profound for many children, as research has found. Many children with incarcerated parents are far more likely to be depressed, angry, socially withdrawn, and have other problems compared with children of non-incarcerated parents. And, these children can be more prone to juvenile delinquency and have conflicts with their peers (Travis & Waul, 2003, pp. 16-17).

It is even more important to recognize that 95% of all prisoners are released from prison sooner or later. Many of the parent inmates have sentences of less than 2-3 years. Over 600,000 inmates are released from prison every year. The recidivist rate, however, is extremely bad.

According to the Bureau of Justice Statistics, released prisoners end up committing some form of crime or violation 30% of the time within the first six months, 44% within the first year, and 67.5% within the first three years (Bureau of Justice Statistics, online and Santos, 2006, p. xiii). Prisoner reentry has been a significant failure and the incarcerated keep getting re-incarcerated. This revolving door makes even short prison sentences end up being much longer sentences, and the children of the incarcerated end up suffering the consequences, stigma, and overall negative effects of long-term parental incarceration. Research has shown that repeated failures in the prisoner reentry programs continues to undermine any parental bonding with their children. It may take a year or more for former inmates and their children to possibly reestablish a bond between them or try to form one that never existed prior to incarceration (Gabel & Johnston, 1995, pp. 3-20).

Recidivism is a major obstacle to strengthening the parental-child relationship and building a stronger foundation for children to work upon. Children, as a result, are subjected to repeated episodes of parental failure and returns to prison. When children see their parents repeatedly fail within the normal bounds of society, it obviously has a negative effect on them. Children naturally identify with those closest and familial to them. If those that they see as role models and like themselves completely fail in society and, then, are bounded up like animals on a regular basis, the children no doubt must wonder if this fate awaits them and whether it is inevitable that the same conditions that led to their parents being incarcerated will lead them down the same path. Worse, if the children recognize that their incarcerated and increasingly re-incarcerated parents actually grew up with two parents in the home and, moreover, under better economic times, then the children have to wonder whether their conditions are actually much more disadvantageous than their imprisoned parents. Whether or not the children are conscious or unconscious of this, research has shown that children of incarcerated parents are more likely to have significant social, psychological, and other problems and eventually have a higher risk of incarceration.

The “War on Crime,” Socio-Economics, and Parental Incarceration

The “war on crime” was declared in 1968 by Richard Nixon under the mass protests of the Vietnam War. Regardless of any evidence of a major increase in serious and violent crime, the politicians and the media played up the other “war” to great effect. As the “war on crime” was implemented into the 1980s, the urge towards much more punitive sentencing was ingrained within the legal system. With tougher, longer term sentencing (including the Three-Strikes laws), millions of Americans are now being incarcerated at a higher rate and for longer periods than ever before. Even for many petty crimes such as possessing an ounce of cocaine, the “get tough” approach has been a massive assault on American citizens. What may have been tolerated or accepted as a non-violent and relatively harmless act within society is now labeled a serious crime that results in imprisonment and, often, with many of the worse and violent criminals in society (Beckett & Sasson, 2004, pp. 52-72 and Golden, 2005, pp. 1-2).

When you consider that many of the incarcerated are relatively poor, uneducated, and unskilled, it is quite understandable that they may have personal issues they may want to escape from through the use of some form of drugs. It is even more understandable that many poor people living in communities and neighborhoods that have little if any economic opportunities attempt

to make a living through illegal activities such as drug dealing. When many of these people have children to take care of, it becomes as much a necessity as a crime for the adults to attempt to provide an income for their families so that they may have a home and some food on the table. There is a clear correlation between the substantial amount of crime in a community and the economic deprivation and high levels of unemployment. Society, thus, is partly responsible for not providing a reasonable socio-economic environment for its citizens to make a decent and legal living. If society cannot provide for its citizens, then citizens naturally have to try to survive on their own. When it comes to survival and whether society approves or disapproves of the methods of survival, many non-violent people may not care whether their behavior is deemed legal or illegal. If society appears to abandon you and your family, it is understandable why you may not be concerned about that society's moral and legal standards, especially when it means depriving you and your family with the basic necessities of a home and food and any purpose in life (Hagan & Dinovitzer, 1999, pp. 121-122, 131-137).

Furthermore, what has gotten lost within all these dismal socio-economic figures and descriptions is that millions of children are being exposed and assaulted on a daily basis by these terrible economic deprivations. The combination of poverty, crime, and the seemingly endless line of re-incarcerated parents can damage children severely in all respects. Starting off and then growing up with such negative conditions creates a world in which many children will never get out of, with the deck being very much stacked against them, by no cause of their own. The children are the ones who appear to be the most damaged by this revolving door of affliction and recidivism. More than enough research has been done so far to reveal that substantial numbers of children of imprisoned parents suffer high levels of stress and trauma even with the parents in the homes; the overall environment is just that bad and terrifying to many (Hagan & Dinovitzer, 1999, pp. 124-127, Travis & Waul, 2003, pp. 15-16, and Pattillo, Weiman, & Western, 2004, pp. 104-107).

When the parents end up in prison or back to their old "prison homes," millions of children are deprived of a protector and a role model, an educator and a provider. It is even worse that millions of kids are growing up within single parent homes (at best) and rarely if ever see their imprisoned parent. According to research and standard operating procedures in many prisons, children may see their imprisoned parent possibly just one time per 28 days and for only 30 minutes. One third of prisoners report never seeing their children the entire time they were in prison, and half report not seeing their children over a six month period (Gabel & Johnston, 1995, pp. 8-9 and Travis, 2005, pp. 131-136). This, certainly, is not any reasonable time to maintain a family bond let alone have any type of relationship; in fact, the prison visitation policies can be so short that it is not surprising that many adult family members may not even make the effort to bring the children to the prison, or even themselves. The deliberate breakdown and separation of the family is inherent in the prison system and, to a lesser extent, the visitation policies.

Thus, the children of incarcerated parents will grow up all alone or to a large extent isolated by the stigma and negative effects of parental incarceration. These children, nonetheless, will have to eventually go out into the world, if not just to school, and this is where things get worse. The children naturally seek to learn the ways of adulthood and the overall environment. But, the problem is that they tend to grow up in the same type of impoverished and violent-prone

neighborhoods that their incarcerated parents grew up within. These kids are now even more likely to follow in the footsteps of their imprisoned parents, and research has confirmed this. The code of the streets even praises the imprisonment of parents and raises the prestige of many of the children of the incarcerated, though it is a false prestige at best. The children, however, are influenced heavily to go down the wrong path. Surrounded by bad role models, crime, and other seemingly easy or necessary criminal activities, the bad neighborhood replaces the imprisoned parent as the role model for children. The world around the children of incarcerated parents becomes a prison unto itself. This neighborhood prison then leads down a path of inner and external destruction that eventually leads back to the parents in prison. This creates an apparent “factory” of incarcerated individuals that runs right down the family line. It gives and expands new meaning to the term “prison-industrial complex,” with the parents being the current raw materials and the children being the future reserves (Hagan & Dinovitzer, 1999, pp. 124-129 and Hagan, 1992, pp. 1-19).

Given the likelihood and common sense that children of incarcerated parents will be more prone to criminal behavior, it would seem practical to develop and implement programs that would immediately intervene in the lives of children whose parents are incarcerated, in order to reduce the chances of a continuing cycle of intergenerational crime. But, what is American society doing to deal with this very important issue of intergenerational crime prevention? If a revolving door of family crime is not stopped or reduced significantly, then there will be entire new generations of children that will be condemned to follow in the footsteps of their incarcerated parents. There are moral, social, economic, political, and practical reasons for controlling this issue and preventing it from getting worse. Whether there is a fundamental breakdown in the community bonds of society as a result of an industrialized and urbanized world is yet to be concluded. The more society is separated from their self-sufficient and extended-family means, the more isolated and vulnerable many people can become. Without the strong family bonds and close community relations among all, it is not surprising that there are serious problems regarding crime and incarceration. Yet, in other industrialized countries, there is a lot less crime and incarceration (Beckett & Sasson, 2004 and Currie, 2009).

Why are relatively high levels of crime and incarceration more of a peculiar American institution than in other advanced industrialized countries? Why has the incarceration rate increased four-fold in the last several decades while the overall crime rate has actually gone down in the last decade? Why are other advanced countries more progressive in their socio-economic systems? Why is the United States so ineffective in dealing with crime and the victims of crime, especially the children of the incarcerated? Let us look at some of the scholarly literature over the last several decades, from the post-WWII period on up through the present, and see what efforts have been made to recognize and address these very closely and inter-related factors and questions on intergenerational crime. Then, we can examine the most recent efforts at dealing with preventing intergenerational crime and trying to make headway into a long and deeply rooted problem in American society. As we shall see, the gaps—or deep crevices, some would say—between scholarly research, public policies, and substantial positive results are a far ways off, but there has been some improvement over the last several decades in reducing the gulf and helping some of the children of incarcerated parents.

Brief History of Literature on Children of Incarcerated Parents

The research on intergenerational crime has been relatively small compared with the importance and size of the problem. The research, nevertheless, has been good at heart, you can say, in terms of realistically assessing the problem and offering potential solutions and policies for the problem at hand. The scholarly literature and public policies can be grouped into three distinct periods for this analytical analysis. The first period covers the post-WWII to 1968 literature on parental incarceration and its effects on children. The second period starts with the declaration of the “war on crime” in 1968 and encapsulates a generation of children of the incarcerated to 1990. The third period covers the 1990s to the present in which more and more people started to see the major negative effects and failures of the “war on crime,” especially with regards to the current and former children of incarcerated parents.

The scholarly literature on children of incarcerated parents was very sparse and haphazard prior to 1968 and the “war on crime.” Some of the books include Norman Fenton’s *The Prisoner’s Family* (1959), Serapio Zalba’s *Women Prisoners and Their Families* (1964), and Pauline Morris’ *Prisoners and Their Families* (1965).

Fenton’s study was on the counseling of inmates’ families. It was a groundbreaking perspective on the effects of imprisoning parents. Fenton encouraged all levels of corrections to focus on assisting families of the incarcerated and incorporating the overall treatment into the correctional programs. Fenton investigated first-hand the corrections system in California and looked at how the prison administrators dealt with the family dimension at all stages of incarceration. Fenton concluded that more and better training of prison staff in this area was necessary and he encouraged much more opportunities for prisoners and their families to bond (Fenton, 1959).

Zalba’s book on female prisoners was one of the first of its kind in terms of examining the prisoner-mother. Zalba was part of a California government study on the largest female prison in the United States. Zalba’s evaluation was intended to help incarcerated mothers and their families, especially the children. The initial understanding was that children were seriously affected by their mothers’ incarceration. Zalba’s findings included the need for more funding for families of the incarcerated and much better coordination and services among the relevant state agencies in dealing with the issue (Zalba, 1964).

Morris’ book was one of the first to look at the families and incarceration issue on a national level. Morris had a well-structured analytical approach that looked comprehensively at incarcerated parents and their families through a scientific study. With a variety of numbers and statistical analysis, Morris concluded that much more needed to be done at all levels to assist family members of the incarcerated. Morris laid down the extent of the problem and demonstrated that current programs were undermining families or were uncoordinated. Morris declared that a strong, stable family throughout the incarceration process was essential to eventual and successful prisoner reentry (Morris, 1965).

As the clarion call in 1968 to make war on millions of Americans for even the pettiest and non-violent of crimes, the literature on families of the incarcerated started to grow, but only so slowly. For the first few decades after 1968’s declaration of a war on crime, there were several more books and articles that grabbed scholars’ attention, though little of the public’s. These

books included Stanley Brodsky's *Families and Friends of Men in Prison* (1971), Donald Schneller's *The Prisoner's Family* (1976), L. Alex Swan's *Families of Black Prisoners* (1981), Ann Stanton's *When Mother's Go to Jail* (1980), and James Boudouris' *Prisons and Kids* (1985).

Brodsky used a psycho-analytical approach to examining prisoners and their families. He analyzed the ground-levels of the prison system from each stage of incarceration. His examination took a more personal approach to prisoners and how visitation, letters, and other forms of communications between prisoners and their families affected their relationship over the long term (Brodsky, 1975).

Schneller was one of the first to argue that parental incarceration and the lack of prison and government programs to assist families was a crime in itself. He declared that the punishment of families and their children should not be tolerated by the state. He recommended that much greater efforts be made to assist families and minimize the damage when parents are incarcerated, including counseling, greater numbers of visitations, and more telephone privileges (Schneller, 1976).

Swan reviewed the racial dimension on parental incarceration. Swan's book was a strong, analytical approach that included a good review of past literature. Swan stressed the much greater incarceration and problems of minority families. Swan stated that the overall socio-economic environment played a role in minority incarceration and the breakdown in minority families during and after parental incarceration. Swan provided statistical data that showed that the less time and value prisoners spent with their wives and children, the worse off they were and that a revolving and downward spiral emerged over time within minority communities (Swan, 1981).

Stanton's book was a comprehensive and legalistic approach to incarcerated mothers and their children. She, like the other authors, stressed her desire to improve upon the relatively small amount of literature on the effects that parental incarceration has on children. Stanton looked in detail on the psychological, emotional, and physical harm that parental incarceration has on children. She also developed an extensive set of questions and a research plan to examine the issue, which she published the details of. She recommended that greater opportunities should be made for incarcerated parents to see their children inside and outside of prison (Stanton, 1980).

Boudouris looked at the bonding issue between children and their imprisoned parents. He also reviewed the existing programs that a number of prisons had in terms of assisting incarcerated parents, especially those of very young children. Boudouris brought up the provocative suggestion that young children, especially babies, possibly be housed in the prison facilities under special conditions. He noted that there used to be prison nurseries before being scrapped for administrative and political reasons. He, at the very least, supported greater numbers and durations of visitations (Boudouris, 1985).

It was not until the 1990s did we see a significant rise in the amount of scholarly literature and public attention to the issue of children of imprisoned parents. Possibly because of a new generation of scholars working under and/or inspired by the previous generation of scholars,

there was a lot more active research and publication on this topic. On the other hand, the reality of the effects of mass incarceration since 1968 started to kick in and many of the children born started following in the footsteps as their incarcerated parents. As the “war on crime” became much more publicized by the media and politicians in the 1980s and 1990s, the public was bombarded with much more graphic images of crime, especially youth crime in the form of gangs and other random violence. As the “war on crime” expanded to include a “war on drugs” and a “get tough” approach to all crime in general, including the Three-Strikes laws, society was inculcated on a daily basis with fears of mass crime waves and near-future anarchy and gang control (witness *Escape From New York* and *L.A.*, for example).

A number of the books and articles written from the 1990s to the present offered society a much better look into the effects of mass incarceration on children. These books and articles included Roger Shaw’s *Prisoners’ Children* (1992), John Hagan’s “The Poverty of a Classless Criminology” (1992), Katherine Gabel and Denise Johnston’s *Children of Incarcerated Parents* (1995), John Hagan and Ronit Dinovitzer’s “Collateral Consequences of Imprisonment for Children, Communities, and Prisoners,” (1999), Cynthia Seymour and Creasie Finney Hairston’s *Children with Parents in Prison* (2001), Gwyneth Boswell and Peter Wedge’s *Imprisoned Fathers and Their Children* (2002), Jeremy Travis and Michelle Waul’s *Prisoners Once Removed: The Impact of Incarceration and Reentry on Children, Families, and Communities* (2003), and Nell Bernstein’s *All Alone in the World: Children of the Incarcerated* (2005).

Shaw’s book was a compilation of works on parental incarceration and its negative effects. It took a comprehensive view on the various dimensions in which children are harmed. It also included some foreign cases to show that parental incarceration can be damaging anywhere and that there are alternatives out there to improve things (Shaw, 1992).

Hagan’s article was a presidential address to the American Society of Criminology in 1991. He declared that many socio-economic factors play a role in creating a revolving door of intergenerational incarceration. He called on other scholars to look more closely at the underlying causes of incarceration and to develop a theory of class reproduction of prisoners, essentially an intergeneration prison-industrial complex (Hagan, 1992)

Gabel and Johnston presented a collection of very informative writings that included a lot of very good data on parental incarceration. They examined separately and together incarcerated fathers and mothers. They looked at public policies and current programs to assist families of the incarcerated. They reviewed the foster care and child visitation prison policies. And, they made a lot of very good recommendations on how to help the children and imprisoned parents (Gabel & Johnston, 1995).

Hagan and Dinovitzer’s article presented a comprehensive and thorough analysis of the effects of parental incarceration on children. They reviewed a number of plausible theoretical interpretations, including strain theory, the socialization view, stigmatization, and the selection perspective. They emphasized that a complex layer of environmental factors influence the downward spiral towards incarceration and recidivism and the overall negative effects on the families of the incarcerated, especially the children (Hagan & Dinovitzer, 1999).

Seymour and Hairston offered a good group scholarly analysis on how children of incarcerated parents are treated within the government system. They looked at the existing public policies, foster care, and other welfare services. They stressed that a lot more resources and services need to be implemented to assist children of imprisoned parents, including greater prison wages and child support, better telephone and mail communications, and the perennial recommendation of more and better visitation practices (Seymour & Hairston, 2001).

Boswell and Wedge's book provided us an international perspective on parental incarceration and its effects on children. They examined the United Kingdom's efforts and policies in dealing with facilitating and minimizing the damage of parental incarceration. They pointed out a number of differences but in sum recognized that the same types of negative effects on children of the incarcerated happen in countries across the ocean (Boswell & Wedge, 2002).

Travis and Waul compiled a group of powerful and comprehensive writings on incarceration, prisoner reentry, and the effects they have on children. They offered a very good collection of analyses with up-to-date information on parental incarceration. A number of interesting recommendations are made, including the older (previously mentioned) suggestion of allowing children to be housed at the corrections facilities and improving contact between the incarcerated parents and their children (Travis & Waul, 2003).

Bernstein's book took a straightforward account of the very negative effects of parental incarceration on children. He used real-life examples and statements in presenting his case against the current system of parental incarceration. He presented a strong argument against the breakdown of families under the current prison and social policies. He made a number of good recommendations to help children of incarcerated parents, including greater protection and social support mechanisms, better visitation policies, abolishing the prison phone tax, adding more specialized services and skills to child welfare agencies, and greater financial support for families who lose their primary income provider (Bernstein, 2005).

Assisting Children of Incarcerated Parents: The Layout

In today's world of mass incarceration in the United States and the extremely high recidivist rate, one would expect the United States' policymakers and citizens to have evaluated thoroughly and comprehensively the overall effects of such a prison nation, especially on the children and future generation of America. Unfortunately, relatively little research has been done at the policymaking level on the negative consequences and collateral damage on the children of incarcerated adults. After several decades of mass incarceration, a whole new generation of youth are emerging that have been seriously hurt by one or more parents being incarcerated for most of their lives. If the existing research is correct and many of these new adults and teenagers are as maladjusted as some research has shown, then we can be heading towards a much worse crime rate. The culmination of children following in their parents' footsteps with little choice or awareness and, moreover, joining a very combustible and already overcrowded prison system, is a staggering thought to comprehend, let alone try to deal with at this late stage in the game, so to speak.

We can look at the root causes of intergenerational crime and see that mass incarceration is creating a whole new generation of criminals. With such a high level of children of incarcerated parents growing up in the same poor and miserable environment as their imprisoned parents, the socio-economic structure is already heavily turned against them. The many disadvantages of poor children are compounded by a history and stigma of parental incarceration. Hopelessness, anger, and sadness abound. With few if any good role models ever emerging for these children, the default models are the incarcerated parents and/or the violent neighborhood criminals that have yet to be arrested. With very little if any economic opportunities, the pressure to conform to the local structure and follow down the criminal path is very tempting and all-too-often chosen. It is a sad and depressing cycle of condemnation for children whose only fault was to have been born to at least one parent who gets incarcerated (Hagan & Dinovitzer, 1999, pp. 121-127).

How society deals with the children of incarcerated parents is a reflection of society's morals and values. Alexander Solzhenitsyn said many times that prisons reflect the society and government that people exist under. We can expand the description to include the treatment of the children of the imprisoned. If society does not respect and deal effectively with the children of the incarcerated, then it reveals a lot about that society, as well as how the future will look like. When you consider that within twenty years or so the children of the incarcerated will become adults and then you combine this with the high recidivist rates of the parents, then you eventually come to the point that both the massive number of incarcerated parents will combine with the newly incarcerated children to overwhelm society's will and resources. We are just about reaching the point where the children of the imprisoned will soon be reaching adulthood, if they have not reached it already. With prisons already being maxed out and beyond (California being 40% over the limit, according to recent reports), society will soon face a serious dilemma of how to handle the massive overload of criminal parents and their children. And, this is all under reasonably stable economic times. Should the economic situation get worse and many of the millions of unemployed do not find work in the near future, we can have a much graver situation on our hands. For decades, society has been setting up a perfect storm of parental incarceration followed up by their children being incarcerated. The storm of intergenerational crime may be about to hit us.

Analyzing and evaluating the efforts or lack thereof to assist children of incarcerated parents is a very important issue that seems to get very little attention. Just like the general public assumes that prisoners are being "rehabilitated" and prepared for a successful reentry into society, the public tends to assume that the innocent left behind by these imprisoned individuals are just fine with at best a little financial hardship and mental anguish. There does not appear to be any serious public concern that the children of imprisoned parents will be much worse off and have any significant increase in their likelihood to become criminals. Yet, the statistics say otherwise. Just like the last several decades of facts that show a high incarceration rate has not reduced significantly the crime level or that corrections are not really rehabilitating most prisoners, the statistical reality is that children of incarcerated parents are several times more likely to end up in prison than children of non-incarcerated parents. These statistics would behoove people to focus on preventing or at least reducing the next generation of criminals (Hagan & Dinovitzer, 1999, pp. 121-127 and Grothaus, online). There are many factors that contribute to potential crime, but this paper will now examine society's efforts at dealing with the children of incarcerated parents.

What has been done to assist children of incarcerated parents? What government and non-government programs have been established or proposed to help the children of incarcerated parents? What has worked and what has not? What more needs to be done? All in all, what can be done to improve the situation and give the kids of imprisoned parents a better chance of not following in their parents' footsteps?

It takes one to know one, as they say, but children of imprisoned parents do not have to follow down the same road. All too often, the pressures and circumstances drive the children down the wrong path, down a trail of incarceration tears and collapse, you could say. Losing a parent (or even both parents) to prison will put a tremendous amount of stress on children. Given the current likelihood of generational crime, it would seem that it is society's responsibility to ensure that the children of incarcerated parents are not punished for their parents' mistakes. Children should not be victimized by the sins of the parents, yet they so often are on a daily basis. It is society's responsibility to prevent the children from suffering any further than would naturally follow the loss of an incarcerated parent. Yet, society's response to these children has been perplexing, to say the least.

There are a number of societal programs that exist to help children of incarcerated parents. Most of them are non-governmental. Others are federal and state funded programs and organizations. These are all relatively small and uncoordinated compared with the magnitude of the problem. With millions of children being thrown under the train of mass parental incarceration, relatively little has been done to stop the flood of childhood neglect from a societal point of view. Although there has been a growing number of public and private efforts to assist these children of incarcerated parents, there still needs to be much more done to turn things around. Let us now take a look at some of the public and private efforts that have been implemented to assist the children of incarcerated parents.

Assisting Children of Incarcerated Parents: The Programs

There are a number of government and non-government programs that have been created to assist the families and children of inmates. The federal and state governments provide or help fund a number of agencies that assist families that are burdened by parental incarceration. Child welfare agencies can provide a number of services to the children of the incarcerated, though few people have given these government agencies and programs high marks in terms of effectiveness and substance. One common criticism of government programs is their inability to properly coordinate and maximize their resources to assist children in a comprehensive manner. Another criticism is the government's inability to adapt quickly and effectively to the realities of mass incarceration and the increasingly negative effects on children of the incarcerated throughout their childhood, only allowing things to get much worse for many children (Gabel & Johnston, 1995 and Travis & Waul, 2003). Furthermore, the government has recognized some of these problems and limitations and, as a result, has provided funding to non-government organizations that support prisoners' families. The government declared in 2001 a Faith-Based and Community Initiative that was intended to promote greater opportunities for religious and social organizations to get involved in helping the families and children of the incarcerated (White House, online).

There are a growing number of public and private non-government organizations that have been created to help the children of imprisoned parents. Many of these programs are religious-based programs, though others like Big Brothers Big Sisters of America are not and have been very effective in their specific roles and capacities, like providing mentors for 6-18 years olds. The Mennonites make a lot of effort at helping the children, especially babies, of imprisoned parents. There are various religious groups that work together in combining their resources to assist families of the incarcerated, like the Washington Association of Churches. There are outreach programs, like LIFE and 4-H in Missouri, that make comprehensive and regular efforts to support the children of inmates and to help the inmates as well in better parenting skills. K.I.D.S. (Kids In Distressed Situations) is another organization that collects private donations and works with other related organizations to help children of the imprisoned.

Complementing and often encouraging these social-support organizations are a new generation of scholars who have become increasingly conscious and active on the problem of children of incarcerated parents. The critical and scholarly analysis goes a long way in persuading the public and government to work harder and do better in terms of assisting prisoners' families. Yet, given the magnitude of the problem and the millions of children affected by parental incarceration, the current academic efforts should be considered just a continuation and development of past scholarly research and not an end. A lot of work and foundations have been made over the last several decades to motivate private and government organizations to help prisoners' children. The current organizations, however, are still not able to deal with the vast majority of prisoners' children and their problems. Much more private and government programs and funding must be made to continue building upon the last half century of effort to help the children of the incarcerated parents (Lawson, 2007, Grothaus, online, Dunn & Arbuckle, 2003, and Eastburn, 2000). More scholarly research needs to be done to identify the current problems and come up with much more comprehensive and effective solutions to the ever-growing problem of intergenerational crime, especially over the long-term.

Conclusion

Overall, the efforts and attempted cures for the children of incarcerated parents have not been very effective, although they have mostly been good at heart. Government programs seem to be more going-through-the-motions types of efforts that do not show any past, present, or hopeful evidence of future success on any substantial basis. We, unfortunately, now see that the fundamental problems of parental incarceration still remain with us and have not improved significantly for the past several decades and, in many cases, it appears to be getting worse, especially in terms of numbers, intensity, and long-term effects.

If there is a "war on crime," then we are clearly not winning it at the younger generational level. There continues to be high levels of crime in the United States despite the mass incarceration rate. Corrections are not really correcting since there is such a high failure in prisoner reentry. What seems to go unnoticed by most Americans and political leaders are the major effects this revolving prison door is having on the next generation of youth whose parents are incarcerated and keep getting re-incarcerated. If the prison system continues to fail in criminal reduction and deterrence let alone rehabilitation and prisoner reentry, then it culminates its failure in producing a future generation of criminals beneath its heap of losses.

Children of incarcerated parents have been found (not surprisingly) to be much more likely harmed in a number of ways by their experiences of parental incarceration. They may even be more likely to end up in prison than children of parents who have never been incarcerated, though we are just getting to the point of being able to collect substantial evidence on it. The prison system, thus, is not only massively failing the imprisoned but is setting up the prime conditions for the prisoners' children to follow in their footsteps. This is becoming a critical mass situation when it comes to our prison system and the country's future. If a whole new generation is virtually being driven down the path towards a life of crime along with the typical number of criminals, then there is likely going to be a much higher rate of crime and incarceration in the future. This does not do anyone any good, except for the prison-industrial complex.

In the end, society needs to do much more in terms of helping the children of imprisoned parents. This should not be a voluntary or minimal policy for prisons but, instead, be a mandatory and comprehensive program carried out by all correctional facilities. Society expects the prisons to rehabilitate and it, certainly, does not expect or want the prison system to harm the children and families of the incarcerated. It is high time for the prison system to readjust its policies and programs to emphasized rehabilitation, prisoner reentry, and continued family bonding on a much greater basis. Prisoners' families should not be punished or permanently harmed by incarceration. Society does not benefit by this as well. It is clearly not in our interests to create a revolving door of intergenerational crime and incarceration. If we do not act now and strongly, then we will soon see the beginnings of an all-in-the-family crime and incarceration system, in addition to all the new criminals that tend to emerge. Much more needs to be done in helping the children of imprisoned parents. Some good programs and efforts have been initiated, but all these programs need to be nationalized, made mandatory, and offer comprehensive and long-term assistance. And, society should be willing to go the extra mile and pay for it for the short-term benefit of the families of the incarcerated and the long-term benefit of all. Preventing intergenerational crime should be a top national priority for the United States. If not, then we will all be paying for the consequences, in some ways we could become intergenerational victims of the intergenerational criminals. Not a good future, but something that can be changed now for the better if we commit the necessary time, efforts and resources in helping the children of the incarcerated.

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Book Review. *Earth, Animal, and Disability Liberation: The Rise of the Eco-Ability Movement.* 2012. Edited by Anthony J. Nocella II, Judy K. C. Bentley, and Janet M. Duncan. NY: Peter Lang.

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***EARTH, ANIMAL, AND DISABILITY LIBERATION: THE RISE OF THE ECO-ABILITY MOVEMENT.* 2012. EDITED BY ANTHONY J. NOCELLA II, JUDY K. C. BENTLEY, AND JANET M. DUNCAN. (Book Review)**

The book began with a simple task of bringing animal advocacy together with disability rights and studies. But we found the goal of merging the two groups to be limiting and not articulating fully what we were arguing for. It was then that we understood the need to include the ecological world in this dialogue, and it was then that the concept of eco-ability was born. (pp. XIX).

Earth, Animal, and Disability Liberation: The Rise of the Eco-Ability Movement begins by outlining the basic tenets of the new concept, and the establishment of it by the contributors to the volume. Eco-ability emerges from this book as one of the most important intersectional concepts to be born from academia in modernity, and this book not only introduces the concept effectively, but is also filled with chapters that delineate eco-ability in an easily understandable way.

For me personally, the editor that drew me to this volume was Anthony J. Nocella II, as his writing and editing on ecopedagogy, nonhuman animal liberation, and dis-ability has been extensive prior to this volume, and I have simply had more interaction with his previous pieces. This being said, both Bentley and Duncan are excellent editors herein, and the volume shows this by having a diverse selection of chapters on both defining eco-ability and applying eco-ability pedagogy.

This book, much like the title suggests, merges three liberation-based fields, and thus, many of the chapters focus on tying the disciplines of earth, nonhuman animal, and dis-ability liberation together into eco-ability. This volume is particularly remarkable in and of that it does spend time defining eco-ability, but is very succinct in doing so, leaving much space to apply eco-ability. This approach to applying rather than defining is refreshing when compared to other academic texts, and allows the book to exist as a text both promoting and exhibiting advocacy.

Saying exactly who *Earth, Animal, and Disability Liberation*'s audience is can be a rather confusing endeavor. While there are many activist-academics contributing to the volume, and whilst eco-ability is also an intersectional concept, the volume cannot escape the fact that the majority of chapters are written by academics. The oversaturation of academics in this volume undermines the book's emphasis on eco-ability as an intersectional, liberating concept, as academia is hardly liberating. It seems as though some intent was present in the compiling of this book to make an intersectional, non-exclusive text, however, I can easily imagine someone outside of academia feeling reluctant to read this text. Ultimately, I believe this book can be used at nearly any level of higher education, however, that may not have been the editors and authors' intent.

One of my favorite elements of the book is something that I have noticed being present in many of the volumes Nocella has edited, and that is the use of narrative structure and the integration of personal experience into the chapters. This does much in the way of dispelling the strictly academic tone that many other similar volumes succumb to.

Another element of *Earth, Animal, and Dis-Ability Liberation* that I loved was that many of the authors are not simply academics, but also activists. This, for lack of better terminology, shows that they can "walk the talk". In a volume such as this in which advocacy is being championed, the presence of academic-activists is almost a prerequisite to be considered an important text, and this volume has more than enough scholar-activists to fill this requirement.

Earth, Animal, and Disability Liberation: The Rise of the Eco-Ability Movement is a phenomenal start to a new concept and line of advocacy, however, it should be understood as such. This volume will not exist as the definitive text on eco-ability, rather, the pioneering one. I feel it begets the fields of critical animal studies, environmentalism, and critical dis-ability studies to champion this new concept and this volume as a means to advance all three causes. I enjoyed this volume as an exploration of different fields and problems through an eco-ability lens, yet, my main feeling upon finishing this volume is that *Earth, Animal, and Dis-Ability Liberation* has laid the groundwork for an innovative new concept that cannot be ignored.

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Book Review. Adventures With a Texas Naturalist. 1947. Roy Bedichek. Austin, TX: University of Texas Press edition 1994. (330 pages).

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ADVENTURES WITH A TEXAS NATURALIST. 1947. ROY BEDICHEK. (Book Review)

The connection between peace education and environmental issues is central to attempts at transformational practices in a consumer society. When human beings come to realize they're part of a web of relationships that exist in nature, they tend to become more respectful of life in all of its forms. The relative balance evident in subsistence cultures may center on a world view where they see themselves as a part of nature, thereby being much more respectful of the delicate balances shared among all life, from plants to animals, to humans. Wise scholars in consumer societies do not fit into the dominating role of "man versus nature" and show a deeper appreciation for the big picture. The defenders of nature and the environment bemoan the outright pillage of the planet's resources born out of ignorance and arrogance. When greedy capitalists value pieces of paper over the wealth of knowledge and diversity nature offers, it is no surprise that damage to delicate balances in the environment are inconsequential to their purpose to maximize profits. Unfortunately, the consequences for sustainable life have become more apparent with each new decade of globalization of consumer culture around the planet. Prolonged draughts, the expansion of tornado belts, crop failures, record-breaking temperature extremes, floods beyond the worst in recent memory, all indicate signs from nature that consumerism is an unsustainable way of being.

Many scholars have invested their lives in exploring and contemplating the relationships among animals in the wild and human disruptions of the balances that have come to threaten all life as we have known it. The wealth of knowledge and understanding these scholars have generated

over the course of their lives should not be squandered as we may find insights to help us to find our way back to a saner way of being human. Unfortunately, with the victory of screen culture over book culture we are seeing fewer and fewer people engaging in literacy for life. While screen resources are not all useless in raising consciousness, the vast majority of what is being promoted and consumed is vacuous and serves as a distraction from the pressing issues of our age.

To turn back to literature we will find wisdom among the many scholars who lived peaceful lives even as they wrote to warn us about the errors of our ways. Loren Eiseley, Rachel Carson, Paul Shepard, David Abram, Lewis Hyde, Maggie Jackson, Bill McKibbin, represent a host of people concerned more about humanity and life on the planet, than profits. Among these, Roy Bedichek is one we would do well to read and to introduce to our students. In his classic book, *Adventures with a Texas Naturalist*, he describes the intimate relationships between animals living in ecological niches seldom understood by most. He asserts that the worst invention introduced by European colonialists to the “new world” is the fence. The last wild grasslands he claims are found along railroad tracks and highways. Eiseley made similar observations about these abandoned parcels of land. In Korea, it has been observed that the wildest land is the demilitarized strip between north and south that has been taken back by nature. It is a biological game reserve where many species that have disappeared elsewhere on the peninsula still thrive.

Bedichek’s old-fashioned, patient science had him walking a mile on one side of fences next to highways, counting species of prairie grasses. He would then jump the fence into a cow, goat, or sheep pasture and walk a mile back counting species again. He clearly documented the depletion of biological diversity in fields of grazing animals, the cows being the least destructive, the goats a bit more, and the sheep almost completely devastating a field. Here is a STEM project for children to engage in that might contribute to deeper understandings of our place in nature, rather than just promoting math skills that distract as they disfigure our relationships to the natural world. Children can be transported out of stagnant classrooms into the real world of science as it has been practiced by concerned citizens such as Bedichek, who had to wait for death to be elevated to a stature of folkloric proportions in Texas.

Bedichek shows us the power of naming. Where some might call a place a swamp and frame it as an obstacle to their aims to farm or ranch, he sees it as a wetland sanctuary for myriad species living in harmony for millennia. Through his writing he captures and focuses the attention of the reader on the importance of preserving ecological niches vital for the survival of the species inhabiting such areas, but he also expands his observations into philosophical treatises pleading for humanity to rise to our potential beyond the mundane material world. Bedichek is driven by a young boy’s passion and curiosity that never outgrow his aging body. He identifies with the eighty-six-year-old cedar cutter described in the last chapter, who tells him, he has been cutting cedar for seventy-six years. “I later learned that this man is wealthy. It is not economic necessity that forced him to this dismal labor, but a grim, determined fight against the helplessness which he feared old age would force upon him.” Bedichek tells us, “This is the pioneer philosophy of being up and doing, of marching on to the end of a row, of never quitting. It is the gospel of salvation by work” (p. 286).

He observes how we have been led astray from our place in nature. “Slipping into a featureless routine, clock and calendar governed, is slipping into something really worse than death, because you still remain conscious.

“Routine machines our lives to conform to industrialization. Life is its opposite: dawn, stars, storms, calm, the witchery of twilight, the whimsicality of the seasons, and the vast ample variety of the natural day – all proclaim an antagonism to routine” (p. 287).

Throughout his book, Bedichek reveals a well-read, literate mind, steeped in the wisdom of the ages now collecting dust on library shelves as people take on a whole new meaninglessness to “dancing with the stars.” He tells us, “The so-called literature of escape with its growing popularity is in part a revolt against the tyranny of clocks. It is not labor that kills, but the small attritions of the daily routine that wear us down. A month of days, a year of months, twenty years of months in the treadmill is the life that slays everything worthy the name of life” (p. 288).

The lessons for us all, Bedichek gleaned from natural metaphors. He keenly observes the plight of the commercialized food chain now poisoning humans:

“A sharp, unsentimental surgery obtains throughout the animate world. Mother nature wants to see her creatures healthy and happy or not see them at all. It is only in domestication that man’s physical ailments are conferred upon lower animals” (p. 292).

I would not characterize Bedichek’s masterpiece as dismal or hopeless. Time and again he provides examples of the resilience of the animals despite the onslaught of careless, corporate profit mongering. Swallows build nests on the undersides of bridges; a path is cut between cedar forests for powerlines, highways, or trains, and the birds find new places to inhabit with the greater edge provided by the swath. In a day and age when we cannot even protect the children of our own species, the violence we visit upon nature leaves us with a total lack of respect for all life. We would do well to return to our roots to find the path to humanity once more. It is the power of literacy, and it is the least we can do for the children who will be responsible for the care of the planet.