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What if Habermas Went Native?
Mechthild Nagel¹

In an interview, recorded in 1985, Perry Anderson and Peter Dews asked sociologist and philosopher, Jürgen Habermas, the following question:

The Frankfurt School tradition as a whole has concentrated its analyses upon the most advanced capitalist societies, at the comparative expense of any consideration of capitalism as a global system. In your view, do conceptions of socialism developed in the course of anti-imperialist and anti-capitalist struggles in the Third World have any bearing on the tasks of a democratic socialism in the advanced capitalist world? Conversely, does your own analysis of advanced capitalism have any lesson for socialist forces in the Third World?

Habermas’s response? “I am tempted to say ‘no’ in both cases. I am aware of the fact that this is a eurocentrically limited view. I would rather pass the question” (Habermas, 1986, 183).¹ This paper explores the question, what if Habermas had dared to say yes or dared to develop his anthropological leanings, which lurk through his discourse theory, rather than take the quasi-mystic path with Ludwig Wittgenstein (2001): what one cannot talk about, one should pass over in silence. To that end, I will sketch a schematic approach using Habermas’s latest major work Between Facts and Norms (1996), contrasting his explicit views on jurisprudence in the Occident with implied statements about the native Other. I wish to show that there’s an embedded agonistic (combative)—if not imperial—theme, not only in his theory of communicative competence, but also in his larger project of critical theory.

Habermas’ project as he explains in The Philosophical Discourse of Modernity (1987) is to lead us out of the morass of a philosophy of the subject which started with the later Hegel and culminated in Nietzsche, Heidegger and Derrida. Instead Habermas wishes to go back to the

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ideas of Kant and the young Hegel. Such a corrective move would assist in restoring the ‘right’
roots of the self-grounding project of modernity and found an intersubjective, socially relevant
discourse theory, which also leaves behind the trappings of conventional social contract theory.
Following the logic of Charles Mills’ *The Racial Contract* (1997), I argue that it might be too
convenient to leave behind the unfortunate, anthropocentric, Eurocentric ideals of yesterday’s
Enlightenment thinkers; in fact, I am going to look for the vestiges of such ideals in Habermas’
refined post-Enlightenment, post-metaphysical thinking. While many feminist critiques have
investigated Habermas’ gendered discourse and, to use Carole Pateman’s concept (1988), a
hidden “Sexual Contract” (e.g. Young, 1990; Meehan, 1995; and Love, 2002), critics, with the
notable exception of Cynthia Willett (2001), have generally been silent on the cross-cultural
implications of his theory.

**Clashes of Cultures**

What if the Eurocentric heritage of the Enlightenment has become an exotic cultural
expression, globally speaking? Habermas now ponders as much, at least since his dialogue with
a Teheranian colleague woke him up from “dogmatic slumber.” Habermas was asked if it isn’t
the case that the European secularization is the true exceptional discourse from a comparative
sociology of religion perspective. At first, Habermas was scandalized and retorted that that such
sentiment reminds him of the mood of the Weimar Republic, and of Nazi ideologues, e.g., Carl
Schmitt, Heidegger or Leo Strauss (Habermas, 2005, p. 113). Yet, Habermas concedes that there
may be a kernel of truth in that provocative question. After the second US led war against Iraq,
Europe seems to have gone on a path of isolation (*Sonderweg*) with its pursuit of secular liberties
(abolition of the death penalty; rejection of torture; liberalization of sexual and gender politics).
Habermas laments: “A prototypical model for the future of all cultures turns into an aberration
(*Sonderfall*)” (p. 121). Secular civilization is doomed by the rise of religious and political
fundamentalisms the world over in particular in the United States post 9/11. However,
Habermas may sometimes want to look to the global South for spearheading surprising secular
and progressive social policy. After all, Habermas ignores the path breaking gay rights agenda
taking hold in the post-racial constitution of the New South Africa (1996), where women’s and
gay rights activists fought hard to see human rights language embedded which guarantees non-
discrimination on the account of gay and lesbian identities. Thereafter, global North—a few
European countries and Canada—followed suit by liberalizing their constitutions, e.g. the right to civil unions and marriages for gay and lesbian couples. Thus, the rule of law of an African state provided the necessary impetus for some civil rights victories in Max Weber’s “rational” occident.

I in turn worry about Habermas’ jubilation of the European solution, over his clamoring on to constitutional patriotism, to his support of NATO’s war against Serbia (breaking ranks with the German left), where I see his support of “old Europe” in a way that we now look back on Hegel’s uncritical support of the Prussian state. Habermas’ open-minded, rational, secular Europe is a “fortress Europe” for many others due to the draconian Schengen Solution of 1992 which practically closed Europe’s border to the subaltern Other. A secular Europe has difficulty embracing a multiculturalism that endorses post-secular fundamentalist (i.e. “Muslim and post-rational”) values. Nevertheless, Habermas writes critically about the changes in German asylum law as they dismantle principles of constitutional democracy by absolving Germany from granting political asylum to refugees (Pensky, 1999, p. 227). Yet, Habermas speaks about tolerance for other values, minority opinions, etc., he means exactly that: mere tolerance—not an active, positive acceptance of the Other (bypassing contemporary debates in critical, multicultural theory).

Let’s look at a schematic table of values that articulate the “clash of ideas” between Habermas and the subaltern subjects the world over. Obviously, some of the comparisons are overdrawn and satirical, but it is a playful attempt not to pass over in silence, but instead to engage Habermas and other critical theorists in issues that should have been their own all along:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>African Worldview</th>
<th>Habermas/European worldview</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ubuntu</td>
<td>enlightenment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>concrete, embodied</td>
<td>abstract, disembodied</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>care, compassion</td>
<td>justice</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>transcendence - traditional law</td>
<td>immanence - positive law</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>restitution</td>
<td>punishment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>concrete other</td>
<td>generalized other</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>engaged</td>
<td>objective, neutral</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>wisdom</td>
<td>knowledge</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>spirituality</td>
<td>rationality</td>
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Peace Studies Journal Vol. 1 Issue 1. Fall 2008
outcome focused: healing being right/winning the argument
long-term goals short-term gain
holistic retributivist, focus on delinquent (as a species)
sociocentric individualist
‘what is private?’ public vs. private sphere

Table 1

The African worldview of *ubuntu* (roughly translated as humanity) is similar to certain (Western) feminist viewpoints (as articulated in Gilligan’s ethics of care or in Benhabib’s concrete other”), and it raises trouble with the neat public/private distinction which has won currency in the modern western social contract theory and its postmetaphysical adherent in discourse theory. *Ubuntu*, unlike the abstract humanism of the Enlightenment era, expresses a spirit of sociality, famously turning the Cartesian motto in its head in the following formula: “I am because we are, and because we are, I am” (John Mbiti, 1969; cf. Tutu, 1999). It is an engaged, empathic perspective towards the other, who is interconnected with my fate and therefore deserves no retribution but compassionate recognition of her humanity. Moral flaws are recognized and then dialogue about healing may ensue, if only to ensure that our kin, especially the subsequent generations may be allowed to intermarry between each other, and live harmoniously with one another. Hence, the focus is not so much whether “justice was served,” but whether all parties can agree to restitution, to the resolution of conflict, and thus aid in healing the community. Following Love (2002), a further distinction could be made between oral societies and literate/“scholarized” societies, such that “Habermas’s theory of communicative rationality is historically and conceptually linked to the textually based speech of literate societies” (Love, 2002, p. 329). Having clarified the divergent worldviews (African v European) I will make transparent Habermas’s value judgments about the subaltern’s discursive practices (Table 2).

**Subalterns according to Habermas**

**Discourse ethics**

culturally specific values universalizable/ norms & principles
metaphysics postmetaphysics
naïvely habituated lifeworld rationalized lifeworld
interest-bound rights trump in the argumentative game
pre/conventional adjudication  postconventional adjudication

teleology & 'what works'  deontology 'what is right-wins'

fundamentalist/religious  secular

simple (premodern)  complex (high modern)

homogeneous  accommodate heterogeneous values

Table 2

Rational, Kantian paradigms do not hold traction in the subaltern world as seen by Habermas. Their world is a simple, naïve living with traditions that are deeply religious and often backwards (i.e. fundamentalist), untouched by the rationalist, secular endeavors peculiar to the global North. Following Pensky’s (1999) analysis, arguably, Habermas’s perspective on the subalterns may also be a reflection of his anxiety about post-1945 West Germany’s sliding back into totalitarian Weltanschauung or at least into a mandarin, socially conservative, particularist, anti-democratic metaphysics.

According to Habermas, the native, traditional world view is static, whereas high modern Western society is dynamic and ever changing given the flexible portrayal of traditional values, among other things, in the secular, rational Occident. Take for instance, Habermas’ portrayal of the impact of Buddhism in the Orient: In an interview with Eduardo Mendieta, Habermas (2002) concedes that this world religion has achieved a level of abstraction, similar to Judeo-Christianity, which has left a huge ideological mark on the European Enlightenment project (e.g., universalistic egalitarianism, autonomy, individual morality of conscience), but Habermas argues that “cultural and social modernization has not been completed in the regions dominated by Buddhism” (2002, p. 148). He gives no further explanation why and how the East has so miserably failed in providing a coherent modern philosophy of the subject.

Principles of Discourse Ethics

Yet, I also wish to see what can be salvaged of Habermas’ theory of communicative action; where might we find an “overlapping consensus” among discursive practices, say in the occident and among colonized peoples? As Habermas elucidates recently, Discourse Theory—which focuses only on the praxis of argumentation (not metaphysical values, Being, Truth,
Subjectivity)—gives us four pragmatic conditions for successful, rational communication where the better argument wins:

1. Inclusivity: nobody who can contribute in a relevant way should be excluded
   *(who will be included? what counts as ‘relevant’?)*

2. Equal distribution of communicative liberties: all have equal chance to contribute
   *(assumes rational participant; issues of age; different intelligences; rhetorical skills; gender, class, caste, ethnicity, race power differentials are all ignored)*

3. Condition of honesty: all participants have to mean what they say
   *(Habermas ignores power differential between parties; what if issues of infertility or domestic violence are being discussed? would all participants feel safe to discuss their perspectives?)*

4. Absence of contingent external or internal constraints of communicative structure: the yes/no positions of participants regarding contested claims should only be motivated by the persuasive force of convincing reasons (Habermas, 2005, p. 89).
   *(Here, too, the concern about a power differential applies.)*

As critic Stephen Bronner (2002) notes “Neither the legal nor the linguistic theory of Habermas can link the prerequisites for communicative competence or the stages of moral evolution with the reality of compromise, violence, and the structural imbalance of power” (209).

Let’s compare Habermas’ theory with the subaltern discursive practices:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>communicative competency (subaltern)</th>
<th>communicative competency (discourse theory)</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>some constraints necessary to build consensus</td>
<td>unconstrained force of better argument</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>council of elders</td>
<td>community of experts</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>experience builds expertise</td>
<td>intersubjectivity or 'community of scholars' writ large?</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 3.

Habermas posits as oppositional terms strategic interests vs. communicative action and system vs. life-world. Bronner (2002) asks, why is there a need to overcome strategy? After all, it is key to negotiations (collective bargaining), social movement activism, etc.: In fact one needs
both strategic interests and communicative action (p. 208). Given that strategies play a key role in most conflict situations, it is often the case that “‘better’ arguments … emerge victorious for nonrational reasons” (p. 209).

Although Habermas is aware of the danger of identifying Peirce’s community of investigators with simply scholarly experts, nevertheless he inevitably runs into prescribing such investigators as “the scholar” writ large because he has no theory of power relations that accounts for declining literacy levels and the overconcentration of media in the hands of a few moguls (Bronner, 2002, pp. 212-3), who are interested in “manufacturing consent” (Chomsky) rather than providing an unconstraining forum of dialoguing of equal partners.vi Also, as Bronner notes, Habermas overemphasizes the principle of autonomy where accountability would be better placed to postulate a new critical theory that takes into consideration international and regional institutions (p. 210). As Willett (2001) notes Habermas (1994) explicitly dismisses voices of “fundamentalism” right to engage in public debate on the grounds that they would not be “loyal to a common political culture” (p. 8). If one is sympathetic to the subaltern cause and counter-publics, one might want to console those dismissed from Habermasian universal discourse with this gesture: “the definitions belonged to the definers—not to the defined” (Toni Morrison, 1987, p. 190; quoted in Willett, 2001, p. 71).

Discourse theory in the context of criminal justice

In postcolonial states or territories, we may witness a contemporary devolution of criminal justice under liberal proceduralism (abstract, generalized other) and an adoption of discourses of cultural justice, which involve sentencing circles (concrete others). However, due to the colonial legacy a western based human rights discourse has firmly been instituted in the legal instruments of the African countries and clashes with the parameters of cultural rights, i.e. “other languages of resistance” (An-Na'im, 2002). Yet, discourse ethic insists on the primacy of democratic institutions and values and therefore, it is only applicable in communities and states where “pure” western style democracy is enforced (Bronner, 2002, p. 213). Thus, we notice that an overlapping consensus between the two worldviews may be difficult to accomplish:

Habermas—as viewed by the subalterns

| artificial & abstract boundaries |Consensus model in the subaltern world |
| monological                     | strategies, interests merged with norms |
| dialogical                      |
In Table 4, I reverse the ordering of the simple/complex oppositional couple. Habermas often refers to industrialized nations as “complex societies” without spelling out in what ways they might be complex and less industrialized nations might be simple. So, reversing his order, I suggest that subaltern subjects with multiple histories of colonization (e.g., Arab and European in Africa) face at least a three-partite juridical, socio-historical structure of rights and duties of the self in community and civil society. Ali Mazrui (1986; 2002) has famously claimed that the complex histories of African nation-state are indebted to a “triple heritage.” In other words, a far more complex social ordering occurs in the post-colonial world than in the global North. Habermas’s discourse model could be considered monological in so far as the intersubjective equality demand concerns only a community of scholars who share a precise hermeneutic and cultural background.

Now, what of the claim that “non-rational” arguments might win out in subaltern discourses? Criminologist Hal Pepinsky gives an account of “adjudication” in Navajo (Diné) Peacemaking Circles:

Formally, the Navajo Peacemaker Court is a creature of the Navajo Nation's Supreme Court. Formally too, the peacemaker court is a culmination of a peacemaking process conducted by a naat'aanii, someone recognized as a wise and good listener in the local community. The court formally, ultimately, convenes in a circle, where each person takes a turn speaking uninterrupted about his or her feelings and experience of a social disruption, which includes, notably, domestic violence. The naat'aanii convenes and closes the circle with a prayer that social imbalance become more balanced. Each
member of the circle leaves free to do as s/he pleases; personal responsibility requires no less (Pepinsky 2000).

Peacemaking circles have also been called healing circles, because the purpose of the circle is resolve conflict and not mete out punishment or bring about a win-lose judgment. What looks non-rational to a Western observer is deeply imbedded in a cultural-spiritual worldview. If there were a rational ideal, it would be that the disputing parties apologize to each other at the end of the process. All parties enter the circle voluntarily and discuss their respective grievances. These healing circles are guided by the wisdom that everybody’s actions are influenced by what makes sense to the person. What seems at first non-rational, i.e. avoiding punishment, is practical—from a native standpoint: it does not really make sense to punish the offender, especially, considering that we are all connected to each other (as expressed in the principle of ubuntu). This holistic realization leads the elders to point out with compassion to offending parties that their actions have negative consequences on the whole and that their social reintegration is encouraged for a successful community healing. Often it is the offender, rather than the victim, who is moved to tears by the illustration of the particular harms caused by the act. Macroscopically speaking, these peace circles have a great chance to minimize offenses (both violent and non-violent), and importantly, markedly reduce recidivism in a community.

Rather than invoking the specter of Hobbes (being in awe of the Law), subaltern subjects may combine strategic, rational and non-rational arguments that are accepted by all, say, in a sentencing circle. If “judgment” is to be accepted by all interested and involved parties, care is often taken to avoid a win-lose situation, which on the other hand is the agonistic game played out in Habermas’ rational “uncoerced” force of the better argument. Discourse theory presumes the cultural, homogeneous background of social contract theory, the Enlightenment and Western democratic ideals, which in fact are not universalizable. vii It is unfortunate that Habermas seems to forego the opportunity to shed light with the tools of Critical Theory onto subaltern histories of struggle at the same time that he ordains discourse theory to have universalizable import.

Of late, in his engagement with theologians, multiculturalism within Europe and the rise of Islamic movements after 9/11, Habermas does tentatively pronounce judgments on the subaltern condition. In his interview with Eduardo Mendieta, who raises questions regarding globalization and religious conflict, Habermas remarks: “Individual cultures can only make a
positive contribution to the rise of a world culture if they are respected in their own, stubborn individuality” (2002, p. 155). This raises several questions: Respected by whom? Perhaps by cultural experts in the West who can determine what, if anything is positive about that culture? Or is it left up to indigenous practitioners who can plead their case at the level of the United Nations that their human rights project is in order? Clearly, being indebted to Weber’s protestant work ethic, Kantian universalism, and a “legalistic turn” (Love, 2002, p. 322), keeps Habermas locked into a Eurocentric high modernist, masculine discourse which runs up against the multiplicity of postcolonial voices. In the end, perhaps it is better, after all, to remain silent.
References


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i In a recent essay on religion, Habermas acknowledges that silence can be problematic, especially when one doesn’t engage with one’s critics’ concerns: “In this situation, silence would be a false response: the person who is addressed and remains silent, clothes himself or herself in an aura of indeterminate significance and imposes silence. For this Heidegger is one example among many. Because of this authoritarian character, Sartre has rightly called silence ‘reactionary’” (Habermas, 2002, p. 67).

ii Social contract theory emerged in the writings of Hobbes, Locke, and Rousseau and describes the political process of individuals leaving the “state of nature” and joining a polity which would safeguard, to some extent, the subject’s freedom and equality.

iii “Aus dem Normalvorbild für die Zukunft aller übrigen Kulturen wird ein Sonderfall” (p. 121).

iv Cf. G. Spivak’s seminal essay “Can the Subaltern Speak?” (Spivak, 1985). The term subaltern signals a defiant, counterhegemonic move in order to contest the colonial project which despotically ruled over populations who are taxed but not represented, who are subjects but not citizens (cf. Mamdani, 1996).

v Even though I am using Seyla Benhabib’s terms (generalized and concrete other), I do not subscribe to her hierarchical ordering of these concepts (see Willett, 2001, chapter 3, for a cogent critique of Benhabib's rationalist, reconstructed modernism).

vi However, in a talk at the International Communication Association (Dresden, 2006), Habermas addresses the issue of power structures by holding media moguls such as Ted Turner and Berlusconi responsible for the pathologies of political communication. This talk was published shortly thereafter (cf. Habermas, 2006).

vii Denouncing religious fundamentalism, Habermas vehemently argues that “modern conditions are compatible only with a strict, Kantian form of universalism” (2002, p. 151).
Buddhist Ethics and Nonhuman Animals
Lisa Kemmerer

Abstract
The question of our moral responsibility to nature and nonhuman animals is increasingly pressing. This article examines Buddhist philosophy, morality, scripture, myths, and contemporary commentary to reveal an animal and nature-friendly approach to the larger world. This article is not critical in nature, but attempts to provide an alternative vision and practice, one conducive to a more peaceful world.

Buddhist Ethics and Nonhuman Animals
All beings tremble before danger, all fear death. (Dhammapada 54)

Buddhist concepts such as karma and reincarnation, interconnections and oneness, lend Buddhism to comment on the current topic of our rightful relations with nonhuman animals. Buddhist scriptures overwhelmingly support adopting a vegan diet for spiritual reasons, as part of a life of compassion toward other creatures. Core elements of Buddhist philosophy support animal advocacy and call for change in our contemporary treatment of nonhuman animals.

Buddhism does not assume a strict boundary between humans and animals. In fact, Buddhism presents species as a semi-permeable membrane, at least in part due to the philosophy of reincarnation. Eons of transmigration have had a predictable result: today’s duck and dog are yesterdays human sisters and brothers. The Lankavatara Sutra states:

In the long course of samsara [the cyclical process of life, death, and rebirth], there is not one among living beings. . . . who has not been mother, father, brother, sister, son, or daughter, or some other relative. Being connected with the process of taking birth, one is kin to all wild and domestic animals, birds, and beings born from the womb. . . . Repeated birth generates an...

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interconnected web of life which, according to the Buddhist precept of harmlessness, must be respected. (Chapple 143)

Each cow and chicken was at some point one’s parent, and to harm one’s parent is a particularly base act in the Buddhist tradition.

As we are all reborn again and again, so all species are subject to the same karmic process; what each being does in life matters to our personal spiritual journey. *Karma* rules the lives of animals and humans alike (Kraft 277): Lassie and the Prince of Wales are both subject to the same moral laws. *Karma* can no more be avoided by a Persian cat than it can by an avahi (woolly lemur). The *Sutta Pitaka* notes that one’s actions determine one’s future as surely as “the wheel follows the foot of the ox that draws the carriage” (Burtt 52). What is good for the goose is also good for the gal, and the guy. The cosmic process of justice does not stop at human skin.

Buddhism offers a vision of radical inter-identification. A vision where all living beings are identified with all other entities. This vision does not merely teach that we are all in this together, but that we all *are* this, “rising and falling as one living body” (Cook 229). The words of the contemporary Buddhist monk, Thich Nhat Hanh, reflect this view of radical interconnections, rooted in the concept of “oneness”:

I am one with the wonderful pattern of life which radiates out in all directions. . . . I am the frog swimming in the pond and I am also the snake who needs the body of the frog to nourish its own body. . . . I am the forest which is being cut down. I am the rivers and air which are being polluted. (Allendorf 43–44)

No entity is “other”; we are not separate from anyone or anything else. Thich Nhat Hanh writes:

A human being is an animal, a part of nature. But we single ourselves out from the rest of nature. We classify other animals and living beings as nature, as if we ourselves are not part of it. Then we pose the question, “How should I deal with Nature?” We should deal with nature the way we deal with ourselves. . . ! Harming nature is harming ourselves, and vice versa. (Hanh 41)

Reincarnation and oneness led some Buddhist philosophers to conclude that there
is no independent “self.” Many Buddhists view individuals and species as mere name and form—outward vestiges and labels applied to something indistinct yet enduring, something more fundamental that transcends individual bodies and biological categories. In this view, individual human existence is a mirage: we are mere matter in human form, soon to be disbanded and recreated according to what we have earned through our actions in this and past lives.

“Codependent arising” offers a yet more intense vision of radical interdependence. “Codependent arising” holds that no individual or action can be separated from any other individual or action (Robinson 23–29). Radical Buddhist interdependence does not allow for an independent entity, action, word, or thought; all things influence all other things. Each being, each act, is critical to every other being and every other act. The idea of radical interdependence led some Buddhists to conclude that all things are one another in their very essence. In the words of a contemporary Thai Buddhist monk: “The entire cosmos is a cooperative. The sun, the moon and the stars live together as a cooperative. The same is true for humans and animals, trees and the Earth. . . . [T]he world is a mutual, interdependent, cooperative enterprise” (Swearer 5).

When Buddhism traveled to China, it combined with Daoism to form extraordinarily nature-friendly spiritual teachings. One of the most nature-friendly extant religious philosophies, Hua-yen, is a school of Chinese Mahayana Buddhism formed around 600 CE. Hua-yen carried “codependent arising” to its logical extreme. In the Hua-yen worldview all things are reflected in all other things. Codependent arising means that our existence is best understood through the image of an infinitely regressing mirror that encompasses the entire universe in “simultaneous mutual identity and mutual intercausality” (Cook 214). Nothing is independent in this “vast web of interdependencies in which if one strand is disturbed, the whole web is shaken” (Cook 213).

If a roadrunner is squashed under the tires of a truck carrying cow’s milk to Phoenix, Arizona, this event affects all living beings. The roadrunner may have been sitting on eggs which will now spoil and never hatch. Something will consume the abandoned eggs, and will therefore not consume someone or something else. That which
was not consumed will go on to effect other creatures, maybe even one of us. Meanwhile, someone else will feast on the dead roadrunner’s body, but the new generation of roadrunners will never participate in life on planet earth, or join the food chain—eating and being eaten. Some people will be horrified to see the carnage along the road, and their world will be sadder for the sighting.

And what of the truck that ran over the roadrunner? For this nursing milk to travel to Arizona, cows have been perpetually artificially impregnated, given birth, had their calves snatched from their grasp soon after birth, then milked and re-impregnated until they are “spent” and sent to the butcher. Calves not earmarked for the same fate (all males, for instance) generally become veal after six months of deprivation—confined, never knowing their mothers or their mother’s milk, which people have stolen. This milk, made to turn a tiny calf into a huge bovine in roughly a year’s time, will continue traveling to Arizona, where it will clog human arteries and carry bovine growth hormone (BGH) into consumers. This growth hormone is linked to early puberty in little girls, now common in countries that use BGH. And this does not even touch on the environmental effects of the milking industry: the gasoline burned, chemical fertilizers for feed, or water consumption—all environmentally much more harmful than a lunch of vegetable fried rice. Radical Buddhist interdependence requires people to see that cruelty and exploitation are counterproductive. Harming one entity harms all that exists, including oneself.

Also in China, the influential T’ien T’ai Mahayana Buddhist school teaches that all things are contained in one moment and one moment contains all things. This combination of single and universal in one unity culminated in the concept of “Buddha-Nature” (deBary 156–57). “Buddha-Nature” is nirvana in samsara, perfection in the mundane, the Buddha in each of us and in every living thing. “Buddha-Nature” is the inherent perfection of each thing as it naturally is. All things have “Buddha-Nature,” and to acknowledge this quality is to realize that all things are perfect in their essence, just as they are. Everything has inherent value, spiritual value, and one can learn important religious truths from every aspect of the physical world. The mighty Western red cedar and the little winter polypore both have Buddha-Nature, as do the exquisite tamandua, and the now-extinct (but once-exquisite) tarpan (who had the misfortune of requiring land
on which to graze, and was crowded out by the cattle industry).

In Japan, animal and nature-friendly teachings of Mahayana Buddhism were fostered and enhanced. The great Japanese Buddhist philosopher, Dogen (1200–1253), taught that the splendors of nature hold the essence of enlightenment, and that spiritual ideas themselves are “the entire universe, mountains and rivers, and the great wide earth, plants and trees” (Curtin, 198; Swearer 15). The Buddhist tradition, as it traveled across China and into Japan, continued to teach that the physical world has spiritual significance.

Mahayana Buddhist’s further developed the idea of Buddha-Nature and radical interdependence. These combined concepts suggest that nonhuman animals are important in and of themselves, that they are no more or less important than we are, that they are integrally linked with all else, and with the perfection of Buddha Nature. Animals are not lesser or “other,” they also have Buddha Nature.

Buddhist philosophy diminishes human pride with the teaching of anatta, or “no self.” Buddhist philosophy holds that the ever-changing nature of the physical universe, and the interconnections of this fluid universe, disallows the existence of an individual self. We are but name and form, a perceived entity that has come to be what we appear to be over eons, through the workings of the cosmos, and which perpetually changes and ultimately dissolves. Buddhist philosophy, through the teachings of Buddha Nature and anatta tended to elevate the rest of nature while diminishing the worldly importance of human beings. We are part of an ongoing process, just as are the pea pod and cuckoo.

Buddhist moral conduct is “built on the vast conception of universal love and compassion for all living beings” (Rahula 46). Buddhism inherited ahimsa from its land of birth, India, and added some uniquely Buddhist expressions of this universal moral ideal, such as metta (loving-kindness) and karuna (compassion). Teachings of compassion, including compassion toward nonhuman animals, have a high profile in the ancient and foundational Buddhist Pali Canon, as well as in extracanonical writings (Waldau 149). Nonviolence, lovingkindness, and compassion are applied to human beings and animals alike; Buddhist literature features prominent injunctions not to kill any living being (Waldau 136). The Dhammapada, a popular and important text in the Buddhist canon, teaches that those who follow the Buddha will not only avoid causing
harm, but will, “ever by night and day,” “find joy in love for all beings” (78).

This ethic of compassion is consistent with core Buddhist philosophies: karma and oneness. For a Buddhist practitioner, harm done to others is harm done to oneself, for we are all one, and we are bound by karma. The Bodhicharyavatara of Shantideva (circa 600 CE), teaches that fellow-creatures are the same as the practitioner. The Buddhist is to remember that “All have the same sorrows, the same joys as I, and I must guard them like myself” (Burtt 139). We are all equally fellow creatures. “There is never a hint in Buddhist teachings that intellectual ability, a sophisticated sense of self, or any characteristic beyond the ability to suffer is relevant to moral standing” (Phelps 40).

Buddhism teaches followers to exhibit “an unlimited self-giving compassion flowing freely toward all creatures that live” (Burtt 46). “Indeed, Buddhists see this orientation to the suffering of others as a sine qua non of ethical life” (Waldau 138). The virtue of compassion is “one of the indispensable conditions for deliverance” (Kushner 148f); the Dali Lama has often stated that loving-kindness is his religion (Gyatso 8). One who is cruel will not attain to nirvana; only those who “hurt no living being” will reach nirvana (Dhammapada 68). A truly great person is not one who succeeds in worldly matters, but one who “hurts not any living being” (Dhammapada 74). Buddhist are to vow: “With all am I a friend, comrade to all/And to all creatures kind and merciful” (Burtt 79). The Buddhist Sutta-Nipata includes the following beautiful contribution to spiritual literature encouraging compassion in humankind:

may all
be blessed with peace always;
al creatures weak or strong,
al creatures great and small;

creatures unseen or seen
dwelling afar or near,
born or awaiting birth,
—may all be blessed with peace!

. . . as with her own life
a mother shields from hurt her own,
her only, child, —
let all-embracing thoughts
for all that lives be thine,
—an all-embracing love
for all the universe. (Burtt 46–47)

Compassion is expected of monks, saints, and all Buddhists, noninjury, is an ethical goal for every Buddhist (Shinn 219).

Buddhists are encouraged to choose their livelihood so as to avoid harm to living beings. It would be unthinkable for most Buddhists to capitalize on factory farming of any kind, as it would be unthinkable for a Buddhist to run a business exploiting the cheap labor of poor children or to earn their living as a soldier. Even keeping animals in captivity is contrary to teachings of loving-kindness, for the captive elephant “remembers the elephant grove” (Dhammapada 81). Those who successfully travel the Buddhist path will be filled with mercy, living a life that is “compassionate and kind to all creatures” (Burtt 104).

So it is not surprising that Buddhist writings warn that “meat-eating in any form or manner and in any circumstances is prohibited, unconditionally and once and for all” (deBary 91–92). Buddhist teachings state that the moral ideal is to reduce suffering—flesh eating fosters massive amounts of misery among millions of animals. Factory farmed animals—including dairy cows and hens who lay eggs—are brutally exploited. They are deprived of freedom, their young, their nursing milk, their eggs, and ultimately their lives. To support industries that cause such suffering is not compassionate.

For the Buddhist, good conduct requires “putting away the killing of living things” and holding “aloof from the destruction of life,” even at the dinner table (Burtt 104).

All beings tremble before danger, all fear death. When a man considers this, he does not kill or cause to kill.

All beings fear before danger, life is dear to all. When a man considers this, he does not kill or cause to kill.

He who for the sake of happiness hurts others who also want happiness, shall not hereafter find happiness.
He who for the sake of happiness does not hurt others who also want happiness, shall hereafter find happiness. \textit{(Dhammapada 54)}

The Buddha is said to have described a worthy and enlightened human not by caste, but by actions. More specifically, an enlightened human is one who, \textit{“whether feeble or strong, does not kill nor cause slaughter”} (Burtt 71). It matters little who kills the turkey; the one who buys a dead bird \textit{causes} another to be raised and killed, and has thereby \textit{caused} unnecessary suffering. Buddhist philosophy teaches that a flesh-eater can no more avoid negative \textit{karma} from eating flesh, than one can escape the effects of dust thrown into the wind. Those who seek happiness in this life but cause misery to others \textit{“will not find happiness after death”} (Burtt 59).

The first, and most fundamental Buddhist precept requires followers to refrain from killing—not just human beings, but all living beings. This proscription against killing \textit{“is central to the Buddhist tradition}. Indeed, it is in fact one of the few common features across the vast Buddhist tradition and its many sects, strands, and branches” (Waldau 143). To suppose that this injunction absolves those who do not kill directly, is only to suggest that Buddhist ethics are vacuous and meaningless. For to purchase body parts and body fluids is to purchase suffering, misery, and premature death.

The Buddhist moral obligation to show concern for other life-forms is \textit{“a significant, indeed a radical, message,”} particularly given that Buddhist lands included animals who posed a threat to human beings (Waldau 123). In a restaurant in Dharmasala, India, I watched a Tibetan Buddhist restaurant owner carry a live-trapped rat from his restaurant, away to a new life in the thick forests of northern India. The power of one’s commitment to compassion is challenged when the being protected is not a large-eyed fuzzy creature, but a cow or a crocodile. Whether turkey or viper, Buddhist morality teaches practitioners not to kill.

As an expression of this expansive ethic of compassion, in the Mahayana Buddhist tradition spiritual adepts called \textit{“bodhisattvas”} commit themselves to the task of saving \textit{all} creatures from suffering. Bodhisattvas vow to return to the earth again and again through reincarnation, rather than disappear into nirvana. They come back to suffer the trials and tribulations of life in order to help \textit{every individual of every species} to
escape from ongoing suffering and rebirth.

[Compassion is given an especially prominent place in the Mahayana branch of the Buddhist tradition by virtue of its association with the central ideal of the bodhisattva, although concern for living things is conceptually no less central in the Theravadin branch. The bodhisattva is known, and even defined, by his or her commitment to the salvation of other beings. (Waldau 138)

As the sun illuminates the entire earth, while a glowworm offers only a tiny spot of light, so the bodhisattva commits to the task of lighting the way to nirvana for “countless beings” (Burtt 130–31). No creature is excluded. A bodhisattva thinks: “As many beings as there are in the universe of beings,” with or without form, with or without perception, “all these I must lead to Nirvana” (Conze 164). Buddhist sutras explain a bodhisattva’s commitment:

A Bodhisattva resolves: I take upon myself the burden of all suffering, I am resolved to do so, I will endure it. I do not turn or run away, do not tremble, am not terrified, nor afraid, do not turn back or despond. And why? At all costs I must bear the burdens of all beings. In that I do not follow my own inclinations. I have made the vow to save all beings. All beings I must set free. The whole world of living beings I must rescue, from the terrors of birth, of old age, of sickness, of death and rebirth, of all kinds of moral offence, of all states of woe, of the whole cycle of birth-and-death. . . from all these terrors I must rescue all beings. . . . I must rescue all these beings from the stream of Samsara, which is so difficult to cross; I must pull them back from the great precipice, I must free them from all calamities, I must ferry them across the stream of Samsara. I myself must grapple with the whole mass of suffering of all beings. (Burtt 133)

Buddhist animal tales also “illustrate and underscore the position that life from one form to the next is continuous,” through reincarnation, and that compassion for all creatures is foundational in the Buddhist religion (Chapple 143). The Jataka tell of the Buddha’s past incarnations. In the process, these entertaining stories feature animals of every kind (including humans). Animals are not incidental to Jataka stories; they are primary, and are “presented with remarkable detail and accuracy” (Chapple 143). This menagerie of stories includes such diverse creatures as a crow, jackal, snake, swan, quail, horse, goose, tortoise, boar, cuckoo, pigeon, woodpecker, chameleon, chicken, mongoose, mosquito, otter, shrew, beetle, osprey, and many more. Numerically, the most
important animals in these tales are monkeys, who appear in twenty-seven stories, followed by elephants (twenty-four), jackals (twenty), lions (nineteen), and crows (seventeen). In all there are seventy different animals in the *Jataka*, many acting as central characters in the stories in which they appear (Chapple 134, 145–46).

*Jataka* stories focus on animals as individuals, with personality, volition, flaws, and moral excellence. Buddhists are often introduced to *Jataka* tales at a young age, and children begin to learn that a rabbit is not just an alien other, a thing, but an individual, a member of a rabbit community, and also a member of a larger community that includes all life. The *Jataka* help remind Buddhists of the significance of other species.

In *Jataka* tales many humble animals turn out to be the Buddha in previous lives. These animals exemplify the all-important spiritual qualities of the Buddha: self-sacrificing generosity “for the benefit of all living beings” (Martin 98). One tale reveals the Buddha in a former life as Prince Mahasattva, who comes upon a hungry tigress that is too weak to hunt for her offspring. She and her little ones are on the edge of death, and the bodhisattva comments, “Holy men are born of pity and compassion.” Prince Mahasattva then offers his own body that the tigress and her young might live (Conze 24–26). The message is one of radical and generous compassion, and Buddhist readers know that Prince Mahasattva is eventually reincarnated (due to good *karma*) as Siddhartha Gotama—the Buddha. *Jataka* tales instruct Buddhists to live mindfully—with an awareness of the likely effects of each and every action, and the knowledge that human actions toward spiders and piglets matters not only to the spider and the pig, but also in an ultimate sense—to one’s future existences.

In many *Jataka* stories animals “set an example” for humans and also “deepen the threads of human experience” (Chapple 135, 144). *Jataka* animals frequently exhibit “compassionate and often heroic self-giving” (Martin 97). One story tells of a monkey leader who saves his followers and community by using his body as a bridge to form an escape route. The monkey’s back is broken, but his companions are saved through his self-sacrifice. An observer comments to the monkey: “It is not your sword which makes you a king; it is love alone” (Khan 18).

*Jataka* tales highlight the horrors of hunting, and reveal hunting as a base activity. In one *Jataka* tale, deer are perpetually hunted by a king, who chases them through the
woods, wounding many and ultimately killing one. . . if not more than one through mortal wounds and injuries. The deer agree that it would be better to volunteer for death than to be so hunted, and so each day one of the deer must go forward to the king to be killed. But one day a doe draws the short stick, and she is with young. The leader of a group of deer offers his life so that this new mother, tending her young fawn, is able to remain alive. The hunter, who happens to be the king of the realm, is impressed by the magnanimous nature of the stag, and so spares his life. But the stag does not beat it for the hills, counting his blessings. He inquires after the lives of the other deer, will they also be spared, not just today, but tomorrow? The king agrees, seeing the sense of the argument. But the stag is not done. What of the many other creatures of the forest, would they not also wish to live? The king is quite amazed, but grants the truth of the stag’s inquiry, and agrees to cease hunting the creatures of the forests. But even so, the stag is not done. He next asks about the birds of the air, and the king once again must admit that it is better not to shoot down those busy about their lives in the air. When the king believes nothing else can be questioned by this remarkable stag, the deer asks his final question: What of the fish?

The king is much moved by the compassion of the stag, his willingness to die for others, and his ability to speak up on behalf of all the suffering individuals of the forest, air, and waters. The king ultimately agrees to stop killing sentient animals for food; he will hunt and fish no more, neither the four-footed animals, the birds, or the fish will ever again suffer and die at his hand. He will have to kill—but nothing will suffer, as vegetables have no central nervous system. Because of the deer, “Love had entered into the heart of the King,” and he ceased to kill animals so that “all the living creatures in his realm were happy ever after” (Khan 33). The stag is, of course, the Buddha in a future life.

Other Jataka tales reveal a rabbit and elephant offering their bodies so that starving people might eat. The rabbit flings himself into a fire to be cooked while the elephant runs off a cliff to land at the feet of those who needed food. Eating flesh is acceptable when an animal offers his or her life, and the flesh is already absent of life. In each instance the Buddha is revealed to be the brave and generous rabbit and the self-sacrificing elephant. All living beings are infused with spiritual possibilities.
Jataka stories remind readers that there is a difference between those who have nothing to eat except dead animals, and those who choose to kill for food by purchasing body parts or by hunting. Stories of self-sacrificing compassion, stories of the Buddha in earlier lives, remind readers and listeners that the Buddha has been in many forms, as have all living beings, and that each living entity is capable of respectful and compassionate actions. No animal is so very insignificant or “undesirable” that he or she is unable to house the karmic presence of the future Buddha; no animal is morally irrelevant.

Jataka tales remind readers and listeners that animals are an integral part of our spiritual world, and are subject to the same moral laws (Waldau 150). Jataka stories reveal “the essence of the Buddhist attitude, . . . the attitude of universal compassion. . . flowing from the knowledge of inner oneness” (Martin 98). In the Jataka, “animals have their own lives, their own karma, tests, purposes, and aspirations. And, as often brief and painful as their lives may be, they are also graced with a purity and a clarity which we can only humbly respect, and perhaps even occasionally envy” (Martin 100).

Animals in the Jataka speak out against harming other species, against animal sacrifice, and against hunting and eating animals (Chapple 135–38). We are born, we die, we are born again. Those who ate the rabbit who had cooked himself in their fire did not know that they consumed a future Buddha, so we cannot know today who we are eating in our hamburger. No Buddhist would take lightly the possibility of dining on a future Buddha. And how many future Buddhas and Bodhisattvas—future enlightened souls—are now among us in animal form? How is our spiritual journey affected if we consume these spiritually enlightened beings? A contemporary Buddhist, reflecting on the Jataka, noted:

Was not the Buddha a hare? a quail? a monkey, a lion, a deer or ox? Who is to say that the dog guarding our porch or the cat twining around our legs is not a Bodhisattva. . . ? Entering the market one sees live rabbits and chickens and turkeys for sale. And one wonders, “Why are they here?” and is torn. “Should I buy them all? How can I save them?” For in the Jatakas one has seen that their inner life is the same as our own. One seeks to save them all, and they too, looking out at us with black or with golden shining eyes, yearn only to liberate us. (Martin 100)
Through the lives of animals, *Jataka* tales encourage aspirants to follow the compassionate path of the Buddha, to see animals as individuals worthy of compassion, as bodhisattvas and future Buddhas, as spiritually important.

One of the most famous Chinese Buddhist stories is the novel, *Monkey (Journey to the West)*. The main characters in *Monkey* are the monk himself (a human), a monkey, a pig, and a horse. The virtue of compassion is featured prominently in *Monkey*. In one sense it is a true story about a monk in the early seventh century who traveled across China in order to transport Buddhist scriptures from India, a journey that took seventeen years (Mair, *Columbia* 966). His travels became a folk legend sprinkled with religious satire and spiritual insights (Sommer 239). At one point in this tale of adventure, a man releases a fish back into the river, and his aging mother comments, “To release living things... is an act of piety. I am very glad you did it” (*Monkey* 87).

Chapters that focus on Monkey, an out-of-control primate, captivate almost any reader. Monkey is a powerful and likeable, though of a somewhat questionable character. He “represents the human mind and, as such, is resourceful and intelligent, but at the same time is unbridled and wild unless controlled” (Mair, *Columbia* 967). He combines “beauty with absurdity” and “profundity with nonsense”; Monkey exemplifies “the restless instability of genius” (*Monkey* 7–8). He causes so much trouble in the Halls of Heaven that, as punishment, he is trapped in a stone for five hundred years in the side of a mountain. He is only released by the bodhisattva Kuan-yin in order that he might help the monk on his journey to India. He promises to do so faithfully. But soon kills a handful of thieves, for which he is scolded by the monk. The undisciplined primate readily abandons his promise, and his responsibilities, in the face of such blunt criticism.

Kuan-yin gathers the various animals for the journey, which is at the core of the novel, *Monkey*. She makes them each ready, and watches over them on their way; she is their “guardian and protector” (Kinsley, *Goddesses’* 37). She gives to each what they need along their spiritual journey.

With help from the bodhisattva Kuan-yin, the monk secures a cap and jacket to keep Monkey under control. Monkey quickly dons the cap, not knowing of its powers (always ready to act without thinking), and is vexed when he finds the cap impossible to remove. Thereafter, whenever the monk recites a certain spell, the cap gives Monkey a...
terrible headache (*Monkey* 133–37). Monkey is forced to focus on accomplishing the spiritual task at hand, which he has promised to fulfill.

The bodhisattva Kuan-yin, who releases Monkey from the stone in which he is trapped, and brings him into submission with a headache skullcap, is also a prominent character in *Monkey*. Kuan Yin, the bodhisattva of compassion, remains the most worshipped and popular of all Chinese spiritual beings (Kinsley, *Goddesses*’ 26).

“Kuan-yin” means “She Who Listens to the World’s Sounds,” revealing her role as the compassionate assistant to all who find themselves in distress (Kinsley, *Goddesses*’ 35). Kuan-yin listens and responds to those who cry for help. Like all bodhisattvas, her goal is to free all sentient beings from suffering, to help “all beings on earth to attain enlightenment” (Sommer 127; Storm 194).

Kuan-yin “is a state of perfection” (Kinsley, *Goddesses*’ 51); she embodies spiritual perfection because she hears all of the agonizing cries of those in need, and assists any living being who cries out. Kuan-yin embodies both wisdom and love; she is the “essence of mercy and compassion” (Kinsley, *Goddesses*’ 26). In the Buddhist worldview, those who are knowledgeable, those who are spiritually enlightened, are also compassionate. To be cruel is to be spiritually ignorant. To be perfectly compassionate is to be perfect.

The Bodhisattva of Compassion is surrounded by an array of animals. In one story she is aided by a gigantic tiger; in another she relates that she has more than once been a “noble horse” (Blofeld 69, 75). In a third, tigers bring her firewood and birds collect vegetables, at the behest of the gods (Palmer 70). In a legend of Kuan-yin’s youth, the bodhisattva saves a cicada, falling from a wall in the process. When she alights, she has a bleeding wound, but remarks that a scar is “a small price to pay for the life of a cicada” (Palmer 67). Kuan-yin also releases a carp caught by fishers. (The carp happens to be the son of a dragon king dwelling deep in the waters (Kinsley, *Goddesses*’ 48).) Through Kuan Yin readers discover a special spiritual importance in every living creature. A small fish might be the offspring of a great and powerful ruler, or a tiger might be working for ones no less than the gods, on behalf of Kuan Yin, and how we treat these other beings is a matter of great spiritual importance.

Always, in all forms, Kuan-yin shows mercy and compassion, but she is not
merely an abstract concept of love, a helpful bodhisattva, nor merely a popular and beneficial goddess. *She is what each of us is meant to be*—what we are to strive for. Practitioners are not just to cry out for Kuan-yin’s assistance, but to cultivate the spiritual virtues of this great bodhisattva: compassion, mercy, and selflessness toward all (Kinsley, *Goddesses*’ 51). Buddhists devoted to Kuan-yin are expected to do their share of listening, to do their part in healing the wounds of the world, and to aid those who cry out in agony, whether cat or kinkajou.

A Tibetan folktale about a frog highlights the lack of a clear species division in Buddhist cosmology, and the morality that goes with this philosophical understanding. In this tale a frog begs an old widow to adopt him as her son. After several days, she finally agrees and quickly comes to love the frog. The frog soon proceeds to hop off to secure for himself the most beautiful young woman in the area. The young woman’s family is mortified at the thought of their only child, their beloved daughter, marrying a frog. The frog reminds the reticent people that “[h]uman beings, animals, birds, even frogs” are all “of the same spiritual force” (Hyde-Chambers 177). Nonetheless, a frog son-in-law is a hard sell to a human family, and they offer the frog *anything* else he might want. He again offers a Buddhist rationale: “Can you not see that all beings, human or animal, are the same?” (Hyde-Chambers 180). Apparently they cannot, and the frog resorts to a series of disruptive events, revealing his powers, to convince the parents to let him marry their daughter.

Once he forces the parents to acquiesce, he must still gain the young woman’s heart. She is no less disappointed in her webbed-toed marital match than her parents, and at her father’s instruction, makes three attempts on the frog’s life, and each time the frog patiently returns her weapons, saying, “Remember that we are all one” (Hyde-Chambers 180). Eventually the frog does win her heart, and consistent with Western folklore, she discovers him to be a handsome young man wearing a magic frog-skin. But the moral of the story bears no resemblance to that of Western lore, which focuses on the inner qualities of human beings. Instead, this Buddhist tale concludes: “[A]ll things differ only in their ‘skin’. . . . [A]ll are really one nature” (Hyde-Chambers 186). This charming children’s story teaches oneness, *anatta*, reincarnation, inter-being, *metta*, *karuna*, and Buddha-Nature.
As in the *Jataka*, Tibetan Buddhism has carried on the tradition of shunning the hunt. One of the most famous Tibetan Buddhist saints, Milarepa, is often depicted as an ascetic harboring a deer in the presence of a passing hunter. In this artistic rendering, the hunter usually pauses to show his respects to the great ascetic, honoring and respecting this protector of animals. The Buddhist tradition views hunting as a cruel pastime, a way of life inimical to Buddhist spirituality. In the story of Milarepa, the hunter acknowledges the spiritual superiority of one who does not kill. Buddhist stories honor those who would rather starve than kill for sustenance.

Buddhism is a practical religion aimed at salvation; acts of kindness and generosity are critical to Buddhist salvation. Buddhist teachings must be enacted in *daily life* if devotees are to avoid ill affects in future lives. Thus, King Ashoka (India 250 BCE), a Buddhist of great power who ruled northern India, was not only concerned with his human subjects, but also with the welfare of animals (Harris 386). He “famously attempted to integrate the First Precept [not to kill (or harm)] into his rule”; engraved writings “posted around his large realm testify again and again to a respect for the lives of other animals” (Waldau 143). His Buddhist compassion was not an isolated incident, but part of a lived Buddhism that required him to protect and nurture all beings.

Buddhist philosophy teaches that people are merely one small ephemeral part of an interconnected and interdependent universe. The core of Buddhist spiritual practice is loving-kindness and compassion; the first precept condemns killing. Teachings of karma and reincarnation reinforce this spiritual imperative: the chicken on our plate was once our best friend; our teacher, our beloved, may have been a future Buddha, and we will suffer in the future for any suffering we cause. Buddhism entails a philosophy that is sensitive to the pains and needs of animals, and this philosophy is not merely peripheral, but belongs “to the core of the tradition” forming “the foundation of Buddhist morality” (Waldau 138). Buddhist philosophy indicates that Buddhists will adopt a vegan diet and stand with on the side of animal liberation.
References


Harris, Ian. “Buddhism and the Discourse of Environmental Concern: Some


Arendt on Language and Lying in Politics: Her Insights Applied to the ‘War on Terror’ and the U.S. Occupation of Iraq
Gail M. Presbey1

The recent U.S.-led military incursion in Iraq and the subsequent occupation has been filled with myriad examples of the Bush Administration using misleading statements in an effort to win the support of American citizens, and in a secondary sense, the international community and the Iraqis. This situation provides many opportunities to analyze the use of sophistry and linguistic sleight of hand. Over the years, philosophers, journalists, political theorists, and military analysts have noticed the same problems with Bush Administration arguments, and have been vocal in their criticisms. But this has not resulted to the Bush Administration abandoning its methods of deceitful propaganda; a sizeable part of the population appears to be convinced by it—‘everybody does it’ to some extent.

In this paper, I will draw upon the insights offered by Hannah Arendt in the earlier context of her critiques of totalitarianism during the 1930s and 1940s, and her later critique of the United States upon the publication of the Pentagon Papers in the midst of the U.S. war in Vietnam. Her insights regarding truth and lying in politics shed light on what is wrong with U.S. approaches today. I do not intend to argue that propaganda under the Bush Administration is the same as, or as bad as that practiced by Nazi Germany. I hold the more humble view that similar (but not identical) methods have been used by governments on both sides of the World Wars and continue to be used today since people have continued to be gullible to these methods.

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Arendt, as a kind of prophet, admonishes that the methods are dangerous because they distort politics badly: we must learn to inoculate ourselves against these methods.

As a preamble to my analysis, let me begin by briefly surveying the history of the term ‘propaganda.’ The earliest use of the term dates to 1622 when Pope Gregory XV founded the Sacred Congregation for the Propagation of the Faith, or *Propaganda Fide*. Its goal was the dissemination of ideas as related to the Roman Catholic Church’s overseas missions. Here, the word propaganda involves convincing people of the veracity of ideas articles of faith. During the late nineteenth century, two books appeared that analyzed how propaganda could be used for political goals: Gabriel Tarde’s *Laws of Imitation* (1890) and Gustave Le Bon’s *The Crowd: A Study of the Popular Mind* (1897). Adolf Hitler acknowledged that *The Crowd* was one of his references.

Newspaperman William Randolf Hearst was involved in encouraging war between the United States and Spain. He had sent his reporter, Frederick Remington, to Cuba, asking him to find a rationale for a U.S. war there. Remington said he saw no reason for the war. When the U.S.S. Maine exploded and sank in Havana harbor in February 1898, probably due to an accident, Hearst popularized the idea that Spain was at fault. Edison Company created movies with simulations of the Maine sinking (Sharratt, pp. 126–127).

Former U.S. President Woodrow Wilson hired propagandists Walter Lippman and Edward Bernays to bolster citizen support for entering World War I. Lippman considered the American public to be bewildered, prejudiced, and unable to see its best own interests. When the *Lusitania* sank on May 7, 1915, Lippman saw his opportunity to galvanize the American public to support the war. He conveniently neglected to mention
that the ship was indeed loaded with weapons for the war. (Silverstein, 1987; Sharrett, 2004, pp. 127–128). Bernays (1947) described his efforts as engineering consent in a democratic society. He explained that not all people can understand the facts, since the average American adult, at the time, had an average of six years of schooling. A leader facing a crisis of national security cannot wait for people to gain understanding. Through the Creel Committee (the popular name for the Committee of Public Information), they created four-minute speeches to stir up fervor. The British supplied the Americans with a list of 1200 atrocities committed by the Germans during the war. These atrocities were never referenced, but they were repeated by American news media without questions. The Creel Committee censored the press and created fabrications such as films of Germans hoisting babies on their bayonets. They told people to look out for internal enemies also. They read mail, tapped phones, and spied on anyone who called for peace, criticized the government, or suggested that the Allies were not doing well in the war. Victories were magnified and losses under-reported, to keep the American people cheerful and confident.

Hitler said that he learned the lessons of propaganda’s effectiveness during World War I. In Mein Kampf, he outlined simple rules for success: (1) endless repetition of a few simple points in slogan form; (2) appealing to groups; and (3) avoiding rational argument, instead manipulating instinctive reactions such as fear. He boasted that through propaganda, he could make people think heaven is hell, and vice versa. R.W. Jepson (1948) noted that propaganda did not end with the end of the World War II, but became a way of life, even in Britain, since nations realized that is was more efficient than compulsion and repression.
While the Nazis engaged in their World War II propaganda, so did the Americans. Authors like Robert B. Stinnett, who served with distinction in the U.S. Navy during World War II, has used recently declassified U.S. government documents to demonstrate that U.S. President Franklin Delano Roosevelt had been warned of the attack on Pearl Harbor, but thought that allowing the attack would help him to gain support for entering the war (Stinnett, 2001; Sharratt, 2004, p. 15, note). After the war, the Cold War was promoted with articles like the one in *Look* Magazine in 1948, which asked, “Could the Reds Seize Detroit?” The article includes statements like: “Detroit . . . is the industrial heart of America. Today, a sickle is being sharpened to plunge into that heart” (Silverstein, 1987, p. 56). Schlesinger and Kinzer, in their book *Bitter Fruit*, used archives to prove that the CIA and United Fruit had a deliberate campaign to mislead the U.S. public about the U.S. role in a coup to overthrow Jacobo Arbenz in Guatemala in 1954 (ibid.).

Arendt’s Analysis

Arendt’s experiences with propaganda came as she, a German Jew, became involved in exposing her own country’s anti-Semitism. Early in 1933, Hannah Arendt took on a dangerous task of collecting examples of what her Zionist friends called ‘horror propaganda’—anti-Semitic remarks and actions of the Nazis in the early 1930s. They wanted to expose the extent of German anti-Semitism at the Zionist Congress in Prague that summer. She did her work in the Prussian State Library where she had access to materials of the nongovernmental organizations, business associations, and professional societies. But in the midst of her assembling a ‘beautiful collection’ of materials, she was arrested. She was kept in detention and questioned for eight days, during which time she
told lies to protect her organization. As soon as she was released, she left Germany for Prague, never to return until after the war had ended (Young-Breuehl, 1982, pp. 105–106). A few years later, in 1937, living in Paris and working with German refugees there, she noticed the weekly newspapers there were filled with anti-Semitic remarks. Copies of the famous forgery, *Protocols of the Elders of Zion* were sold on street corners. Arendt dedicated much of her energy working with children at the Youth Aliyah training center to “protecting the children from the psychological damage that such an atmosphere inflicts” (ibid., p. 143).

In a book review essay published in *Commentary* in 1946, Arendt commented on how well Hitler had studied propaganda. He knew that he wanted to insist on “scientific” arguments for anti-Semitism. He didn’t want real science, but he wanted to find scholars who could speak seemingly authoritatively – what Arendt calls a destructive power “dressed in the clothes of some superior, super-human sanction (Arendt, 1946, p. 294).” In the review she compared and contrasted two books that chronicled the Nazi crimes of genocide. While insisting that the German slaughter of Jews in the camps was a reality so monstrous that it almost destroys history (that is, greatly challenges our capacity to comprehend an event), she nevertheless approved of Max Weinreich’s book, *Hitler’s Professors*, which she calls an honest presentation of the facts, soberly written.

On the other hand, she thinks that *The Black Book: The Nazi Crime Against The Jewish People*, edited by the World Jewish Congress and other Jewish organizations, presents itself as propaganda and publicity, to the point that even if the facts are true, they don’t sound true because of the way in which they are presented. She also commented on how the Nazis had power to make their phony world of propaganda look real. Germans
had found a way to make Jews look guilty, like criminals, while the Jews don’t have the power to make the Germans look as guilty as they really are. She seems worried that a book, by itself, won’t convince people. The extent of the crimes might breed incredulity. Arendt seems to be concerned that people will be taken in by appearances. Here one can’t help but notice the harsh criticism she dispenses to a book with an agreeable message but a format she finds unsuitable. One might be surprised that a book put together by so many Jewish groups, with Albert Einstein as its honorary Chairman and Sholem Asch as its President, would get such short shrift from Arendt. But as Henry Srebrink explains, the book had been put together during the Cold War by pro-Soviet Jews, who made use of their factual sources about deaths of Eastern European and Soviet Jews for pro-Soviet ends (Srebrink, 2008). Early in her career Arendt was finding propaganda, on whichever side of an issue, an inappropriate medium.

In her academic work, Arendt addressed the issue of propaganda in 1950 in her lecture, entitled Ideology and Propaganda, given at University of Notre Dame. There she argued that the ideological propaganda of totalitarianism creates “covers of seeming normality when it embarks upon its greatest crimes.” By creating a pretense of legality, Nazi rulers meant to dull the consciousness of elite forces so that they would not realize the extent to which the ‘normal’ world would judge their acts as crimes (Arendt, 1950). Arendt learned about the possibilities of systemic lying first from the Nazis. One way of lying is to rename and or use euphemisms. Arendt noticed that the Nazis realized that by changing the words used to signify a certain reality, the truth could be masked or evaded. For example, they referred to gassing as ‘granting a mercy death’; they named the plan for exterminating the Jews, ‘The Final Solution.’ Even the memos crossing the desks of
leaders ordering them to change the words used to refer to a particular act were called ‘language rules’ —which is an example of itself, for Arendt points out that language rule is a euphemism for ‘lie’ (Arendt, 1965/1984, pp. 85–86, 108, 161).

By these subtle controls of language, the reality of what transpiring was kept beyond the reach of consciousness. Arendt cynically notes that lies were so widespread throughout Germany that it became part of the national character. The Nazis were able to keep up the morale of the people and prepare them for war by use of speech. The biggest lie, Arendt claims, was the slogan for the war, “the battle of destiny for the German people.” This slogan made self-deception easier for three reasons. It suggested: (1) that the war was no war; (2) that the war was started by destiny, not Germany; (3) that the war was a matter of life and death for the Germans (ibid. pp. 52, 105–106).

Arendt makes distinctions among different kinds and ‘sizes’ of lies. David Luban holds that Arendt defended the use of manipulation and lies in politics, while Ana Maria Martinez de la Escuelra argues that Arendt asserts that the political realm needs lying (Luban, 1979, pp. 86–87; Martinez de la Escalera, 2005). I think these analyses are faulty. While Arendt admits that lying has often been a part of the political scene, and that the liar is engaged in acting, that is, using freedom to change the world, which does not imply a sanguine acceptance of the role of lying. The only thing Arendt says in favor of lying refers to a limited lie, meant to fool one’s enemy. She states that since this is often done to avoid violence, people usually do not view it as morally reprehensible. On this topic, she engages in a thought experiment—one of those extreme cases, where she asks, if one could save the world from being obliterated by lying, wouldn’t it to justified to lie? Preserving the world’s existence would help the greater cause of establishing truth in the
long run. One should not generalize from such an extreme thought experiment to
conclude that lying, particularly systemic lying, should be accepted as normative. Part of
her acceptance of this limited lie comes from her confidence that all lies of this limited
sort will eventually be found out and truth restored. But as for the widespread lying and
self-deception that goes on in today’s politics, she has harsh words of condemnation.

Limited lies of an earlier time could have mitigating circumstances. But the lies of today
are so big, even those who create the lies get caught up in their own fabrications and

Notably, when Arendt speaks of lies in politics, she contrasts them with factual
truth, making a distinction between factual truth and the ‘absolute’ truth of the
philosophers, made popular by Plato. I am not here referring to the problem of knowing
the absolute truth (Arendt, 1968/1985, p. 229). Arendt argues that the opposite of factual
truth is deliberate lying. But she also contrasts facts, which she says are apolitical
(although they are the ground of pursuit of politics) with opinion, which is in the realm of
politics and is perspectival. John S. Nelson has pointed out that Arendt’s account of
factual truth is overly simplistic, and seems to be influenced by the empiricists and
logical positivists. As such it can fall prey to an oversimplified fact-value dichotomy, as
debunked by W.V.O. Quine and described by Hilary Putnam (Nelson, 1978, pp. 282–
284). According to Putnam, our considering something to be a ‘fact’ relies upon a host of
value judgments such as the epistemic values of coherence, plausibility, reasonableness,
and simplicity. We have no way of telling we have arrived at the truth, Putnam says,
without consulting our epistemic values. Valuation and description are interdependent
any time we say that someone is courageous, foolhardy, or cruel (Putnam, 2002, pp. 30–
Arendt was ready to admit that perspectives and values were introduced when people formed their opinions based on factual truth, but she did not (like many of her contemporaries) take stock of how observation itself involves presuppositions.

Arendt did realize that it is sometimes hard to draw a line between hard fact and hypothesis or opinion. She wanted to simplify her appeal to the importance of facts by giving what she considered unproblematic examples. She stated, for example, that on August 4, 1914, German troops crossed over into Belgium. She cites a story told about Clemenceau, who asserts that no matter what historians say about the war, they will not say that Belgium invaded Germany. Arendt argues that for this fact to be denied, a government would have to have a power monopoly over all the world. While not inconceivable, the dauntingness of this task illustrates the general indestructibility of facts (Arendt, 1968/1985, p. 239).

Arendt decried the “total contempt for reality and factuality” that she saw in totalitarian regimes, where leaders consider veracity no restraint on their pronouncements. Jeffrey Isaac (1992, p. 59) sees a link between Arendt’s insight and the character of the interrogator O’Brien in George Orwell’s 1984, when O’Brien asserts that reality “exists in the mind an nowhere else . . . only in the mind of the Party.” Today’s liars engage in systemic lying. The lies are far-reaching and the government targets not only the ‘enemy’ but also, or especially, its own people with their lies.

Lying is not restricted to totalitarian governments Western European and the United States government also engage in it. Arendt warns that even in ‘the free world,’ where government has not yet monopolized the power to decide what is or is not, gigantic interest organizations take liberties with truth that previously were reserved only for
governments in emergency situations. Most recently, tables have turned; the government follows civil society, learning tricks from Madison Avenue (Arendt, 1968/1985, p. 255; 1976, p. 69). Reflecting on the sweep of Arendt’s critique, Nelson says, “Arendt’s examinations of totalitarianism, the big lie, the displacement of politics by Madison Avenue public relations, and the like reveal that the premier political problem of our day may well be the creation of conditions for truth and the reassertion of its moral and political claims upon us. I think that Arendt would have agreed with Aleksander Zinoviev that ‘the basis for a genuinely human existence is truth’ and that from now on the degree of development of a society will be defined ‘by the degree of truthfulness that society allows’” (Nelson, p. 294).

Arendt thought that from the time of Plato, those uncomfortable with democracy’s need to persuade people (ideally with rational arguments), decided to win people’s consent through myth making, as in Plato’s myth of the metals in The Republic. Since only the few are coerced by reason, one can only reach the many with a myth. But Arendt does not agree with that cynical view of people’s abilities. In contrast to myth-making, Arendt holds up a paradigm of speech as self-revelation, communication, attempt at understanding others, and reaching agreement. Her model of a political community is not one of rulers figuring out ways to rule others, but of a community of equals engaging in self-rule. Arendt insists that truth and politics should never have to clash; truth is a ‘problem’ only for the low level of interest politics, where manipulation of others is the goal. For healthy politics, truth is indispensable (Arendt, 1968/1985, pp. 108, 263–264).

Arendt describes the fragility and the stubbornness of facts. As for the fragility, Arendt says:
The deliberate falsehood deals with contingent facts; that is, with matters that carry no inherent truth within themselves, no necessity to be as they are. Factual truths are never compellingly true. The historian knows how vulnerable is the whole texture of facts in which we spend our daily life; it is always in danger of being perforated by single lies or torn to shreds by the organized lying of groups, nations, or classes, or denied and distorted, often carefully covered up by reams of falsehoods or simply allowed to fall into oblivion. Facts need testimony to be remembered and trustworthy witnesses to be established in order to find a secure dwelling place in the domain of human affairs. (Ibid., p. 6)

Because of the fragility of truth she has harsh words of condemnation for liars. Witnesses are crucial.

As truth has a fragility about it, so also has it a stubbornness. Powerful governments will never be powerful enough to change the facts of history altogether. We can see this point emphasized in literature by Winston Smith, in George Orwell’s 1984, who saved pieces of history from destruction while working at his job to rewrite history at the Ministry of Truth. Arendt explains:

Power, by its very nature, can never produce a substitute for the secure stability of factual reality, which, because it is past, has grown into a dimension beyond our reach. Facts assert themselves by being stubborn, and their fragility is oddly combined with a great resiliency—the same irreversibility that is the hallmark of all human action. In their stubbornness, facts are superior to power. (Arendt, 1968/1985, pp. 258–259)

Facts do not change but lies always need revision. One lie leads to another. A great danger lurks in treating the past as if it were the future with the potential to be anything, which is what the liar does. Arendt notes that if we indulge in such lying, “What then begins is the constant shifting and shuffling in utter sterility” (ibid., p. 258). Many nations
engaging in propaganda, suffer this misfortune. They have no solid starting point in reality from which action can begin.

Although a fabricated story may enjoy an immediate advantage in that it appeals to reason and often appeals to the wishes of the audience and so sounds more probable than the actual case, eventually people discover the discrepancy with reality. Says Arendt, “Under normal circumstances the liar is defeated by reality.” Usually witnesses can attest to the truth. Nazi Germany’s persecution of the Jews is a good example. Although the Nazis went to great lengths to hide the traces of their concentration camps, the story surfaced (Arendt, 1972, pp. 6–7; 1965/1984, pp. 232–233).

When Arendt first arrived in the United States after fleeing the Nazis during World War II, she was enamored of American democracy and wrote with admiration for the American Revolution and founding Fathers such as Thomas Jefferson. But when the Pentagon Papers were published during the Vietnam War, she revisited the theme of lying in politics.

Arendt noted that the United States government officials had a preoccupation with how they American citizens perceived them. In an effort to look as good as possible, the officials used words to create an image of a strong and moral country—image was so critical that lives could be sacrificed to it. The Pentagon Papers revealed a government more concerned with its image than whether it had valid reasons for conducting the war. In the document, John T. McNaughton weighs up the reasons for fighting the war in 1965:

70% - to avoid a humiliating U.S. defeat (to a reputation as a guarantor). 20% - To keep SVN (South Vietnam) (and the adjacent) territory from Chinese hands.
10% - To permit the people of SVN to enjoy a better, freer way of life. (McNaughton, 1971, p. 432, as quoted in Arendt, 1965/1984, pp. 16–17)

Today’s ‘Worship of the Image’ is very dangerous. Propagandists can deny even established facts to preserve an image. Arendt’s example is Charles de Gaulle and Konrad Adenauer’s assertion that France was one of the victors of World War II and is therefore one of the Great Powers (when Arendt considers it a fact that the Nazis had defeated France, and that France was rescued by other Allied nations), and that National Socialism had only affected a small portion of France. Modern political lies, Arendt notes, “deal efficiently with things that are not secrets at all but are known to practically everybody.” She continues:

in image making of all sorts . . . every known and established fact can be denied or neglected if it is likely to hurt the image; for an image, unlike an old-fashioned portrait, is supposed not to flatter reality but to offer a full-fledged substitute for it. And this substitute, because of modern techniques and the mass media, is, of course, much more in the public eye than the original ever was. (Arendt, 1968/1985, p. 252)

Now governments and interest groups engage in the mass manipulation of fact and opinion to an extent unknown in prior history. Arendt quotes a Pentagon Papers analyst who notes that during the Vietnam War, “the goals pursued by the United States Government were almost exclusively psychological.” The purpose of the Pentagon was to win the minds of the American people over to an image of America, and for that reason, the war was fought (ibid.; Barnet, et al., 1971, p. 209, as quoted in Arendt, 1965/1984, p. 37).
In systemic lying, our whole view of reality is colored, so that one lie cannot be distinguished from the background for easy detection. Our sense of reality depends that much on the witness of others. If the lying were limited, say, to only the enemy, one would minimally have a peer group that knew the truth and which could give a person his bearings. But if all of society is deceived, soon one can’t help but believe one’s own lies (Arendt, 1968/1985, p. 253; 1972, p. 34).

Arendt holds that self-deception is the biggest danger for a liar. Yet that is exactly what the Pentagon officials engaged in during the Vietnam era. Because they wanted to believe a Communist takeover had occurred, they fabricated it. Once they fabricated the story, they began to believe in it because believing made their world so simple and straightforward. Arendt points to passages in the Pentagon Papers showing that despite the Pentagon having received evidence from the United States Intelligence community that 80–90 percent of the Viet Cong were local, indigenous people, who had no outside supplies, the Pentagon still insisted on believing in a monolithic Communist conspiracy directed from a nonexistent Sino-Soviet bloc, with its resultant domino theory (Arendt, 1972, pp. 25–26, referring to the Pentagon Papers, pp. 98, 242).

The main problem that the Pentagon faced is that they believed their lies more than the American people did. Arendt:

they were so convinced of overwhelming success, not on the battlefield, but in the public-relations arena, and so certain of the soundness of their psychological promises about the unlimited possibilities in manipulating people, that they anticipated general belief and victory in the battle for people’s minds. (Arendt, 1972, p. 35).
Arendt notes that luckily much of their audience “refused to be convinced” (Arendt, 1972, p. 35). She explains that in most ‘normal’ contexts, the act of telling the truth, stating the facts, is apolitical. It is not persuasion or self-revelation. But in a context of widespread deception and organized lying, stating the truth becomes a political act. The truth-teller becomes a political actor, who begins to change the world and the future of action by stating the truth (Arendt, 1968/1985, p. 251). Arendt explains that a ‘free press,’ which speaks the truth when lies surround it, is a more dangerous enemy to image-makers than are foreign conspiracies. Around the world, people who speak the truth are killed or imprisoned or banished from speaking in public (Arendt, 1975/1976).

Arendt explains further that the truth-teller often joins with an interest group whose interest would be served by the truth. The unfortunate consequence of this alliance is that association with interest groups often invalidates the truth-teller in the eyes of others. They begin to judge the truth-teller as biased; they reduce fact to opinion. This reducing of fact to opinion is often a convenient excuse.

Another complicating factor is that because people are constantly bombarded by lies, they become jaded, unwilling to believe anything. Often if people discover that someone has lied to them, instead of becoming angry, they merely resolve not to believe anything again. This feeling permeated much of United States society in the wake of Watergate. The problem is that after becoming so jaded, people will not take the truth seriously either. People in this situation are incapable of political action because they have no firm sense of reality, an idea of the present world that can serve as a launching point for action in the future (Arendt, 1968/1985, pp. 247–248, 257).
Parallels to the U.S. Occupation of Iraq and the ‘War on terrorism’

People who have been following the news regarding President Bush, Vice President Dick Cheney, and their declared war on terrorism have probably found the above accounts of Hannah Arendt, who died in 1975, all too familiar. The techniques of propaganda, well known and used during the twentieth century, have continued to be used in the twenty-first century.

Before continuing, let us look at a brief history of the use of the phrase war on terrorism (variously called ‘war on terror’ or ‘Global War on Terror’), and then survey the debates about what constitutes ‘terrorism’ or who are terrorists. I will then focus on examples from the post-9/11 presentation of the war on terrorism. Presidents before Bush used the phrasing ‘war on’ coupled with the major problem of the day). In 1965, Lyndon B. Johnson declared a ‘war on poverty.’ In 1971, Richard M. Nixon declared a ‘war on drugs.’ Later, Ronald Reagan revived that war (Kramer, 2008).

Bush’s use of war on terrorism fits into this overall pattern. But he was not the first to use the phrase. A 1977 issue of *Time Magazine* had a cover story entitled, War on Terrorism. The story reported on Germany’s attempts to fight its own homegrown terrorists of the Baader-Meinhof Gang and the Red Army Faction, as well as a group (‘apparently Palestinians,’’ the article says) that hijacked a Lufthansa flight and held 82 passengers hostage. The hijacking was only the most recent in a series that had wanted ransom money and release of prisoners from Japan and Israel. The article surveys the problem of skyjacking, which began as early as 1931. It cites studies that show that most terrorists are from the middle classes, educated, and they take advantage of freedoms
provided in democracies. The article ends with an ominous prediction: “The one certainty is that civilization’s ‘war on terrorism’ will go on” (Time, October 31, 1977, p. 41).

What are the advantages and disadvantages of using the term ‘war’ to describe efforts to stop or ameliorate terrorism? Claudia Card argues that using a phrase like war on terrorism confers a sense of legitimacy to the project, since people are familiar with arguments that decide that war can be a legitimate response to an attack. But how can a country declare a war on terrorism? This is not just a metaphorical use of the term war, because U.S. armed forces have gone into Afghanistan and other places to fight terrorists who are said to have attacked the United States on September 11, 2001 on their own soil. More metaphorical phrases such as war on poverty do not entail the use of armed forces to attack poverty (Card, 2003, pp. 174). Yet, the Bush Administration’s response was not only or wholly military. A White House press release explained, “The President fired the first shot in the war on terrorism with the stroke of his pen to seize terrorist financial assets and disrupt their fundraising pipelines” (Bush, 2001). This is using language metaphorically. Card’s point still holds. While the ‘war on terrorism’ entails a mix of metaphor and actual war, the earlier war on poverty was purely metaphorical. However, the earlier and ongoing war on drugs contained the same mix of metaphorical and actual war tactics, as funds directed to Colombia in the war on drugs has funded military and paramilitary operations.

Card questions the attempt to justify attacking Afghanistan as part of this war. She opines:
global hunts (with international cooperation) for responsible survivors: those complicit in planning and supporting the attacks, including provision of training, financial backing, and safe harbors . . . persons apprehended under suspicion of complicity in the 9/11 attacks should then, if evidence warrants a trial, be duly charged and tried in international tribunals. (p. 175)

Such actions would not constitute a war, but an attempt to bring perpetrators to justice, using a paradigm of international crime rather than war.

Crucial to this discussion is the acknowledgment that real terrorists exist, who set bombs and plan to harm governments and innocent civilians. To say that the war on terrorism is a fabricated idea is not to say no real danger exists. But framing the danger as a war may be counterproductive if inaccurate. Recently Ken McDonald, Senior Criminal Prosecutor in Great Britain, rejected the terminology and metaphors of war on terrorism when describing the London bombings of 2005, saying, “London is not a battlefield. Those innocents who were murdered on July 7th, 2005 were not victims of war” (DPP Rejects ‘War on Terror,’ 2007). He considered the threat real, but held a view similar to Card’s in rejecting the terminology used to describe it. Reporters noted that McDonald’s position was not reiterated by then Prime Minister of Great Britain, Tony Blair.

Card also comments on the use of the term ‘terrorism’ in the phrase war on terrorism. Terrorism is political violence that often has two targets. The direct targets of the harm are often the secondary targets of an action. The purpose of the action goes beyond their harm. The primary targets may be the indirect targets, those who will hopefully by intimidated or changed by the acts aimed directly at others. Terrorism uses people for ulterior motives and does not respect them as humans (Card, 2003, p. 173). Not all people agree on exactly the same definition or description of terrorism. Some apply it only to insurgents; others insist that governments can and do engage in acts of
terror against their own people as well as against their enemies. Some insist that terrorists by definition attack innocent civilians, others would broaden this definition to include attacks on the military. But many commentators notice a widespread double-standard regarding who is called a terrorist. Often, governments call their opponents ‘terrorists’ even if their own governments or its allies engage in the same tactics. But they would not call themselves terrorists. (Kapitan, 2003, pp.47–66; Imamkhodjaeva, 2007, pp. 255–288, Chomsky, 2001; 2003, pp. 69–87). Also, part of the colonial heritage is for colonizers to consider those who attack them terrorists, without admitting that they, the colonizers, hold the land and run the government through illegitimate use of force. (H. Odera Oruka, 1985, pp. 42–47; Elkins, 2005; Johns and Davies, 1991, p. 157).

The above survey of debate surrounding application of the term terrorist shows just how far the government has gone in creating an image of a good America defending the world against terrorists and spreading democracy. This image, in Arendt’s terms, is intended to replace the reality of a superpower, which, according to its perceived self-interest, names its enemies terrorists and fights them, but itself engages in the same kinds of terrorist acts when expedient. Then the superpower deems its actions to be self-defense, spreading freedom and democracy, and the like.

The U.S. government uses ‘propaganda’; its targets are the American people and the Iraqis. Despite espionage, detentions without trial, and reduction of people’s rights under the PATRIOT Act, the Bush administration continues to paint the United States as the bastion of freedom. If only they repeat the mantra often enough, they might succeed in convincing many Americans of its veracity:
The Bush administration’s public relations team had a strategy in spinning the war against Iraq. The first involves repeated use of phrases that reinforce the Bush administration’s point of view. They grappled with the question of how to present an American occupation as ‘liberation.’ The phrase ‘regime change,’ begun during the Clinton administration, was based on the idea that Saddam Hussein’s government should always be called a ‘regime,’ since ‘government’ was too neutral a term (Elisabeth Bumiller, Even Critics of War Say the White House Spun it with Skill, *New York Times*, April 20, 2003).

A key concept in the public relations approach was to associate the United States with freedom. Bush continues to repeat in his speeches that the U.S. occupation is liberation. While asking other European countries to not withdraw their troops as did the new President of Spain, Jose Luis Rodriguez Zapatero, Bush said “think about the Iraqi citizens, who don’t want people to withdraw, because they want to be free.” Bush then explained that Al Qaeda wants to target Iraq because “they fear the spread of freedom and democracy in places like the greater Middle East” (Lizette Alvarez, Spain Grapples with Notion that Terrorism Trumped Democracy, *New York Times*, March 17, 2004).

A media project lacking subtlety was an American government-sponsored satellite television station, which broadcasts in Arabic to the Arabic world. The station is called *Al Hurra*, meaning ‘the free,’ a word whose opposite is *Al Abda*, ‘the slave.’ They have hired ‘modern’ and ‘hip’ looking news anchors and the pace is fast. Shows called *Hot Topics* and *Cool Stuff* are broadcast several times per day. A *New York Times* news article notes:

> Between programs *Al Hurra* presents unsubtle promotional spots. Heavy orchestral music surges behind images of horses running free, or men walking against the crowd, or eye after eye opening wide. “You think, you aspire, you chose, you express, you are free, Al Hurra, just the way you are,” read the text on one. (Neil McFarquhar, Washington’s Arabic TV Effort Gets Mixed Reviews, *New York Times*, February 20, 2004)

Perceptions of the United States have been at an all time low in Arab countries and around the world. Recent polls note that countries like Saudi Arabia, Turkey, and Indonesia have very low ratings for ‘favorable image of America’ among their populations despite official government allegiance with the United States. A recent bipartisan study sponsored by a House Appropriations subcommittee noted, “America’s standing abroad had deteriorated to such an extent that it will take us many years of hard, focused work to restore it” (Christopher Marquis, U.S. Image Abroad Will Take Years to Repair, Official Testifies, *New York Times*, February 5, 2004; see also Brian Knowlton, Anti-U.S. Anger Spreading in Islamic States, Survey Finds, *International Herald Tribune*, May 19, 2005). The new television station seems to be seen as part of the ‘favorable image’ solution, from the perspective of Edward Djerejian and Margaret D. Tutwiler, the two former ambassadors who presented their study to the subcommittee.

While I would suspect that U.S. foreign policy played a major role in the negative perception of America abroad, Djerejian and Tutwiler did not mention that possibility in their study. Instead, they proposed that the State Department needed more diplomats fluent in Arabic, and that American private sector media companies should help by creating programs that could reach out to Arab youth (ibid.).
Tutwiler had been given a leading role in the public relations campaign regarding how to ‘spin’ the U.S. war against Iraq in a way that makes it more acceptable to Arab television viewers. Her position as Under Secretary for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs includes two jobs. ‘Public diplomacy’ is focused on ‘engaging, informing, and influencing key international audiences,’ while ‘public affairs’ involves ‘outreach’ to Americans. Her job is related to ‘psychological operations’ insofar as it suggests that military victory is helped by the shaping of ideas and winning the ‘hearts and minds’ of adversaries and convincing Americans that the war effort is worthwhile.

The Bush administration’s public relations campaign during the war was found to be ‘extraordinarily successful’ for American audiences, while they ‘floundered’ in the Arab world, necessitating Tutwiler’s mission (Bumiller, 2003).

The ‘image’ portrayed by Al Hurra is not intended to stay as a fantasy on a television screen. The Pentagon has backed a $5 billion plan to fill the five square miles of the Green Zone, the area immediately surrounding the $700 million newly constructed United States embassy in Baghdad, with luxury hotels, condos, and shopping areas. This project, which appears to have a hidden agenda as making Americans comfortable in the Iraqi capital, has the expressed goal to create a ‘zone of influence’ around the United States embassy.

A Los Angeles based company, C3, has been given a $500 million contract to build an amusement park with a skateboard park in the zone. Mr. Llewellyn Werner has hired the same company who constructed Disneyland to construct the park. Werner has said that 200,000 skateboards and kneepads will be distributed at no cost to Iraqi children during July 2008. Critics have noted that the United States is doing something similar to
what Saddam Hussein had done in his \textit{Tashri} project of surrounding his capital headquarters with sycophants (Brooks and Abdul-Zahra, 2008; Verma, 2008).

In \textit{Travels in Hyperreality}, Umberto Eco noted how Americans, in projects like Disneyland, appear content to replace real history with an ersatz history—something that looked like history, with no attention to the difference, or a bold acknowledgment that the fake is better. Reality is filled with pitfalls and imperfections. Disneyland, which creates theatrical gunfights in a simulated Wild West, pretend voyages to the bottom of the sea, new shops and streets that mimic the old shops and streets of foreign lands, and contemporary ‘medieval’ castles, creates a world that is better than real (Eco, 1990). Jean Baudrillard had discussed these same tendencies toward hyperreality in his book \textit{The Gulf War Did Not Take Place}. In the work, he explained that the first Gulf War of 1991, which he calls a one-sided slaughter, and not a war in any conventional sense, happened mostly in the air (with radar seeking its targets) and on television screens. Americans were fed an edited version of the war that was far from facts on the ground and masqueraded its harshness (Baudrillard, 1995).

In a strategy seeming to mirror the earlier creation of Disneyland, the U.S. government has proclaimed that it has liberated the Iraqis. Now, they will attempt to build a beautiful downtown center for Baghdad, where children will play and have fun, to create the illusion of liberation. But will they achieve such harmony so easily? Disneyland may ‘work’ in America, but can it successfully be placed in the heart of Baghdad, given the current political context?

Even in 2006, Bush repeated his hackneyed argument about why we were attacked on 9-11. Presuming to know who the terrorists are and what motivates them, he
says, “They are at war against us because they hate everything we stand for and we stand for freedom. Freedom bothers them because their ideology is the opposite of liberty” (Bush, 2006). In this understanding of terrorism’s causality, the United States has done nothing wrong. The presence of over 700 U.S. bases around the world, its spending of billions of dollars on military might while others have little to eat, and its repeated protection of Israel from U.N. sanctions are not mentioned as background to why terrorists may have attacked the United States. The history of doctored evidence regarding ‘weapons of mass destruction’ (WMDs) in Iraq, the side-stepping of U.N. Security Council clearance, and Project for a New American Century documents that pre-date the invasion but suggest need for regime change in Iraq are all missing in this discussion (Presbey, 2005; 2006).

In his September 2006 speech, Bush stated that the terrorists ideology is “a form of totalitarianism following in the path of fascism and Nazism,” thereby making reference to World War II: all Americans know fighting the Nazis was essential. In earlier speeches, Bush had used a term popularized by some academics, ‘Islamofascism,’ to describe conservative religious Islamic clerics in Iraq and Iran. But Katha Pollitt was concerned that the phrase was misleading. No good parallels exist between today’s terrorists and earlier Italian fascism or German Nazism. The term conflates disparate groups. Is it intended to describe Baathists loyal to Saddam Hussein (enemies of the United States) and the rulers of Saudi Arabia (allies of the United States)? Also, these dictators do not share much in common with stateless terrorists. Pollitt concludes that the purpose of using this rhetoric is not to be analytic but to appeal to emotion, another way of calling the terrorists ‘evil madmen’ (Pollitt, 2006).
This defensive and apolitical posture can be found as well in the September 2006 document, ‘National Strategy for Combating Terrorism’ released by the White House. The document reads, in a tone only slightly less apolitical than the President’s speech, that terrorism “is not simply the result of hostility to U.S. policy in Iraq,” and it is “not simply a result of Israeli-Palestinian issues” (“National Strategy for Combating Terrorism,” 2006). In this wording, the government is agreeing that foreign policy issues may play some role in the terrorist’s motivations. But addressing these issues does not appear to be the goal of the document. The document states, “the hard core of our terrorist enemies cannot be reformed or deterred”, and so it suggests that U.S. forces should focus on preventing attacks, attacking terrorists “and their capacity to operate,” denying terrorists entry to the U.S. or movement in between other countries, and defending potential targets of attack. It also states as goals denying terrorists access to materials needed to create WMDs, and denying them sanctuary within other rogue states. These are not necessarily bad goals. But the question of whether U.S. foreign policy is exacerbating the problem is not even mentioned in the practical suggestions of the document. The document ends on a note of triumphalism: “We have liberated more than 50 million Afghans and Iraqis from despotism, terrorism, and oppression” (ibid.). Yet clearly, more Afghans and Iraqis die daily from terror attacks than do Americans, and more Iraqis die daily since the U.S. invasion than prior to the U.S. invasion. Our newspapers are often riddled with headline stories of the ten, twenty, fifty and one hundred Afghans or Iraqis dead from roadside bombs. Can we realistically say, therefore, that our ‘war on terrorism’ has liberated Afghans and Iraqis from terrorism?
According to the 2007 Failed States Index (compiled by *Foreign Policy* magazine and the Fund for Peace), Iraq is second on the list of failed states (behind Sudan) (Morgan, 2007).

It is, however, important to note that many sides to this ‘war on terror’ are resorting to propaganda techniques. Many Salifi-Jihadis (Arab fighters promoting Islamic States) who had come from the Middle East to fight in Chechnya had been recruited through the use of videotapes which portrayed the fight in a certain way. As Murad Batal al-Shishani explains, videos like “Russian Hell” and “Aeed Victories” implored their viewers to give up their luxurious lives for the sake of religion. The tapes portray Islamic societies as idyllic and without corruption. The tapes show mujahideen chanting and praying and smiling martyrs (al-Shishani, 2006). While some may argue that if the other side is using propaganda, one’s own side is justified in ‘fighting fire with fire.’ But in such a contest, all sides lose.

Conclusion

Arendt insisted on the importance of keeping facts straight. Facts are the bedrock upon which political action can then continue. But the basic facts about the Iraq war and the ‘war on terrorism’ are not yet known by the American people. In an insightful argument by Robert F. Kennedy, Jr. on the topic of manipulation of citizens by the media, Kennedy argues that there is not a split in our country (along the lines of ‘red’ and ‘blue’ states) regarding values. Rather, there is a split in our country regarding facts. A survey undertaken by the Program on International Policy Attitudes (University of Maryland) right after the 2004 elections said that most Bush supporters were convinced that Iraq played a role in the al Qaeda attacks of 9-11, and therefore they supported the
U.S.-led war in Iraq. Most respondents who held this view listened to Fox News. Most Kerry supporters did not think that Iraq played a role in the al Qaeda attacks of 9-11, and so they were against the plan to invade Iraq. Those who thought so got their news from sources other than Fox News. Kennedy therefore argues that the debate in the U.S. is really over the facts, and not the differing conclusions people may come to over the same set of facts. As proof of his distinction, he says the same pollsters followed up with another poll of the people who say they support the U.S. invasion of Iraq whether their position would change if they were to find out, in the future, that Iraq did not play a role in the 9-11 attacks. Eighty per cent of the Bush supporters interviewed agreed that under such circumstances, they would withdraw their support for the war (Democracy in Crisis, 2007).

Fox News had even played video footage of U.S. troops finding the WMDs in Iraq. They showed some tubes being pulled up out of the ground. They said they were rocket to propel WMDs. The other news stations later reported that the weapons found were not WMDs. But those who watched Fox News continue to believe that they saw the WMDs with their own eyes. When Colin Powell presented his ‘evidence’ to the United Nations, I remember being completely unconvinced by his aerial photographs of two trucks parked somewhere in the middle of nowhere in Iraq. He was arguing that they were mobile labs for chemical and biological weapons. I remember being completely unconvinced. But a friend of mine who watched the same presentation was thoroughly convinced by Powell’s presentation. News media of Powell’s presentation around the world mirrored our two views, with the U.S. press being convinced and foreign press
skeptical. I think this illustrates Putnam and Nelson’s points, that we evaluate sense data in contexts, according to familiar narratives as well as our criteria for believability.

Historian Howard Zinn (2006) argues that if the American public only knew more about United States history, they would not be so vulnerable to the war propaganda of their leaders. Zinn cites speeches of former U.S. President William McKinley, who suggested that U.S. wars against Spain, fought in Puerto Rico and the Philippines, were intended to help give the people there ‘freedom.’ But the United States stayed as occupiers.

Education on history is an important skill to help one detect propaganda. But the way in which Americans are taught history is highly framed by myths. Sometimes facts are distorted; sometimes they are brushed over to give a misimpression. Nelson sees an affinity between Arendt’s own position and that of Aleksander Zinoviev. He says that for both thinkers, “‘the basic for a genuinely human existence is truth’” and that from now on the degree of development of a society will be defined “by the degree of truthfulness that society allows (Nelson, p. 294).’”

The United States is not the only country that presents their history in a mythical way. Since human beings have fertile imaginations and since the image is often clearer and more comforting than messy reality, people of good as well as ill will are often tempted to weave such narratives. But as Arendt insists, we have to return to the witnesses to truth and break through the myths, to find a more accurate picture of reality. Such realism is a prerequisite for effective action.
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Human Trafficking Trends in Nigeria and Strategies for Combating the Crime
Dave-Odigie, Chinenye Patience

Abstract
This paper examines the phenomenon of human trafficking in Nigeria and reasons for victims’ vulnerability to it. It discussed the motivations for human trafficking and identified poverty as a major cause for victim vulnerability to it. It also discussed its trends and effects. For lasting solution to the problem, I recommended a carrot and stick approach with emphasized on poverty alleviation, good governance, law enforcement, prosecution of perpetrators of the crime and a co-ordination of efforts between security services and all stakeholders. My thesis draws on information from secondary sources such as newspapers, journals and published works on the World Wide Web in examining the relevant issues and arriving at the conclusion.

Introduction
Human trafficking is a phenomenon that is currently generating a lot of concern globally, especially in countries like Nigeria, where it is highly prevalent. The generally acceptable definition of human trafficking is that of the United Nations which defines it as the recruitment, transportation, transfer, harboring or receipt of persons by means of threat or the use of force or other means of coercion, of abduction or fraud, of deception, of the abuse of power or a position of vulnerability or the giving or receiving of payments or benefits to achieve the consent of a person having control over another person, for the purpose of exploitation. Exploitation shall include at a minimum, prostitution or other forms of sexual exploitation, forced labor or services, slavery or practice similar to slavery, servitude or the

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removal of organs. (Palermo Protocol, 2000) Thus, three main elements are at the core of this definition and they include: the actual act of trafficking including the recruitment, transportation, transfer, harboring or receipt of persons, associated acts such as the threat or the use of force or other forms of coercion, abduction, fraud, deception, abuse of power or of a position of weakness or vulnerability and exploitation including at a minimum the exploitation for prostitution (or other forms of sexual exploitation) forced labor or services, slavery or practices similar to slavery, servitude or the removal of organs.

The vulnerability of prospective victims are exploited in many respects; the victims most of whom are pre-teens, teenagers and mostly female are taken far away from their homelands to cities within their country or across national boundaries and exploited for optimum economic benefits. Many of them are engaged in cheap labor such as domestic servants, hawkers, beggars, prostitutes or put into other forms of servitude akin to slavery. Expectedly, the global outcry generated against this phenomenon is informed by the obvious human degradation which accompanies this racketeering. A number of global initiatives, many to which Nigeria is a signatory, have been put in place as a way of addressing this challenge.

The paper has tried to examine the trend in human trafficking in Nigeria and its purpose is to uncover what makes victims vulnerable and how to overcome the challenge. The paper is therefore divided into the following seven sections: Introduction, human trafficking trends in Nigeria, motivation and effects of human trafficking in Nigeria, strategies for combating the crime, conclusion and recommendation.

**Human Trafficking Trends in Nigeria**

Human trafficking is ranked the world’s third largest crime (Keefer, 2006). Perhaps the nefarious activities of human traffickers in Nigeria would have remained hidden and uninhibited despite general concern but for the intervention of the office of the wife of the Vice-President of Nigeria with the collaboration of the wife of the Edo state (of Nigeria)
governor in 1999. The suffering and indignity meted out to trafficked victims in the process of transporting them and at the various destinations, especially those abroad, had become a huge source of embarrassment to Nigeria’s integrity as a nation with responsibility to safeguard the interest of its nationals. The various forms of manifestation of these indignities are - prostitution, child labor and under aged domestic services.

Human trafficking is a global demand driven business with a huge market for cheap labor and commercial sex. It involves exploiting vulnerable people like needy women, children and young men with offers or promises of employment and better life abroad.

Internal Dynamics
Internal trafficking of women and children is not a new phenomenon. It has been going on with the trafficking of people from rural communities to major cities such as Lagos, Abuja, Kano, Kaduna, Calabar, Warri and Port-Harcourt, predominantly for exploitative domestic work, scavenging, begging and prostitution. The incidence is a little more precarious in Lagos, (www.unesdoc.unesco.org/images/0014) the commercial nerve center of Nigeria with a surging population of about 9.1 million. (www.ipsnews.net/africa/nota.asp) The busy schedules of families who are mainly working class, makes high demand for domestic servants imperative.

Trafficking for organized begging takes place mostly in the Northern part of Nigeria where physically challenged or disabled persons are lured into begging business in major cities such as Kano and Kaduna. Furthermore, experienced adult beggars traffic children under their custody. These children are then compelled to lead the handicapped into organized begging, they are forced to do this for practically nothing or without any reward other than the daily meals that may be handed out to them along the streets. These trafficked children are denied access to formal education and proper social upbringing.

(www.unesdoc.unesco.org/images/0014)
Baby harvesting is another type of human trafficking in Nigeria. In states like Ebonyi, Abia and Lagos, there are cases of hospitals, clinics, orphanages, doctors and nurses who keep teenage and single mothers who do not want to keep their babies after birth to provide them shelter and care while they are pregnant and sell off their babies for a premium to couples that need them. They are made to sign papers renouncing their rights to the babies as well as swear to oaths of secrecy. The Good Shepherd Orphanage in Lagos was reported to be engaged in illegal adoption of babies as well as sheltering young pregnant girls and selling off their babies at birth. Many of these babies sold cannot be traced and one cannot determine what became of them. (www.unesdoc.unesco.org/images/0014)

Cross-border trafficking

Nigeria has been described as a country of origin, transit and destination for human trafficking and African countries like Cote d’Ivoire, Equatorial Guinea, Mali, Cameroon, Gabon, Benin Republic, Libya, Algeria and Morocco are some of the destination points for trafficked Nigerians; while countries like Belgium, Spain, Germany, United Kingdom are the destination points in Europe. The trend for Nigerian women and girls trafficked to Europe is to be used as domestic servants, whereas in Italy, prostitution is the main work that they usually end up doing. Venezuela in South America is a recent addition to the destination points while Saudi Arabia is the destination point in the Middle East. Nigeria has road links with Niger republic and it provides the route to North Africa, the Middle East and Europe. Most of the trafficked persons are deceived into believing that their destination would be Europe but most of them end up in some African countries like Benin Republic or other countries other than Europe. (www.unesdoc.unesco.org/images/0014)

An escapee narrated her ordeal in the traffickers den. According to her story, the twenty year old victim, a senior secondary school student in Edo state before she was trafficked said she escaped from Burkina Faso with the help of a Burkinabe after one month of prostitution. She also stated that her male trafficker resided in Benin City Edo state.
had been made to believe that she would be taken to Europe but she ended up in Burkina Faso. She was deceived by a friend’s brother’s promise of a job in Europe. She mentioned that the trafficking ring use the Saki Route in Oyo state to cross girls into Burkina Faso and Mali. She also revealed that girls most of them below fourteen years are beaten and starved to subdue them into doing the biddings of their madams. She also alleged that the illicit trade thrived with the connivance of some security agents. (News agency of Nigeria, 2007)

The Northern part of Nigeria has not attracted enough attention as Edo, Cross Rivers, Delta, Ebonyi and other states from the South leading to the erroneous assumption that human trafficking is more prevalent in the south of Nigeria. However from March 2002 to April 2004 alone, the Saudi Arabia authorities deported nine thousand, nine hundred and fifty women and one thousand, two hundred and thirty one underage and unaccompanied children. (www.unesdoc.unesco.org)

Investigations revealed that the majority of the women deported from Saudi Arabia are from Kano, Borno, Adamawa, Yobe, Nassarawa, Plateau, Niger, Kebbi, Kwara, Sokoto, Zamfara, Jigawa, Gombe, Bauchi and Taraba states. These records debunk the erroneous impression that human trafficking for prostitution does not occur in the Northern part of Nigeria. (www.unesdoc.unesco.org/images/0014

Motivations for Human Trafficking in Nigeria

Although Nigeria has enormous natural and human resources, corruption takes a serious toll on the country’s economy. Nigeria has been rated one of the poorest countries in the world and so widespread poverty abounds even in the midst of abundant resources. Thus, poverty has been identified as the principal driving force behind this trade and the most visible cause of the vulnerability of women and children to trafficking in Nigeria. An ILO/IPEC report found out that forty per cent of Nigeria’s Street children and hawkers are trafficked persons (ILO Doc., 2000) These are children who are from poor and deplorable backgrounds and so due to lack of opportunity at home and with or without their consent are trafficked. Again in
some communities in Nigeria, the wealthy are accorded honor and respect without bothering to find out the source of their wealth. This at times makes people engage in all sorts of vices to acquire wealth. The society stratifies people into groups of the ‘haves’ and the ‘have – not’ and some people out of the desperation to belong to a better social class or at least pull through the poverty line fall into the racketeering bait.

In Edo state from where the contemporary trend in human trafficking started, it is alleged that business transactions existed between the natives and Italians when the Nigerian economy was more robust. These Nigerians visited Italy to buy shoes, gold and clothing to sell in Nigeria. However when sex business became more lucrative in Italy, coupled with worsening economic situations in Nigeria, the women shifted to sex business and involved their relations in it, and with time involved more people as the business began to boom. This explains why until date, over eighty per cent of trafficked persons for prostitution to Europe especially Italy come from Edo state. (www.unesdoc.unesco.org/images/0014 However, poverty alone cannot explain the trend in Nigeria because it is not the poorest country in West Africa and indeed in Africa as a whole, so why then is human trafficking on the increase particularly in Nigeria?

Obviously, there are close linkages between poverty and widespread illiteracy as well as unsafe and uninformed migration. Due to the high rate of poverty, many Nigerians of school age are not in school because they cannot afford it, thus those with minimal education and who lack the skills required to secure good jobs often fall easy prey to traffickers who deceive them with tales of good jobs in the cities in case of internal trafficking and greener pastures abroad for trafficking across borders.

Even when many of these young people have some education but are not able to get jobs, they feel that they could find jobs elsewhere and of course and this makes them very vulnerable to the manipulation of the traffickers who bank heavily on their misery. Thus, unemployment has been identified as another causative factor for human trafficking. The rate
of unemployment is high in Nigeria leading to desperation for a lot of people. Most of the trafficked victims are people who want to go abroad to seek better employment opportunities. NAPTIP identified ignorance with of what victims face when they are trafficked and desperation due to the unemployment as other causes for the outrageous rate of human trafficking in the country (www.gvnet.com/humantrafficking/nigeria).

The issues of poverty and unemployment was not felt much in the traditional, communal and extended family setting in Nigeria because people watched out for one another and it was common to see a wealthy person take on the responsibility of catering for some members of the extended family at least to meet their basic needs. However with social change as a result of rapid urbanization, education, globalization and harsh economic conditions there has been a decline in traditional and cultural values. It is now common for people to want to solve the problems of their immediate or nuclear families without consideration for the larger family. Thus, rapid urbanization led to an alteration of the extended family and community forms of solidarity.

Furthermore, there is a collapse of the protective environment as a result of the laxity of security agents in discharging their duties. Negligence on their part accounts for why most of the trafficked victims pass through immigration with fake visas which are undetected at the point they are checked. Negligence of duty may be attributed to poor salary for the security agents or to corruption as some victims claimed that some security agents connived with the traffickers who let them pass security checkpoints at the airports or land borders unchecked. (NAN Report, 2007)

Again, the road and sea links or boundaries of Nigeria with her neighboring countries are extensive and are difficult and expensive to patrol effectively. As a result, citizens from other African countries who have intra-state conflicts in their countries of origin use this porosity to flee across international borders to enter into the country as refugees and some of them end up doing menial jobs in Nigeria or fall prey to the traffickers. No doubt the political
and economic situations in various African countries contribute to rending African people vulnerable to human traffickers. (Agbu, 2003)

The motivation for human trafficking in Nigeria is multifaceted, poverty though identified as the major cause cannot fully explain it. As said earlier, unemployment, ignorance, illiteracy, collapse of the protective environment and the decline in cultural and traditional values are contributory factors. However, the worst form of motivation for human trafficking is greed and quest for quick wealth on the part of the traffickers who go to any extent to deceive the victims. They are the ones who flaunt their life styles of unexplained wealth and use it to prey on victims’ ignorance and misery.

Effects of Human Trafficking in Nigeria

Significant financial resources are gained from it as there has been a tremendous rise in trafficking from Nigeria to Europe since the late 1990s. Much of the profits flow to other illicit activities and are laundered and the trade thrives not only because of prevalence of poverty but also because of highly paid facilitators in the west. (EU Report, 2005)

Organized criminal groups which traffic women in Nigeria have multifaceted crime portfolios of which the trade in women is one part of their criminal profile. Using female recruiters who conclude contracts with girls and manipulating voodoo traditions, they are able to force compliance through psychological as well as physical pressure. The physical pressure also manifests in various significant human rights violations as children are abandoned in recipient countries (in the case of trans border trafficking) and women pressured to work in the most physically dangerous conditions at the lowest end of the prostitution markets usually as streetwalkers - exposed to the elements with physical violence against them being common. They are also exposed to the threat of HIV/AIDS which is also a major security threat. Upon arrival at their destinations, victims are placed in conditions controlled by traffickers while they are exploited to earn illicit revenues. They also prey on

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victim’s fears that authorities in the foreign country will prosecute or deport them if they ask for help (ILO Doc.1996).

Human trafficking deprives the country of its human resources. Though majority of the people trafficked are semi-literate or illiterate, some literate and talented people are also trafficked out. Putting it plainly, talent and human resources are pushed out of Africa mostly by domestic conditions. The result is a self-perpetuating cycle in which mass poverty and underdevelopment feeds crime and violence that in turn leads to even greater poverty.

**Strategies for Combating Human Trafficking**

To stem the rising tide in human trafficking in Nigeria, the government has set up machineries and embarked on legislations while aligning with international protocols as both preventive and deterrent measures. In 2001, it ratified the United Nations Protocol to Prevent, Suppress, and Punish Trafficking in Persons Especially Women and Children as well as passed a national law in 2003 –Trafficking in Persons (Prohibition) Law Enforcement and Administration Act 2003. Through this act, the National Agency for the Prohibition of Trafficking in Persons (NAPTIP) was established.

However, much still needs to be done as the problem still persists because it is a covert activity and thus the extent to which it occurs remains unknown. Non-governmental organizations like Women trafficking and Child Labor Eradication Foundation (WOTCLEF) has also been involved in the prosecution of traffickers, protection of victims, rehabilitation, retraining and counseling of repatriated trafficked people and their activities have received worldwide support as well as local recognition for their contribution towards curbing the menace (www.comminit.com/en/node).

**Conclusion**

In Nigeria, human trafficking especially the cross-border trafficking is a fast growing international organized crime. It is motivated and continues to thrive because of poverty, ignorance, selfishness, greed and a lack of state capacity to translate policy into action.
result of the harsh economic realities in Nigeria such as lack of job opportunities for both its skilled and unskilled labor, lack of welfare package to cater for the needs of the unemployed and ignorance have contributed to its sustenance. Nigeria is part of the global system and thus must respond and be seen to be responding responsibly to trends of any form. Failure to do so will in effect expose the entire population to greater ridicule than has been experienced.

The country might be confronted with graver challenges like the prevalence and the depriving of the country of its human resources and HIV/AIDS. It is social vice that needs to be curbed by addressing the issues holistically through policy, action and co-operation of stakeholders. Such co-operation will help tackle the issue of demand as well.

Recommendations

First, it cannot be overemphasized that traffickers should be prosecuted to the full extent of the law. More effective strategies that will combine and balance punitive measures with protection of human rights in order to make human trafficking non-profitable and less interesting to criminal organizations on one hand and on the other to provide maximum protection and respect to the personalities of each and every victim should be introduced.

The Police on whom the primary responsibility for crime detection, prevention and control rests on as well as the Immigration and Custom Service need to be properly equipped and professionalized as demoralized police and immigration personnel would be incapable of providing efficient service. Their operations need to modernized and adequately computerized as well as surveillance equipment bought for them. They also need regular trainings as capacity building measures to keep abreast of new trends in human trafficking and related crimes. The government should also work towards the general application of biometric technology to reduce visa fraud as well as the use of heat-sensitive scanners at the most used access points and key transport routes.

Because of evolving trends in human trafficking, there should be ongoing research into it. Such research will lead to synergies between the government, NAPTIP, security
agencies, EFCC, research institutes, non-governmental organizations, (NGOs) and various stakeholders to co-operate and co-ordinate their efforts towards finding lasting solutions to the problem. An outcome of such research will be to create a nationwide database whereby information about victims of human trafficking is stored and made retrievable for police forces. This database should contain information on found people, missing people and traffickers.

Public opinion should be critically mobilized behind a concerted campaign to put a stop to the inhuman trade and this can be done by conducting public enlightenment programs like organizing workshops and conferences for stakeholders, documentaries to inform the people on the pernicious impact of human trafficking. This is important in the quest for peace, protection of human rights and national development. Opening up access to information through these public enlightenment programs and documentaries will be most critical in helping to defend our human dignity. These campaigns should be structured in such a way that sensitizations are carried out in all the geo-political zones of the country as a way of reaching the grassroots and religious, traditional, community, youth leaders and other stakeholders. The sensitization would involve fact finding missions on some of the rehabilitation and re-integration centers set up by government and non-governmental organizations to assess their impact and ensure that the victims are not re-traumatized or their well being damaged.

More importantly, as long as people are not well provided for and the government not living up to expectations which includes providing for the basic needs of its people, people will continue to seek for their own ways of making ends meet be it legal or illegal. So, good governance is what will bring a lasting solution on the long run and it depends a lot on the government to cater for the welfare of masses. It can achieve these by promoting policies which reduce the level of poverty and ensure equity in the distribution of resources among the citizens. No nation can enjoy relative peace, stability, and development or achieve a
reduction in its crime rate if a vast proportion of its people wallow in abject poverty. If the
government ensures sustainable infrastructural development, it will enable the economy to
function appropriately.

Since women are more vulnerable to trafficking, a social security policy should be put
in place to enhance their access to education by providing scholarships. This will make the
millennium development goals of ensuring the girl-rights and child education acts sustainable. The policy should also aim at efforts to remedy the low status of women particularly the economic disadvantages they face and such efforts must be woven into a larger anti-poverty and anti-corruption framework.

Due to the transnational character of human trafficking, countries of origin, transit and
destination must work in partnership to prevent it, protect its victims and prosecute those
responsible. Therefore, government should strengthen bilateral agreements to garner
international co-operation and also enter into new ones towards tackling the problems of
human trafficking. This will include the co-ordination of laws, investigation and the seizure
of crime proceeds. This is where the Economic and Financial Crimes Commission (EFCC)
has a role to play by networking with similar commissions abroad to investigate and put
strategies in place to repatriate and seize crime proceeds and assets of traffickers often
stashed away in foreign accounts and their profits used in the overall development of the
nation.
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The Language of Violence
Larry Ashley1

Most people who bother with the matter at all would admit that the English language is in a bad way, but it is generally assumed that we cannot by conscious action do anything about it. Our civilization is decadent and our language -- so the argument runs -- must inevitably share in the general collapse. It follows that any struggle against the abuse of language is a sentimental archaism, like preferring candles to electric light or hansom cabs to aeroplanes. Underneath this lies the half-conscious belief that language is a natural growth and not an instrument which we shape for our own purposes.

George Orwell, "Politics and the English Language," 1946

Introduction

If, as Orwell suggests in the passage above, language is an instrument which we shape for our own purposes, it may serve us well to examine the major contexts in which we employ the language of violence and conflict.

I want to divide my investigation into three separate areas. Here they are in a nutshell:
(1) What is the language of violence in the field of combat?
(2) What is the language of violence in the public sphere?
(3) How does the language of violence emerge in our ordinary lives, especially in sports?

I do not approach this topic from an experts stance or even as one who has amassed a deal of experiential background in these areas. I have never been a soldier or a peace officer, though my father was a career military man (engineers). I approach this area as a philosopher, bringing to the issue of “the language of violence” a willingness to advance abstract connecting principles with which to understand and process our shared history and social space.

(1) What is the language of violence in the field of combat?

The principle objective of the military forces of a nation is to menace or kill the people judged to be enemies of that nation. The principle objective of the police forces2 of a nation is to apprehend people judged to have broken laws, by the use of violent force if necessary. In both of these domains the acceptance by the primary participants of the use of force requires two

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2 In the very names Armed forces® and Police forces® the use of the word force® acknowledges the connection of the personnel to violence, as opposed to other words like Staff® or Faculty® or other group terms. By metaphorical extension we describe organized employees of a company or state as a workforce® and the currently unemployed as a reserve army of the unemployed®. These latter usages and examples would fall under the section below where I treat language of violence in our ordinary lives.
dynamics which are quite explicable in human terms: (1) the dehumanization of the people toward whom the violence is or may be directed and (2) the renaming of the actual acts of violence in functional ways. Let us look more closely at each of these in turn.

The first of these (the dehumanization of the people toward whom the violence is or may be directed) is so commonplace that it will not have escaped your notice. If you turn your attention to the terms used (collective nouns) to refer to the opponents, one can easily recall that every war has its collection of dismissive epithets for the other. To take only a few of the epithets used by the US in these conflicts:

(World Wars): The Hun, Boche (originally “alboche,” an eliding of “allemande” and “blockhead”), Heinie, Kraut, Jap, Dago, etc
(Asian conflicts): Slant, slope, gook, chink, etc
(Iraq): Towel head, raghead, camel jockey, etc
(policing): scumbag, perp, hump, skels, etc

and these are just the more repeatable instances, vulgar sexual and scatological metaphors being extremely common.

All of these terms serve to obscure the fact that it is people one is preparing to inflict violence on. In fact, the targets of violence could more intimately be described as brothers or sisters, fathers or mothers, sons or daughters. But no soldier would refer to the people s/he is targeting in these terms. The whole point of the replacement terms is to avoid recognizing the humanity of the other and the fact that one is prepared to do violence to a person, with the implications that involves.

That reality (of the essential humanity of the persons on the other side whom one intends to kill if possible) may be why, while “yank” and “reb” can be said with a lot of venom, there did not seem to emerge a vocabulary which so distanced the humanity of the participants in our civil war, and I suspect the same is true for the Irish and Iraqi participants in their civil wars. That is, I would hazard that they do not have as dismissive a vocabulary as do combatants in wars in which racial and cultural divides characterize the opponents. When brother literally fights brother, it is not so easy to accomplish the dehumanizing of the opponent, as it comes near to dehumanizing oneself.

If we turn now from the objects of violence to the act of violence itself, we find ourselves surrounded by euphemisms, but not euphemisms designed to obscure the fact that violence has occurred. What people actually do to others in combat are roughly (brutally) these:

  shooting
  piercing with knife, bayonet, arrow, sword, etc
  exploding
  choking to death with garotte, poison or hands
  drowning
  poisoning (with gas or radiation)
  setting on fire

I can feel in myself the desire, even as I list these things, to avoid the horror of their direct description, an instinct to cover the simple directness of the words. That is an instinct to which combatants fully give rein. Perhaps only (or mainly) in training scenarios are the above terms commonly used by combatants. The preferred expressions are:
and other expressions which serve to insulate the killer from the act of killing. All in all, it would be humanly surprising if this sort of linguistic replacement did not occur.

I won’t belabor the point, but using these terms replaces, with a euphemism, a more blunt description of the act of killing someone in one of the brutal ways available to combatants.

It might be worth investigating gang violence and family violence to catalogue similar dynamics (think “take to the woodshed” and “tan his hide” for equivalent family violence replacements). Social scientists in those areas could surely enumerate the spectrum of terms that replace the fundamental fact of beating a child or a spouse. The important thing to note here is that it would be surprising if the same phenomenon of euphemistic language to obscure the brute fact of violence were not present in family violence, gang violence, etc.

(2) What is the language of violence in the public sphere?

Let’s now turn to the language of violence as it appears in the public sphere. Without a doubt we can trace the two dynamics mentioned earlier dehumanization and the replacement of direct descriptors by euphemistic equivalents. Let’s unpack the commonalities and differences between the two domains (the public sphere and the field of combat).

While the racial and ethnic slurs which are common in the field of combat (and which I argued above serve to distance the awareness of the combatant from the humanity of the opponent in order to make it possible to accept killing him), the language of the public sphere is more complex. Take any one of the terms identified from particular wars above as being current on the battlefield and hardly a one would appear in public print as acceptable terms for opponents. “Kraut” and “Jap” are the sole exceptions, I think. But the same function of diverting attention from the essential humanity of the people toward whom violence is being directed is apparent.

Here is a partial list of terms in the public sphere to refer to our opponents when simple national identity won’t do:

- Terrorists
- (Fundamentalist) Extremists

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3 By “public print” I mean the newspapers of the time and the military and congressional reports of conflicts which make up the public record then or at a later time of the events in question.
Seditionists
Rebels
(Godless) Communists

These and other such terms perform the role of the distancing of humanity, but they also are designed for other purposes. These terms have persuasive power to legitimize the directors of violence (the military bureaucracy and the legitimators of directed violence—the civilian government and the people of a state) to feel comfortable with the human destruction for which they are opting. These terms are designed to convince us that our role in state-sponsored violence is justified. It suggests that those toward whom we direct our violence are either irrational (and thus diplomacy or persuasion are impossible) or have objectives (“the destruction of our way of life”) or position themselves so implacably against duly constituted authority that they must be militarily opposed in a “just” war.

Note that the heart of the terms used for the “enemy” on the battlefield arise primarily from the racial, ethnic or personal otherness of the opponent, while those in the public sphere stress ideological or political otherness. Thus while there is a functional link between the terms used in these two areas, there are also important differences in role. There is no place for the persuasive or the justificatory on the battlefield; these are done deals. The situation on the battlefield is understood to be “kill or be killed,” and the appropriateness of conflict is not supposed to be an issue for the in-place combatant. The requirement at the point of conflict is to reinforce disdain and distance so that violence can be pursued without real threat to the mental health of the soldier, which would be imperiled if the humanity of the opponent were fully absorbed. In the public sphere, on the other hand, the language functions to justify our (or rather, more accurately, or son’s and daughter’s) killing other people’s sons and daughters.

If we now turn to the collection of terms in the public sphere for deliberate violent actions (as distinct from the terms for the opponent himself) we run right into the terrain George Orwell explored so devastatingly in his famous essay “Politics and the English Language.” There he described a "catalog of swindles and perversions" which characterized how the government sought to obscure the reality of conflict from its citizens. Recent conflicts can add a lot to just this “obscuring” by the perverse use of the language of violence in the public sphere.

- We no longer use “landmines”; we use "area denial munitions"
- We no longer use “torture”, we use "physical persuasion"
- The term "concentration camp" has totally replaced “death camp”
- We don’t drop bombs or missiles, we “employ aerial ordnance”, and the bombs we used to drop are now referred to as “vertically deployed anti-personnel devices”

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4 The gut-level personal otherness of the opponent may come down to what they eat (as the French and the British calling each other “frogs” and “rosbifs” and both calling the Germans “Krauts”) or items of dress as in “raghead” and “towelhead” mentioned above.

5 This is the presumption, but a more subtle analysis would invoke other possibilities: as opposed to being killed, a combatant can surrender or flee, and in lieu of killing, the combatant can decline the opportunity to engage, can deliberately misdirect the instruments of violence or propose surrender. These are all important personal decisions which are reported with some frequency on the actual field of combat, and their use or abandonment have important moral dimensions.
In WWII we employed the term adehousing for the allied bombing of German civilian homes.

“Extraordinary rendition” is a relatively new term for delivering “terror suspects” to foreign intelligence services for torture without extradition proceedings.

What we used to call “mercenary troops” we now call “security contractors.”

We no longer invade...we liberate.

Remember those body bags which used to bother us when so many of them came home in the Vietnam war filled with bodies? They are now referred to as “transfer tubes.”

Our assassins are no longer assigned assassinations they are given "wet work"

A pre-emptive strike, as you know, is really a US military unprovoked attack.

A “free fire zone” is an area under attack by troops in which the usual rules of engagement are suspended and the napalming and bombing of villages and shooting of journalists, women and children is permitted.

To “neutralize” is to kill or to render politically ineffective by imprisonment, damage to reputation, ideological seduction, etc.

“Shock and awe” emerged in the context of our invasion of Iraq, and is synonymous with massive bombing; this is an example of the military’s new strategy called “effects-based operations” where the desired outcome is concentrated on rather than the action itself but that is probably more than you want to know about the “new” military science.

“Pain compliance” is the new term for applying violence to make a detained person obey.

The death of human beings, in extraordinary numbers, is encompassed in the neutral phrase collateral damage, suggesting that if those who died were not deliberately chosen as the target there is no responsibility for that result.

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6 ALEX LEARY & CURTIS KRUEGER, St. Petersburg Times, February 26, 2006: Most boot camp employees are trained under the defensive tactics component, which in 624 pages spells out how to take down subjects and apply some of the very moves -- hammerlocks, shoulderlocks and pressure points -- barred in other juvenile facilities. Those facilities, which include wilderness camps and standard juvenile detention facilities, follow the more restrictive Protective Action Response policy. “Too many youth have been injured in incidents with these techniques," Schembri said in 2004. "While these holds may be appropriate for an adult population, experience has shown us that it is too easy to injure a young person when applying these holds. Physical restraint should be applied only to prevent a youth from hurting himself or others.”

His memo disclosing those reforms did not mention that boot camps were not affected. Juvenile justice officials already have taken steps to create a more uniform policy. A tentative list of changes that surfaced this week bar use of "pain compliance" at boot camps.
Shouldn’t I stop? The list is enormous and growing and all of it is carefully designed to
depersonalize violence by obscuring its reality either under the blanket of technological terms or
the most blatant of euphemisms. The comparison, you will remember, is to combatants’ use of
terms like “waste,” “drop,” “level,” grease,” etc (see list above) to replace more accurate
descriptors for killing people in combat. The gap is huge between the lists, however. The
combatants’ euphemisms may be crass, but they are direct and unapologetic about the action
taken. The bureaucratic euphemisms crafted for the public sphere are indirect and emotionally
distancing. They do all they can to deny that the violence of conflict is occurring, suggesting
that “areas” are being secured rather than people killed, that violence is being prevented rather
than initiated by our actions and that our ends are always just rather than self-serving.

(3) How does the language of violence emerge in our ordinary lives?

In this final section I want to change gears and observe how much our ordinary language
is dominated by the language of war, conflict and violence.

Before I settle into my primary field of analysis “the language of violence in sports” I’d
like to just bow toward the fact that an immense amount of our ordinary language is almost
invisibly saturated with the language of violence. I say “almost invisibly” because we are surely
no longer sensitive to the violent imagery behind our speech. Let me just list a number of
examples to mark out the field, though I will not give it, at this point, the analysis it deserves:

In the US we **fire** a person from a job; (in the UK they **make** a person redundant).
We describe a successful event as a **smash hit**
Something is to **die** for
A successful comic says “I **killed’em tonight**” (before he went on he was urged to “**break
a leg**”)
A person or an idea can be **striking**, and a deal or a compromise can be **struck**
You can **battle** a disease, **smother** a salad in dressing or **shoot** me an e-mail

As a party game you might want to propose that everyone think of such expressions
where we describe common experiences in the language of violence. There will be a ton of
them. But why, you may ask should we attend to them? Aren’t they innocent metaphors or
linguistic devices which should not be taken too seriously? Here is my thesis: The adoption of
such violence-oriented expressions are initially less the cause of increased violence in the culture
but the **symptom** or expression of a violent culture. Their continued presence will serve to
maintain a casual attitude toward violence and make it more difficult to become a more gentle or
pacific culture in the future.

Now before you make up your mind as to whether you want to share my thesis or oppose
it, allow me to move to an area where the language of violence really holds sway. I ask you to
attend to the area of sports and to follow me into an examination of sports language.

**The basic actions of sports.**
Teach someone a sport some day and attend to the language in terms of which you ask
them to engage. The fundamental act of almost all racket sports is called a **shot** or a **volley**, both
drawn from the fundamental infantry actions.
You can follow that up by the bomb in football, a ground war the air war the bullet pass the blitz the smash, the lob, the quick strike for team sports, all these are executed by the squad or the unit as in military formations and the bout between adversaries may be characterized as a battle of the titans

So much for the terminology one encounters when one adopts the descriptive language of sports. But you might want to add to this by imagining for yourself how you would describe the outcomes of games under different circumstances. When the score is lopsided or close or even tied, what would you say? Now listen to radio sportscasters report to their audience the same facts and you will encounter a veritable avalanche of violence. Here is how, in our culture\(^7\), we report the amassing of more points by one team (let’s say Xavier) than does another team (shall we say Cornell?)

- Xavier crushed Cornell
- Xavier beat Cornell
- Xavier clobbered Cornell
- Xavier annihilated Cornell
- Xavier whipped Cornell
- Xavier toppled Cornell
- Xavier smothered Cornell
- Xavier smashed Cornell
- Xavier picked off Cornell
- Xavier nipped Cornell
- Xavier pasted Cornell
- Xavier slaughtered Cornell
- Xavier rolled over Cornell
- Xavier outfought Cornell
- Xavier manhandled Cornell
- Xavier creamed Cornell
- Xavier dueled Cornell to a tie
- Xavier battled Cornell to a tie

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\(^7\) It would be interesting to listen to how other nations report their sports scores. The BBC routinely reports the outcome of its football (soccer) contests as follows: It was West Ham 2, Arsenal nil; Newcastle 1, Leeds 1... etc., though I have heard, with some frequency, the term beat, which I argued above is a violence term, on the BBC for sport score reporting.
Lest you think I am being unfair to the sportscasters for failing to acknowledge that there are expressions they use which are more neutral, I offer these:

- Xavier edged Cornell
- Xavier dominated Cornell
- Xavier lost to Cornell
- Xavier outlasted Cornell
- Xavier outscored Cornell
- Xavier topped Cornell
- Xavier breezed past Cornell
- Xavier played Cornell to a tie

I am happy to acknowledge these more neutral expressions, however, because they point us to the very important fact that the violent-expressions list is not as full as it is because it is inevitable that we use those expressions...there are plenty of non-violent alternatives for recording the same fact, as this later list reveals.

While it may seem inevitable that sports adopt the language of war or conflict, it is not. Some sports, I’ll take cricket as an example, do almost totally without such language. Cricket does it by adopting a totally exotic vocabulary for its elements: googlies, yorkers, off-stump, silly mid off, bowl, hook, century, hat trick, maiden over, leg bye, etc. This poses a considerable barrier for its fans, who must master this new set of terms. Here is the remarkable thing about the game, however...there is not a single term in the vocabulary of cricket that I know of which reaches into the language of violence. But it could have. Had the game been conceptualized as a war-substitute, a number of military metaphors could have been exploited to describe the game.

If the cricket example does not seem compelling to you, imagine that instead of employing the language of military conflict to describe our sports, we used (and this would be perfectly plausible in the hyper-capitalist country we are) the language of accounting or the market as our fundamental comparison. Then we might report:

- Xavier outperformed Cornell
- Cornell ended in the red by six points against Xavier
- Xavier out-tallied Cornell
- Cornell tumbled relative to Xavier, etc.

However odd this sounds, it would sound as natural as our current language does if this reconfiguring were in place for a while.  

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I would like to note that the language of swordplay dominates a lot of the academic imagination. I imagine the following bit of fictional writing:

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ATouche! thought George. Fred’s rapier-like wit had always impressed him. Just when he thought he had Fred in the thrust and parry of their exchanges, George managed to let Fred get the upper hand. With his slashing wit and pointed barbs Fred could be counted on to decide these contests of will.
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Summary: Those who are charged with committing violence on behalf of the state will adopt language designed to obscure from themselves (in the field) or us (in the public sphere) the reality of what violence they do on our behalf. They will do so in slightly different ways, however. In the field the language will serve to dehumanize the other while in the public sphere the language will be designed to convince us that our violence toward others is justified. When it comes to describing the actions of violence, in contradistinction to the people who are the object of violence, on the battlefield the agents will use “standard” euphemisms which soften the blunt description of what is occurring, while in the public sphere, the military and politicians will opt for “Orwellian” euphemism which gut (irony intended) the language of any emotive connection to the violence described, revealing the catalog of swindles and perversions which Orwell railed against in the famous essay with which this paper’s preface began.

Meanwhile the language of our ordinary and even admired activities is so saturated with the terms of violence and conflict that it requires a genuine and thoughtful analysis of the media and the world around us to remain freshly aware of the moral dimensions of our culture and our own place within it.

Note that I haven’t, in this paper, covered true doublespeak in the public sphere or even the recent examples where politicians have made clear their intent to abandon certain words with the explicit intent of manipulating public opinion, as when John Hernandez, deputy administrator of the EPA, explained that words like "hazard" would no longer be used by the EPA, and instead of talking about "degree of hazard" the EPA would refer to "degree of mitigation of risk." Note also President Bush’s attempt to escape from the commitment to a policy of stay the course, which had come to mean stay committed to permanent violence in Iraq. This is an important topic but I judged it not central to my topic.

Here is Orwell in pure railing mode: "In our time, political speech and writing are largely the defense of the indefensible.... Thus political language has to consist largely of euphemism, question-begging and sheer cloudy vagueness.... [It] is designed to make lies sound truthful and murder respectable, and to give an appearance of solidity to pure wind."
Who Is a “Terrorist?” Language and the Case of Domestic “Terrorism”
Joshua M. Frank and Pamela Carlisle-Frank

Abstract

Language is used to marginalize, dismiss, and control some groups in this country. Language is now being used to justify surveillance and harsh criminal charges for minor offenses against members of some targeted groups. While the official justification for these actions is a threat of “terrorism” from these groups, this explanation is implausible. The true justification appears to be that these groups are comprised of United States citizens who have political views opposing the current administration, and, in some cases, the profit interests of major corporations. These groups include movements such as peace activists, animal rights activists, environmentalists, Quakers, and Puerto Rican independence activists. The current administration, as well as members of the U.S. national security and law enforcement offices, has now begun to routinely use the language of "domestic terrorists" to describe members of these groups. FBI representatives have made statements to the media on several occasions that animal rights activists, in particular, represent "the nation’s greatest domestic terrorist threat." While members of these groups may take part in demonstrations, letter-writing campaigns, and even, in a small percentage of cases, engage in direct action activities, they do not seek to hurt or kill people. This invites the question: What makes them "terrorists"?

The social and economic implications behind the current use of language to control those with opposing views are examined. We use as our springboard recent legislation that was signed into law in late 2006, the "Animal Enterprise Terrorism Act", which actually defines "terrorism" in such a way that includes many traditional forms of civil disobedience, including those practiced by peaceful activists such as Martin Luther King, Jr. Some attorneys have argued that under this act, even speech that might potentially be perceived as harming corporate interests could be considered "terrorism." We will examine how this current use of language to describe peaceful, nonviolent activities of animal advocates as "terrorism" is a calculated, divisive attempt to socially engineer the reality of the general public. We will explore how language is currently being used by corporate lobbyists and government and law enforcement officials to create the perception of violence and the threat of violence in order to protect the profit-margins of corporations.

1. An Overview of the Problem: The Use of Language to Silence Alternative Beliefs.

Language is currently being used by U.S. corporations and the political and law enforcement officials who represent them to silence and marginalize people who have dissenting beliefs. In

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particular, words such as “terrorists”, “domestic terrorism”, “violence”, “violent assaults”, and “extremists” are being used to describe individuals who present no threat to life, have no history of harm to living beings, and whose primary goal is to adversely affect the economic position of corporations who do.

Language is being manipulated by U. S. governmental officials in the executive and legislative branches as well as by law enforcement (FBI) whose job it is to stop “terrorist” activities. The target of these manipulations is a variety of groups whose beliefs threaten corporate profit and/or political power. This paper will focus on animal groups as one especially timely and egregious case of how language, and, in particular, the use of “terrorism” and related concepts, have been manipulated to enact legislation, fund and target law enforcement activities on political dissenters, and mold public opinion.

In many ways, animal rights groups are not a very powerful political force. This invites the question, “Why would politicians feel a need to target animals rights groups and present them as ‘domestic terrorists’?” We will explore several answers to this question.

One of the primary reasons animal rights groups are now being singled out by some government officials is because major corporate industries have experienced financial losses from the efforts of animal rights advocates. Corporations whose primary profits are derived from using animals (biomedical research industry, fur farming, circuses, zoos, etc.) are concerned that the campaigns and efforts of animal rights advocates to reach the public with their message may threaten a multibillion dollar industry. In response corporations have pressured politicians to create legislation that seeks to silence any person whose beliefs about animal rights runs in contrast to those of the corporation.
The ultimate goal of these linguistic manipulations and legislative/law enforcement efforts is compliance. Government politicians and law enforcement, acting on behalf of powerful corporations, have set out to socially engineer public opinion about a group with dissenting beliefs in order to marginalize the group, discredit its beliefs and statements, and ultimately, to garner compliance by silencing and controlling this group’s ideologies, beliefs, and activities. One avenue legislators and law enforcement (acting on behalf of animal enterprise corporations and their lobbyists) have used to accomplish their goal to silence animal rights advocacy groups and socially engineer fear in the general public about these groups is enacting federal legislation denouncing animal rights advocates as “domestic terrorists” and enacting severe punishments that, some legal experts argue, could be meted out for something as benign as email letter writing campaigns and boycotts of corporations that have created cruel conditions for animals.

Legislation passed by the House in November 2006 has done just that. The Animal Enterprise Terrorism Act (AETA) will be the primary focus of analysis here. We will examine how the government, fueled by enticements from high-priced corporate lobbyists acting on behalf of corporate interests, along with the opportunity presented by government sponsored post-9-11 funding (both at the federal and state levels), has begun to reshape the public’s perception of animal rights. This reshaping of perceptions has been accomplished through marginalizing those advocating on behalf of animals, and presenting them as “the nation’s number one domestic threat,” replacing the public’s sympathy and open mind with fear about animal rights groups.

Legislators and law enforcement make extensive use of the news media to reach the public and inform it of the “threat” to its safety. Using press releases and press conferences, public officials feed the media the elements of the story they want the public to hear. The
mainstream news media then reports the story using officials’ language of fear: “terrorism”, “domestic terrorists”, “violence”, “threat”, and other similar terms are directly linked with the words “animal rights.” There is no mention of the corporate lobbyists or corporate profit interests, and any thoughts of how legislation has impeded on the public’s first and fourteenth amendment rights have been either ignored or omitted by the journalists creating the news piece.

2. A Closer Look at Language as a Tool to Suppress.

Language is a quite powerful tool for manipulating public opinion. The power of language is well-known among social scientists. In terms of animal rights and welfare issues, which are a primary focus of the discussion here, there have been some analyses in the scholarly literature. Joan Dunayer (2001) discusses many ways in which language is used to maintain the exploited position of animals in society, while Carol Adams (1990) discusses how meat has been associated with positive attributes such as strength and masculinity, while vegetables have negative associations such as dullness. Pamela Carlisle-Frank & Joshua Frank (2006) examined the use of the terms of “guardian” and “owner” empirically among people with companion animals, and found strong differences in behavior associated with the language used with respect to these two terms.

The term “terrorism” conjures up images in the minds of the public of foreign religious extremists, generally with fundamentalist Islamic religious beliefs, intent on killing civilians. The terrorists of our collective imagination hate everything the United States stands for, are beyond logical discussion or compromise, wish nothing but death and suffering upon us, and do cheer in the streets when harm comes to innocent Western civilians. While this may be an unfair characterization that has been over-generalized to create stereotypes of all Islamic foreigners,
these “terrorists” are not the focus of this analysis. Instead, the focus here is on those dubiously labeled as domestic “terrorists.” While government officials and the media cultivate a public image of “terrorists” as foreign Islamic extremists, other domestic political groups have recently been quietly swept into the same category with a goal of dismissing and marginalizing these groups, as well as justifying surveillance and harsh criminal charges for minor offenses.

Even if the public’s image of terrorism focuses on the archetype of a foreign Islamic extremist, cultivating public fear of terrorism in general helps in suppressing domestic political causes labeled as “terrorist” by generating anti-terrorist momentum. This momentum is used to help garner support for anti-“terrorist” legislation that targets domestic causes as well as foreign threats. Momentum is also utilized to increase funding for law enforcement to fight “terrorism” that includes domestic groups. Public momentum from fear of terrorism has also been used for other causes, such as to promote surveillance programs that are heavily invasive of privacy under innocuous sounding names such as “total information awareness” or “secure flight” (Harper, 2006).

The use of the term “terrorism” by the media and government officials has shown a clear bias. In fact, the President and his representatives have often used the word terrorism to describe events that fail to fit their own definition (Dunn, Moore, & Nosek, 2005). Subtle wording changes in reports that suggest an action is taken by an ally or enemy also can make a significant difference in whether an event is perceived as terrorism (Dunn, Moore, & Nosek, 2005).

The proper definition of terrorism has been discussed extensively. Cooper (2001) defines terrorism as the “intentional generation of massive fear by human beings for the purpose of securing or maintaining control over other human beings”. Cooper, like many other authors on the subject, notes the selective use that officials have made of the term, failing to universally
apply this (or any other definition) to all parties, regardless of the perceived legitimacy of their cause. The term “massive fear” is noteworthy here, since while setting minks free from a farm or burning SUV’s may cause some level of fear in interested parties, but it is unlikely this would qualify as “massive fear”. The term massive fear in this definition is left somewhat unclear by Cooper, since it is not indicated what kind of fear we are discussing. There are many legal actions systematically taken to cause some level of fear for loss of one’s interests. For example, an employer who threatens to fire any workers who unionize may cause “massive fear” of job loss, but it seems that this is not what Cooper has in mind. It appears likely that Cooper intends fear of harm to self or others, not fear of economic loss or other less weighty interests.

Charles Ruby (2002) uses the United States State Department’s definition as a starting point for considering the definition of terrorism. Ruby uses three key criteria that distinguishes terrorism from other forms of violence. The first is that they are politically motivated, the second is that terrorist violence is directed against non-combatants, and the third is that subnational groups or clandestine groups are involved. This last part, unlike some other definitions eliminates the possibility of state-sponsored terrorism by definition. However, for purposes of this discussion, the most important part of the definition is that it there must be violence involved. Once again, no explicit definition is given for what is meant by “violence”, but the tone, examples, and discussion in the article all seem to implicitly indicate that violence involves harm or the threat of bodily harm, not damage done strictly to property.

Bruce Hoffman (1998) states that all acts of terrorism involve violence or the threat of violence. Hoffman also mentions the intent of terrorism being to instill fear in a wider audience. Benjamin Grob-Fitzgibbon (2005) separate terrorism-from-below (as opposed to state terrorism) into four categories: national terrorism, revolutionary terrorism, reactionary terrorism, and
religious terrorism. It is worth noting that animal rights-related terrorist acts do not easily fit into any of these categories, though if forced into any category it would most likely be revolutionary terrorism. Sonia Torres (2006) notes that North American and South American definitions of terrorism indicate a consensus in some respects, including the threat or use of violence. However, there is a difference in emphasis between terrorism-from-above versus terrorism-from-below (or using the terms utilized by Torres “wholesale” vs. “retail” terrorism).

While opting not to outright define terrorism, Samuel Schefller (2006) states that the standard cases of terrorism undertake to kill or injure more or less at random. He suggests that creating a general state of fear of violent death is one of the primary reasons that terrorism is particularly morally reprehensible. Furthermore, according to Schefller, the definition of terrorism must be linked to the creation of a state of terror (as opposed to, for example, political assassinations that do not provoke widespread fear of life), otherwise it loses its more importance. While the State Department’s definition of terrorism includes the requirement of “violence”, this term is clearly used very broadly since about half of their count of international terrorist incidents since the late 1990’s consist of bombs directed at oil pipelines rather than at injuring persons (Tilly, 2004).

Generally speaking, while precise definitions may differ, there are some consistent threads in the definition of terrorism that are relevant here. First, terrorism under most definitions involves violence or at least the threat of violence. Second terrorism involves the use of “terror” (or “massive fear”) in its target to affect political change. Third, the use of “noncombatants” or similar wording is often used when discussing the target of this activity. While noncombatant implies that the targets are not military or police personnel, it also implies that the user is assuming the targets are human beings. Aside from government attempts to
redefine terrorism based on political interests, there is general consistency in discussion of these definitions that “violence” implies harm to living beings, that “terror” implies fear of serious injury (not fear of loss of property), and that terms for the targets (such as noncombatants) generally implies human targets. In fact, the reason that the analyses of these definitions fail to state these assumptions outright appears to be that they are obvious enough to be taken for granted.

Precise definitions of terrorism may differ (particularly on issues such as how government-originated activity should be counted), but as discussed, there is general consistency on a number of issues. Nevertheless, public anti-terrorism sentiment has been used to target activities that would not fall under most experts’ definitions of terrorism. Many groups that are comprised of United States citizens who have opposing political views and sometimes use direct action as a tactic for social change have been targeted using this anti-terrorism momentum. These groups include diverse movements such as peace activists, animal rights activists, environmentalists, Quakers, and Puerto Rican independence activists. Generally, the groups are outside the mainstream just far enough to elicit little outrage from the general public when they are labeled and treated as terrorists. Yet, at the same time, these groups pose a real threat to some interests, either because they represent the leading edge of a larger political movement, or because they threaten corporate profitability. Another trait shared by all of these groups is that they have not ever killed a person in the United States. Nor are they usually violent. Activists in these groups generally do not consider violence directed toward other living beings an acceptable approach to use.

If these groups do not seek to hurt or kill people, what makes them “terrorists”? FBI representatives have stated on several occasions that environmental and animal rights activists
represent the nation’s greatest domestic “terrorist threat” (Frieden, 2005; Associated Press, 2006; Potter, 2006a). Noticeably absent from stated government concerns regarding domestic terrorism are the two domestic groups that have killed people recently in the United States: abortion activists, and domestic militia groups. This also suggests the possibility of a political motivation for which domestic groups are labeled “terrorists.”

Animal activists generally hold their “extremist” views due to a reverence for all life, making them unlikely candidates for inflicting intentional harm to people. The quite small portion of animal activists who conduct illegal activities generally engage in acts of vandalism, theft, trespassing, and other minor property crimes. It would be a large stretch to consider these crimes “violent” and it is also highly unlikely that these crimes create a state of terror or massive fear in any audience. While the total cost of these crimes has run into millions of dollars over the course of the past 15 years (Frieden, 2005), the cost is minor relative to the profits of the industries involved. It is true that animal industries might incur “defensive costs” to prevent future property crimes, but from an economic standpoint, this spending should be similar in magnitude to the cost of damage. But more importantly, regardless of the extent of property damage, to equate such acts with “terrorism” is a stretch, to say the least.

The primary targets of animal activists are corporations, and the primary impact is financial. Corporations and profits margins cannot experience “terror.” The term terrorism in relation to property crimes is a distortion. In addition, the use of the word “violence” with regard to the illegal activity of some animal activists (Smith, 2002) is also misleading. While there are a few occasions where animal activists have used explosives, these incidents have been carefully planned to avoid any injury to humans (or any animal for that matter) (ALF Press Releases, 2001-2005). Therefore, the term “violence” with respect to crimes that involve damage to
property is again misleading. Federal agents have argued that it is only a matter of time until somebody is accidentally killed due to being in the wrong place when one of these explosives go off. This argument is questionable since this is an uncommon tactic at best, and since care is taken to avoid causing harm. However, even if Federal Agents are right, and someone someday may accidentally die at the hands of animal activists, the possible accidental death of one person in the future hardly justifies the level of prominence given to all animal activists as a major “terrorist” threat. Furthermore, the possibility of a future accidental death does not make the activity “violent” any more than golf becomes a “violent” sport if somebody is struck in the head one rare day and killed with a ball.

It should be noted that there are some questionable tactics used by animal activists. For example, some activists have campaigned against corporate leadership at a personal level in a way that could be argued as bordering on “harassment.” Publishing animal research laboratory employees’ social security numbers, home addresses, and names, ages, and schools of their children are good examples. If such activities make people frightened for their safety or that of their family, their emotional state could technically be considered one of “terror” and the acts could, at some level, be labeled “terrorism.” But these groups also have a history of consistently not perpetrating violence. While such acts may not be morally justifiable, to be considered terrorism, any fear instilled by the actions should be justifiable based on the reasonable threat presented. Otherwise, anybody could legally claim to be terrorized by political opponents based on any perceived threat, reasonable or not.

Also ignored in the discussion of “terrorism” are the actions by corporations and the government that threaten those who speak out. Whistleblowers are frequently harassed, threatened, and live in terror both before and after they speak out. History is full of incidents of
labor organizers, civil rights activists, people who speak out about being sexually harassed or otherwise mistreated in the work place. People who speak out in general to change the status quo have been harassed, threatened, or at times even harmed or killed. While some of the most blatant of these activities have stopped, those who speak out against major corporate or political interests are still subject to intimidation or harm. If organized efforts to thwart corporate activities are considered “terrorism,” then activities by corporations and their representatives which target individuals can equally be considered “terrorism.” They certainly could fit most definitions in that they are political actions intended to create fear of violence and target an audience beyond the immediate victim. Yet somehow, militia groups, Nazi and Klan activities, abortion activists, and pro-corporate intimidation do not receive labeling or significant attention as “terrorist” activities, while anti-corporate activities by environmental and animal advocacy groups receive a great deal of law enforcement attention. Any activities by corporations that create a climate of fear and that overtly threaten or cause violence should certainly fall under the definition of terrorism. At the very least, more consistency needs to be used by law enforcement and other government agencies in defining terrorism.

Animal and environmental groups are not the only causes that have received attention and have been under surveillance for alleged security purposes. For many of these groups, the case that they represent a security risk is even weaker than it is for animal activists. For example, what possible threats to our national security do the societies of Quakers and peace activists present? Furthermore what state of terror do these groups create in any audience?

These domestic groups have been targeted using homeland-security-funded surveillance. The same expansion in surveillance methods utilized because of post-9-11 law and policy changes has also been used to target domestic groups. Now, however, federal legislation has
been created to attack domestic political groups in ways that go beyond general anti-terrorism laws and funding. The “Animal Enterprise Terrorism Act” was passed and signed into law on 27 November 2006. There can be no question that legislators sought to connect this legislation with the concept of “terrorism” since terrorism is in the very name of the act. Yet this legislation has little, if anything, to do with terrorism. It is highlighted here because it is perhaps the most blatant manipulation of the public’s fear of terrorism to date. To make matters worse, the legislation’s focus is almost exclusively to protect corporate interests, and further, it supports activities that infringe on civil liberties (Boghosian, 2006a).

3. Overview of the Animal Enterprise Terrorism Act (AETA).

The Animal Enterprise Terrorism Act (AETA) is an expansion of the 1992 and 2002 Animal Enterprise Protection Acts. The purpose of all three acts is purportedly to address illegal activity by animal activists. While those laws are also of questionable merit, the focus here is on AETA because of its manipulation of the concept of “terrorism.” The AETA broadens the scope of the previous acts, as well as increasing the penalties for violations. However, the AETA goes much further by defining “terrorism” in such a way that includes many traditional forms of civil disobedience such as those practiced by Martin Luther King, Jr. In addition, penalties for causing economic damage alone can be as high as life in prison.

After AETA passed the Senate without dissent or discussion, animal and social justice advocates across the country started a national campaign to contact House legislators with their concerns; the hope was that AETA would receive more serious scrutiny and debate in the House than it received in the Senate. However, the House of Representatives leadership pushed this legislation onto the “suspension calendar,” a procedure normally reserved for uncontroversial bills, as a strategy to “sneak” the bill through the House (Potter, 2006a). The bill passed the
House with just six legislators voting, during a lame-duck session following the 2006 election when the leadership of both houses of Congress changed hands. Supporters in the Senate were both Republican and Democrat, and no Democrats dissented; in the House the bill was passed through a voice vote in a nearly empty room, with a lone dissenter: Representative Dennis Kucinich, D-Ohio (Anon, 2006a).

**i. Opposition to AETA.**

A variety of legal scholars and social justice organizations have argued that AETA is flawed in several ways. Opponents argue that AETA brands nonviolent animal protection and civil disobedience activities as “terrorism” (Boghosian, 2006a; Equal Justice Alliance, 2006). Anything that interferes with business could be labeled “terrorism” (Potter, 2006b). The legislation states that “property damage” includes “loss of profits”, therefore boycotts, undercover investigations, whistleblowing, and other acts that cause no physical damage, but hurt corporate profits, could be defined as terrorism. Acts such as urging shoppers to stay away from a store, expressing an opinion on the Internet about the health risks of salmonella in chicken, condemning a university for conducting animal experiments, or asking alumni to withhold donations until changes are made, all might lead to jail time for the individuals involved (Hanchette, 2006). While most supporters have denied the bill would make civil disobedience a crime, one supporter in the House of Representatives did acknowledge during discussion that civil disobedience would be covered by the bill if it causes disruption or loss of profits (Potter, 2006c). Virtually all effective disobedience that targets a business should have some indirect negative effect on profits. So in effect, civil disobedience by animal activists has been turned into a serious crime, and “terrorism” by this legislation.
Opponents also voice concern that the AETA invokes excessively harsh penalties (Equal Justice Alliance, 2006, Potter, 2006b). Penalties for economic damage can be up to 20 years in prison, while jail terms of up to 18 months are possible for activities that involve no threatened or actual economic damage and no bodily harm (NOAETA.org, 2006).

Opponents also argue that the AETA may authorize unwarranted wiretapping of animal advocacy organizations (Equal Justice Alliance, 2006). Another complaint is that the AETA is overly broad so that activists do not know if they are acting within the law (Hanchette, 2006; NOAETA.org, 2006;). This vagueness, legal scholars argue, will act to deter activity and speech which is lawful under the first amendment (Boghosian, 2006a). Arguably the intention of AETA is precisely to deter lawful activity. It does little to deter the “terrorist” acts it allegedly targets, since these acts are already illegal (Mitchell, 2006). The true target appears to be the actions of “above-ground” animal activists (Potter, 2006b). While the AETA discusses creating “reasonable fear” of harm as a criminal act, it has been argued that corporations are intentionally creating a “climate of fear” regarding domestic terrorism, thereby making the “unreasonable seem reasonable” (Potter, 2006b).

### ii. Media Coverage of AETA.

In addition to passing through Congress relatively quietly, with no dissent or discussion in the Senate and little discussion in the House, AETA has received surprisingly little media coverage. Other than those within the networks of animal and social justice organizations, the people had little opinion on AETA because they generally did not know about the law. Politicians, law enforcement agents, and industry representatives were quite successful at creating the perception that some political groups are “terrorists” who pose a threat to the public safety. The goal of those backing AETA was to create an impression that stopping these terrorist acts was a top
priority and therefore non-controversial. The news media had little reason to cover the story. Perhaps more importantly, the legislation focused exclusively on one marginalized group that had already been successfully characterized for the public and media as “nuts” or “extremists”, therefore making it an issue unworthy of general coverage.


Focusing exclusively on one type of political dissent appears to have been a wise strategy for supporters of the AETA. It follows a “divide and conquer” strategy that can be very effective for silencing causes that currently represent a minority of the population. If the majority of the population sees an aggressive punitive law as irrelevant to them since it focuses on one small group, the law is likely to pass with little dissent. Even if this law may conflict with basic constitutional rights and threaten to corrupt the democratic process, the marginalized status of the group affected makes large-scale dissent unlikely. Furthermore, misinformation regarding the threat level and the actions of the groups affected can easily be propagated due to the marginalized nature of these groups. Therefore, focusing on one specific type of political dissent can be quite effective.

But the fact that the legislation focuses on a single political viewpoint makes its premise even more questionable. Legislation making an activity a crime is typically based on the nature of the activity instead of the motivation for it. If the activities discussed in the AETA legislation are so egregious that they warrant harsh penalties, then why should they not warrant equally harsh penalties if an act of vandalism or trespass occurs during a protest of abortion, war, gay marriage, or any other political motivation? Or, for that matter, why should penalties not be equally harsh for vandalism or trespass in general? Even if an argument could be made that organized political illegal activities deserve special treatment and that the primary violators are
currently animal activists, this still does not justify such a specific legal act. After all, in the future, the activists damaging property could do so in support of a completely different cause. This is, after all, why criminal laws are written to generally cover all causes of an act. If there is a rash of thefts of sports cars, we do not make a law about stealing sports cars, we make a law about stealing cars. If we are concerned about suicide bombers and currently the groups conducting such bombings are Islamic in religious beliefs, we do not pass a law to deter Islamic suicide bombings, we pass a law to deter all suicide bombings. There is no legitimate public policy or ethical justification for passing a law specifically addressing animal “terrorism.”

If there is no legitimate justification for passing a law targeting a specific group, the alternative explanation is that the law was worded that way for practical reasons. As already discussed, one reason—perhaps the main reason—for creating a law focusing on only one political cause is that such a law is much easier to pass. Most of society either does not care about this one relatively small political cause, or is at least uninformed enough about it to easily accept the premise that they represent a legitimate terrorist threat. A law that targets one cause also insures that the legislation will never be turned and used against its makers. If for, example, a cause that is dear to the law’s drafters becomes illegal or disfavored, their allies seeking to fight that cause can conduct acts of civil disobedience or other illegal activities without fearing the harsh penalties that are reserved for animal-friendly “terrorists.”

The law’s asymmetrical nature and limited scope is evidence of the its inconsistency, inherent unfairness, and questionable morality. If anti-hunting animal activists are threatened by armed hunters in a way that makes them and other activists fearful for their lives, would the hunters be legally prosecuted as terrorists? What about a slaughterhouse that instills fear of violence in low-pay (or possibly illegal immigrant) workers that consider reporting violations?
The fact that these activities probably would not fall under the scope of the law and almost undoubtedly would not be prosecuted indicates the inherently unfair nature of the law.

Aside from the issue of why the law’s supporters chose to take on only one specific group, there is the question of why animal activists in particular were targeted. It has been argued here that animal activists present no real terrorist threat. Therefore, AETA supporters must have other motivations. Yet animal activists represent a small political force with little potential to topple the existing power structure. Why then, might they present such a threat?

Perhaps the most obvious reason why animal activists are perceived as a threat is that acts causing property damage to the animal industry directly cost corporations millions of dollars. These losses are very small relative to the size of the animal agriculture, biomedical, and fur industries. However, the direct losses from property damage alone might be large enough to justify lobbying for passage of such an act.

The direct property damage losses from animal activists are compounded by the indirect costs from animal activists. These include the costs from acts of civil disobedience that result in disruption, organizing boycotts, pushing for animal welfare legislation, and providing information to the public. It is likely that these indirect costs greatly exceed the direct property damage done by activists. Even if property damage done by animal activists is considered to be “terrorist” activity (which is, in itself, quite a stretch), the indirect costs from boycotts, providing information to the public, etc. can in no way be considered terrorism. Arguably, it is the indirect costs from legitimate activist tactics that are the target of AETA.

One of these activities, provision of information, warrants further discussion. Business production methods remain largely hidden from view and consumers lack a great deal of information about the ethical nature of corporate behavior that is highly relevant to their decision
making. A strong case can be made that markets cannot function optimally until consumers are provided with this information (Frank, 2005). One of the more important roles of animal activists has been to provide the public with information through whistleblowers, undercover investigations, and dissemination of information. Regulators that are charged with enforcing animal welfare laws are too closely tied to the industry to adequately enforce these laws, and violations rarely result in any action. Often, the only way animal abuse comes to light is through the actions of animal activists. Sometimes trespassing, illegally filming facilities, or other minor violations of the law have been needed in the current institutional framework to bring violations of animal welfare laws to light (Frank, 2004). It is likely that one of the more important reasons for AETA’s creation was to prevent information from becoming public that would be harmful to the animal industry in the future. When such information has been exposed in the past, it has resulted in public outrage that has caused boycotts, permanent shifts in consumer behavior, and enactment of animal welfare legislation. While the merits of minor legal infractions to obtain information of great interest to the public can be debated, obtaining information does not qualify as “terrorism”. Obtaining information is not creating violence of the fear of violence, nor does it instill fear or terror. Aside from its definition as terrorism, providing information has many public benefits and should not justify harsh penalties that will ultimately reduce the amount of information available to the public.

Another advantage for the animal industry persuading legislators to pass AETA is that it allows industries, lobbyists, and politicians to further marginalize animal activists by strategic use of the “terrorist” label, a technique that has been used in the past. Television debates featuring representatives of animal organizations such as the People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals (PETA), paired against pro-animal industry lobbyists, have often degenerated when the
industry representative focused the debate on discrediting the animal advocate as a “terrorist” or “supporter of terrorism.” (Such accusations were based on reports that PETA has given money for the legal defense of activists accused of crimes.) Passage of AETA gives animal industry supporters a very powerful tool to discredit their opponents. By definition of the law, anybody convicted or even charged with any of the multitude of minor infractions that fall under AETA can be labeled a “terrorist” or as “federally charged with terrorism.”. For many members of the general public who are unfamiliar with the context and details of AETA, having an advocate labeled a terrorist automatically discredits the advocate.

There is also one more reason animal advocates may be targeted even if they do not pose a major political threat. They could be just the first group targeted by a series of laws designed to silence a wide range of political opponents one by one. Once such a law has been achieved, it tends to set a precedent making it more difficult to oppose such a law in the future, especially if the harm to civil liberties caused by the prior law remains unseen due to the silencing of the opposition.

5. How Language Is Used to Socially Engineer Public Perceptions Against Those Who Pose an Economic or Political Threat.

How do politicians manage to garner public support for the potential infringement of civil liberties of laws like AETA? Part of the equation for the social engineering of the American public is the public themselves. In order for this to happen, the general public must either (1) have complete trust in government officials, law enforcement and the media, (2) be apathetic, making it indifferent to the potential loss of its own civil liberties, (3) have a lack of understanding about how laws like AETA can impact its own personal freedom, or (4) be already so consumed with fear about terrorism and terrorists that the fear alone overrides logic and critical thinking.
i. Primed for Social Engineering.

The American public is, by and large, a receptive audience for public officials who want to manipulate public opinion in order to justify creating and passing extremely prejudicial laws. After all, the general public has been primed for social engineering because we are a fear-driven culture, being fed a steady diet of fear-driven rhetoric from corporate marketers and advertisers. Thanks to a barrage of advertisements and messages in print, radio, and television news media, and supported by our entertainment-based media, Americans are fearful of growing old, getting wrinkles, being sad, getting sick, having less sex, fewer erections, getting fat, having bad credit, not enough money, dying, a glut of social stigmas, and now, terrorism.

Using fear to manipulate and motivate is the American way. Fear is one of the two major tools used by American marketers and advertisers (“desire” is the other) to increase sales revenues and profits for their clients (Spence & Moinpour, 1972; LaTour & Zahra, 1989). We fear so many things that there appears to be little questioning or critical thinking about the ever-present messages of things to fear that permeates our culture. Given the lack of questioning by the public at large, and how responsive the public is to fear-driven messages, it should not be surprising that public officials would adopt this approach when trying to convince and persuade the public that legislation is needed to fight “terrorism” when that legislation might otherwise be called into question.

6. Politicians and Law Enforcement Use Fear to Obtain Compliance and Deflect the Public’s Attention Away From Constitutionally Questionable Laws

The language being put forth to the public by law enforcement and political officials about groups who believe in animal rights has been extreme and fear provoking (FBI, 2002). In a 2005 CNN report entitled “FBI, ATF address domestic terrorism. Officials: Extremists pose serious
threat,” top federal law enforcement officials told the media, “Violent animal rights extremists and eco-terrorists now pose one of the most serious terrorism threats to the nation” (Frieden, 2005).

Senior officials from the FBI and the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms (ATF) testified at a Senate panel in May 2005 about their growing concern over animal rights and environmental groups they have labeled as “violent extremists.” Both FBI and the top Officials of the ATF used strong language capable of striking fear in the American public. The FBI’s deputy assistant director for counter-terrorism John Lewis stated that “animal and environmental rights extremists have claimed credit for more than 1,200 criminal incidents” over the course of the previous 15 years. Chief crimes the animal rights group was blamed for were vandalism, arson, and bombings (all done after-hours) of animal research labs used by pharmaceutical and cosmetic industries. While Lewis concedes there have been no deaths resulting from the activists’ attacks, he neglects to make clear that 100 percent of the “1,200 criminal incidents” he uses as his basis for calling animal rights activists the “number one threat of domestic terrorism” are property crimes.

James Inhofe, Chairman of the Senate Environment Committee, cited his estimates for the cost of damages from “militant” environmental and animal rights supporters to be more than $110 million over the past decade. Again, we see that profit losses stemming from vandalism to property is the motivating force for the concern over animal rights and environmental activists.

Continuing on with the pattern of extreme language designed to substantiate danger and create fear in the public’s mind he says, “Just like Al Qaeda or any other terrorist movement, ELFiii and ALFiv cannot accomplish their goals without money, membership and the media.” This statement is revealing in linking animal rights and environmental activists—people who
believe strongly in stopping abuses and suffering of sentient beings, and of saving the trees, water, air, and eco-system—to al Qaeda, a known terrorist group who has claimed responsibility for deadly attacks on innocent humans. But the statement is also revealing from another angle, as it warns those who may be sympathetic and/or offer support that the groups they are supporting are now officially “terrorists” and “extremists.” Most revealing, however, is the implied warning to the media that it should not be giving the activists a voice. The media should not tell the animal and environmental activists’ side, present a balanced view, or even imply that there is another side with a valid viewpoint, as doing so would be aiding and abetting terrorism.

The inclusion of the media in the legislator’s statement appears unnecessary as a thorough search of media reports on the topic indicate that the majority of scant media reports on the topic have used the same strong, prejudicial language as the politicians and law enforcement do to describe animal and environmental activists. In the majority of news media reports, animal activists are lumped into a single, monolithic group. This group is referred to as “terrorists” and “extremists” who commit “violent” acts (Smith, 2002; Frieden, 2005; Associated Press, 2006; Mitchell, 2006).

Animal rights advocates are no more a monolithic group than are those who advocate for stopping harm to the environment or stopping wars. The overwhelming majority of those advocating for animals do so lawfully and peacefully. Most advocates, numbering in the hundreds of thousands worldwide, are affiliated with registered nonprofit charitable organizations (World Animal Net Directory, 2004), focusing their efforts on legitimate animal rescue, public and humane education efforts. These efforts include conducting and publishing scholarly research in the animal welfare sciences, distributing literature during public venues, organizing letter writing campaigns, peaceful demonstrations and leafleting, and, to a lesser
extent, organizing boycotts of corporations reported to engage in activities causing animal suffering. Unfortunately, according to some legal scholars, the AETA will most directly impact those advocates who engage in peaceful, lawful campaigns by labeling and potentially prosecuting them as “terrorists” (Boghosian, 2006a) and will likely not affect the handful of people who act independently under the name of ALF liberating animals from research labs, setting animals free from fur farms, uncovering information from undercover videos and document retrieval, and committing acts of vandalism and property destruction against corporations (Potter, 2006).

i. Pay No Attention to the Man Behind the Curtain.

It would appear that legislators supporting AETA must be justified in their concern for protecting the public from terrorism, until we look closer to see who is behind the creation of such legislation. We can begin this process by examining the AETA legislation itself. As discussed earlier, AETA uses broad, vague language to link “economic damage” with “terrorism.” Suffering economic damage and profit loss are defined broadly enough such that advocates can be charged with terrorism if corporations make a claim that they have suffered financial decline. Such financial damage might result from peaceful protests, boycotts, media campaigns, or leafleting (Boghosian, 2006a).

It is the corporations who engage in the use of animals to make profits who have the most to lose from the actions of animal advocates (Trull, 2006). It is no surprise, then, that AETA was created by the lobbyists group American Legislative Exchange Council (ALEC), an alliance of corporations and political interest groups in conjunction with the U.S. Sportsmen’s Alliance (Boghosian, 2006a). ALEC is an alliance that is supported by more than 300 large corporations including pharmaceutical companies, and the tobacco and petroleum industries. ALEC works
with right-wing entities which work to influence legislation that benefits Big Business. Between 1999 and 2000, legislators working on behalf of ALEC introduced over 3,000 pieces of legislation to benefit corporations. Four hundred and fifty of those have since been enacted as law (Boghosian, 2006a).

The supporters of AETA include organizations who have been repeatedly cited for animal welfare violations (NOAETA.org, 2006). AETA, according to some, was motivated in large part not by acts of violent terrorism but by the use of undercover footage showing blatant violations of animal welfare laws such as laboratory beagles being punched for laughs and dissections of live baboons (Hanchette, 2006).

ii. The Justification of Enacting Prejudicial Legislation.

The passing of AETA has not happened quietly. Legal scholars and professionals, together with numerous mainstream animal advocacy organizations, and even some politicians, have come out in opposition to the legislation. The primary arguments against the legislation are three-fold:

1) The legislation violates the First and Fourteenth Amendments. The vague, broad language of the legislation can define a “terrorist act” from peaceful, lawful activities such as leafleting or letter writing campaigns—anything that a corporation can claim as “economic damage” or a “loss of profits.”

2) The penalties are excessive: up to a year imprisonment for economic damage less than 10 thousand dollars, up to five years in prison if a threat caused someone “reasonable fear” of bodily harm, and prison sentences of up to 10 years if someone is injured.

3) There are already existing laws (the Animal Enterprise Protection Acts of 1992 and 2002) that punish perpetrators who cause harm to corporations engaged in Animal Enterprise.
In a letter defending AETA written by Legislative Director Michael Dobbs, on behalf of U.S. Representative Rick Larsen, the legislator argues that he feels “confident that the bill provides ample protection of First Amendment rights” (Potter, 2006). First Amendment activity may be excluded until the time that a corporation argues that a boycott, letter writing campaign, peaceful demonstration, or distribution of literature outside their facility has caused “a loss of profits.” While AETA does state that lawful boycotts and other related activities are excluded, a company could conceivably make a case that such boycotts or campaigns caused it to suffer economic damage vis-à-vis the need to increase security procedures and personnel.

Legislators go on to argue that AETA is necessary because there have been over 1,000 “acts of terrorism” causing “more than $120 million in damages” between 1990 and 2004 and that “the FBI considers such extremists activities among its most serious terrorist threats.”

The politicians supporting corporate pushing of AETA neglect to mention two crucial facts here. (1) There already exists a federal law (AEPA 2002) to protect corporate interests in the animal enterprise field, and (2) those committing vandalism and property damage will be the least affected by the new legislation, as those who release minks from fur farms, covertly photograph and tape egregious acts of violence against animals by lab workers, spray-paint buildings and set empty trucks and empty buildings on fire will not be deterred by AETA. They are already committing illegal acts under pre-existing laws and AETA will not help law enforcement catch perpetrators of property crimes any better than the current laws.

According to transcripts of the Congressional Record of the debate on AETA as it went before a six-person voice-only vote on 13 November 2006, AETA supporter Congressman Sensenbrenner used strong, fear-driven language to justify the bill. At the same time he overtly
acknowledged that the primary crux of the bill was to protect corporate profits by increasing punishments geared toward property crimes (Anon, 2006).

**Mr. Sensenbrenner:** The reason the bill is before us is that the current statute is drafted too narrowly and does not deal with threats by animal rights extremists in inflicting bodily harm, for example, against the publisher of Vogue magazine, because they put ads in depicting people wearing furs...the bill will make it a specific crime to intentionally damage the property of a person or entity having the connection to or relationship with or transactions with an animal enterprise.

It should be noted that while Sensenbrenner refers to “inflicting bodily harm”, the Vogue incident mentioned involved damage to clothing rather than body, and as previously mentioned, “animal rights extremist” crimes in the United States have been limited to damaging property, not causing bodily harm.

### iii. What AETA and the Language of “Terrorism” Means to Us As A Society

The passing of AETA and the proliferation of “terrorism-speak” to label and marginalize some groups on the basis of their beliefs have deleterious consequences for everyone in the U.S. When exercising First Amendment rights becomes a federal crime with extensive penalties we are on a slippery slope.

It is a serious situation when corporate leaders have so much power that they induce politicians to create and pass laws to protect their profits, all the while controlling what the news media reports by threatening to withdraw much-needed advertising dollars from newspapers and televisions news stations. Powerful corporations have hired expensive lobbyists to pressure politicians to pass laws that silence people whose beliefs and peaceful activities may threaten corporate profits (Trull, 2006). Unfortunately, the public never gets the whole story because the corporations are also controlling how and what the news media reports to the public.
The entire society is at risk when groups can be singled out and threatened with federal charges because their beliefs and lawful protests might affect corporate profits. According to the National Lawyers Guild, AETA contains vague and overbroad language that may be interpreted to criminalize legitimate activities such as an email campaign protesting actions of a corporation known to cause unnecessary suffering of animals. According to the Guild, “AETA will increase the likelihood of misguided prosecutions and will also serve as a deterrent to a host of lawful, First Amendment-protected activities.” This broad language not only puts animal protectionists at risk, but potentially anyone in the future, such as whistleblowers, who may be seen as harming corporate profits. The Guild states that “…the government is labeling some activist activities as ‘terrorist’ related, and levying harsher penalties for actions that are associated with political messages” (Boghosian, 2006a). Today it is those who protest and advocate for animals used in research laboratories and other venues. Next year it may be those who participate in walk-outs for better working conditions, or nonprofit consumer-protection organizations that expose corporate fraud or injustices to consumers and stockholders. Any time there is political- and profit-motivated legislation designed to squelch those with alternative beliefs, the consequences are bound to be far-reaching. This becomes especially insidious when political, corporate, and media factions use strong, prejudicial language to reshape the minds of the American public to make it believe it is all being done in the name of “public safety” for its best interest.

7. Conclusion.

Where we are now—According to the National Lawyers Guild, animal industry groups, corporations, and the politicians who represent them pushed hard for the passage of the Animal Enterprise Terrorism Act (AETA). The legislation was ostensibly pushed for in order to crack down on violent animal rights advocates extremists. The Guild argues, however, that AETA may
instead lead to a crackdown of legal constitutionally-protected political expression. This may be
an easy thing to do given AETA’s broad language that covers any activity corporations deem as
“interfering with the operation of an “animal enterprise” that results in a loss of profits. The
Guild maintains that AETA “deals a severe blow both to First Amendment protection of free
speech and assembly, and the Fourteenth Amendment, which guarantees all people will be
treated equally under the law.” The National Lawyers Guild argues that AETA will punish
people solely on the basis of the beliefs that motivate them (Boghosian, 2006b). The law is
flawed both in its broad language that allows people to be targeted for protected political
expression, and also because it targets one particular set of political beliefs, an unusual tactic
which makes the law subject to less public controversial but nevertheless particularly immoral.

Though now signed by the President of the United States and passed into law, there is
still a good chance this legislation will be challenged. The National Lawyers Guild has issued a
position statement saying they will challenge efforts under AETA to stifle legitimate dissent, and
look forward to opportunities to challenge this law in court and hopefully strike it down. In the
Guild’s publication “Punishing Dissent,” they document a surge in incidents and numerous
accounts of the government’s infringement of First Amendment rights, including documentation
of a rise in the government’s efforts to crackdown on environmental activism (Boghosian,
2006b).

The fact that the Guild has publicly recognized and spoken out against the potential threat
AETA has on First and Fourteenth Amendment rights is both refreshing and reassuring to animal
activists. The specifics and the outcome surrounding the first test case will no doubt have far-
reaching implications.
References


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The first amendment to the constitution, part of the original “Bill of Rights” guarantees the freedom of speech, press, right to assemble, and to petition. The fourteenth amendment, passed shortly after the abolition of slavery states that no citizen’s rights should be abridged.

Earth Liberation Front (ELF) is an eco-defense group dedicated to taking the profit motive out of environmental destruction by targeting and causing economic damage to businesses through the use of direct action. www.earthliberationfront.com

Animal Liberation Front (ALF) carries out direct action against animal abuse in the form of rescuing animals and causing financial loss to animal exploiters. www.animalliberationpressoffice.org/

Italics added.
Charu Gupta

One Paradigm, Many Worlds: Conflict Resolution across the Disciplines has one goal and that is to demonstrate that the paradigm of collaborative conflict resolution has a broad application across the social sciences. Edited by Mitchell Rosenwald, the book is a collection of essays written by various scholars from disciplines like: human services, elementary and secondary education, higher education, philosophy, and international relations.

As it promises, One Paradigm, Many Worlds: Conflict Resolution across the Disciplines provides something that has been missing in the genre and that is a cross discipline approach. A number of books have been published about using peaceful methods to resolve disputes. But each book was focused on one area of interest. Peter Ackerman and Jack DuVall’s A Force More Powerful: A Century of Non-Violent Conflict examines world history to demonstrate that peaceful methods brought an end to dictatorships, colonialism, and civil injustice. Colman McCarthy’s All of One Peace: Essays on Nonviolence is a collection of McCarthy’s essays from his career with The Washington Post advocating the use of peace in a variety of areas ranging from international relations to abortion. Conflict Resolution by Daniel Dana is designed for the business world and provides the tools managers need to resolve workplace conflicts. James A. Schellenberg’s Conflict Resolution: Theory, Research, and Practice is a study of classical and contemporary conflict theories. Finally, David and Roger Johnson’s book, Reducing School Violence through Conflict Resolution, educates students on how to reduce peer violence

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peacefully. Rosenwald has moved the genre one step forward by using a cross discipline approach to further the discussion on collaborative conflict resolution.

An added bonus is that the reader will definitely get the feel that the essays are more like a conversation among peers sitting at a roundtable sharing insightful stories and experiences or debating worst case scenarios. Undoubtedly, this is a result of the fact that an interdisciplinary conference on conflict resolution inspired the work and that most of the essays share anecdotal evidence rather than concrete research data. This reliance upon anecdotal evidence is one of the weaknesses of the book. It is most noticeable in the chapters that do not discuss human services.

The first four chapters concentrate upon social workers and their dealings with a variety of people. In this section, real evidence is interspersed among personal narratives and persuasive discussions. The examples in these four chapters range from mediation between parents and troubled teenagers to divorcing couples. All in all the discussion is convincing and builds upon the existing literature. Readers will relate to this section easily because the general belief is that conflict or dispute resolution has been most utilized in the human services.

The rest of the book lacks the ingredients that make the first four chapters convincing. Chapters Five and Six attempt to demonstrate that conflict resolution in the public school system will improve the learning environment for students. It is an admirable goal, however, the argument that “universal support” will facilitate acceptance of “emotionally disturbed” students by the rest of the student body ignores a most recent case. Fifteen year old Lawrence King of California was shot twice in the back of the head by a classmate during class in February 2008 after declaring that he was gay. An article in Newsweek magazine discovered that the school had attempted to provide a tolerant environment for the teenager, forced teachers and students to accept Larry the way he was, and even allowed Larry to dress like a girl down to stiletto shoes.
The result was the opposite of what school officials had hoped for. Such situations should have been included in the discussion and explained using the paradigm.

Perhaps what is most startling in these chapters is the way they ignore the importance of school funding for initiating changes in elementary and secondary schools. Yes, it is necessary to involve students, parents, teachers, and administrators while implementing conflict resolution programs. But without adequate funding such programs look better on paper than in practice. It is a fact that schools across the country are suffering from the lack of funds as tax revenues continue to fall. Schools already suffer from inadequate staffing and overworked teachers and counselors. It would be highly unrealistic to expect these schools to be able to implement demanding new programs into state mandated curricula, especially with the modern day emphasis on passing standardized tests.

Unlike, the chapters on elementary and secondary education, Chapters Seven, Eight, and Nine do describe the practical application of conflict resolution programs at colleges and universities. These three chapters combined illustrate the struggles and rewards of student and faculty efforts to rise above the stigma of “peace studies” and establish strong, fiscally viable programs. The idea that universities can use existing programs like interdisciplinary studies to promote student training in dispute resolution is realistic and adaptable.

Chapters Ten and Eleven change the direction of the book from the practice of conflict resolution and its implementation in various areas of life to the philosophical origins of the paradigm. Much of this section reads like a self-help book.
Chapter Twelve stands alone as the only part of the book that deals with conflict resolution on a global scale. This chapter is an essay that was written by three contributors and focuses upon United States foreign policy and how it can be improved following the conflict resolution paradigm. Unfortunately, this essay tends to sound like a conspiracy theory about the Bush Administration trying to conquer the world with the help of neoconservatives and the military-industrial complex. Since it is the only chapter that tries to apply the paradigm to international relations it makes a poor case by being diverted from its goal. It would have done better to examine situations like that of Costa Rica abolishing its standing army or that of Japan not rebuilding its military after World War II. The argument made in this chapter is that the United States has become a police state since the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, and is intent upon global domination. The more compelling discussion in this chapter is the belief that the United States is unwilling to differentiate between freedom fighters and terrorists. The essay does make a valid point that without clearly defining the term “terrorist” we can never know who the real enemy is.

Another way to approach conflict resolution on a global scale would have been to discuss the potential for success by following the United Nations existing mandate to be a peaceful forum for dispute resolution. The United States could also increase its support of organizations such as Doctors Without Borders, Peace Corps, and CARE. The importance of conflict resolution in international relations could also have been demonstrated by showing that cases that prefer spending all of their resources upon military expansion to peace suffer long term problems. Excellent examples of this would be North Korea, Iran, and Pakistan.
As the title suggests One Paradigm, Many Worlds: Conflict Resolution across the Disciplines does attempt to apply the paradigm of conflict resolution in many different areas. In this respect, Rosenwald achieves his goal. As the essays are organized by discipline and begin with conflict resolution as a useful model at the individual level and ends with the model being applied at the aggregate level in the arena of international relations, it does demonstrate this paradigm’s broad applicability.

However, the book would have benefitted from two things that currently are missing. The first is evidence or data to support the conclusions made in the chapters about elementary and secondary education and international relations. The second is more discussion about conflict resolution at the global scale. The emphasis appears to be on the human services and higher education. In these essays, contributors describe the successes they have had following this paradigm in real world applications. But this aspect is missing on a global scale. The essay that takes on the responsibility of applying the paradigm to international relations is woefully inadequate. A few more essays about successful examples of conflict resolution on an international scale would have balanced the discussion between the individual and aggregate levels and strengthened the book’s argument. (No pun intended.)
Kirill Meleshevich

With the arguable connection between the collapse of the Soviet Union, the rise of ethnic conflict, and proliferation of civil wars, a great burden has fallen on response humanitarian actors – among them peacekeepers. As such, the scope, importance and number of peacekeeping missions have all greatly increased. For example, twenty-six UN missions were established between 1988 and 1995 – double the amount from the preceding four decades. Billions of dollars have been dedicated to this cause, and millions of people are affected by the peacekeeping process. While immense in scope, it is not a well understood institution. How exactly do soldiers of different upbringing work together in peacekeeping missions? Does culture influence the success of a mission, or only further its failure? As the world gets “smaller,” and the melting pot is introduced with new cultures and ideas, these questions take central stage.

*Peacekeeping Under Fire*, a short, yet encompassing book, provides a convincing perspective on questions dealing, in part, with the military make up of peacekeeping missions. The research and information presented in the book is the result of Dr. Robert A. Rubinstein’s long career as an anthropologist. With the twentieth anniversary of the fall of communism approaching, and the implications which came as consequence, this book serves to provide a timely message. While major warfare between nations is largely absent from international affairs - it has expanded and ballooned in the intra-national perspective. Humanitarian organizations and peacekeepers alike are challenged to provide service in a world of increasing ethnic and religious animosity and misunderstanding. Victory is no longer defined by resources or territory, but rather by greatest attention to detail, culture and stability.

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At times, we have seen peacekeeping fail. While we can point to disastrous peacekeeping missions (i.e. 1994 Rwanda), there are many examples of failure that are the result of subtle misunderstanding. Rubinstein examines a key element leading to failures, or near failures: “cultural considerations affect all levels of peacekeeping, including the most microlevel interactions on the ground and the most macrolevel interactions in the international community.” (138) From daily food distribution to working with organizations on the ground, culture can become the crucial breaking or solidifying point of a mission. This is especially evident when we remember that peacekeeping forces are often made up of soldiers from various cultures, and work on a staggered schedule. With barely enough time to become accommodated to the nuances of the country they are serving in, those soldiers are deployed elsewhere, opening the door for newcomers.

Peacekeepers, which are ultimately made up of the servicemen of a traditional national army, often have to leave behind their national military upbringing in exchange for the ideals of that peacekeeping mission. Rubinstein goes into detail comparing peacekeepers and the soldiers of traditional armies in their hierarchical standards, interaction with population among other criteria. One of the more striking chapters in the book outlines the importance of symbolism in those troops coming from traditional armies into peacekeeping forces. Considering that peacekeeping “engages people from all around the world and from all walks of life,” (86) creating strong links between servicemen of different upbringings provides a culture of teamwork and understanding within peacekeeping missions. Rubinstein outlines a comparison of American and non-American soldiers to interpret their understanding of their roles and their duties as peacekeepers. Both saw the missions as necessary, albeit for much different reasons. While most non-American forces see peacekeeping as a noble duty, American troops saw
peacekeeping as a route to a promotion, a transitional period for some earlier career mistakes, or as a burden.

From the most macro-level issues, such as reinforcing legitimacy, to micro-level necessities such as troop interaction during off-hours, culture plays a defining role in the success of a peacekeeping mission. Correctly, peacekeeping is coupled with the ideals propagated by the United Nations. With this impressive work, Rubinstein begins to unravel this often generalized and misunderstood branch of UN responsibility. Peacekeeping is not a remedy that is “one size fits all.” The intricacies that go into a successful peacekeeping force perhaps are not yet completely understood. The author has undertaken a monumental task in helping to unravel one of the most controversial, yet crucial, functions of the UN. This clarification of a highly complex issue is enough to regard Peacekeeping Under Fire as highly sophisticated.

Peacekeeping Under Fire does a fine job of transitioning from anthropology to international studies, and displays professional and seasoned research in both. Through interviews, site visits and various other methods, Rubinstein gathered research for this work. The major ethnographic research for this book took place from 1988 to 1992 when the author lived in Egypt and worked as an observer of the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization mission in that nation. The chapter of Peacekeeping Under Fire dedicated to the description of interviews, and growing rapport between the author and the on-site staff is interesting, but reads exceedingly like a personal journal. This is not a complaint: the attention to detail gives the text an almost novel-like feel at times and helps create a balance with the parts of the text which are heavy with academic wording.

While the book is interesting, insightful and timely, there were some minor complaints worth mentioning. The text is just shy of one-hundred and fifty pages, and leaves a reader
wanting more. Seemingly, the author could easily have dedicated more attention to topics touched upon but not expanded. More than anything, the book would have benefited greatly from a study of a failed peacekeeping mission, coupled with research on the extent of cultural considerations in that case. If in fact Rubinstein’s claim that “in thinking about peacekeeping, culture is not a peripheral subject; it should be a core policy consideration,” (42) hold true – an example of a culturally devoid peacekeeping mission would have been supportive.

As mentioned, the chapter describing the authors experience in Egypt reads less like an academic text and more like a journal. This is appreciate for a number of reasons, but sets a much different tone for the book – one that is reversed with ongoing chapters.

The possible audience for Peacekeeping Under Fire is wide. As a current graduate student, I can easily see this book being assigned for conflict resolution or a course dealing with humanitarian action. Having taken the later, I found Rubinstein’s work an insightful contrast and companion to other reading on peacekeeping missions. As a recent undergraduate, this book would fit in well into a course on United Nations agencies and functions or international relations. The book is dense at times, but completely approachable and easily read.

In the process of writing this review, a news piece caught my attention. It tied well into the book material, and clarified a point of confusion for me. While the research for this book was gathered over twenty years ago within a field that is ever-adapting, the argument is relevant and timely. Starting in October, Al-Jazeera began running a string of interviews with Afghani soldiers who recently deserted from the NATO trained Afghani police to join forces with Talibani fighters. While trustworthy numbers were unavailable, it was not a one-time occurrence. Their conversation was due to the behavior of US and NATO troops who drank, took part in prostitution and gambled – all banned by Islam. Taking great offense to such behavior, the
Afghans left the national army. Very clearly, their reason for leaving was cultural. With the exception of prostitution, behavior such as smoking, drinking and gambling is a common part of life for some western cultures. For the peace-enforcement mission in Afghanistan, this lack of cultural adaptation by NATO forces has translated to the highest presence of attacks by the Taliban since 2002. Part of Rubinstein’s argument is that more attention to cultural misunderstandings such as the one illustrated here would ensure greater success in the peacekeeping process.

With the help of books like *Peacekeeping Under Fire*, we may come to a better understanding of the deterrents to an effective peacekeeping force – an often crucial part of modern humanitarian action.